The Benefit of Regan’s Doubt: Betting on the Ethics of Eating Robert Bass [email protected] When our ignorance is so large, it is not unreasonable to give these animals the benefit of the doubt . . . ~Tom Regan (1983, 367) Since the structure of Regan’s case for animal rights is familiar, a brief sketch will suffice. In essence, he argues that, in reflective equilibrium, we would agree that practically all human beings have basic rights to equal respect which bar using any of us in purely instrumental ways. Since this rights view is the best interpretation of human morality, he seeks its explanation and finds it in the claim that we are all equally bearers of inherent value, because we are all subjects-of-a-life—that is, possessors of a morally consequential suite of psychological properties: Not only are we all in the world, we are all aware of the world and aware as well, of what happens to us. Moreover, what happens to us—whether to our bodies, to our freedom, or our lives themselves—matters to us because it makes a difference to the quality and duration of our lives, as experienced by us, whether anyone else cares about this or not. Whatever our differences, these are our fundamental similarities. (Regan 2004, 50)1 Since many other animals2 are also subjects-of-a-life, Regan draws the inevitable conclusion: they, too, are bearers of equal inherent value and have rights on the same basis we do. Regan’s argument is elegant and powerful but also modest. He limits his claims on behalf of animal rights to the clearest cases—normal mammals at least a year old. This makes good strategic sense. For the clearest cases, it will be hard to sustain objections based on alleged deficits of animal minds. Also, it seems likely that many psychological defenses against acknowledging rights for animals cluster at the species boundary. Once breached, resistance regarding others will be more difficult. But there are also questions about what to do now. Even if it is settled how to treat

2 mammals of at least a year, what should we think of other animals—of non-mammals, such as chickens, turkeys, and fish, or of mammals such as veal calves or pigs, who are almost always slaughtered at less than a year? Regan certainly does not approve of eating them, but what response can he offer? Part of the answer is that he has never held that being a subject-of-a-life is necessary for having inherent value, only that it is sufficient. He is explicit that some creatures might have inherent value3 and therefore rights on some other basis. Still, this is unsatisfying without a theoretical framework to distinguish non-subjects-ofa-life with inherent value from other non-subjects that lack it, such as rocks or automobiles. Regan’s main response4 is to appeal instead to our uncertainty about which animals are subjectsof-a-life. He thinks that The reasons for viewing fish as subjects-of-a-life are so plausible, that I personally would rather err on the side of moral caution and give them the benefit of the doubt—which is why I think we should think and act as if fish have rights.” (Regan 2004, 102) Of other non-mammals, he has written: We simply do not know enough to justify dismissing . . . the idea that a frog, say, may be the subject-of-a-life, replete with desires, goals, beliefs, intentions, and the like. When our ignorance is so large, it is not unreasonable to give these animals the benefit of the doubt, treating them as if they are subjects, due our respectful treatment . . . (Regan 1983, 367) Of very young human beings, he writes, Precisely because it is unclear where we should draw the line between those humans who are, and those who are not, subjects-of-a-life . . . the rights view would advocate giving infants and viable human fetuses the benefit of the doubt, viewing them as if they are subjects-of-a-life, as if they have basic moral rights … (Regan 1983, 319-320) Elsewhere, similar reasoning is applied to young, non-human mammals: “[W]e ought to err on the side of caution, not only in the case of humans but also in the case of animals.” (Regan 1983, 391)5

3 I think Regan’s informal appeal to the benefit of the doubt can be fleshed out and made more compelling. What I shall do differs from his project, however. It is narrower in scope, because I shall focus on a single issue, the dietary use of animals.6 On another dimension, though, I aim to do more. Regan thinks that it is “not unreasonable” to extend the benefit of the doubt, and that it is better to do so. I shall be arguing that it is unreasonable not to do so. I shall begin by arguing that it’s wrong to take a serious chance of doing wrong. Then, I try to show there is a serious chance meat-eating is wrong, but since seriousness comes in degrees, we need to know what makes a chance serious or not. To address that, I develop a modified version of Pascal’s wager. Finally, I sum up and reflect on the argument and its implications.

