Strategies for increasing Women’s Political Participation in Afghanistan: a brief history and critique Substantial Research Paper Shari Ulery [email protected] Masters of Global Studies June 1, 2008

“Afghanistan may be the only country in the world where during the last century kings and politicians have been made and undone by struggles relating to women’s status.” Huma Ahmad Ghosh

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“Any kind of discrimination and privilege between the citizens of Afghanistan are prohibited. The citizens of Afghanistan-whether men or women- have equal rights and duties before the law. ” Article Twenty-Two of the Constitution of Afghanistan, adopted January 4, 2004 at the Loya Jirga constitutional assembly “In Afghanistan, no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam.” Article Three of the Constitution of Afghanistan “Afghanistan is an Islamic Republic…The religion of the state of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is the sacred religion of Islam.” Articles One and Two of the Constitution of Afghanistan “My name is Malalai Joya from the Farah province. With the permission of all those present and in respect of the martyrs who were killed, I would like to speak. I wish to criticize my compatriots in this room. Why would you allow criminals to be present at this Loya Jirga, warlords responsible for our country’s situation? They have oppressed women and have ruined our country. They should be prosecuted. They might be forgiven by the Afghan people, but not by history. Chairman: “Sit down! The sister has crossed the line of what is considered common courtesy. She is banished from this assembly and cannot return. Send her out! Guards, throw her out! She doesn’t deserve to be here.” Transcript of December, 2003 Afghani Constitutional Assembly “…I stand up against these fundamentalist warlords and I expose their mask, because, unfortunately, they were in power and they control Loya Jirga…these Northern Alliance killers…they have the mask of democracy, they learn how to talk about democracy, women rights, human rights and just they deceive people around the world, but they do not believe in. Human Rights Watch published the name of these criminals recently,…[b]ut unfortunately, right now they control Afghanistan. Some of them are MP, minister, governor, commanders, chief district, ambassador…Our people are like hostage in the hands of them.” Malalai Joya, female member of the Afghan parliament, interviewed after she was suspended in May, 2007 from the lower house of the Afghan Parliament for the rest of her term for criticizing Parliament, who is currently under threat of assassination.

The values of gender equity and the goal of increasing women’s political participation have been both express and implied goals in the post-conflict nationbuilding strategies of the United States; the United Nations; multi-lateral organizations

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and NGO’s in Afghanistan. Implementing those goals in a country such as Afghanistan, a culturally mixed nation located in a critical geostrategic crossroads, with centuries of conquest, multiple different forms of government, tribal conflict and civil wars culminating in the gender-apartheid of the Taliban regime and the United States military invasion, is a formidable challenge. While life for many urban Afghan women is certainly vastly improved from the days of gender apartheid and genocide under the Taliban, rural Afghan women continue to suffer from societal and cultural practices that deprive them of education, physical security, economic and political power. In rural areas, self-immolation by women trapped in forced marriages with men who physically abuse them with impunity persists. Particularly in tribal areas in the south, Islamic fundamentalists continue to target female educators and politicians for assassination, while government institutions, despite the express Constitutional guarantees of equality, fail to act to affirm and secure the basic human rights of Afghani women in practice. With respect to gender issues, the post-conflict period in nation-building often presents a tension between the moralists, who argue that a post-conflict society must give priority to respecting the rights of women because it is the right thing to do, and the pragmatists, who argue for a gradual approach, assuming that the hard-won peace will be jeopardized if a progressive and firm stance is taken on gender issues. This debate has to date often be held in a vacuum, due to the lack of empirical data regarding either approach. The Rand Corporation recently published a 200 page study examining this question with respect to women’s post-conflict political participation in Afghanistan. This paper will summarize that report’s examination of the post-conflict material conditions (cultural and political) in Afghanistan and some of the strategies employed by

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both state and non-state actors in the post-invasion period and whether those strategies have been successful in meeting goals of gender equity and increased political participation by Afghani women while still maintaining the goal of not jeopardizing the minimal level of security that was achieved after the US invasion.. Political Participation by Women The historic exclusion of women from public life and their relegation to the sphere of family has deep cultural and philosophical underpinnings and justifications. Through examination of significant philosophers and political theorists over the last two millennia, one can trace the origins of patriarchy and misogyny that continue yet today to minimize women’s participation in public life in all spheres: business and the economy; politics; religion and education. Whether this pervasive patriarchy and misogyny is overtly expressed or internalized by both men and women and thus more subtly expressed, the empirical evidence is unmistakable: women continue to be excluded from public life. As 50% of the population, women are not 50% of corporate boards; corporate executives; tenured faculty; or elected or appointed officials at any level of government, even in liberal, Western democracies. It is useful to briefly examine the work of three foundational political philosophers (Aristotle, Rousseau and Marx) and their re-reading by three contemporary feminist political scientists (Cooke; Elshstain and Okin) to trace the evolution of the “public-private” sphere divide that is articulated today as both a secular and religious rationale for excluding women from full political participation. The critical re-reading of these foundational political philosophers is done in the context of the material conditions of the time, both cultural and political, and is therefore useful as a theoretical framework

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for examining the rationale for the exclusion of women from political life in Afghanistan, both historically and presently. For Aristotle, the key to determining the nature of a thing, was to examine its capabilities and potential in light of the actualization of those capabilities and potential. It is a teleological argument in that the nature of a thing is determined by examining the thing’s end, which is predetermined because it will act in accordance with its nature or essence. Greek society at the time was “founded on slavery, flourishing on imperialism of the most brutal sort, dedicated to misogyny in thought and practice…” (Elshstain, 1993, 41). Given this material and normative backdrop, it is not surprising that Aristotle argues for the “unambiguous subjection of woman on the grounds that her nature required it. Aristotle absorbs woman completely within the oikos or household, denies woman any possibility of a public voice or role, and precludes the possibility for female selftransformation over time.” (Elshstain, 1993, 41).

