PROBLEMS AND THEIR POSSIBLE USES IN EDUCATIONAL PROGRAMS (Second Concurrent Session)

Ronald Swartz Oakland University

I. Overview of Two Different Uses of Problems My plan in this paper is to discuss two different ways in which problems might be used by an educational program.' For convenience I will label these two different approaches the psychological and the sociological use of problems. Down through the ages many educators have been aware of the importance of problems or questions. As we all know, Socrates used questions in his attempt to help people learn. It is a mistake to assume that the importance of questions for learning is a modern discovery. However, contemporary educational programs do seem to emphasize one particular way in which to use problems. That is, problems are often viewed as a means to encourage or motivate children to acquire and believe particular ideas. When problems are used to motivate children to learn particular ideas they are used in a psychological sense. 2 What needs to be noted about the psychological use of problems is that it attempts to psychologize both questions and particular solutions 3 to problems. The psychological use of problems involves at least two aspects. First, it requires that a child be personally concerned or psychologically involved with a question. Second, it attempts to motivate children to psychologize particular beliefs that are viewed as answers to questions. According to the psychological use of problems, once a child has psychologized a question, he will then feel motivated to psychologize some predetermined idea that is viewed as worthy of knowing and believing. In this paper I will argue that the psychological use of problems is unsatisfactory because it offers a narrow and restricted view of a prob135

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lem situation. I will suggest that problem situations can be used not only to motivate children to learn particular beliefs, but can also be used as a means to organize the different formulations and solutions that people might associate with a problem. That is, I think problem situations can be used to help children understand how different groups of people have disagreed over the same issue. The disagreement over a problem situation involves at least two aspects. First, people can disagree about what question they should ask in order to formulate a particular problem. Second, people can disagree about how best to solve a problem. The notion of viewing problems as a means to organize the disagreements between people suggests that problems can be used in a sociological sense.4 This sociological use of problems does not emphasize the need to psychologize particular questions or beliefs, but instead emphasizes how problem situations develop and change over ti me. The sociological use o£ problems emphasizes the notion that problem situations have a historical development which is dynamic and open to change and improvement. The psychological and the sociological use of problems have some similar aims. In particular, they both share the aim of trying to find a way in which problems can be used in a learning and teaching theory. However, despite the fact that these two different uses of problems share some aims, they also have incompatible aims. A major area of incompatibility between these two uses of problems is that they often provide answers to different kinds of questions. One of the most important questions answered by the psychological use of problems is, "How can questions be used to teach beliefs?" On the other hand, the sociological use of problems does not answer this question, but replaces it with a question such as, "How can questions be used to organize the disagreements between people?" My aim in this paper is to discuss the differences, rather than the similarities, between the psychological and the sociological use of problems. I have decided to discuss these differences because I think that they are important for determining whether an educational program provides children with an adequate or inadequate view of a problem situation. Also, these differences will, it is hoped, lead people to rethink the questions that one should ask when developing an educational program. A final point that I would like to make about the argument of this paper is that I will restrict my discussion to matters dealing with educational programs for the natural and social sciences. I have made this decision for the following three reasons. One, I wish to make an elaborate case study of how problems can be used in an educational program. Although I will not attempt to expand my discussion to such areas as philosophy, art, or literary criticism, I think many of the points I make may be relevant to these and other areas of human inquiry. Two, I have decided to concentrate on science education because I think that

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this area of education provides one with a wealth of material and information about how problems are used by contemporary educational programs. Three, I have chosen to concentrate on science education because I think that the development of scientific knowledge provides us with one of the best examples of how people can use problems as a part of human inquiry. II.

A Further Explanation of the Psychological Use of Problems

Contemporary educational programs that use problems psychologically view questions as an instrument to make ideas more acceptable to the minds of children. Often these programs have singled out specific generalizations or worthy ideas that children should learn and acquires It is often suggested that classroom inquiry should begin with a question that will motivate children to learn particular ideas. The aim of contemporary educational programs that use problems psychologically is to make both a problem situation relevant to a child's concerns, and to teach a child particular solutions to a problem. The process of motivating children to feel concerned about a problem is what I refer to as the psychologizing of a particular question or formulation of a problem. The process of motivating children to feel the need to acquire a particular solution to a problem is what I refer to as the psychologizing of belief. It is my guess that the contemporary educational emphasis on the psychologizing of questions and beliefs is an attempt to upgrade or i mprove a child's ideas. Contemporary educational programs seem to assume that children entering the classroom do not possess or believe the generalizations that represent the best ideas discovered by professional scholars. Since this is so, these programs assume that if the school can successfully psychologize the questions asked by the professional scholar, then children will come to believe the important ideas discovered by these scholars .s Modern curriculum developers in the natural and social sciences often turn to the professional scholar with the hope of uncovering the i mportant generalizations or concepts that represent the present state of knowledge in the different sciences.7 However, to be familiar with the key generalizations of the different scientific fields is not considered sufficient for the effective teaching of generalizations. Instead, curriculum developers attempt to make these key generalizations relevant to a particular problem situation because it is thought that children will not effectively learn isolated generalizations. It seems that contemporary educational programs are suggesting that if children can be motivated to get interested in a problem whose solution is a key generalization, then the schools will have a better chance of helping children acquire the generalizations that have been discovered by professional scientists. For example, if the school wanted to have children acquire the generalization "All the planets make an

