The Introduction to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit M. D. Schiller

Paragraph 80: But the goal is necessarily fixed for knowledge as the serial progression; it is the point where knowledge no longer needs to go beyond itself, where knowledge finds itself, where Notion corresponds to object and object to Notion. Hence the progress towards this goal is also unhalting, and short of it no satisfaction is to be found at any of the stations on the way. Whatever is confined within the limits of a natural life cannot by its own efforts go beyond its immediate existence but it is driven beyond it by something else, and this uprooting entails its death. Consciousness, however, is explicitly the Notion of itself. Hence it is something that goes beyond limits, and since these limits are its own, it is something that goes beyond itself. With the positing of a single particular the beyond is also established for consciousness, even if it is only alongside the limited object as in the case of spatial intuition. Thus consciousness suffers this violence at its own hands: it spoils its own limited satisfaction. When consciousness feels this violence, its anxiety may well make it retreat from the truth, and strive to hold on to what it is in danger of losing. But it can find no peace. If it wishes to remain in a state of unthinking inertia, then thought troubles its thoughtlessness, and its own unrest disturbs it inertia. Or, if it entrenches itself in sentimentality, which assures us that it finds everything to be good in its kind, then this assurance likewise suffers violence at the hands of Reason, for precisely in so far as something is merely a kind, Reason finds it not to be good. Or, again, its fear of the truth may lead consciousness to hide, from itself and others, behind the pretension that its burning zeal for truth makes it difficult or even impossible to find any other truth but the unique truth of vanity – that of being at any rate cleverer than any thoughts that one gets by oneself or from others. The conceit which understands how to belittle every truth, in order to turn back into itself and gloat over its own understanding, which knows how to dissolve every thought and always find the same barren Ego instead of any content – this is a satisfaction which we must leave to itself, for it flees from the universal, and seeks only to be for itself. [Hegel, G. W. F. (1977). Phenomenology of spirit (AV Miller, Trans.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.]

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Textual Analysis of the Introduction to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit

Unlike the Preface to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, the introduction was written prior to the writing of the body of the text, and is less of a stand-alone work or a coda best read last, but more a metacognitive elucidation of the thesis (though Hegel may cringe at the use of that word) that permeates the text. After providing a polemical treatment of his predecessors and their supposed ‘false starts’, a large part of the introduction concerns the dialectical method that is so central to his philosophy. Hegel addresses the paradoxical nature of the task of trying to evaluate one’s ability to know the Absolute, without first having a set of criteria that is superior to one’s current knowledge of the Absolute. His novel solution is that the criteria must come from within consciousness itself, not externally, and that we may simply look on shrewdly at its quest. The persona of the introduction is very clearly an objective (once again, Hegel cringes) third-person Hegel, foretelling to the reader the inevitable fate of the yet unleashed voice of the natural consciousness, and providing them with a bird’s eye insight with which to knowingly view its upcoming journey.

Paragraph 80 represents a pivotal stage, where, among other things, the goal of consciousness’ dialectic is revealed, and obstacles to its realisation are highlighted. Here, Hegel provides meaning and direction to the dialectical approach, and foreshadows the end-point of the Phenomenology, and it can in this way be viewed as the climactic point of the introduction.

This paragraph comes after Hegel’s outlining of what he believes to be the true nature of philosophical scepticism. Namely, he proposes that it is not like doubt, in that it is not a negative activity, nor is it piecemeal enterprise. Rather, such negative scepticism is merely an unavoidable transient stage, which consciousness may find itself deluded into accepting as an end in itself. But true scepticism is ultimately positive and productive, finding transcendence to a “new form” via necessary contradictions between each a form and its negation – the characteristic M. D. Schiller (3187221)

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Textual Analysis of the Introduction to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit

movement of the dialectical method. Hegel appears to shift between talking about this method in a general sense, and in the specific sense that concerns the Phenomenology – movement between shapes of consciousness.

It is with the above freshly pronounced that Hegel begins paragraph 80, explicitly telling the reader the inevitable and ultimate end-point of natural consciousness’ journey, namely “where Notion corresponds to object and object to Notion”. This is the final synthesis of the dialectical process, beyond which no further transcendence is necessary, nor even possible. It is, if you like, a kind of ‘end of history’ for consciousness and knowledge. However, simply talking of the mutual adequacy of object and Notion in those terms does not fully capture the magnitude of this goal, and it is tempting to try to talk of it almost from consciousness’

perspective,

despite

the

fact

that

the

epiphany

paradoxically overcomes any such perspective in a sense. That is, consciousness will come to fully relate to an object as a distinct entity apart from itself, and yet instantly appreciate that the object is simply a reflection of itself. This distinction is what Hegel later discusses as ‘being-for-another’ and ‘being-in-itself’.

It could be argued that Hegel possibly does not provide a satisfactory technical reason why the dialectical process does not continue ad infinitum, never reaching an untranscendable position, and with consciousness being trapped as an eternal traveller on a never-ending path of despair. In some ways, the apparent weakness of Hegel’s assumption of finitude is semi-analogous to that of the cosmological argument. At this stage of the text, it is as if the reader is simply expected to trust that Hegel knows something that we cannot know until we have experienced consciousness’ journey.