Seen in its simplest terms, the

Aristotelean argument was that women are in the home and excluded from public life because it is their nature and essence to be unsuited for public life. How do we know their nature and essence? By looking at their “end”, which is that they are confined to the private sphere. In contrast to Plato, who questioned the world as it is, even going so far as to question material reality itself, Aristotle accepts the world and seeks to explain it. As Okin describes it, Aristotle perceived himself as a “moral philosopher”, who assumed that the “status quo” in both the natural and the social realm is the best way for things to be.” (Okin, 1979, 74). His assumptions about the natural inferiority of women were

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therefore necessary in order to explain and justify the material reality of the society of the time. Coole points out that this approach results in the polis being more “natural” than the oikos . Therefore, the function of the household was to engage in production and reproduction in order to support the freemen who engaged in the public life. Women were to be virtuous and silent, with only so much rationality as necessary to perform her domestic functions. As Coole puts it: “Women and slaves exist for the sake of rational male citizens…” (Coole, 1993, 30). The tragedy of Aristotle’s ideas is that “Aristotle made women’s inferiority and domestic role an integral part of his philosophy, thereby granting to such ideas a legitimacy they could never have derived from merely gratuitous prejudices…and thereby endured long after the Greek city-state and the culture which had given birth to them, had disappeared.” (Coole, 1993, 34). Rousseau As confirmation of Coole’s point about the endurance of Aristotle’s conception of women’s natural inferiority and relegation to the private sphere, Rousseau’s functionalist views echo that of Aristotle’s. As Okin points out, the tragic effects of such an influential political and moral philosopher embracing patriarchy and misogyny are still being felt today. As she puts it, the ideas of Rousseau on women’s nature, education and place in the public and private sphere are “representative of the whole Western tradition regarding women”. (Okin, 1979, 99). The tragedy of Rousseau’s views were not only that they perpetuated the myth of women’s natural inferiority and relegation to the private sphere, but that such views violated all of the ethical principles contained in Rousseau’s political and social theories regarding liberty and freedom, which were so influential in the

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overthrow of monarchy and feudalism in the French revolution. While one might excuse Aristotle, who was writing in the Fourth Century B.C., there is no justification for a modern philosopher such as Rousseau to follow suit. During Rousseau’s time, both Montesquieu and Wollstonecraft were raising questions about the subordination of women to men as arising from centuries of patriarchy and oppression, rather than women’s essential nature. Rousseau had to struggle mightily in his writings to justify the continued exclusion of women from the public sphere in light of his arguments for the natural freedom and autonomy of man. Not only does Rousseau perceive women’s place in terms of women’s reproductive function, he also perpetuates the religious superstition of women as the “source of evil.” arising from her sexuality. As Okin points out, this requires women to be “Jekyll and Hyde” or “Madonna and whore”: virtuous and chaste in order to ensure certainty about the paternity of her offspring, yet seductive enough to satisfy man’s passionate nature. (Okin, 1979, 100). In Rousseau’s Social Contract and other writings, Rousseau conceives of women as lacking “reason, autonomy, judgment, sense of justice and ability to consent.” (Coole, 1993, 85). While demanding equality and autonomy among male citizens, he envisions an authoritarian family where the man is the absolute ruler. Rousseau also gives voice to an extraordinary collection of stereotypes about women that persist in Western culture today: that women communicate indirectly; saying “no” when they mean “yes; that they are naturally accustomed to putting the needs of others above their own; that they have a particular moral authority that, when exercised upon their husbands at home, can influence men for good and therefore result in public

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happiness; and that their nature makes them incapable of a role in public life. (Coole, 1993, 87). Women’s “role is to be a desirable and faithful sexual object for man, his wife and the mother of his children” (Okin, 1979, 130), so women’s natural intellectual differences and inferiority thereby render them incapable of discerning the “General Will”, and the need arises to safeguard and seclude women to preserve these essential moral qualities . Elshstain points out that Rousseau’s view of nature, and the nature-to-social evolution, supposes a passionate aspect to “nature”. Man evolved from a state of nature, to “savage society” to the “social contract” of public life where “no man has a natural political authority over his fellows.” (Elshstain, 1993, 157). However, the family is not a place where this social contract of freedom and natural equality applies. “The basis of family government or authority lies…in the superior strength of the father who deploys it to protect his children and to command their obedience. This paternal authority ‘is correctly thought to be established by nature.’” (Elshstain, 1993,157). Elshstain extends a bit of compassion to Rousseau, observing that if he were merely a misogynist, he would not have gone to such lengths to justify his relegation of women to the private sphere. (Elshstain, 1993, 157). She observes that Rousseau was indeed struggling with the same dilemma citizens do today: “ Is it possible for men and women to be coequals within interrelated public and private spheres for which they share burdens and responsibilities? (Elshstain, 1993, 170). Rousseau’s answer was a resounding “no”, and he went so far as advocating different education for women to ensure that they continue to be relegated to the domestic sphere.

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Marx While 20th century feminists found value in Marx’s economic explanations of the subjugation of women, a re-reading of Marx reveals a “reductionist and masculinist ethos to Marxism” because of its emphasis on production. (Coole, 1993, 85). In Marx, Engels, and Hegel, we see the first discussions of the relationship between “nature, alienation, labour and private property” with the argument that private property and accompanying exploitation of others for paid or slave labor was the cause of man’s alienation from nature. Both Marx and Hegel see the relations of men and women as symbolic of the historical process of development of human nature and society through conflict. As Coole observes: “The implication is that men make history and express their progress in the way they treat their female partners, the passive indicators and beneficiaries of male advance in humanizing nature.” (Coole, 1993, 145). It is the “natural and spontaneous” division of labor within the family” which creates the first property relationship, allowing men to direct their wife’s labor and creating a class system within the family. It is this class system which “allows a materialist account of women’s oppression there.” (Coole, 1993, 146). Okin argues that Marx’s views on the oppression of the system of production and the struggle to free human beings from the demands of the system of production also apply to the “system of reproduction.” In her re-reading of Marx, she argues that women’s freedom to fully participate in the public sphere is inextricably linked with women’s reproductive freedom. (Okin, 1979, 299). Elshstain sees Marx’s viewpoint on the public/private sphere dichotomy most forcefully expressed in “his condemnation of bourgeoisie society.” (Elshstain, 1993,

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183). Marx sees the state as an instrument which serves the interests of the wealthy, not the “one citizen-one vote” classless and colorblind world of liberal political thought. This false vision allows the process of economic dominance and subordination of the working classes to continue unchecked, because the myth trumps the reality. Elshstain characterizes Marx as arguing for the “elimination of all distinctions between the general and the particular, the universal and the individual, public and private, nature and culture, man and citizen, freedom and necessity” which leads to a utopian view of man “restored to himself.” (Elshstain, 1993, 190). While one can argue that pure Communism as posited by Marx has never been implemented as a governing principle in a state, the recent primacy of neo-liberalism and it’s wedding of unbridled capitalism with democracy makes it unlikely that such an experiment will be attempted in the near future. Elshstain suggests that “the cost is too high” in the Marxian elimination of the public and the private because the individual human being loses value at the altar of the “social whole.” (Elshstain, 1993, 195). Tahira Khan, in her materialist analysis of honor based violence against women, states: “[H]onour/passion crimes against women occur very much so, in material contexts with deep-rooted material foundations and material forces active at all levels. Such violence is tri-dimensional: personal, structural, and cultural. The occurrence, persistence, and increase in such violence is a result of close interaction between the actors from all three dimensions. Such crimes revolve around female sexuality only.” (Khan, 2006, xxi).

This materialist analysis points out that it is economics, and not religion that is the basis for the structural and cultural oppression of women, in systems of land ownership, inheritance, parenthood and the patriarchal family. Quoting Engels, Coole says: “The moment of defeat for women arrives as we saw, once monogamy becomes compulsory.