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elliptical orbit around the sun," then one of the important parts of the activities in the classroom is to get children interested in the question, "What shape represents the orbits of the planets around the sun?" The contemporary educational emphasis on problems can be seen as an attempt to have children acquire and believe the generalizations that come to answer the questions asked by professional scholars. Since this is so it is my claim that these programs use problems to psychologize beliefs. However, it should not be thought that problems are the only means used for the teaching of belief. On the contrary, contemporary educational programs may often attempt to use a child's own experience, or the authority of experts as a means for teaching beliefs. The use of problems for the psychologizing of belief may often be one aspect of an entire educational program which attempts to upgrade the beliefs of children. 111. Three Inadequacies of the Psychological Use of Problems It is my claim that if problems are used to psychologize questions and beliefs, then children will be exposed to a narrow and unsatisfactory view of problem situations. The narrow and unsatisfactory view of a problem situation is not an intended consequence of contemporary educational programs, but is instead an unintended consequence of the psychologizing of questions and beliefs. 8 In this section I would like to explain why this is so. Very few contemporary educational programs that use problems psychologically would claim that the generalizations suggested in the curriculum are the final solutions to scientific problems. 9 It is often admitted that these generalizations may indeed be improved upon by future scientists. Contemporary educational programs usually view science as an open-ended enterprise which can always improve or change human knowledge. However, when contemporary educational programs use problems as a means to psychologize particular generalizations, the open-ended nature of scientific knowledge is not emphasized. Instead, the need to improve or go beyond the solutions that have already been discovered by scientists is ignored because children only become exposed to the latest solution to a problem. In order to emphasize the open-ended nature of science it is necessary to provide a situation which allows people to consider various or competing solutions to a problem. It would of course be naive to assume that all children could easily discover improved solutions to the problems that have interested scientists. If this were the case then all students would be Einsteins. Nevertheless, no matter how difficult it may be to discover new solutions, if we wish to emphasize the open-ended nature of science, then we cannot use problems as a means to psychologize the latest solutions to our problems. On the contrary, if problems are to be used to emphasize the open-ended nature of scientific knowledge, then it would

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be helpful to aid children in understanding that our problems often have competing solutions. Hopefully, by understanding that our problems may have many solutions, children will be able to see that it is possible to come up with new and improved solutions to a problem. When we consider the competing solutions to our problems we will become acquainted with some of the mistaken answers that people have offered to a question. This is so because all the solutions we study will not be correct. The mistaken solutions to problems are an important part of problem solving because they emphasize the dynamic and competitive nature of a problem situation.10 That is, if we study the mistaken solutions that people have offered to a problem, then we will be able to see that scientific knowledge has the potential to grow and improve; mistaken solutions to problems can be viewed as a positive force for improvements because they may help people see that human beings can go beyond and eliminate some of the mistakes that people have made. Contemporary educational programs which use problems to psychologize particular generalizations do not seem to realize the importance of studying the mistaken solutions to a problem. This aspect of a problem situation is ignored because the psychological use of problems aims to help children acquire and believe the latest or best-known solution to a problem. It may not always be an easy matter to reconstruct the competing and mistaken solutions to a problem. Unfortunately, people do not always clearly articulate or formulate the problems they have attempted to solve. In a similar manner, the reconstruction of a problem situation may entail a great deal of interpretation because people may offer different formulations of the same problem.11 That is, in attempting to solve a particular problem different groups may use different questions to formulate the same problem. For example, Aristotelians and Copernicans were both interested in the problem of planetary orbits. However, each of these groups offered a different formulation of this problem. It is my guess that Aristotelians would formulate the problem of planetary orbits by a question such as, "What is the shape of the planetary orbits around the earth?" On the other hand, Copernicans might formulate this problem with a question such as, "what is the shape of the planetary orbits around the sun?" One of the interesting results of considering the mistaken and competing solutions to a problem is that we may see that some of our problems also have competing formulations. The same problem may be formulated by different questions because a formulation of a problem makes assumptions which are implied by the questions we ask. In the example above, we can easily see that the Aristotelians and Copernicans make different assumptions about the orbits of the planets. The Aristotelians assumed that the planets orbit the earth, and the Copernicans assumed that the planets orbit the sun. These two groups can be seen as offering competing formulations of the same problem because

