CHAPTER 1

Defining That Which Is Other to Religion Ryan T. Cragun Associate Professor, Department of Sociology The University of Tampa, FL

As is the case with most areas of research, scholars studying that which is other to religion have wrestled with terminology and the definitions of terms. Of course, all definitions are conditional and scholars can mold and shape them to fit their particular research objective. Even so, a general level of agreement on the definitions of terms can be helpful in clarifying the focus of a field of inquiry. Shared definitions also can help ensure that scholars are talking with each other rather than past each other. This chapter has two primary aims: (1) to provide definitions of the key terms that are common in the study of what is considered “other” to religion, and (2) to attempt to provide some context regarding the definitions of the key terms, illustrating why definitions are not always universally agreed upon by those employing them. The definitions proposed in this chapter will, no doubt, have more appeal to some scholars than others, and not everyone will agree with every definition. Those disagreements have been addressed in discussing the various terms employed. Before discussing the terms employed by those who study this topic, it may be helpful to discuss briefly what is meant by religion so what is mean by religion’s other is also more clearly elucidated. There have been many definitions of religion proposed over the years, ranging from the overly broad to the overly specific. To date, no field of scholarly study that takes religion as its focus (e.g., anthropology, psychology, sociology, and religious studies) has coalesced on a single, universal definition of religion. This means that the study of what is other to religion is also difficult to define, because it is difficult to study anything that is other if that central thing is ill defined. Even so, there are a few well-known and widely employed definitions that are worth mentioning. Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) proposed one of the most famous but also most problematic definitions of religion. For Durkheim, religion was that which is sacred in society. Superficially, this definition seems to work well, as most of the organizations that are generally considered to be religions do, in fact, have sacred components to them. However, there are many other aspects of society that are considered sacred that are not typically considered religious, such as flags, families, and for some, sports teams. Thus, Durkheim’s definition is overly broad because sacred things are found outside the context of what most people would consider religious.

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A different approach has been to suggest that religion is context specific. Such definitions consider religion to be a signifier that may or may not mean the same thing in different contexts. Thus, what religion is in Japan is different from what religion is in Jordan or in Jamaica. This definition could also be overly broad in that it would include whatever people in a given context consider religion, but it’s also overly specific in that it is difficult to offer a comprehensive definition of religion other than to say, “Religion is whatever people in society X say it is.” Although technically precise, and useful in illustrating the diversity of religion, this approach fails to offer a general definition that might encompass what most people would consider religion. A third and fairly popular approach to defining religion stems from the work of Max Weber (1864–1920) who suggested that religions were collective beliefs (and often rituals) relative to the supernatural. There are two key components to this definition. The first component is that the beliefs are relative to the “supernatural.” Super- means “above” or “beyond.” When applied to -nature, “supernatural” refers to that which is above or beyond nature or that which we are unable to sense using our five senses or tools that we have developed to enhance those senses. The supernatural would include gods, demons, ghosts, angels, jinni, fairies, and spirits. The second key component is that religion has to be collective beliefs. Some examples should help illustrate the importance of this component of the definition. A pregnant woman who believes she is going to give birth to a demon would likely be considered insane. However, if thousands of people believe that a virgin gave birth to a god, that is not collective insanity; it is a religion. This definition works well to capture most of those institutions and organizations we consider religions (e.g., Catholicism, Hinduism, and Shintoism), but excludes those we do not (e.g., families and football teams). There are many other definitions that have been proposed for religion other than these three. The point of offering these three definitions is not necessarily to suggest that there is one, absolute, universal definition of religion, but rather to show there is some general agreement on the domain that should be considered religion yet debate continues on precise definitions and terminology. The same is true when it comes to definitions and terms in the study of what is other to religion.

SECULAR AND SECULARITY The word secular is perhaps the most neutral of all the terms that will be discussed in this chapter. The English words secular and secularity both come from the Latin saecularis, which means, variously, “worldly,” “temporal,” or “of a generation, belonging to an age.” The word secular was introduced into Christian thought by theologians as a reference to that which is not religious. In other words, secular is an adjective that describes things that are not religious in orientation. For example, sleeping would typically be considered a secular activity, as would exercising. In contrast, praying to a god or burning incense to one’s dead relatives would typically be considered religious activities. Thus, secular is a reference to that which is not religious. Secularity is the state of being secular or apart from religion. It is common today for the word secular to be applied as a descriptor to many aspects of social life. For instance, a secular government would be a government that is not attached to or affiliated with a specific religion (though this does not necessarily mean that the government does not privilege or favor a religion). A secular university would be a university that is not affiliated with a religion. Many early universities in the United States, such as

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Chapter 1: Defining That Which Is Other to Religion

Yale University, began as religious institutions. Yale University was originally founded to train Congregationalist ministers, and the governance of the university was tied to that denomination. However, over time, Yale University administrators distanced the governance of the university from the denomination to the point that the university is, today, almost exclusively secular in orientation. It is important to note that secular and secularity imply no particular perspective on religion; they are essentially neutral terms. The neutrality of these terms is apparent in light of the fact that many religious people engage in secular activities, such as visiting amusement parks or watching sporting events. In those instances, people who consider themselves religious are engaged in secular activities that are unrelated to religion. This does not make them hostile toward religion. It only indicates that they engage in activities that are apart from religion.