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to safeguard private property, the male polices his wife’s fertility…and uses his position to exploit her labour…” (Coole, 1993, 146) While economically based, this cultural and structural oppression of women is now cloaked in nationalism and Islam, making positive change extremely difficult. Religious fundamentalism, whether Islamic or Christian, relegates women to the private world of family and home, ensuring that men retain power and control over women. “Despite the apparent increased oppression that women have encountered with the emergence of fundamentalism in many Muslim states, many women prefer their lives to westernized women who are projected as corrupt, licentious, and antifamily…Religion may be perceived as the only force able to reinstate a sense of nationhood, kinship solidarities and economic and political empowerment against what are seen as corrupting western ideologies and forces.” (Ahmad Ghosh, 2003, 9). This east-west polarization framed in religious terms, makes cultural and social change directed by western based actors extremely problematic. Following the historical materialism approach discussed above, in order to understand the material conditions that have resulted in the past and current exclusion of women from public life in Afghanistan, and the level of violence directed at women in Afghan society, it is necessary to briefly examine the highlights of the turbulent Afghan history. As one commentator put it: “Afghanistan may be the only country in the world where during the last century kings and politicians have been made and undone by struggles relating to women’s status…[O]ne must approach the analysis of women’s situation in Afghanistan, not through the ideological formulation of “before and after” the Taliban, but within the larger historical context of Afghanistan. Only such a perspective

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can ensure that women will be seen as integral to the rebuilding of the Afghan nation.” (Ahmed-Ghosh, 2003, 1). Afghan history The modern nation-state of Afghanistan was created as part of the “Great Game” between the British Empire and the Russian Empire in the late 19th century. Prior to that, in 1747, Ahmad Shah Durrani consolidated territory with roughly the same borders as exist currently and called it Afghanistan. The country is mountainous and located at a strategic crossroads of Indo-European civilizations. Consequently, it is a country with a long history of civil war, shifting rulers, conquest and rebellion. At various times, Afghanistan has been invaded by Mongols, including Ghenghis Khan and Tamerlane, Turks, Persians, Huns, Medians and Alexander the Great. In modern times, it has been invaded and ruled by the British, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Ethnically, it is diverse, with Pashtuns being the largest group at 40 % of the population of approximately 14 million, with Tajiks second at 20%. There are also Hazars, Uzbeks and Aimaq. Tribal politics and the forbidding terrain have created “spacial and ethnic impenetrability [that] has prevented Afghanistan from ever forming a consensual and coherent sense of nationalism.” (Ahmed-Ghosh, 2003, 2). Religion and National History Zoroaster was thought to have lived in Balkh, and Zoroastranism may have originated there between 1800 and 800 B.C. During the 6th Century B.C., the Persian empire overthrew the Medeans, whose territory included Afghanistan. Alexander the Great conquered in 330 B.C, followed by the Seleucid Empire, who then ceded Afghanistan to the Mauryan Empire in 305 B.C. During the Mauryan period, Buddhism

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became the dominant religion. The Sunga Dynasty overthrew the Mauryans in 185 B.C, followed by the Indo-Greeks during the second century B.C. During the first century B.C. the Kushan Empire, which was then centered in Afghanistan, was a center of Buddist culture. In 226 CE, the Persian Sassanid Empire overthrew Kushan rule in Afghanistan. Although strong supporters of Zoroastrianism, the Sassanids tolerated Buddhism and allowed the construction of more Buddhist monasteries. (Berzin, History of Buddism in Afghanistan). It was during their rule the two colossal Buddha statues were erected at Bamiyan, which the Taliban later destroyed to worldwide condemnation. The Sassanids defeated the Kushans in the third century.

Various groups, including the

White Huns and the Western Turks controlled various portions of Afghanistan. Buddism was the predominant religion during this time. Muslim Arab and Muslim Turkish armies invaded in the first and second centuries AD. The Arabs allowed followers of non-Muslim religions in the lands they conquered to keep their faiths if they submitted peacefully and paid a poll tax (Arabic: jizya). Most Buddhists in the region accepted this dhimmi status as loyal non-Muslim protected subjects within an Islamic state. (Berzin, History of Buddism in Afghanistan). The next centuries continued the pattern of dynastic conquest by the Arab Abbasids, followed by the Taharid, Shaffarad and Shahi dynasties, followed by the Samandad, Ghaznavad and Seljuk dynasties. For the most part, all of these Islamic dynasties continued the policy of granting Buddists dhimmi status. In 1219, Ghengis Khan invaded. For the next century, the Khanate continued the tradition of religious tolerance toward Buddism. However, in 1321, the Khanate fragmented, and the 1900 year history of Buddism in Afghanistan came to an end, as the

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khans governing Afghanistan converted the populace to Islam and ended the history of tolerance. Descendents of Ghengis Khan and Tamerlane established the Mughai Empire in 1504, whose capital was in Kabul. The first Afghan to rule a portion of Afghanistan was Mir Wais Hotak, a Pushtun from the Ghilzai clan, who took power in 1709 by assassinating Gurgin Khan. Hotak also defeated the Persians, who were trying to convert the locals from Sunni to Shia Islam. In 1722, he sacked Isfahan, Iran and massacred thousands of civilians, thereafter proclaiming himself King of Persia. In 1738, the army of Nadir Shah of Persia, which included thousands of Pashtuns from the Abdali clan, conquered Kandahar and the region around Kabul and Lahore and ended the Hotaki rule. In 1747, Nadir Shah was assassinated by his nephew. A loya jirga was called, an Ahmad Shah was chosen as King. He chose the name “Durrani” as his new clan name. His army conquered all of present day Afghanistan, as well as Pakistan, two Iranian provinces and Delhi. He retired in 1772, and was succeeded by his son and grandson. Modern Afghanistan: the first push for women’s rights Modern Afghanistan is dated from the rule of Abdur Rahman Khan, the “Iron Amir”, a Pashtun who ruled Afghanistan from 1880 to 1901. He was the first ruler to attempt to consolidate rule of various tribal areas into a centralized state. The Iron Amir ruled ruthlessly, but did try to change some laws related to women’s status. He raised the age of marriage, gave women the right to divorce and abolished the custom of forcing a widow to marry her husband’s next of kin. In accordance with Islam, women were given property rights in their husband’s and father’s property. (Ahmed-Ghosh, 2003, 3). Although he considered women to be subservient to men, he believed they should be

