New Ventures’ Reliance on Interorganizational Relationships; a Contingency Framework. Paul Callaghan, Lecturer, F.C. Manning School of Business, Acadia University Wolfville, Nova Scotia, Canada, B0P 1X0 Tel: (902) 585-1480, Fax: (902) 585-1085 email: [email protected] The new venture development process has been described as a resource acquisition process involving the sub-processes of resource exchange and credit, domain definition within a particular task environment, and the pursuit of organizational legitimacy. As the complexity of technical products increases, so too does the depth and breadth of resources needed to design, develop, and produce innovative products, making it increasingly difficult for organizations to launch new products independently.

As a result it is the system of resources a new venture is able to assemble, both

internally and externally, that determine its potential to establish a sustainable competitive advantage. Lacking the resources of established firms, interorganisational relationships (IORs) provide a means to complement and leverage the knowledge resources that typically form the core capability new ventures competing in technology-based markets are based on. Whatever factors motivate forming IORs, it is also important that new ventures recognize they are not assured they will be able to develop the relationships they would like to, nor will the anticipated benefits necessarily be realized. As a result an important aspect of formulating new venture strategies is to assess both the anticipated benefits of relying on external relationships, and the risks and challenges inherent in doing so. This paper develops a contingency framework to assess how key design, task and context traits of the product technology being developed by a new venture influence its reliance on IORs. Based on a review of past studies, the framework can be used as part of the strategic planning process to make an objective, logically structured assessment of a new ventures’ dependence on IORs.

Interorganizational Relationships and the New Venture Development Process Advocates of a resource-based view of the firm describe organizational resources as “all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge, etc. controlled by a firm that enable it to conceive of and implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness.” (Barney 1991). A resource-based view of the firm also emphasizes it is the system of resources an organization is able to assemble, both internally and externally, that determine its potential to establish a sustainable competitive advantage (Barney 1991). A central tenet of these 1

resource-based arguments is that the survival and competitiveness of a new venture is determined by the “system of resources” an organization “controls,” not solely the core capabilities it is able to develop internally or acquire. Interorganizational relationships (IORs) refer to enduring transactions, flows and linkages between organizations (Oliver 1990). As such they provide a mechanism for new ventures to develop relationships with outside firms to gain access to the technological resources and operational capabilities of other organizations within the “technological infrastructure” the firm intends to compete within (Weiss and Birnbaum 1989). Indeed, the entrepreneurial process has been characterized as a resource acquisition process involving the sub-processes of resource exchange and credit, domain definition within a particular task environment, and the pursuit of organizational legitimacy (Weimal & Hunter 1985).

As the complexity of technical products increases, so too does the depth and breadth of resources needed to design, develop, and produce innovative products, making it increasingly difficult for organizations to launch new products independently (Sen and Rubenstein 1990). As a result, the resources and actions of several organizations typically influence the development trajectories and commercial success of technological innovations (Teece 1986, Pennings & Harianto 1992, Van deVen 1993). For new ventures entering technically complex product markets, typically the core competence of the firm is the product development expertise of the founders. While having these knowledge-based competencies is essential to developing a commercially viable venture, so too is access to various complementary resources / capabilities (Teece 1986). At the same time, the opportunities to outsource specialized value-added activities proliferate across many industries. As a result new ventures face a complex set of decisions to assess the role interorganizational relationships can potentially serve to complement and leverage the firm’s internal capabilities. Although few studies test the performance implications of relying on IORs, the management literature generally assumes the results are positive. This paper intentionally avoids this positive bias by developing a contingency framework to assess the implications product technology has for a new

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venture’s dependence on IORs. In some instances the need and opportunity to rely on IORs is high, while in other cases a more self-reliant strategy is justified.