SECULARISM Building on the same root as secular, secularism is primarily viewed today as a political philosophy that advocates a separation between religion and government. The “-ism” suffix turns the word secular into a philosophy or ideology rooted in the idea that there should be distance between that which is religious and that which is secular when it comes to government. Jacques Berlinerblau argues in How to be Secular (2013) that secularism advocates for two primary interests: “(1) the individual citizen’s need for freedom of, or freedom from, religion, and (2) a state’s need to maintain order” (xvi). I’ll discuss each of these in turn. Although widely accepted today in many countries around the world and enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the idea that individuals should have a right or the freedom to choose their religion is a relatively recent development in world history. For instance, when Martin Luther broke away from the Roman Catholic Church in the sixteenth century, leading to the Protestant Reformation, in a short time span millions of Europeans were forced to become Protestants at the behest of their governments when those governments adopted Lutheranism as the state religion. For instance, in Sweden, the transition of the state religion from Catholicism to Lutheranism took place between 1523 and 1527. During that time, the King, Gustav Vasa, was able to take control over the national church and convert it from Catholicism to Lutheranism. As a result, Swedes began to be instructed in Lutheranism and became Lutherans. Swedes did not have the right to choose their own religion at that time. Similarly, despite suffering persecution over their religious views in England, Puritans did not grant freedom of religion in their colonies in the United States and instead persecuted religious dissenters, such as Mary Dyer, who was hanged in Boston in 1660 for being a Quaker in Puritan Massachusetts. Similar intolerance and persecution of religious dissenters has occurred in predominantly Muslim societies, as well as in Hindu, Buddhist, and Jewish societies (and continues in many of these today). The idea that humans should have the right to choose their religion or no religion has precursors in Greek and Roman thought, but was formulated more recently by Enlightenment thinkers such as Thomas Paine, Thomas Jefferson, and Voltaire. The term secularism itself was coined by George Jacob Holyoake in the nineteenth century, though his use of the term was less political than the modern understanding of secularism and more along the lines of humanism and freethought. RELIGION: BEYOND RELIGION COPYRIGHT 2016 Macmillan Reference USA, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning WCN 02-200-210

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The second component of secularism outlined by Berlinerblau, the state’s need to maintain order, is a counterbalance to the first. One of the key functions of any government is to develop a system of laws that maintain order in a society. Laws, of course, are not always objectively neutral or devoid of favoritism. To the contrary, many laws are written to benefit specific groups of people. For instance, in the United States, the Constitution originally enfranchised just land-owning White men. In France, the secular government funds both secular public schools but also Catholic and Jewish private schools. This funding reflects a favoritism toward secularism, and also two specific religions (Catholicism and Judaism). It was not until 2008 that the French government began funding a single, private Muslim school in France. When there is not a separation between religion and government, government can be used to privilege or show favor toward specific religions. This is the case in many countries around the world where the divide between government and religion is unclear or nonexistent, such as in Saudi Arabia. In Saudi Arabia, which is a monarchy, the king must comply with Sharia or Islamic law and the Qur’an, and the laws in the country are Islamic laws. There is also no freedom of religion, as individuals who leave Islam in Saudi Arabia can be executed for apostasy (apostasy is discussed in more detail later in the chapter). Of course, the challenge is finding an appropriate balance between the need of the government to maintain order and simultaneously allowing individuals the right to choose their religion or no religion. Achieving this balance can be a challenge because religion can be an effective extension of the government to regulate behavior. Religion has been (and in some places continues to be) used on behalf of the government to maintain order by proscribing certain behaviors. In order for religion to be an effective extension of government control, it helps if everyone in the society has the same religion. The presence of multiple religions in a society has the potential to undermine religious credibility and can also lead to hostility among religions. Thus, finding an appropriate balance between individual rights and government control is challenging. However, advocates of secularism generally argue that secularism is the philosophical and political approach that is most effective at finding a balance between these two competing interests because a secular government should not, theoretically, show any favoritism toward any specific religion or religious group. To the contrary, all religions should be viewed and treated as equal before a secular government. As a result, individuals have the right to choose their own religion or no religion, the government guarantees and protects this right, and does not elevate any one religious perspective above any others or privilege any particular perspectives. Thus, secularism is rooted in the idea that the best way to balance the competing interests of religious freedom (or freedom from religion) with the government function of maintaining order in society is for there to be a separation between the government and religion such that the government is secular and does not privilege any one religion over others. Organizations that advocate for secularism are sometimes labeled secularist. Examples of such organizations would be the Secular Coalition for America or the British Humanist Association. Both strongly advocate for secularism, discouraging any involvement of religion with the government. The aim of such organizations is generally to reduce the privileging of religion in those societies. For instance, in the United States, although there is a separation or wall between the government and religion in theory, in practical effect the wall is rather porous. Religions are given a number of tax benefits, including paying no property or income taxes, and religious clergy are allowed to deduct their housing expenses from their

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taxes (i.e., the parsonage exemption). Although these benefits are given to all institutions that are recognized as religions by the government, in effect they elevate religion over nonreligion. With a discussion of secularism as it relates to the separation of church and state comes a type of secularism that focuses less on politics and more on criticism of the privileged position of religion in society. Many publications, such as Sam Harris’s bestseller The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason (2004) or Richard Dawkins’s 2006 work, The God Delusion, as well as several organizations, including the International Humanist and Ethical Union and the Council for Secular Humanism, criticize the position of religion in society and point out some of religion’s detriments to society as a whole. The aim of this collective movement is to diminish the privileged position of religion in society—often regarded as a manifestation of politics or power relations—and to create a safe and egalitarian space for nonreligious or secular people.

