Religion, Political Power and Human Capital Formation: Evidence from Islamic History Eric Chaney∗ March 2018

Abstract This essay links the rise and subsequent decline of scientific output in the medieval Islamic world to institutional changes. The rise of secular bureaucratic institutions stimulated scientific output whereas the collapse of these bureaucratic structures —and the concomitant rise in the political power of religious leaders— suppressed it. The essay concludes that secular state capacity can help encourage scientific development by constraining rent-seeking religious elements within civil society.

∗

Oxford University, [email protected]. I thank Jared Rubin for helpful comments. Any remaining errors are mine.

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The flowering of scientific production in the medieval Islamic world has received increased scholarly attention in recent years (e.g. Saliba, 2007; Dallal, 2010). For some, this historical episode demonstrates the compatibility of Islam and science. For others, it represents a temporary deviation from Islam’s obscurantist pull. These conflicting views stem partly from the fact that the reasons behind the rise and subsequent decline in scientific production remain poorly understood. This essay draws on recent and ongoing research to locate the “Golden Age” of scientific advances in the Islamic world’s institutional history. In particular, the rise of scientific production is linked to the waxing of secular bureaucratic structures in the late eighth century CE whereas the decline is attributed to the waning of these structures in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. How did the rise of a secular bureaucracy encourage scientific development? The emergence of rationalized forms of administration increased the demand for secular knowledge and politically empowered secular elites such as administrators, astrologers, doctors and secretaries (Crone, 2006, pp. 23-24). These individuals joined rulers in their patronage of scientific works both for practical (Sabra, 1996, p. 662) as well as for ideological reasons (Gutas, 1998; David, 2008). A period of institutional change in the late eleventh and twelfth centuries, traditionally known as the Sunni Revival, resulted in the decline of the secular bureaucracy. This empowered religious leaders (e.g. Gibb, 1982a, p. 24) who molded the institutional environment to discourage scientific production that undermined their societal influence. I hypothesize that an increasingly militarized government undermined the secular bureaucracy and allowed religious leaders to take control of civil society. This in turn contributed to the emergence of educational institutions such as madrasas that decreased the relative payoff to producing science. As the payoff structure shifted in favor of the production of religious knowledge, talent increasingly flowed away from the study of scientific topics, leading to a decline in both the quality and quantity of scientific works produced (Baumol, 1990; Murphy et al., 1991). Conceptually, this historical account is related to the growing literature highlighting the relationship between state capacity and economic outcomes (e.g. Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013; Acemoglu et al., 2015; Dell et al., 2017). In particular, it suggests that secular state structures can help constrain rent-seeking religious elites within civil society. In this sense, it is consistent with Acemoglu and Robinson (2017) who argue that growth-promoting state structures 2

constrain (and in turn are constrained by) civil society. The essay also complements the growing literature arguing that “religion matters” in understanding differences in human capital formation rates across societies (e.g. Mokyr, 2002; Becker and Woessmann, 2009; Botticini and Eckstein, 2012; Benabou et al., 2013). Consistent with Cantoni and Yuchtman (2013); Cantoni et al. (2017), I argue that where religious elites are more powerful they will favor an institutional and educational framework that discourages human capital accumulation that could detract from their control over the population (see Acemoglu and Autor, 2012, for a related discussion). This view suggests that better understanding these political constraints may help clarify why some religions historically encouraged human capital formation to a greater extent than others. Finally, this essay is related to studies investigating the economic rise of the Western World. The literature increasingly highlights the role of the technological and scientific dynamism of the West as a key driver of the divergence both within the West and between the West and the rest of the world (e.g. Mokyr, 2005; A’Hearn et al., 2009; Buringh and van Zanden, 2009; Squicciarini and Voigtlander, 2015). It is often forgotten, however, that the Islamic world outstripped the West technologically and scientifically for much of the Middle Ages. The analysis in this paper suggests that future research investigating how the political equilibrium in the West placed constraints on religious leaders may provide insights into the greater scientific and technological development of the West in the run-up to the Industrial Revolution. The remainder of the essay proceeds as follows: section 1 provides a brief overview of scientific development in the medieval Islamic world. Section 2 locates these advances within the Islamic world’s institutional history and section 3 concludes.