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treated justly. His wife, Bobo Jan, was the first Afghan queen to appear in public in European dress without a veil. She was keenly interested in politics, rode a horse, trained her maids in military exercises, and was sent on numerous diplomatic missions. (AhmedGhosh, 2003, 3). Adur Rahman’s son, Habibullah continued his father’s progressive policies. His wives were publicly unveiled and in western clothes, and he put a limit on dowry and wedding expenses that often bankrupted poor families. He set up the first college in 1903, the first hospital, the first hydroelectric plant and constructed roads and improved trade. The most important figure in this era was the returned exile, Mahmud Tarzi, who founded a modernist newspaper, Siraj-ul-Akhbari-i Afghan, which was influenced by modern Islamic jurisprudence and the treatment of women in Syria and Turkey. Tarzi was also anti-imperialist and nationalistic. He had a special section in the newspaper for women, edited by his wife, which advocated girl’s education and equal treatment. King Habibullah, influenced by Tarzi, opened a girl’s school. As Magnus and Naby discuss, modernization and education was the catalyst for tribal opposition. (1998:39). “Education for women, and state’s interference in marriage institutions challenged the power of tribal leaders and their patrilineal and patrilocal kinship systems, resulting in Habibullah’s assassination in 1919.” (Ahmed-Ghosh, 2003, 4). Habibullah’s son, Amanullah succeeded him, and continued with the push for modernization, with a focus on ending British rule in all of Afghanistan. Amanullah had traveled in Europe, and was determined to bring modern ways to Afghanistan, including liberating women from tribal strictures. He drew up the first Afghan Constitution in 1923, establishing a constitutional monarchy. Tarzi, the progressive newspaper editor,

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was very influential and Tarzi’s daughter married Amanullah. It is then not surprising that Amanullah “campaigned against the veil, against polygamy and encouraged education of girls not just in Kabul, but also in the countryside. At a public function, Amanullah said that Islam did not require women to cover their bodies or wear any special kind of veil. At the conclusion of the speech, Queen Soraya tore off her veil in public.” (Ahmed-Ghosh, 2003, 4). The Queen was a vocal advocate for women’s education and their full participation in public life as being on Islamic value. In 1927-28, the King and Queen traveled to Europe, Turkey and Egypt, where they were impressed by the path to modernization being pursued in the latter two Islamic countries. Upon their return, they attempted to impose more reforms regarding women’s status, including abolition of bride price and polygamy, and education and freedom of marriage choice for girls. It was too much, too soon for the conservative rural tribal leaders. Fueled by the British, who distributed in rural areas photographs of the Queen unveiled at banquets in Europe with men kissing her hand as a deliberate tactic to destabilize the country, tribal leaders formed coalitions to oppose the King. “It should be pointed out that in this period women in tribal and rural areas outside of Kabul did not receive the benefits of modernization. Tribal leaders controlled not only their regions, but through intertribal unity, held sway over most of the nation in resisting attempts at modernization.” (Ahmed-Ghosh, 2003, 5). By 1929, mullahs reasserted their powers, schools for girls were shut down, bride price limits removed and women were again required to be veiled. Amanullah was forced to abdicate and leave the country.

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With this cautionary tale, it is no surprise that subsequent rulers did not push a women’s rights agenda. One who did, Nadir Shah, in 1931 announced a Second Constitution which opened some girl’s schools and introduced some minor gender based reform. Despite trying to maintain good relationships with the mullahs, Nadir Shah was assassinated in 1931 and King Zahir Shah then reigned until 1973. Second Period of Women’s Rights. Afghan again tried to modernize in the 1950’s, thanks in part to massive aid from the Soviet Union. In order to develop, it was clear that women could not continue to be oppressed and ignored. Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud, cognizant of the fate of prior rulers who had attempted to change the status and treatment of women, declared veiling to be optional, and women were encouraged to contribute in some way to the economy, but no coercive measures were adopted. The Third Afghan Constitution in 1964 allowed women the right to vote and to be elected to office. Four women were elected to Parliament, and in 1965 the Democratic Organization of Afghan Women was formed to advocate for women’s literacy, and the abolition of forced marriage and bride price. 1965 also saw the formation of the organization which was to be later responsible for the second great push for women’s rights: the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a Soviet backed socialist party. In 1973, Mohammed Daoud Khan, launched a bloodless coup against Zahir Shah, and became the first “President” of Afghanistan. In 1978, a prominent member of the PDPA was assassinated, and the PDPA, fearing extermination, organized an uprising, killing Mohammed Daoud and his family. The PDPA renamed the country the

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“Democratic Republic of Afghanistran” and implemented rapid social and economic change, including “Decree No. 7”, which echoed the reforms King Amanullah and Queen Soraya attempted in the 1920’s. Decree No. 7 required compulsory, universal school attendance, abolished bride price and forced marriage, set the age of consent at 16 for girls and 18 for boys, and implemented land reform. However, this revolutionary social change again alienated the mullahs and tribal chiefs in the rural areas, who saw education for women as upsetting tribal and religious tradition and usurping male authority. PDPA workers in rural areas were killed and women social workers and educators were harassed, and women in Western clothes were shot. “The PDPA’s use of force in bringing the changes to fruition, combined with a brutal disregard for societal and religious sensitivities, resulted in massive backlash from the rural population.” (Marsden , 2002, 24). In the urban areas, women were employed in significant numbers as doctors, nurses, in private corporations, and in universities. In March, 1979, Amin took over as prime minister, and later that year overthrew Taraki, who was killed. As part of Cold War strategy under Carter and Brzenzinski, in early 1979 the US began arming the mujahidin, using the Pakistani Secret Service as part of this effort, which was an attempt to provoke the USSR into intervening. The Soviets did exactly that on December 24, 1979, when they invaded with over 100,000 troops. Amin was killed and replaced by Karmal. Estimates are that close to 2 million Afghan civilians were killed during the 10 year Soviet occupation. Over 5 million Afghans became refugees. The battle-cry of the mujahidin was “a war in the name of Islam, emphasizing a reversal of all socialist policies including those that guaranteed women liberties through

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education and employment. (Ahmed-Ghosh, 2003, 7). When the Soviets withdrew in 1989, civil war ensued. The mujahideen took over Kabul in 1992, declared an Islamic republic, and started re-imposing the “Islamic” restrictions on women’s dress, public participation and employment that were common in the tribal areas. They burned down the university, the libraries and the schools. This ushered in a period of “unprecedented barbarism” with daily accounts of killings, rapes, amputations and other forms of violence against women. Suicides by women grew as a means to avoid rape and forced marriage. (Ahmed-Ghosh, 2003, 7). In yet another example of the tragic shortsightedness of US foreign policy in this area, in 1996, the US, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia then armed a new group called the Taliban in order to counter the brutality of the mujahideen. The Taliban took over, and shortly thereafter established the Department of the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice. Women were prohibited from working, and from going outside except to buy food, and then only in the company of a male relative. The brutalities of the Taliban are well-known, and the photograph of the Taliban man executing a kneeling woman in a burqua by a shot to the head is as iconic an image of Afghanistan as the naked, burned Vietnamese girl running down a road screaming is of the Vietnam War. Lessons from History As can be seen from the above history, the prior efforts in the 1920’s and the 1970’s to improve women’s status led to violent, fundamentalist backlash that resulted in the overthrow of both monarchs and socialist leaders. Tribal leaders resorted to violence, including assassination and murder to protect themselves from any diminution of their traditional absolute authority over women. While cloaked in Islam, ironically these tribal

