The Diffusion of Institutional Design Among Regional Organizations∗ Anja Jetschke and Patrick Theiner University of G¨ottingen September 16, 2015

Abstract

Why are there clones of the European Union (EU) in Africa and the Caribbean, i.e. regional organizations that are very similar to the institutional design of the EU? Why do regional organizations (RO) in general develop similar goals such as common markets or mechanisms of intervention within and across regions? Are such similarities the outcome of random co-evolution, functional adaptation, or are they the outcome of outside coercion? Questioning the standard explanations for the design of international institutions, the Comparative Regional Organizations Project (CROP) investigates the extent to which institutional designs are determined by processes of diffusion between regional organizations. This is motivated by two observations: First, a number of regional organizations are quite similar in their institutional design. Second, the emergence of regional organizations occurs in waves. Over the last five decades, states have decided at specific points in time to either establish regional organizations or to amend them. Both observations indicate that regional organizations and their member states take their decisions in dependence on the decisions of other regional organizations the similarity might be a consequence of diffusion. The project has begun to systematically survey the characteristics and content of the founding and/or amending documents of more than 100 regional organizations, and developed an index of similarity between texts, and therefore institutions. The paper presents CROPs methodological approach and first substantive insights, such as a quantitative evaluation of the argument that some regional organizations develop a model character for other regional organizations.

Keywords: regional organization; diffusion; institutional design; regionalism; quantitative textual analysis ∗

Draft version, please do not cite or quote without authors’ permission. Financial support of the German Research Foundation (DFG) is gratefully acknowledged. Questions and comments should be addressed to [email protected] or [email protected]

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Introduction and State of the Art

We live in an era of regionalization and regional organization (Haftel 2013; Katzenstein 2005; Mansfield and Solingen 2010; Paul 2012). Regional organizations (ROs)are defined here as organizations constituted by at least two contiguous states, which define their membership therein on a regional basis (e.g. African, Middle Eastern) and are multipurpose in scope. Since the mid-1980s the number of regional organizations has grown remarkably from 42 to almost 100 (Comparative Regional Organizations Project Dataset I) a figure that does not include bilateral free trade agreements (see Figure 1, Appendix 1). In the wake of this second wave of regionalism the first having occurred in the 1960s after the establishment of the Treaty of Rome that would create the European Community a vibrant literature on regional integration and comparative regionalism has developed. This literature has recently been joined by new approaches that explicitly depart from the perceived Eurocentrism of this literature and seek to systematically compare regionalism and regionalization broadly defined (Acharya 2012; Fawcett 2004; Hettne and Sderbaum 2000; Hurrell 1995; Sbragia 2008; Warleigh-Lack and Van Langenhove 2010). Yet, despite the development of innovative research programs, the existing literature with only a few exceptions has neglected two key phenomena that characterize regional organizations: their institutional similarities and their wave-like emergence. Why do regional organizations reveal similarities when it comes to their institutional design? Why, for example, does the Andean Community look like a copy of the European Union i.e. why do they have similar institutions and pursue similar policies? Or why have eleven regional organizations outside of Europe created a regional court based on the template of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), and why have they partly implemented its rulings even if there is little evidence of similar integration challenges being faced by them (Alter 2012)? The existing literature on international institutions provides three theoretical explanations for such similarities: functional necessity, random co-evolution, and more or less coercive external pressures. The first functional approach regards similarities as being the outcome of functional necessity (Sachzwang). In this case, the set of relevant regional institutions is determined functionally, i.e. by the type of cooperation problem that needs to be solved. Higher levels of interdependence are likely to create externalities and hence will be associated with greater regional institutionalization in the form of bureaucracies or specific dispute settlement mechanisms (Haftel 2013: 391; Hawkins et al. 2006: 15). The most prominent approaches are regional integration theories asserting that the technical regulation of cooperation problems requires regional institutions that later expand from economic or non-political realms into

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the political one (Haas 1970; Haas 2004 [1958]; Lindberg 1970; Malamud and Schmitter 2011: 147; Schmitter 2009). More generally, problem-structural approaches to international institutions start from similar assumptions (Hasenclever et al. 2002: 59f.; Koremenos et al. 2001; Mitchell 2006; Zrn 1997): Regional institutional similarities are the result of comparable levels of regional integration, as expressed by similar patterns of interdependence and lead to a specific institutional demand (Haftel 2007, 2013; Krapohl and Fink 2012; Mattli 1999). In contrast, explanations of random co-evolution place the focus not on the nature of the underlying problem structures, but on the configuration of state preferences and characteristics. Random co-evolution of institutional forms would occur where member states are arranged in similar constellations of interests or ideas. Rationalist (Haftel 2012; Hawkins et al. 2006; Koremenos et al. 2001; Milner and Kubota 2005; Solingen 1998) as well as constructivist approaches, focusing on the role of ideas of regional integration and legal cultures (Acharya and Johnston 2007; Duina 2006), are compatible with this view. Rationalist approaches view international institutions as the product or outcome of specific constellations of interests and structures: ”[S]tates use international institutions to further their own goals, and they design institutions accordingly. []” (Koremenos 2001: 762). The number of states seeking to cooperate, their preferences, and the nature of the collective action problems needing to be resolved determine the design of a regional institution (see also Bhmelt and Pilster 2011). More developed states or more democratic states agree on institutional designs that systematically differ from those of less developed or less democratic states (Milner and Kubota 2005; Solingen 2008, 2012). Because such factors vary considerably both cross-regionally and intra-regionally, organizational variance should be high, and random co-evolution of institutional designs should be a correspondingly rare event: ”Major institutions [are] organized in radically different ways” (Koremenos et al. 2001: 761). Likewise, rationalists would expect similar institutional designs among regional organizations in which members exhibit considerable similarities. The third perspective emphasizes external pressures, either in the form of powerful actors coercing members of regional organizations into adopting specific policies and institutions, or of the pressures of globalization, which impose on regional organizations the need to adapt to system-wide challenges. This perspective is broadly compatible with realist and international political economy (IPE) approaches to regional organizations. Realist theories of international relations traditionally hold that international institutions in general, and regional organizations in particular, are established by a hegemon as a way to pursue its own core interests (Krasner 1976). ”Regions are the creation of political power and purpose. Powerful states tend to extend their purposes beyond national borders through 3

