Ancient 29 (2009) ©Mathesis Publications

249

Articles

The

Theology

Xenophon's Socrates

Nathan Powers

In two passages of his Memorabilia, Xenophon represents Socrates as encourviltue in his companions by them to accept novel claims about and their relationship to human beings" In Mem. i 4, Socrates argues for claims about the intelligence, benevolence, and power of the gods based on the evidence of design in the world-the eatliest surviving version of this sort of In Mem. iv 3, Socrates describes the world as anthropocentric, arranged at the cosmic level by a human-loving deity or deities so as to be an environment in which humans can Xenophon's is the earliest report we have of such a view. These texts have received relatively little analysis, despite the interest they hold as the initial steps in a long-lived tradition of 'natural' theology and their demonstrable ini1uence on later Greek philosophers in that tradition (particularly 1 Furthermore, very little attention has been paid to the question of the how these passages fit into the broader context of the Memorabilia: why does fInd it important to present Socrates as a theological innovator in the and what do these innovations contribute to his overall portrayal of Socrates? I examine these two passages looking both at the arguments that attributes to Socrates and at the agenda that these arguments subserve.

1.

and

in the Memorabilia

Like his Plato, Xenophon wrote an Apology oj Socrates in which Socrates is confronting his accusers at the notorious trial that ended with his death sentence, But while Plato was content to let his engagement his direct engagement) with Socrates' accusers end there, Xenophon also wrote an ambitious defense of Socrates in four the Memorabilia. In this work Xenophon sets out to defend Socrates comprehensively against both the of his indictment and, other accusations that had been leveled him after his death. 2 Xenophon directly to both sets of charges i For some recent discussion of Mem. i 4 and iv 3, see McPherran 1996,273-285; Viano 2001, 109-113; Dorion 2003, on i 4 ad loc.; and especially Sedley 2007, 78-86 and 210-225. For the connections between these passages and Stoic views, see section 4 below. 2 We know that there were anti-Socratic pamphlets circulating in Athens in the early decades of the fourth century. The most notorious of these was the sophist Polycrates' inflammatory Accusation afSocrates, to which Mem. i 2 appears to be responding. Evidently the Accusation portrayed Socrates as an enemy of Athenian democracy responsible for the (mis )education of prominent anti-democrats

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Socrates in Mem. i 1 but the bulk of the work (i 3-iv 8) is devoted to painting a portrait of Socrates as than detrimenas his detractors to the of conversations accomplished almost which Xenophon claims to reprobetween Socrates and various bear in mind when is to defend not to the Memorabilia that a representation of his intellectual activities as such. The philosophical method and doctrines of Socrates are indeed described frequently and at length within the but insofar as Xenophon deems them relevant to his getic efforts (d. Cooper 1999,5). Socrates' views about the gods are, for central in several ways to his defense of Socrates. In the first he uses these views in his response (in i 1) to the of impiety that was part of the formal indictment Socrates. Xenophon's strategy for rebutting this charge has two elements. At the outset of his he claims that Socrates is known to have fulfilled all the such as sacrifice and the consultation of uirernlents of traditional cult diviners; we are told that Socrates was in fact an avid enthusiast of divination (i He then returns to this subject in i 1. in a remark whose importance has not, I think, been [Socrates] believed that the gods care for human but not in the same way that most people believe this. For they [i.e., most people] think that the gods know some and do not know other but Socrates held that the gods Imow all things-what is said, what is done, and what is considered - and that they are and that signs to humans all human affairs. So, I wonder how the Athenians were ever persuaded that Socrates did not think concerning the gods ... 4 This passage shows that it is built into Xenophon's defense of Socrates against the accusation of impiety to concede that Socrates' beliefs about the were indeed new and unconventional, as his accusers maintained. The essential point (for Xenophon) about the Socratic views is if one stops and reflects on them, these views are not for Socrates to have been Rather, prompt one to attribute a kind of super-piety to Socrates. 5 such as Critias and Alcibiades. For a summary of what is knmvn about this document, see Chroust 1957, eh. 4. 3 Socrates as benefactor: Mem, i 3.1. The best overall account of Xenophon's apologetic strategy in the Memorabilia is contained in Erbse 1961, who compares the work to certain examples of Attic oratory (e.g .. Lysias 16) in which a brief rebuttal of the charges against the defendant is followed by a longer demonstration of the defendant's personal character that highlights those features of character that make the charges seem improbable or even ridiculous (Erbse 1961,266-269). On the organization of Mem. i 3-iv 8, see Gray 1998. ch. 8. 4) follow Marchant's of the Memorabilia (2 nd edn., 1921); translations are my own. j This is in fact how i 1.20 concludes: Xenophon claims that Socrates said and did the sorts of

