Journal of Global Security Studies, 2(3), 2017, 204–219 doi: 10.1093/jogss/ogx006 Research Article

Proclaiming Principles: The Logic of the Nonrecognition of the Spoils of War Joseph O’Mahoney Seton Hall University Abstract Starting with the Stimson Doctrine in the early 1930s, the international community has adopted, on numerous occasions, a policy of nonrecognition in response to international boundary changes gained through the use of force. Why? This article uses an investigation of the Manchurian Crisis to reconceptualize nonrecognition as a symbolic sanction against a norm violation. Existing accounts often view symbolic sanctions like nonrecognition as either failed attempts at coercion or mere posturing for domestic audiences. Against this view, this article explains how collective symbolic sanctions create or recreate common knowledge of what the rules of international behavior are in the face of a lack of effective rule enforcement. This common knowledge, or intersubjective understanding, shapes future expectations and interpretations. Nonrecognition of the spoils of war is thus a means to reinforce the norm of nonaggression within international society by reestablishing a shared valuation of the rule. Keywords: recognition, norm dynamics, sanctions, common knowledge, legitimacy, global governance

Law is not necessarily disintegrated by impotence; but it is destroyed by unqualified submission to the lawlessness of force. –Hersh Lauterpacht (1947, 435)

Starting with the Stimson Doctrine in the early 1930s, the international community has adopted, on numerous occasions, a policy of nonrecognition in response to international boundary changes gained through the use of force.1 For example, the United Nations (UN) responded to Russia’s recent annexation of the Crimean Peninsula with both condemnation and a policy of nonrecognition, even though Russia remains de facto in control of the territory today.2 Similarly, the international community (with the exception of a handful of states) justifies nonrecognition

1 The Stimson Doctrine was a policy of nonrecognition toward the territorial changes resulting from Japan’s 1931 military occupation of Manchuria (i.e., the state of Manchukuo).

of South Ossetia’s claims to sovereignty on the basis that it was created as a result of Russia’s 2008 war with Georgia. Finally, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus continues to exercise authority, despite forty years of nonrecognition since Turkey invaded the island in 1974. In sum, nonrecognition of the spoils of war is a prominent part of the politics of war and peacemaking. Yet the international relations (IR) literature gives little consideration as to why states choose nonrecognition over other options. Why do states refuse to recognize situations arising 2 For example, a draft UN Security Council resolution (UN Doc S/2014/189 [March 15, 2014]) supporting the territorial integrity of Ukraine, and reaffirming that no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal, failed to pass only because Russia exercised its veto power. A General Assembly resolution (GA Res. 68/262 UN Doc A/RES/68/262 [March 27, 2014]), along the same lines, was passed by one hundred to eleven (fifty-eight abstentions).

O’Mahoney, Joseph. (2017) Proclaiming Principles: The Logic of the Nonrecognition of the Spoils of War. Journal of Global Security Studies, doi:10.1093/jogss/ogx006 C The Author (2017). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association. V All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]

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from aggression, even when they are not willing to take steps to reverse them? This article examines the Manchurian Crisis to build a theoretical model conceptualizing nonrecognition as a symbolic sanction against a norm violation.3 Symbolic sanctions have received inadequate treatment in the IR literature. Existing work often ignores the normative or institutional context in which symbolic sanctions like nonrecognition are imposed. States that benefit from cooperation or compliance with norms have an interest in enforcing the rules (Thompson 2009) and, therefore, sometimes act on raison de systeme, or the belief that it pays to make the system work (Watson 1990). But if symbolic sanctions do not enforce the rules by imposing costs, what use are they? Though constructivist scholars have directed attention toward social sanctions like shaming (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998), they have done less to conceptualize the relationship between different ends and these mechanisms. In this article, I explore a strategic rationale for engaging in symbolic sanctions that highlights their importance for maintaining rule systems. I argue that symbolic sanctions are a means of creating or reinforcing a shared understanding among states as to what the rules of international behavior are. When rules are violated, and no enforcement action is taken, the status of the rule becomes questionable. The lack of enforcement may mean that actors no longer value compliance to the rule. However, low-cost sanctions can reassure the international community that member states still value the rule (Tyran and Feld 2006). Thus, even symbolic sanctions can maintain or reproduce rules. In this article, I build a model of rule maintenance using the idea that common knowledge coordinates future collective action and can sustain the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a class of actions. This model explains nonrecognition of the spoils of war. I conduct a plausibility probe of this model in the case of the collective nonrecognition of the state of Manchukuo in the 1930s as a symbolic sanction against Japan’s invasion of northern China. I find that nonrecognition was aimed at maintaining the rule against aggression by reestablishing the joint commitment of all states to that rule. This argument reconceptualizes an important subclass of recognition decisions as a means for imposing symbolic sanctions and uses the logic of rule maintenance to explain those decisions. It also provides the micro3 Often the term sanctions is used as shorthand for economic sanctions. In this article, I use sanctions to refer to all types of sanctions and use qualifiers like symbolic, economic, or diplomatic to denote subsets.

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foundations for an alternative, and hitherto unexplained, strategic rationale for engaging in sanctions. Finally, it adds to the growing literature on the changing norms surrounding the legitimacy of war and the use of force.

Recognition and Nonrecognition In this article, nonrecognition is states’ refusal to recognize (i.e., admit the legality or legitimacy of) concessions obtained via the use or threat of force.4 The object of nonrecognition can be territorial gain or the creation of a new state or a favorable treaty. Nonrecognition is not merely an absence of action; it is a highly visible, provocative act. Nonrecognition can be an explicit declaration or an absence of recognition when recognition is requested or expected. Nonrecognition is, in effect, a sanction against a violation of a particular norm. The politics of international recognition remains underexamined.5 Despite a long-standing but largely unproductive debate in international law between the constitutive and declaratory schools,6 there has been little theoretically informed investigation of the political underpinnings and motivations behind formal recognition. The social science literature generally deals with recognition without qualifying the reason or basis for the decision, and it has not emphasized the distinction between nonrecognition as a sanction and nonrecognition with an alternative illocutionary status.7 So, for example, the United States switched recognition between the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China 4 This is not the only possible use of the word nonrecognition. States throughout history have chosen not to recognize various situations, including new states, for various reasons (Fabry 2010). However, for ease of expression in this article, I only refer to situations brought about by the use or threat of force. 5 This despite a small surge of recent work. See Fabry (2010); Caspersen and Stansfield (2011); Lindemann and Ringmar (2012); Caspersen (2012); Ker-Lindsay (2012); Agne et al. (2013); Daase et al. (2015); Coggins (2016). 6 Crawford (2006, 26) relates the suggestion that “the ‘great debate’ over the character of recognition has done nothing but confuse the issues, that it is mistaken to categorize recognition as either declaratory or constitutive in accordance with some general theory.” 7 Speech acts have various elements: locutionary (the meaning of an utterance), illocutionary (the type of social act, e.g., promise, request, excuse, and condemnation), and perlocutionary (the effect of the act, e.g., persuading, convincing, and frightening).