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Science in the Medieval Islamic World: a Brief Background

Scholars broadly agree that for much of the medieval period Islamic societies led the world in both technology and science (e.g. Huff, 2003, p. 48). While the factors that led to this surge in intellectual output remain a topic of debate, its timing is reasonably well known. From the rise of Islam in the seventh century until the start of the Abbasid Caliphate in 750 CE, the nascent Islamic world produced

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relatively little scientific output.1 Abbasid Caliphs over the following century sponsored a translation movement aimed at rendering every available scientific text into Arabic (Gutas, 1998). This translation movement coincided with and served as a catalyst for the explosion of scientific output that occurred in the Islamic world over the following centuries. Scientists during this period made important advances in fields as varied as astronomy, mathematics, medicine and optics (Kennedy, 1970, p. 337).2 Indeed, many scientific works from the medieval Islamic world were eventually translated into Latin and are believed to have played a central role in the scientific development of Western Europe during the late medieval and early modern periods (e.g. Lindberg, 1978). According to Brentjes (2009, p. 305) there were “two major periods for the patronage of scientific knowledge,” the first spanning roughly the eighth to the twelfth centuries and the second running from the twelfth to the nineteenth century. During the first period, rulers, bureaucrats and wealthy urban groups funded scientific output and also established institutions such as libraries where scientific topics were studied (e.g. Brentjes, 2009, p. 305). Rulers and other wealthy individuals patronized scientists for both prestige (David, 2008) and for the “practical benefits promised by the practitioners of medicine and astronomy and astrology and applied mathematics” (Sabra, 1996, p. 662). In the second period, funding for intellectual pursuits shifted to religious institutions such as madrasas. Unlike the direct patronage system of the first period, in the second period rulers and wealthy individuals endowed religious institutions dedicated to knowledge production. Prospective scholars who wished to be appointed to these posts generally had to specialize in the production of religious knowledge (Makdisi, 1981, p. 285). One line of scholarship implies that this shift in the patronage structures was the product of the Sunni Revival which began sometime in the eleventh century. Traditionally, scholars have stressed the ideological aspects of this shift arguing that the Revival marked the final triumph of traditionalist religious leaders in their battle against rationalism (e.g. Makdisi, 1973, p. 168). As traditionalists 1 In the century following the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 CE, Arab-Islamic armies conquered a vast territory reaching from modern-day France to Pakistan. The immediate successors to Muhammad (known as the Rashidun Caliphs) were followed by the Umayyad Dynasty in 661 which was replaced, in turn, by the Abbasid Dynasty in 750. Contrary to what is implied in many studies, this dynasty was relatively short-lived, at least in its ability to directly control territory. Generally speaking, after 945 the Abbasid Caliphs no longer controlled territory and primarily provided their blessing upon the true holders of power across the Islamic world. In 1258, this state of affairs came to an end when the last Abbasid Caliph was killed by the Mongols. 2 The term scientist is, admittedly, anachronistic. Throughout, I use this term in place of others such as natural philosopher for expositional ease.

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gained societal influence, madrasas replaced institutions such as libraries focused on scientific research (Makdisi, 1981, p. 10).3 Historical evidence suggests that traditionalist religious leaders worked to orchestrate these institutional changes. These elites had long criticized rationalist interpretations of Islam, claiming that they led to a loss of belief (e.g. Kraemer, 1986, p. 72). Madrasas are generally believed to have served the traditionalist agenda by discouraging rationalist strains of Islam, unrestricted study of scientific topics and innovation more broadly (e.g. Talbani, 1996).4 Other explanations for the medieval decline of scientific output compete with the Revival hypothesis in the literature. For centuries, scholars have stressed the role that the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century played in bringing about the medieval decline. Although the mechanisms through which these shocks affected scientific output remain a topic of debate, the existing scholarship often stresses the importance of the destruction of physical and human capital as well as institutional and cultural changes (for one critical review of this hypothesis, see Saliba, 2007, p. 235). In recent years, a new line of scholarship has emerged challenging the entire medieval decline narrative. For example, Saliba (2007) provides overwhelming evidence that important advances continued to be produced in the Islamic world long after the supposed decline of scientific production. He suggests that the decline did not begin until the sixteenth century. Chaney (2016) provides new empirical evidence suggesting that scientific output declined in the late eleventh century. Such evidence casts doubt on both Mongol and revisionist narratives, suggesting the importance of better understanding the mechanisms through which the Revival dampened scientific production.

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Scientific Development in Institutional Perspective

Existing studies of scientific development in the Islamic world tend to abstract from the region’s institutional and political history. In this section, I argue that this political history can explain both the 3

While there are isolated examples of madrasas solely dedicated to funding scientific endeavors most available posts were dedicated to the production of religious knowledge (e.g. Brentjes, 2009, p. 313). 4 Rationalism, innovation and the unrestricted study of science were believed to lead individuals to a loss of belief. Consistent with this view, Stroumsa (1999) provides examples of the deist/atheist figures that emerged during the Golden Age. Also, see Glaeser and Sacerdote (2008) for evidence of a negative relationship between religious beliefs and human capital formation.