25] In the two passages I shaH consider below his for this

and shows it to have been

around him, 6 II. The D1 vine Craftsman: Mem, i 4 One of the accusations made Socrates after his tells us (i 4.1), was that he was able to exhort his companions to but not to lead them ali the way there 7 Xenophon that the people who make this are into consideration Socrates' nT"0t,',~A of the elenchus- his refutation, ofthose 'who think - and not the other sorts of conversations in which he regwith his It is upon the latter, he says, that these critics should base their of whether or not Socrates was able 'to make his companions better'. What will he announces (i are some examof such improving discussions, His first exhibit the remainder of i 4) is a conversation that he once heard Socrates with his friend Aristodemus on the subject of the divine, Socrates has noticed (i that Aristodemus nickname, we are is or 'Tiny')8 does not perform the acts that piety requires--offering sacripraying to the gods,9 and consulting diviners--and even mocks those who do perform these traditional observances, He has decided to confront Aristodemus, and sets out to convince him through an argument in two parts (i 4,2-7 and that he to be pious towards a divine craftsman whose authority and attention extend throughout the entire cosmos. This argument has received little close examination from and when it is discussed in the literature it tends to be as I shall show below, things regarding the gods, which, if anyone else 'were to say and do them, would cause that person to cf. i 2.64), be considered 'most pious of all' 6 I am not particularly iuterested in addressing the question of whether or not Socrates himself really held the views that Xenophon attributes to him (or similar views); uar am I especially interested in the separate question, which is sometimes conflated wilh this one, of whether Xenophon's material derives largely from his own memories of Socrates (as he claims) or is rather heavily filtered through his reading of other writings about Socrates, 1 am primarily interested in the views expressed in rhe Memorabilia by the character 'Socrates', and as a malier of gross convenience I shall call this character Socrates. Readers should feel free, if they like, to mentally insert 'the character "Socrates'" or 'Xenophon's Socrates' instead. 7 Socrates is criticized in precisely these terms in the Clitophon. a short polemic in dialogue form that has survived as part of the Platonic corpus: see Clitophon 41Oe. For a discussion of philosophical 'protreptic' in the fourth century, see Slings 1999, 'Introduction' Part II. Xenophon may in fact be responding directly to the Clitopiwn, as Slings suggests; however, he seems to consider this criticism of Socrates to be widely shared and discussed (lvlem. j 4. 1: 'as some write and sail. S This poor fellow is known otherwise only from a brief mention in Plato's Symposium l73a-b, where he is again described as a 'tiny' man (0fl1Kp0C;), who was wom to accompany Socrates everywhere barefoot. 9 Accepting Portus' COJrllectulre, conjecture. oUt' 0111' f1JXOflEVOV; £Uxoll£vOV ~ see Dorion 2003 ad loc.

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In the argument's first (i on the basis of certain features of animals, that animals were begins Aristodemus if there are any persons towards whom he 'feels wonder/amazement at their wisdom' mus offers a the dithyrambic poet, , and Zeux'(s the painter (i The people towards yvhom Aristodemus claims w feel wonder for their wisdom are alJ creative, productive one sort or another, and Socrates accepts this without comment; his in what follows is to offer evidence that animals were created a craftsman of the order. 10 He asks Aristodemus which persons are more who produce senseless and motionless or [those who produce] and active r£ those who make Aristodemus replies-but that animals do come about through chance Uv0'F,H,-"U

nvC i Prompted Socrates, Aristodemus asserts that the hallmark of having come about by or plan chance is clearly a source of benefit (En' that come about by in contrast, bear no clear mark of what are for (i These claims about design and chance the argument to follow: in i 4.5-7 Socrates goes on to propose a series of examples I shall consider of features by many animals that seem to be sources of benefit to and so fulfill the criterion for N',~"t·,·,n been taken to be a version of the familiar has U!',F,"'~UVH that the argument of Mel1L i 4.2-7 is a direct it is because the

nr,m71('~'O

the existence of a divine creator Xenophon with a clear motive to argue for the into a pJausible narrative about the histor-

of the argument from ical gestion is wrong; and the common

intpITlrp',,,ti

10 Why does Aristodemus claim to be amazed by members of this particular group of crafTsmen (poets, sculptors, and painters)1 Perhaps he is deliberately exciuding the banausic crafts (such as carpentry) as unsuitable vehicles for wisdom; or perhaps he sees anJazement as being specially connected to those crafts whose business is the production of spectacle. At any rate, Socrates finds Aristodernus' examples of amazing craftsmen to be conducive to his case. For the representations produced by poets, painters, and sculptors are in many cases representations vf the craft-products w which he wants to draw a comparison: animals. 11 So, e.g., Festugiere 1949, eh. 4; Gigon 1953, 122-123; Burkert 1985,319; Parker 1992, 85: own, see DeFilippo and Mitsis 1994, 256; and McPhenan ! 996, 271-278. For a view closer to Dorion 2003,142-143.