The Motives & Challenges of Depending on Interorganizational Relationships Table 1 proposes a scheme to categorize the motives for establishing IORs into two broad categories. First and foremost IORs are motivated by the need to assemble the resources needed to compete in a given industry such that the organizational and financial structure of the enterprise crafted by the new venture reflects the current and emergent economic structure of the industry. Secondly, forming relationships are motivated by the secondary benefits they provide in supporting the development process of the firm.

These motives are characterized as secondary in the sense they play a

facilitating role in “assembling” resources, not the primary task of accessing the resources needed to launch the firm per se.

IORs can also be categorized in terms of the type of resources being

exchanged, accessed or developed within the relationship (see Table 2 in appendix). The resources sought represent the purpose of forming the relationship, i.e. the external resource dependency being managed through a relationship. The discussion that follows focuses on relationships formed for the following purposes; (i) technology sourcing, (ii) collaborative development, and (iii) accessing production/process capabilities.

Technology sourcing relationships involve procuring components and technology that an outside firm within the supply chain is willing and able to exchange with a new venture in trade. Whether tangible or intangible (knowledge-based) resources are involved, these relationships involve an exchange or flow of tradable resources, creating a sequential interdependence between the organizations. Whereas relationships that involve collaborative product or process development differ in that an outside organization dedicates knowledge-based capabilities to the development of new technological solutions, creating a reciprocal interdependence between the firms.

By

facilitating shared learning and more expedient knowledge transfer processes, knowledge-based

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relationships can extend the “R&D boundaries” of the firm, reducing the technical and financial risk associated with developing complex technological products (Pisano 1990). Table 1: Motives / Perceived Benefits of Technology-Based New Venture’s Reliance on Interorganizational Relationships Assembling enterprise resources; linking asymmetrical capabilities  Knowledge exchange / organizational learning; broaden the scope of the firm’s R&D competencies.  Reduce the resource requirements to launch a new venture, especially in cases where accessing capital intensive complementary capabilities reduce entry barriers.  Enhanced operational flexibility.  Risk reduction; lower and/or share the technological, market and financial uncertainty associated with launching the firm.  Improved quality and cost reduction associated with specialization (by tapping economies of scale enjoyed by partners). Enhancing the legitimacy & stability of new ventures  Enhanced legitimacy; based on “nested power” and representational affects of being affiliated with established firms.  Greater stability associated with membership in established technological regimes.  Signaling effect; an unbiased assessment of feasibility of new venture. References: Kogut (1988), Oliver (1990), Chan & Heide (1993), Ring and VandeVen (1994). Relationships with outside firms can also accelerate the start-up process by securing access to “offthe-shelf” product technologies and in-situ process capabilities, a critical consideration given the imperative of speed when competing in “high-velocity” technology markets (Iansiti 1995). External relationships can also be an important means to overcome entry barriers by accessing capitalintensive complementary assets.

Like relationships to procure technological inputs, relying on

relationships with outside firms for production/process capabilities creates a sequential interdependence between the firms. From a financial perspective, external relationships often benefit new ventures in two distinct ways. First by providing access to the resources needed to leverage its own capabilities, a new venture lessens the direct financial investment required to launch the firm. Having relationships in place may also increase the attractiveness of a new venture to prospective investors based on the enhanced legitimacy and stability having relationships in place provides, especially when these relationships are formed within established organizational communities

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(VandeVen 1993, Wade 1995). Thus a new venture’s reliance on IORs influences the strategy for financing a new venture, the speed of the new product development cycle, and the legitimacy of the firm within the community of organizations that form the technological infrastructure the firm must operate within.

Whatever factors motivate forming IORs, it is important to recognize new ventures are not assured they will be able to develop the relationships they would like to, nor will the anticipated benefits automatically accrue to the firms involved. A summary of risks and challenges associated with relying on IORs is provided in Table 3. Developing and managing external relationships is a complex, evolutionary process (Ring and Van de Ven 1994). The ability to develop relationships is supported by repeated ties and trust among the firms involved (Parkhe 1993, Gulati 1995), positive experiences with relationships in the past, and focal firms that hold “strong social positions” within their organizational field (Eisenhardt & Schoonhooven 1996).

