Quantitative Approaches to International Relations LMU, Munich Syllabus - Winter 2011 Instructor Leonardo Baccini Office: Raum H 009 [email protected] http://sites.google.com/site/leonardobaccini/

Class Schedule Term: Winter Time: 10am-6pm Day: 22-23/01 - 29-30/01 Office Hours: by appointment

Course Description and Objectives This course is designed to introduce students to the theory and practice of international relations, with an emphasis on the positivist research tradition. This course has two broad purposes. First, it aims to show that world politics is best understood through the strategic perspective, which we will explore in depth over the term. Second, the class aims to familiarize students with quantitative approaches to international relations, with particular emphasis on research on conflict and peace and international political economy. The methodological tools explored in the course include game theory, large-N quantitative analysis, and comparative case study methodologies. By the end of the course, students should be able to identify the basic assumptions underlying contemporary IR theories, show how these assumptions are used to generate empirically-falsifiable hypotheses, and critically evaluate the research design with which authors test their hypotheses.

Prerequisites The course is primarily intended for masters’ students in Political Science. A good background in international relations is expected.

Textbook Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce. (2009) Principles of International Politics. Washington DC: CQ Press (BdM, henceforth).

Background Readings Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow. (2005) The Logic of Political Survival. The MIT Press. Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Mark S. Bonchek. (1996) Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior and Institutions. W. W. Norton & Company. Gilligan, Michael. Empowering Exporters: Reciprocity, Delegation, and Collective Action in American Trade Policy. University of Michigan Press, 1997. Milner, Helen. Interests, Institutions, and Information. Princeton University Press, 1997. Tomz, Michael. (2007) Reputation and International Cooperation. Princeton University Press. 1

Course Requirements Course Meetings: Class will meet 4 times over the last two weekends in January. Each class will be divided into two parts. The first part will be mostly lectures and presentations by me. The second part will be devoted to presentations by students. Presentation – 30%: Each student must deliver a presentation (around 20 minutes) on one of the topics addressed by the seminar. The emphasis of the presentation should be on the theoretical part of the articles. You can also decide to present articles that are not on the reading list, if they are of interest for a specific topic. Moreover, the student who presents is responsible for circulating 5-6 questions to structure the discussion during the week. You should point out areas that will generate some debate, avoiding yes/no questions. Final Project – 70%: The second part of the grade will be based on a final paper or a takehome exam. The first option is the final paper, which can take the form of a research article or a policy proposal. You may deepen one of the topics covered in the seminar. You may also pick a topic that has been not covered, if you have specific interest. The final paper should be (roughly) 20 pages long. The second option is take-home exam, which includes five questions. The formula of the take-home exam implies that: (1) you can consult any materials you think necessary; (2) your answers should not be merely descriptive or yes or no, but should involve an evaluation of the topic addressed. The final exam will involve all the topics addressed in the course.

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COURSE SCHEDULE - TENTATIVE IR METHODOLOGY The Strategic Perspective Chapter 1, BdM.

BdM, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow. The Logic of Political Survival. Ch. 2.

McGillivray, Fiona and Alastair Smith. (2004) The Impact of Leadership Turnover on Trading Relations Between States. International Organization, vol. 58 (3): 567-600. Tools for Analyzing International Affairs Chapter 2, BdM. Shepsle and Bonchek, chapters 3 and 4. An Introduction to Game Theory Chapter 3, BdM. Dixit, Avinash and Susan Skeath. (2004) Games of Strategy. W.W. Norton & Company (not formal). Morrow, James D. (1994) Game Theory for Political Scientists. Princeton University Press (moderately formal). Osborne, Martin. (2004) An Introduction to Game Theory. Oxford University Press (formal). INTERNATIONAL SECURITY Theories of War Chapter 4 and 5, BdM. Fearon, James. (1995) Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization, 49 (3): 379-414. Levy, Jack. (1998) The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace. Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 1 (1): 139-65 Democratic Peace Chapter 6, BdM. 3

Debs, Alexander and Goemans, H. E. (2010) Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War. American Political Science Review, vol. 104 (3): 430-45. Gelpi, Christopher and Michael Griesdorf (2001) Winners or Losers? Democracies in International Crisis. American Political Science Review, vol. 95 (3): 633-47. Schultz, Kenneth. (1999) Do Democratic Institutions Constrain or Inform? Contrasting Two Institutional Explanations of the Democratic Peace. International Organization vol. 52 (1): 233-66. Terrorism Chapter 7, BdM. Sandler, Todd and Walter Enders. (2004) An economic perspective on transnational terrorism. European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 20: 301-16. Military Intervention Chapter 8, BdM. Meernik, James. (1996) United States Military Intervention and the Promotion of Democracy. Journal of Peace Research, vol. 33 (4): 391-402. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION Foreign Aid Chapter 9, BdM. Alesina and Dollar. (2000) Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why? Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 5: 33-63. BdM, Bruce and Smith, Alastair. (2007) Foreign Aid and Policy Concessions. Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 51 (2): 251-84. Neumayer, Eric. (2003) The Determinants of Aid Allocation by Regional Multilateral Development Banks and United Nation Agencies. International Studies Quarterly, 47: 102-21. The International Political Economy of Trade Chapter 10, BdM. Baldwin, Richard E. (1993) A Domino Theory of Regionalism, NBER Working Paper No. 4465. Kono, Daniel. (2006) Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency. American Political Science Review, vol. 100 (3): 369-84. Mansfield, E. D., Milner, H. V., and Rosendorff, B.P. (2000) Free to Trade: Democracies, 4

Autocracies and the International Trade, American Political Science Review, Vol. 94 (2): 30521. Milner, H. and Kubota, K. (2005) Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Country. International Organization, vol. 59 (1): 107-43. Rogowski, R. (1987) Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade. American Political Science Review, vol. 81 (4): 1121-37. The International Political Economy of Finance Bernhard, William and David Leblang. (2006) Democratic Politics and Financial Markets: Pricing Politics. Cambridge University Press Clark, William R. and Mark Hallerberg. (2000) Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policies. American Political Science Review, vol. 94 (2): 323-46 Hays, Jude C., John R. Freeman and Hans Nesseth. (2003) Exchange Rate Volatility and Democratization in Emerging Market Countries. International Studies Quarterly, 47(2): 20328 Jensen, N. M. (2003) Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment. International Organization, vol. 57 (3): 587-616. Keefer, P. (2007) Elections, Special Interests, and Financial Crisis. International Organization, vol. 61 (3): 607-41. Leblang, David. (2003) To Devalue or to Defend? The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy. International Studies Quarterly, vol. 47 (3):533-59. International Organizations Chapter 11, BdM. Downs, G. et al. (1998) Managing the Evolution of Multilateralism. International Organization, vol. 52 (2): 397-419. Elkins, Zachary, Andrew T. Guzman, and Beth A. Simmons (2006) Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000. International Organization, 60 (4): 811-46. Fearon, James D. (1998) Bargaining Enforcement and International Cooperation. International Organization, vol. 52 (1): 269-99. Goldstein, Judith, Douglas Rivers and Michael Tomz. (2007) Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effect of the GATT and WTO on World Trade. International Organization, vol. 61 (1): 37-67 Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal. (2001) The Rational Design of International Institutions. International Organization, 55 (4):761-99 5

Vreeland, James R. (2003) The IMF and Economic Development. Cambridge University Press.

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