The Scope of Evidence in Small Clauses Keir Moulton McGill University TOM 4 — 9 April 2011

1 Two Puzzles about small clauses: Scope and Evidence Scope: Williams (1983), as one of his arguments against analyzing the complement in (1a) as a Stowellian small clause, showed that raised small clause subjects (SCSs) can’t take narrow scope with respect to the predicate that embeds the small clause. Subjects raised from infinitives, on the other hand, can (1b).1 (1)

Given the fact that a seat is empty in our otherwise completely full classroom. . . a. Someone seems sick. someone  seem; *seem  someone b. Someone seems to be sick. someone  seem; seem  someone (Williams 1983, 293:(40a))

Evidence: The small clause gives rise to slightly different conditions on the evidence involved in a seem-report than an infinitive. (2)

The Absent Squire I walked into the squire’s room when he wasn’t there. I saw medicine bottles, kleenexes, and smelled a foul, sickly stench. a. The squire seemed to be sick. b. #The squire seemed sick. (Matushansky 2002, 225:(14))

Connection between the scope facts and the evidentiality effect? 1 Two

notions: (i) the scope of the quantifier and (ii) what world the descriptive content of the DP is evaluated at. e.g. transparent vs. opaque (Fodor 1970). Right now we’re just asking about the scope of ∃ with respect to seem. We’ll collapse wide with transparent and narrow with opaque.

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1.1 Two Possible Answers to the Scope/Evidentiality Connection Possibility #1: Small Clauses don’t exist! The SCS is an argument of seem • this will give the SCS wide scope (with certain assumptions) • this will allow us to state how the SCS is/provides the evidence for the complement proposition. Compare to Copy Raising Constructions, which show similar Scopal and Evidential properties (Asudeh and Toivonen 2010): The Puzzle of the Absent Cook (3)

A and B walk into Toms kitchen. Tom is at the stove doing something, but exactly what is a little unclear. a. Tom seems to be cooking pasta. b. It seems that Tom is cooking pasta. c. Tom seems like he’s cooking pasta. (Asudeh and Toivonen 2010 (27))

(4)

A and B walk into Toms kitchen. Theres no sign of Tom, but there are various things bubbling away on the stove and there are several ingredients on the counter, apparently waiting to be used. a. Tom seems to be cooking pasta. b. It seems that Tom is cooking pasta. c. #Tom seems like he’s cooking pasta. (Asudeh and Toivonen 2010 (27))

Asudeh and Toivonen (2010) call the matrix subject a Perceptual Source argument and take it to be an argumnet of the copy raising verb.2 Like SCS, CR subjects constructions do not allow narrow scope Lappin (1984), Potsdam and Runner (2001) No runner seemed like she was exhausted. No runner seemed to be exhausted. (Asudeh and Toivonen 2010)

no  seem; *seem  no no  seem; seem  no

(5)

a. b.

(6)

Someone seems like he’s sick. someone  seem; *seem  someone

And the evidential facts look the same, of course. (7)

The Absent Squire (again) a. #The squire seems like he’s sick. b. #The squire seems sick. c. The squire seems to be sick/it seems that the squire is sick.

2 Landau

(2009) qualifies this: he claims the matrix subject is the Source argument only if there is no pronominal copy. (i)

Tom seemed/looked like Mary has said something awful. (Tom myst be P source)

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Keir Moulton Possibility #2. The evidence effects are epiphenomenal • wide scope of SCS gives the illusion that the SCS is an argument of seem

• seem has a silent situation argument that provides the “evidence argument”; nonrecosntructed DPs like to be evaluated as being “in” these situations. (This is a first attempt at trying out Jon’s suggestion for the evidentiality requirement.) Possibility #1 is wrong because there are certain circumstances where a narrow scope interpretation for a SCS is available. (8) is an example. (8)

At least three more papers on reconstruction seem unnecessary.

And here the evidentiality effect seems to go disappear (there are no papers!) So the Source argument idea can’t be right. But then why the scope and evidence effect in the other examples?