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laws do not reflect Islamic teaching. Marriages are forced, and divorce is disallowed because marriage is a tool of power and alliance building. Women are prohibited from education, and total obedience to their husband and his family is expected. The honor of the tribe and the family is vested in women, and therefore they must stay in the private sphere of the home and have no public role or voice. The consequences of this patriarchal, misogynist, medieval tribal system for women is devastating by any measurement. The following World Bank table shows the dismal situation for Afghani women in 2004: Summary Gender Profile

GNP per capita (US$) Population Total (millions) Female (% of total) Life expectancy at birth (years) Male Female Adult literacy rate (% of people aged 15+) Male Female LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION Total labor force (millions) Labor force, female (% of total labor force) Unemployment Total (% of total labor force) Female (% of female labor force) EDUCATION ACCESS AND ATTAINMENT Net primary school enrollment rate Male Female Progression to grade 5 (% of cohort) Male

2004 ..

South Asia 1980 265

2004 594

Low income 1980 321

.. ..

31.1 ..

898 48.3

1,446.80 48.7

1,392.20 49

.. ..

.. ..

47 48

54 54

63 64

52 53

.. ..

.. ..

43 13

Afghanistan 1980 270

1990 ..

1995 ..

15.2 48.3

14 48.3

43 43

.. ..

.. ..

72 46

.. ..

5

5

..

..

360

573

567

29

28

..

..

33

29

37

..

..

..

..

..

..

..

..

..

..

..

..

..

..

.. ..

.. ..

.. ..

.. ..

.. ..

..

..

..

..

..

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90 85

..

.. ..

..

2,34

Female Primary completion rates (% of relevant age group) Male Female Youth literacy Rate (% of people aged 15-24) Male Female HEALTH Total fertility rate (births per woman) Contraceptive prevalence (% of women aged 15-49) Births attended by skilled health staff (% of total births) Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births) Child malnutrition prevalence, weight for age (% of children under 5)

..

..

..

..

..

.. ..

.. ..

.. ..

.. ..

.. ..

85 78

.. ..

.. ..

.. ..

.. ..

51 18

.. ..

82 65

.. ..

..

..

7.2

..

..

..

10

..

46

..

..

..

14

..

36

..

..

..

..

..

7.8

12 .. 41

.. 39

..

5.2

..

..

3.1

..

..

.. 49

Note: Data in italics refer to the most recent data available within the two years of the year indicated

Afghanistan currently has the second highest infant and maternal mortality rates in the world, an average female life expectancy of 45 years, and an average family size of seven children and a female literacy rate of 13%. Prior to the 2004 Afghan Constitution and elections, there were no female judges; politicians or leaders at any level. Post US Invasion Nation-Building As summarized in the Rand report, nation-building requires: •

the establishment of a system of governance, including the ability to maintain order, guarantee the fulfillment of international obligation and human rights and deliver essential social services.

•

Violence and arbitrary exercises of power must be replaced by the rule of law and due process.

•

In stratified societies, parties must achieve a social compact governing their relations

•

Both political and economic processes must be progressing toward viability

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5.6

..

•

Both internal and external relationships must be conducted in the context of peaceful and legal processes, not violence and war

In examining the nation-building process employed in Afghanistan after the US invasion, and the impact of the issue of women’s political participation in that process, it is important to look at the material conditions at that time. One the one hand, the urban middle class, largely forced into exile during the years of civil war, “underpinned the institutional development of political democracy in the 1960’s and were ready to support it again…The restrictive interpretation of Islam [in the rural areas] was totally alien to the middle class.” (Suhrke, 2007, 4). On the other hand were the mujahedin, “the product of years of warfare supported by external powers [and] now pointed to enter the political contest, heavily armed and lacking in democratic experience.” (Suhrke, 2007, 4). Other than the military/political organization of the mujahedin, political parties were weak or non-existent, and there was no social structure to support democracy. “The country was divided by ethnicity, tribes, clans and sub-clans, and by urban versus rural life styles.” (Suhrke, 2007, 4). President Bush announced on October 1, 2001 that the US would support a political transition in Afghanistan that was coordinated by the United Nations. Four Afghan groups participated in the “Bonn Agreement” as the “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions” came to be known. The two most important groups being the Northern Alliance (a group of largely Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras from northern and central Afghanistan who had been fighting the Russians and then the Taliban for over 20 years); the Rome group (the deposed King and exiles living in the West). The goal of the Bonn

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Agreement was “the establishment of a broad-based, gender sensitive, multiethnic and fully representative government through national elections.” (Reynolds, 2006, 104). The Bonn group had two structures to guide the process of developing a new, interim constitution for Afghanistan. The first was Zahir Shah’s 1964 Constitution, and the period of relative stability under his reign from 1964-73. While political parties were not allowed to operate during that time, and the King appointed the prime minister and the Supreme Court, there was an elected parliament. The lack of political parties resulted Parliament with “diluted lines of popular representation and accountability” in a “fractured body driven by parochial interests and populated by religious men, teachers, minor government officials, prosperous merchants and tribal notables…preoccupied with private business affairs and their role as broker between the central government and their local constituencies….Little national-level legislation resulted.” (Suhrke, 2007, 3). However imperfect, the 1964 Constitution was used as a guide in the Bonn process. The second structure was the historical tradition of jirgas, historically held by Pashtun tribes. In previous periods of national instability, a Loya Jirga, or grand jirga was held to make national decisions. The Bonn parties agreed that the Constitution drafted as part of the Bonn process would be approved at a Loya Jirga, and that an “emergency” Loya Jirga would be convened by June, 2002 to elect a head of state and key positions in a transitional administration. The emergency Loya Jirga held in June, 2002 (“ELJ”) resulted in the election of Hamid Karzai, a Pushtun and the preferred candidate of the United States. While a limited number of women did participate, the ELJ has been strongly criticized for a number of reasons:

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•

A non-jirga member, Zalmay Khalilzhad, prevented the King from being considered as a serious leadership candidate, leading to the perception that the US was really in control and the whole process was rigged.

•

The Northern Alliance, who controlled both the Ministries of Defense and Interior, sent their own intelligence operatives into the hall in order to intimidate the opposition. This was not opposed by the US or the UN mission, who feared alienating the NA, but human rights activists were infuriated.

•

The newly elected interim administration decided to violate the previously agreed upon rules and added an additional 100 government officials to the list of positions to be filled at the ELJ, making more “patronage” positions available to placate the NA

•

The US, the UN and Karzai quashed any discussion of having a legislative body constituted during the interim period, sacrificing democratic principles for the expediency of having fewer parties to accommodate.