SECULARIZATION Also based on the same root term as secular is another term widely used by those who study religion and its other: secularization. Secularization can refer to two ideas that are closely related. The first idea referenced by secularization is the process of change occurring over time that involves the transformation of aspects of society from religious to secular. This transformation can occur at multiple levels. For instance, at a broader or more macro level, governments can secularize over time. This process would involve removing the influence of religious institutions from the political process. This does not mean that religions do not influence the values and beliefs of politicians involved in political decision making, but rather refers to the direct control or influence of religious institutions on governance. This transition from religiously influenced or controlled government to secular government can be seen in the transition of the former British colonies in North America into the United States. Of the thirteen original colonies, most of them had an established religion that was closely involved in the governance of the colony (the official religions were either Anglican/Church of England or Congregationalist). When the colonies came together to form a new country, not all of the colonies had the same established religions. The solution that developed was to have no official religion for the new country: it was to be a secular government. Over the next decades, each of the original colonies that had an official religion slowly disentangled that religion from the state government. This took hundreds of years in some of the colonies turned states, such as Maryland. The Anglican religion was the official state religion when Maryland was chartered as a colony in 1632, and remained the official religion of the state until 1867, when a new version of the constitution removed the religious requirement for holding political office in the state. This process of disentangling and removing a religion’s involvement in government is a form of secularization. Secularization can also take place at an institutional level. This was described previously in the case of Yale University, which began as a school to train Congregationalist ministers. Over time, the university has removed the influence of the Congregationalist religion from the governance of the university to the point that the religion has virtually no influence on the governance of Yale University today. Similar processes have occurred with hospitals, charities, book publishers, and many other types of organizations. RELIGION: BEYOND RELIGION COPYRIGHT 2016 Macmillan Reference USA, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning WCN 02-200-210

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Secularization can also take place at the individual level, as people who are raised religious move toward lower levels of religiosity. An example of this at the individual level would be Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a Somali-born activist who now has dual Dutch and American citizenship. She was raised Muslim in various countries in Africa and migrated to the Netherlands in 1992. It was during her time in the Netherlands that she began to encounter ways of thinking that ran counter to what she had been taught as a Muslim. These alternative perspectives eventually led her to leave Islam and ultimately arrive at atheism in 2002. This process of disenchantment with religion is an individual-level manifestation of secularization. Secularization, then, can refer to the process by which different aspects of society (e.g., governments and institutions) and individuals differentiate or diverge from religion. This process has been observed in many societies, in many institutions, in many organizations, and in many people over time. Secularization can also refer to a well-known theory among those who study religion and its other. The basic argument of secularization theory is that societies will grow less religious as they modernize. Early advocates of secularization, such as Max Weber, referred to this as “the disenchantment of the world.” The basic idea is that modern understandings of the natural world (such as the cause of earthquakes or an understanding of what the sun is and how the earth is related to the solar system, the galaxy, and the universe and so on) result in people no longer needing to rely on religious explanations for how the natural world works. People, instead, rely on naturalistic or scientific explanations. As naturalistic understandings of the world replace supernaturalistic understandings, people rely less and less on religion, becoming less religious (or disenchanted) over time. The end result is people’s lives are spent almost entirely if not entirely in the secular realm and not in the religious realm.

ATHEISM AND ATHEISTS At the simplest level, the word atheism can be separated into its constituent parts. The aprefix means “without” or “lacking.” The root of the rest of the word, -theism, is the Greek term, “theos” (θϵός), which means God or a god. Theism is the belief in a god or God. The most common understanding of the term atheism today is, therefore, without belief in a god, God, or gods. Atheists are individuals who are without belief in a god, God, or gods. The distinction between God with a capitalized G and god with a lower case g is an important one. When capitalized, as in God, this is typically a reference to the JudeoChristian deity, YHWH, the god of the Hebrew scriptures or the Christian Old and New Testaments. When not capitalized, as in god, this can refer to any deity, as in Zeus, Thor, Shiva, or Quetzalcoatl. This distinction is important because it introduces an extension to the definition of the term atheism. Atheism is not exclusively limited to not believing in the Judeo-Christian deity, though in most Western countries this is often what people understand atheism to mean (i.e., they think that an atheist does not believe in God or YHWH). This understanding is a reflection of Judeo-Christian privilege in countries that are or were predominantly Jewish or Christian because it assumes that there is only one god in which someone does not believe, YHWH or God. In fact, the existence of millions of gods has been asserted by believers, and most people do not believe in most or all of those gods. Additionally, most Jews and Christians who believe in God or YHWH are simultaneously atheists toward all other gods, though typically they do not self-identify as such and are