1.2 In this workshop talk I will address. . . • SCOPE: What narrow SCSs tell us about small causes • EVIDENCE: Some speculative evidence about the truth of Possibility #2 • SCOPE AND EVIDENCE: Wild speculations about the reason for Possibility #2

2 Scope in Small Clauses We should verify that there is indeed is contrast between (1a) and the sentences where scope diminishment/lowering/reconstruction is possible. We can get more reliable judgments about the relative scope of a raised subject and seem with a numeral indefinite as in (9).3 (9)

Last weekend we were walking through the woods and encountered a sleeping bear. But it was so large we mistook things. a. Two bears seemed asleep. 2  seem; *seem  2 b. Two bears seemed to be asleep. 2  seem; seem  2

Wide: There are two bears and given the available evidence those bears are asleep. Narrow: Given the available evidence, there are two bears asleep. 3 There

is a worry about (1a) because the epistemic nature of someone (Strawson 1974) confounds the issue somewhat in judging its scope relative to epistemic seem. (Note: We are limited to asking about the scope of indefinites, because it is only these that we believe undergo A-movement reconstruction in the first place (Boeckx 2001).)

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2.1 The News! Narrow readings are possible Narrow scope interpretations for SCSs appear to be available when the embedded predicate is a modal adjective. Consider (10). (10)

a. b.

She considers a new fridge unnecessary. unnecessary  a new fridge; a new fridge  unnecessary A stove seems to me much more necessary. necessary  a stove; a stove  necessary

I can use (10b) to convey that what seems to me is that in all worlds that satisfy some needs, there is a stove—but not necessarily the same stove across those possible worlds where those needs are satisfied. This is certainly not an interpretation we would expect if the SCS had to take wide scope with respect to seem and consider. A range of indefinites, including existentially interpreted some and at least NPs, allow readings that put them in the scope of the modal adjective in the small clause. (11)

a. b. c. d.

Sm policemen seemed necessary. seem  necessary  sm At least two more Green Party senators seem necessary. seem  necessary  2 Someone from France appeared likely to win. appear  likely  ∃ Five police officers seemed to us required by the regulations governing street parties. seem  require  5

In virtue of being interpreted narrowly with respect to the embedded predicate, these SCS are interpreted narrowly with respect to the embedding predicate.

• The puzzle: Why can SCSs take narrow scope below seem in (10) and (11), but not in the original Williams cases, (9) and (1a)?

• Proposal: Narrow scope can only be achieved if the small clause contains a scopebearing predicate that itself can put indefinites in its scope.

• A slogan: Modal adjectives in small clauses “smuggle” indefinite SCS into the scope of the embedding verb.

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I.e. the difference devolves to the difference between the adjectives: only those in the latter cases interact scopally with indefinites. (12)

a. b.

A student is sick. A student is necessary ≈ What’s necessary is some student or other

What gives the subject in (12b) narrow scope is the particular way that modal adjectives modally embed indefinite DPs unlike adjectives like sick, on the other hand, which describe properties of individuals, as usual.

2.2 Solution: modal adjectives and property-type interpretations What’s special it about necessary and it’s ilk? Comparion to intensional transitive verbs: (13)

a. b.

I want a new fridge. A new fridge is necessary.

Intensional transitive verbs (ITVs) allow only those noun phrases with property-type interpretations to fall in their scope. Indefinites, for instance, can, e.g. Matt looked for a table. On the other hand, quantificational expressions like most-NP (which don’t have property denotations (Partee 1986)) cannot scope under intensional look for as in (14) (Zimmermann 1992). Some particularly clear examples constructed by Schwarz (2006) are cited below. (14)

Context: Matt needs to have change on hand for the conference Matt is looking for most of the small bills that were in the cash box. a. for most bills x: Matt is looking for x. b. *in all worlds where Matt’s search is successful, he has most of the bills. (Schwarz 2006(16))

Some other intensional transitive verbs, like the active form of need, can put most-NPs in their scope: (15)

Context: Matt needs to have change on hand for the conference Matt needs most of the small bills that were in the cash box. a. for most bills x: Matt needs x. b. in all worlds where Matt’s needs are met, he has most of the bills. (Schwarz 2006(15))

Modal adjectives like necessary pattern like look for and not like need (surprisingly) in this respect: (16)

Context: We need to have change on hand for the conference Most of the small bills that were in the cash box are necessary. a. for most bills x: x are necessary. b. *in all worlds where our needs are met, we have most of the bills. 5

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As with ITVs, (16) motivates (17) as a denotation for necessary: property type argument with modal embedding (see Van Geenhoven and McNally 2005).4 (17)

J necessary K = λPe,st .λw.∀w’∈ Nec(w) [∃x [P(x)(w’)]] where Nec(w) = {w’ : w’ is compatible with what’s necessary in w}

(18)

a. b.