The role of Islam and intertwined with that, the role of women was an issue from the beginning. The 1964 Constitution declared Afghanistan to be an official Sunni Muslim state, and no law could be contrary to Islam, but the arbiter of that decision was the judiciary or ultimately the King, not ulama or tribal leaders. The 2004 Constitution declares Afghanistan to be an Islamic state, and that the official religion is Islam. These provisions beg the question of how gender equity, also enshrined in the Constitution, is to be ensured within conflicting interpretations of what is “Islamic”.

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The 2004 Constitution contained three significant provisions that have affected women’s political participation. First, the Constitution adopted a quota system for women’s representation, setting aside 25% of the lower house and 16% of the upper house for women. Secondly, the proposal put forth by ethnic minorities for a mixed parliamentary system, with a prime minister and a President, was defeated and the prime minister position that had historically existed, was abolished. Third, the judiciary was not reformed. The above three constitutional provisions have significant impacts on women. Quota systems, although long employed in India, Nordic countries and elsewhere across the world, are controversial. Some feminists, such as Meena Dhanda, have defended gender quotas in legislative bodies as being an efficient way to increase women’s presence and experience in politics. (Dhanda, 2000). Given that women are still only approximately 15% of the legislative members around the world, despite quota systems, indicate that they are working very slowly. Others object to quotas on the basis that such systems (i) give the impression that women are favored over men; (ii) that the women in such positions are tokens, and are not the “best persons for the job and therefore can be ignored. (Hoogenson, 2006, 37). Most quota systems, except in some Nordic countries, do not insure women have reserved legislative seats equivalent to their percentage in the population. The bicameral legislative body, with a lower and upper house, did retain some significant powers such as the right to confirm Supreme Court appointments and the right to pass laws and approve the budget. However, the strong presidential model pushed by the US and Karzai, coupled with the restrictions on political parties and the Single Non-

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Transferable Vote (SNTV) system used only in two other countries in the world, ensured that political parties were weak and fragmented. Civil society groups and the UN warned against adopting this non-party electoral system, but Karzai prevailed. The 2005 elections under SNTV had ballots that were several pages long, with over 2700 candidates vying for 249 seats in the lower house. (Suhrke, 2007, 10). Voters vote for candidates, not parties, so that the individual candidates fielded by any one party must all obtain seats in order for the party to obtain legislative power. “SNTV’s undersirable consequences include a high disproportionality between votes and seats, a tendency to exclude minority parties, increased clientelism and corruption, and the fragmentation of the ruling party.” (Reynolds, 2006, 108). Third, but I would argue, the most important structural failing, was the failure to reform the judiciary. The judiciary in Afghanistan was the target of many complaints, and it was reported that the constitutional commission agreed that the system of high court appointment of lower court judges fosters corruption. However, “the judiciary is the main source of employment for the ulama (Muslim clergy) who have a vested interest in maintaining a strongly Islamic legal system, and neither the president nor the commission want to confront this influential constituency. Given the expanded powers of the Supreme Court, the failure to create more space for judicial reform in the constitution may prove an obstacle to future reforms.” ( Rubin, 2007, 9). The effect on women of this failure has been devastating. As the Rand Report indicates, “at all levels of the criminal-justice system, the authorities fail to respond to…domestic violence, rape, sexual violence and assault.” (Rand Report, 2008, 26). Women complaining of violence, rape and assault are ignored, and women leaving forced

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marriages are sent home or imprisoned “for their own protection.” Legal representation is unavailable to them, and perpetrators go unpunished.

The pragmatists argue that the primary concerns in post-conflict nation building are to: (1) stabilize the situation (2) obtain the buy-in of important stakeholders and (3) take care of the former combatants. (Rand Report, 2008, 4). Improvements in the rights and status of women can come later. This would seem to be the more popular approach, given the lack of functioning governmental institutions during and immediately after the Taliban. “By the time the Taliban were deposed, peace and economic security were the most important concerns of the Afghan people, as numerous surveys have shown. Democratic reforms by themselves were a lesser priority, but widely welcomed because they suggested disarmament and peace. “ (Suhrke, 2007, 3). The pragmatists in postconflict Afghanistan made a strategic decision to use Northern Alliance surrogates to defeat the Taliban, rather than commit more of its own troops. These Northern Alliance leaders were then rewarded by receiving political power, many despite having committed human rights violations and despite their continuing support of cultural and tribal practices that oppress women, and involvement in the drug trade. (Human Rights Watch) Among the 249 legislators in the Wolesi Jirga, the lower house, there are 40 commanders still linked to militias, 24 who belong to criminal gangs, 17 drug traffickers and 19 against whom there are serious war-crimes allegations. Nearly half of all members of Parliament were mujahideen. (Reynolds, 2006, 112) Malalai Joya, a female member of Afghanistan’s lower house of Parliament, was suspended last year for her continued campaign against these Northern Alliance “criminals”. The situation was further exacerbated by the passage in 2006 of a blanket amnesty law, unopposed by

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President Karzai, which gave immunity to warlords and tribal leaders from prosecution for human rights violations. As a result of this and of the government’s continued failure to “deliver tangible improvement in the quality of people’s lives within a reasonable period of time”, violence in Afghanistan is resurgent and the Karzai government is losing popular support. (Economist, May 24, 2008). Voter turnout is decreasing, indicating disillusionment with the democratic process. The 2004 election had a 70% voter turnout, but the parliamentary elections in 2005 had only a 49% turnout, with even a lower turnout (33%) in Kabul, an urban, middle-class stronghold where turnout was expected to be high. (Suhrke, 2007, 7). Would the “moralists” approach have resulted in a more successful outcome? The Rand study suggests that it would, based upon the following empirical evidence: •

Researchers examining over 70 variables used to identify risks associated with failed states found a strong correlation between the Gender Development Index (“GDI”) and the HDI (“Human Development Index” suggesting that “gender parity may … play a strong and measurable role in the stability of the state” (Rand Report, 2008, 9)

•

Gender Equality results in the “demographic shift”, which includes smaller family size (the average Afghan family is seven children); increased maternal and infant survival rates (Afghanistan currently has the second highest infant and maternal mortality rates in the world, and an average life expectancy of 45 years); greater societal prosperity and increased political stability

•

Economic development is strongly elevated when women enter the marketplace, because it decreases the dependency ratio (the proportion of

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wage earners to dependents) but also because women are significantly more likely to reinvest their earnings in things that benefit the family than men are •

In many instances, including women in the labor force is the most critical determinant in lifting families out of poverty (6.5 million Afghans, 1/3 of the population live with chronic food insecurity)

•

The presence of women in institutions such as government bureaucracies and the police is correlated with decreased levels of corruption (Rand Report, 6)

Women’s inclusion and gender equity in nation building include three vectors: official programs and state policies; non-governmental actors and the impacts of the former on the nation-building process. The Rand report examines women’s inclusion in nation-building in several dimensions: security; health; governance, economic participation; and the National Solidarity Program (“NSP”) run by the World Bank and hundreds of contracted NGO’s and international actors. Because women’s political participation, the subject of this paper, cannot be looked at in isolation from women’s security and governance, it is useful to briefly summarize the Rand report’s conclusions in those areas. Security and Women Quoting Amnesty International, the Rand Report concludes that there is little human security for women in Afghanistan: Violence against women and girls in Afghanistan is pervasive; few women are exempt from the reality or threat of violence. Afghan women and girls live with the risk of : abduction and rape by armed individuals; forced marriage; being traded for settling disputes and debts; and face daily discrimination from all segments of society as well as by state officials. (Amnesty International, May 30, 2005).