I. The Don’t Take Chances Principle I begin with a commonplace: If we don’t think ethics is hopeless, we have to deal with uncertainty. Even though we can sometimes confidently rule out error, other cases remain controversial. If there are real obligations in such cases, there are obligations to act, even in the face of uncertainty. I think such obligations are real for two reasons. First, if uncertainty removed obligation, it would be difficult to explain the moral phenomenology, the felt urgency to get things right. If uncertainty removed obligation, the appropriate response might be relief that we could not at any rate be doing wrong. The second reason is practical: were we convinced that uncertainty removed obligation, we might be tempted to evade obligation by inducing uncertainty. (“Can you be certain that feeding starving children is a good thing?” Any philosopher worth her salt can produce half a dozen reasons it might not be.) If there are such obligations, something can be morally required, even when we are less

4 than certain of it. How uncertain may we be? That will be hard to pin down, but at least we are not talking about trivial chances.7 We are only interested in significant or serious chances that some act or practice is morally required. There will be something we can represent this way: (1) For someone, x, and some act, φ, if there is a significant chance that x ought to φ, then x ought to φ. This is not the universal formula, (2) For anyone, x, and any act, φ, if there is a significant chance that x ought to φ, then x ought to φ. For there are possible cases in which there is both a significant chance that x ought to φ and a significant chance that x ought not to φ. If there is a significant chance we ought to impose capital punishment for first-degree murder and a significant chance we ought not, that would unacceptably imply that we ought to do both. So, we are interested only in cases with a significant chance something is morally required but not that it is morally wrong. That is, (3) For anyone, x, and any act, φ, if there is a significant chance that x ought to φ, and no significant chance that x ought not to φ, then x ought to φ. That seems plausible enough, but its plausibility is reinforced by considering examples: •

•

•

Consider a variant of a case presented by John Noonan.8 You are in the woods shooting at a target fifty yards away. Suddenly, there is a stirring of leaves near the target. There is a one in five chance it is caused by someone’s movement, but a four in five chance that it’s just the breeze. May you shoot anyway, knowing there’s a one in five chance of injuring or killing someone? Surely not. Consider negligence law. You can be held legally responsible for harm that befalls someone, not because you deliberately caused it, but for failing to take adequate precautions against causing it. Your responsibility extends beyond what you intend or foresee to what you should have considered. Consider laws against driving while intoxicated. You may drink too much and weave your way home without incident. You are prohibited from driving while intoxicated, not because you aim to hurt someone or will actually hurt someone, but because there is an unacceptable risk. Taking the risk is wrong, not just causing the harm. These suggest something like (3) above, the Don’t Take Chances principle: When there’s

5 an alternative, then, if there is a serious chance an action is wrong, it is also wrong to take the chance.

II. A Serious Chance that Meat-Eating is Wrong I believe the moral case for vegetarianism is compelling. My concern, however, is not to establish that. I aim only to establish a serious chance that it is wrong to eat meat.9 To that end, I shall present five separate arguments, but I shall be very sketchy. First is the environmental argument. Animal agriculture is implicated in a host of environmental problems, including global warming, loss of biodiversity, water pollution,10 and a variety of threats to human health.11 It is widely agreed that we ought to take steps to avoid or reduce environmental harm. Recycling, using renewable energy, reducing our carbon footprints, preferring public transportation to automobiles, consuming locally grown foods and more all seem like sensible measures, and it is reasonable to think consumers ought to take such steps, especially when change can be made at little expense. But an anomaly infects our environmental conscientiousness. One of the most important ways consumers harm the environment is through consumption of meat and other animal products. Our diets matter as much as our cars.12 If we ought to take reasonable measures to protect the environment, we ought to avoid eating meat. Second, there is the hunger argument. Animal agriculture almost literally takes food from the starving.13 It is more efficient to feed people by growing plants for human consumption rather than for consumption by animals to be fed in turn to people.14 The argument is simple. Hundreds of millions live on the edge of starvation, and thousands die every day. We could feed most or all the world’s hungry at no extra expense—if we changed our diets. Additionally, much of the world’s hunger is due to the affluent outbidding the poor for grain. As long as people are

6 going without food, we should not contribute to conditions that make it less available to the poorest of the poor. Third, there is the health argument. Vegetarians tend to be healthier, live longer and suffer less from numerous diseases.15 Health-based arguments are primarily appeals to selfinterest, but not entirely. It is better for me to be healthy, but also, the healthier I am, the more I can contribute to my community and the less strain I will put on health care resources and budgets.16 Whatever reason there is to look out for one’s health, contribute to the community and avoid unnecessarily burdening others is also a reason to avoid meat. Fourth, there is the argument from marginal cases.17 Applied to the current issue, the idea is that if it is morally acceptable to eat all other animals but not to eat human beings, there must be a Big Difference between humans and other animals. The problem comes in trying to explain what the Big Difference is. A Big Difference would need to be based on some morally significant property had by all human beings but not by any other animals, but credible candidates are scarce. Some property or other that we, but no other animals, all have, such as being members of a species that builds skyscrapers, is not enough. To make the Big Difference, the property must also be morally important. Skyscraper-building doesn’t fit the bill since we don’t imagine the ethics of eating would differ if we were not skyscraper-builders. Popular suggestions such as rationality or language turn out to be possessed by some animals, not possessed by all humans, or both. Others, such as the capacity to feel pleasure or pain, even though nearly universal among human beings, are also nearly universal among other animals. But without a plausible property, it is not plausible that there is a Big Difference. And without a Big Difference, it is no more acceptable to raise and kill animals for food than to do the same to certain human beings.18 Fifth, there is the unnecessary harm argument. We start with the fact that, in raising and