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a combination of strategic action and sheer weight.” (Katzenstein 2005: 21). More recently, some authors have contended that the European Union has emerged as a powerful supporter of regional integration efforts worldwide (Schimmelfennig 2009, Tel 2007), doing so by acting as an external federator. Theories of IPE explain regionalism as an outcome and a rational response of political actors to structural changes in the world economy. The recent literature assumes that increasing integration and interdependence in the world economy and the tightened institutional arrangements that come with it also lead to the strengthening of regional integration (Mauro et al. 2008). Hence, regional integration is progressing parallel to increased global integration (Mauro et al. 2008; Dees et al. 2007). Consequently, the expectation here is that increasing integration at a global level also leads to greater regional integration, with those states and regions that are more integrated into global structures also developing more similar regional institutions (Dees et al. 2008). While these theoretical approaches provide important insights into both why states establish regional organizations, and how these institutions subsequently develop, several facets of regional organizations pose a challenge to them. Dominant in this regard is the already mentioned enigma of why similarities of regional institutional design exist between groups of states that vary radically in their preferences and interests. Why, then, would groups of states as different as African and European ones choose similar institutional designs, as we see in the cases of the European Union and the African Union? Why do we find regional parliaments where there is no functional need for them, i.e. within regional organizations to whom members have not delegated sovereignty or in regions where governments are autocratic? How do we conceptually deal with the observation that many regional organizations take the EU or other regional institutions as models according to which they themselves intend to develop? Russias President Vladimir Putin, for example, declared in 2012 that members of the newly formed Eurasian Economic Community will take the European Community as their model. Recent approaches claim that such similarities are an outcome of forces operating between regional organizations in a horizontal fashion (Brzel and Risse 2009; Jetschke and Lenz 2013). This means that members of regional organizations do not act in isolation, nor do they determine institutional design and policy completely from scratch. Rather, they observe each other, draw lessons and look for model institutions that could be used as templates for their own development. Such approaches speak of a diffusion effect on regional organizations. This field connects to an earlier literature that emerged in the context of comparative regional integration research in the 1970s, one which did not, however, have any lasting impact (Avery 1973). Thus far, despite the anecdotal evidence for diffusion ef4

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fects being compelling, systematic evidence about the design of regional organizations and their possible determination by other such bodies elsewhere in the world is lacking. The focus on the possible influences emanating from other regional organizations also demonstrates an additional weakness of existing IR approaches to the subject. These view regional organizations as operating independently of each other, and thus either tend to neglect international influences altogether as is the case in functional and co-evolution approaches or they conceive of them as impacting on regional organizations, as forces to which regional organizations react commonly but independently.

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Relevance

We aim to address the identified research gaps and provide an innovative perspective on the institutional design of regional organizations around the globe, drawing on insights from the growing number of studies that are exploring diffusion processes between states and, in part, regional organizations in order to develop and test different sets of hypotheses about cross-regional similarities in formal organizational structures among regional organizations. We make the novel argument as part of the literature on comparative regionalism that diffusion matters for regional organizations. We investigate empirically whether regional organizations and their member states are influenced by other such institutions and will explore how i.e. through which causal mechanisms diffusion might influence the design of regional organizations. To achieve these goals, we are developing two datasets, one surveying regional organizations and the second focusing on diffusion variables. We focus on the similarities of any two regional organizations as indicated in their regional treaties, declarations and conventions, following the pioneering research of Zachary Elkins et al. (Elkins 2010; Elkins et al. 2010) on the diffusion of national constitutions. Elkins et al.s Comparative Constitutions Project1 investigates the sources and consequences of constitutional choices. It also adopts a diffusion-oriented approach. Our reasoning is that if members of regional organizations observe each other or are connected to each other, the result of these processes will most likely manifest itself in the agreements that the different regional organizations adopt. These agreements should, and will, hence be the focus of our analysis. The approach of analyzing a given regional organization’s institutional design and the external horizontal influences on it promises a better grasp of the design and development of regional organizations over time. First, on a very practical level, area specialists have long observed the adoption of similar regional integration projects and institutions, especially 1

www.comparativeconstitutionsproject.org

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from Europe, by regional organizations in other parts of the world that subsequently generate little in the way of integration dynamics (Montecinos 1996). For example, the copies of the EU court in Africa do not behave as an integration motor as expected (Osiemo 2014). Hence, we contribute to the on-going discussion among area specialists on the gap between the stated goals of regional organizations and their implementation (Bach 1983; Malamud 2005; Martin Jones and Smith 2002; Gray 2014). A paucity of systematic evidence exists on what causes this behavior, but the diffusion of regional integration models does appear to play a role. Especially the sociological variant of diffusion would explain such outcomes as ’decoupling’, caused by the trend of organizational structures to become more alike (isomorphism) (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Little systematic attention has been paid so far to horizontal influences between regional organizations. This is all the more astonishing as external promoters of regional integration and cooperation are frequently mentioned in studies of regional organizations (Farrell 2005; Lombaerde and Schulz 2009; Tel 2007). Second, since the end of the Cold War, academic interest in international and regional organizations and their governance practices has significantly increased (Goertz and Powers 2012; Hafner-Burton et al. 2008; Paul 2012). Regional organizations are conceptualized more and more as organizations contributing to the governance of international relations, doing so alongside the endeavors of global institutions (Hurrell 2007). The former are also increasingly being utilized to contest the hegemony of Western institutions. Mapping the development of their institutional structures and specifying the possible channels of external influence will allow us to better determine whether the growth of regional organizations indicates a global development toward convergence or divergence. However, our investigation will have reached its limits where actual regional practices are concerned, as we will not focus on the proclaimed versus the de facto level of integration or on the effectiveness of regional organizations.

