Term Paper : Portfolio Management

Recent Crisis – Impact on Developing Countries

Submitted by:Girraj Meena (F-027) Tarun Saini (F-155)

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Contents The global financial crisis and developing countries .............................................. 3 Which countries are at risk and what can be done? ........................................... 3

Growth in developed and developing countries; decoupling or delayed coupling? ............................................................................................................ 3 Impact of the current financial crisis on developing countries ............................... 6 Which countries are at risk and how? .................................................................... 9 The Crisis and India .............................................................................................. 10 International Financial Architecture and the Role Of IMF .................................... 12 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 13 The future: building back better? ..................................................................... 15

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The global financial crisis and developing countries Which countries are at risk and what can be done? The global financial crisis is already causing a considerable slowdown in most developed countries. Governments around the world are trying to contain the crisis, but many suggest the worst is not yet over. Stock markets are down more than 40% from their recent highs. Investment banks have collapsed, rescue packages are drawn up involving more than a trillion US dollars, and interest rates have been cut around the world in what looks like a coordinated response. Leading indicators of global economic activity, such as shipping rates, are declining at alarming rates. What does the turmoil mean for developing countries? Many developing country economies are still growing strongly, but forecasts have been downgraded substantially in the space of a few months. And for how much longer can growth persist? What are the channels through which the crisis could spread to developing countries and how are the effects being felt in developing countries? Which developing countries will be able to withstand the international macro-economic challenges created by the downturn in developed economies, and which are most at risk? What is the role for development policy and what do developing country policy-makers need to know? This term paper discusses recent growth performance in developed and developing countries, the channels through which the global crisis affects developing countries, which countries might be most at risk, and possible policy responses.

Growth in developed and developing countries; decoupling or delayed coupling? With a recession already underway in the UK, Germany, France, the USA and other developed countries, it is quite startling to hear the Malawian finance minister argue that Malawi‟s economy is projected to grow by more than 8% this year. Yet this is today‟s stark reality. The USA is going through the greatest financial crisis since the 1930s, but, as the Financial Times has reported, Lagos is not Lehman. Nigeria, held back by decades of economic mismanagement, is growing at nearly 9%. Leaders in China suggest that they can help the world by offering growth rates of up to 10%, and many African countries still gain significantly from this (they are growing at 6-7%). Growth performances vary substantially among developed and developing countries. African growth exceeds OECD growth by margins not seen for 25 years; East Asia‟s growth is diverging as much as it did during the last significant global economic downturn in the early 1990s (see Figure 1).

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The relationship between OECD GDP and Africa‟s GDP has weakened as a result of the emergence of countries such as China, as well as structural changes in African economies. According to the IMF World Economic Outlook report in April 2008, a decline in world growth of one percentage point would lead to a 0.5 percentage 4

point drop in Africa‟s GDP, so the effects of global turmoil on Africa (via trade, FDI, aid) would be quite high. The correlation between African GDP and World GDP since 1980 is 0.5, but between 2000 and 2007, it was only 0.2. As there have been significant structural changes (and a move into services that were able to withstand competition much better) as well as the rise of China, African growth has temporarily decoupled from OECD GDP. Several Asian countries have built up healthy government reserves, and solid export performance has helped their strong current account position. Latin American countries are currently in a much better fiscal and external position compared to the 1990s, the decade in which several financial crises struck. However, there are also several worrying signs. The combination of high food prices and high oil prices has meant that, while the current account of oil and food importers was in balance by 2003, it was in deficit by 4% in 2007. Inflation has also doubled. Many developing and especially small and African countries are, therefore, in a bad position to face yet another crisis. The terms of trade shock tend to be highest in small importing countries such as Fiji, Dominica, Swaziland. However, African countries such as Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania are projected to have faced terms of trade shocks of greater than 5% of GDP (World Bank paper for the October 2008 Commonwealth Finance Ministers meeting).