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(PRC) in 1979, but not on the basis that Taiwan had violated an international norm. There are many other motives for nonrecognition. For example, recognition could be withheld in order to later be used as a reward for services rendered, similar to the way that small states switch recognition between Taiwan and the PRC. Nonrecognition might also express disapproval over the nature of a state (rather than its behavior), such as the United States’ nonrecognition of communist governments in Russia, China, and the Baltic states. Acts of nonrecognition might also be statements that certain conditions have yet to be fulfilled. The debate over why states grant recognition to some but not other entities or situations has been carried on largely with reference to whether legal criteria, like those set out in the Montevideo Convention of 1933, are applied by states or instead whether recognition is given for political reasons (Fabry 2010; Coggins 2016). Surveys of large numbers of cases of recognition (see Fabry 2010; Caspersen and Stansfield 2011; Caspersen 2012; Coggins 2016) follow this logic of inclusion. Both are valuable but miss differences in the meaning of nonrecognition. The sheer variety of cases where recognition is at stake (e.g., de facto states like Taiwan, attempted secessions like Katanga or Biafra, and territorial conquests like the Israeli Occupied Territories, Goa, and East Timor) collectively suggest that more fine-grained analysis is required to adequately deal with the complexity of this phenomenon. There is some awareness that nonrecognition policies might “uphold” or “preserve” norms, or prevent setting a dangerous precedent, but there is no coherent theoretical account as to how exactly such policies work. Furthermore, there are no detailed empirical investigations of whether this intention is, in fact, driving nonrecognition decisions. Pegg (1998, 196) argues that widespread refusal in international society to recognize de facto states means that “aggression is not seen to be rewarded and future would-be secessionists are not provided with any encouragement,” and “the rules and norms of existing sovereign legitimacy are thus upheld.” However, he does not develop this point further. Ker-Lindsay (2012, 13) characterizes decisions for collective nonrecognition as steps “taken to uphold international law and prevent the creation of facts on the ground that might eventually create the conditions for statehood” and to stop “the passage of time,” leading to “international acceptance.” Ker-Lindsay (2012) thus sees “nonrecognizers” as mainly being concerned with the future status of the entity not being recognized. Coggins (2016) finds that “system stability” (i.e., collective agreement rather than unilateral action) is an important goal of recognition decisions. Peterson’s (1982) “political uses of recognition” includes the symbolic use

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of recognition to express opinions about the actors potentially being recognized, but does not include any strategic value of collective symbolic sanctions. Despite limited consideration of the role norm dynamics may play in recognition decisions, then, this work does not elucidate how “upholding” is to work and sometimes conflates it with actions aimed at the future state of the entity in question, or at imposing costs on the nonrecognized entity.

Nonrecognition and Sanctions The literature on sanctions largely ignores the strategic issues involved in low-cost sanctions such as nonrecognition. Analysts commonly assume that economic sanctions aim to induce policy change. Most find that sanctions rarely work in this sense and dismiss them as useless (Pape 1997; Morgan and Schwebach 1997), the result of miscalculations (Hovi, Huseby, and Sprinz 2005), or catering to domestic constituents (Whang 2011, 2, 4). Tostensen and Bull (2002, 378) lament that low-cost sanctions are “only symbolic—and ultimately ineffective—acts.” Because they do not inflict enough costs on the target to be a coercive tool, nor are they costly enough to those imposing them to serve as a credible signal of resolve to punish future violators of a rule, they are unlikely to induce policy change. Given that low-cost sanctions like nonrecognition have potential negative consequences for the sanctioners but offer little chance for success, it is puzzling that we ever see states engaging in them (Maller 2010). Some existing work has noted the relevance of the institutional or normative context in which sanctions are imposed. For example, Nossal (1989, 314) argued for conceptualizing international sanctions as retribution, or “the infliction of pain on an offender in return for an evil inflicted on the community.” Nossal (1989, 315, 314) tried to distinguish this from “punishment for its own sake” but undercut his argument by claiming that “there is nothing in the retributive punishment that is directed toward the future actions of either the offender or others.” Relatedly, sanctions have sometimes been said to have an “expressive” function. For example, Chesterman and Pouligny (2003, 505) claim that “sanctions may be designed primarily to express outrage but without a clear political goal.” Barber (1979, 380–81) sees a secondary objective of sanctions, “to express a sense of morality” or “symbolize a general stance.” Sometimes this expressive function is explained by saying that inaction represents approval. Galtung (1967, 411) argued that sometimes “doing nothing is tantamount to complicity,” and sanctions serve as a “clear signal to everyone that what the receiving nation has done is disapproved of.” Other schol-

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ars have also referred to this intriguing idea. For example, Giumelli (2011, 35) includes “shap[ing] normality in what is allowed and what is forbidden in the international system” as an objective of sanctions. Baldwin (2000, 84) points out that “if the principal alternative to economic sanctions is appearing to condone communism, racism, terrorism, or genocide, the observation that they are a ‘notoriously poor tool of statecraft’ may miss the point.” Nossal (1991) rightly focused attention on the symbolic function of sanctions, with particular regard to weak state sanctions on strong states. Inter alia, he argued that the role of Australian and Canadian sanctions on the Soviet Union after its invasion of Afghanistan was to indicate that “the sanctioner disapproved of this behavior, and thus was reaffirming a commitment to the norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity” (Nossal 1991, 34–35). Similarly, Crawford and Klotz (1999, 27) suggest that one reason for imposing sanctions is “to establish international norms by punishing a state for breaking global standards and multilateral rules.” While some scholars acknowledge that sanctions can have important symbolic powers, they have not developed this idea theoretically. Despite appeals to the general idea of upholding, establishing, or reaffirming norms, the current literature provides little guidance on how symbolic sanctions, like policies of nonrecognition, are supposed to work. Also, existing scholarly work treats the norm violator as the primary target of the sanctions. Attending to the various meanings behind nonrecognition, particularly acknowledging that some nonrecognition is a form of symbolic sanction, and recognizing that nonrecognition may be directed at an international audience as well as the norm violator, opens the way for an account of symbolic sanctions as tools for maintaining the rules of international society.