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Diffusion: Mechanisms and Hypotheses

The core features of the concept of diffusion (Busch and Jrgens 2007; Gilardi 2012; Holzinger et al. 2007; Holzinger and Knill 2005; Levi-Faur 2005) are that: It is a situation of interdependent, uncoordinated decision-making that is characterized by the voluntary adoption of specific institutions and policies (Aldrich 1979; Rogers 1983: 5f.). ’Interdependent’ means that the decision of actor A alters the likelihood of actor B making a similar decision (Simmons and Elkins 2004). Neumayer and Plmper similarly define spatial dependence as existing whenever ”the marginal utility of one unit of analysis depends on the choices of other units of analysis” (2010: 146). At its core, the concept of diffusion rejects 6

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the notion that actors take their decisions in isolation and hence independently of each other. Instead, actors observe each other and react to decisions made by their peers. Whether or not this interdependence arises is contingent on the level of interaction occurring between regional organizations. Most studies that focus on forms of cultural or policy transmission conceptualize the channels through which it occurs as ties or connections existing between units of a system. In the social sciences, these channels are usually grouped under various mechanisms that constitute causal mechanisms of transmission (Elkins and Simmons 2005; Holzinger et al. 2007; Simmons and Elkins 2004). We will follow this convention and identify the specific trigger mechanisms leading to similar institutions and policies being adopted. We will differentiate between five mechanisms, with each indicating a distinct channel of influence: learning; peer-based social learning; legitimacy-driven mimicry; competition-driven mimicry; and soft coercion. In the following, we take great care to distinguish the individual diffusion mechanisms from another and what appears even more important to distinguish them from independent adaptations to external stimuli. Moreover, we try to find indicators for each mechanism that match the theoretical concepts underpinning the diffusion mechanisms, thus reflecting the current state of the debate on diffusion (Graham et al. 2013: 654). In the following, the key mechanisms will first be explained and then hypotheses will be developed to test them. For each of the diffusion mechanisms a general hypothesis will first be developed, before more specific hypotheses are generated. Here, we focus on those variables that appear plausible for regional organizations and that have had demonstrable traction in other diffusion studies, which is, for example, not the case for a variable like common language (Cao 2009).

3.1

Learning

Rational theories of diffusion emphasize the lessons that can be learned from following the example of a more successful regional organization. Learning refers to the change in beliefs, or the change in ones confidence in existing beliefs, that results from exposure to new evidence, theories or behavioural repertoires (Haas 1990; Sommerer 2011; Meseguer 2009). Actors assume institutional designs from elsewhere because they obtain information about the effectiveness of other institutions and policies, allowing them to better evaluate the consequences of making their own policy innovations. Actors can acquire new beliefs that only affect their evaluation of the appropriate means for achieving a goal (simple learning), but they might also acquire new beliefs about these goals themselves (complex learning). Actors not only respond to who does what but also to what happens when they do it (Lee

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and Strang 2006: 894). Especially if they need to solve cooperation problems or face external shocks, they are likely to look to other actors experiences (Meseguer 2009; Sommerer 2011). According to rational theories of learning, actors are Bayesian updaters. Bayesian updating is a rational process that assumes actors change their evaluations of the probability of an outcome based on any new information that they receive. The classical example of this is learning from success: in this case, members of an organization (or those willing to establish one) follow the lead of more successful organizations, which they observe period after period in a sequential updating process in order for lessons to be learned (Meseguer 2009: 39). We thus hypothesize that: H 1: Highly successful institutional and policy changes in regional organization A will be followed by similar changes in regional organization B. Similarity of agreements is driven by measurable policy success. While we acknowledge that regional organizations’ goals vary considerably, and that ’success’ and the perception of it therefore also vary, we focus on two possible outcomes of regional integration that might serve as evidence for learning as an underlying mechanism of diffusion: learning from economic success and learning from peaceful change. We suggest those two factors because they are usually cited as the justifications for establishing regional organizations, with the European integration process providing a good illustration of this mechanism (Powers and Goertz 2011; Schiff and Winters 2003), they are widely acknowledged as regional organizations’ core functions in the literature, and some of the other functions of regional organizations, such as the promotion of collective values, might even be considered a correlate of a regional organization’s ability to keep the peace among members.

3.2

Peer-Based Social Learning (Social Learning)

Sociological theories emphasize that rational learning can ”go wrong”, in the sense that actors learn more easily from close peers or peers in their in-group and that the flow of ideas is mediated more effectively through existing communication channels and networks. Thus, they might learn wrong lessons just because they are better connected to specific actors. Ideas diffuse faster between states or groups of states that share more or denser network connections, which are also referred to as ”direct ties”. As Beck et al. (2006) suggest, these direct ties can be any type of interaction that indexes the degree to which two regional organizations are likely to intensively interact, to be aware of each other’s policies and to serve as prominent referents for each other. This includes geographical proximity, similar language, culture and colonial history, shared membership in other organizations, or density of trade ties.

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We thus hypothesize that: H 2: Information will be filtered through specific channels of diffusion (direct ties). The more closely regional organizations A and B share these ties with each other, the more similar their agreements will be.

3.3

Legitimacy-Driven Mimicry (Legitimation)

Constructivist and organizational sociologists focus on a different mechanism of diffusion, namely that of mimicry. This is defined here as the conscious adoption of a policy innovation out of a concern for status and legitimacy. Meyer et al. (1977) have shown that many organizations routinely adopt innovations that do not correlate with their capacities or endowments. Here, adopters obviously take up innovations because they value the prestige and legitimacy that is connected to them. They follow the logic of appropriateness. Rather than expressing functional necessity, adoptions symbolize the commitment made to the values of the community. This theory would expect an across the board adoption of similar institutional designs even among extremely varying sets of states because particular institutional designs are associated with quasi-universal values of bureaucratic rationalization and modernity (Finnemore 1996; Meyer and Rowan 1977). Threshold models further posit that actors’ decisions will be influenced by the proportion of actors who have already made a similar decision or who have undertaken similar institutional reforms (Granovetter 1978). Jupille and Jolliffe (2011) argue, for example, that regional integration has become a trend in international relations, indicating cooperative behaviour. Moreover, several studies (Cao 2009; Fink 2013; Fglister 2011) find that international organizations influence policy convergence among states. Cao found the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to influence economic policies of member states. One could similarly assume that joint membership of the members of regional organizations in these international organizations also influences the institutional design of regional organizations, as when the choice for a dispute settlement body for economic disputes brings either the WTO mechanism or a court modelled after the European Court of Justice to the attention of member states (Alter 2012). We thus hypothesize that: H 3: System-wide trends partly promoted by international organizations increase the similarity of agreements of regional organizations A and B.