And there are also signs of a slowdown in Asia, the engine of recent world growth. In the space of a couple of months, the Asian Development Bank has revised its forecast for Asian countries downwards by 1-2 percentage points. The IMF growth forecasts have been revised significantly, especially for the UK (-1.8 percentage points down from the last forecast for 2009), but also India (-1.1 percentage points 5

down to 6.9% real GDP growth), and China and Africa (both down by -0.5 percentage points to 9.3% and 6.3% respectively). The magnitude of the crisis will depend on the response of the USA and EU. Trillion dollar rescue packages are launched around the world, but while the markets may eventually respond, the UK is already in a recession. Its magnitude will depend, in part, on how accommodative monetary policy can be, with the recent interest rate cut a sure sign the authorities are concerned more about the financial crisis than recent inflationary pressures. There is less scope for expansionary fiscal policy – in fact these rescue measures have increased public debt.

Impact of the current financial crisis on developing countries The current financial crisis affects developing countries in two possible ways. First, there could be financial contagion and spillovers for stock markets in emerging markets. The Russian stock market had to stop trading twice; the India stock market dropped by 8% in one day at the same time as stock markets in the USA and Brazil plunged. Stock markets across the world – developed and developing – have all dropped substantially since May 2008. We have seen share prices tumble between 12 and 19% in the USA, UK and Japan in just one week, while the MSCI emerging market index fell 23%. This includes stock markets in Brazil, South Africa, India and China. We need to better understand the nature of the financial linkages, how they occur (as they do appear to occur) and whether anything can be done to minimize contagion. The past months have made it clear that the developing world is far from immune to the storms raging in financial markets in industrial countries. Stock prices in emerging markets have gone on similar roller coaster rides to those in New York and Europe, in a manner reminiscent of the behaviour of stock indices in the last major international financial upheaval in 1929/30 – the Great Depression. The credit crunch and freezing of interbank lending have been only too evident even in developing countries whose economic “fundamentals” were apparently strong and whose policy makers believed that they could de-couple from the global trends. This almost immediate diffusion of bad news is partly the result of financial liberalisation policies across the developing world that have made capital markets much more integrated directly through mobile capital flows, and created newer and similar forms of financial fragility almost everywhere (Akyuz 2008). But the international transmission of turbulence is only one of the ways in which the global financial crisis can and will affect developing countries. A medium-term implication is the impact on private capital flows to developing countries, which are likely to reduce with the credit crunch and with reduced appetite for risk among investors. The past five years witnessed an unprecedented increase in gross private capital flows to developing countries. Remarkably, however, this was not accompanied by a net transfer of financial resources, because all developing regions chose to accumulate foreign exchange reserves rather than actually use the money. Thus, there was an even more unprecedented 6

counter-flow from South to North in the form of central bank investments in safe assets and sovereign wealth funds of developing countries, a process which completely shattered the notion that free capital markets generate net financial flows from rich to poor countries. The likely reduction of capital flows into developing countries is generally perceived as bad news. But that is not necessarily true, since the earlier capital inflows were mostly not used for productive investment by the countries that received them. Instead, the external reserve build-up (which reflected attempts of developing countries to prevent their exchange rates from appreciating and to build a cushion against potential crises) proved quite costly for the developing world, in terms of interest rate differentials and unused resources. While some developing countries may indeed be adversely affected by the reduction in net capital inflows, for many other emerging markets thus may be a blessing in disguise as it reduces upward pressure on exchange rates and creates more emphasis on domestic resource mobilisation. Similarly, it is also very likely that the crisis will reduce official development assistance to poor countries. It is well known that foreign aid is strongly procyclical, in that developed countries‟ “generosity” to poor countries is adversely affected by any reversal in their own economic fortunes. But in any case development aid has also been experiencing an overall declining trend over the past two decades, even during the recent boom. In fact, the developed countries were extremely miserly even in providing debt relief to countries whose development prospects have been crippled by the need to repay large quantities of external debt that rarely contributed to actual growth. Notwithstanding the enormous international pressure for debt write-off, the G-8 6 countries have provided hardly any real debt relief. When they have done so, they have provided small amounts of relief along with very heavy and damaging policy conditionalities and in a blaze of self-serving publicity. So the speed and extent of the debt relief provided to their own large banks by the governments of the US and other developed countries, even when these banks have behaved far more irresponsibly, has not gone unnoticed in the developing world. One major source of foreign exchange that is already strongly affected is remittance incomes, especially from workers based in Northern countries. Already, the Inter-American Development Bank estimates that 2008 will be the first year on record during which the real value of inward remittances will fall in Latin America and the Caribbean. Remittances into Mexico (which are dominantly from workers based in the US) in August were already down 12 per cent compared to a year previously, and this will only get worse. There is also evidence of declining remittances from other countries that relied strongly on them, such as the Philippines, Bangladesh, Lebanon, Jordan and Ethiopia. In India, where around half of inward remittances currently come from the US, the same pattern of decline is likely. Exports of goods and services, like remittances, are going to be affected by the global economic downturn. For most developing countries, the US and the European Union remain the most important sources of final export demand, and as they 7