Nonrecognition as a Symbolic Sanction for Rule Maintenance A subset of nonrecognition decisions can be seen as symbolic sanctions. They are aimed primarily at the international community rather than the violating state and are communicative and coordinating tools for reinforcing the collective importance and legitimacy of a violated rule. Symbolic sanctions can be used to maintain an international rule by creating or reproducing common knowledge, or shared understandings, regarding the rule. This process influences and coordinates future collective action. To understand how this works, we have to first define the strategic situation, with special attention given to the social institutional context (see Figure 1).

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Imagine that a community of actors knows there is a rule of conduct between them. When one of the actors breaks the rule, or is judged to have broken the rule, the other members of the community have a choice. They can: (1) impose material sanctions on the violator and enforce the rule;8 (2) do nothing or accept the action and its results, potentially abandoning the rule; or (3) impose symbolic sanctions and thereby maintain the rule, even in the face of a violation. If no one in a community punishes the rule violator with material or costly sanctions, the community as a whole is uncertain as to whether the rule still exists, has changed, or has been abandoned. The community will only know that the rule still exists if it is reaffirmed. A joint declaration of principle, or the condemnation of a violator, is a relatively low-cost way of reassuring the international society that its member states value the existing rule. There are two reasons why rule maintenance is important. First, it can affect expectations about whether the community will be able to coordinate costly sanctions on rule violators in the future. Second, it can affect actors’ beliefs about what is considered legitimate behavior in the international system.

Symbolic Sanctions, Rule Maintenance, and Collective Coordination The expectation reproduced by rule maintenance sanctions is that, even though costly sanctions were not used in the current instance, they may be used against future violations. Analyses of signaling games demonstrate that symbolic sanctions can reveal preferences to a limited degree. Assume there are three types of states. One type (state A) does not care about the rule. A second type (state B) values the rule and would be willing to use costly sanctions to enforce it under some circumstances. And the third type (state C) values the rule and would be willing to send a weak signal of support, but in reality would be unwilling to use costly sanctions against a rule violator. There is a semiseparating equilibrium in which state A does nothing and both states B and C collectively send a weak signal.9 The signal is too weak to demonstrate a willingness to bear the costs of enforcement. However, it is strong enough to differentiate between states that do 8

The canonical example of the enforcement of the rule against conquest is the use of force by the United States and others to punish and reverse Saddam Hussein’s conquest of Kuwait in 1990–1991. 9 Also sometimes called a partially pooling equilibrium. See Gibbons (1992, 215–17) and McCarty and Meirowitz (2009, 225).

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The Logic of the Nonrecognition of the Spoils of War

Figure 1. Rule maintenance

not value the rule (i.e., state A) from states that do value the rule (i.e., states B and C), even if there is a lack of political will to pay the costs of enforcing the rule.10

10 This is different from a direct deterrence argument. Deterrence is premised on the idea that expectations of future action change because actors have demonstrated their ability or willingness to bear costs, thus

Norm enforcement sanctions present a (second-order) collective action problem. Even if all actors benefited enabling the differentiation between those actors willing to bear costs and those unwilling to do so. Rule maintenance actions have an effect because absent rule maintenance, potential rule-breakers can draw the inference that not only is the community currently unable to enforce the rule, but they do not even value it.

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from enforcement, they would be better off if other actors paid the costs of enforcing the norm (i.e., free-riding on the efforts of others). However, many actors are “conditional cooperators”; that is, they will cooperate if they believe that others will cooperate as well (G€achter 2006, 19). If actors agree to participate in collective symbolic sanctions, it suggests that they disapprove of the violation and value the rule. Absent collective symbolic sanctions, actors willing to participate in concert with the community in future costly sanctions, that is, to conditionally cooperate, will not have common knowledge of valuation of the rule. Thus, they will be less likely to be able to coordinate collective action. Common knowledge can be defined formally in terms of partitions of information sets (Geanakoplos 1992, 65), but it can also be understood informally as a proposition; p is common knowledge if everyone knows p, and everyone knows that everyone knows p. Common knowledge is thus different from aggregated individual knowledge. Rubinstein (1989) showed that if there are a finite number of messages being sent between rational players, then they cannot be sure that the other one knows the information, even though intuitively they would believe it.11 However, Clark and Marshall (1981) analyzed this problem and posited a relatively simple heuristic regarding common knowledge. If p happened when both A and B were present, and both A and B were aware of each other’s presence, we can, therefore, infer that p is common knowledge. This is called the mutual experience heuristic (Clark and Marshall 1981). Chwe (2001) analyzed public rituals as examples of attempts to use mutual experience to create common knowledge aimed at helping or hindering coordination. In addition to other features of public rituals, like the content or the emotional resonance, the publicness of the rituals generates common knowledge. Wendt (1999, 160) pointed out that the concept of common knowledge is the same as the concept of intersubjectivity used by constructivists. Further, given that common knowledge is highly influential, the processes by which common knowledge, or intersubjective 11 This is the basic point of the coordinated attack problem or two generals problem. An informal version involves two generals who will only win the battle if they attack together, sending messages to each other (e.g., by messenger on horseback) about when to attack. They are never sure if the last horse rider they sent got through until receipt of the other’s reply confirming receipt. But they then have to confirm receipt of the message to the other, who does not know if the last confirmation of receipt got through. And so on (Rubinstein 1989).

