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The Tyranny of the Majority in Bangladesh: The Case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Lailufar Yasmin

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University of Dhaka Published online: 28 Feb 2014.

To cite this article: Lailufar Yasmin (2014) The Tyranny of the Majority in Bangladesh: The Case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 20:1, 116-132, DOI: 10.1080/13537113.2014.879769 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2014.879769

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Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 20:116–132, 2014 Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1353-7113 print / 1557-2986 online DOI: 10.1080/13537113.2014.879769

The Tyranny of the Majority in Bangladesh: The Case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts LAILUFAR YASMIN

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University of Dhaka

This article analyzes how the construction of a national ideology in Bangladesh has been achieved through a style of majoritarianism based on “positional dominance.” This has resulted in the construction of a national identity that is based on a particular form of Bengali identity that subsumes and indeed delegitimizes other claims to identity within the state, including claims made by indigenous communities to their own distinctive, place-based identity. Although a formal peace treaty has been signed, peace remains elusive due to the cultural hegemony of Bengalis over the indigenous peoples in the name of the supremacy of the national state.

INTRODUCTION Bangladesh is one of the 11 countries that has not signed the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted in 2007, on the grounds that the term “indigenous peoples” was not appropriately defined in the proposal.1 This demonstrates ongoing problems for indigenous people in Bangladesh where the positional power employed by the state vis-`a-vis its minority indigenous peoples determines the fate of the “other.” The ability to construct an “official” national identity has usually been within the control of a country’s majority population group, and this majority status is what underpins the notion of “positional power” in general terms. The majority, or at least the elites that command its support, also possesses the power to recognize “indigeneity” and any special rights and privileges that may attach to it. There are numerous instances in the history of modern statemaking where recognition of indigeneity or “first people” status and any rights associated with it have been ignored altogether. This has occurred Address correspondence to Lailufar Yasmin, Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, Bangladesh. E-mail: [email protected] 116

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in many different national settings, both in the west and in other parts of the world. The history of western colonialism is especially rich in historic examples of indigenous dispossession and oppression with recent trends in recognition and reconciliation—as illustrated by the recent “apology” to Australia’s indigenous people—often being a case of too little too late. But indigenous dispossession and the attempted erasure of indigenous identity has scarcely been peculiar to western colonialism. It has become just as much a feature of the politics of “nation-building” in other parts of the world. Bangladesh, a country that achieved independence just over 40 years ago in the only successful case of secession in the Cold War period, has been no exception. This is despite the fact that the justification for secession from the state of Pakistan was grounded very firmly in claims to a Bengali identity that was different from, and indeed oppressed by, the (East) Pakistani majority. Thus, Bengalis fought a war of secession against an East Pakistani elite (and military junta) to assert their own identity, gaining independence in December 1971 after nine months of violent battle. But the victorious Bengalis immediately required the indigenous people of the new state of Bangladesh, known collectively as Adivasis, to renounce claims to their own identity and, instead, to embrace an all-encompassing Bengali identity. This demand plunged Bangladesh first into political instability between the majority Bengalis and the indigenous population and, later, into a military skirmish. The crisis was only partially resolved in 1997 and has continued to simmer since then. Recently, the current Foreign Minister declared that Bangladesh does not have any “indigenous” population. This claim has, once again, precipitated heated debate on the rights of the adivasis to maintain their own culture and identity within the state while still being regarded as full citizens of Bangladesh. This article examines debates surrounding this issue from a theoretical and historical perspective. In doing so, it critiques “the tyranny of the majority” in Bangladesh with its exaggerated emphasis on “Bengali” identity—an emphasis that serves to deny any other claim to identity and that reflects poorly on Bangladesh’s reputation internationally. More specifically, the article highlights the dilemma that postcolonial countries create for themselves when they attempt to replicate a flawed conception of “modern” nationhood that leads them to attempt to force homogeneity on the entire population. In such exercises, it is often a minority indigenous population that becomes the main victim of elite-sponsored attempts to create “sameness.” Bangladesh therefore stands as a classic example of a dilemma where the demand for nationhood has generated a demand for homogeneity that denies recognition to indigenous people the right to preserve their own place-based culture and identity and a right that is recognized internationally. Here we should note that in most postcolonial states, indigenous culture and identity are associated very closely with place (land) on which their very existence depends.