inevitably tip into recession, exports to these markets will also decline. All the loose talk of China emerging as the alternative engine of growth for the world economy has died down after China‟s exports contracted in the last two months of 2008 and domestic manufacturing stagnated. Chinese growth, which has pulled along many other Asian developing countries in a production chain, has been largely export-led. The US, EU and Japan together account for more than half of China‟s exports, and as their economic crisis intensifies, it is bound to affect both exports and economic activity in China. Even if China‟s policy makers respond by shifting to an emphasis on the domestic economy, for example through expansionary fiscal policy of along the lines suggested by the declared fiscal stimulus of $340 billion over two years, this is unlikely to generate levels of international demand that will come anywhere near to the meeting the shortfall created by recession in the developed countries. China‟s share of global imports is still too small for it to serve as a growth engine on the same scale. Across the developing world, one additional detrimental effect of the current crisis is likely to be the postponement or even cancellation of large investment projects whose ultimate profitability is now in doubt. This will have negative multiplier effects, as cancelled orders and lost jobs further reduce demand. The construction sector has already been hit, and many large projects are being cancelled even in economies that are still growing. The aviation sector is going through a major shakeout, which is evident even in India where there has already been a tendency towards mergers and worker retrenchment. The tourism and hospitality sector, which had emerged as an important employer in many developing countries, is facing cancellations and declining demand across both luxury and middle class segments. Second, the economic downturn in developed countries may also have significant impact on developing countries. The channels of impact on developing countries include: • Trade and trade prices-Growth in China and India has increased imports and pushed up the demand for copper, oil and other natural resources, which has led to greater exports and higher prices, including from African countries. Eventually, growth in China and India is likely to slow down, which will have knock on effects on other poorer countries. • Remittances-Remittances to developing countries will decline. There will be fewer economic migrants coming to developed countries when they are in a recession, so fewer remittances and also probably lower volumes of remittances per migrant. • Foreign direct investment (FDI) and equity investment-These will come under pressure. While 2007 was a record year for FDI to developing countries, equity finance is under pressure and corporate and project finance is already weakening. The proposed Xstrata takeover of a South African mining conglomerate was put on hold as the financing was harder due to the crunch. There are several other examples e.g. in India. • Commercial lending-Banks under pressure in developed countries may not be able to lend as much as they have done in the past. Investors are, increasingly, factoring in the risk of some emerging market countries defaulting on their debt, following the financial collapse of Iceland. This would limit investment in such countries as Argentina, Iceland, Pakistan and Ukraine. 8

• Aid-Aid budgets are under pressure because of debt problems and weak fiscal positions, e.g. in the UK and other European countries and in the USA. While the promises of increased aid at the Gleneagles summit in 2005 were already off track just three years later, aid budgets are now likely to be under increased pressure. • Other official flows-Capital adequacy ratios of development finance institutions will be under pressure. However these have been relatively high recently, so there is scope for taking on more risks. Each of these channels needs to be monitored, as changes in these variables have direct consequences for growth and development. Those countries that have done well by participating in the global economy may also lose out most, depending on policy responses, and this is not the time to reject globalization but to better understand how to regulate and manage the globalization processes for the benefit of developing countries. The impact on developing countries will vary. It will depend on the response in developed countries to the financial crisis and the slowdown, and the economic characteristics and policy responses, in developing countries.