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understandings, of the rules of the game get created are “highly contested” and often the object of strategic social construction (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 911). The effect of common knowledge is to introduce an element of certainty into our interactions. If something is common knowledge, we can take it as given. The distinction between aggregated individual knowledge and common knowledge allows for political action. In particular, collective public reaffirmation of a rule creates or reproduces common knowledge that the rule exists. Actors can then treat the rule as existing objectively. They have to orient their behavior around the rule even if they do not believe in the rightness of it individually. This conception is similar to Searle’s (2010) idea of how the social world is created by speech acts. One class of speech acts both represents the world and changes the world by declaring that a state of affairs exists. Searle (2010) calls these Status Function Declarations. These create objective facts about the world by virtue of people’s collective acceptance or recognition of those facts.12 The rules of a society are an example of this type of objective fact. To create, or recreate, them requires stating that they exist. A rule maintenance argument is consistent with recent work on social norms and rules as coordinating devices. Tyran and Feld (2006), for example, conducted public goods provision experiments and found that mild law (i.e., law backed only by non-deterrent sanctions) significantly increases cooperation if endogenously imposed, meaning participants jointly agree to the law. They argue that “voting for mild law is interpreted as a signal for cooperation, and induces expectations of cooperation” (2006, 137).

Symbolic Sanctions, Legitimacy, and Norm Reproduction Symbolic sanctions also maintain rules by sustaining the illegitimacy of certain acts. Knowledge of the rules of international behavior is important for states’ expectations because when considering an action, leaders of states cannot predict what others will do. There is a fundamental uncertainty over the capacities and intentions of others. However, actors can know what principles are involved, and how actions that violate those principles will be interpreted. Prudent actors will take these principles into account when deciding what actions to take. The key role of international law under this conception is 12 Acceptance or recognition does not require approval. I can deplore the fact that tipping is customary while still recognizing that it is customary.

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that leaders of states have an idea of what types of actions will be investigated and in what terms they will be evaluated. As Reus-Smit (2004, 20) notes, “international law can serve as a focal point for discursive struggles over legitimate political agency and action.” This makes knowledge of what rules are considered authoritative and accepted an important part of states’ calculations of the likely consequences of their actions. Maintaining the legitimacy of rules is crucial to international order. It is for this reason that Mitzen (2011) places rule maintenance at the center of global governance. She argues that when states “jointly and publicly commit to pursue a project together, publicity can exert a centripetal pull on individual actions capable of countering centrifugal tendencies and pulling individual acts toward the shared project” (2011, 54). In order to understand what is being claimed here, it is important to distinguish between the moral beliefs of individual people and social norms. Rule maintenance does not necessarily reflect or affect the moral beliefs of individuals. However, rule maintenance does influence what people believe to be the authoritative norms of society. Jaeger (2008) claims that “world opinion” is a powerful, socially recognized phenomenon, which reflects something more than the simple aggregation of individual opinions. Steffek’s (2003) account of the legitimation of international governance foregrounds two core parts of rule maintenance. First, international governance is dependent upon explaining and defending the actions and policy decisions of international actors in terms of shared, justificatory reasons. Moments of explicit consensus are crucial for defining the values, goals, and procedures that make up the rules (or regimes) of international governance. Rule maintenance actions, like the symbolic sanction of nonrecognition, are examples of these moments of consensus. They provide, in Steffek’s (2003, 264) language, “the consensual reference points for the regime’s discursive justification and thus legitimacy.” Second, international governance requires stewardship and management of the consensus-building processes; “international governance. . .requires permanent consensus-building” (Steffek 2003, 265). International rules and norms are constantly open to renegotiation; past agreements are no guarantee of future agreements. This means that rule maintenance is a necessary condition for the formulation, continuation, and reproduction of what makes up legitimate governance. Symbolic sanctions thus can be effectual, and made comprehensible, if we see them as rituals of rule affirmation or attempts to create common knowledge regarding what is considered acceptable behavior. Symbolic sanctions can, therefore, be understood as consciously adopted efforts of norm reproduction. Actors declaring

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principles are aware that future interpretations of potential violations will involve consideration of previous incidents and action taken now will influence those future interpretations by providing a clear indication of appropriate action.

Explaining the Nonrecognition of Manchukuo as Rule Maintenance The concept of rule maintenance thus provides a plausible reason why states might engage in symbolic sanctions, including nonrecognition of aggressive gains. I now turn to examining one instance of this: the nonrecognition of the state of Manchukuo in the 1930s as a symbolic sanction. In so doing, I engage in theory-building processtracing (Beach and Pedersen 2013), using evidence from a single case to infer the existence of an analytically general mechanism. One concern for the generalizability of the Manchurian case and the scope for application of the rule maintenance model, is that the rule being maintained — that against the use of force changing the territorial status quo — was not yet fully established. This may mean that there is some difference between establishing or bolstering an incipient rule and maintaining a firmly institutionalized one. One possible difference is that rule maintenance actions are more necessary the less institutionalized the rule. However, the noted absence of rule maintenance when it should be routine might indicate a shift in attitudes. This would mean that rule maintenance would continue to be essential to world order. This and related questions are important topics for future research. Demonstrating the usefulness of this mechanism requires attention to the ways in which actors justified their actions to others, both publicly and privately. Speech acts provide evidence for assessing strategic intent, whether individuals are being honest about their reasoning, trying to convince others, or trying to avoid censure for violating shared rhetorical standards (O’Mahoney 2015). As Schimmelfennig (2001, 66) points out, “whether or not political actors really mean what they say, they will choose their arguments strategically; and both opportunistic and truthful arguments have real consequences for their proponents and the outcome of the debate.” It is highly unlikely that we will find evidence of decision-makers saying something as obvious as “I am not recognizing Manchukuo in order to perform rule maintenance of the prohibition on aggression.” Actual speech acts are far messier, requiring interpretation sensitive to the historical and political context (Hopf 2007). However, language consistent with rule maintenance has several central properties. First, it should be concerned with

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Table 1. Observable implications Reason for sanctioning

Costs

Oriented around

Intended audience

Rule maintenance

Not important

Rule/norm

Community

Coercion

High cost important

Violator or future violators

Domestic politics

Low cost is benefit

Behavior of violators or future violators Domestic group

rules.13 Actions in support of rule maintenance are therefore focused on saving or promoting a rule rather than influencing behavior in a specific instance. Second, it should be future oriented. The desired effect of rule maintenance is not immediate; it speaks to a deferred goal. Finally, it should be oriented primarily toward members of the community as a whole; it is not aimed only at affecting specific actors (norm violators), but instead is aimed at creating common knowledge. If rule maintenance is at work, we should observe the following. Nonrecognition justification should establish a principle, define a standard of behavior, or establish a precedent. We may see actors expressing worry that failure to withhold recognition will legitimize or normalize the rule violation. This reasoning should be coupled with the explicit denunciation of the sanction itself as efficacious in deterring violations. Actors might also emphasize that stating or proclaiming the principle, maintaining the legitimacy of the rule, will help coordinate action, or provide a basis for action, in the future. Alternatively, if actors justify nonrecognition by its ability to compel compliance, to deter future instances of aggression, or with reference to various domestic political audiences, we should take that as evidence for more traditional explanations (see Table 1).