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Competition-Driven Mimicry (Competition)

Another important mechanism for diffusion is rivalry between competitors. Competitiondriven mimicry describes a self-selection process between organizations that might equally lead to a similarity of institutions and policies. Here, what is adopted by one regional organization might also have profound consequences on other regional organizations. Similar formal structures might thus emerge as a result of actors competing for external resources. For example, many states around the world decided to reform regional organizations or to create new ones after the EU adopted the Single European Act (1986), and later the Maastricht Treaty (1992). Kathleen Hancock notes, for example, that ”the EUs deepening integration and ensuing economic power have made many regional groupings eager to replicate its success”. She further notes the ”pressures” of an ”integration race” (Hancock 2009: 27). Since many regional organizations are established as a way to liberalize markets in the global competition for FDI, this mechanism is likely to positively affect the similarity of agreements in place as well. Simmons and Elkins (Simmons and Elkins 2004) and Elkins et al. (2006) found the rival policies of economic competitors to be a strong influence on the decision in favour of adopting liberalization policies. We approximate this particular mechanism of diffusion by drawing on the concept of ”structural equivalence” (Burt 1987). Structural equivalence models assume that it is position rather than direct ties that triggers diffusion. It is ”the imitation of the behavior of others who are in a similar position in the social space, but not necessarily others with whom the potential adopter communicates” (Valente 1999: 14). We assume that states that are structurally equivalent with regard to their economic position (i.e. the space they occupy in the global production chain) or their power position in the international system develop similar regional organizations in a competitive bid for survival. To capture specifically the horizontal effects arising from competitors (and not just similar reactions by similarly positioned states to external globalization pressures), we assume that competition is driven by the FDI inflow to a regional organization as compared to its competitors. We thus hypothesize that: H 4: Regional organizations that compete for the same external resources and are in a similar structural position have more similar agreements.

3.5

Soft Coercion

Rational material theories expect actors to adopt institutional designs that they would otherwise not accept if these institutions and policies are linked to specific resources that positively alter the costbenefit analysis of actors. The adoption of institutional designs 10

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might be costly to implement, for example, but the material incentives associated with them significantly offset these costs. In the case of European enlargement, EU conditionality has provided a key incentive for states wanting to become members of the EU to change their domestic structures and to implement EU regulations. A similar process might be what leads other regional organizations to adopt institutional designs from elsewhere. The EU has implemented programme activities for many regions outside of Europe and foresees considerable amounts of financial support being given to regional integration around the globe (Farrell 2005, 2009; Lombaerde and Schulz 2009). The EU has supported regional economic integration efforts between the group of African, Caribbean and Pacific states (ACP), the MERCOSUR in Latin America and many regional organizations in Africa. Since 2003 it has also been providing assistance to the ASEAN (Martin 2009). Gray and Slapin (2012) show that regional organizations outside of Europe change their institutional structure in line with requirements articulated by the EU. These program activities are different from the ones provided by the UNCTAD, WTO or the OECD, as the EU is an important trade partner and has via market access offered greater leverage over the states that it does business with. We thus hypothesize that: H 5: The material resources associated with regional integration support by another regional organization increases similarity of agreements between A and B.

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Data

We will proceed in two distinct steps. First, a dataset will be developed that allows us to describe and analyze in detail the pattern of emergence and institutional development of regional organizations, as indicated by their agreements. This step requires the set-up of a simple (monadic) regional organization dataset. Second, our different hypotheses will be tested. This step requires the development of a second (dyadic) dataset, comparing any two agreements of regional organizations over time. Both datasets together then establish an overall database for regional organizations. The first dataset will capture the institutional characteristics of regional organizations established since 1945. We are particularly interested in the formal institutional structure of regional organizations. ”Institutional structure” refers to the institutions and policies mentioned in the regional organizations’ founding and amending agreements. We understand these to be regional organizations’ ”constitutions”, defined here as a ”set of institutions governing political decision-making” (Weingast 1995: 2). Thus, every regional organization in this sense has its own ”constitution”, even if it does not necessarily bind its member states together in a meaningful way or does not meet more 11

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demanding criteria.

4.1

Dataset 1

To warrant inclusion in our dataset, we have adopted the following criteria for an entity’s designation as a ”regional organization”: • It must have been established by at least two states who define their membership on a regional basis. • It must be multipurpose in scope. • It must be sufficiently institutionalized to require regular meetings and rules governing decision-making. These criteria are more inclusive than the standard definition of the updated Correlates of War project (Pevehouse et al. 2004) or the latest Formal Intergovernmental Organizations (FIGO) project (Volgy et al. 2008: 851; see also Beohmer et al. 2004), which adopt similar criteria, such as formal entity, states as members, possession of a permanent secretariat, and autonomy. For the purposes of this study, organizations that consist of only two members still warrant inclusion, as they often form the nucleus of larger organizations, such as, for example, the Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas (ALBA) as established between Venezuela and Cuba. The institution must further have a regionally defined membership, meaning that all states have to come from a particular geographic region (e.g. ”West Africa”, ”Caribbean”, ”Pacific Rim”). Its scope must in theory or practice be multipurpose, in the sense that the organization offers the means to achieve a variety of ends. This excludes single purpose organizations focusing on one issue such as OPEC, and strictly functional arrangements such as free trade agreements and currency unions, where means and ends are essentially congruent. Our definition does include entities without permanent organizational structures (such as a secretariat), as we believe that they constitute a distinct type of decentralized organization.2 We also include interregional organizations if they have a clear regional mandate and never meet outside the region. A list of regional organizations is included in Appendix 2. Our dataset will consist of ”agreement events”, denoting when a regional organization was established or changed and what specifically has been amended in the case of the latter. Each case in the dataset (regional organization agreement) will contain basic information about: the regional organization and the agreement, the significance of changes, information 2

One example is the EFTA in the 1960s. EFTA’s institutional design has been adopted by other regional organizations.