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The Taliban and other Islamic radicals have been targeting women. They have “bombed schools and assassinated teachers” and have targeted women politicians, and women working for NGO’s. Amnesty International reports that for rural women, roving militias and the threat of violence has “made their lives worse than it was during the Taliban.” (Rand Report, 2008, 23). Domestic violence is widespread, including deprivation of education and economic opportunity, sexual violence, murder, beatings, and traditional practices that amount to violence: infant and child betrothal; child marriage, forced marriage and crimes of honor, where women are punished for male transgressions.

The Rand Report cites women as having a positive impact on security, in that women have been advocates for disarmament and peace, as in the Afghan Women’s Bill of Rights. Women have also been an important part of civil affairs in working with the NATO led Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRT’s), which deliver health and education services. However, as the security situation has deteriorated, PRT’s and NGO’s are not able to operate in a significant portion of the country. (See discussion on the current security situation, infra.) Women have not been integrated into the military, and few have been integrated into the police, because of the dangers to the women. Safiye Amajan, the head of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, was assassinated. The Rand Report makes three recommendations with respect to security issues. First, that Afghan authorities publicly condemn all violence against women and girls. Second, that the criminal justice system be reformed to put in practice the guarantee of

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equality in the Afghan Constitution. Third, that Afghan women need to expand their role in the humanitarian organizations delivering health, education and economic service. Governance and Women The establishment of systems to manage the state and deliver its functions (security, education, health care and infrastructure) are the means by which post-conflict nation building occurs. While women’s equality is a stated fundamental value of contemporary democratic states, the role of women in the process of nation building remains “vaguely defined and contentious.” (Rand Report, 2008, 60). While women and women-focused NGO’s played a significant role in ensuring the equal rights provisions were incorporated into the Constitution, “[t]here is a great disconnect between the abstract rights of the women of Afghanistan as written in the constitution and the actual, practical circumstances of their lives and daily treatment.” (Rand Report, page 71). The country lacks formal legal structures with respect to property rights, family law and a modern civil law code and modern judiciary system. Tribal historical practices, often based on a distorted or totally incorrect interpretation of Islam, enforce two main principles: that women are subordinate to men and that they are responsible for the honor of their extended family. The governance structures in Afghanistan today have been to a large extent mandated by outside organizations. The quotas for women’s representation have already been discussed. However, as external pressure falls away, there is evidence that “women’s inclusion in Afghanistan’s government, which the international community has been using as an indicator of democratic progress, is actually regressing.” (Rand Report, 2008, 64, quoting Isobel Coleman of the Council on Foreign Relations).

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The Rand Report recommends that: (i) NGO’s and other groups need to create long range plans to create effective legal and judicial systems to bridge the gap between the Constitutional guarantees and the reality of daily oppression and violence against women; (ii) men and boys need to be informed and educated (iii) women should be placed in judicial and legal positions. National Solidarity Program The NSP is a large-scale community-driven capacity building reconstruction and development program begun in 2003 and funded by the World Bank and other bilateral and multilateral donors and administered through 24 NGO facilitating partners (“FP’s”). The NSP’s goal was to develops the skills and attitudes in local communities that would enable the local communities themselves to design and implement their own development projects. Gender mainstreaming and the inclusion of women was and is a priority of the NSP. The policies and practices of the NSP include holding separate, parallel gendersegregated meetings, with distribution of written minutes of all meetings to both men and women; separate voting venues for men and women; allow separate, gender-segregated governing sub-committees and have all NSP forms signed by both a man and a woman. The FP’s use women field staff in their outreach to women. This has required the FP’s to pay for a male relative guardian, who can accompany female FP staff members, and they have experienced difficulty in hiring and retaining female staff who can meet the job travel requirements. This has also been complicated by mullahs in some locations prohibiting women from working for foreign NGO’s. Most significantly, the deteriorating security situation, including violence directed at female staff and their

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families, has made it difficult to employ women. FP’s have countered this by distributing pamphlets containing passages from the Koran that explain that many of the tribal restrictions on women are not based in Islamic law. (Rand Report, 2008, 114). The NSP has also experienced significant gender-related challenges in implementing the Community Development Council, (“CDC’s”), the core of their community based strategy. Elections for local CDC’s were to serve as a teaching opportunity regarding democracy and gender equality. Many FP’s reported that in conservative, rural communities, the women would not, or could not, be communicated with regarding CDC elections, and if the women were informed, they declined to get involved claiming such things were beyond their understanding and their place. This led to some FP’s conducting CDC elections with only male candidates, concluding the “inclusion of women was a process that cannot be decreed and will gradually take root through a culturally sensitive facilitation effort.” (Rand Report, 2008, 119). In 2005, the policy of allowing separate, gender segregated CDC’s was discontinued, because the women’s groups were discounted and ignored by the men’s groups. CDC approved projects are required to benefit both men and women, so this requirement has helped women CDC member to be listened to. The Rand Report lists three findings from the experience of the CDC program to date: •

Gender mainstreaming is a process rather than a policy

•

Fostering local support is essential for involving women in nation-building

•

FP’s have used local culture, including Islamic principles, to support female participation in the NSP

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Rand Report Recommendations The Rand Report recommends three strategies: (1) have a gender equity goal-oriented focus for all nation building activities. This could include strengthening women’s traditional roles as well as increasing women’s access to nontraditional roles that include increasing women’s economic capacity. (2)

Build reliance on civil society

Emphasize programs that encourage local leaders to accept both traditional and non-traditional roles for women and reform of the justice system to provide greater protection for women from violence and oppressive practices, such as arranged marriage of children. For example, successful local programs in Afghanistan’s rural areas have focused on education about a more inclusive, liberal interpretation of Islam that allows women access to public and economic life, and clarifies that the long-standing Afghan tribal practice of child marriage is not sanctioned by the Qu’ran.. Place a high value on programs that make mass employment opportunities immediately available to women. Integrate women in all business and economic enterprises. (3)

Improve data collection so that programs and strategies can be empirically

evaluated (4)

Resolve contradictions.

The Afghani Constitution guarantees equal rights for women, but also states that no laws may contradict the Qu’ran. This has resulted in the paralysis of the justice system and government agencies particularly with respect to gender issues.