7 killing animals for food, we cause them great harm.19 A principle most people would accept is this: It is wrong to cause serious harm, such as suffering and death, unnecessarily, and in general, the greater the harm, the weightier the reason needs to be to justify it. Without a good enough reason, the harm is unnecessary. A plausible minimum condition is that it is unnecessary to cause suffering and death when we could live just as well without it. Combined with the facts that eating meat causes suffering and death and that we could live just as well—perhaps better and longer—without it, the conclusions seem inevitable: Eating meat causes suffering and death unnecessarily, and since it’s wrong to cause unnecessary harm, it’s wrong to eat meat.

A Serious Chance I have sketched five independent arguments that meat-eating is wrong. One might be correct and the rest mistaken or one mistaken and the rest correct, and there are many other permutations.20 Of course, these are only sketches and might be challenged in several ways. But also, the challenges might be met. My point has not been to establish that meat-eating is wrong just that there is at least a serious chance that it is. Remember that a serious chance is not just a favorable balance of probabilities. There can be a serious chance of something, even when it is probably false. You take a serious chance of injuring someone if you drive intoxicated, even if you will probably reach home without incident. But if there can still be a serious chance of something improbable, how can we proceed? For the present, I shall simply stipulate that a chance of 25% or greater is serious.21 Later, I will be justifying that stipulation. So, do the arguments establish at least a 25% chance that meat-eating is wrong? Consider that the arguments were selected for their plausibility. I have offered only sketches,

8 but the arguments they represent have persuaded many reasonable and intelligent people. They do not rely upon doubtful or controversial assumptions. The environmental, hunger and health arguments are all rooted in solid, peer-reviewed science. The marginal cases and unnecessary harm arguments have been extensively debated. They all assume moral premises, but nothing radical or controversial. None has proven easy to counter. My impression is that vegetarians are winning the debate among philosophers—which is significant since most American philosophers, like most American non-philosophers, are themselves meat-eaters. If the better arguments favored meateating, one might expect vegetarians to be overwhelmed by meat-eaters’ responses. These facts suggest that each argument has a significant chance of being right and certainly not less than a 25% chance. I myself would assign probabilities above 25% to each, but I shall not insist upon it. If only a single argument established a 25% chance that meat-eating is wrong, the threshold would be met: There would be at least a 25% chance that meat-eating is wrong. But less would also suffice. Suppose each argument has only a 10% chance of being right and a 90% chance of being wrong. Still, there are five arguments. The chance that at least one is right would be about 41%.22 The threshold would still be met. There will be a serious chance that meat-eating is wrong.23

The Basic Argument We can now state the basic argument: 1. If there is a serious chance we ought to do something, but no serious chance that we ought not, then we ought to do it. 2. There is a serious chance we ought to avoid eating meat. 3. There is no serious chance we ought not to avoid eating meat. 4. Therefore, we ought to avoid eating meat.

9

Plainly, this is valid, so its conclusion is true if all the premises are. The first premise is just the Don’t Take Chances principle, and I have been concerned to support the second premise in the present section. The third is established by common consent: there is no respectable case that vegetarianism is morally wrong.24 The most vulnerable premise is the second, so long as it is vague what counts as a serious chance. Even if I established at least a 25% chance that meat-eating is wrong, I only stipulated rather than established that a 25% chance was serious. More exploration is needed, and Pascal’s wager—or what can be made of it—is a useful tool.

III. Pascal in the Kitchen Almost at the dawn of decision theory appears Pascal’s tantalizing wager, aimed at showing that belief in God is rationally required, in the face of uncertainty. What is tantalizing is not so much the conclusion,25 but the sense that it is almost right, that something structurally very much like it might work for some issues in which we must choose in the face of uncertainty.26 I think it is well-adapted to the question what to do when we are uncertain whether it is wrong to eat meat. Omitting details, here are four desiderata for a Pascalian argument that avoids problems afflicting the original Wager. We want a decision problem (a) (b) (c) (d)

which includes all relevant alternatives, in which the alternatives are plausible, which supports acting rather than having a belief, and which does not count upon infinite payoffs.