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rise and subsequent decline of scientific activity during the medieval period. The basic premise underlying this hypothesis is consistent with recent evidence linking the rise of scientific activity in the medieval Islamic world to institutional changes. For example, Gutas (1998) recounts how the emergence of the Abbasid Caliphate led to a resurgence of pre-Islamic institutional forms which led to the translation movement and subsequent scientific activity. In particular, his analysis suggests that the rise of the secular bureaucracy during this period was “instrumental” in stimulating scientific development and that state functionaries constituted “one of the most important social groups” patronizing scientific activities (Gutas, 1998, p. 128).5 Scholars have long noted that the rise of the Abbasid Caliphate represented a break with previous institutional arrangements. Importantly, the Abbasid Revolution politically empowered non-Arab (initially largely Persian) bureaucratic elites who aimed to remold institutions on pre-Islamic Iranian patterns (Gibb, 1982b, p. 66). The increased political power of this group, in turn, stemmed from the fact that both Persianized Arabs and Persians played a central role in bringing the Abbasids to power (Gutas, 1998, p. 29). Thus, the Abbasid revolution led to a marked change in both the size and political influence of the secular bureaucracy (e.g. Biddle, 1972, p. v) and by the start of the ninth century this bureaucracy had become “a major political and cultural force” (Kennedy, 2004, p. 146). How did the rise of a secular bureaucracy encourage scientific development? The emergence of rationalized forms of administration increased the demand for secular knowledge and politically empowered secular elites such as administrators, astrologers, doctors and secretaries (Crone, 2006, pp. 23-24). These individuals joined rulers in their patronage of scientific works both for practical (Sabra, 1996, p. 662) as well as for ideological reasons (Gutas, 1998; David, 2008). Saliba (2007, pp. 58-64) argues that competition between bureaucrats also worked to stimulate scientific output.6 As the bureaucracy expanded and competition increased, incumbent bureaucrats “resorted to higher specialization through the translation of the more advanced sciences” to secure their positions (Saliba, 2007, p. 65). Regardless of the exact mechanisms at work, the educational needs of these bureaucrats are generally viewed as a central impetus for scientific development (e.g. Gutas, 1998, p. 115). For example, algebra is believed to have been developed, at least in part, to address engineering and irrigation problems bureaucrats 5

The term secular bureaucracy has been used by Goitein (1957, p. 597) among others. It is worth noting that Saliba (2007) sees the rise of the translation movement in this competition, which in his view is rooted in the bureaucratic reforms of the late Umayyad period. 6

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faced at the time (Gutas, 1998, p. 113). Although the rise of the secular bureaucracy had benign consequences for scientific development, it also reflected an attempt to build autocratic state structures. Opposition to this project began early on as disaffected groups began to organize opposition to government policy around religious ideals. These groups are generally viewed as proto-ulama or the first of the religious elites that were to play a central role throughout much of Islamic history (Hodgson, 1974a, p. 250). As Arab elites in the Umayyad dynasty became increasingly autocratic, the distance between these religious elites and the ruling class grew. This process continued under the Abbasids and played a central role in the development of Islamic law (Hallaq, 2009, pp. 128-129). Some scholars have viewed the development of this law —which largely developed outside state structures— as an attempt to constrain increasingly autocratic caliphs (e.g. Crone and Hinds, 2003, pp. 108-109). The process is believed to have come to a head during the Abbasid Caliphate during what is known as the Mihna (833-848). During this period, the Abbasid Caliph attempted to undermine this growing opposition by forcing religious leaders to adhere to rationalist interpretations of Islam. After this attempt failed, Abbasid caliphs introduced the slave soldier system that characterized much of the Islamic world over the following centuries (Crone, 1980). The timing of the failure of the Mihna and the introduction of slave soldiers suggests that these two events may have been related. In particular, it seems plausible that the introduction of slave soldiers marked an attempt by caliphs to circumvent the growing constraints that the autonomous development of Islamic law threatened to place on their rule (Crone and Hinds, 2003, pp. 108-109). Recent analyses support this claim (Blaydes and Chaney, 2013; Chaney, 2013; Blaydes and Chaney, 2016).7

2.1

Slave Soldiers, Militarization of Government Structures and Scientific Decline

The introduction of armies staffed by slaves marked a “major innovation in Middle Eastern history” (Lapidus, 2014, p. 86). Although the use of military slaves began in the ninth century, this institution did not fully develop until the tenth century (Kennedy, 2004, p. 204).8 Although the introduction of 7 More broadly, the idea that slave soldiers were introduced to reduce constraints on the caliphs is consistent with both Fukuyama (2011, p. 192) and Lapidus (1982, p. 717). 8 See Blaydes and Chaney (2013) for an in depth overview of this institution.