In addition power in negotiating

relationships tends to be skewed in favour of established firms that new ventures find themselves dependent on.

These realities suggest new ventures face greater challenges in developing

relationships than established firms.

For new ventures able to overcome the challenges of developing IORs, ongoing dependence on relationships introduces a new set of challenges. As the extent of relying on IORs increases, often a trade-off exists between the enhanced agility associated with outsourced capabilities, and the administrative burden of managing an increasingly complex enterprise.

Relying on external

relationships requires the managerial capabilities needed to direct and control a relatively complex organizational structure. This can be a significant challenge for technical entrepreneurs naturally focused on applying their expertise to the product development task.

Technology-based new

ventures must also guard against the risk that spillover of technical expertise undermines the firm’s core capabilities. Spillover does not have to be the “self-interest seeking with guile” opportunism

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described by Williamson (1985) to undermine a new venture’s competitive position, since any leakage that triggers action by competitors can be devastating to a new venture with limited resources or market power to accelerate its own efforts. Dependence on outside firms can also be extremely costly if a new venture that has to adjust its strategy mid-course upon discovering limitations in the capabilities and/or waning interest of its partners. Table 3: Challenges / Risks of Technology-Based New Ventures’ dependence on Interorganizational Relationships Challenges in developing relationships  Liabilities of newness; lack established network of prospective firms to form collaborative relationships with.  Negotiation power skewed in favour of established firms.  Barriers to entry; e.g. insufficient scale of operations to warrant interest from established firms.  Act of seeking out partners triggers or accelerates competitive initiatives. Risks of relying on relationships  Over-dependence results in failure to develop internal capabilities important to establishing a sustainable competitive advantage  Risk of opportunistic behaviour on behalf of “partner” firm; especially the risk associated with spillover of technological expertise.  Misinterpret the capabilities and/or the commitment of partner; e.g diminished priority in partner’s portfolio of development projects over time.  Increased structural complexity resulting in a disproportionate commitment of scarce resources having to be committed to developing administrative capabilities.  Agility is compromised as degree of control is abdicated to “partners,” and the comparatively more bureaucratic managerial processes of partners are imposed on new ventures. References: Emerson (1962), Stinchcombe (1965), Porter (1985), Brockhoff (1992), Nohira & Eccles (1992), Chan & Heide 1993, Kaplan (1994) Technology’s affect on relying on interorganizational relationships Prior research that considers the affect product technology has for firms’ decisions to rely on interorganizational relationships tends to focus on three basic arguments; (i) the more complex the technological task, the more critical external relationships are (Osborn and Hagedorn 1997), (ii) technologically innovative firms are more likely to form relationships for the purpose of knowledge acquisition, and (iii) technologically innovative firms are more likely to use equity-based governance

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arrangements to structure relationships (Dutta & Weiss 1997). The rationale for the first two arguments is that technological innovativeness is correlated with uncertainty, and external relationships provide a means to reduce uncertainty (i.e. risk). Whereas the rationale for the third argument is that equity-based relationships are the preferred means to mitigate the risk of opportunistic behaviour, risk technology-based firms are particularly sensitive to.

As a starting point to develop a more comprehensive view of the affect product technology has for new venture’s reliance on IORs, Table 4 proposes a scheme for characterizing product technology and product innovations. In addition Exhibit 1 in the appendix provides a framework that depicts the influence product technology has on new ventures decisions to rely on interorganizational relationships. Within Table 4 design traits refer to intrinsic characteristics that describe a product’s structural form, which are primary traits in the sense they are objective characteristics of the technology, not characteristics that describe technology in terms of its relationship to a specific organizational or environmental context. Task traits describe product technology in terms of the knowledge resources required to complete the development task. These traits are secondary in that the nature of the task depends on the individuals and/or organization involved, not the technology per se. Finally, context refers to secondary characteristics that describe product technology in terms of the competitive and technological environment it is embedded within. All these characteristics of product technology have some affect on new ventures’ reliance on IORs. Yet to consider all these traits, and the various combinations thereof, is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather the discussion that follows considers the affect a number of these traits have to illustrate the contingent affect product technology has on new venture’s dependence on interorganizational relationships.