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The discussion therefore distinguishes between the positional identity of the majority, which commands far superior political power, and what is called here the place-based identity of Bangladesh’s indigenous people who possess only the force of moral argument and (unenforceable) international law to back their claims. The article first reviews certain theoretical debates on nation and ethnicity that form the basis of debates on two interrelated concepts relevant to this argument: indigeneity and place-based identity as opposed to the positional identity of a state-based nationality that is in turn controlled largely by elites enjoying the support of a majority population. It then looks at how the construction of a positional identity based on the myth of a Golden Bengal operates to deny the right of indigenous people to express their own place-based identity. In this context, it will be argued that a conventional but nonetheless flawed understanding of the creation of a modern state based on essential sameness is what largely drives Bangladeshi elites to attempt to impose a homogeneous “Bengali” identity on the indigenous people of the country.

NATIONS, ETHNICITY, AND INDIGENEITY—WHOSE NATION? The political transformation of nations as the basis of national selfdetermination and political sovereignty raises the question of the basic identity of “a people,” and which group provides the foundation for the state. While nationalism as an ideology is a manifestation of the political establishment of a nation, Anthony D. Smith argues that “ethnies” are the atoms of a nation—identities that are assumed or presumed on the basis of “notable myths and historical memories, and a link with historic territory.”2 The (assumed) ethnic origin of a nation therefore grounds the past in the present and projects it into the future to give it a certain continuity that enhances its legitimacy. The issue of ethnicity—an identity formed on the basis of assumed common ancestry and cultural attributes—was often used to explain the political problems of many developing countries in contrast with those of the developed world where there was presumed to be a well-defined notion of unitary “nationhood” established—despite the diversity on which most European countries have actually been built. For many people of Asia and Africa, especially those often described as “tribal,” there appears to be an especially strong allegiance to place or land than to the artificial construct of a “nation” forged in the transition to independence and requiring the amalgamation of certain symbols to establish the foundations for a national, sovereign state.3 It is in relation to the situation of mainly “tribal” people that terms such as “primordialism” and later the concept of “indigeneity” actually emerged to explain the place-based attachment of certain groups. What also

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distinguished these people from larger national groups was that they also tended to lack power and resources. As emphasized above, the concept of indigeneity is intimately tied to a place-based identity, where “place” is generally understood to be ancestral territory. From a colonial perspective, however, such territory was often deemed to be terra nullius—empty land. This enabled colonizing forces to treat it as “unclaimed” and to regard themselves as the first to have “really” arrived there, thus enabling them to make legal claims on the land and consequently to dismiss the claims of the original inhabitants, even as they continued to call them “natives”—a term that inextricably associates a person with the place where they and their ancestors were born. However, although indigenous people often lost their political/legal claim to what was their own land, this by no means diminished their sense of place-based existence that has therefore remained an essential component of their identity. The concept of indigeneity actually emerged as a direct consequence of native people’s struggles to establish an identity vis-`a-vis the domination of the colonizers, starting in North America in the 17th century and later encompassing the native populations of Australia and New Zealand.4 The idea of indigeneity is considered to be a reflection of the day-to-day experiences of “first people” in relation to the colonial other in a land that once belonged to them,5 not merely an anthropological or scholarly invention or simply an “awakening of old memories.”6 The psychological understanding of such bonds that has developed since the 1960s and 1970s analyzes place-based identity formation within the realm of cultural geography and environmental psychology with a special emphasis on the “emotional involvement with places.”7 These studies suggest that the attempt to replace place-based bonds with a homogenized national identity is never going to be satisfactory to indigenous populations.

WHOSE IMAGE? Another important aspect of the discussion of nation, ethnicity, and indigeneity that is intrinsically linked with the concept of power is the following: Who constructs the image of the people? As the history of nationalism shows, the mobilization of the masses and the promotion of a national culture has always been an elitist endeavor. As the term “nation” in its French construction emerged in relation to aristocrats and as the concept of sovereignty initially associated it with the ruler, the construction of a statist or national culture has been facilitated by elites in both western and nonwestern contexts. While the French Revolution sought to bring popular power to the fore, Ernest Gellner reminds us that the power to create a national image is an elite power, as “[F]or a given society, it must be one in which they can all breathe and speak and produce; so it must be the same culture.”8 This aspect has also been