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for existence is mistaken. 12 Xenophon's Socrates should not be understood as making a direct response to the atomists' valorization of the creative power of because he does not argue that animals must have been produced by a designer on the grounds that could not have been produced chance. in his view for a thing to be produced 'by design' does not-at least in principle-preclude its also being produced by chance. To see that this is so, it will be helpful to consider how the claims that Socrates endorses about 'design' and 'chance' map onto two different ways in which these terms are commonly contrasted. Sometimes a is said to be produced 'by design' in case it comes into being in accordance with a creator's plans or intentions. Understood this way, 'design' picks out specifically the causal relationship between a maker and a made thing, and to say a thing comes about 'by is to assert its maker's responsibility for its coming about - that the maker is the author of the product. To say that a thing comes about 'by chance' will then be to deny that there is an authority or maker responsible for the thing's being the way that it is. Yet sometimes a thing is said to be produced design' when it can be seen to exhibit a design or plan in the way it is put together. In this case, the relevant contrast is with things that are produced 'by chance' in that they lack evident organization, purpose, or useful resources. The first contrast is between whether a cause of a certain sort (namely, an author) must be posited to account for a thing's production or not; the second contrast is between whether a thing possesses what we might call a good teleological organization or a poor one. These two ways of condesign and chance are not, of course, mutually exclusive. Indeed, in the traditional argument from design are linked with one another: it is precisely the fact that animals are organized in a beneficial way, like the products of human that is supposed to make it at least plausible that too were causally produced by a craftsman. But for present purposes it is important to note that neither contrast, taken by itself, the other. Aristodemus and Socrates make use of only the second form of contrast throughout their discussion. Aristodemus believes that a thing's of sources of benefit for itself-its being 'provided for,' as we sometimes say - is sufficient to make it count as having come about by design; and he identifies a thing's having been produced 'by chance' with its parts that have clear purposes in relation to its good. Something that comes about 'by chance' in this sense may well have a creator responsible for its being the way it while something that comes about design' in this sense need not have been produced 12 Sedley 2007, 86 notes that Socrates' argument is not intended to demonstrate the existence of god per se, but rather the existence of 'god understood as a ... creator'; he takes this to be the general logical form of arguments from design. It follows that an argument from design need not be intended to refute atheism-though if successful, it incidentally does so. This is a valuable point about arguments from design, but it fails to characterize the argument of Mem. i 4.2-7 accurately; for Socrates does not in fact argue for any existence claim in the present passage (see further below). In my view, Socrates' argument fails to meet Sedley's criteria for being an 'argument from design'.

254 or creator. Socrates and Aristodemus appear to be uninterested in cona way that will HVH~'vA~'O"~W~vJ of a divine creator. But this is not interested in mere cansal for animals. \Vhat is at issue in their discussion whether or not animals also show of of a craftsman who is vvise. Evidence of in animals will be evidence that the divine craftsman is wise to an amazing That is Socrates begins his as he Aristodemus to which craftsmen possess the most Socrates does not, argue to the conclusion exists' or to the conclusion 'a designer of animals exists', but rather to the much narrower conclusion 'the of animals is wise'. And this is no unintentional shortfor Aristodemus is not, in vinced that god exists. He does not when Socrates calls maker of humans' (i 13 Aristodemus does not doubt even that some god or made human he does not doubt their existence. The traditional view that exist and that made animals is taken for granted throughout. What Aristodemus doubts at the outset is whether in iW~UHHh humans the with concern for human wellbeing. His further problem is that he does not think that is in need ofworship.14 He says as much at i 4. when Socrates has finished with this first line of argument: 'Indeed I do not the but I consider it too to stand in need of my , This statement is not a sudden conbut rather a clarification of Aristodemus' view about V~ifnUiHiHh his behavior and he who is he has come to wise. The evidence of in animals that Socrates offers first is found in the sense-organs. ears, nose, and tongue are commended (i '~What awareness would there be of sweet and bitter and all un.,
aES apxii~ IT01WV. On this phrase, see Sedley 2007, 85n24.