The Manchurian Crisis In 1931, the Japanese Army occupied northern China. Initially, other major powers were confused over whether 13 The term rules here includes principles, standards of behavior, precedents, norms, and laws. Rule maintenance is therefore specifically oriented toward the maintenance of a social rule.

Domestic group

Other

Establish a precedent; define standard; protect a principle; provide basis for future action Consideration of effect of costs on behavior; publicly threaten costs Existence of pressure group; consideration of electoral consequences

this was a violation of the incipient rule against the use of force, which had been gaining strength since the end of World War I. In signing the Kellogg–Briand Pact in 1928, states resolved to avoid wars of aggression with other signatory states. Once the members of the League of Nations (and the United States) decided that Japan’s actions were unacceptable by Kellogg–Briand terms, there was pressure to take action. Economic sanctions were deemed infeasible. The Great Depression had made governments very sensitive to any policies, or potential criticism, that might cause economic harm. Also, Japan’s recent rapid increase in military capability and consequent strategic weakness in the Far East had made running the risk of war too costly. However, the United States and the League of Nations argued for the need to act to reaffirm their commitment to the cause of peace and opposition to aggression. They decided upon nonrecognition of the newly proclaimed state of Manchukuo because it was a product of Japan’s illegitimate use of force. There were several deliberate acts that constituted the collective nonrecognition, visible in the League of Nations’ resolutions (see below). Consistent with the rule maintenance argument, the collective declarations of nonrecognition established that territorial expansion via the use of force was illegitimate and that interstate disputes should be solved via peaceful means. Given its proximity in time with the Kellogg–Briand Pact, the Manchurian Crisis was the first use of nonrecognition as a symbolic sanction against aggression. As such, the actors involved engaged in many explicit discussions of the purpose and merits of the policy, facilitating data collection. The Manchurian Crisis is also a valuable case to study because there were no other sanctions, like trade embargos or military intervention, that would lend support to more traditional sanctions arguments. The policy

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discussion was directed toward nonrecognition alone. This case, then, provides strong support for the rule maintenance argument. The following analysis is based on both primary and secondary sources. I focus my attention on the United States and the United Kingdom, and also cover other discussions within the League of Nations. Using both private and public statements, I establish their justifications for not adopting another type of sanction, and for opting for nonrecognition. There were, at different times, several justifications given for the policy of not recognizing the spoils of Japan’s use of force in Manchuria. Occasionally, the major actors were skeptical of the idea that a threat of nonrecognition might work, especially against an “Oriental nation like Japan” (President Herbert Hoover, quoted in Stimson 1931–1932). However, throughout the interactive diplomatic process, rule maintenance was the dominant justification for the international community’s policy response toward the evolving situation in Manchuria. By the time the Lytton Report (League of Nations 1932a) was adopted by the League Assembly in 1933, which constituted a collective declaration of nonrecognition toward Manchukuo, rule maintenance was the only justification articulated.

The United States and the Stimson Doctrine of Nonrecognition Much of the US reaction to the Manchurian Crisis was articulated by then–Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson. However, it was clear that President Herbert Hoover was insistent on avoiding war. Speaking to his cabinet in November 1931, he said, “we will not go along [with] war or any of the sanctions, either economic or military, for those are the roads to war” (Steiner 2005, 727). By late December 1931, Secretary Stimson was concerned that Japanese military actions in Manchuria constituted aggression. He noted in his diary that an attack at Chinchow “would necessarily be in the nature of an aggression” (Stimson 1931–1932). In 1932, after months of fighting in northeastern China, he wrote in his diary that the Japanese Army’s occupation of the city of Chinchow on January 3, 1932, constituted a “final slap in the face,” bringing “the Manchurian matter up to a final climax” (Stimson 1931–1932). Secretary Stimson famously responded four days later with a telegram to both the Chinese and Japanese governments, stating that the United States “does not intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement, which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the pact of Paris of August 27, 1928” (US Department of State 1948, 8). Secretary Stimson’s motivation for sending this threat of nonrecognition was to notify Japan officially that the

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United States considered its actions in China as “aggression.” At this point it does not appear that he intended to set a precedent, given his unconcern with the future position of the United States. However, once the telegram had been sent and world opinion seized upon it as a precedent for international law, Secretary Stimson began to justify his nonrecognition policy as a means for maintaining international law. At the best this policy [nonrecognition] might in fact deter the Japanese. At the worst it would lay a firm foundation of principle upon which the Western nations and China could stand in a later reckoning (Stimson and Bundy 1948, 258). Secretary Stimson quickly realized that his note would not, in fact, deter further Japanese military action.14 However, this did not sway him from making a further statement of nonrecognition. Stimson now appealed to “the morality” of the situation and the need to “bar the legality” of aggressive gain (Stimson 1931–1932; US Department of State 1943, 83–87). Public opinion formers in the press accepted this justification, and even Stanley K. Hornbeck, the Chief of the Far Eastern Affairs Division at the State Department, who was highly skeptical of the efficacy of a policy of nonrecognition, accepted the argument on moral grounds (Doenecke 1984). Commenting later, Secretary Stimson described the reasoning behind the nonrecognition doctrine as “the best available method of reinforcing the treaty structure, and particularly the Kellogg Pact. If the fruits of aggression should be recognized, the whole theory of the Kellogg Pact would be repudiated, and the world would at once be returned to the point of recognizing war as a legitimate instrument of national policy. Nonrecognition might not prevent aggression, but recognition would give it outright approval” (Stimson and Bundy 1947, 235).

