Structural Differences, Common Challenges: The Civil Service Systems of Mexico and the United States in Comparative Perspective Mauricio I. Dussauge Laguna1 (Article originally published in Spanish in the journal Revista Servicio Profesional de Carrera, no.5, 2006, pp 99-126)

We live in times of administrative reforms. While the “New Public Management” and “Governance” have been the “hot” topics in specialized debates, along with them other older issues have remained in the reform agendas of several governments: decentralization, increasing government control, administrative professionalization.2 Even if we limit ourselves to the latter, the international perspective seems to offer various scenarios: in some countries, the issue is posed in terms of how to create/design merit-based systems, structures, and proceedings which can bring professionalism to the State functioning; in other countries, the current issue is how to transform/redesign the traditional merit-based systems, structures, and proceedings so that the State continues to have the intellectual capital to perform its duties in the face of changing social and technological conditions. This is the merit vis-à-vis flexibility dichotomy, as Francisco Longo has pointed out.3 Mexico and the United States are good examples of these two contrasting scenarios. On the one hand, in 2003, the federal government of Mexico started the design and implementation of its new Professional Civil Service. At almost the same time, the United States government began an ambitious revision of its “merit system”, which will ideally lead to a radical transformation of human resources management in the federal administration. At present time, it is possible to observe the development of highly ambitious administrative reforms in both countries, despite their different bases,

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I would like to thank to Guillermo M. Cejudo and Oscar Jaimes for their comments to a previous draft of this essay. Of course, they are not responsible for any failure or vagueness in it. 2 See, for example, María del Carmen Pardo (comp.), De la Administración Pública a la Gobernanza, México: El Colegio de México, 2004; and the special number of Foro Internacional, no. 182, oct-dic 2005, about administrative reforms. 3 See Longo’s excelent text Mérito y Flexibilidad. La gestión de las personas en las organizaciones públicas, Barcelona: Paidós, 2004. © Mauricio I. Dussauge Laguna © Revista Servicio Profesional de Carrera

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objectives, and scopes, as well as their different administrative traditions and professionalization systems. However, the central argument of this essay is that, in spite of the existing differences between both countries, it is possible to analyze a set of management and administrative reform themes that equally concern Mexican and US authorities.4 In fact, it could be said that the comparison of this two particular experiences may enlighten a set of fundamental themes for other civil service reforms. The essay is divided into three sections. In the first one, some of the most important structural differences between the Mexican and the US Civil Service Systems are analyzed. In the second one, five current challenges that are common to both countries are analyzed. Finally, the concluding remarks section proposes some general concerns and ideas about some issues that may be interesting to those who are building and transforming civil service systems.

The structural differences The civil service reforms in Mexico and the US are in some ways opposite, given that each

one

represents

different

moments

of

the

process

of

administrative

professionalization. In addition, both countries’ systems are different in structural terms, as will be discussed in this section.

Different “civil service” meanings First of all, in both countries there are slightly different connotations about what does a “civil service” (or “professional civil service”, as it has been called in Mexico) mean in legal, political, and social terms. In the United States, according to Title V of the US Code, the civil service refers to “all positions under appointment of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government”. This implies at least two things: first, that the civil service encompasses positions for which merit-based hiring is required, and some for which the latter is not needed5; second, that the civil service legislation

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This argument is based on one of the possible ways to compare studies: revision of different cases in order to try to observe common aspects and conclusions. See B. Guy Peters, Comparative Politics, New York: New York University Press, 1998. 5 Although it is true that most civil service positions are based on a merit hiring process, some of them such as the “Schedule C” positions, while formally integrated to the civil service, are politically appointed (“excepted appointment”) positions. © Mauricio I. Dussauge Laguna © Revista Servicio Profesional de Carrera

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also covers positions which are not necessarily under the Executive branch.6 Thus, when talking about the “civil service” in the United States, one would essentially talk about just another administrative institution (as important as it may be), that is part of the political-administrative environment. In Mexico, the Professional Civil Service Law points out that the career system is “a mechanism to guarantee equal opportunities in the access to public administration on the basis of merit and with the purpose of stimulating the development of the public administration for the benefit of society”. This reflects that in Mexico the development of the “civil service” concept has been different –more specific–, for it is generally linked to the idea of appointing civil servants through merit-based and depoliticized hiring processes7. Besides the previous legal and conceptual definitions, in the last few years the term “civil service” has acquired a negative connotation in the US, which has been attributed (among other things) to the slowness and ineffectiveness of a bureaucratic/bureaucratized institution, which has not been able to react to new social, technological, and political demands. In Mexico, however, professional/civil service systems tend to be valued in a positive way, since they are seen as means to increase the efficiency and professionalism of the State.

Different scopes of the civil service systems In the second place, there are important differences in terms of the scope that the civil service systems have in both countries (considered the former only in its most limited meaning, as executive and professionalized institutions). If a quantitative dimension is considered, the US civil service covers nearly two million people8, while the Mexican Professional Civil Service barely covers 42 thousand positions in the executive branch.9

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For example, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) personnel, that depends on the Federal Congress. It is necessary to clarify that, for the last years, the GAO has obtained some legal faculties to administrate its own civil service, but always framed by Title V sections, which is the supreme legal reference in the subject. 7 Although there also have been some professionalization efforts in the judiciary and legislative branches. 8 This if we leave the US Post Service civil servants aside, according to Patricia W. Ingraham (“Me estás hablando a mí? Las limitaciones de la rendición de cuentas en el servicio público norteamericano”, Servicio Profesional de Carrera, vol. 2, no. 4, 2005). See also Paul C. Light, “Fact Sheet on the New True Size of Government”, September, 2003 (http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/gs/cps/light20030905.pdf). Even if we leave aside the one million civil servants that are now part of the Departments of Homeland Security and Defense (which have been © Mauricio I. Dussauge Laguna © Revista Servicio Profesional de Carrera