2.2.1

A fridge (is) necessary. ∀w’ ∈ Nec(w0 ) [∃x [fridge(x)(w’)]]

Further evidence for a property analysis: presupposition

Here we add a second argument for treating modal adjectives as property-taking. It’s been suggested that some—and maybe all—ITVs may actually take abstract clausal complements, not properties (Larson, Den Dikken, and Ludlow 1997).5 The claim is that there is a hidden clausal complement for ITVs such as need, which means something roughly like to have. Maria needs a roll of film ≈ Maria needs to have a roll of film.

(19)

Schwarz (2006) discovered a diagnostic using presupposition to detect these such a hidden clause. The particle too introduces presuppositions. When the clausal complement of need is overt, as in (20), too can attach “high”, presupposing that Maria needs to have something besides a roll of film. Or it may attach “low”, to the embedded clause, implying that Maria has something in addition to a roll of film. (20)

Maria needs to have a roll of film too.

If ITV need embeds a constituent with a meaning like the overt complement in (20), then too ought to target this. And this is exactly what Schwarz finds. Schwarz sets up the scenario in (21) that promotes the “low” attachment because the “high” attachment is unsupported. (21)

While rummaging around the attic, Maria found her Dad’s old camera. When she told him, he asked her to take pictures with it at the party he was about to throw. Maria really didn’t need it, since she had a nice new digital camera, but she didn’t want to be impolite, so she promised him that she would take some pictures with his camera. (Schwarz 2006(9))

(22)

Now she needs [a roll of FILM for the camera]F too before the party starts.

4 Clause-taking necessary (It is necessary that there be a fridge) must simply have a different denotation, taking propositions. Attributive necessary will have to be different too:

(i)

a. b.

A new car is a necessary investment. ?At least one new fridge seems like a necessary investment.

The attributive use raises a number of really hard questions, as Bernhard Schwarz has pointed out. 5 Since there is A-movement in (16), it could be argued that we haven’t shown that necessary takes properties; rather we may have shown that (short) A-moved most-NPs do not reconstruct into their base position.

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low attachment of too presupposes: she has something else apart from the film. (true) high attachment of too presupposes: she needs something else apart from the film (false) (Schwarz 2006(10))

Turning to modal adjectives like necessary, we see the opposite holds. Given the same scenario, the only presupposition too can trigger in (23) is an unsupported one.6 (23)

#Now [a roll of FILM for the camera]F is necessary too before the party starts. a. low attachment of too presupposes: we have something else apart from the film. (true) b. high attachment of too presupposes: what’s necessary is something else apart from the film (false)

Compare with an overt clausal complement with necessary: (24)

Now [a roll of FILM for the camera]F is necessary to have too before the party starts.

Modal adjectives take property-type indefinites.

2.3 The Solution So why does this fact about modal adjectives allow them to smuggle SCSs into their scope, when garden variety adjectives like sick cannot? (25)

a. b.

At least one student seemed necessary. At least one student seemed sick.

The quantificational force of indefinites can be introduced higher in the clause, separate from the NP restrictor (Heim 1982) (and it may be generally true that all quantificational expressions are “split” in this way (Beghelli and Stowell 1997) (26)

[ ∃ . . . [VP . . . [ . . . NP . . . ]]]

Sportiche (2005, p. 56–57): the lack of narrow scope for SCSs in the general case to the absence of quantificational heads like ∃ in SCs. What gives rise to narrow scope in ((11)) is the fact that predicates like necessary and likely are themselves a source of existential quantification. Without such predicates, i.e. with a garden-variety extensional predicate like sick as in (??), there’s no other source for quantification in SCs. 6 Of

course, the syntactic location of too would have to modify a constituent from which the subject has raised. In principle this should be available. This is shown in the case where the complement of necessary is an overt, full clause.

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Cashing it out

#1 indefinites denote properties.7 – indefinites combine with adjectives like sick via (intensional) predicate modification (viz. Chung and Ladusaw 2004) #2 A functional head ∃ is responsible for existential closure (27)

J∃K = λPe,st .λw.∃x[P(x)(w)]

#3 Small clauses lack ∃ (by hypothesis) #4 seem takes propositions (glossing over entirely the kinds of worlds seem makes accessible). (28)

J seem K = λp.λw.∀w’ ∈ seem(w) [p(w’)]

Computing three cases: Infinitival complements are large enough to house ∃; deriving narrow scope existentials is routine. (29)

Infinitival complements (∃ available) a. A student seems to be sick. b. LF: [seems [TP ∃ [ a student sick ]]] = [ seems [ λw.∃x [student(x)(w) & sick(x)(w) ]]]

A type clash arises for SC complements with a property-type indefinite: the SC denotes a property but seem takes a proposition. (30)