The United Kingdom and Nonrecognition During the Manchurian Crisis, the British Empire was suffering from the great economic depression, leaving it militarily weak in the Far East compared to Japan. Prime 14 On February 8, Stimson justified a restatement of his note not in terms of deterrence, but that it would “put the situation morally in its right place” (Stimson 1931– 1932). On February 18, he said that continued Japanese military action had convinced him that “we haven’t yet reached the stage where we can dispense with police force” (Stimson 1931–1932). And then, on February 19, he criticized a League of Nations declaration mirroring his note as “rather feebly. . .not recognizing future situations which are produced by a breach of treaty” (Stimson 1931–1932).

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Minister Ramsey MacDonald, who was focused mainly on the empire’s economic woes, delegated foreign policy decisions to his foreign secretary, Sir John Simon. Secretary Simon was essentially “free to chart his own course” (Steiner 2005, 725) and was instrumental in the League of Nations adopting a policy of nonrecognition over Japan’s spoils of war in China. Simon framed his successful argument in terms of protecting the principle of nonaggression and the power of the League to settle disputes peacefully. Simon wrote in a letter to Prime Minister Macdonald on November 17, 1931, that the League could not solve the situation through force or moral persuasion (Dutton 1992, 129). However, in a memorandum presented to the cabinet on November 23, Simon laid out the case for the League “in some manner reaffirming the. . .fundamental principle that a State may not, without prior recourse to the recognized means of peaceful settlement, take the law into its own hands” (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1960, 769). A decision on this issue “will necessarily have a most material influence upon [the League’s] future as an effective international instrument for restraining military action and securing peaceful settlements” (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 1960, 769). Even though a declaration of principle would not deter Japan, it could in the future promote collective action against the use of force through the League. Secretary Simon was consistent throughout the crisis concerning the issues that were at stake, whether he was speaking in public or private. In the House of Commons on February 22, 1932, Simon responded to a question about British policy toward China, Japan, Manchuria, and Shanghai by saying that “it is only by affirming with boldness and sincerity the principles of the League that we shall find the best means of restoring peace” (UK House of Commons 1932, 173–84). In further justification, he hoped that “if we show ourselves devoted to the purposes of the League, the time may soon come, notwithstanding the wreckage of our hopes, when the moral authority of the League will be seen to exercise its influence on the side of peace” (ibid.). Here, Simon is appealing to future occasions where the principle of nonaggression might be enforceable. Declaring now the illegitimacy or illegality of gains made by aggression would secure the standard by which future acts of aggression would be judged.

The League of Nations and Nonrecognition of Manchukuo By the time the League Assembly convened a special session on the crisis on March 3, 1932, the violence in

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Manchuria had spanned five months. The consensus among attendees was that “aggression,” as defined by international law, had indeed taken place, and that selfdefense was not a legitimate justification. In sum, Japan was at fault. The dominant sentiment was that the Assembly should pass a resolution that constituted “a clear affirmation of the principle that, after the establishment of the League as a great international organization based on law and the adoption of the Pact of Paris, no new right can be created by force” (League of Nations 1932b, 51). The primary theme was that the present actions would create a precedent, and this precedent would be influential in affecting the future course of the international order. John Simon’s speech explicitly addressed the rationale behind the proposed action. What should such a declaration accomplish? It would reassert. . .the conditions under which every Member of the League is pledged to conduct relations with every other Member. It would direct the attention of the world once more—the fresh and specific attention of the world—to the proper means of solving disputes. It would be a proclamation not only of the interest but of the duty of us all to stand by the League in this hour of its severest trial. I agree with what was said from this tribune a short time ago by a previous speaker. It would be far better for the League to proclaim its principles, even though it failed to get them observed, than to forsake those principles by meaningless compromise. (League of Nations 1932b, 63)

Secretary Simon, as the statement above makes abundantly clear, was prescient enough to know that a policy of nonrecognition would not affect Japan’s behavior, but advocated forcefully for it regardless. The predominant reason given for engaging in this proclamation of principles was that it would define the standard of behavior between states. This justification is one of the clearest statements that rule maintenance was an important motivation behind the actions of the League. Numerous others, including Nicolae Titulesco, the Romanian representative, affirmed Secretary Simon’s position. Titulesco’s speech made an explicit causal argument that encapsulates several of the strands of the debate (League of Nations 1932b, 60). He argued that it would be better for the League’s policies to fail in Manchuria because conditions are exceptional, “than it should fail because it had changed its law to suit special cases and circumstances. . .It would be the League’s action that had failed in a particular circumstance and not the League itself, for it would have remained faithful to its doctrine as conceived and known by the majority of its members.” (League of Nations 1932b, 60). Titulesco’s justification for a proclamation of principles relied on the idea that af-

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firming a set of explicit rules and standards increases the likelihood that they will be used to judge behavior in the future. To reject [an appeal to affirm principles] would be to eviscerate our faith in the League and to rob the countries that are not parties to this conflict of their most precious possession— the legitimate hope that, in case of war or threat of war, the contractual guarantees they enjoy will be converted into tangible realities (League of Nations 1932b, 60).

The result of this discussion was a resolution, adopted on March 11, 1932, in which the League Assembly declared that it was “incumbent upon the Members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty, or agreement, which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris” (League of Nations 1932b, 87).