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Considering an organizational dimension (the type and hierarchical level of positions), there are also important differences between both countries: the US Civil Service includes positions from all levels of the organizational hierarchy (both middle level and administrative positions); meanwhile, Mexico’s Professional Civil Service includes senior and middle-level positions, excluding de facto secretarial or administrative positions. Another difference has to do with top-level positions. In the US these are part of the Senior Executive Service, while in Mexico top-level officials (Director General-level) are a subset of the Professional Civil Service. Lastly, other differences can be found in terms of the scope of the civil service regulations. In the US more and more administrative institutions (in both number of public officials and number of public organizations) are being exempted from Title V of the US Code. These institutions are thus receiving the authority to make their own regulations.10 It is, in fact, a change trend which will probably continue in the next years. In Mexico, however, the situation is completely different, for the Professional Civil Service Law and regulations homogenously rule every federal government organization.

Different contents in the civil service regulations Thirdly, there is a series of differences between both systems that derive from the specific contents of their regulatory frameworks. For example, in the US career officials have the right to be members of unions and associations; but in Mexico, civil servants do not have that right. In both the US and Mexico, merit and equity are at the basis of civil service systems. However, at the same time both countries’ civil services must meet additional values of its own: Mexican legislation includes values such as efficiency, impartiality, objectivity, rule of law, and quality, which seem to be linked both to the search of a depoliticized public service and to the creation of a neomanagerial public service. In the US, “veteran’s preference” or “affirmative action”

developing, as the GAO, new career systems differentiated from the Federal one), the difference of coverage between both countries’ civil services is huge. 9 It should be mentioned that the US civil service originally covered 10 thousand positions, which were nearly 10% of Executive power at the end of the 19th century. 10 Such as the Post Service, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Departments of Homeland Security and of Defense. © Mauricio I. Dussauge Laguna © Revista Servicio Profesional de Carrera

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principles have been concrete answers to social minorities’ demands, as well as to the government’s need to integrate them to the civil service.11 In terms of hiring, in the US there are several mechanisms to recruit and select new civil servants. They range from open public competitions, to streamlined hiring of graduate students with outstanding academic records, who go through the prestigious “Presidential Management Fellows Program” that has been designed to attract new middle-level officials with leadership skills and potential. In contrast, in Mexico, the only way to enter the Professional Civil Service is by open public contests, even though article 34 of the Law establishes some exceptions to the rule (like natural catastrophes, epidemics, etc.).12

Different “governance frameworks” for the civil service systems There is another important difference between both countries, which refers to the “governance framework” of their civil service systems. In Mexico, the Ministry of Public Administration (MPA) is responsible for the overall management of the system, although it is its Unit of Human Resources and Professional Service the one responsible for the day-to-day operation of the system.13 Apart from it, there are Professionalization Committees in each ministry, which are responsible for adjusting federal rules to each ministry’s specific conditions; these committees are also responsible for implementing recruitment, hiring, and training systems. So, in some sense we could say that the management of the civil service is “shared” by both the MPA’s Unit and the other federal ministries, although with some tendency to centralization given that all tools provided by the Unit (such as position classification and some hiring tools) must be

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These principles, derived from a particular social history, are to some extent opposite to the merit principle, because they are based on social or gender considerations (e.g., being a war veteran, woman, or African-American), and not in professionalizing criteria. These principles are not superior to civil service’s merit principles, because that is considered as unconstitutional. Nevertheless, they need to be taken into account by HR officials during recruitment and hiring processes.. See, J. Edward Kellough, “Equal Employment Opportunity and Affirmative Action in the Public Sector”, in Steven W. Hays and Richard C. Kearney (eds.), Public Personnel Administration, NJ: Prentice Hall, 4th ed., 2003, pp. 209224; and Donald E. Klingner and Dahlia B. Lynn, “Más allá del Servicio Público de Carrera: Los Paradigmas Nacientes en los EE UU”, Servicio Profesional de Carrera, vol. 2, no. 4, 2005. 12 This article, by the way, seems to be used with a highest frequency to that expected. Whether that is being done following the spirit of the law is yet to be assessed. 13 In terms of institutional design, this Unit has an inferior hierarchical level than State ministries. This is, to some extent, inadequate if this Unit need enough authority to control and supervise civil service implementation. © Mauricio I. Dussauge Laguna © Revista Servicio Profesional de Carrera

