Lecture Plan ! The Knowledge Argument ! Responses
Philosophy of Mind PHL2643 • University of Sydney • Lecture Seven
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Modes of acquaintance
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Knowledge How
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Failure of Integration
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H2Oism
• But there must be a reply!
Frank Jackson and the Knowledge Argument
Three Frank Jacksons
'Epiphenomenal Qualia', Philosophical Quarterly, 32, 127, 127-136, (April, 1982)
Books and things
The Argument • The knowledge argument is very simple!
A powerful argument . . . 1.If Physicalism is true, then Mary knows everything there is to know about human psychology before she leaves the black and white room
1. If Physicalism is true, then Mary knows everything there is to know about human psychology before she leaves the black and white room
2. When Mary leaves the room she learns something new about human psychology – she learns what it is like to see red – so she didn’t know everything about human psychology in the black and white room
2. When Mary leaves the room she learns something new about human psychology – she learns what it is like to see red – so she didn’t know everything about human psychology in the black and white room
3. Therefore, Physicalism is false ! The argument is deductively valid
3. Therefore, Physicalism is false
! The premises are very plausible – 1 follows from the definition of Physicalism and 2 is very intuitive
• Well okay then! • What is a physicalist to do?
The responses
Lecture Plan
1.If Physicalism is true, then Mary knows everything there is to know about human psychology before she leaves the black and white room
" The Knowledge Argument
2. When Mary leaves the room she learns something new about human psychology – she learns what it is like to see red – so she didn’t know everything about human psychology in the black and white room
! Responses
3. Therefore, Physicalism is false • The responses we shall examine today all employ the same strategy: they claim that the argument commits a fatal equivocation between the first and second premise
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Opacity/Modes of knowing
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Knowledge How
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Failure of Integration
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H2Oism
• But there must be a reply!
- They will claim that sense of ‘know’ has a different meaning in premise one than it does in premise two.
Mark Twain
Modes of acquaintance
On Evolution
• I know an awful lot about WWII
Man has been here 32,000 years. That it took a hundred million years to prepare the world for him is proof that that is what it was done for. I suppose it is. I dunno. If the Eiffel tower were now representing the world's age, the skin of paint on the pinnacle-knob at its summit would represent man's share of that age; & anybody would perceive that that skin was what the tower was built for. I reckon they would. I dunno.
On Philosophy Every man is in his own person the whole human race without a detail lacking....I knew I should not find in any philosophy a single thought which had not passed through my own head, nor a single thought which had not passed through the heads of millions and millions of men before I was born.
On the Mind
• But what I know I know in a different way than, say, a war veteran • In this case, we have one and the same set of facts, say, the Battle of El Alamein, but understood from completely different perspectives • Myself and the war veteran have different modes of acquaintance with the same set of facts
Your mind is merely a machine, nothing more. You have no command over it, it has no command over itself--it is worked solely from the outside. That is the law of its make; it is the law of all machines.
Two modes of acquaintance with red
The Argument rewritten
• The idea is we can map the Battle of El Alamein case onto the case of Mary
• The knowledge argument according to the modes of acquaintance reply:
• Mary and I have know the same fact: the sensing of red • But I know it through personal experience, whereas she knows it by a neuroscientific theory • But the idea is that there’s still only one kind of fact – the sensing of red – but two modes of acquaintance
1. If Physicalism is true, then Mary knows everything there is to know about human psychology before she leaves the black and white room 2. When Mary leaves the room she learns something new in the sense that she obtains a new mode of acquaintance with the sensing red – she learns what it is like to see red – but she doesn’t learn a new fact about the sensing of red 3. Therefore, Physicalism is false • Under this reading, 3 does not follow
The problem with the modes of acquaintance reply
Lecture Plan
• Modes of acquaintance are features of human minds – they are features of states of knowledge
" The Knowledge Argument ! Responses
• If physicalism is true, then it is true about all the characteristics of the mind, not just some of them • Thus if physicalism is true, Mary should be able to know of the sensing of red under all its relevant modes of acquaintance – including what it is like to see red
" Opacity/Modes of knowing •
Knowledge How
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Failure of Integration
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H2Oism
• But there must be a reply!
Standing on a fit ball
Maybe!
• I know how to stand on a fit ball
• When she sees red maybe Mary learns how to do something, rather than learning that something is the case
• Notice the locution: I know how to stand on the fit ball • What I know isn’t a fact, it’s a skill that I have acquired • When I know facts I know that something is the case - I know that standing on fit balls often results in calamitous injuries - I know that fit balls come in a delightful range of colours
• Before leaving the room she knows that seeing red is a certain neurological process • After leaving the room she comes to know how to see red
The Argument rewritten again
The problem with the knowledge how reply
• The knowledge argument according to the knowledge how reply:
• A very important feature – perhaps the most important feature –!of human psychology is the qualitative character of certain mental states
1. If Physicalism is true, then Mary knows everything there is to know about human psychology before she leaves the black and white room 2. When Mary leaves the room she learns something new in the sense that she how to see red – but she doesn’t learn a new fact about the sensing of red 3. Therefore, Physicalism is false • Under this reading, 3 does not follow
• It seems that the qualitative character of the state of seeing red is what Mary learns • Jackson and DBM say . . . ‘. . . although Mary will acquire certain abilities when she first sees red, it is hard to believe that this is all she will acquire. It seems to many that she learns something important about what life and the world are like, and that is knowledge that.’ p. 131
Lecture Plan
Knowing what something implies!