The Lytton Commission’s Report The Stimson telegram and the League Assembly’s resolution were all threats of nonrecognition. The adoption of the League Assembly report on the Lytton Commission in February 1933 was an act of collective nonrecognition. Arguments in favor were based on rule maintenance. For example, Joseph Connolly, the Irish representative, declared that it was the responsibility of the Assembly “to uphold at all costs the terms under which the Covenant must be applied by the Members of the League” by declaring “their intention of refusing to recognize the ‘State’ of ‘Manchukuo’” (League of Nations 1933, 34). Christian Lange of Norway stated that “the all-important thing is to safeguard the primary object of the League— namely, the maintenance of the principles of peace and right and the application of those principles in all cases arising for the League” (League of Nations 1933, 39). After continued Japanese military action and refusal to negotiate on the issue of recognition of Manchukuo, the Assembly accepted the Lytton report, which included the statement that “the Members of the League intend. . .as regards the existing regime in Manchuria. . .not to recognize this regime either de jure or de facto” (quoted in Willoughby 1935, 481). In a widely cited analysis, Crawford (2006, 76) argued that, because the League of Nations and the Lytton Commission inquired into whether the Manchukuo government was independent, it cannot have been the case that “the illegality of its creation operated as a categorical bar on statehood.” In other words, if statehood were solely determined by its creation being legal, then there would be no need to address independence. Further, he cites the Lytton Commission’s report and a League Assembly resolution that both address whether

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the Manchurian independence movement was “spontaneous and genuine” (2006, 78). Crawford’s claim seems to be that recognition of Manchukuo rose and fell on the question of independence, not on the legality of Japan’s use of force. However, this claim is not supported by the actual discussion among the actors at the time. Not only was the discussion of nonrecognition based primarily on the issue of the legality of Japan’s actions, but also the decision-makers held that independence and illegality of creation were mutually exclusive. The Japanese Army’s occupation of Manchuria was condemned on the basis of the League Covenant, particularly Article 10 (concerning external aggression against territorial integrity and existing political independence) and Article 12 (resort to war), as well as the Pact of Paris (the Kellogg–Briand Pact or Treaty on the Renunciation of War). When the Lytton Commission was appointed in December 1931, the issue was solely Japanese use of force, and there was no question of the independence of Manchuria. However and subsequently, various actions like the declaration of independence (on February 18, 1932), the formation of self-governing committees, and the inauguration of the former Chinese emperor as regent of Manchukuo (March 9, 1932) were used by Japan to argue that despite the fact that the Japanese Army was defeating and replacing the military forces of a warlord allied to the Guomindang government in Nanjing, the change in administration had support among local elites.15 The independence movement, then, was only relevant to the international community in the context of its bearing on the question of Japan’s actions. Was Manchukuo “brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris” (i.e., by Japanese use of force), or was it brought about by an independence movement? If Manchukuo was brought about by Japan’s use of force, then it was illegitimate, but if, instead, an independence movement had brought it about, then it may not be. Crawford (2006) draws his inference on the basis that illegality and genuine independence could have coexisted, but that is not the way that the members of the League characterized the situation. For example, Edvard Benes, the Czechoslovakian foreign minister, pointedly asked in the League Assembly regarding the adoption of the Lytton Report, “(2) was the 15 See the Lytton Commission Report (League of Nations 1932a). Mitter (2000) shows that, in contrast to the common dismissal of a “puppet state,” numerous local elites in fact had more ties to Japan than to the Guomindang, and that local order and government functions were provided by compliant coopted provincial elites.

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creation of the independent ‘State’ of ‘Manchukuo’ a spontaneous political act of the Chinese population of Manchuria, or did it occur as the result of particular circumstances, more especially of the military occupation by Japanese forces?” (League of Nations 1933, 36). Benes here clearly viewed the two options as mutually exclusive, a stance echoed by the other representatives. Crawford (2006, 75) states that “since Manchukuo was both illegally created and not independent, the need to distinguish the two issues did not really arise.” This claim misses the point that for the actors involved it was not merely a coincidence; the two issues were indistinguishable by definition.

Alternative Explanations Standard motivations (see Table 1) for sanctioning norm violators are unsuitable for explaining the nonrecognition of Manchukuo. If the motivation was coercion or deterrence, we should see decision-makers saying that the costs of the sanctions will be high and will change Japan’s analysis and actions. We should also see attempts to identify areas where costs on Japan could be increased. If the motivation was domestic politics, we should see decisionmakers expressing concern about either general public opinion or specific pressure groups and mentioning that they would be placated or appeased by nonrecognition. Decision-makers should also be unconcerned that other states adopt the sanctions, as nonrecognition is aimed at a domestic constituency. Though Secretary Stimson initially justified his threat of nonrecognition in his note of January 1932 in terms of its effect on Japan, as I demonstrate above, the coercive inefficacy of the note was clear. Furthermore, the adoption of a nonrecognition policy in the Manchurian case was not especially costly and, hence, not useful either as a deterrent or as a credible signal of intent. Japan bore no identifiable material costs as a result of the nonrecognition of Manchukuo. There were some costs to Manchukuo, but they were negligible. In February 1933, the League Assembly appointed a subcommittee to consider measures needed to implement the nonrecognition policy of Manchukuo (Willoughby 1935, 520). The subcommittee recommended that Manchukuo be denied access to all international conventions and international organizations, even those open to administrative and private associations. This included the Universal Postal Union (UPU). If Manchukuo tried to join the UPU, Manchukuo postal service would be suspended, Manchukuo stamps would be considered invalid, and all post would be routed through China. Manchukuo currency would not be allowed on international exchange markets (Wil-

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loughby 1935, 523). Passports issued by the Manchukuo government would not be given visas.16 Consuls stationed in Manchuria could be replaced and advised that they were to do nothing to indicate recognition of Manchukuo. As Manchukuo could not accede to the 1925 Geneva Opium Convention, opium could not be exported from the territory (although in June 1934, a League committee reported that poppy cultivation in the territory had increased substantially over the prior year). The members of the League all agreed to the subcommittee’s recommendations. However, these restrictions were not especially onerous. The North China Herald reported in January 1935 that the postal restrictions had been dealt with by the creation of a new franking stamp and an injunction on writing “Manchukuo” in the address (Willoughby 1935, 530). It is possible that nonrecognition was posited to be costly prior to its use, in which case a deterrence argument would have more explanatory power. Very few people at the time, especially after January 1932, viewed nonrecognition as costly. A representative statement was, “[The nonrecognition] policy was just about as effective as saying to a man who has just burned a neighbor’s house, ‘I refuse to take cognizance of the conflagration, and shall continue to send letters to the old address’” (quoted in Doenecke 1984, 52). Domestic political considerations were also not driving the adoption of nonrecognition. President Herbert Hoover forbidding action that might lead to war shows that he was largely concerned with how such steps might interfere with his plans for economic recovery. This attitude, coupled with Britain and other European powers’ lack of support for economic sanctions, explains the nonadoption of a stronger sanction (Thorne 1972). But this constraining effect of public opinion on foreign policy does not account for the use of nonrecognition. None of the justifications for the policy made by Secretary Stimson and other policymakers, either public or private, refer to the need to placate a domestic constituency. Two studies covering a wide range of public opinion conclude that there was no link between administration policy and public opinion (Doenecke 1984; Tupper and McReynolds 1937). Stimson, Hoover, and Hornbeck, when they were not being “patronizing” to peace groups, “refused to be pressured by businessmen, intimidated by leaders of peace societies, or swayed by editorials” (Doenecke 1981, 15). Ferrell doubts that “Stimson before promul16 However, individuals living under the Manchukuo government were given alternative identity documents (Willoughby 1935, 524).