I shall use 'worship' as convenient shorthand for the Greek Hprwm"1W1V It should be kept in mind that the Greek word is rather broader in meaning: 'to be in the service' of the gods, including doing ali the things (such as soliciting omens) that are necessary to maintain one's relationship with the gods, 14

255 of sweat away. Socrates does not comment any but there are three that may be in here. is part of the vision of that the organ of comes with built-in. these features of the eyes serve a beneficial most there is a cumulative force to the argue for as each but their very coordination with one another does as well. Further of beneficial animal features follow. The ears are constructed so as to never be overfilled with sound. Front teeth tend to be for The mouth is in close to the eyes and nose. while all of these are well away from the anus. is 'Do you doubt', concludes 'whether these are the V~UU~iJ~.v0 Socrates has do seem to be contrivances of some craftsman who is 'wise and a lover of animals' ... Kal When Socrates adds that animals evince a desire to beget and raise children-and the children themselves a desire to live and not to die--Aristodemus further infers that these look like the devices of someone 'who has decided that there shall be animals'. of the (i Socrates to infer the presin the world as a 'whole. This section has sometimes been stand-alone argument for the existence of 1953 ad loc and McPherran once it is understood that the brunt of the first part of the argument was to establish the wisdom of the craftsman this passage then appears to a further ,v,~aL'H" its seat it in the cosmos as a whole. Ull.q.JLlUll that Aristodemus takes himself to be of

of these in the world. 16 So then, do you think it is some that you have snatched up nowhere while all these vast and masses are well-ordered-as you think some lack of The claim Socrates presses here is that it is absurd to think that humans possess one element of the cosmos while all the rest of their constituent 17 elemental Some of these became, in time, stock examples of divine providence (cf Cicero ii 140ft.), Xenophon is making a joke here: Aristodernus. called 'Tiny', is said to be made up of a 'tiny' amollnt of stuffl 17 There is an interesting parallel to this passage in Plato's Phi/elms 29a-30a. The chronological order of the two texts is unclear (see Dorion 2003. 'Introduction' ccxl-cclii), and I prefer to reserve [5

16

256 This

not a very we should ask "vhat to make it at least a valid one. We should not let it distract us thm seems conceived of here as a and distinct that can be ranked stuffs such as water, etc., for such a concep-tion is in line with the broad trend of Pre socratic least from It is more important to understand what is supposed to underwrite the inference from 'Aristodemus possesses intelligence' to "The U",\.llvv.' The most economical I the most is that a thing can be assembled from basic constituents on a routine basis if there is a of each of those constituents elsewhere. 18 If we accept this, then Socrates can infer that a of intelin the cosmos. this cosmos-arrangis to be Aristodemus balks (i He cannot see, he at the cosmic level as he can see the human craftsmen who operate around him. To counter Socrates introduces an analogy. 'Neither do you see your own of your body. On that you could say that you do but rather chance It is at this point (i 4. that Aristodemus reminds Socrates that he has no problem the existence of a , even of the sort they have been diswise divine craftsman. He does not think that such a deity is in need of and nothing Socrates has said so far has convinced him otherwise. 'You know well', he adds (i 4.11), 'that I would not be inattentive towards the if I believed that showed any concern for human fOVJCUUH_'-'

judgment on the question of whether Xenophon is borrowing from Plato or vice versa. Frede 1993. 36n38 suggests piausibly enongh that both passages may derive independently from something Socrates said_ The Philebus passage is part of a larger argument for the thesis that the world is ruled by reason (vo'iiC;, 28c). Socrates (the character) observes that human bodies, which are composed out of the four elements, possess a soul; he then secures agreement that the body of the whole world (1(l nav), which is composed of the same four elements, must also possess a soul, and that this soul of the world must be the somce of soul in us. To this extent the parallel with Xenophon is quite close. But in the Philebus argument (unlike in Mem_ i 4), 'sour appears to be introduced into the argument qua a principle of organization: it is plausible that the world has a soul precisely because the human body is organized its soul, and the world's body displays a much more beautifully organized disposition of its constituent elements than the human body does. Moreover the Socrates of the Philebus makes (as Xenophon's Socrates does not) it clear distinction between 'soul' and 'reason'. He does not go on to argue, as Xenophon does, tha! there must be an intelligence present in the world as a whole_ Rather. he argues (30b-d) that there must be some voue; that produced the world's soul--something that answers. in the case of the entire world, to the ontological category (posited earlier in the dialogue at 26e) of 'maker' or 'cause' of orderly mixtures. This idea is quite distant from Xenophon's benevolent craftsman of animals, Is Cf. Sedley 2007. 220-221, who offers a similar postulation to make sense of a later Stoic defense of Xenophon' s argument. On Stoic interest in this passage, see section 4 below_ 19 Socrates curiously does not go on to draw this conclusion explicitly; however, it is clearly implied later on in i 4.17_ 20 That the gods are indifferent towm-ds humans was, if perhaps not a widely heJd view, at least