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unaware of this fact. This, again, is a reflection of religious privileging as, for most of these people, they are so unaware of the claimed existence of other gods that they do not realize that they are atheists toward the many other claimed gods. This raises an important extension of the term atheism. As noted, the most common understanding of atheism is to be without a belief in a god or gods. But there are at least two ways that people can be without belief in a god or gods. People can be aware of the claimed existence of a god and deny the existence of that deity. This is typically referred to as positive atheism, meaning the individual is making a positive assertion about the nonexistence of a deity. Many people in Western countries have heard about Aphrodite and Thor, meaning they have some knowledge about these gods, but they do not believe these gods exist. Thus, they are positive atheists toward Aphrodite and Thor; they are making a positive assertion about the nonexistence of these two deities. However, people can also be unaware of the claimed existence of a god and therefore be without belief in that god. This is likely the case for most readers of this chapter regarding the god Jörð, the Norse goddess of the earth. Until now, most readers of this chapter had probably never heard of Jörð and therefore were without belief in Jörð. Readers without any knowledge of Jörð were, in fact, atheists toward Jörð, but in a negative fashion. Negative atheism is being without belief in a god or gods because of no prior knowledge of the claimed existence of that god or those gods. It is in this fashion that most people alive today are atheists: they are unaware of the claimed existence of the millions of gods of, for instance, Hinduism, or the many other gods of the many other extant or defunct religions. They are therefore atheists toward those gods (i.e., without belief), but in a negative fashion. Likewise, it is in this sense that all babies are atheists; until they are taught about a god, they are negative atheists toward all gods. This discussion of atheism is generally how people understand atheism and atheists today, but this has not always been the case. Historically, things were different. It is likely that there have been atheists for as long as there have been theists or believers in a god, gods, or God. However, the label atheist was not used until relatively recently (perhaps the last three to four hundred years) to describe individuals who were without belief in any gods. Instead, atheist was used as a pejorative or epithet to describe anyone who did not believe in the claimed god or gods of those in power or was a label applied to someone who held heretical or nonorthodox views of a god or gods. It was in this second sense that Socrates was accused of being an atheist, as he held nonorthodox views of the Greek gods. Early Christians were called atheists by Romans, because they denied the existence of the Roman pantheon. Later, pagans, who believed in many gods, were called atheists by Christians, because pagans did not believe exclusively in the existence of the Christian monotheistic deity, YHWH or God. In all of these cases, the groups targeted with the label atheist were labeled as such not because they did not believe in any gods but rather because they did not believe in the god or gods of the dominant social groups or conceived of them differently from how those in power did. The label atheist continued to be used to describe those who did not adhere to orthodox views of God or gods of the dominant social groups up until the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the modern understanding of the term developed. One of the earliest atheists in the modern sense was the French Catholic priest Jean Meslier, whose posthumously published writings revealed that he did not believe in any gods. Today, when people self-identify as atheist, they typically (but not universally) mean that they are without belief in any gods. Thus, the modern understanding of atheism, without belief in a god or gods, was not how the term was understood historically. There is one additional extension of the term atheism that is worth noting. In recent years, there has been extensive discussion among atheists as to whether atheism is simply a RELIGION: BEYOND RELIGION COPYRIGHT 2016 Macmillan Reference USA, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning WCN 02-200-210

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negative referent (meaning it only describes what someone does not believe in, i.e., a god or gods) or whether it can also be a positive referent (meaning it indicates what someone does believe in, such as skepticism, humanism, equality, or critical thinking). This discussion has led to a revised understanding of the term atheist such that it can be a largely empty signifier, similar to one of the previously discussed definitions of religion. An empty signifier is a label that is applied, whether by the individual or to the individual, that indicates that the individual may belong to a certain category or group of people, but precisely what is meant by membership in that category is not perfectly clear. In this understanding of the term, anyone can identify as an atheist, just as anyone can identify as being religious, but the specific meaning of the term can only be determined by combining the context in which the labeling occurred and what the specific individual understands the term to mean. There is some utility in this approach, but it is also somewhat problematic. The utility lies in the fact that it accurately reflects the many ways that people use language and conceptualize the terms atheism and atheist. Additionally, it also illustrates the important contextual nature of atheism, as the god or gods toward which someone is without belief are context specific. In other words, an atheist in Saudi Arabia is likely without belief in a different god or gods than is an atheist in India or an atheist in a tribal group in the Amazonian basin in Brazil. Thus, using atheism as a largely empty signifier allows for greater variability in how the term is used and what it means. The problem is that it could result in methodological reductionism, meaning that the terms atheism and atheist can only be understood relative to specific individuals. In other words, the general definition of atheist offered in this section could serve as a sort of generic component of the atheist signifier, but just as with religion, precisely what any given individual means by atheist would have to be situated in that person and that person’s context. There would, therefore, be no universal definition of atheism—just a placeholder for something that is related to being without belief in a god or gods.