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on the number of members who have signed the agreement, the specified institutions for policy-making, the mentioned principles of cooperation, the number and fields of cooperation, membership rules, among other things. The dataset will be generated using a specifically designed questionnaire (sample questions are shown in Appendix 1). Additionally, we will collect key data on these organizations (average economic growth, number of interstate conflict onsets), on their institutionalized links to other organizations (as indicated by their observer status and institutionalized dialogues), on their openness to global trade and on the characteristics of member states (average score of democracy, average level of per capita GDP). This collation will be referred to as Comparative Regional Organizations Project Dataset 1. A sample view of the dataset is provided in Annex 1. While some of these dimensions are also already included in existing datasets, ours will not only directly survey organizational characteristics but also measure connections to other regional and international organizations, thus providing ties to institutional similarities between regional organizations. Goertz and Powers (2012) surveyed 38 regional and international organizations that were in existence during the period from 1980 to 2005. This dataset also focuses on multipurpose (general) organizations, but is much smaller than our dataset will be and has a different analytical focus, namely a morphological description (Goertz and Powers 2012: 1). The dataset of Haftel (Haftel 2007, 2013) includes 28 regional organizations with a baseline year of 1980 and tracks primarily the institutionalization of them, as measured by the frequency with which member states meet, the degree of centralization and the membership rules. This dataset neglects diffusion processes altogether. Hooghe and Marks (Marks et al. 2014) are interested in the authority and independence of international and regional organizations. They evaluate 72 international and regional organizations with a baseline year of 2010 and collect data on the institutions involved in policy-making in order to determine their degree of independence from other member states as indicated by budgetary powers and their ability to sanction member states. This dataset is also designed to analyse the authority of regional organizations, and not their institutional similarity or the influence of regional organizations on each others institutional structure. None of these three datasets collect data on the links between regional organizations.

4.2

Dataset 2

In the second major step, we go beyond the detailed description and analysis of regional organizations and seek to theoretically as well as empirically contribute to the debate about the occurrence of diffusion processes between regional organizations. The dependent variable here is the similarity or convergence of agreements, as oper-

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ationalized by a similarity index (see below). We understand convergence as a potential outcome in the form of an increasing similarity of policies, and diffusion as a process in which policy choices are interdependent. We seek to explore whether convergent institutional designs of regional organizations are caused by diffusion, and we control for other possible causes of convergence (see Fink 2013: 630). Due to the requirement of dealing with the similarities of two regional organizations instead of only the characteristics of one as the unit of analysis, a second dataset is required. Here, the unit of analysis will be defined as the dyadic relationship between the agreements of two regional organizations. A case in this dataset will therefore consist of the pairing between agreement X of a regional organization A and agreement Y of a regional organization B. This dataset will contain variables indicating the type, number and strength of ties between any two regional organizations. Dataset 2 will allow us to: • Compare any two agreements between regional organizations over time, in order to determine their similarity. • Track concrete institutional changes and innovations that are the source of growing or diminishing similarity between two organizations. Because we code individual agreement events and their changes for each organization in Dataset 1, the dyads in Dataset 2 necessarily show which institutional features overlap between two regional organizations, and when this overlap increases or decreases. • Systematically test theoretically derived hypotheses on the diffusion of institutions and policies across regional organizations. The hypotheses will identify the mechanisms and processes that best explain such similarities: Learning, peer-based emulation, legitimacy-driven mimicry, competition-driven mimicry, and soft coercion. Table XXX below provides an overview of the hypotheses and the operationalization of the independent variables. Appendix XXX provides further information on how these variables will be measured.

4.3

Alternative explanations and control variables

As outlined above, existing explanations of similarities between international institutions fall into three broad groups: functional necessity, random co-evolution, and coercion. These constitute our null hypotheses for similarities of institutional design. Explanations of functional necessity see institutional parallels arise where the underlying cooperation problems are similar. Regional institutional similarities are then due to 14

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comparable levels of regional integration, based on similar patterns of interdependence and institutional demand (Mattli 1999). Following Haftel (2012) and Marks et al. (2014), we analyze structures of primarily economic regional interdependence and their correlation with specific institutional designs. The operationalization will include the levels of regional interdependence (trade, forced migration, existence of neighboring conflicts) and patterns of intra-regional versus inter-regional interdependence, which were found to systematically differ between the global north and south and thereby impact institutional arrangements (see Krapohl and Fink 2012). An explanation of functional necessity would expect similar institutions in regions with comparable levels of interdependence between states, but would be challenged by findings that show institutional similarities between regions with varying degrees of intra-regional and inter-regional interdependence. In contrast, explanations of random co-evolution place the focus not on the nature of the underlying problems, but on the configuration of state preferences and characteristics. Random co-evolution of institutional forms would then occur where member states are arranged in similar constellations of interests or ideas. To test for this alternative explanation, our analysis will include variables related to state characteristics, interests, and interactions. This includes the number of actual or potential members (i.e. those situated in the region) of the institution (Koremenos et al. 2001), state-level and regional GDP, the number of past and ongoing conflicts occurring within a particular region, the type of political system, and the level of democratization (Milner and Kubota 2005). Including t as a linear variable will further help to control for random co-evolution over time. We would consider this explanation falsified if two regions that consist of states that have varying scores on several of these variables exhibit significant similarity of institutional arrangements. Explanations based on coercion expect institutions to be alike in circumstances of similar external pressures acting on member states or institutions themselves. This perspective is commonly held by proponents of realism or IPE. Our operationalization of coercion-based alternative explanations on the one side includes variables capturing hegemonic interests: whether a hegemon was active in the creation and negotiation of agreements, the intensity of economic relations as expressed by bilateral trade and investment, and military involvements represented by the overlap between alliance portfolios (Sweeney and Fritz 2004, 2005). This alternative argument would be challenged by situations of dissimilar hegemonic interests, but similar agreements. On the other side, exposure to globalization as a coercing force is understood primarily in economic terms by IPE. We will use the intra-regional trade intensity and a regional organization’s trade openness as measures for a regional organization’s integration in world markets. Institutions consisting of states exhibiting comparable exposure to economic globalization should thus become more similar in their agreements 15

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over time.

5

Methods and Work Program

The project is divided into two major phases: the development of a dataset on regional organizations; and a test of theoretically derived hypotheses on the diffusion of institutions and policies between regional organizations through the use of a separate dataset.