Most scientific and technical innovations rely on pre-existing knowledge (Weiss & Birnbaum 1989), knowledge that typically resides in, or at least originated in the work of established organizations. As the complexity of technical products increases so too does the dispersion of this knowledge

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among organizations, as individual firms focus their capabilities on a specific aspect of product technology and rely on the capabilities of other firms to complement their efforts (Sen and Rubenstein 1990). Besides “industry pressures” to develop focused, specialized capabilities, timebased competition also favours the use of market-ready technologies when they are available, and resource constraints limit the scope of capabilities new ventures can develop internally. Collectively these factors suggest increased technical complexity of the product being developed by a new venture leads to increased reliance on external relationships. This line of argument is common in the Table 4 –Traits of Product Technology that affect New Ventures’ reliance on IORs Design  Complexity; (i) number of design elements, (ii) “information content” or embedded knowledge within design elements, (iii) interdependencies among design elements and between product and process technology, (iv) non-divisibility of product design into discrete design elements.  Modular versus Integral Design Architecture (Henderson & Clark 1990, Ulrich & Eppinger 2000).  Design Hierarchy, including centrality; core versus peripheral design elements (Clark 1985).  Systemic or non-systemic. Task  Uncertainty (familiarity / novelty)  Radical versus incremental (Dewar & Dutton 1986); extended to include modular and architectural (Henderson & Clark 1990), and original versus reformulated / knowledge creation versus synthesis.  Sequential, long-linked, intensive (Thompson 1967)  Base > new familiar > new unfamiliar (Roberts & Berry 1985)  Codified versus tacit knowledge (Polanyi 1958) Context  Competence destroying or enhancing discontinuity (Anderson & Tushman 1990)  Convergent technologies (Pennings & Harianto 1992)  Dominant design (Anderson & Tushman 1990)  Appropriability conditions (Levin, Cohen & Mowery 1985).  Stage of technology life cycle (Anderson & Tushman 1990)  Transilience Map; regular, niche creation, revolutionary, or architectural technological innovations (Abernathy & Clark 1985)  Technological paradigms (Sahal 1981)

management literature. Yet there are examples of new ventures that develop highly complex technical products independently. Therefore in order to extend the analysis beyond this general proposition, it is important to consider the various dimensions of technical complexity. Dimensions of technical complexity include; 8

 the number of design elements,  “information content” or level of knowledge embedded within individual design elements,  interdependencies or interactions; (i) among design elements such that changes in one design element affects others, and (ii) between product and process technology,  Non-decomposability of product design into discrete design elements.

The specific combinations of these dimensions that explain the technical complexity of a given product are important determinants of a firm’s reliance on IORs. For instance if complexity is the result of non-decomposibilty of the product design into discreet design elements, the extent to which a new venture can rely on IORs to partition the development and operational task among multiple firms is limited. Whereas if complexity is the result of a large number of standard design elements, then a new venture’s reliance on outside organizations may simply fall within the realm of routine, market transactions with suppliers, also resulting in low reliance on IORs.

However market

transactions become less efficient when the resources required by a new venture are knowledgebased capabilities embedded in the routines and accumulated skills of established organizations. The combination of bounded rationality, buyer’s uncertainty, and asymmetrical ownership of information contribute to a “knowledge paradox” in the sense that buyers have trouble fully understanding what it is they are acquiring, and sellers have difficulty in valuing the knowledge they posses (Goes and Park 1997). This type of dependence on the exchange of knowledge resources within supply-side procurement relationships is more likely as; (i) the “information content” or level of knowledge embedded within individual design elements increases, and/or (ii) more complex interdependencies exist among design elements. In this case, accessing such resources is more likely to involve formal contractual relationships or equity-based alliances rather than market transactions given the superior monitoring mechanisms, and mutual safeguards such relationships provide against opportunistic or non-performing partners (Kogut 1988).