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The Rand Report recommends a shift in emphasis in nation-building involving three elements: “First, security must be understood and implemented more consistently with the concept of human security. Second, governance should be placed on a foundation of equity and consistent rule of law from the start of the nation-building process. Third, women must be included even in the earliest phases of economic reconstruction and administrative reconstitution.” (Rand Report, page 2). Current “Material Realities” Afghanistan has been deemed “the good war”: the war the United States had the unequivocal support to wage from the international community. The Taliban had given sanctuary to Al Queda and refused to turn them over to international justice. There was no “twisting of intelligence, as in Iraq, and no rift with the United Nations”. (The Economist, “How the “good war could fail”, May 24th, 2008). Even the feuding US Presidential candidates agree that the Afghan war is more justified, and strategically and tactically, capable of being won if the US focuses its efforts solely there. Given that Afghanistan has become the “poor cousin” of the Iraq war in terms of deployments of soldiers and material, what is the military and security situation there today? A record number of Coalition soldiers died in Afghanistan in 2007 (232). 8,000 Afghans were killed in 2007, including 1,500 civilians. Suicide attacks are rising, with 374 Afghans killed and 631 wounded in 2007, as reported by Human Rights Watch. The country is in a de facto partition, with the “Pushtun belt” in the south and east on the border with Pakistan’s lawless northwest area of Waziristan deemed too dangerous for aid workers, NGO’s and non-military government personnel. An attached map from The

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Economist article cited above shows this de facto security partition of the country, together with the corresponding opium belt. Where the country is unsecured, poppies are growing.. On April 27th, insurgents opened fire at President Karzai during a military parade in Kabul, killing three people and raising international outcry regarding the state of security in the country. The Afghan Army is “arguably the best-run institution in Afghanistan.” (Economist, May 24, 2007). Western trainers report that Afghan forces, unlike the Iraquis, have little fear of fighting. The army has more than 50,000 troops, and will be at 80,000 men by 2010. The corrupt local police force is being retrained, and even includes over 100 women stationed in the Kabul area. Afghan forces can call upon coalition air power to aid their ground war against the resurgent Taliban operating in the Pushtun belt. Another factor affecting security is the availability of money to coalition forces. The American forces in the eastern half of the country, have far more funds available to them than the British and Canadian forces operating in the south. Since these countries will not commit more money or troops, the military effort in the south is likely to fall under American control in coming months, to the chagrin of the British, who invented the “Great Game” of politics in the Hindu Kush to keep Russian influence contained in the region. The military effort continues to be far too small to effectively control a country the size and complexity of Afghanistan, and is grossly undermanned compared to the number that were deployed in the Balkans, for example. The objective of the military effort is to extend the authority of the government throughout the entire country, not just the perimeter outside Kabul and other large cities.

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The Economist article quotes a British officer, quoting Ibn Qutayba, a ninth-century Muslim scholar: There can be no government without an army No army without money No money without prosperity And no prosperity without justice and good administration

With respect to “justice and good administration”, the Karzai government is failing. Corruption is rampant, fueled by drug money. Afghanistan currently produces more than 90% of the world’s opium poppies. If standards were uniformly applied, the US would classify Afghanistan as a “narco-state.” Mr. Karzai’s popularity is declining, even within his own administration. As in Iraq, the failure to deliver essential government services has eroded confidence in the central government. Mr. Karzai, while not being accused of corruption himself, has failed to confront and purge the warlords, druglords and criminals within his government. Karzai has failed to implement the five year plan for transitional justice. The warlords and criminals in Parliament have recently passed legislation to curtail human rights and press freedoms, and give them amnesty for past violations. The situation for women is grave and deteriorating, with increased violence and a lack of rule of law due to a corrupt and ulama dominated judiciary. In conclusion, both the security situation and the political situation are deteriorating. Two actions must be taken soon to avoid further deterioration into a failed “narco-state”. First, Mr. Karzai must confront and remove the warlords and criminals in the government at all levels to restore credibility and increase government influence and restore faith in the rule of law. Secondly, the coalition must commit more forces to the

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southern areas of the country to eradicate the Taliban, and other fundamentalist militias, prevent them from crossing the border from Pakistan with impunity, and secure the area so aid can again flow.

Conclusion The pragmatist’s nation-building alternative chosen in Afghanistan, that of moving forward quickly with a new Constitution and elections that empowered many negative actors, which allowed a repressive social order and a corrupt and fundamentalist

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controlled judiciary to continue to remain entrenched, with the assumption that a return to order will eventually allow for a reversal, is not proving successful. This alternative has proven particularly lethal to Afghani women, who suffer extraordinary levels of violence, with absolutely no recourse to police or the judiciary. War criminals and drug lords are in Parliament in significant numbers, and gain power and votes through intimidation, so much so that they have successfully passed a law to immunize themselves against prosecution. Against this backdrop, some of the recommendations of the Rand Report seem almost quaint, and certainly not capable of being successfully implemented in the almost one-half of the country where the security threat is either extreme or high. I discussed those recommendations in an interview with Tahira Khan, a JKSIS professor a Pakistani native who has done field work and training with women’s NGO’s in the PakistaniAfghan border area for over 15 years. She reports that much of the work of women’s NGO’s in that area in the last 15 years has been destroyed. Schools for girls have been burned; NGO’s cannot operate; fundamentalist militias operate with impunity. To me, it is clear that no strategy for increasing women’s political participation, whether it be Constitutional protections or community based development projects teaching governance principals in gender apartheid rural communities can succeed without freedom from violence. Freedom from violence cannot be achieved without a top to bottom reform of the civil and criminal justice system that will ensure punishment for perpetrators. The opportunity for such a sweeping approach was the period immediately after the US invasion, when international actors held power and militarily controlled most of the country. The Rand Report recognizes this, stating: “Afghan

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authorities must ensure that the law is implemented by the courts in a way that ensures equality in practice between men and women. Completion of this task at the outset of reconstruction might have proactively prevented the highly volatile and responsive surge in violence we wee in today’s efforts by a minority to re-Talibanize the society through intimidation and force.” (Rand Report, 2008, 34). While the lessons of Afghan history make it clear that assassination is the sad end for many reformers who championed more equitable treatment for women, the international community sadly failed in Afghanistan to seize the opportunity for instituting a system of rule of law that could have opened the door to real human security for women. Civil society programs, including the NSP, have obviously made positive changes, but I would argue that only the coercive power of the state, through an effectively administered legal system and a non-ideological, corruption-free judiciary, can create the fundamental societal and cultural change that is necessary to make women full participants in Afghan political and economic life. Until the perpetrators pay for their crimes (whether they are rapists and batterers in small rural village or a mujahideen member of Parliament) and the victims have recourse and protection, there will be no effective strategies for increasing women’s political participation in Afghanistan.

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