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highlighted by Benedict Anderson, who has emphasized the role of print capitalism in spreading unifying nationalist sentiments as well as constructing “national genealogies” that help to forge particular national “imagined communities.” In such communities, a nation particularly remembers its glories and forgets certain pasts in order to strengthen its claims to nationhood.9 One past that seems to get forgotten is the past of indigenous history. The role of elites in the creation of nationalist discourses has been a subject of much study. Scholars have pointed out how the elitist imagination can remain untouched in relation to the larger masses, as the formation of a nation is a continuous process. In this context, Montserrat Guibernau has cited Eugene Weber’s work showing how the French masses did not regard themselves as French until the First World War.10 Kemal Karpat has similarly argued that the construction of nationhood remained an essentially “selfsecluded elite-based” project in Turkey.11 In the context of India, the creation of an overarching identity of Bharat Mata (Mother India), based on Hindu religious ideals, denies the claims of other ethnic and religious populations to be “proper” Indians.12 Both Muslims and indigenous people are victims of this othering, where Muslims are regarded as social pariahs and indigenous people’s rights are curtailed in the name of initiating development projects in their lands.13 Another interesting dimension of such national constructions is that a nation can emerge in relation to the other. While nations in their earliest form emerged with the prime objective of consolidating their identity within a given geographic boundary, with the spread of communication and the discovery of newer locations, some nations became more concerned with constructing their own “first-ness.” An excellent example of this can be found in the creation of “Englishness,” which was “constructed as a translatable identity that could be adopted or appropriated anywhere by anyone who cultivated the right language, looks, and culture.”14 The idea of a “Greater Britain” emerged in the mid-19th century to refer to “English-speaking territories of the globe” that might have “modified the blood” yet retained connections to England by virtue of the “commonality of institutions and language.”15 The narrative of nationalism therefore tells us that the imagining of a people within a specific boundary has been actively promoted by elites representing the majority. It has always been a “top-down” approach, in both the west and the non-west. Therefore, Turkey has turned out to be, in S. N. Eisenstadt’s words, “for the people, despite the people,”16 while the very first Prime Minister of India, Jawharlal, Nehru privately commented, “I am the last Englishman to rule India.”17 A state with a dominant nation therefore possesses a positional existence, equipped to confront the demands of any place-based identity within the state. As Etienne Balibar argues, the “ubiquity of borders” has created a situation in which one type of political system has been institutionalized to curtail the claims of the others that are readily

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submerged.18 While Balibar’s main reference point is Europe, a similar topdown approach has created a tyranny of the majority in Bangladesh where the very identity of the indigenous people has been smothered through the top-down construction of nationalism.

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THE CASE OF BANGLADESH Bangladesh emerged as an independent country on 16 December 1971. The demand for autonomy by Bengalis residing in East Pakistan against the center located in West Pakistan was ostensibly based on two reasons—identity and justice. The state of Pakistan had been artificially created to provide a home for the Muslims of India made even more artificial by the fact that the new country was divided into two sectors—East and West—with India in between. The people of East Bengal, predominantly Muslim by religion, had sought to separate from the West Bengal part of India during the partition of the subcontinent by voting in favor of the Two Nation theory in 1946. However, this policy was based more on the concept of economic justice than religious identity.19 However, identity—both religious and ethnic—did continue to play a central role in determining a sense of belonging for the people of East Bengal. This was finally achieved with the realization of their own state, Bangladesh, based on Bengali ethnic identity. However, the achievement of the East Bengalis in establishing their own state also transformed the national identity of the indigenous people living in the south-east region (known as the Chittagong Hill Tracts [CHT]). The indigenous people of this region, collectively known as the Jumma, have turned out to be the ultimate victims of the transfer from one form of majoritarian rule to another, starting with development projects initiated under the state of Pakistan and reaching their lowest point with the imposition of a dominant Bengali identity that effectively requires that they abandon claim to a distinctive identity.