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Another important trait of product technology is the distinction between modular and integral design architectures (Ulrich & Eppinger 2000). By definition products with high modularity can be broken down into discrete design elements more readily than products with integral design architectures. In turn knowledge concerning interdependencies among design elements can be more readily understood and codified for modular products. The task of developing and producing modular products suits a sequential, long-linked view of an organization’s core operational activities (Thompson 1967), a view consistent with a value chain perspective of the primary operational activities of the firm (Stabell & Fjeldstad 1998). Since the design of the product can be readily separated into distinct design elements, the value chain for modular products is more likely to involve multi-organizational enterprises based on IORs linking specialized firms. In this context a firm’s reliance on IORs can be understood by breaking a product down into its discrete design elements, each of which introduces a “make / contract / buy” decision for the firm. As the number of design elements increases, typically so too does the extent of reliance on IORs. If knowledge concerning interdependencies among design elements is relatively simple and readily codified, then design elements are more likely to be procured based on discrete market transactions, not IORs per se. Whereas more complex interdependencies among design elements require the exchange of tacit and codifiable knowledge, a situation more likely to result in formal relationships with suppliers.

In contrast, the complexity of products with integral design architectures is primarily determined by the non-decomposability of the design into discrete design elements, and the “information content” or knowledge embedded in a few highly interdependent design elements. For product technologies based on integral design architectures, an intensive, value-shop perspective of the enterprise is the appropriate lens to understand the development and operational tasks of the firm (Stabell & Fjeldstad 1998). The non-decomposability of integral technology limits the opportunity to source technology / design elements from outside firms. Also the reciprocal interdependent nature of integral product

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technology requires close collaboration among those involved in the product development task, requiring a new venture to divulge much of its own expertise in order to engage an outside firm to support its development effort. This increases the risk of spillover of the firm’s core capabilities, potentially undermining the principal source of competitive advantage sought by technology-based new ventures. As a result new ventures based on products with integral design architectures are likely to fall into one of two extremes in terms of relying on collaborative product development relationships; (1) those that adopt an isolated, self reliant approach to product development, i.e. essentially no reliance on external relationships, and (2) those that form close collaborative relationships with outside organizations to support the product development effort. Given the nondecomposability of integral product technology, there is less opportunity for middle ground between these two extremes.

Another important trait of product technology is the categorical distinction between products that are devices or components, sub-systems, products used within a group of systemic products, or nonsystemic products that function independently. This distinction is referred to as the “completeness” of product technology, i.e. from the perspective of end-user product markets.

Success in

technological product markets depends on the level of organizational support a technological regime is able to attract (Wade 1995). The common feature for new ventures based on components, subsystems or “complete” systemic products is that all involve positioning the firm within an established technological regime which adds a degree of stability to the start-up process. Firms within established technological regimes have a vested interest in supporting new ventures whose product innovations complement their product lines, either as component suppliers or producers of complementary, systemic products.

New ventures that enter product markets with less clearly

established technological regimes face greater uncertainty in defining their task domain, and less opportunity to develop relationships based on explicit and clearly articulated complementary roles.

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If the product being developed by a new venture is a device / component or sub-system, by definition the end product is a modular design architecture, and the discussion in the previous section concerning the interdependencies among firms within the value chain applies. However these arguments have to be qualified depending on how narrowly focused the design element is within the overall design hierarchy of the product. The more narrowly focused the device, component or subsystem is, the less likely a new venture will need to rely on supply-side external relationships for technology sourcing or collaborative product development. Yet the benefits of supplier involvement in the new product development process are well documented (e.g. Cusumano & Nobeoka 1992), so as suppliers to downstream producers, relationships with these firms may be critical to the new ventures survival. Whether these relationships evolve into collaborative product development depends on how complex interdependencies among the product’s design elements are, and how central a specific design element is within the product’s design hierarchy.