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used by all ministries.14 Additionally, there is an Advisory Board formed by four ministries (Public Administration, Finance, Interior, and Labor), and a member from each the social, academic, and private sectors. This board has met each six months for advising and providing recommendations to the MPA authorities. Finally, and given that the civil service system is new, the Unit seems to be basically playing a role of a regulatory entity, more than a supervisory or advisory entity. In the case of the US, the situation is quite different. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is not a federal department, but a presidential office which directly reports to the President.15 Federal agencies have their own human resources offices which, after the decentralization and delegation that occurred in the nineties, have almost absolute autonomy to manage the civil service inside its institution (even though, they are always to respect federal regulations). This is thus fundamentally a decentralized system, even if some of its components are jointly managed by the OPM and federal agencies (i.e., the Presidential Management Fellows Program and the Senior Executive Service). In this decentralized environment, the OPM mainly performs both a supervisory and advisory role, but without losing its regulatory authority. Unlike in the Mexican case, in the US there is no Advisory Board that formally involves the participation of other non-government sectors. However, in recent years a new Chief Human Capital Officers Council (also known as the CHCO Council) was created. It is formed by the OPM Director and Senior officials that are responsible for managing the human resources of each Federal agency. Another important difference is that in the US a number of other institutions take part in the management/supervision of the civil service system: the Merit Systems Protection Board (which revises and is the last authority in the matter of dismissals and sanctions); the Federal Labor Relations Authority (which analyzes and solves conflicts between unions and Federal agencies); the Office of Special Counsel (which investigates cases related with a politicized management of human resources subsystems); and the Equal Employment Opportunity 14

Civil service management can be a) centralized (a central office is responsible for the whole system), b) decentralized (State Ministries/Departments are responsible for certain part of the system and a central office sets norms and rules), c) shared (a central office collaborates with the rest of the organizations in all aspects). See those human resources sections in “Government Performance Project”, Paths to Performance in State and Local Government, Syracuse, NY: The Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs; and Patriia W. Ingraham, Philip Joyce and Amy K. Donahue, Government Performance. Why Management Matters?, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003. 15 Although in the United States, the OPM Director does not have the same hierarchy as State Ministries, she has directly accounts to the President. This fact balances any possible disparities with other existing powers. © Mauricio I. Dussauge Laguna © Revista Servicio Profesional de Carrera

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Commission (which revises and solves possible discrimination cases). None of these institutions currently have an equivalent in the case of Mexico.

Different civil service reform dynamics The last difference (somewhat obvious, but worth mentioning) has to do with the different origins of administrative reforms in both countries. The US civil service system has a 120-year long history, which goes back to its creation by the Pendleton Act of 188316. Throughout all those years, the system has evolved, although this process has been accelerated in the last years because of the presidential willingness to reform the system. During President Clinton’s administration, and especially in the current Bush’s administration –when the Department of Homeland Security was created and the new human resources management regulation for the Department of Defense was approved–, a new conception of what the US civil service system(s) should be has emerged. In this view, it has been argued that the federal civil service needs to be completely reformed (“reinvented” in the 1990’s, “transformed” in the 2000’s), in order to become a more flexible and differentiated system.17 On the contrary, the Mexican professional civil service was not created until 2003. Although there were previous professionalization experiences (such as the Federal Electoral Institute’s civil service and the Mexican Foreign Service18), this is the first time that the whole Federal government undertakes a reform to regulate human resources management according to merit and equality. This aims to create a new system and to limit the existing HR flexibilities (which has derived in politicized discretion) and heterogeneity of public personnel management. In order to provide a synthetic view, the following table summarizes the differences between the two systems which have been discussed in the previous pages.

16

For further details on the US civil service history, see OPM, Biography of an Ideal, Washington, DC: 2003, and Patricia W. Ingraham, The Foundation of Merit, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. 17 For a general insight of recent changes in the US civil service, see Patricia W. Ingraham and Donald P. Moynihan, “Civil Service and Administrative Reform in the United States”, in John Halligan (ed.), Civil Service Systems in Anglo-American Countries, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004; OPM, “OPM’s Guiding Principles for Civil Service Transformation”, abril 2004 (www.opm.gov); and Mauricio I. Dussauge Laguna, “Tendencias de cambio en el servicio civil en los Estados Unidos”, Servicio Profesional de Carrera, vol. 1, no. 2, 2002, pp. 41-60. 18 Two very useful documents are: Revista de Administración Pública, “El Servicio de Carrera en la Administración Pública Mexicana”, no.103, 1999; and Rafael Martínez Puón, La profesionalización de la Administración Pública en México, Madrid: INAP, 2003. © Mauricio I. Dussauge Laguna © Revista Servicio Profesional de Carrera

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Table 1 Main differences between the civil service systems of Mexico and the United States Element/aspect

Mexico

United States

Civil Service term connotation

• Civil Service = Professionalization • Basically positive image

• Civil Service = administrative institution • Partially negative image in recent years

Guiding principles

• Merit and equal opportunities • Other: legality, impartiality, objectivity, efficiency, quality

Civil Service scope

• Federal ministries and agencies (about 80) • Approximately 42,000 officials

Administrative institutions not covered by federal civil service regulations

• Presidential Office, national security systems, Foreign Affairs Ministry

Positions which are part of the civil service system

• Chiefs of Department, Area Director, Associate Director Generals, Director Generals • Basically professional, middle management level positions, and top civil servants • No, high level officials (Director Generals) are part of the same career system • No

• Merit and equal opportunities • Other: veterans’ preference (war veterans’ right) and affirmative action (positive discrimination) • Federal agencies (although in the last years, the civil service has been “disaggregated”, and new particular regulations for some agencies have been approved) • 2 million officials (or nearly 1 million, if the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security are left aside) • Post Service, Foreign Service • Agencies that have been exempted from Title V: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Department of Homeland Security, Department of Defense • General Schedule 1 to 15 levels • Administrative personnel, professional and top civil servants

Is there a senior officials’ corps?