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they have the same major aim in mind. That is, they want to know the shape of the orbits of the planets. However, despite the fact that these groups have the same major aim, they ask different questions because they make different assumptions about their aim. Whenever we ask a question we always make assumptions about the aim we have in mind. It is wrong to assume that we ask questions without any assumptions or expectations about the answer we seek. Of course, our expectations about an answer to a question may never be fulfilled because we may not satisfactorily solve our problems. In a similar sense, we may have impossible expectations because our expectations may be based on false assumptions. Nevertheless, when we ask a question we should realize that our questions say a lot about the answers we are looking for. The assumptions that are implied by a formulation of a problem may not always be as easy to detect as in the case of the Aristotelian and Copernican example. Often the assumptions made by a question are very subtle and difficult to articulate. Also, any suggested formulation of a problem is highly conjectural because we may not choose a question which accurately represents a group's expectations and assumptions. However, despite the difficulty in reconstructing a formulation of a problem, we may learn a great deal from the questions people use to formulate their problems. That is, the ideas that make up a group's theoretical framework may be used as assumptions for the questions people use. In order to understand a problem situation it is helpful to know the competing traditions or theoretical frameworks that have allowed people to formulate the same problem with different questions. 12 A discussion about competing theoretical frameworks is important because the competitive nature of a problem situation does not only restrict itself to competing solutions, but may also manifest itself when people formulate their problems. In short, to understand a problem situation it is helpful to be familiar with the different possible ways in which people might formulate a problem. I suggested earlier that contemporary educational programs which use problems psychologically attempt to psychologize particular formulations of a problem. When questions are psychologized there is no need to discuss the assumptions made by a question. This is so because when questions are psychologized they are not viewed as ideas that should be discussed, but are instead viewed as a means to learn worthy beliefs. That is, the psychologizing of questions ignores the fact that questions are not only part of a method for learning worthy ideas, but are also an important part of human knowledge. 13 In summary it is my claim that the psychological use of problems is unsatisfactory for at least the following three reasons: 1) When particular answers to questions are psychologized children will not be exposed to the idea that problems are open-ended situations which have competing solutions. 2) When particular answers to questions

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are psychologized children will not be able to see that the mistaken solutions to problems can be an important aspect of a problem situation. 3) When children psychologize particular formulations of problems they will not be exposed to the idea that it is possible to have competing formulations of the same problem. Towards the Development of a Sociological Use of Problems In order for an educational program to emphasize competing solutions, mistaken solutions, and competing formulations of a problem it is necessary to give up the notion of using problems to psychologize particular questions and beliefs. If we eliminate the psychologizing of questions and beliefs, then problems could be used as one way to organize the competing formulations and solutions that people have offered for a problem situation. Using problems to organize the different ideas associated with the same issue would mean that problem situations would be viewed as sociological phenomena. That is, problem situations would be used as one way to articulate and organize the disagreement between different groups of people. For the remainder of this section I would like to suggest how a sociological use of problems relates to and is different from the psychological use of problems. I do not plan on offering a complete explanation of the sociological use of problems, but merely want to suggest the direction I think an educational program will have to go if it rejects the psychological use of problems. If we accept the fact that the psychological use of problems is indeed inadequate, then an educational program that values problems must develop an alternative to the psychological point of view. The alternative I am suggesting can be conveniently referred to as a sociological use of problems. One of the most interesting aspects about this alternative is that it allows people to see that problems can have competing solutions and formulations. An educational program that uses problems to organize the different ideas that people have about the same issue is able to demonstrate that human knowledge is a competitive enterprise that has the potential to change and improve. However, it should not be thought that problems are the only means available to demonstrate the competitive and ephemeral nature of human knowledge. On the contrary, we may use empirical tests or metaphysical arguments to demonstrate that knowledge has the potential to grow and improve. 14 In short, the study of a problem situation is one way to understand the growth and development of human knowledge. The sociological use of problems says nothing about how problems can be used to teach children particular beliefs. Since this is so, the sociological use of problems does not provide answers to the same questions that are answered by the psychological use of problems. It will be remembered that I suggested that an important aim of the psychological use of problems is that it answers the question, "How IV.