A decision problem that satisfies these conditions and otherwise mirrors the structure of Pascal’s original wager can easily be defined:

10

A ~A

M Best Worst

~M Second Worst Second Best

Let A and ~A represent action to be taken or not and let M and ~M represent unknown, but mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive states of the world. If we grant that both M and ~M are plausible,27 that A and ~A both represent actions available to the agent, and that the ordinally ranked payoffs are all finite, we have something with the structure of Pascal’s wager but without its defects. With no further information, there is a powerful argument in favor of selecting A. Selecting A gives some chance of producing the best outcome and none of producing the worst, while selecting ~A gives some chance of producing the worst and none of producing the best. We may not know which is the real state of the world, but we do know that if M is the real world-state we lose more if we choose wrongly than we do if ~M is the real world-state. Best minus Worst is a bigger gap, and therefore a bigger loss, than Second Best minus Second Worst. There’s more to gain and less to lose. We can begin to put flesh upon these abstract bones with the following matrix: Meat-Eating is Wrong

Meat-Eating is Not Wrong

Abstain from Meat Do Not Abstain from Meat It is at least plausible that meat-eating is wrong,28 and everyone should agree that vegetarian and non-vegetarian diets are options. How should the cells be ranked? Assume first that meat-eating is not wrong. Abstaining from meat-eating when it is not wrong should count as a modest negative: a negative because one is needlessly restricting one’s culinary range, but no more than a modest negative, because many people enjoy vegetarian fare, and other advantages may partly offset pleasures of the palate foregone. Similarly, eating meat

11 when it’s not wrong should count as a modest positive. One enjoys certain innocent pleasures, and any disadvantages are not so great as to offset the advantages.29 Now consider the assumption that meat-eating is wrong. If true, that’s a moral requirement. How weighty or important is that? This is controversial, but what is uncontroversial is that moral requirements are, at least in general, extremely weighty: Even if it is possible to have sufficient reason to act against a genuine moral requirement, it is rare. Almost always, moral requirements outweigh or count for more than whatever might be urged against them.30 With these points in mind, abstaining from wrongful meat-eating must be a significant positive and wrongful meat-eating must be a significant negative. Filling in the matrix, we get a ranking like this:

Abstain from Meat Do Not Abstain from Meat

Meat-Eating is Wrong

Meat-Eating is Not Wrong

Significant Positive

Modest Negative

Significant Negative

Modest Positive

Notice, that is the same relative ranking as this:

Abstain from Meat Do Not Abstain from Meat

Meat-Eating is Wrong

Meat-Eating is Not Wrong

Best

Second Worst

Worst

Second Best

This is a familiar structure, so, in the absence of further information, this is a strong argument against eating meat. Abstaining gives a chance of achieving the best outcome with no

12 risk of the worst. But what if we do have more information? To make progress, we need probabilities for the world-states and cardinal values for the payoffs. That will allow us to calculate expected values for the different courses of action.31 Each cell of the decision matrix will represent an outcome with a value or payoff, which is what would be realized, given a combination of a world-state and a choice of action. For each action, there is a pair of outcome values. We need to multiply each world-state’s probability by the corresponding outcome value and sum the probability-adjusted values to get expected values for the actions. I have argued already that there is at least a 25% chance that meat-eating is wrong. Now, we need to assign cardinal values to the outcomes. Here is a set of values I take to be reasonable:

Abstain from Meat Do Not Abstain from Meat

Meat-Eating is Wrong

Meat-Eating is Not Wrong

+10

–1

–10

+1

With at least a 25% chance that meat-eating is wrong, there is no more than a 75% chance that it is not wrong. The expected value of abstaining from meat would be at least 1.75, while the expected value of eating meat would be no more than –1.75.32 The argument will favor vegetarianism whenever there is more than one chance in eleven that meat-eating is wrong. It is a fair question, though, where the values come from. In one sense, the numbers are arbitrary, but in a more important sense they are not. They are arbitrary in the same sense that it is arbitrary whether to use a Celsius or Fahrenheit scale. Other numbers could be used to make the same points. However, like temperature, they are not entirely arbitrary: there are constraints on what numbers make sense together. By outlining the constraints, I shall be making a case that