<:~1 2 JI

Aristodemus takes the cult. Dorion 142-143 claims in response, Arlstodemus tmvards the traditional indeed stand in need of sacrifice from humans, But this does

need human

stems from the preSocrates does not sateven desirable state of character - in his those truths about the that will benSince Aristodemus has that animals in efits from the his the passage humans somehow do not receive benefits from the care or benefit for and so deserve no spedo not reserve any cia! response from humans, After as Socrates himself goes on to remark below (i 4, who beneficiaries of divine attention to humans

have set humans alone heavens and also for to our which allows us to indicate to one another what other animals can have sex are of age, Note that the elaborates on human at in lWem, iv 3, this becomes even more Such are the benefits conferred on the human the but the gn~at,est the best soul is able to gn,atest and finest

discussed seriously among intellectuai circles at Athens, A similar view is reported at Plaw Lmvs 885b, and discussed at S99d-903a; cf. Thrasymachlls fr. 8 DK. 21 Dorion 2003, 144, with examples, points out (cOlTectiy, think) EllDawoVla and its cognates frequently connote 'pl"osperity' fHore than 'happiness' in Xenophon,

258 and human soul is best and at TP:mF'mnplrm

doubt so as to

Socrates now closes his case for the 4.

an animal with a of an ox; it would be unable to aV'-'VJLH~'HO>H an ox-soul in a human body would possess its hands in for concludes what more

vain. So the care could he want from them') Once Aristodemus does not contest Socrates' claims about the but he still resists the conclusion that the care about him as an individual. He makes it clear what he would consider to be a sure of divine care: in the conduct of one's own life, He would like the to send him 'advisors' to tell him which courses of action to take and which to avoid (i 4, Socrates has three things to say about this. the do send advice to peoand to entire cities, oracles and Aristodemus can have no from these divine instructions. Second reason to suppose himself the gods have caused humans to hold certain beliefs about and to harm the and the this belief would not have endured so among humans if it were not true (i 4.16; and see Aristodemus must remember that pays attention to and observes what he is is made by an between the human and and the cosmos and the mind in the cosmos, on the other (i 4,17), The soul in us directs the asie so the intelligence in the universe as a whole disposes all as it likes, We should think of our limited intellectual as magnified m if we can see for miles at once, eye can see the whole world at once; if we can think of really far away from one and in (at opposite ends of the worJdknown to in the world at once. on (i 4,18). We test other charYVC'HH.",

22 This claim is a bit tricky; if Socrates' purpose is to persuade Aristodemus that the gods deserve worship, does it not beg the question to say that the gods have accorded recognition ane! worship of themselves to humans as a special pri vilege? It may be that Socrates thinks the fact that there is a commonly held belief that the gods exist constitutes evidence that we should worship them; after all, one might think, the gods need not have made hnmans capable of apprehending their existence, so evidently we are meant to take notice of them and pay appropriate attention, But I suspect that SocraLCs is expressing, rather, the simpler thought that human awareness of the gods is part of our general perceptiveness and intelligence, and such constitutes one more sign of divine favor for which we should express gratitude by showing the gods honor (cf. the final sentence of i 4.10).

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acters when we interact with them, We services for and in so discover whether or not show in return; we take advice from others, and in it discover whether or not counselors, in the proper different from these and to like made his companions 'refrain from and shameful deeds-not when were being watched since thanks to Socrates believed the were them. Ae:nO'Dnon has now shown how Socrates each of the claims that make possible his super-piety described at i 1. quoted that the are omnipresent, omniscient, and helpful towards humans,23 III, A World

for Humans: lV/em. iv 3

Mem. 1V 3 Socrates' views about the for different immediate purposes than Mem. i Yet insofar as both passages serve the same overall purpose of defending Socrates the accusation of clear what his views about the were, iv 3 can be at least in part, as a further elaboration of the views that constitute Socratic in i 1 and defended in i 24 In iv 3 has more say about the distinct \"U:}JWUHlties with which the gods have furnished human and about the proper grounds for piety (as honoring the 'unseen' powers for human welfare). The chief difference between the two passages is that in iv 3, the benevolence is as to the of the cosmos, both in the of the environment as a other animals can and in the location of human of the world-order as the of divine concern. This passage is of a sequence of conversations iv 2-3 and between Socrates and a very young Athenian with Euthydemus. When we first encounter him in iv 2, conceited and Socrates finds it necessary to elenchus on him in order to deflate his iv 2 indeed contains the ;JvcaWv
23 It is less clear precisely how Socrates' conversation with Aristodemus contributes towards fulfilling Xenophon's promise (in i 4.1) to show that Socrates made his associates 'better'. What Xenophon has shown so far is that Socrates put the fear of divine wrath into people so that they would refrain from evildoing that they might otherwise (for all we know) engage in lustily. Perhaps we are to consider the views about the gods that Socrates propounds in i 4 as belonging to a preparatory (self-control), which phase in moral education. In the next passage (i 5) Socrates discusses he considers foundational for virtue (i 5.4-5), so it possible that in i 4 piety is being thought of specifically as a preliminary to virtue. 24 For 'amplification' (the progressive elaboration of themes) as a literary device in the Memorahilia, see Gray 1998, 16-25 and 33-40.

