The Role of Causal Uncertainty in On-line vs. Memory-based Judgments Ryan P. Brunner & Gifford Weary The Ohio State University
Abstract Past research has found that causally uncertain (CU) individuals are highly motivated to process social information (Weary & Edwards, 1996). Initial work indicates that individuals high in CU process information in an on-line fashion. The evidence for on-line processing, however, suggests unique processing consequences associated with chronic concerns for causal understanding. The current study seeks to further assess these processing consequences through the manipulation of task instructions and the inclusion of a more sophisticated measure of attention allocation. It was found that only individuals high in CU who received impression instructions formed on-line judgments. Moreover, the attention allocation measure shed light on the differential processing of information as a function of CU and task instruction.
Introduction • Causal uncertainty (CU) is the uncomfortable feeling or belief that one does not understand the causes and effects of the social world. • Activation of CU leads to the adoption of accuracy goals designed to reduce feelings of uncertainty (Weary & Edwards, 1994; 1996).
• These subjective-accuracy goals can lead to an evenhanded information processing strategy when evaluating stereotype-relevant information (Tobin, Weary, Han, Brunner, & Jacobson, 2003).
• This even-handed processing strategy can also lead to superior recall for causally-relevant behavioral information typically difficult to recall (i.e., the middle items in a list of behaviors)
(Brunner & Weary, 2004).
Introduction (cont.) • On-line judgments occur when perceivers form an impression of a target at the time they initially process and encode target-relevant behaviors while memorybased judgments are rendered only at the time when judgment is required. (Hastie & Park, 1986; McConnell, 2001). • On-line judgments are associated with greater overall recall of target behaviors and the absence of illusorycorrelations. Although also typically associated with primacy in serial recall, initial work suggests that this may depend on the processing goal associated with the impression formation task. • The current study seeks to test the interaction between manipulated task instructions and goals associated with chronic causal uncertainty concerns.
Method • The current study utilized an illusory correlation paradigm (e.g., McConnell, 2001; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996). • One hundred forty-eight participants were asked to read a series of behaviors regarding two target individuals. • Participants were instructed to either form an immediate impression of the individuals or to focus on the complexity of the presented sentences. • Thirty-six total behaviors were presented, with 24 behaviors describing the majority target (Jim) and 12 behaviors describing the minority target (Bob). • Half of the behaviors for each target were negative and half were positive.
Method (cont.) • During the presentation of behaviors, a tone sounded at specified intervals to assess attention allocation to behavior statements (Plaks, Stroessner, Dweck, & Sherman, 2001). • Following the presentation of behaviors, participants were asked to recall as many behaviors as possible. • They then were asked to estimate the number of undesirable behaviors performed by each target and rate the desirability of each target (i.e., illusory correlation measures).
• All participants then completed the Causal Uncertainty Scale (Weary & Edwards, 1994) and Causal Importance Scale (Weary, Jacobson, Edwards, & Tobin, 2001).
Results Total Number of Behaviors Recalled
Number of Behaviors Recalled
Causal Uncertainty X Task Instruction interaction 8 7.5 7 6.5 6 5.5 5
7.478
5.847 5.738
Low CU
5.821
High CU
(ß=.441, p=.076, N = 148)
Impression instructions Memory instructions
Results Serial Position of Recall
Serial Position of Recall
Impression condition
Memory condition
3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1
High CU Low CU
First 12
Middle 12
Last 12
Behavior Position
Recall of Middle Behaviors as a Function of CU: (ß=.473, p=.009, N = 148)
Number of Behaviors Recalled
Number of Behaviors Recalled
CU x Instruction x Serial Position Interaction
3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1
High CU Low CU
First 12
Middle 12
Last 12
Behavior Position
Recall of Middle Behaviors as a Function of CU: (ß=.018, p=.922, N = 148)
Results Reaction Time to Tones
Reaction Time to Tones
Impression condition
Memory condition
400 350
High CU Low CU
300 250 First 12
Middle 12
Last 12
Behavior Position
Recall of Middle Behaviors as a Function of CU: (ß= 18.922, p=.068, N = 148)
Higher RTs = Greater Attention
Higher RTs = Greater Attention
CU x Instruction x Tone Reaction Time Interaction
400 350
High CU Low CU
300 250 First 12
Middle 12
Last 12
Behavior Position
Recall of Middle Behaviors as a Function of CU: (ß=-5.673, p=.595, N = 148)
Conclusions • Indicative of on-line processing, individuals high in CU who had received impression task instructions recalled a greater number of target-relevant behaviors relative to all other groups. • As in previous work, individuals high in CU showed significantly higher recall for behavioral items appearing in the middle of the behavioral list. This again was dependent upon receiving impression task instructions. • Reaction times for the attention allocation measure mirrored the serial recall effects; individuals high in CU who received impression task instructions paid more attention to items appearing in the middle of the behavior list relative to other groups.
Implications • Based on recall and reaction time measures, it appears that high levels of CU are associated with a unique variation of on-line processing of information. • The results also indicate that although the effects of chronic CU may be wiped out by memory-based task instructions, on-line task instructions do not override the chronic goal of achieving accurate causal understanding. • As a result of the accuracy motivations associated with causal uncertainty, it seems that individuals high in CU engage in continuous on-line processing that takes into account all available information relatively equally. • Thus, even though on-line processing is typically associated with a strong bias towards initial information, individuals high in CU appear to be strongly motivated to take into account all information that may aid in their goal of achieving accurate causal understanding.
References Brunner, R.P., & Weary, G. (2004). Causal uncertainty and consequences for social judgment of individuals. Masters thesis, The Ohio State University. Hamilton, D.L., & Sherman, S.J. (1996). Perceiving individuals and groups. Psychological Review, 103, 336-355. Hastie, R., & Park, B. (1986). The relationship between memory and judgment depends on whether the judgment task is memory-based or on-line. Psychological Review, 93, 258-268. Levy, S.R., Stroessner, S.J., & Dweck, C.S. (1998). Stereotype formation and endorsement: The role of implicit theories. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1421-1436. McConnell, A.R. (2001). Implicit theories: Consequences for social judgment of individuals. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37, 215-227. Plaks, J. E., Stroessner, S. J., Dweck, C. S., & Sherman, J. W. (2001). Person theories and attention allocation: Preferences for stereotypic versus counterstereotypic information. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 876-893. Tobin, S.J., Weary, G., Han, H.A., Brunner, R.P., & Jacobson, J. (2003). Chronic causal uncertainty beliefs and stereotype usage revisited: Individual differences in the attention to and use of social information, Manuscript under review. Weary, G. & Edwards, J. A. (1994). Individual differences in causal uncertainty. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 308-318. Weary, G., & Edwards, J.A. (1996). Causal uncertainty and related goal structures. In R.M. Sorrention and E.T. Higgins (Eds.), The handbook of motivation and cognition (Vol. 3): The interpersonal context. (pp. 148-181). New York: Guilford. Weary, G., Jacobson, J., Edwards, J., & Tobin, S. (2001). Chronic and temporarily activated beliefs and stereotype usage. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 206-219.