Which countries are at risk and how? The list of channels above suggests that the following types of countries are most likely to be at risk (this is a selection of indicators): • Countries with significant exports to crisis affected countries such as the USA and EU countries (either directly or indirectly). Mexico is a good example; • Countries exporting products whose prices are affected or products with high income elasticity. Zambia would eventually be hit by lower copper prices, and the tourism sector in Caribbean and African countries will be hit; • Countries dependent on remittances. With fewer bonuses, Indian workers in the city of London, for example, will have less to remit. There will be fewer migrants coming into the UK and other developed countries, where attitudes might harden and job opportunities become more scarce; • Countries heavily dependent on FDI, portfolio and DFI finance to address their current account problems (e.g. South Africa cannot afford to reduce its interest rate, and it has already missed some important FDI deals); • Countries with sophisticated stock markets and banking sectors with weakly regulated markets for securities; • Countries with a high current account deficit with pressures on exchange rates and inflation rates. South Africa cannot afford to reduce interest rates as it needs to attract investment to address its current account deficit. India has seen a devaluation as well as high inflation. Import values in other countries have already weakened the current account; • Countries with high government deficits. For example, India has a weak fiscal position which means that they cannot put schemes in place; • Countries dependent on aid. While the effects will vary from country to country, the economic impacts could include: 9

• Weaker export revenues; • Further pressures on current accounts and balance of payment; • Lower investment and growth rates; • Lost employment. There could also be social effects: • Lower growth translating into higher poverty;

The Crisis and India When the crisis first broke internationally, within India there was much talk of how the Indian economy is less likely to be affected and how the Indian financial sector will be relatively immune to the winds from the international financial implosion. But it is clear that important elements of the balance of payments and the domestic financial sector have been affected. There are significant implications for domestic banking, which are already reflected in the credit crunch that has dramatically affected access to credit especially for small and medium enterprises. There are effects on some important macroeconomic prices – in particular the exchange rate. And there are direct and indirect effects on employment, with falling export employment generating negative multiplier effects.

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Despite all this, Indian policy makers still seem to be caught in some complacent time-warp, whereby they proudly point to the GDP growth rate (now spluttering, but still high by international standards) and to the supposed “resilience” of the domestic financial sector. Of course, neither of these is as positive as the government would like to make out. The current slowdown in GDP is sharper than the government would like to admit, and more significantly it has been accompanied by a much steeper than expected reduction in employment, especially in export sectors. Domestic banking is still generally secure, especially because nationalised banking remains the core of the system, largely thanks to resistance from the Left parties to government attempts to privatise it. Even so, there are clear signs of fragility and inadequacy within the banking sector: the recent rapid growth of often dodgy retail credit, associated attempts to securitise such debt, the emergence of a credit crunch in the face of macroeconomic uncertainty, and the inability or unwillingness of the banking system to provide loans to medium and small borrowers other than in the form of personal credit.

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International Financial Architecture and the Role Of IMF Progressive change will require fundamental changes in the system of organising global finance and the institutions that govern trade and finance. But such changes will not come easily. The global financial and trading system is one that for many generations has been almost exclusively determined by the governments of western former colonial powers, and their writ still runs large in all the global institutions. Thus, the G-7 which leaves out Russia and China, not to mention India and Brazil, still presumes that it has the right to redesign the international financial architecture. The Financial Stability Forum of the Bank for International Settlements excludes any representation from developing countries. The tiny countries of Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg, with a total population of less than 28 million, have more votes in the IMF than China, Brazil or India. The role of the IMF has once more assumed significance in this changed context. It has been some time now since the IMF lost its intellectual credibility, especially in the developing world. Its policy prescriptions were widely perceived to be rigid and 12

unimaginative, applying a uniform approach to very different economies and contexts. They were also completely outdated even in theoretical terms, based on economic models and principles that have been refuted not only by more sophisticated heterodox analyses but also by further developments within neoclassical theory. What may have been more damning was how out of sync the policies proposed by the IMF have also been with the reality of economic processes in developing countries. The 1990s and early 2000s were particularly bad for the organisation in that respect: their economists and policy advisers got practically everything wrong in all the emerging market crises they were called upon to deal with, from Thailand and South Korea to Turkey to Argentina. In situations in which the crisis had been caused by private profligacy they called for larger fiscal surpluses; faced with crisisinduced asset deflation they emphasised high interest rates and tight money policies; to address downward economic spirals they demanded fiscal contraction through reductions in public spending. Possible Policy Responses The current macro economic and social challenges posed by the global financial crisis require a much better understanding of appropriate policy responses: i. There needs to be a better understanding of what can provide financial stability, how cross border cooperation can help to provide the public good of international financial rules and systems, and what the most appropriate rules are with respect to development; ii. There needs to be an understanding of whether and how developing countries can minimize financial contagion; iii. Developing countries will also need to manage the implications of the current economic slowdown – after a period of strong and continued growth in developing countries, which has promoted interest in structural factors of growth, international macroeconomic management will now move up the policy agenda. Do countries have room to use fiscal and monetary policies? iv. Developing countries need to understand the social outcomes and provide appropriate social protection schemes;