260 of a Socratic elenchus in the entire Memorabilia, to expose other indeed turns out to be and this initial encounter with Socrates in virtue and In iv 3 we to a basic lesson in how to be a 'sound thinker', a notion that has to do with knowone's own proper boundaries and oneself the usual translation Recall that in i L 19-20 above in section 1) Socrates is called a 'sound thinker' about the because of his of their him. Socrates was in no hurry, vve are told (iv 3. and before first making them possess moderation believed that otherwise great mischief ensue. This assertion is intended to defend Socrates that he was such as Critias and Alcibiturned out to be bad men, it was not because Socrates had his educational priorities wrong. 25 The conversations with model of how Socratic education is to himself is a foil for those notorious failures of Socratic education. 26 In iv 3 we are shown how Socrates among the young aSSOClated 'with him. Socrates asks you to reflect on how which humans need?' him to reflect on the matter, attend to our needs We need our eyes would be useless. But we also need of rest, so with as well. The sun marks off the hours of the makes all clear. however, is dark and stars to shine in it, so that we can tell time at need to. The moon of months as welL We need and establish the so the send variseasons for growth in such way that we are 2S Indeed, Xenophon makes the same point in very similar language in Men!. i 2.12- i 8, where he claims that Critias and Alcibiades were bad in spite of (and not because of) Socrates, The two are said to have cOllnived to become Socrates' companions not because they wanted to acquire vWqlpoauvil from him (i 2.15)-which they would rather have died than possess (i 2.16)-but rather because they thought that they could get him to make them 'very competent at speaking and acting' (lKr£vcoTcnw /cEY£lV 1£ Kr~\ Nonetheless, asserts Xcnophon, so long as these men actually kept company with Socrates. he managed to make them moderate (i 2. ! 8). 26 On this aspect of the Euthyde.mus sequence in the li,!{em.orubiliu see Dorion 2003, ~Irltroduc­ tion' cciv-ccxiii; and ct Morrison 1994, 185190 and Johnson 2005. j

261 ety of food. 'This too is quite human-loving (qnNiv8pco1tcx)' , comments Euthydemus (iv 3.5). Water is furnished plentifully, to help things grow, and for us to drink, and to make things easier for us to digest (which is both healthier and more pleasant than eating food dry); Euthydemus remarks that all this, too, seems providential (1tpovoT\'ttlCOV, iv 3.6). The gods also give us fire, a great ally against the cold and an aid in all human crafts, through which we arrange great benefits for ourselves. Finally, the sun provides another great service to humans by observing the summer and winter solstices, turning around in its course at precisely the appropriate points of the year. So (in the summer) it draws nearer (iv 3.8), taking care (
262 other than and-take of benefiIs humans come out the domestication of animals for a himself

Humans reguwmners of purposes, and moreover even creatures that

are to the list of divine that it allmvs us to remember and to learn how each the of here Socrates says that and teach one another and form associations and 'JVC<.HH'''F,

27 make laws and live in a The about this passage is how Socrates character of the benefits that the than he did in 4, on the There are, on the one sorts; on the other be, for cure those objects. It is not even hinted that there of that are worthwhile in or some non-instrumental be had from with other like that enters into the ture. Socrates as Divination is another source of benefit for and oracles can indicate vlhat to do and what to avoid in unclear situas ations and so us to success. Divination is here conceived of assistance that the when humans are unable to

3.

the same he used with Aristodemus in i 4) wants to reathe form of is reliable. sons in support of the beJief that divine aid was that god, being the mind of the cosmos, sees In Menlo i 4, the and so has the power to humans. Here (iv 3. the L>Hif-'lJla~.D is on a different we believe the of unseen and we must realize that the are a;O;'-'llC.>C.O 'You too will know that I the truth', says 'if you do not wait of the but rather let the of their until you see the works suffice for you to revere and honor the ' It is the custom of the of and this is also the way of to without seen in the 'the one who sets in order and sustains the entire cosmos, in which there are all

27 This may be meant to describe a temporal sequence. a miniature anthropology of speech lead· ing from basic communication about the things that we require to the gradual establishment of complex social institutions.