AGNOSTICISM AND AGNOSTICS Like atheism, agnosticism is, at its simplest, understood relative to the constituent parts of the term. The prefix a- means “without” or “lacking.” The rest of the term, -gnosticism is based on the root word, gnosis, which also comes from the Greek, gnōsis (γνωσις), which means “knowledge.” Combining the two, agnosticism is “without knowledge.” Of course, in the context of this chapter, agnosticism is a referent to a god or gods. Thus, agnosticism is “without knowledge of a god or gods.” What is meant by knowledge can, of course, be debated, but typically it is understood to be justified true belief, or beliefs that have empirically verifiable evidence to support them. ~

Readers will note that this definition is similar to that of negative atheism. However, there is a way in which it can be understood to differ. Agnosticism need not be exclusively about having or not having knowledge about the existence of a god or gods. Agnosticism can also refer to whether or not it is possible to obtain knowledge about the existence of a god or gods. In other words, agnosticism can refer not just to whether or not someone has knowledge about a god or gods, but also to whether or not one thinks it is possible to obtain such knowledge. This, of course, is contingent upon how a god is defined or described. For instance, if someone asserted that god was a one pound rock inside a backpack, it would be fairly easy to ascertain whether or not that rock existed through the use of our empirical senses (i.e., touch, sight, taste, and so on). But if someone asserted that god was a rock that was infinitesimally small and invisible, it would no longer be possible to obtain knowledge

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about the existence or nonexistence of this god-rock as we could neither find it nor sense it. In the first case, we could obtain knowledge about the existence of the rock and would therefore not be agnostic toward the existence of the rock because we would have knowledge. In the second case, we would have no knowledge about the existence of the rock because the claim of the person asserting its existence would be based on a belief, not knowledge. Therefore, we would have no ability to gain knowledge about its existence given the characteristics of the god-rock. Likewise, certain gods are more or less amenable to empirical verification. If someone were to assert that god was a statue that occasionally bled from carved wounds in its wrists and feet, we could empirically verify the existence of the statue and could investigate the source of the blood. We would not have to be agnostic about the existence of the statue or, potentially, the cause of the bleeding. But if someone were to assert the existence of a god that is not omnipotent, nor omniscient, nor just, nor engaged with humans or even with the unfolding of the universe, but is supernatural and undetectable by any human senses or any tools that extend human senses (i.e., a deistic god), this makes obtaining knowledge about the existence of such a deity impossible. It would be impossible to assert whether or not such a god exists based on knowledge of that god and it would be impossible to gain any knowledge of such a god because it is defined and described in such a fashion that there is no way to gain knowledge about the existence of that god. This, of course, does not mean that someone cannot assert that such a god exists. People can assert and have asserted the existence of deities of a great many varieties. But, given the characteristics of the god, there is no way to obtain knowledge about that god, resulting in agnosticism toward this deity. Philosophically, this raises numerous questions concerning epistemology, the characteristics of deity, and whether logic can be used to determine whether a specific deity can or cannot exist, among other concerns. But for our purposes here, this extends the definition of agnosticism to mean something like, “not having knowledge of a god or gods and potentially believing that such knowledge cannot be obtained.” This is not, however, how many people understand the term agnosticism today. Many people understand agnosticism to mean that someone is unsure of the existence of a god or that the individual has doubts about the existence of a god. Not being sure about the existence of a god could still qualify as agnosticism if, for instance, one believed in a god but recognized that there was no evidence for the existence of that god. If the basis for the doubts or lack of surety of belief in a god is based on a person’s lack of knowledge of those gods, then such individuals would be agnostic theists. But if individuals who are unsure about their belief in a god but believe they have knowledge or can obtain knowledge about the existence of the target god or gods, then this would not qualify as agnosticism using a strict definition of the term. Instead, this would be theistic uncertainty, not agnosticism. The term agnosticism was coined in 1869 by Thomas Henry Huxley (1825–1895), an English biologist, to describe what basically amounts to a side argument between those asserting the existence of a god or gods (i.e., theists) and those asserting the nonexistence of a god or gods (i.e., positive atheists). In Huxley’s words, “Agnosticism, in fact, is not a creed, but a method, the essence of which lies in the rigorous application of a single principle.… Positively the principle may be expressed: In matters of the intellect, follow your reason as far as it will take you, without regard to any other consideration. And negatively: In matters of the intellect do not pretend that conclusions are certain which are not demonstrated or demonstrable” (768). For RELIGION: BEYOND RELIGION COPYRIGHT 2016 Macmillan Reference USA, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning WCN 02-200-210

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Huxley, agnosticism was a philosophical position that recognized the limitations of empiricism and logic. If something cannot be measured empirically or demonstrated logically, then the safest position philosophically is to neither assert nor deny its existence. It’s safest to simply assert, “we don’t know,” and perhaps, “we can’t know.”

Thomas Henry Huxley (1825–1895), English biologist, 1866. Huxley coined the term agnosticism to describe an argument between theists (those asserting the existence of a god or gods) and positive atheists (those asserting the nonexistence of a god or gods). For him, agnosticism was a philosophical position that recognized the limitations of empiricism and logic. PRINT COLLECTOR/ GETTY IMAGES.