Small clause complements a. A student seems sick b. *LF: [ seems [SC a student sick ]] = [ seems [ λx.λw.student(x)(w) & sick(x)(w) ]]

There are two options for SCS. One involves movement of SCS, leaving an individual type trace. This gives seems its propositional complement. The property-type indefinite then composes via predicate intersection in the matrix clause (movement having created a predicate-abstract). The matrix clause houses the closure, but this necessitates a wide scope transparent indefinite SCS, just as Williams found. (31)

Small clause complements with movement of SCS a. A student seems sick

7 In

principle, there are many technologies that will serve to cash out the account I offer (e.g. unselective binding (Heim 1982), alternatives/Hamblin semantics for indefinites (Kratzer 2005, Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002)).

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LF: [ ∃ [ studenti [ seems [SC ti sick ]]]] = λw.∃x [ student(x)(w) & seems [ λw’.sick(x)(w’)]]

Just the case where there’s a property-taking predicate like necessary in the SC, the SCS can be interpreted low and seem nonetheless gets a proposition. Moreover, we get the right meaning: it puts the indefinite in the scope of necessary and therefore in the scope of the embedding predicate. (32)

a. b.

A fridge seems necessary. LF: [ seems [ necessary [a fridge]]] = [ seem [SC a fridge necessary ]] = [ seem [ λw.∀w’ ∈ Nec(w) [∃x[fridge(x)(w’)]]]]

The LF in (32) assumes syntactic reconstruction for the SCS, but that’s not crucial. We could have left a property-type trace.

2.4 Further Issues related to scope in Small Clauses 2.4.1

Overtly low indefinites: ∃ in PPs?

SCs must allow ∃ in certain places; e.g. to handle the objects of prepositions, which can be construed as narrow scope existentials. (33) 2.4.2

Mary seems in love with a hat like mine. Distinguishing among embedded predicates

Examples like (34) may appear at first glance to be counter-examples to the generalization that only modal adjectives are able to “smuggle” indefinites into SCs. The following SCs don’t contain modal adjectives, but the indefinites appear not to receive straightforward wide-scope existential interpretations. (34)

a. b. c.

A new car seems expensive. A fridge seems expensive. A Mercedes seems unwarranted.

Generic reading of indefinite? Available without seems (35)

a. b. c.

A new car is expensive. A fridge is expensive. A mercedes is unwarranted.

Note that at least doesn’t work as well with a generic interpretation: (36)

a. ?At least one new car is (usually) expensive. b. ?At least one new car seems expensive.

(37)

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How to tell the relative scope of the Gen operator and seem? Some possible paraphrases: (38) (38) (38) (38)

A new fridge seems expensive: 6≈ It seems that there is a new fridge and it is expensive. ?≈ It seems that GENx: x a new fridge, x is expensive. ?≈ GENx: a new fridge x. It seems that x is expensive.

How can we tell? 2.4.3 Bare Plurals and Small Clauses An often-cited fact about small clauses is that bare plural (BP) SCSs are limited in their interpretation. Heycock (1995) claims that bare plural SCSs cannot be interpreted existentially, but rather must be interpreted generically (her terms): (39)

a. b.

Firemen seem available. Firemen seem to be available.

(Heycock 1995, 234:(39a))

There are two factors to untangle here: (i) whether a BP SCS is interpreted existentially or generically and (ii) whether, in each case, it is scopally interpreted within the SC or outside of it. The following examples surely are wide-scope existential bare plural SCSs: (40)

a. b. c.

Children in the next room seem sick right now. They all look feverish. Sm fireman appear upset with their poles. Sm guy with a drink seems unhappy talking to Lou-Anne.

The question which we ought to ask is whether a BP SCS can be interpreted existentially and yet narrow with respect to seem. It seems that bare plurals can only receive a narrow scope existential interpretation with modal adjectives in the SC, not regular old (S)-level predicates. (41)

a. b.

Camping stoves seem necessary ≈ given the evidence, what’s necessary are sm camping stoves. Camping stoves seem on sale. 6≈ given the evidence, sm camping stoves are on sale.

3 Evidence again Recall that small clauses differed from infinitives (under seem and appear) along some dimension related to evidentiality. (42)

The Absent Squire I walked into the squire’s room when he wasn’t there. I saw medicine bottles, kleenexes, and smelled a foul, sickly stench. a. The squire seemed/appeared to be sick. b. #The squire seemed/appeared sick. (Matushansky 2002, 225:(14)) 10

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Keir Moulton Another, for fun. (43)

a. He seems Canadian, but all the evidence suggests he’s American. b. #He seems to be Canadian, but all the evidence suggests the he’s American.