Do civil servants have bargaining rights/right to unionize? The Governance of the Civil Service System

• The Unit of Professionalization and Human Resources is part of the Ministry of Public Administration • There are Professionalization Committees in every federal ministry/agency • There is an Advisory Board (meets every six months) formed by public officials, and members of the public, private, and social sectors. • The Unit mainly plays a regulatory role, although it is strengthening its supervising and advisory functions. • Management based on “shared responsibilities”, with some centralized elements

• Yes, the Senior Executive Service • Yes • Office of Personnel Management is a presidential office • Each Department has a Chief Human Capital Officer, who is responsible for coordinating the management of its institution’s human resources • There is a Chief Human Capital Officers Council formed by the OPM Director, a representative of the Office of Management and Budget, and each agency’s Chief Human Capital Officer • There are other institutions such as the Federal Labor Relations Authority, the Merit Systems Protection Board, the Office of Special Counsel, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission • OPM plays a supervising role, even though it has reinforced its advisory activities and has renewed its regulatory activities • Decentralized system, with some “shared responsibilities”

Source: Author.

© Mauricio I. Dussauge Laguna © Revista Servicio Profesional de Carrera

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The Common Challenges The previous section attempted to emphasize some of the main structural differences that exist between the Mexican and the US civil service systems. In this second section, what I would like to do is to show that, in spite of the existing differences, there are at least five areas in which both countries face similar reform challenges.

Building the administrative capacities to implement reforms The first challenge that both countries face has to do with the need to build the adequate institutional and administrative conditions that are required for the success of their civil service reforms. In the Mexican case, the creation of the Professional Civil Service has brought an enormous quantitative/qualitative change in the way that the federal agencies must manage their human resources. Until very recently, most of the Federal government’s HR offices had a passive role (basically, they just supervised the payroll and did the paperwork for HR decisions taken by other officials). However, these areas are now formally and truly responsible for leading/coordinating open recruitment/hiring processes, performance appraisals, position classification, etc. A major problem is that, as some experts directly involved in the implementation of the Professional Civil Service have said19, federal ministries were not prepared (and they may not be ready yet) to deal with such a big load of work in such a short time. Although there are no detailed studies on the subject yet, it could be said that most HR offices are facing situations in which some of the following issues are happening: there is not enough HR personnel; the HR personnel does not have the required skills to conduct the reform; the existing information and technological platforms are not adequate for following up on the implementation of the new HR systems; the infrastructure for conducting open recruitment procedures and examinations does not suffice. Although without the same complexity, the US government has also faced and still faces the need to build the required administrative capacities in its HR offices, in order to successfully lead current reforms. Starting from the nineties, federal HR offices 19

Antonio Casas Vázquez, “El Servicio Profesional de Carrera: un sistema complejo pero impostergable para la consolidación del buen gobierno”, Servicio Profesional de Carrera, vol. 2, no. 3, 2005; and Rafael Martínez Puón, Servicio Profesional de Carrera, ¿para qué?, México, Miguel Ángel Porrúa, 2005. © Mauricio I. Dussauge Laguna © Revista Servicio Profesional de Carrera

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had to adapt themselves to a process of HR decentralization, which included the absorption of functions and personnel management processes that were previously under OPM’s responsibility. Moreover, in the last few years these same offices have had to adapt themselves to changing environmental conditions. First of all, they had to face new governmental work and the need to recruit experts for emerging government fields. Second, they had to adjust themselves to the use of new technologies in order to manage personnel’s information. Third, they had to internalize new “authorities”, regulations, managerial flexibilities, and trends in HR management (now called “human capital management”), which involve the strategic use of information about demographic trends, in order to develop HR plans and succession plans for leadership positions.20 However, not every Federal agency has HR personnel with adequate expertise and specialized knowledge. Besides, many of the new HR tools and concepts are simply unknown for many HR experts. In addition to this, as in the case of the Mexican government, many US federal agencies lack the administrative infrastructure and ICT systems that will be needed to deal with their new responsibilities. So, although in different dimensions and with different levels of complexity, it can be said that both countries are facing the need to assess and strengthen their administrative capacities. In some cases, this (will) mean to redesign HR offices in order to adjust their organizational structures and provide them with new personnel. In other cases, the training of personnel in charge of HRM –and in fact of all public servants– will be emphasized, so that they can adequately perform their new functions and responsibilities. Finally, in some other cases, Federal agencies will have to acquire or develop new information technology systems that allow them to store, manage, share, and transfer all the information related to both the civil servants (their career, qualifications, annual performance, etc.), and the civil service system itself (reforms implementation progress, status of the different HRM subsystems, etc.)

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See Patricia W. Ingraham and Heather Getha-Tayor, “Flexibilizar la gestión de recursos humanos en el gobierno federal de los Estados Unidos: ¿lo que ordenó el doctor o una receta equivocada?”, Foro Internacional, no. 182, pp. 635-657. © Mauricio I. Dussauge Laguna © Revista Servicio Profesional de Carrera