Relying on IORs to access production capabilities is an important consideration when these capabilities involve relatively high fixed costs. Typically the opportunity to outsource production capabilities requires process technology to be relatively undifferentiated, yet sufficiently complex to provide the mix and volume flexibility contract manufacturers need to service a diverse customer base. Assuming this is the case, knowledge concerning product/process interdependencies is an important determinant of if and how IORs are formed to secure these capabilities. If product/process interdependencies are readily codified, outsourcing relationships are likely to be structured based on transactional market exchanges or routine contractual relationships. Whereas if more complex product/process interdependencies exist, more comprehensive “strong-tie” contractual relationships will be required with contract manufacturers. When production capabilities require investments in unique configurations of process technology (high asset specificity), generally there is less opportunity to rely on contract manufacturers. In this situation a new venture is more likely to have

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to develop process capabilities independently. However, if the entry barriers to establish these capabilities are high, the following alternatives involving interorganizational relationships may be considered; (i) forming an equity-based alliance with a partner that has the resources available to develop production capabilities, or (ii) relinquishing the responsibility and profit potential associated with production capabilities by selling the new venture’s product technology, typically on the basis of licensing agreements. New ventures that adopt either of these strategies have been referred to as “R&D boutiques,” since they provide firms with downstream production and marketing capabilities the opportunity to acquire R&D competencies.

Besides design and task traits, how a product technology fits within a broader organizational and technological context also influences its reliance on IORs. Anderson and Tushman (1990) model the technology life cycle as an era of ferment initiated by a technological discontinuity (i.e. the fluid or variation stage) that concludes with the emergence of one or more dominant designs (i.e. selection). Once one or more dominant designs are established, an era of incremental innovation follows (i.e. the specific or retention stage) which concludes when a new technological discontinuity is introduced to begin the cycle anew. The impact the technology life cycle has for new venture’s reliance on IORs relates to three issues. First is the general trend towards less technical uncertainty as product technology evolves through its life cycle.

The second is the shift in competitive focus from

knowledge-based competencies (i.e. product design and development expertise) to the broader set of operational capabilities needed to compete later in the technology life cycle. Finally the opportunity set of interested, available partners to form relationships with changes over time given industry-wide pressures to develop specialized, focused capabilities as technologies mature, and incentives to create organizational communities that support common technological regimes.

The early fluid stage of the technology life cycle, i.e. the “era of ferment,” represent windows of opportunity for new ventures, as evidenced by the large number of small firms that emerge during

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this stage of the technology life cycle. However a new venture’s ability to appropriate returns from a product innovation are also more tenuous during this period, making the firm more vulnerable to the risk of spillover of its’ technological know-how. Even basic knowledge of what a new venture’s product innovation is can accelerate competitive initiatives already underway, and/or trigger competition that might otherwise have remained dormant. Technological entrepreneurs also tend to be highly focused on the task of product design and development, reflecting a technical bias that often underestimates the significance of other capabilities required to build an enterprise capable of launching new products. Empirical evidence also suggests the uncertainty associated with industries in the emergent, turbulent stage of their evolution acts as a deterrent to establishing comprehensive contractual or equity-based relationships because of the high resource commitments involved (Auster 1992). Given that equity is the principal currency available to new ventures, the opportunities to form relationships is restricted if potential partners perceive the technological risks to be too high to enter into equity-based alliances. A new venture might also be forced to adopt a relatively isolated stance early in the technology life cycle as a result of ambivalence shown towards the firm by industry incumbents. In fact for competence destroying technological innovations, the response of incumbents often focuses on improving old technologies (Foster 1986), not entering into collaborative relationships with new ventures to embrace emerging / nascent technologies. As a result of these factors, new ventures are more likely to adopt a self reliant, isolated stance during the early stages of the technology life cycle.