" The Knowledge Argument
• Last week I was informed that I am going to a wedding on 6th May (not mine)
! Responses
• But only yesterday did I figure out that this means that I will going to a wedding this weekend
" Opacity/Modes of knowing " Knowledge How •
Failure of Integration
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H2Oism
• But there must be a reply! ! The Zombie Argument
• I knew all the relevant facts, it’s just that I hadn’t worked out what they implied
Perhaps!
The failure of integration reply
• Perhaps this is Mary’s problem
• The failure of integration reply is very implausible
• She knows all the relevant facts
• It implies that if only she had thought longer and harder about it Mary could come to know what it is like to see red in her black and white room
• But she hasn’t worked out that these facts imply that it is like this to see red • This is called the failure of integration reply
• Imagine the scene: with a sudden leap of logic Mary suddenly knows what it is like to see red • It is implausible to think by making a few extra deductions is what Mary needs to do
Sure
Lecture Plan " The Knowledge Argument ! Responses " Opacity/Modes of knowing " Knowledge How " Failure of Integration •
H2Oism
• But there must be a reply!
Discoveries, discoveries!
Mary’s limitations
• We know a lot of stuff:
• That the experience of seeing red = a brain process is a posteriori too
- Water = H2O - Heat = molecular kinetic energy - Light = electromagnetic radiation - Life = replicating and respirating molecules or assemblies of molecules
• There’s no reason to suppose that Mary can infer what it is like to see red from contemplating the relevant brain processes than it is to assume she can infer that water is H20 from contemplating the H2O molecule • This is the H2Oism reply
• But in none of these case can I infer the identity from the contemplation of the right hand side of the identity • This stuff was discovered not deduced – it is a posteriori knowledge
A problem with the H2Oism reply
Another problem with the H2Oism reply
• I think the H2Oism reply misses the point entirely
• Jackson and DBM point out that, nevertheless, if water = H2O then it must possible to deduce this from knowing all the relevant facts:
• For the problem isn’t that Mary doesn’t know that the experience of seeing red = a brain process – she’s already worked this out • She doesn’t need to infer anything from contemplating neuroscience of colour vision – she’s already worked out that connection
1.Water = the watery stuff hereabouts – conceptual claim 2.H2O = the watery stuff hereabouts – empirical claim 3.Therefore, Water = H2O
• She also knows that should it be her that is experiencing red, then her experience = a brain process • The problem is that she doesn’t know what it is like to be in this state
• 3 follows from 1 and 2, and presumably 1 and 2 are available to a person in Mary’s position
Mary’s situation
Water
• Mary’s situation with respect to seeing red is not like the water-H2O case 1.Experiencing red = being in a state like this – conceptual claim 2.brain process x = being in a state like this – empirical claim 3.experiencing red = brain process x • Although Mary has learnt 3, she can’t deduce 3 from 1 and 2 because she can’t know 1 and 2 without experiencing red first!
Lecture Plan
But there must be a reply
" The Knowledge Argument
• DBM and Jackson are keen on the ‘there must be a reply’ reply
! Responses
• This is a popular reply in philosophy to arguments with unpalatable conclusions
" Opacity/Modes of knowing " Knowledge How " Failure of Integration " H2Oism • But there must be a reply!
• But DBM and Jackson have argument to support their view
The dangers of Epiphenomenalism
Second part
• The first part goes like this
• Let’s add the conclusion of the previous argument to the Knowledge Argument
1.Knowledge of qualia requires causal contact with instances of qualia 2.If Epiphenomenalism is true, then Mary can not have causal contact with qualia
1. If Physicalism is true, then Mary knows everything there is to know about human psychology before she leaves the black and white room [premise]
2. When Mary leaves the room she learns something new about human psychology – she learns what it is like to see red [premise]
3. Therefore, Physicalism is false [conclusion from 1 and 2] 3.If Epiphenomenalism is true, Mary can not have knowledge of qualia
4. If Physicalism is false, then Mary can not have knowledge of qualia [conclusion of previous argument]
4.If Physicalism is false, then Epiphenomenalism is true 5.Therefore, If Physicalism is false, then Mary can not have knowledge of qualia
Lecture Plan " The Knowledge Argument " Responses " Opacity/Modes of knowing " Knowledge How " Failure of Integration " H2Oism " There must be a reply!
5. Mary does not have knowledge of qualia [conclusion from 3 and 4] 6. 2 is false – reductio [conclusion from 2 and 5] 7. Hence either 1 or 2 is false: there must be a reply [conclusion from 6]