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gating his Doctrine made any calculation of the American psyche” (Ferrell 1957, 168). It seems then that domestic political considerations, while rendering the use of force or economic sanctions prohibitively costly, were largely irrelevant in the formulation and enactment of nonrecognition by the United States. As for UK decision-making, the Manchurian Crisis was only a minor issue in British domestic politics. Other questions, such as the economy, a naval mutiny at Invergordon, leaving the Gold Standard, war debts and reparations, and troubles in India, were all seen as more important than a minor spat in the Far East (Dutton 1992, 126).

Did Nonrecognition Reinforce International Rules? There is some indication that nonrecognition had effects. Shortly after the Manchurian Crisis, Benito Mussolini, leader of Italy, set out to conquer Ethiopia and incorporate it into the Italian Empire. While making reference to the principles affirmed during the Manchurian Crisis, the members of the League of Nations Council first found that Italy had resorted to force in violation of the League Covenant. They then coordinated the most extensive regime of economic sanctions the world had ever seen. These sanctions included both economic and financial sanctions and were both indirect (i.e., refusal to import) and direct (i.e., refusal to export). Though not without critics, these sanctions were genuinely collective, with fifty states participating (Baer 1976, 131). There is also an indication that moving away from these policies began to undermine the rule. The United Kingdom and France subsequently indicated a willingness to reward Mussolini’s aggression with the Hoare–Laval Pact, a proposed peace plan that included international recognition of substantial territorial concessions from Ethiopia to Italy (approximately two-thirds of the existing Ethiopian state) (Parker 1974, 313).17 The plan was leaked to the press in December 1935. The international community saw the willingness of the United Kingdom and France to accept a compromise peace deal as an abandonment of collective security. Frank Walters, a 17 The pact is named after the foreign ministers who were part of the negotiations, Samuel Hoare and Pierre Laval. The agreement “conceded Italy Adowa, Adigrat, the strip of Tigre leading to, and including, Makale, minor territory on the Danakil–Eritrean frontier, and a substantial portion of Ogaden, including Wal Wal” (Robertson 1975, 440). The result of the pact was an Italian economic monopoly in “virtually the whole of Southern Ethiopia” (Robertson 1975, 440).

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League official at the time, wrote that the plan seemed to be “the consecration and reward of aggression, proffered to Mussolini in the name of the League,” and that the authority of the Covenant and the potential for collective security had been lost (Walters 1952, 669–72). Baer’s (1976, 132) analysis of the Hoare–Laval proposals was that “the Covenant, and what the Covenant stood for, was betrayed,” and that the world was asking, “was this a change of policy, from opposing aggression to appeasement?” This perceived abandonment of the rule against aggression by the United Kingdom and France was followed both by a lack of sanctions against future rule violations and a widespread move away from the institutions that might have coordinated their implementation. After the Hoare–Laval plans became public in December 1935, Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland in March 1936. Sanctions were not imposed, nor were they imposed on Hitler’s future conquests. On July 1, 1936, seven small European powers (Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, the Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland), despite earlier full participation in the sanctions against Italy, made a joint declaration that they would no longer be subject to the authority of the League Council on the question of the application of economic sanctions against aggressor states (van Diepen 2013). In August 1936, Honduras and Nicaragua were the first states of many to submit notification of their intention to leave the League entirely. Widespread formal recognition of Italy’s conquest followed.18

Conclusion In this article, I suggest that nonrecognition can serve as a symbolic sanction, which, as a public collective action, creates common knowledge of the rules of international society. This is one way that norms are actively reproduced in the face of nonconforming state behavior. The evidence from the Manchurian Crisis demonstrates that threats of nonrecognition and the adoption of the Lytton Report, with its declaration of nonrecognition, were primarily justified in terms of rule maintenance. This type of symbolic sanction is an important element in international norm dynamics. Above, I established why decision-makers chose to use symbolic sanctions and explain how this could work to maintain the rule. Whether rule maintenance helped coordinate future collective action is a topic for further research, but there is suggestive evidence from the interwar period that nonrecognition did in fact help coordinate future costly sanc18 “French Envoy Gives Credentials to Rome: Brings Total of States Recognizing Ethiopian Conquest to 47,” New York Times, November 20, 1938.

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tions, and that the absence of nonrecognition inhibited such coordination.19 Even if symbolic sanctions are not useful in directly deterring or forcing compliance from would-be aggressors, “proclaiming principles” has a role in maintaining the illegitimacy of certain acts. For example, without the visible consensus of the international community that aggression is immoral or unacceptable, the prohibition on aggression might very well wither away. A broader implication is that if rule violations are not met with rule maintenance reactions, then the rule will decay or disappear. This means that criticism of symbolic sanctions as weak or not robust misses the point. These actions are not intended to change the behavior of the current violator. They are directed at the other states in the system; they, in part, constitute international society.

Acknowledgments I would like to thank Robert Adcock, Davy Banks, Miki Fabry, Henry Farrell, Martha Finnemore, Eric Grynaviski, Alison Kaufman, Ron Krebs, Daniel Lake, Chad Rector, Susan Sell, Chana Solomon-Schwartz, Erik Voeten, and Tristan Volpe.

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19 An additional complication is that the effectiveness of rule maintenance is plausibly nonlinear. For example, while the first use of rule maintenance might heavily influence states’ expectations, if the rule is repeatedly violated and there are never costly sanctions and only symbolic sanctions, the effectiveness of rule maintenance might decline over time. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for emphasizing this point.

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