Typically the transition out of the turbulent stage is marked by the emergence of a few designs that appear to have the most commercial potential. As an industry begins to coalesce around these “dominant designs”, the level of technical uncertainty is significantly reduced relative to the era of ferment. During this transitional period, the competitive focus shifts from product performance to sales maximization, with the imperative of time-based competition and the pursuit of first-mover advantages becoming key strategic drivers. It is during this transitional period that the motivations to

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create IORs peak (Lambe and Spekman 1997). Having survived the era of ferment, by this stage new ventures are less vulnerable to the risk of spillover, are in a better position to assess the resources needed to complement their own capabilities, and more informed regarding the structure and dynamics of the industry they are competing in. Another factor that supports increased reliance on IORs is the strategic importance of becoming part of one of the organizational communities that begins to coalesce around the dominant designs that survive the era of ferment (Wade 1995). Potential partners from within these organizational communities are now in a better position to judge the capabilities of new ventures than earlier in the technology life cycle. For both groups, new ventures and potential partners, the timing of negotiating these relationships is critical given the limited window of opportunity that exists for any technological innovation, and first-mover incentives to establish relationships with preferred partners.

Conclusion There is a tendency in management literature to treat technology-based new ventures as a broad strategic archetype. While it is widely recognized that innovative product technology can be a powerful capability to launch a new venture, the role that IORs serve in supporting successful technology-based new ventures is not always recognized. In fact, technical entrepreneurs themselves potentially underestimate the importance of external relationships and the capabilities required to develop and manage them effectively, focusing their efforts instead on applying their expertise to the product development task. The principles outlined in this paper provide a framework to assess technology-based new venture’s dependence on external relationships based on characteristics of the product technology being developed by the firm. The focus on technological contingencies is important because it is consistent with the natural focus of technical entrepreneurs, yet it assesses the implications of product technology in light of an important managerial issue that otherwise may not be given high priority by technical entrepreneurs.

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18

APPENDIX

Table 2 - An Overview of Representative Views of the Purpose of Interorganizational Relationships Secure Access to Development Resources Reference Bird 1989

Technology & Knowledge-Based Product technology and development capabilities

Financial Secure financial capital and loan guarantees

Weimal & Hunter 1985 Jarillo 1988

Resource exchange and credit

Dutta & Weiss 1997

R&D agreements

Tyler & Steensma 1995 Human & Provan 1997 Wade 1995

Technological collaboration

Create Linkages with Complementary Enhance Legitimacy / Develop Value Chain Competencies Community Membership Supply Chain

Production - Distribution Operational & Marketing Access Access complementa marketing ry process channels technology and product components. Domain definition within task environment Pursuit of legitimacy Structure value chain activities based on positioning strategy within established industry structure Marketing agreements

Exchange of information and competencies Access to resources Sponsor-based community development Acquire resources

Design-based community development Goes & Park 1997 Acquire new technologies Resources Osborn & Hagedorn Technology development, learning 1997

Expand market reach Structural & Resource Links Market penetration

19

Develop organizational legitimacy Community Development: be it design or sponsor based Enhance legitimacy Negotiate stable competitive order Institutional & Administrative Links

Product Technology • Design Traits Resource Requirements • as per product technology task traits Enterprise Building

Internal Resources • Build Core Capabilities

Iterative decision process across all value chain resources

Market Transactions

External Resource Dependency

Reliance on IORs • Various purposes • Overall extent

Performance Implications

Technology Context • Life cycle • Appropriability conditions • Dominant designs / paradigms

Form & Context of IORs • Trust / uncertainty • Reciprocity • Governance structure • Formal vs. informal

Exhibit 1 Contingency Framework of New ventures’ Reliance on IORs

20

PDF 23.pdf

following purposes; (i) technology sourcing, (ii) collaborative development, and (iii) accessing. production/process capabilities. Technology sourcing relationships involve procuring components and technology that an outside. firm within the supply chain is willing and able to exchange with a new venture in trade. Whether.

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