Astute readers will note that the definitions of atheism and agnosticism are not mutually incompatible. Because atheism is without belief in a god or gods and agnosticism is without knowledge of a god or gods, one can be both simultaneously: for example, an agnostic atheist. This would indicate that someone does not believe in a god or gods based on one’s lack of knowledge of the god or gods. It could also mean that someone is without belief in a god or gods because one does not believe that it is possible to obtain knowledge about a god or gods. Readers may be interested to note that one of the most well-known atheists today, Richard Dawkins (1941–), would likely describe himself as an agnostic atheist given these definitions. Although Richard Dawkins rejects the existence of the Judeo-Christian God or YHWH, he does not reject the possibility that some sort of deity could exist, contingent upon the characteristics of that deity. Thus, Richard Dawkins is a positive atheist toward some gods as he understands them and rejects their existence, but he is also an agnostic atheist in that he does not believe in any gods but recognizes that it is possible that some god or gods might exist (depending on their characteristics) but we have no knowledge of them and have no way of gaining knowledge about them.

APOSTATES AND EXITERS (AND OTHER TERMS FOR THOSE WHO LEAVE RELIGIONS) Perhaps the most widely used term to refer to those who leave a religion is apostate. This term also comes from the Greek, apostasia (α’ ποστασία), which means “to defect or revolt.” This term can be used in a relatively neutral fashion to simply describe those who leave a religion, but often it is not used that way. Although there has been an attempt in recent years to reappropriate the term apostate by those who have left religions similar to how homosexual men reappropriated the term gay, it is still generally the case that the label apostate is applied externally to those who leave a religion and is done so by those who remain members of the religion. In this fashion, the label apostate is pejorative and is meant to reflect the sense of betrayal felt by those who remain members of the religion. As a result,

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individuals who are labeled apostates by those who remain members of the religion they left are subject to derision and scorn. Realizing the way apostate is often used, some sociologists studying apostates have illustrated the politicization of the term. As a result, scholars such as David Bromley in The Politics of Religious Apostasy (1998) have argued that those studying religion and its other should use the term only in the specific case of individuals who leave religions and then actively work against those religions. Given that the root of the term focuses on defection from a religion, this understanding and application of the term apostate makes sense. This also makes sense in light of the millions of people around the world who have left the religions in which they were raised but do not actively work against those religions and are not particularly critical of those religions. Many people who leave are largely indifferent toward or uninterested in religion. Labeling as apostates those who leave a religion but do not actively work against it once they have left is, perhaps, a bit extreme. Considering such individuals apostates or defectors from religion when, in reality, they are indifferent toward religion is again a reflection of religious privileging. Labeling such individuals apostates suggests that all that is required in order for someone to be assigned a deviant and subordinate identity is for them to leave a religion, automatically privileging those who do not leave religions. According to Bromley, then, the term apostate is best reserved only for those who leave a religion and then actively work against the religion they left. Other scholars, such as Cragun and Hammer (2011), have argued that even this moderated use of the term apostate still reflects a privileging of a religion. Because apostate is a pejorative term, these scholars have argued that it should only be used to describe those people who leave a religion when scholars are attempting to capture the attitudes of those who remain members of the religion. It is, of course, accurate to report that those who remain members of a religion think of those who leave as apostates. Thus, using apostate in that sense is an accurate reflection of reality. But referring, generally, to those who leave religions as apostates in any other context except perhaps when such individuals use apostate as a self-reference reflects the privileged and normative status of religion in society. Because privileging religion necessarily subordinates that which is other to religion, to prevent such privileging, those who leave religions should not be labeled using the terminology of the religious. They should be allowed to self-identify and self-label. Even though apostate is a pejorative term that privileges religion, it continues to be used widely among those who study religion. This reflects, at some level, the contentious nature of scholarship on religion. As Cragun and Hammer (2011) illustrated in their discussion of this term, much of the research on religion in the social sciences has been conducted by individuals who are personally religious. Their bias has been reflected in the language that has been used to describe individuals who leave religions. Apostate is just one of the many pejorative terms that has been used to describe those who leave. Other terms that have been used in reference to such individuals include: defectors, dropouts, disaffiliates, disengagers, and deserters. All of these terms negatively depict those who leave. What’s more, these terms are often used in other contexts to do the same thing, such as military deserters or school dropouts. In all of these contexts, the terms suggest deficiencies in those who leave, as though they are somehow morally inferior to those who remain members of the religions. Given the contentious and pejorative nature of these terms, Cragun and Hammer suggest that a more neutral term would be religious exiter as it reflects only the fact that someone left a religion and implies nothing else about where that person went, whether the person is now RELIGION: BEYOND RELIGION COPYRIGHT 2016 Macmillan Reference USA, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning WCN 02-200-210

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critical of the religion left behind, and minimizes the privileging of religion. It may still privilege religion to a small degree in that it necessarily sets religion as being that which someone leaves, rather than inverting that relationship and reflecting the fact that the natural state of all humans is both atheism and secularity. Yet, if people were at some point affiliated with a religion and then leave it, considering such people religious exiters accurately reflects what they have done vis-a-vis religion without unnecessarily suggesting that they are deviant or deficient in some fashion for having done so. Another common term used by social scientists to refer to those who leave religions is switcher. This label is used for those who leave a religion but then join another religion. It is generally used in a more neutral fashion to reflect the relatively common practice in religiously open and pluralistic societies of people changing religions at different points in their lives. It is not, however, typically used in reference to those who leave a religion but do not join another religion. There is not, to date, a term specific to that scenario (though some have suggested “dones” as a possible term), as apostate and the other terms noted do not specify whether individuals who have left a religion joined another religion or left religion altogether.