Hegel goes on to talk of the progress toward the aforementioned goal as “unhalting”. It is if, once consciousness is swept out of complacency by M. D. Schiller (3187221)

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Textual Analysis of the Introduction to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit

a seed of knowledge, it becomes caught up in a snowball effect. Each layer of snow is greater than that on which it was formed, it also covers that preceding layer into obscurity, and it adds momentum in the process. However, one of the (many) inadequacies of this analogy is that, although gravity is a good representation of the dialectical force or consciousness’ thirst, it does not capture the central idea of ascent to a higher plane.

From the perspective of consciousness, the reason it does not stop because there is “no satisfaction is to be found at any of the stations along the way”. Once perturbed from blissful ignorance, consciousness can find no confort at any stage in its journey, as once it properly explores each form of itself, it will always find negation before it inadvertently finds transcendence. In everyday life, it is not pleasant to have our underlying assumptions of the world questioned – this is why parents put off telling their children the truth about Santa Claus, or why religion is not considered suitable dinner-table conversation. Consciousness is similarly not partial to having the proverbial rug swept out from underneath its feet, and losing the whole framework with which it once naively made sense of the world – not once, but continually! Furthermore, consciousness is nobody’s victim, as it suffers the rigour of the dialectical method “at its own hand”, and in doing so “spoils its own limited satisfaction”. For as Hegel expresses best at a latter stage of the introduction (paragraph 84), it “provides its own criterion from within itself”. This is arguably the central stroke of genius in Hegel’s method, allowing him to bring consciousness to his way of thinking without imposing on it or begging the question, as its movement is totally of it own doing, with each step being seen as necessary to the impartial observer.

It is curious to note that Hegel shifts from talking of ‘no satisfaction’ to ‘limited satisfaction’ when referring to the unquestioning state of naivety or retreat from dialectical movement. This may appear to be a triviality, M. D. Schiller (3187221)

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Textual Analysis of the Introduction to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit

but one may consider its importance from the perspective of the natural consciousness. What Hegel does not fully explore is why consciousness, assuming that it is totally unaware of the fact that it will eventually arrive at a rewarding end-point (of absolute knowing), does not give up and knowingly find content in ignorance if there is at least some to be found (this in part harks back to the question of finitude). For surely the only reason that satisfaction is not found at any one station is because, as a whole, each station involves an uncomfortable negation and state of purgatory, which could alternatively simply not be sought. In other words, it seems that Hegel presupposes that each station will be transcended when he posits that it will not bring satisfaction.

Hegel foreshadows this theme to a degree, and goes on to talk of a natural response of consciousness to its fate, namely to “retreat from the truth, and strive to hold on to what it is in danger of losing”, a position that he holds to be unsustainable and ultimately unfruitful. That is because, according to Hegel, consciousness has but three options in this regard – ignorance, sentimentality, or vanity. The former is unsustainable because natural consciousness is actively tricking itself, and its thoughts will eventually get the better of it. It will need to be actively thinking about not thinking, which disturbs its peace and renders it restless. As Hegel succinctly puts it: “thought troubles its thoughtlessness”. Sentimentality involves trying to find the merits of a naïve system of thought despite, or in spite of, its inadequacy. Hegel finds that consciousness’ reason will prevent such a retreat from having value, essentially because sentiment is the antithesis of reason. This relies on reason ultimately overcoming sentiment, that is, that reason in this case becomes the niggling voice that prohibits consciousness from rest. It reflects Hegel’s Kantian partiality, or bias, to reason as the almost self-evident cornerstone of philosophy. Finally, Hegel proceeds to expound on the pitfalls of seeking refuge from the dialectical quest in a self-important and self-indulgent manner. That is, to stop and rest on one’s laurels and to adopt a smug contentment on account of that very M. D. Schiller (3187221)

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Textual Analysis of the Introduction to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit

fact. It would be to suppose that one had found an answer and that it was to not try to seek further answers. This is a self-sustaining exercise if one is under the illusion (as Hegel would put it) that one is gaining anything of worth each time a cycle of dismissal and self-contentment occurs. It builds a false sense of meaning around the self rather than striving for universal satisfaction, and is dangerously impenetrable to change.

In continuing the previous line of criticism, it could be argued that Hegel

does

not

satisfactorily

or

convincingly

demonstrate

the

unsustainability of ‘retreating’ from the dialectic. Presumably, most people are in such a state of retreat on most issues, so is he discounting the existence of the vast majority as meaningless? Indeed, does he arrogantly suppose that he is the only individual whose life has any ultimate meaning, as presumably he is the only one who has completed the journey that he is about to take us through? Furthermore, retreat is perhaps not a helpful word in this case, as it implies prior engagement with the matter at hand, which could be avoided in the first instance. But perhaps Hegel would concede that this sustained ignorance is possible, or even most likely, but is simply not an issue for the particular persevering natural consciousness who is his protagonist, with its “burning zeal for truth”. It seems that the question of how much meaning is to be found in a limited naïve existence is not of pertinence to Hegel, as it is eclipsed by the absolute knowledge that he has discovered.

The remaining paragraphs of the introduction provide little more unique import that is not an extension of the themes already discussed. In particular, Hegel expounds upon exactly how consciousness provides its own criteria for assessing its own knowing. He points to our privilege as observers of the natural consciousness, explaining how consciousness will not be aware of its own transformation until it has reached its endpoint, whereas we will be knowingly grinning the whole way. M. D. Schiller (3187221)

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