13 this is a reasonable set of values. First, we need a scale.33 Numbers were selected with the idea that positive and negative numbers could conveniently represent values and disvalues, with the number giving the quantity and the sign indicating value or disvalue.34 Second, the numbers were selected to represent the facts that, when it’s wrong to eat meat, eating it has to count as a significant negative and not eating it as a significant positive, but that, when it’s not wrong to eat meat, eating it is a modest positive and abstaining, a modest negative. Inevitably, that means that the values for the cells where meat-eating is not wrong are going to be much closer together than the values for the other two. Third, consider what numbers should be attached to eating or not eating meat when it is not wrong. In thinking about it, I ask myself how bad I think it would be to abstain for the rest of my life from some delicious food, if I had plenty of delicious alternatives. (Could I do without chocolate? If I had other sweets?) Though it would be a negative, I have to think it’s small. It would be at most a minor misfortune. Similarly, to enjoy one delicious food among many others is a positive, but also small. That is why I selected 1 and –1 to represent these small values and disvalues. Notice what we are doing. In effect, we are (roughly and approximately) defining a unit for our scale. The unit is the quantity of good or bad associated with enjoying or doing without an innocent culinary pleasure. Fourth, suppose it is wrong to eat meat. Clearly, eating meat anyway should then be represented by a negative value and a greater negative than doing without meat when it’s not wrong. But how much greater? I suggest it should be at least several times as bad. Remember that moral requirements are normally much weightier than contrary considerations. Were they not, it would be implausible that they should almost always be

14 complied with, because contrary considerations can combine or aggregate. Suppose meat-eating is wrong. There are moral considerations that count against meat-eating, and their weight is normally greater than the weight of any reasons favoring meat-eating. If culinary pleasure is a reason in favor, others might be convenience, tradition or social pressure. If one of those were nearly as weighty as the considerations against meat-eating, adding another might easily shift the balance and convert wrongness into permissibility. But this doesn’t capture what we mean by saying meat-eating is wrong. If it were so easy to convert wrongness to permissibility, we would hesitate to call the act wrong in the first place. We would more likely say it depends. It could be wrong in your circumstances but not in my slightly different circumstances. Since we are considering the hypothesis that meat-eating is wrong at least for nearly everyone under nearly all circumstances, we have to assume that its wrongness does not depend on minor variations of circumstance. But minor variations would make a difference if the moral considerations against meat-eating were not substantially weightier than likely combinations of considerations favoring meat-eating. So, they must be substantially weightier. That is why eating meat if it is wrong must be at least several times as bad as doing without meat if it is not wrong. Of course, that is not enough to show that 10:1 is the right ratio. I think it is probably too small, but I shall not insist.35 For present purposes, it will not matter much. Even if the ratio is considerably less, the result will be the same.

What is a Serious Chance? To this point, I have invoked the idea of a serious chance that something is wrong, but I have only stipulated that 25% is serious. I think that’s reasonable, though smaller chances might also be serious. However, I could only stipulate a threshold, because two factors are important,

15 and we have not been in a position to discuss both before now. One is the probability of doing wrong; the other is the gravity: how bad the potential wrong will be. To illustrate, it is very bad to cause the death of an innocent person by driving while intoxicated, so, even if the probability of killing someone on a particular occasion is small, we think it wrong for the intoxicated to drive. Similarly, if the probability of wrong-doing is very high while the harm done is small, we will agree that the act is wrong—for example, walking across a lawn where the owner has plainly posted “Keep off the Grass!”. In intermediate cases, I think we’re willing to accept moderately high probabilities that something is wrong when the harm is negligible. An example might be lying to organize a surprise party. Perhaps that’s wrong, but the likely harm done is so small it’s hard to regard it as a major moral issue. In general, the greater the probability of wrong-doing, the less grave the offense needs to be for the chance to count as serious, while the graver the offense, the lower the probability needs to be. The wager format can usefully organize these considerations. I propose the following sufficient condition: There is a serious chance that doing x is wrong when the expected value of abstaining from x is greater than the expected value of doing x, where the expected value is a function of all relevant factors, including the moral significance of the action and the probability that x is wrong.36 That is meant to capture the kind of calculation to apply to decision matrices, such as the last one above. When we have outcome values and a probability that something is wrong, we can calculate whether the expected value of avoiding the possible wrong is greater than the expected value of engaging in it. If it is, that is sufficient for the probability to constitute a serious chance.

16 IV: Conclusion Let’s return to the basic argument: 1. If there is a serious chance we ought to do something, but no serious chance that we ought not, then we ought to do it. 2. There is a serious chance we ought to avoid eating meat. 3. There is no serious chance that we ought not to avoid eating meat. 4. Therefore, we ought to avoid eating meat. Again, this is clearly valid, but we are now better placed to evaluate its premises. The warrant for the third premise is secure and unchanged, but the other two look better grounded. The first was already plausible, but now there is an account of when there is a serious chance of doing wrong that incorporates the probability and gravity of wrong-doing. Further, since the proposed account harmonizes with decision-theoretic treatments of risk and uncertainty, it inherits the general plausibility of decision-theoretic approaches. Avoiding an action when there is a serious chance it is wrong turns out to be a special case of maximizing expected value. The second premise is also more secure. If there is as much as a 25% chance that meateating is wrong, that will be a serious chance as long as the ratio between the badness of eating meat (if it’s wrong) and the badness of doing without meat (if it’s not wrong) is greater than 3:1—which is hard to deny. Or, if the ratio is 10:1, any chance greater than one in eleven will be serious. We can be much more certain there is a serious chance that eating meat is wrong than of the factors upon which it depends: the conclusion is robust across considerable variation in the underlying factors. Thus, we have a valid argument against eating meat that proceeds from very plausible premises. That makes it hard to resist. Those who try face a burden of proof. They need to show either that there is not even a serious chance that meat-eating is wrong or else that it is not wrong, other things being equal, to take a serious chance of doing wrong. Unless that burden of