Infinitive → Canadian = nationality Small Clause → Canadian = outward characteristics (dialect, politeness, snowmobile . . .) Our options now... • One option we might have pursued (Possible Answer #1) is that the SCS is an argument of seem/appear and thus there are constraints on it—it must be the Source of the evidence for the epistemic claim (just as Asudeh and Toivonen (2010) say for copy raising subjects He seems like he’s sick). • But! It can’t be the case (at least, without additional assumptions) that the SCS is an argument of seem/appear—because then we wouldn’t get our scope facts. (44)

A new fridge seems necessary.

• the SCS takes low scope, and it certainly is not the evidence that we need a new fridge! There is no new fridge yet! • What if the evidential effect is a result of DPs scoping high...an epiphenomenon8

3.1 The nature of the evidential effect From Willett’s (1988) survey of languages with evidential marking: (45)

Types of Evidence (Willett 1988, 75)

Indirect

Direct Attested

Reported

In f erring

Visual Auditory Othersensory

2ndHand 3rdHand Folklore

Results Reasoning

8 This

has always been my—and maybe many other’s suspicion—since one even detects a shade of meaning difference in infinitive construction with universal quantifiers–even though we shouldn’t really be able to tell apart the difference between seem  ∀ and ∀  seem: (i)

Everyone seems sick today.

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3.2 Not a ‘directness’ requirement Surveying the types of evidentiality markers there are and what they signal, we might speculate there’s something Directness implicated in small clauses. But! There is no “directness” requirement on the SCS, at least in the sense that you have to see the SCS or directly perceive it: e.g. the evidence can be given “second hand”. (cf. Grimm 2010, who examines the difference between infinitival and finite complements of raising verbs.) (46)

Phone conversation between A and B: A: Yeah, my cat has watery eyes and is grumpy. B: He seems sick.

(47)

Ane exchange on Car Talk: Caller: The engine goes grrrrrr and vrooom. Tom or Ray: The car seems over heated.

Conclusion: (direct) perception of the SCS is not necessary. A pair: (48)

John writes me letters saying how lonely he is and that he doesn’t like it in Georgia. a. John seems depressed. b. John seems to be depressed. c. John must be depressed.

(49)

John writes me letters once a week. Lately they’ve become less frequent. Last time this happened, it was because he was depressed. a. #He seems depressed again. b. He seems to be depressed again. c. He must be depressed again.

Speculation: the SCS must be the source of evidence. The mystery: In (49), of course, John and his behaviours contribute to facts that are used to come to a conclusion, but that appears not to be enough! (Reminiscent of the circumstantial vs. epistemic distinction in Kratzer (1991)’s Hydrangeas?)

3.2.1

Non perceived things still must be directly part of the evidence

This makes sense of lots of non-perceptual things—even here we get a contrast, though: (50)

a. b. c.

The law seems unfair. #My reason for saying this: It was struck down by the supreme court. The law seems to be unfair. ? My reason for saying this”It was struck down by the Supreme Court. It seems that the law is unfair. My reason for saying this is that it was struck down by the supreme court. 12

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In some cases, SCS can’t be the source of the evidence for some conclusion for pragmatic reasons: the presence of a bike can’t be evidence that it is not present. (51)

The Missing Bike I walk out to the bike stand and can’t see my bike anywhere a. #My bike seems missing. b. My bike seems to be missing.

3.3 If evidentiality is a result of Scope. . . We expect that even subjects raised from infinitives will show the epistemic effect, as long as they’re interpreted high. Force a high reading with a Condition C effect: Fox/Romero cases: (52)

a. b.

*Another paper of Quinei ’s seems to himi to be needed. bad on the seem  ∃ interpretation This paper of Quinei ’s seems to himi to be flawed. (after (Fox 1999) and Fox’s lecture notes)

Tracking the evidentiality effect with Condition C:9 (53)

a. ?Maryi ’s bike seemed to heri to be missing. b. Maryi ’s bike seemed to heri to be broken.

Even when scope reconstruction is not required/detectable (e.g. with definites/universals), you still end up getting (I think) a contrast depending on the whether the raised subject is the evidence or not: (54)

a. ?This paper of Quinei ’s seems to himi to be needed. b. This paper of Quinei ’s seems to himi to be flawed.