JUMMA—WHAT IT MEANS TO BE INDIGENOUS IN BANGLADESH Indigenous people in Bangladesh constitute about 1.13% of the total population.20 The CHT region is home to the majority of the indigenous people where 13 different ethnic groups are considered to be original inhabitants of the area.21 These groups have their own unique culture and are mainly Buddhists, which sets them apart from the majority ethnic Bengalis who are mainly Muslim. (The ethnic Bengalis are generally known as plain people and the indigenous people are generally referred to as hill people.) While this region was originally inhabited by the indigenous people, albeit with

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some immigrant groups arriving in earlier periods, a purposive settlement policy initiated by the government of Bangladesh has led to a gradual increase of ethnic Bengalis. The active migration policy implemented by the Bangladesh government, first in 1972 immediately after independence and subsequently renewed in the 1980s, had led to an indigenous-Bengali ratio, measured at 53:47 by 2003. This contrasts with the situation at partition in 1947 when indigenous people constituted 98% of the total population of this region.22 The CHT region had come under Mughal rule in 1666 and under British rule from 1760. It had retained its autonomous status under British colonialism, ruled under a separate CHT Manual of 1900, which was guided by two principle objectives—the protection of British political and economic interests and the protection of indigenous people vis-`a-vis the Bengalis through restrictions on Bengali migration. British economic interests in reaching China via the CHT region and Myanmar originated as early as in 1761.23 However, analyses of the CHT conflict in the 1980s and later have suggested that the British had an alternative objective in relation to the protection of the indigenous population—the need to maintain a clear segregation between the Bengalis and the indigenous people.24 In essence, this policy emerged as a result of a peace treaty between the British and the Chakma King after a series of wars in the latter half of the 18th century and the final acceptance of the British right to rule in the CHT region. During the partition of the subcontinent in 1947, the Jumma people preferred to be a part of a secular India due mainly to the religious difference with predominantly Muslim Pakistan.25 While the CHT region was initially accorded to India, because of political concerns regarding the fate of the Sikh population in Pakistan, a Sikh-dominated region in Pakistan was accorded to India in exchange for the CHT in its eastern region.26 An influx of ethnic Bengalis began in the 1960s under the Pakistani government’s policy of translocation. The situation reached a climax with the building of the Kaptai Dam, a hydroelectric project on the river Karnafuli over the period of 1957–62. The Kaptai Dam, often termed a “death trap” for the indigenous people, created many environmental refugees in the region.27

ASSIMILATIONIST BENGALI DICTUM Indigenous identity began to consolidate in the 1960s, culminating with the formation of the Parbartya Chattagram Jana Shamhati Samiti (PCJSS; Chittagong Hill Tracts United Peoples’ Party) in the early 1970s following Bangladesh’s independence.28 This period is significant in delineating the specific context and reasons leading to the emergence of a collective consciousness. As Schendel has pointed out, “the creation of ‘Jummas’ was an act of defiance . . . it was a bid for ethnic innovation, to cope with the

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political and economic consequences of loss of power, growing expendability to the state and cultural marginalization.”29 The emergence of Jumma consciousness lay in the assertion of Bengali identity over indigenous identity in Bangladesh. This situation prompted the creation of a pan-indigenous identity under the rubric of which all 13 ethnic groups could embrace a singular Jumma consciousness as their primary marker of identity. The first Constitution of Pakistan of 1956 had classified the CHT as an “Exclusive Area.” Although its status declined to a “Tribal Area” in later constitutional instruments, the CHT continued to be governed under the CHT Manual of 1900. However, the Constitution of Bangladesh, adopted on 4 November 1972, did not accept the existence of any ethnic groups other than Bengalis residing within the territorial boundaries of Bangladesh. This Constitution declared in Part II, Fundamental Principles of State Policy, that The unity and solidarity of Bengalee nation, which, deriving its identity from its language and culture, attained sovereign and independent Bangladesh, through a united and determined struggle in the war of independence, shall be the basis of Bengalee nationalism.30

Before the adoption of the Constitution, representatives of the indigenous communities, headed by Manabendra Narayan Larma, had met the new Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibar Rahman, in February 1972 in a quest to establish their autonomy within the CHT region. This was rejected by Sheikh Mujib who suggested that they forget their identity, instructing them to “Go home and become Bengalis.”31 With the adoption of the Constitution, legal control by the majority Bengalis was established over the indigenous people. In a visit to the CHT, Sheikh Mujib reiterated his original position and asked the indigenous community to join the mainstream of Bengali culture.32 This move was underpinned by a state initiative to reclaim the land of the CHT by initiating Bengali migration into the area starting as early as 1972. Political changes in Bangladesh national politics in 1975, however, saw Manobendra Larma flee to India. It must be noted here that CHT is wedged between the two Indian northeastern states of Manipur and Tripura, which provides India a unique opportunity to play an active role in this matter. India provided support for the military wing of the PCJSS, called the Shanti Bahini (SB), which established its headquarters in the state of Tripura.33 The military skirmishes that ensued after 1977 between the government of Bangladesh and the Shanti Bahini were only resolved officially by the signing of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord in 1997 between the government of Bangladesh and the PCJSS. Under the treaty, the Government of Bangladesh has recognized the reestablishment of the rights of the indigenous people in the CHT region. One of the major aspects of the treaty was to introduce a special governance system in the region, which would cover the most