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can questions be used to teach beliefs?" Rather than answer questions such as this, the sociological use of problems answers questions such as, "How can questions be used to organize the disagreements between people?" When one works within a framework that uses problems sociologically we may find that we will have to ask different questions about problems. Also, people may find that they will have to answer old questions in a new way. For example, it may be necessary to offer new answers to the following two questions: 1) How are generalizations i mportant for an educational program? and, 2) How can professional scholars be used to help people understand a problem situation? In order to better understand some of the differences between the psychological and sociological use of problems I would like to suggest how these two questions might be answered by an educational program that opts for the sociological point of view. An educational program that uses problems sociologically does not have to claim that generalizations are an unimportant part of a problem situation. On the contrary, generalizations may be included in the reconstruction of a problem situation because solutions to problems are often generalizations. However, contrary to using problems psychologically, an educatibnal program will not psychologize particular generalizations. Instead, all generalizations that can be viewed as a solution to a problem will be considered important. 15 This would mean that when studying the question, "What is the shape of the planetary orbits around the sun?" such generalizations as "All the planets make an elliptical orbit around the sun" and "All the planets make a circular orbit around the sun" would be included in the study of a problem. When people study a problem situation from the sociological point of view there is no reason to exclude any generalization that can be associated with a problem situation. Of course, this does not mean that all generalizations should be viewed as true; it may be that some generalizations will be viewed as false or mistaken by different groups of people. However, when problems are studied sociologically, the goal would be to help children understand the history of a problem situation. Children would not only become familiar with the most recent formulation and solution to a problem, but would also be exposed to all the possible competing formulations and solutions that have been offered for a problem. When problems are used sociologically there is no need to use professional scholars as the source of the important generalizations that represent the present state of scientific knowledge. Nevertheless, experts may be used as one of the sources for reconstructing a problem situation. Rather than using experts as the source of important generalizations, they could be used as one of the potential sources of clarifying and understanding the historical development of a problem situation. Many scholars may find it difficult to reconstruct the historical development of the problems that exist or have existed in their fields of

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study. 16 This is so because professional scholars are often trained to use only one theoretical framework or world view. This kind of training makes it difficult to see that people may be interested in the same problems in spite of the fact that they ask and use different questions. Also, by training scholars in one theoretical framework we often run the danger of having these people think that it is only necessary to consider solutions to problems that are consistent with their theoretical framework. In short, if we are to use professionals for the historical reconstruction of problem situations we will have to educate people to think from and use a number of theoretical frameworks. V. Concluding Remark In this paper I have not considered the possible objections that contemporary educators might have for the sociological use of problems. Instead, I have mainly tried to demonstrate how the sociological use of problems is more satisfactory than the psychological use of problems. However, some educators might consider it irresponsible and frivolous to have children learn mistaken ideas. After all, it is often claimed that we are in the midst of a knowledge explosion which demands that curriculum developers "wisely" select ideas for the curriculum. Since this is so it could be claimed that educational programs are not wisely selecting ideas when they incorporate mistaken ideas into the curriculum. In a similar manner, other educators may consider it inefficient to spend a great deal of time discussing formulations of problems, rather than helping children learn to acquire the i mportant ideas that have been discovered by professional scholars. Moreover, since the sociological use of problems in no way limits the number of ideas that are studied in the classroom, it does not offer a means of selecting worthy ideas to believe - one of the main aims of most contemporary curriculum designs. 17 A major area of competition between educational programs which opt for a sociological and a psychological use of problems is that these programs disagree as to whether beliefs should be taught and learned in the classroom. Is it necessary or desirable for an educational program to opt for the teaching and learning of particular questions and beliefs? Can we develop educational programs that do not psychologize beliefs? How can an educational program use problems without teaching beliefs? It is my hope that the discussion in this paper will lead people to ask questions such as these. 1 My views on problems have been greatly influenced by the work of Karl R. Popper, Joseph Agassi, Stephenie G. Edgerton, and others. Many of my ideas on the theme of this paper were developed in conversations I have had with Professor Stephenie G. Edgerton. I would like to thank Professor Edgerton for her helpful suggestions. Also, I would like to thank Professor Joseph Agassi and Dr. William Berkson for offering helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I do not know if any of these people agree with my ideas and I accept full responsibility for what follows. 2 For examples of contemporary educators who use problems in a psychological