5.1

First Phase

In the first phase the dataset on the institutional structures of regional organizations will be developed, the basis of which is a survey of founding and amending treaties and documents of regional organizations, as outlined above. We will study the formal characteristics of agreements as well as their constitutional designs. Formal characteristics of agreements refer, among other things, to the numbering of articles, the length of a document, or the language used in it. We propose the ”regional organization / agreement / year” (RO agreement) as the unit of analysis. Here, we depart from the established practices of similar studies on international and regional organizations (Elkins et al. 2010; Gleditsch 2002; Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Pevehouse et al. 2004), as we are interested in changes in the agreements of regional organizations, not in changes of status (e.g. war vs. no war). The first phase consists of a number of distinct tasks to be tackled in succession, some of which have already been completed. The universe of regional organizations to be included in the dataset has been defined: any organization will be considered that is constituted by at least two member states who define membership regionally, that is multipurpose in character, and that has some institutional framework for meetings and decision-making. This leaves us with a total of 102 organizations created between 1945 and 2015 across all world regions, which can be found in Annex 2. Furthermore, a questionnaire for the coding of RO treaties and agreements has been developed. This is based on Elkins et al.’s (2010) survey tool for the Comparative Constitutions Project, as our types of documents are comparable. Additional existing questionnaires, such as those used in the research on the design and authority of international institutions (Haftel and Thompson 2006; Marks et al. 2014), have also be consulted. The questionnaire was refined by several rounds of pretests, which were conducted in the framework of a graduate seminar on textual analysis and coding at the University of Gttingen. The survey instrument can be roughly divided into questions relating to ’inventory similarity’ and ’content similarily’. The first set of questions simply asks whether a particular

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institution or policy is mentioned in the document or not. For example, whether the treaty mentions a body featuring the foreign ministers of member states. Here, the idea is to ”identify topics at a general level and thus measure broad areas of inclusion or exclusion (Elkins 2010: 984-85). The second set of questions evaluates choices between specific possible characteristics. An example would be If a body of foreign ministers exists, which general competences does it have?”, with possible answers including ”guiding the future direction of the RO”, ”decision-making”, or ”legislative initiative”. This second measure is called ’content similarity’. Thus, we will obtain two types of data: dichotomous values on the existence of specific institutions and policies (existent=1; non-existent=0), and categorical values on the choices within specific items. An excerpt of the current questionnaire is included in Appendix XXX. We propose following Elkins et al. (2010), who calculate their index by adding up the number of topics on which any two agreements concur and then dividing that total by the number of all topics included in the agreement. The resulting score will vary between 0 if two documents do not match on any topic, and 1 if they agree completely. Calculated for all items across two agreements, we will obtain an asymmetric matrix with agreement dyads that can then be used for statistical purposes (see the discussion in Elkins 2010: 986). We have also defined the list of documents to be coded. We will refer to our text corpus as ”agreements”, and herein include legal treaties as well as the less binding protocols, declarations or conventions as many organizations are established on the basis of non-legally binding agreements. Agreements are either founding documents in which case they establish the organization for the first time or they are amending documents in which case they similarly change an existing institutional design and/or impact on the fields of cooperation. We thus will code, for example, the EU’s Treaty of Maastricht, but not the European Charter on Human Rights, as the latter only refers to the issue of human rights. Founding and amending agreements frequently have the status of organizational constitutions, as outlined above. Indicative of this status are the websites of regional organizations and the documentary histories in which key treaties are explicitly mentioned. While the number of regional organizations worldwide is currently relatively high, the restriction to founding and amending agreements limits the number of documents to be coded, as compared to other projects. Based on an overview taken of the key documents of regional organizations, we anticipate having to code around 450 documents. For the text of agreements, we will partially rely on those collected by Goertz and Powers (2012) who have already translated some of them into English. Where such sources do not exist, we will collect the data from various other sources: most importantly, the United Nations Treaty Series, the Yearbook of International Organizations of the Union of International Associations, the International Monetary Fund’s Directory of Economic, Commodity and 17

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Development Organizations, and the websites of regional organizations. For some regional organizations and older agreements, we expect having to undertake archival research, as their founding documents have not been made available in official publications. As of September 2015, we are entering the coding phase. Coding of the agreements will proceed on a regional organization basis by region. We will code the formal structure of regional organizations in Africa, the Americas, the Middle East, Asia, Europe, and transcontinental organizations, the issue areas in which cooperation takes place, and the policies set forth. Treaties will be fully hand-coded by team members and student assistants using an Excel-based survey instrument, which will then be processed in R using the dplyr package. Automated text analysis (e.g. WordFish) and machine learning to speed up coding verification have could become part of the coding process in the future.

5.2

The Road Ahead: Second Phase

How can we explain similarities between regional organizations that otherwise vary in the pre-conditions of institutional design? Our hypotheses have been designed in such a way as to specifically parse out the effects of diffusion on the institutional design of regional organizations. In this phase we will thus focus on collecting data on the diffusion and control variables, and conduct a thorough statistical analysis. The diffusion variables will be operationalized according to the indicators used in the comparative regionalism and regional integration literature, to statistics from the World Bank and other international organizations, to Eurostat and to other datasets (see Appendix 4). This will involve substantial data collection and coding, as country-specific indicators such as GDP, the level of democracy, and the number of conflicts will have to be aggregated and calculated for regional organizations. We are aware that we might face problems of data availability, especially for the early time period and for regional organizations outside of Europe. We will adapt our dataset accordingly. As outlined in detail above, we will include control variables related to three distinct alternative explanations on institutional design and inter-institutional similarities: functional necessity, random co-evolution, and external pressures. Each of these potential determinants of the design of regional institutions will be operationalized by a number of factors. Data collection and coding of control variables will be conducted alongside our efforts on our main variables of interest capturing diffusion, and use similar sources. We will then use our dataset to test the different diffusion hypotheses. We will thoroughly discuss and evaluate the different estimation techniques discussed in the literature on diffusion, such as spatial maximum likelihood (SML) regression (Beck et al. 2006; Elkins

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2010; Franzese and Hays 2008b; Hays et al. 2010), network autocorrelation regression models (Dow 2007), or multilevel (hierarchical) regression models (Gelman and Hill 2009). As we are interested in the nature and strength of these connections, we will opt for models including spatially lagged variables instead of spatial error models (Dow 2007; Ward and Gleditsch 2008: 6970). As discussed above, Dataset 2 will consist of observations of regional organization agreements, have a dyadic structure (pairs of agreements), and our dependent variable will be a discrete variable (ranging from 0 to 1) thus allowing us to work with directed dyads (Neumayer and Plmper 2010).