Speculation: if a DP has to be interpreted in the matrix subject position (e.g. in small clause constructions without modal adjectives; in infinitival construction because of Condition C), then it gets interpreted as the evidence that the seem-report is based on. 9 You’d think, of course, we could just use scope to track height and then ask the evidentiality question. There are confounds though. First, DPs can be interpreted high without having to be syntactically high, esp. if it’s an indefinite (e.g. wide scope indefinites an all that Abusch (1998) et seq.). So we could get a wide-scope reading without the DP being in the high position. Second, even if a subject is interpreted low, we might still be able to consider it part of the evidence situation:

(i)

It seemed that a dog I was watching just then was sick (given how it looked).

The only real reliable test case we have are things that must be interpreted high in virtue of their syntactic position. It’s in that case, I am suggesting, that we get the evidentiality requirement.

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3.4 Seem more generally, and wild speculation Comparison of seem to epistemic must. Must can just signal pure inference/reasoning von Fintel and Gillies (2010).: (55)

There are three cups and the ball is under one. I lift up Cup A, the ball is not there. Cup B, the same. The ball must be under Cup C.

Seem cannot signal just pure reasoning.10 (56)

There are three cups and the ball is under one. I lift up Cup A, the ball is not there. Cup B, the same. a. #The ball seems to be under Cup C. b. #The ball seems under Cup C. c. #/?It seems that the ball is under Cup C.

The closest I’ve seen to seem, in both it’s SC and infinitive use, is the non-visual sensory evidential l´akw7a in St‘a´ t‘imcets reported in Matthewson 2010 Thoughts: • The wild speculation: maybe the problem is that with seem, a modal base (and ordering source) is not enough. • The Wild proposal: Seem has an Evidence Source Argument which denotes a (concrete particular) situation.11 (57)

a. b.

seem → λpλsλw. ∀w’ in seem(s)(w): p(w’) seem(s)(w): the set of worlds compatible with (the evidence made available by) s in w

Two silent situation arguments: (58)

a. b.

It s seems that John is depressed. [DP The squire in s ] s seems to be sick.

Two subjects: both like to be the same situation? 10 I

(i)

can almost do this with finite complement, if I am being really resigned or something: Well...seems it’s under Cup C.

11 Kratzer

(2010) is saying that epistemic modals have situation arguments from which epistemic alternatives are projected. I haven’t yet connected this work.

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Acknowledgments This work is supported, in part, by a SSHRC Post-doctoral Fellowship (756-2009-0403) to the author and SSHRC (SRG 410-2010-1264) to Junko Shimoyama and Bernhard Schwarz. Michael Brigham provided the perceptive scenarios and judgments. *

References Abusch, Dorit. 1998. Generalizing tense semantics for future contexts. In Events and grammar, ed. Susan Rothstein, 13–34. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Asudeh, Ash, and Ida Toivonen. 2010. Copy raising and perception. Manuscript, Univeristy of Ottawa. Beghelli, Filippo, and Tim Stowell. 1997. Distributivity and negation: The syntax of each and every. In Ways of Scope Taking, ed. Anna Szabolcsi, 71–108. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Boeckx, Cedric. 2001. Scope reconstruction and A-movement. Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 19:503–548. Chung, Sandra, and William A. Ladusaw. 2004. Restriction and saturation. MIT Press. von Fintel, Kai, and Anthony Gillies. 2010. Must...stay...strong. Natural Language Semantics . Fodor, Janet Dean. 1970. The linguistic description of opaque contexts. Doctoral Dissertation, MIT. Fox, Danny. 1999. Reconstruction, binding theory, and the interpretation of chains. Linguistic Inquiry 30:157–196. Grimm, Scott. 2010. An empirical view on riasing ot subject. ZAS Papers in Linguistics 52:83–109. Heim, Irene. 1982. The semantics of definite and indefinite Noun Phrases. Doctoral Dissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. Heycock, Caroline. 1995. The internal structure of small clauses: New evidence from inversion. In Proceedings of the North East Linguistic Society 25, ed. Jill Beckman, 223–238. University of Pennsylvania: Graduate Linguistic Student Association. Kratzer, Angelika. 1991. Modality. In Semantics: An international handbook of contemporary research, ed. Arnim von Stechow and Dieter Wunderlich, 639–650. de Gruyter. Kratzer, Angelika. 2005. Indefinites and the operators they depend on: From Japanese to Salish. In Reference and quantification: The Partee effect, ed. Gregory N. Carlson and Francis Jeffrey Pelletier, 113–142. CSLI Publications. 15

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Keir Moulton

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