17 proof is discharged, the animals deserve the benefit of the doubt.

18 References Allen, Michael W., Richa Gupta, and Arnaud Monnier. 2008. “The Interactive Effect of Cultural Symbols and Human Values on Taste Evaluation.” Journal of Consumer Research 35 (2): 294-308. American Public Health Association. 2003. Precautionary Moratorium on New Concentrated Animal Feed Operations. http://www.apha.org/advocacy/policy/policysearch/default.htm?id=1243. Barnard, N D, A Nicholson, and J L Howard. 1995. “The medical costs attributable to meat consumption.” Preventive Medicine 24 (6) (November): 646-55. Bass, Robert. 2004. Towards a Constructivist Eudaemonism. Ph.D., Bowling Green State University. Bittman, Mark. 2008. “Rethinking the Meat-Guzzler.” The New York Times, January 27, sec. Week in Review. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/weekinreview/ 27bittman.html?_r=1&oref=slogin&pagewanted=all. Callicott, J. B. 1980. “Animal liberation: a triangular affair.” Environmental ethics 2 (4): 311338. Callicott, J. Baird. n.d. Introductory Palinode. http://jbcallicott.weebly.com/introductorypalinode.html. Campbell, TC, and TM Campbell. 2005. The China Study. Dallas: Benbella Books. Carlin, John, and Robert P. Martin, et al. 2008. Putting Meat on the Table: Industrial Farm Animal Production in America. Pew Charitable Trusts and Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health. http://www.ncifap.org/_images/PCIFAPFin.pdf. Craig, Winston J., and Ann Reed Mangels. 2009. “Position of the American Dietetic Association: Vegetarian Diets.” Journal of the American Dietetic Association 109 (7) (July): 1266-1282. Dombrowski, Daniel A. 1997. Babies and Beasts: The Argument from Marginal Cases. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press. Eisnitz, Gail A. 1997. Slaughterhouse: The Shocking Story of Greed, Neglect, and Inhumane Treatment Inside the U.S. Meat Industry. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books. Eshel, Gidon, and Pamela A. Martin. 2006. “Diet, Energy, and Global Warming.” Earth Interactions 10 (9) (April): 1-17. Foer, Jonathan Safran. 2009. Eating Animals. New York: Little, Brown and Company. Foot, Philippa. 1978. Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives. In Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Berkeley: University of California Press. Fraser, Gary E. 2009. “Vegetarian diets: what do we know of their effects on common chronic diseases?” American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 89 (5) (May 1): 1607S-1612S. Goodland, Robert, and Jeff Anhang. 2009. “Livestock and Climate Change.” World Watch, December. Heap, Shaun Hargreaves, Martin Hollis, Bruce Lyons, Robert Sugden, and Albert Weale. 1992. The Theory of Choice: A Critical Guide. Oxford: Blackwell. Hoyt, Clark. 2007. “THE PUBLIC EDITOR; The Danger of the One-Sided Debate - New York Times.” New York Times, June 24, sec. Opinion. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/24/ opinion/24pubed.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print. Joyce, Richard. 2006. The Evolution of Morality. Cambridge: The MIT Press. Keim, Brandon. 2009. Swine Flu Ancestor Born on U.S. Factory Farms. News. Wired Science. May 1. http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2009/05/swineflufarm/.