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Developing effective mechanisms for inter-organizational coordination The creation of effective mechanisms for inter-departmental/inter-agency coordination is a second challenge that both governments are facing. Good coordination between the offices that are responsible for leading the whole civil service reform (Mexico’s Civil Service Unit, and the US Office of Personnel Management), and those other institutions taking part in the process will be essential for (re)designing the regulations, planning the implementation phases, and in general for ensuring better decision-making processes. In Mexico, the Civil Service Unit has arranged periodical meetings between representatives from federal agencies. In those meetings, the most important topics of the civil service implementation process have been discussed and Federal agencies are informed about relevant issues: time schedules, paperwork, norms, and relevant news. Additionally, there is a division within the Unit that is specifically devoted to be in continuous communication (even daily) with those public organizations which are part of the system. Although it is difficult to assess how effective these coordination mechanisms have been, it could be said that they are still going through a ripeness or adaptation phase. Firstly, HR senior specialists, who lead the implementation of the civil service reform, do not always attend to the meetings, but send a delegate. This causes problems in terms of how quick, effective, and legitimate the decision-making process can be; it is also problematic in terms of the quality and adequacy of the information that is transmitted to the federal agencies, since arm-length agencies do not always send representatives to the meetings and thus depend on the information that their head ministries’ communicate to them. Secondly, the Unit’s division devoted to reach out Federal agencies can not fully accomplish its mission because of a simple reason: it was designed to give detailed information about regulations, norms, and other normative/implementation news. However, in many cases that information is not available yet, because the division in charge of designing the new HR policies is still working on them (either writing new regulations, or preparing complementary rules). In the US, the “reinventing government” movement of the nineties emphasized the decentralization of authorities and decision-making processes, as well as public personnel management deregulation.21 Federal agencies then suddenly found 21

See the first section in Steven W. Hays and Richard C. Kearney (eds.), Public Personnel Management, Upper Saddle River, NJ, Prentice Hall, 2003. © Mauricio I. Dussauge Laguna © Revista Servicio Profesional de Carrera

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themselves having too much freedom/autonomy for managing their workforce. Nonetheless, due to this deregulation it was not always clear whether or not an organization was allowed to make decisions on certain topics, whether some actions were forbidden or not, etc. This led to a Federal regulations “interpretative vacuum”. At the same time, the progress of some demonstration projects and the approval of new HR flexibilities (such as “category rating” and “broadbanding” for executives)22, made appropriate the creation of the CHCO Council. The latter is responsible for, among other things, leading in a coordinated manner the implementation of new personnel rules. Although the Council was created in 2002, it has supported inter-agency decisionmaking in a coordinated way. However, some experts affirm that the Council’s legal and organizational foundations are weak, and risk long-term stability23. In addition, the OPM and the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security have created joint-groups (OPM/DSI, OPM/DoD) in order to implement in a coordinated way the civil service reform process. Civil servants and union leaders have been part of these groups. At the beginning, group meetings allowed OPM’s ideas and interests to be in tune with departments’ and union leaders’ ideas and interests. Besides, they gave greater legitimacy and coherence to the reforms. However, it should also be said that those meetings consumed time and resources; were accompanied by conflicts between union leaders and reform leaders (and even between the OPM and the participating departments); and did not assure the legitimacy of the proposed legal changes. Thus, inter-organizational coordination is an essential condition for both countries’ civil service reform processes. In Mexico, the creation of the Professional Civil Service and the design/implementation of new regulations require the development of new inter-secretarial dynamics/interaction, in order to harmonize Federal government’s achievements. In the United States, the effects of the “reinventing government” and “transforming civil service” movements have emphasized the need to create new coordination mechanisms, in order to provide Federal agencies with 22 See Ingraham and Getha-Taylor; and Government Accountability Office, “Human Capital: Selected Agencies’ Statutory Authorities could Offer Options in Developing a Framework for Governmentwide Reform”, GAO-05-398R Human Capital Authorities, 2005. 23 See General Accounting Office, “Human Capital. Observations on Agencies’ Implementation of the Chief Human Capital Officers Act”, May 2004 (GAO-04-800T); and Martha Crumpacker and Jill M. Crumpacker, “Elevating, Integrating, and Institutionalizing Strategic Human Capital Management in Federal Agencies Through the Chief Human Capital Officer”, Review of Public Personnel Management, vol. 24, no. 3, 2004, pp. 234-255.

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information about how to implement new regulations published by the OPM, or on how to develop their own regulations according to “merit-system principles”.24

Taking advantage of economies of scale and defining (des)centralization areas A third challenge that both countries have faced (and will face) in their reform processes has to do with the question of how to take the maximum advantage of existing economies of scale.25 In other words, in both the Mexican and US civil services, there have been discussions about what, when, why or why not, and how to (des)centralize civil service authorities, functions, and managerial tools to Federal agencies. In the Mexican case, some of the main civil service system elements that have been centralized by the Ministry of Public Administration and its Civil Service Unit are the development of norms and regulations; the creation of a central online information management system (known as “RHNet”); the on-line recruitment system (www.trabajaen.gob.mx); some hiring examination tools; and the administration of the “@Campus México” e-training system. With regards to civil service regulations, it is clear that at this point of the reform process there should only be one institution (the Unit) responsible for leading the drafting of regulations. This is so because it is necessary to set, develop, and control minimum common criteria for every public organization that will be part of the system. However, it is worth mentioning that this may change in the near future, as general regulations begin to show their limitations when confronted to each public organization’s specific conditions. In the case of computer systems and technologies used for the administration of public information, recruitment of applicants, and personnel training, it seems appropriate that initially the Unit centralizes the purchase of computer systems, as well as the administration of software. In economic and technological terms, this centralization is much more efficient, because it takes advantage of economies of scale (for instance, a ninety-dollar fee for each civil servant who takes any on-line training course in “@Campus México”).