Conclusion Any general conclusions on both the impact of and response to the GEC must begin with a large health warning. At the risk of stating the obvious, the developing countries of the world, their patterns of resilience and vulnerability, and the lives of poor women and men within them are simply too diverse to permit easy generalizations. Moreover the GEC has moved (and is still moving) across the world through transmission channels of different speed and intensity. Finally, the GEC has interacted with other crises, notably those of food and fuel prices, in complex ways. But if one word emerges from Oxfam‟s research into the impact of the GEC, it is resilience of countries, communities, households, and individuals. At a household level, such resilience is to a large extent, built on the agency of poor people 13

themselves, their friends and families, and local institutions such as churches or community groups. More broadly, a community or household‟s resilience to a shock such as the GEC is to a large extent determined long before the crisis actually strikes. Pre-crisis factors that have strengthened resilience on this occasion include: Economic Structures: Dependence on one or two commodities or markets increases the risk should they go into freefall; the degree and nature of integration with the global economy, particularly of the financial sector, has also proved a source of vulnerability. Countries that retain state control over a portion of the banking system have been more able to use those banks to channel credit to cash starved small producers and SMEs. Countries with effective systems of domestic taxation in place reduce their vulnerability to sudden losses of trade taxes or foreign capital inflows. Building regional trade links can offer a bulwark against slumps in global markets. Role of the State: Resilience is enhanced when governments have entered the crisis with „fiscal space‟ in the form of high reserves, budget surpluses and low debt burdens. Effective state bureaucracies capable of responding rapidly to the crisis with fiscal stimulus measures have also shown their worth. Well-designed and implemented labour laws are needed to deter employers from taking advantage of the crisis to attack workers‟ rights, while support for agriculture has provided families with the ability to subsistence farm as a buffer against both high food prices, and loss of alternative sources of income. Social Policies: Countries with free health and education, and effective social protection systems, have proved more resilient, reducing the vulnerability of poor people to health shocks, reducing school dropout rates in response to falling incomes, and providing „shock absorbers‟ against falls in household incomes. More generally, automaticity is beneficial in a crisis: if automatic stabilizers such as unemployment insurance, or demand-driven public works schemes like India‟s National Rural Employment Guarantee Schemeare already in place, they can respond immediately to a crisis rather than wait for decisions by hard-pressed governments fighting the crisis on several fronts. Cash transfer programmes such as Brazil‟s lauded bolsa familia scheme were already catering to 100 million poor people across Latin America, and it is far easier to scale them up to inject cash into poor communities, than to design new schemes from scratch. The „fog of war‟ generated by a crisis also increases the likelihood of emergency responses being badly designed, or captured by vested interests. This focus on resilience appears somewhat at variance with the „big numbers‟ routinely quoted by development organizations (including Oxfam) in discussions of the crisis, for example that 50-100m more people (depending on the source) were driven into extreme poverty in 2009 due to the crisis. These numbers are extremely rough and ready, based on either the predicted fall in economic output and the „poverty elasticity of growth‟ at regional or national levels, or on predicted changes in consumption levels (assumed to be distributionally neutral within country). It will be some time before household surveys provide a genuine picture of the poverty impact of the crisis, but our research suggests the final figures may well fall short of these numbers. But resilience, whether national or individual, has its limits. Assets once spent take years to recoup; working extra hours in second or third jobs leaves a legacy of exhaustion; loans taken on to finance consumption accumulate 14