19 Lappé, Frances Moore. 1985. Diet for a Small Planet. New York: Ballantine Books. Li, Hon-lam. 2002. “Animal Research, Non-Vegetarianism, and the Moral Status of Animals-Understanding the Impasse of the Animal Rights Problem.” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 27 (5): 589-615. Luce, R. Duncan, and Howard Raiffa. 1989. Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. New York: Dover Publications. Lycan, W., and G. Schlesinger. 1999. You Bet Your Life: Pascal’s Wager Defended. In Reason and Responsibility, ed. Joel Feinberg and Russ Shafer-Landau, 118-123. 10th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Mason, M, and Martha Mendoza. 2009. Drug-resistant infections lurk in meat we eat. News. MSNBC. December 29. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34614380/ns/healthinfectious_diseases. Matheny, Gaverick. 2003. “Least Harm: A Defense of Vegetarianism Against Steven Davis’s Omnivorous Proposal.” Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 16 (5) (September): 505-511. Matheny, Gaverick, and Cheryl Leahy. 2007. “Farm-Animal Welfare, Legislation, and Trade.” Law and Contemporary Problems 70 (Winter): 325-358. Noonan, John Thomas. 1970. The Morality of Abortion. Harvard University Press. Planck, Nina. 2007. “Death by Veganism.” The New York Times, May 21, sec. Opinion. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/21/opinion/21planck.html?scp=1&sq=Death%20by%2 0Veganism&st=cse. Pluhar, Evelyn B. 1995. Beyond Prejudice: The Moral Significance of Human and Nonhuman Animals. Durham: Duke University Press. Regan, Tom. 1983. The Case for Animal Rights. Berkeley: University of California Press. ———. 2004. Empty cages: facing the challenge of animal rights. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Richards, Janet Radcliffe. 2001. Human nature after Darwin: a philosophical introduction. Routledge. Rowlands, Mark. 2000. Animal Rights: A Philosophical Defence. Palgrave Macmillan. ———. 2002. Animals Like Us. Verso. Russell, Geoffrey John. 2009. Global Warming Science. In CSIRO Perfidy, 49-62. Vivid Publishing. Shafer-Landau, Russ. 2003. Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Singer, Peter. 1975. Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals. New York: Avon Books. ———. 1980. “Utilitarianism and Vegetarianism.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 9 (4): 325337. Singer, Peter, and J Mason. 2006. The Way We Eat: Why Our Food Choices Matter. Rodale Books. Singh, Pramil N, Joan Sabate, and Gary E Fraser. 2003. “Does low meat consumption increase life expectancy in humans?” American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 78 (3) (September 1): 526S-532S. Steinfeld, Henning, Pierre Gerber, Tom Wassenaar, Vincent Castel, Mauricio Rosales, and Cees de Haan. 2006. Livestock’s Long Shadow: Environmental Issues and Options. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/a0701e/a0701e00.HTM. Tidwell, Mike. 2009. “The Low-Carbon Diet.” Audubon Magazine, February.

20 http://www.audubonmagazine.org/features0901/viewpoint.html. 1

Superficially, at least, Regan’s account in The Case for Animal Rights was more complex, but the differences are unimportant for present purposes. See Regan 1983. 2 Hereafter, I will abbreviate by referring only to animals, rather than to non-human (or other) animals. 3 “[T]he rights view advances the subject-of-a-life criterion as a sufficient, not a necessary, condition for possessing inherent value and, by implication, basic moral rights” (Regan 1983, 319). 4 Regan suggests that some animals lacking the complex psychology of subjects-of-a-life might deserve a lesser degree of protection: It may be that animals, for example—which, though conscious and sentient . . . lack the ability to remember, to act purposively, or to have desires or form beliefs—can only properly be viewed as receptacles of what has intrinsic value, lacking any value in their own right. (Regan 1983, 246) Even if they are only receptacles of intrinsic value, we may have responsibilities to avoid unnecessarily causing them pain, to improve their quality of life, so far as it is in our power, and so on. 5 See also the surrounding context (Regan 1983, 390-392). 6 I shall be referring to meat-eating and vegetarianism, but my arguments or readily constructible analogues may well support the adoption of vegan rather than vegetarian diets. In addition, if my arguments are correct, they might readily be adapted to other issues. 7 Virtually always there will be a trivial chance an act is wrong but also a trivial chance that its omission is wrong. Such trivial chances will cancel out and can reasonably be ignored. 8 Noonan 1970. 9 When I speak of meat-eating being wrong, I mean wrong for nearly everyone in circumstances like ours— i.e., with ready access to alternatives. 10 See Steinfeld et al. 2006, 267, Goodland and Anhang 2009, 10-19, Russell 2009, and Tidwell 2009. 11 See Keim 2009, Mason and Mendoza 2009, and American Public Health Association 2003. 12 See Eshel and Martin 2006 and Bittman 2008. 13 Lappé 1985. 14 The animals use the bulk of their food for movement, respiration, metabolism and building inedible parts, such as hide, bone and hooves. See Matheny 2003, especially 506-507, for detailed accounting of how animal agriculture compares in land use to growing crops for human consumption. 15 See the extensive discussion in TC Campbell and TM Campbell 2005. Summarizing numerous studies, Gary Fraser reports that There is convincing evidence that vegetarians have lower rates of coronary heart disease . . . probable lower rates of hypertension and diabetes mellitus, and lower prevalence of obesity. Overall, their cancer rates appear to be moderately lower than others living in the same communities, and life expectancy appears to be greater. (Fraser 2009) Also see Singh, Sabate, and Fraser 2003, which finds that vegetarian diet increases life expectancy even in an otherwise healthier-than-average population, with the greatest increases being associated with longer-term vegetarianism (≥ 20 years). 16 See Barnard, Nicholson, and Howard 1995. 17 For excellent surveys, see Dombrowski 1997 and Pluhar 1995, 1-123. 18 Different theorists who endorse the argument from marginal cases take it in somewhat different directions, but almost all agree that it has important implications for dietary choices. See Singer 1975 and 1980, Regan 1983 and 2004, and Rowlands 2000 and 2002. 19 Documentation of the treatment of food animals is widely available. Good recent surveys can be found in Singer and Mason 2006, Foer 2009, Carlin and Martin, et al. 2008, and Matheny and Leahy 2007. For what goes on in slaughterhouses, there’s nothing to compare to Eisnitz 1997. 20 There are 32 permutations (25 = 32). In 31, at least one of the arguments is correct. 21 To be clear, I shall be taking it for granted that, in the context of arguments about eating meat, a chance of at least 25% is serious. I think that’s defensible, but the argument for it will have to come later. 22 The chance that all are wrong is 90% raised to the fifth power, or about 59%—yielding nearly a 41% chance that at least one is right. This assumes probabilistic independence of the arguments. See also note 23. 23 When would the threshold not be met? For there to be less than a 25% chance that it is wrong to eat meat, so far as these arguments go, there must be a greater than 75% chance that all the arguments are wrong. The fifth root of 75% is about 94.4%, so, unless each of these arguments has less than about a 5.6% chance of being