24

See Office of Personnel Management, “OPM’s Guiding…” I use the term “economies of scale” in its economic sense, which remarks the need to use one source, and not many sources, for producing something in a more efficient way (less costs, more savings/benefits). 25

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Beyond this particular discussion on whether the centralization is adequate or not (or to which extent things should be decentralized or not), in the Mexican case some concerns have been expressed in terms of the utility, quality, and adequacy of the tools and software that have been acquired by the Civil Service Unit. For example, it should be further analyzed if it is reliable and valid to use the same software and examination contents for assessing applicants that want to work at the Ministry of Education and those that are applying to work at the Ministry of Agriculture; and also if it is adequate to offer the same training courses for career civil servants that are part of the Ministry of Economy and those that work at the Ministry of Energy. (In addition, it still need to be checked whether the hiring tools are being successful or not in assessing what they intend to assess, and whether it is possible or not to gain leadership skills through an online course.) In the case of the US, the debate has been set in similar terms, although the US government obviously has a greater experience about the possible limitations and potentials of decentralizing certain authorities and functions. In a relatively recent document, the OPM points out that there are certain areas where it is necessary to decentralize; but there are also other areas that must be administered in a more centralized fashion, in order to take advantage of economies of scale.26 In general terms, this document highlights the need to centralize information management systems, as well as the purchase of certain products for all civil servants (such as health services), in which the economical power of the US government –as a unit– could be used. As in the Mexican case, the OPM also centralizes the power to draft regulations for the whole civil service, even though (as it was mentioned above) in recent years this power has been limited to a greater extent by the new regulations (and wide managerial autonomy) of the Departments of Homeland Security and Defense. Other areas in which centralization prevails to a certain extent are the management of the recruitment website www.usajobs.gov; the design of general rules for the administration of the Senior Executive Service and the Presidential Management Fellows programs; and the supervision of the federal executive training centers. While in the first case (“USAjobs”), the centralization has to do also with a matter of taking advantage of economies of scale, in the other cases the purpose seems to be more a search for improved coordination in the management of the programs; for some homogeneity in 26

Office of Personnel Management, “OPM’s Guiding Principles…”

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the management of certain bodies of interdepartmental nature; and for the development of an esprit de corps among those who will require leadership skills. Anyhow, beyond each country’s peculiarities, both Mexico and the United States face the challenge of defining which issues must remain under the control of the central institution in charge of administering civil service as a whole, and which issues can and must be delegated to other institutions, which are also part of the system. All this, in order to make good use –in economic, administrative, and HR terms– of the systems’ economies of scale; and, at the same time, to guarantee a coordinated and flexible performance of the civil service.

Harmonizing the multiple roles performed by the central office of the professional civil service system A fourth challenge that the two governments face is related to the multiple (and from time to time contradictory) roles that central offices of the civil service must perform. Both the Mexican government’s Civil Service Unit and the US OPM must be regulatory entities, advisory offices, certifying institutions, and supervisory agencies; and all that at the same time. Mexico’s Civil Service Unit, for example, has four Director Generals. One of them is fundamentally devoted to the design of HR policies and regulations; another office develops rules related to position descriptions and classification, and is responsible for certifying the federal agencies’ organizational structures; a third one coordinates the civil service system’s strategic planning, and administers “RHnet” (the online system for information management); and the fourth one is devoted to provide assistance and information to federal ministries, but also to monitor the same ministries in terms of how they are advancing the implementation of the civil service. In the case of the US OPM, one division is exclusively devoted to design new strategic human resources management policies, and lately has been collaborating also in the development of new HR regulations for the Homeland Security Department and the Department of Defense. Another division is devoted to solve any questions that executive agencies may have about the implementation of Federal regulations; at the same time, this division is in charge of periodically assessing whether the agencies are fulfilling or not their human capital management standards. Finally, another division is

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responsible for providing consulting services on HR issues, services that must be paid by each soliciting Federal agency. In both cases, the central offices attempt to accomplish all those functions and activities that are involved in any civil service reform: regulatory (re)design, administrative capacities building, and inter-departmental coordination. However, there remains a concern about the “tensions” among the different roles central offices must play. In a first sense, the tensions appear within the same central offices, because each of their divisions has to accomplish their own missions in a different way. For instance, those divisions that are responsible for designing HR policies need long periods of time to design HR criteria and rules that are adequate and broad enough to encompass all the federal agencies that are part of the civil service system. On the other hand, those divisions in charge of providing advice to federal agencies must respond quickly to their concerns, and need to have at hand specific recommendations and answers that solve the inquiries posed by institutions. While the advisory divisions must be permanently in touch with the HR policy divisions, both work under different times, logics, and premises. Obviously, this has generated some conflicts (both in Mexico and the US) between these two types of divisions of the same central office. In a second sense, certain tensions may also occur between central offices and the various agencies that are part of the civil service system. On the one hand, central offices are responsible of ensuring that those institutions involved in the reform process have the necessary knowledge and information for the organizational change. Consequently, central offices must give advice to other institutions, and must contribute to building the required administrative capacities for the reform. On the other hand, central offices are accountable for the adequate functioning of the civil service system. Therefore, they must supervise that federal norms and principles are fully respected by all agencies; otherwise, they must sanction those agencies that may not be achieving their goals. At the end of the day, central offices then present two opposite faces to all the agencies that are part of the federal civil service system: they have a “friendly face” (giving advice and support), but they also have a “rough face” (monitoring and control).