144 / PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 1973 sense, see Rudyard K. Bent and Adolph Unruh, Secondary School Curriculum ( Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath & Co., 1969), p. 68; Edwin Fenton, The New Social Studies ( New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1967), p. 31; William D. Romey, Inquiry Techniques for Teaching Science ( Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), p. 17. 3 The notion of psychologizing questions and particular solutions to questions has its historical roots in the work of John Dewey. See, for example, John Dewey, The Child and the Curriculum and the School and Society ( Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 22-23; Experience and Education ( New York: The Macmillan Co., 1970), p. 79. For examples ofcontemporary educational programs that seem to endorse Dewey's ideas on psychologizing, see, Byron G. Massialas and C. Benjamin Cox, Inquiry in Social Studies ( New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966), pp. 90-94; Walter A. Thurber and Alfred T. Collette, Teaching Science in Today's Secondary Schools ( Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1964), pp. 7-8. 4 The notion of using problems to organize the disagreements between people is stated throughout the work of Karl R. Popper. For one of Popper's many comments on viewing problems from a sociological perspective, see, Conjectures and Refutations ( New York: Basic Books, Publishers, 1962), pp. 66-67. For further statements about Popper's ideas on how to view problems in a sociological sense, see Joseph Agassi, "The Novelty of Popper's Philosophy of Science," International Philosophical Quarterly 8, no. 3 (1968): 442-63; also see, Stephenie G. Edgerton, "Is There a Scientific Method?" History of Education Quarterly ( Winter 1969): 492-96. 5For a clear statement about the contemporary educational interest in teaching generalizations, see J. Stanley Marshall and Ernest Barkman, Current Trends in Science Education ( New York: The Center for Applied Research in Education, Inc., 1966), p. 10; John U. Michaelis, Ruth H. Grossman and Lloyd F. Scott, New Designs for the Elementary School Curriculum (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1967), p. 31. 'In attempting to upgrade the beliefs of children, contemporary educational programs often claim that they desire to have children acquire "scientific literacy" or "dependable generalizations." See, for example, Robert Karplus and Herbert D. Thier, A New Look at Elementary School Science (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1967), pp. 30-34; Massialas and Cox, Inquiry in Social Studies, pp. 90-94. For a detailed discussion on how I view the teaching of belief, see Ronald Swartz, "A Fallibilistic View of Human Knowledge - Scepticism in the Classroom: An Alternative to the Teaching of Belief' ( Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of History and Philosophy of Education, New York University, 1971), pp. 44-97. 7 Cf. John I. Goodlad, "Direction and Redirection for Curriculum Change," CuriculmChange:DirctonadProces, ed.RobertL. e p r(Washington,D.C:Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1966), pp. 2-6; Jerome Bruner, The 8Process of Education (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), p. 19. For an interesting discussion on why it is important to articulate unintended consequences, see Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. II ( New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1963), p. 95. 9 See Karplus and Their, A New Look at Elementary School Science, p. 26; Massialas and Cox, Inquiry in Social Studies, p. 92. 1 °The importance of mistaken solutions for the growth of scientific knowledge is emphasized by Karl R. Popper. In particular, see Conjectures and Refutations, pp. 97-119. 11 Cf. Agassi, "The Novelty of Popper's Philosophy of Science," p. 460. 12 Many historians and philosophers of science have suggested that theoretical frameworks are important for understanding the development of scientific knowledge. In particular, my ideas have been influenced by the work of Pierre Duhem, Karl R. Popper, Thomas S. Kuhn, Joseph Agassi and P.K. Feyerabend. For a discussion on how frameworks compete with one another, see Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, pp. 238-40. For a good introductory statement on the incommensurability of frameworks, see Thomas Kuhn, "Reflections on my Critics," in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, eds.ImreLak tosandAlanMusgrave(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPres, 1970), pp. 226-77.

RONALD SWARTZ / 145 131 would readily admit thatquestions are an important part of a method for discovering ideas. However, my claim in this paper is that questions are also an important part of human knowledge. For a statement about how problems are relevant for the study of human knowledge, see Karl R. Popper, "Epistemology Without a Knowing Subject," in Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, ed. B. Van Rootselar (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1968), p. 337. 141t should be noted that when I speak of the growth of human knowledge I wish to include the idea that we often discover new and less mistaken solutions to our problems. That is, the growth of knowledge not only involves the addition of new ideas, but also increases and changes our notions about old ideas. For a concise statement about viewing the growth of knowledge in the sense of which I am speaking, see Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, pp. vii-viii. 15By suggesting that an educational program should include competing and mistaken solutions to problems, I am rejecting the notion that science education should give priority to the latest theories and generalizations discovered by scientists. 16Cf. Edgerton, "Is There a Scientific Method?" pp. 492-93. The Changing Secon17Cf. Arno A. Bellack, "What Knowledge is of Most Worth?" in dary School Curriculum Readings, ed. William M. Alexander (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), pp. 221-34.