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and fine 28 This cosmic and unfailingly serves ere afurnishing them with what they and is 'seen accomplishing the things, but is unseen them'. Socrates offers several analogies to this unseen agency of the cosmic god 3. There is the sun as we saw may conceive of as itself a even view of everyone, it does i.e., with direct gaze. not anyone to behold it 'impudently' 'servants', like the thunderbolt and the The same is true of some of the which have powerful effects even though they are never seen coming or going. And finally there is the human soul if anything human does, parrules us but cannot be seen takes of the divine'),29 which 1 Socrates concludes that one to honor the divine learned its power from its effects'. The conversation ends (again, in a way to i 4) with a statement from Socrates about the proper basis for the practice of 3.15-17). Euthydemus testimony to Socrates' success as an that in the future he will the in the least, but goes Oil, 'I am depressed about the followthat it seems to me that no human could ever reciprocate the benefactions of the gods with adequate thanks.' This is a more serious worry than it of piety may seem at first the basic seems to operate with throughout the cf. Dorion ~~'~'H''''F,~ between humans and Socrates' response is to recall the famous answer that the Delphic oracle gave 'How should one thanks to the The answer was, 'By to the of the city', that the have established their cults in various places so that humans will have a forum in which to thank them in an acceptable way. Socrates adds to this (iv must honor the gods 'to the utmost of one's the way, he says, in which one can benefits from those who have the greatest power to 28 6 tov OlcOV K6()~lOV GDVta'ttwv ,E Ked O'DVEXWV, BV q:, navHX KfJ))X Ked EGtl. The Greek admits either the translation 'in which there are all good and fine things' or 'in which all things are good and fine', Translators tend IO opt for the latter, but this is probably mistaken, On the one hand, the latter translation attributes a very strong view to Socrates that he has not produced any reason for us to accept. On the other hand, the former fits in quite well with what he has been saying all along in 3: the world is stocked with good and beautiful things; the gods have withheld no beneficence from us. 29 McPherran 1996, 277 and 286 makes much of this sentence, seeing in the notion of a soul that shares in the divine a deep connection between Plato's Socrates and Xenophon's Socrates. But caution is in order: (1) here Socrates is drawing a connection between soul and divinity simply for the purposes of the present analogy, that is, to convince us that soul can hold its own as an analogue for god alongside other obviously suitable analogues such as sun and wind; (2) the conditional Cif anything does') must be taken seriously. Socrates does not commit himself to the claim that the human soul is divine here any more than at i 4,14, where he remarks, 'Compared to other animals. humans Jive their lives like gods.'

264 them. Xenophon concludes by emphasizing the significance of this conversation for his defense of Socrates: through his actions and through discussions such as this one, Socrates made people both more pious and more moderate (iv 3.1 IV. Conclusion So far I have emphasized the ways in which the views about the that Socrates argues for in Mem. i 4 and iv 3 advance Xenophon's apologetic agenda. I conclude with a few remarks about the influence that these views had on later philosophical theology, through their influence on the Stoics. 3o There is reason to think that the 'theological' portions of the Memorabilia were popular texts among the Stoics. There survive, for example, instances of both early and late Stoics quoting Mem. i 4 from memory.3! In addition, there survives a discussion among different early Stoics about how best to interpret the argument that infers intelligence in the cosmos in i 4.8-which is concluded to be, once suitably fixed up, a sound argument,32 Also though generally unremarked by scholars, is the fact the Stoics take some of their characteristic theological imagerye.go, god as a steward or household-manager (oh:ov6J.lo~), and the world as a place full of god's public benefactions (£u£Pywlm)-from Xenophon's Socrates as well (Mem. iv 3.13,15)0 This popularity of the Memorabilia is all the more remarkable in view of the fact that to a certain extent the Stoics must have found its theology useless or even wrong-headed-for example, in its failure to accord reason any substantive role in human happinesso So where did their interest come from? In part, they may have simply been interested in Xenophon's portrayal of Socrates, and no doubt they desired to confer the authority of Socrates upon their views about divine providence. They also may have found attractive Xenophon's endorsement of traditional cult practices (a position that distinguished the Stoics from rival philosophical schools in the Hellenistic Perhaps most impor30 That the views expressed in Mem. i 4 and iv 3 bear some resemblance to Stoic doctrine has long been noticedo Indeed in the 19 th and early 20th centuries several scholars proposed--in spite of a complete dearth of linguistic or stylistic evidence-that these two passages are actually later Stoic interpolations in Xenophon's text (see Lincke 1906 for one such proposal, along with a review of earlier literature). Aside from getting the direction of int1uence (as it were) wrong, these scholars did not concern themselves with identifying the specific aspects of these passages that the Stoics might have found phiiosophically fruitful (or philosophically unpromising). 31 Sextus ix 92 .. 94), in a passage that is very likely to come from an early Stoic source (cf. Sedley 2007, 219), paraphrases Mern. i 4.2 . 8. The wording is close enough to the original to demonstrate intimate familiarity with the text, but inaccurate enough to indicate that Sextus' source did not have the written text in front of him. Cf. Cicero, ND ii 18, where Xenophon's Socrates appears as a 'guest star' among the early Stoic scholarchs. also with a paraphrase of Mem. i 4080 Sedley 2007, 212213 and 218 takes these paraphrases (rightly, I think) to indicate that Xenophon's text possessed some sort of canonical status among the Stoics. Note too that Epictetus misquotes (presumably from memory) Xenopbon Mem. i 4.7: 8(xu!l(Xcnn ]((Xl, iiJ~
eM