6

Preliminary Results

In order to test our survey instrument, we ran a number of pretests with members of two successive graduate seminars at the University of Gttingen. Students were given specific documents to hand-code using an Excel-based instrument which contained a total of 740 questions about the institutional structure of regional organizations. Each individual document was analyzed by a minimum of two coders in order to gauge inter-coder reliability. We coded a total of 21 individual agreements corresponding to 18 regional organizations across all continents, with the time of ratification ranging from 1960 to 2007. Half of this sample was pre-determined by us, while the other half was randomly drawn from the full list of regional organizations. A list of these documents can be found in Annex 3. While the analysis of the coded documents and the building of both datasets has yet to be completed, there are a number of interesting patterns emerging already. For instance, regional organization agreements only very rarely mention other organizations on which they are (at least partially) modeled. Perhaps this is to be expected from documents that establish a new organization aiming to deliver added value for its members. Yet the extent of this is unexpected: the European Union is not mentioned as an inspiration at all, despite there being a number of organizations in the sample that are clearly inspired by its structures and processes (chief among them the African Union). The United Nations is mentioned as a model by ASEAN and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), even though it does not qualify as a regional organization. Instead of referencing other organizations, documents seem to most commonly draw on previous agreements by similar sets of members states, or previous organizational iterations (such as the Latin American Integration Association of 1980 being based on the earlier Latin American Free Trade Association). Even though regional organizations can in theory have any number of stated goals, in reality these almost always boil down to a triad of economic cooperation, protection differently understood ”rights”, and common security. ”Trade” is mentioned in more than 75% of all 19

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documents, ”rights” in 60% (note this does not necessarily correspond to ”human rights”), and 45% of documents make reference to ”security” as an organizational goal. Without exception, all documents state that economic cooperation is, above all, the main purpose of the agreement. While these results still fit the narrative of ROs as mostly functional tools to realize economic gains, our coding showed that almost 80% of all documents also make reference to norms, principles, and values. In cases such as ASEAN, such principles even take pride of place in the preamble and multiple articles of the document. As a result, ASEAN promotes more than 20 different norms throughout its charter, from solidarity, to sovereign equality, to democracy, to welfare promotion. In contrast, MERCOSUR only explicitly references freedom as a value to be fostered by the organization. In terms of the actual organizational structure, we found that several institutions - such as the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization and IGAD - have organs that are tasked with guiding the organization, but that do not have any legislative or executive functions. Normally, these are organs assembling member states’ heads of state. Similarly, several organizations lack any form of administrative organ or permanent secretariat, among them EFTA and the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). Another design trend are committees or agencies dedicated to specific issue areas that are within the organization’s scope - more than 70% of the analyzed documents included this element. All surveyed organizations have three or fewer issue-area, functional organs; COMESA is a positive outlier with 15 of these sub-agencies. Decision-making, political organs are one of the core features of regional organizations that allow them to set their own course and agenda. The surveyed documents create an average of 1.9 decision-making bodies, meaning ROs often do not have only one policymaking nexus, but instead a somewhat distributed, checks-and-balances system of decision-making. However, irrespective of their competences, all decision-making bodies in our sample operated on consensus, rather than majorities. Lastly, different organs’ competences and their wording were a special focus during this round of coding. The results were extremely varied: MERCOSUR’s main decision-making body has only two specified competences (general policy, and procedural decision), while more complex, and more integrated, institutions such as COMESA can have up to a dozen (among them the re-structuring of organs, the acceptance or suspension of members, and the appointment of a secretariat and other officials). Taken together, no very clear picture emerges from our pretests as to which specific institutional features have seen especially widespread adoption, with the possible exception of issue-area committees. If anything, our coding has shown that the variance between organizations, their institutional design, and the wording and language of the corresponding documents, is far greater than anticipated. Along the same lines, no individual RO seems to 20

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be especially successful in terms of a diffusion of their institutional design. We expect these results to change as more documents are coded and more complex methods applied to our datasets.

21

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26

Annex 1: Sample view of the survey instrument

3. BASIC PRINCIPLES [REFNPV] [REFNPV] [REFNPV] [REFNPV] [REFNPV] [REFNPV] [REFNPV]

3.1 01 02 96 97 98 99

Does the document make any reference to norms, principles, and values? Yes No

[ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV] [ORGNPV]

3.2 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 96 97 98 99

Which norms, principles or values do member states mention as desirable or valuable? Peace Freedom Social justice Political stability and security Sovereign Equality Territorial integrity Political independence Non-interference in the national affairs of other states (for mutual benefit) Mutual respect Mutual recognition of member states Inalienable right to self-determination Rejection of use of force Peaceful settlement of disputes Inviolability of existing border Respect for international law Collective security Solidarity Mutual understanding Economic prosperity Good neighborly relations Good faith Principle of cooperation Economic and social development Promoting welfare Quality of life National and/or regional self-reliance National and regional autonomy National and regional independence Common values Democratic system Respect for human rights and freedoms Inalienable rights of human person Rule of law Minority rights Civilian peace and inter-ethnic accord Political liberties Human dignity Social rights Sovereignty of member states Sovereignty of the people Sovereignty of the nation

[APPNPV] [APPNPV] [APPNPV] [APPNPV] [APPNPV] [APPNPV] [APPNPV] [APPNPV] [APPNPV] [APPNPV]

3.3 01 02 03 04 05 06 96 97 98

Level of applicability To the internal organization of states To interstate relations To ideas or visions of regional order To ideas or visions of world order To other member states of this RO To third states outside of RO

[APPNPV]

99

[INSPIRE] [INSPIRE] [INSPIRE] [INSPIRE] [INSPIRE] [INSPIRE] [INSPIRE]

3.4 01 02 96 97 98 99

Does the document mention any events, trends, or motives that inspired establishment of the treaty? Yes No

[MAINPP] [MAINPP] [MAINPP] [MAINPP] [MAINPP] [MAINPP] [MAINPP] [MAINPP] [MAINPP] [MAINPP] [MAINPP] [MAINPP]