NONRELIGION, IRRELIGION, AND ARELIGION Those who study that which is other to religion have increasingly begun to refer to this field or topic of study as the study of nonreligion. Nonreligion is, like religion, a problematic term, precisely because it includes religion within the term. One of the most well-known proponents of the term, Lois Lee (2012), suggested that this is perhaps the best term for the field of study focused on that which is other to religion because, unlike secular, secularity, or secularism, nonreligion specifically notes that it is interested in that which is not religion but is related to religion. For instance, secular refers to everything that is not religion. Thus, a clown performance at a circus is secular, but so, too, is an atheist who actively works to diminish the influence of religion in a given society. Secular is broad and encapsulates everything that is not religion. Nonreligion, as proposed by Lee, is that which is other to religion but is still, in some fashion, related to religion. Thus, those studying nonreligion would not be interested in studying clowns at circuses, but would be interested in studying atheists working against religion. Presumably, the clowns are unrelated to religion, whereas the atheist working against religion is secular but related to religion. Thus, nonreligion refers to that which is other to but related to religion. Extending this understanding of nonreligion, Johannes Quack (2014) noted that what is both other to and related to religion is culture and context specific. Thus, nonreligious studies or the study of nonreligion will vary based on the culture and context under investigation. Whereas the atheist working against organized religion would likely always be included in the domain of nonreligion, in some contexts, such as India, skeptics working against magicians would also be the study of nonreligion because magicians in India often claim religious and supernatural powers (unlike most magicians in Western countries). Thus, for Quack, nonreligion shifts relative to culturally variable conceptions of religion, allowing the domain of nonreligion to encapsulate both that which is other to religion but still related to religion regardless of what religion is in a given culture or context. There are two terms closely related to nonreligion that also warrant discussion here. Irreligion is generally understood to be a reference to that which is opposed to religion, following Colin Campbell’s (1971) definition of the term. Technically, the prefix ir- is a

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variant of the prefix in- and simply means “not.” Thus, irreligion, based on the components of the term, is just that which is not religion. However, among those who study nonreligion, “irreligion” is generally used as Campbell suggested to refer to that which is in opposition to religion. Thus, secularist organizations working against religious influence in society would be considered irreligious, as would the writings of well-known religious critics, such as Sam Harris (1967–) or Daniel Dennett (1942–). Areligion is different. As has been noted multiple times, the prefix a- means without. Thus, areligion refers to that which is without religion. Areligion refers to those things that are devoid of religion. Therefore, unlike nonreligion, which is other to but related to religion, areligion would be that which is other to religion but unrelated to religion. An example of something that is areligious would be most modern airline companies, which are devoid of religion (though there are exceptions).

HUMANISM To this point, most of the terms discussed that refer to nonreligious individuals have primarily focused on what those people are not. For instance, atheists are without belief in a god or gods and secular individuals are not religious. What these labels do not reflect is the values nonreligious individuals may hold. Humanism is a philosophical perspective that posits a number of principles not rooted in supernatural or religious beliefs that people can use to guide their behaviors and decisions. Precisely what those principles are varies somewhat based on the specific pronouncement of humanist principles. Pronouncements of humanist principles tend to include ideas such as: ethical and moral principles need not rely on the supernatural or religion, but rather can be based on human experience, logic, and reason; all humans are of equivalent worth and value; working toward the equal treatment of all humans and a world free of discrimination is desirable; science is superior to religion as a method for discerning how the natural and social worlds work; humans have a responsibility to protect all life, human and nonhuman, which necessarily means protecting the environment; each individual can develop meaning and purpose. This list is not inclusive of all such humanist principles, as many such pronouncements have been issued. That many statements of humanist principles exist warrants some discussion of the history of humanism. The term has been used at various points in time, potentially including in antiquity (e.g., humanista). However, the term first rose to prominence during the Renaissance when it was used to describe a body of knowledge and method of instruction (forming the root of the modern Humanities). The basic idea according to scholars at the time was that, during the medieval period in the West there had been something of a regression in knowledge and understanding. Advocates of humanism in the Renaissance believed that the solution to increasing knowledge and understanding was to study the classics (Greek and Roman writings, but also early Christian ones) and to use that knowledge to better understand the world. This understanding of humanism is not entirely unrelated to the modern sense of the term, as it was likely this form of education that gave rise to the modern understanding of humanism. Humanism as a philosophical system of guiding principles divorced from religion and the supernatural developed later, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This stemmed from Enlightenment thinking that came to the conclusion that morality and ethics could be RELIGION: BEYOND RELIGION COPYRIGHT 2016 Macmillan Reference USA, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning WCN 02-200-210