Guaranteeing the legitimacy and endurance of the reforms In this final section, it is worth to briefly discuss a fifth challenge both governments have to deal with: how to guarantee the legitimacy and endurance of the proposed © Mauricio I. Dussauge Laguna © Revista Servicio Profesional de Carrera

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changes? In other words, how to ensure that political and administrative stakeholders are willing to respect and contribute to the institutionalization of reforms? In the Mexican case, the civil service reform had a relatively nice start up, because all political forces represented in the Congress unanimously passed the new civil service law. However, due to the complexities of this kind of administrative reform, the legitimacy of the professional civil service is something that should be carefully protected in a permanent way. Yet it is at this point where uncertainty appears. During the transition from the approval of the law to the drafting and implementation of complementary regulations, new political and administrative actors have emerged: ministry heads and director generals, whose subordinates are also members of the professional civil service system; HR senior specialists, who will now have to deal with more responsibilities; and civil servants whose careers will depend on the new system. These are very important actors because they are responsible for enforcing civil service rules; conducting in a regular way all training/professionalization activities; and ensuring the good progress of the implementation of the new civil service. Although they are part of the system, this does not guarantee their immediate and full collaboration. Therefore, the Civil Service Unit faces an enormous challenge, since it will need to develop a close relationship with these actors, explain them the reform, and persuade them to support this project. At the same time, the Unit must also gain support from other stakeholders that will be involved in a less direct manner in the reform process: legislators, political parties, academic experts, and journalists. These are actors that have several resources at their disposal, which are essential to guarantee a long life for the new civil service. At this moment, however, it is uncertain whether all these actors agree or not on the legitimacy/utility of the merit system, and whether they are willing or not to help with their own resources (intellectual, political, and legal ones) the future institutionalization of the system. In the case of the US this kind of issues are equally relevant. For the new HR system of the Homeland Security Department, Congress mandated both DHS and the OPM to work together with unions, in order to ensure a coordinated and legitimate reform process. In the case of the Department of Defense’s new HR regulations (after having stumbled over some obstacles derived from the initial obstinacy of the reform

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leaders), a similar collaborative scheme was adopted. Thus, the reform has been propelled by a tripartite strategy of permanent coordination. However, despite the fact that these collaborative strategies have been followed along the reform process, and that some external actors (academics, journalists, and think-tank members) have supported reformist ideas and new HR approaches, the reforms have been put to a hold due to the opposition shown by unions at both Departments, which has even resulted in legal controversies that argue for the need to revise previously approved regulations.27 Consequently, achieving success in the medium term and permanence in the long term, are closely related to the perceptions of political and administrative stakeholders’ on the legitimacy of the reform process. Legitimacy that must also get reflected in terms of support: in the case of civil service members, by defending the system they belong to; in the case of officials, by systematically and impartially implementing and enforcing civil service regulations; in the case of opinion leaders and public administration experts, by publicly defending the merit ideals; and in the case of legislators and political parties, by guaranteeing the flow of legal and financial resources needed for a well-functioning civil service.

Final thoughts In this essay, I have endeavored to present a brief comparison of Mexico and US civil services systems, as well as of their current reform processes. While the first section discussed some of their structural differences, the second section attempted to highlight their common challenges. If we set aside for a moment the specifics of these two cases, and we focus in the set of challenges that were described in the second section, we may be able to put forward some relevant considerations for any professional civil service, regardless of their national context or administrative tradition. I am aware that undertaking this task in a serious way would require as much space as that devoted to this essay. Therefore, I will simply sketch some reflections that could inspire further analysis and studies.28

27 See Ingraham and Taylor, already cited. For further details and the evolution of these issues, see Stephen Barr’s articles in the Washington Post and Karen Rutzick’s notes at www.govexec.com 28 For further reflections on this issue, see Mauricio I. Dussauge Laguna, “De los ‘porqués’ a los ‘cómos’. Los servicios profesionales vistos desde la perspectiva de las políticas públicas”, Servicio Profesional de Carrera, no. 8, 2007 (forthcoming).

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The first issue concerns administrative capacities. Although it is obvious that no administrative reform can work without the adequate resources, this fact tends to be ignored by some reformers and thus need to be seriously analyzed. As Michel Crozier would put it, civil service systems cannot be implemented by decree. On the contrary, when civil service reforms (either the creation of the system or its modification) are proposed, any government must assess whether the institutions that will lead the process actually have or not the adequate capacities and expertise to do it successfully. In this sense, it is essential that reform leaders simultaneously engage in a process of analysis and also in a negotiation process. The analysis is needed to determine if the available technology, infrastructure, and organizational design of HR offices is well suited for managing the new HR system. At the same time, reform leaders will need to engage in negotiations with relevant actors, because they will need to persuade of providing to HR offices the necessary resources (technical, human, and of other kinds) along the whole reform process. The second issue relates to inter-organizational mechanisms of coordination. It is, again, a matter of basic public administration principles (“proverbs”, as Simon would say), that nonetheless fails to receive adequate attention. Studies on this issue suggest that the role of reform leaders should be that of network entrepreneurs and managers, instead of hierarchical leaders. Firstly, the creation or transformation of civil service systems requires ICT networks for managing information and ensuring its timely availability for decision-making processes. Secondly, informal networks of public servants will be necessary in order to socialize, exchange ideas, negotiate, and develop an esprit de corps. Thirdly, there is a need to establish organizational networks in which all actors involved in managing the system are included, so that it is possible to make coordinated and (as far as it is possible) consensual decisions. The previous considerations become even more relevant when they are taken together as a whole: ensuring that the institutions participating in the system have a) minimum administrative capacities; and b) permanent access to information and interorganizational networks, so that inter-institutional disparities do not arise during the reform process. Given the existing differences between government organizations, it is impossible, even undesirable, to guarantee a homogenous reform process. However, the central office must carry out coordination and administrative capacity-building actions to ensure that the heterogeneity of the reform processes is due to the diverse nature of © Mauricio I. Dussauge Laguna © Revista Servicio Profesional de Carrera