into crushing debt burdens. When they get it right, governments, aid donors and others can strengthen and replenish the sources of resilience. What lessons can be learned for future crises? At a minimum, keep spending (in the medium term). Governments in most countries entered the crisis in a better fiscal position than in previous crises, and have largely kept to their spending commitments, avoiding the kind of pro-cyclical cuts that have aggravated recessions in past crises. In so doing, many have gone into fiscal deficit, and it remains to be seen whether they can maintain such commitments until the economy picks up again. Especially in low income countries in Africa and elsewhere, much will depend on aid donors sticking to their promises to increase aid, despite their renewed fiscal constraints. Monitor the impact and talk to people: The best responses have involved on the ground, real-time monitoring of the impact of the crisis, and genuine dialogue with affected communities about the best way to respond. Make sure the right people benefit from responses: One near-universal characteristic of responses to date is gender blindness. Governments have responded to job losses in textiles and garments industries, largely of women, by channeling fiscal stimuli into construction, which largely employs men. Big capital intensive infrastructure projects in any case create far fewer jobs than the local level public works exemplified by the NREGS. Attempts to inject credit into cash-starved economies too often end up being pounced upon by large enterprises, who employ relatively few workers, rather than benefiting small, labour intensive firms, or people working in the vast informal economies of the South.

The future: building back better? The crisis continues to ebb and flow through the world‟s economy, and the extent and nature of the eventual recovery remains unclear. It is therefore difficult to discern any clear picture of what lasting changes may result. One fairly certain feature of the post crisis world is that the nostra of „Anglo-Saxon capitalism‟ and its accompanying Washington Consensus policies are damaged goods. On a global scale, the crisis has precipitated a massive and seemingly irreversible shift in the geopolitical centre of gravity from West to East, epitomised by the coronation of the G20 and its eclipse of the G8. The coming decades could be more about the Beijing Consensus than the Washington version. This shift contains some positives for developing countries, including a stronger recognition of the critical role of the state in development, and the importance of regional and domestic markets, as healthy counterweights to excessive reliance on global trade. It may also lead to a greater degree of caution over the potential pitfalls of liberalized financial and capital markets, although the rebound of the „bonuses are back‟ cultures of Wall Street and the City suggest that battle is not yet over. The crisis has driven home the centrality of resilience and vulnerability in the lives of poor people. While economists prefer to talk about stocks and average flows, it is volatility and shocks that can inflict sudden catastrophe, if people, communities and countries are not prepared for them. The GEC has marked the coming of age of social protection as a development issue and more widely, the

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importance of managing risk and volatility at all levels. It is not enough to pursue economic growth now, and social welfare later – the two must come together. So much for the good news, but the response to the GEC has also contained serious flaws. Even those countries that are adopting improved social protection systems seldom extend them to migrants or those working in the informal economy, both of which have been significantly hit by the crisis. Elsewhere, governments have sleepwalked their way through the GEC, giving little evidence of even being aware of, let alone seeking to grapple with the crisis. At a broader level, the crisis response has had only a tenuous connection with the other great development issue of the last few years: climate change and the need to move rapidly to a low carbon economy. Fiscal stimuli in the rich countries have largely squandered the opportunity to introduce a „Green New Deal‟, a failing mirrored in most developing countries, with, perhaps, a few exceptions in East Asia. Poverty is not just about income, it is about fear and anxiety over what tomorrow may bring. This crisis is not the last, but if one of its lessons is that reducing vulnerability and building resilience is the central task of development, then future crises may bring less suffering in their wake. References i.

Oxfam International (2010) „Gender and the Economic Crisis: A Discussion Paper‟, Oxford: Oxfam International. [WORKING TITLE ONLY]

ii.

Z.E. Horn (2009) „No Cushion to Fall Back On: The global economic crisis and informal workers‟, Inclusive Cities project, Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO).

iii.

Asian Development Bank. 2009. Asian Development Outlook 2009 Special Note December 2009

iv.

Chhibber, A., Ghosh, J. and Palanivel, T. (2009) The Global Financial Crisis and the Asia-Pacific region - A Synthesis Study Incorporating Evidence from Country Case Studies, UNDP Regional Centre in Asia and the Pacific.

v.

World Bank, 2009

vi.

http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN0334 95.pdf.

vii.

Chandra, A. (2009), „Global economic crisis, civil society and economic governance in ASEAN: Re-embedding the market?‟, paper given at „Reembedding the Market‟, available online at (accessed 10 December 2009): https://confluencevre.its.monash.edu.au/download/attachments/18973673/Global+Economic+C risis.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1258609204000. Feeny, S. (forthcoming) The impact of the Global Economic Crisis on the Pacific,Oxfam Australia and RMIT.

viii.

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