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developed outside the context of religion. These ideas were developed in various parts of Europe, including France and the United Kingdom, leading to ideas such as those of Auguste Comte (1798–1857) who proposed a religion of humanity. Humanist organizations working toward the betterment of humanity were founded during this time. One of the first humanist organizations with a focus on the modern philosophical understanding was the British Humanistic Religious Association founded in 1853. Humanist ideas were present in the United States during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but it was in the early twentieth century that the first well-known statement of humanist principles was produced. A critical mass of supporters of humanism developed in various regions, including in New York and Chicago. These early advocates eventually drew up a collective statement of humanist principles that they labeled “A Humanist Manifesto” and published in 1933. This first manifesto was not irreligious or secularist; it allowed for religious humanists. Over time, humanist ideas have shifted and a divide has grown between religious and secular humanists. These shifts eventually led to reformulations of the original manifesto, including versions published in 1973 and 2003 by the American Humanist Association. Other organizations and individuals have also proposed statements of humanist principles. Today, most people who identify as humanist are secular, as in secular humanism, but there are still many religious humanists as well.

LESS COMMON TERMS There are a number of additional terms that are a bit more obscure but are occasionally observed in the research on that which is other to religion. Given that these terms are less common, the definitions offered in this section will be rather brief. Two terms that are closely related are freethinker and skeptic. Freethinker is the label applied to individuals who engage in freethought, a philosophical approach that argues that truth should be based on logic, reason, and scientific inquiry. Skepticism is a similar approach to questions of knowledge and belief, arguing that all knowledge should be based on empirically verifiable evidence. Skeptics are individuals who adhere to skepticism. Both of these have rather long histories, with roots dating back to the classical eras of Greek and Roman thought, but becoming formalized in Western thought in the last four hundred years or so. Freethinker is generally seen as being more directly related to religion, as the label was adopted in the seventeenth century by those who questioned the need for organized religion for morality, truth, and knowledge. Skepticism can be and often is applied to religion, but is generally seen as applicable to all sources of knowledge and all beliefs (e.g., pseudoscience, psychics, homeopathy, etc.). Thus, although the basic idea behind the two terms is similar, in practical use skepticism is more broadly applied than is freethought. As noted previously, one of the difficulties atheists and secular individuals have faced is in trying to develop terminology and labels of their own that are not applied to them externally and are implicitly either indicators of what they are not or are derogatory (such as apostate or dropout). One attempt to address these concerns was the creation of the term bright. Bright was developed specifically as an alternative to godless (a synonym of atheist) by Paul Geisert in 2002 and was meant to portray atheists in a positive light rather than a negative one. Despite support from a number of well-known atheists and humanists, the

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term does not appear to have become widely used for self-identification among the nonreligious, secularists, and others sympathetic to the ideas it represents. Another set of terms that are occasionally used to describe and label those who are other to religion are nonbeliever and unbeliever. Both of these terms position those so labeled in contrast to believers. The general sense of the terms, which are often used interchangeably, is that nonbelievers reject not just belief in a god, gods, or God, but also all supernatural truth claims. As a result, these two terms are similar to freethinker and skeptic. Two terms have attempted to extend atheism in unique ways. The first is New Atheism, a label coined by Gary Wolf (2006) to describe the wave of atheist writers who rose to prominence in the early 2000s. Although the philosophical arguments these authors have employed to criticize religion are not particularly novel or new, New Atheists have suggested that what makes them unique is the combination of three key characteristics: the rejection of all supernatural beliefs, advocacy for science, and their open criticism of religion. These characteristics are also not particularly novel, as many early atheists and agnostics held similar views. The second noteworthy attempt to extend atheism was the effort of Jen McCreight and others in 2012 to develop a term related to atheism that indicates more of what those who use the label do believe rather than what they don’t believe. The term chosen was Atheism+, suggesting that those who self-labeled as Atheist+ were atheists but also advocates for gender and sexual equality, scientific inquiry, skepticism, and other generally progressive ideas. Both New Atheism and Atheism+ have seen limited adoption by those who are other to religion.

Summary This chapter has provided definitions for the most commonly used terms in the study of that which is other to religion. It has also tried, in the process, to illustrate that definitions in this area are still in flux. This is due, in part, to the varied definitions of religion, which make defining that which is other to religion somewhat difficult. This is also due to the relatively new nature of this area of research. As research in this area matures, it is likely that these definitions will change and new terms will probably be introduced. Even so, this chapter lays a foundation for those new to this area to have a better understanding of what scholars studying that which is other to religion mean when they use specific terms.

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An Honest Liar. Dir. Justin Weinstein and Tyler Measom. 2014. A feature documentary covering the life and career of magician James “The Amazing” Randi that publically exposes paranormal fakes and con-artists.

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Letting Go of God. Dir. Julia Sweeney. 2008. A humorous monologue about Sweeney’s search for God. Religulous. Dir. Larry Charles. 2008. A documentary putdown of religion by Bill Maher. The Richard Dawkins Collection (The Genius of Charles Darwin, The Enemies of Reason, and The Root of All Evil?). Dir. Russell Barnes. 2009. Three of Dawkins’s television documentaries exploring the intellectual battleground between scientific reason and religion.

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