n

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the Stoics owe to one of their characteristic methods of the inference from observed order and benefit in thevvorld to a beneficial orderer of the vvorld, the Stoics their starting-point for this inference from MenL i 4: the human response of wonder to certain forms of 33 This is not to suggest that Xenophon' s Socrates has a well worked-out method, is content to show that Socrates believed that the whatever else they are great benefactors of humans, But the following in were to use similar considerations in a more formal and

NY 12222 BIBLIOGRAPHY Burkert, '01, 1985, Greek Religion, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Chroust, A-R 1957. Socrates: ,Man and Myth, New York: Routledge. Cooper,1.M. 1999, 'Notes on Xenophon's Socrates' 3·28 in Reason and Emotion. Princeton: Princeton University Press, DeFilippo, J.G" and P.T. Mitsis, 1994 'Socrates and Stoic Natural Law' 252-271 tn Vander Waerdt ed. 1994. Dorion, L-A. trans, and commentary. 2003. Xenophon: Memorabies. iVt Bandini ed, vol. 1. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. Erbse, R 1961. 'Die Architektonik im Aufbau von Xenophons Memorabilien' Hermes 89: 257·287. Festugiere, A.-J. 1949, La revelation d'Hermes Trismegiste. voL 2, Ie dieu cosmique. Paris: Gabalda. Frede, D, ] 993, Platon: Philebos, und Kommentar, Gottingen: Vundenhoeck & Rnprecht. Gigon, Q, 1953. Kommentar zum ersten Buch von Xenophons Memorabilien, Basel: F. Reinhardt. Gray, V,J. 1998. The Framing of Socrates: the Literary Interpretation ofXenophon's Memorabilia. Hermes Einzelschriften 79. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, Johnson, D.M, 2005, 'Xenophon at His Most Socratic (Memorabilia 4. 2), Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 29: 39-73, Lincke, K 1906, 'Xenophon und die Stoa' Neue lahrbiicher flir das klassische Altertum 17: 673·691, McPherran, M.L 1996. The Religion of Socrates. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Morrison, D.R. 1994, 'Xenophon's Socrates as Teacher' 181·208 in Vander Waerdt ed. 1994, Parker, R. 1992, 'The Origins of Providence: A Mystery' 84-94 in Alan Cameron ed. Apodosis: Essays Presented to Dr. WW, Cruickshank to j1l1ark His Eightieth Birthday, London: St. Paul's SchooL :U Craftsmanship evokes wonder as a natural response: Sextns Mix 115-118, which appears to be Stoic in origin (d. Sedley 2007, 211); see also Epictetus i 6.1] and Cicero ND ii 75, where the Stoic Balbns identifies the entire class of Stoic argnments that infer god to be providential from the observation of beautiful, orderly, and well-adapted phenomena in the world (described at length in ND ii 98-153) as argl1ments 'from wonder' (ex admiratione). 34 This article began gestation as paft of my work on a dissertation about Stoic theology at Princeton University; I would Eke to thank John Cooper, Hendrik Lorenz, and Christian Wildberg for their advice and criticism, I would also like to thank Brad Inwood for offering a number of helpful comments on an earlier version of the article.

266 Sedley, n 2007. Creationism and Its Critics in Antiquity. Berkeley: University of California Press. Slings, S.R. 1999. Plato: Clitophon. New York: Cambridge University Press. Vander Waert, P. ed. 1994. The Socratic Movement. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Viano, C. 200 I. 'La cosmologie de Socrate dans les Memorables de Xenophon' 98-119 in G.R. Dherbey and l-B. Gourinat ed. Socrate et les Socratiques. Paris: Vrin.