21

right, the threshold will be met. I have been assuming probabilistic independence, but even if the arguments are only partially independent, it remains true that a 25% threshold can be reached, even if none of the separate arguments has as much as a 25% chance of being correct by itself. 24 Most philosophers who have disagreed with moral vegetarianism have argued only that it is not wrong, or not clear that it is wrong, to eat meat rather than that it is wrong not do so. See, e.g., Li 2002. In 1980, Callicott argued that universal vegetarianism would be ecologically disastrous and therefore wrong (Callicott 1980, 335-336), but has since changed his mind (Callicott n.d.). Occasionally, one comes across health-based objections, such as Planck 2007. For a more balanced perspective, see Hoyt 2007. Those who reject the official position of the American Dietetic Association, North America’s largest organization of nutrition professionals, are unlikely to be persuaded by anything I could add. See Craig and Mangels 2009. 25 Most serious examiners have found flaws, and though the argument has its defenders (see Lycan and Schlesinger 1999), they are likely outnumbered by skeptics among philosophers. See http://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl (accessed 17 March 2011). 26 For another interesting use, see Richards 2001, 35-37. 27 I take this to mean at least that neither can be dismissed as having no more than a trivial chance of being true. 28 Anyone who thinks it is not even plausible that meat-eating is not wrong either already is or should immediately become a vegetarian. My argument doesn’t address her but doesn’t need to. 29 In comparing dietary pleasures, it is a mistake to count all the pleasure derived from a meat-centered diet. Only differential pleasure—however much more pleasure one would get from a meat-centered diet (if any)—should count. Additionally, taste is malleable, and there is good evidence that what people think tastes better is affected by their beliefs and values. (Allen, Gupta, and Monnier 2008) 30 For useful discussion, see (Foot 1978; Joyce 2006, 45-64), on the nature of moral judgments, and ShaferLandau 2003, chapters 7 and 8 on reasons internalism and moral rationalism. 31 For some technical details, see Luce and Raiffa 1989, especially §2.4, and Heap et al. 1992, 3-11. 32 (0.25 x 10) + (0.75 x –1) = 1.75 and (0.25 x –10) + (0.75 x 1) = –1.75. 33 I discuss details of constructing a cardinal scale in Bass 2004, 58-74. 34 I adopt the convention of using greater, larger, smaller, etc. to refer to distances from the zero point. Thus, –5 is a greater negative than –1, and 5 a greater positive than 1. 35 Each argument against meat-eating implicitly compares it to other instances of wrong-doing. If an argument is correct, meat-eating will be about as seriously wrong as what it is compared to. But on most, it is being compared to quite serious wrongs. For example, if the hunger argument is correct, meat-eating is about as bad as— because it is equivalent to—depriving starving people of food we could give them for free. Surely, that’s unconscionable and would have to be represented by some quite large negative number. 36 I have no argument that it is also necessary, though perhaps it is. Note that our account may generalize to cases of unresolved normative conflict, where there is a non-trivial chance of doing wrong, whatever one does.