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slave soldiers is often viewed as an attempt to create a loyal military, these slaves “had a disconcerting tendency to take over the state and tear it apart from within” (Tor, 2008, p. 223). The historian Miskawayh (who died in 1030 CE) records how the introduction of slave soldiers undermined bureaucratic structures. After the introduction of slave soldiers he notes how “the bureaucracy was shut down and the bureaucratic secretaries and tax collectors disappeared [... instead the land was managed by] slave soldiers and agents who did not take care of what was in their power or manage the land in a fruitful manner” (Miskawayh, 1915 [1030], pp. 97-98). Lapidus (2014, p. 179) sums up such evidence, noting how these soldiers “destroyed established elites.” This process culminated in the institutional changes known as the Sunni Revival in the second half of the twelfth century. During this period, the secular bureaucracy contracted in what has been described as the militarization of final governmental power (Hodgson, 1974b, p. 64). As the secular bureaucracy contracted, religious leaders filled the void, emerging as social and political elites in addition to religious ones (Gilliot et al., 2012). Thus, during the Revival, civil society “came under the purview of Islam” as religious scholars “took charge of judicial administration, local police, irrigation, public works and taxation” (Lapidus, 1996, pp. 13-14). During this period the madrasa spread across much of the Islamic world, in what is widely viewed as a sign of the increased political influence of religious elites. As religious leaders gained political power, they could have continued to support scientific research in madrasas or other waqf institutions had they desired. The available evidence, however, suggests that while some scholars employed in madrasas continued to work on scientific topics, the sciences were “banished from the regular course of institutionalized education” under the law of waqf (Makdisi, 1981, p. 283). The evidence suggests that religious elites used their increased influence to limit the study of science because they believed that the unrestricted study of science led to religious skepticism which undermined, in turn, their control over the population. Such skepticism had been widespread among the secular bureaucrats who were “often disinclined to defer to religious scholars” (Crone, 2006, pp. 23-24). To prevent such skepticism, religious elites advocated restricting the study of science to individuals who could be trusted to not go astray (in practice, primarily religious leaders themselves).9 This desire to 9 For example, al-Ghazālī notes that those who study sciences (in this case geometry and arithmetic often) “have gone beyond their study into innovations (i.e. non-orthodox beliefs) and thus the weak (in faith) should be barred from their study like the boy is barred from the bank of the river so that he does not fall in” (al-Ghazālī, 1111 [2005], p. 31). Sabra (1987, p. 237) notes that after the Revival, scientists “were imbued with Muslim learning and tradition.”

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eradicate skepticism appears to have guided the crafting of the post-Revival education system. Thus, in addition to limiting the study of science, this system is believed to have discouraged “questioning, verifying, criticizing, evaluating and making judgements” while encouraging “the uncritical acceptance of authority” (Halstead, 2004, p. 526). As madrasa-employed religious leaders worked with military elites to prevent “unfettered private inquiry by persons not trained to come to the right answers” the “liberty of opinion” that had characterized the previous centuries came to a close (Hodgson, 1974b, p. 192). Chaney (2016) provides empirical evidence consistent with this historical narrative, showing that scientific production experienced a significant drop during the Revival.

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Conclusion

This essay has argued that the Islamic world’s Golden Age of scientific production was closely linked to the region’s secular bureaucratic structures. I have provided evidence that these institutions encouraged scientific production by both increasing demand for scientific output and by constraining religious leaders opposed to the study of scientific topics. The introduction of slave soldiers and the eventual militarization of government led to the collapse of this bureaucracy and the empowerment of religious leaders. These religious elites worked to restrict scientific production that undermined their societal position. The evidence presented in this paper weighs against claims that Islam is uniquely inimical to scientific development. Instead, and consistent with Rubin (2017), it argues that secular state structures can play a fundamental role in constraining rent-seeking religious elites aiming to restrict scientific research. In this sense, it suggests strengthening secular institutions across the Islamic world may encourage scientific production today.

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