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the institutions, and not to asymmetries of information, resources, or power. In other words, the central office is responsible for avoiding (to the extent of its capacity) that the civil service reform evolves at uneven speeds across agencies.29 The third issue is how to take advantage of economies of scale in the system and how to effectively des(centralize) HR and management authorities. Of course, there are no magic recipes about this issue; but it might be feasible to provide some clues. For example, centralization might be a good option when it is reasonable to expect that the central office’s purchasing power or its administrative capacities will ensure budgetary or managerial efficiencies. However, we must also bear in mind that the previous criteria must be seen in perspective, because there are other important variables that, depending on the case, may be even more relevant for the successful development of the reform. While centralized hiring tests, training courses, computer systems, retirement policies, and payroll systems may generate economies of scale, they can also place at risk the statistical validity, utility, opportunity, and diversity required to fulfill the specific needs of the various public organizations that are part of the system. Conversely, flexibility, institutional autonomy, and swift decision-making may underline the relevance of decentralizing some authorities or tasks at a certain point. However, a possible lack of control over the management of the system, the emergence of inter-institutional disparities, and increasing difficulties for developing a coordinated decision-making process must also be assessed to decide whether more centralization (or less decentralization) is needed. A fourth consideration is that of how to combine or harmonize the different roles central agencies play. This is probably the most complex of all issues discussed here, something that would require more reflections and space. At first instance, the tensions between different central office divisions (HR policy and external advisory divisions) might be reduced by joining both in one division. In this way, those who design human resources policies will also be directly responsible for answering any questions or doubts about day-to-day implementation of civil service regulations.

29

This is actually happening in Mexico and the United States, at both Federal and State level. See Ingraham, Joyce and Donahue, op. cit. And also, Mauricio I. Dussauge Laguna, “Civil Service Reform: The New Human Resources Management Systems at Georgia and Florida”, Syracuse: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, fall 2002 (unpublished manuscript). © Mauricio I. Dussauge Laguna © Revista Servicio Profesional de Carrera

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But even if internal tensions are successfully reduced, another issue remains pending: tensions derived from the double nature (Janus-like) of central offices responsible for managing the civil service. On the one hand, they have to advice and support agencies; on the other, they must supervise and monitor them. In this case, a possible solution could be a “New Public Management” like strategy, which would be to assign the contradictory authorities to separate and smaller organizations. However, as it has happened with some neo-managerial reforms, this might result in major coordination conflicts between the newer organizations, and between these and the agencies that are part of the professional civil service. Finally, there is the problem of how to guarantee the legitimacy and permanence of the proposed reforms. Traditionally, the theory has suggested two key factors: firstly, to involve in the reform every actor that might be affected by the organizational change; secondly, to clearly and permanently communicate all relevant issues in order to guarantee every stakeholder’s support and internalization of the reform principles. However, while continuous involvement and communication seem to be necessary conditions, they might not be enough to ensure the legitimacy of such complex administrative reforms as those described in this document. At the same time, other major aspects that those actors involved in the civil service reform should take into account are the following: a careful consideration of the political times; the establishment of institutional spaces for negotiating proposed changes; and the creation and strengthening of networks (both inside and outside the system). As in the case of trust and reputation, the legitimacy of civil service systems is hard to achieve, but easy to lose. Consequently, efforts to obtain the support and approval of relevant actors must be a permanent and systematic task. This is so because the lack of legitimacy may undermine the chances for long-term institutionalization of civil service reforms.

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Ingraham, Patricia W. and Donald P. Moynihan, “Civil Service and Administrative Reform in the United States”, in John Halligan (ed.), Civil Service Systems in Anglo-American Countries, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004. Ingraham, Patricia W., Philip Joyce and Amy K. Donahue, Government Performance. Why Management Matters?, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003. Ingraham, Patricia W. and Heather Getha Taylor, “Flexibilidades gerenciales en la gestión de recursos humanos del gobierno de los Estados Unidos: ¿lo que ordenó el doctor o una receta equivocada?, Foro Internacional, no. 182, 2005. Kellough, J. Edward “Equal Employment Opportunity and Affirmative Action in the Public Sector”, in Steven W. Hays and Richard C. Kearney (eds.), Public Personnel Administration, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 4ª ed., 2003, pp. 209-224 Klingner, Donald E. y Dahlia Lynn, “Mas Allá del Servicio Público de Carrera: Los Paradigmas Nacientes en los EE.UU” (manuscript) Light, Paul C., “Fact Sheet on the New True Size of Government”, September, 2003 (http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/gs/cps/light20030905.pdf). Longo, Francisco, Mérito y Flexibilidad. La gestión de las personas en las organizaciones públicas, Barcelona: Paidós, 2004. Martínez Puón, Rafael, La profesionalización de la Administración Pública en México, Madrid: INAP, 2003. -----, Servicio Profesional de Carrera ¿Para qué?, México: Miguel Ángel Porrúa, 2005. Office of Personnel Management, “OPM’s Guiding Principles for Civil Service Transformation”, April, 2004, www.opm.gov. Office of Personnel Management, Biography of an Ideal, Washington, DC: Office of Personnel Management, 2003. Pardo, María del Carmen (comp.), De la Administración Pública a la Gobernanza, México: El Colegio de México, 2004. -----, “El Servicio Profesional de Carrera en México: de la tradición al cambio”, Foro Internacional, no. 182, 2005. Peters, B. Guy, Comparative Politics, New York: New York University Press, 1998. Revista de Administración Pública, “El Servicio de Carrera en la Administración Pública Mexicana”, no. 103, 1999.

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