3.5 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 96 97 98 99

According to the document, which is the main purpose of the organization? (Exclusive answer) Economy Security Culture Environment Social Political Management of natural resources

Annex 2: Regional organizations in the dataset Name

Abbreviation Year

Region

African and Malagasy Union

OCAM

1961

Africa

African Economic Community

AEC

1991

Africa

African Union

AU

2001

Africa

Afro-Malagasy Union

AMU

1961

Africa

Arab Maghreb Union

AMU

1989

Africa

Central African Economic and Monetary Community

CEMAC

1999

Africa

Central African Union

CAU

1968

Africa

Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

COMESA

1994

Africa

Community of Sahel-Saharan States

COMESSA

1998

Africa

Council of the Entente

CE

1959

Africa

East African Community

EAC

2000

Africa

Economic Community of Central African States

ECCAS

1981

Africa

Economic Community of Great Lake Countries

CEPGL

1976

Africa

Economic Community of West African States

ECOWAS

1975

Africa

Inter-Governmental Authority on Development

IGAD

1996

Africa

Liptako-Gourma Integrated Authority

LGA

1970

Africa

Mano River Union

MRU

1973

Africa

Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries

OAPEC

1968

Africa

Southern African Customs Union

SACU

1969

Africa

Southern African Development Community

SADC

1992

Africa

West African Economic and Monetary Union

WAEMU

1994

Africa

West African Economic Co-operation

CEAO

1963/73 Africa

West African Monetary Zone

WAMZ

1994

Africa

Central American Integration System

SICA/ CACM

1991

Americas

Central American Parliament

PARLACEN

1991

Americas

Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement

CAFTA-DR

2004

Americas

Alianza Bolivariana para los pueblos de nuestra America

ALBA

2004

Americas

Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization

ACTO

1978

Americas

Andean Community (Andean Pact)

AC

1969

Americas

Association of Caribbean States

ACS

1994

Americas

Caribbean Community

CARICOM

1973

Americas

Central American Democratic Community

CDC

1982

Americas

Central American Integration System

SICA

1991

Americas

Latin American Economic System

LAES/SELA

1975

Americas

Latin American Integration Association

LAIA

1980

Americas

North American Free Trade Agreement

NAFTA

1994

Americas

Organization of American States

OAS

1948

Americas

Organization of Central American States

ODECA

1951

Americas

Organization of Eastern Caribbean States

OECS

1981

Americas

Southern Common Market

MERCOSUR

1991

Americas

Union of South American Nations

UNASUR

2004

Americas

Name

Abbreviation Year

Region

Asia Cooperation Dialogue

ACD

Asia

2002

Asian and Pacific Council

ASPAC

1966

Asia

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

APEC

1989

Asia

Association of South East Asian Nations

ASEAN

1967

Asia

Association of Southeast Asia

ASA

1961

Asia

Commonwealth of Independent States

CIS

1991

Asia

Cooperation Council of Turkic Speaking States

CCTS

2009

Asia

Economic Cooperation Organization

ECO

1985

Asia

Eurasian Economic Community

EurAsEC

2000

Asia

Melanesian Spearhead Group

MSG

1988

Asia

Organization of Central Asian Cooperation

OCAC

1991

Asia

Pacific Islands Forum (Secretariat)

PIF

1971

Asia

Secretariat of the Pacific Community / South Pacific Commission SPC

1947

Asia

Shanghai Cooperation Organization

SCO

1994

Asia

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

SAARC

1985

Asia

Southeast Asian Friendship and Economic Treaty

SEAFET

1957

Asia

Southeast Asian Treaty Organization

SEATO

1954

Asia

Baltic Assembly

BA

1991

Europe

Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference

BSPC

1999

Europe

Benelux Union

BU

1958

Europe

Central European Initiative

CEI

1989

Europe

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

CMEA/COMICON 1949

Europe

Council of Europe

CE

1949

Europe

Council of the Baltic Sea States

CBSS

1992

Europe

European Economic Area

EEA

1994

Europe

European Free Trade Association

EFTA

1960

Europe

European Union

EU

Group of Schengen

1993

Europe

1985

Europe

Nordic Council

NC

1952

Europe

Organization for Democracy and Economic Development

GUAM

2001

Europe

Organization for European Economic Development

OEEC

1948

Europe

Regional Cooperation Council

RCC

2008

Europe

Warsaw Treaty Organization

WTO

1955

Europe

West Nordic Council

WNC

1985

Europe

Western European Union

WEU

1948

Europe

Arab Cooperation Council

ACC

1989

Middle East

Black Sea Economic Cooperation

BSEC

1992

Middle East

Economic Cooperation Organization

ECO/CENTO

1985

Middle East

Gulf Cooperation Council

GCC

1981

Middle East

League of Arab States

LAS

1945

Middle East

African, Carribean and Pacific Group

ACP

1975

Transcontinental

Arctic Council

AC

1996

Transcontinental

Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty

ANZUS

1951

Transcontinental

Name

Abbreviation Year

Region

Colombo Plan

CP

1950

Transcontinental

Council of Arab Economic Unity

CAEU

1957

Transcontinental

Eurasian Economic Union

EAEU/EEU

2015

Transcontinental

Indian Ocean Commission

IOC

1982

Transcontinental

Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation

IOR – ARC

1997

Transcontinental

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO

1949

Transcontinental

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

OSCE

1975

Transcontinental

Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation

BSEC

1992

Transcontinental

Organization of Islamic Conference

OIC

1969

Transcontinental

Union for the Mediterranean

UFM

1995

Transcontinental

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development United Nations United Nations Development Programme World Trade Organization

GATT OECD UN UNDP WTO

1948 1961 1945 1965 1994

International International International International International

Annex 3: Organizations included in the pretest Name

Year

African Union Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization ASEAN Charter CARICOM COMESA Commonwealth of Independent States ECOWAS Revised East African Cooperation Treaty EFTA EU Treaty of Maastricht Gulf Cooperation Council Helsinki Declaration Latin American Integration Association MERCOSUR Nordic Council OECD OSCE Helsinki Declaration Pacific Islands Forum SADC Treaty SADC Revised Treaty UNASUR

2000 1978 2007 1973 1994 1991 1995 1967 1960 1992 1981 1975 1980 1991 1962 1960 1975 2000 1992 2000 2008