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contentious issues like resolving land disputes, withdrawal of military camps, and rehabilitation of returning indigenous refuges. However, its various provisions remain either unimplemented or partially implemented to the present time.

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THE CONTEXT OF THE PEACE PROCESS The initiative to resolve the insurgency in the CHT region was basically driven by criticisms that had emerged since the 1980s by international donors, with Amnesty International among the most prominent, regarding gross violations of human rights in the region. Matters relating to the CHT had been transferred from the Ministry of Home Affairs to the Ministry of Defense from 1977.34 Consequently, the period had seen a growing militarization in the region as the government felt the need to counter the Shanti Bahini using the Bangladesh military so that the region came under de facto military rule.35 The role of India in providing support for the PCJSS and Shanti Bahini, while instrumental in starting armed conflict, also played a part in ending it. India provided support to Shanti Bahini to initiate its insurgency against the Bangladesh government after the death of Sheikh Mujib.36 However, with the democratic return to power of his party, the Awami League, under his daughter Sheikh Hasina’s leadership, India withdrew its support from the Shanti Bahini.37 It has also been claimed that the PCJSS was also losing momentum in galvanizing support for its claim to profess a consolidated Jumma identity for all the groups residing in the CHT. A few smaller indigenous groups had become wary of Chakma domination within the Jumma community and opted to use their own names instead of being associated with the overarching Jumma identity.38 The transparency of the peace negotiations has been questioned by observers, as these were carried out behind closed doors. The negotiation process was not known to leading members of the ruling Awami League or members of the opposition at the time. It has also been alleged that a section of the Armed Forces provided the content and substance of the negotiation process to the political delegates.39 The government’s commitment to fulfilling the provisions of the CHT Peace Accord has been challenged, although the government has been insisting that it has already realized most of the provisions of the accord. The most significant allegation was made in relation to the role of the Bangladesh Military. It was argued that even though the signing of the treaty in 1997 had ended the insurgency and the military operations carried on in the CHT, this did not necessarily lessen the military’s de facto control over the region.40 Human rights violations carried out by government forces remain a cause of concern. These have been reported in the national and international media alike.41 Moreover, periodic clashes between settler Bangladeshis and

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indigenous people continue to take place, with recent widespread attacks on Buddhists living in the CHT.42 The concentration of military deployment in CHT, which was supposed to reduce significantly according to the provisions of the Peace Accord, has not decreased. Successive governments have insisted that a large military presence is still a necessity in CHT to fight “terrorism” and to ensure security in the region despite the official end of the military skirmish.43

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NATIONALISM—A JUST TOOL OF LEGITIMATION Internal ethnic conflicts within the framework of a nation-state system, especially in cases of Third World countries, have often been linked to control over resources.44 Where a connection exists between conflict and control over resources, issues of identity and recognition are often relegated to a secondary position. Yet, it can be argued that the issue of identity is linked directly with the conflict. The work of Axel Honneth sheds much light on this. Honneth argues that there is a connection between moral disrespect and social struggle.45 While Honneth does not reject the idea that interests can be a basis for struggle, he supplements the debate by insisting that social conflict can be driven not only by interests but also by a moral reaction to collective shame.46 Thus, what appears to be a social conflict over resources or distribution may, at its core, be a struggle for recognition of identity. This argument leads to two understandings pertaining to nationalism and indigenous identity in the context of Bangladesh. First, Bengali identity itself arose as a reaction to the (West) Pakistani attempt to construct and impose a homogeneous, Islam-based national identity. Second, the consolidation of indigenous identity in the CHT has, similarly, been a reaction designed to counter the imposition of an equally homogeneous, overarching Bengali national identity. Schendel has rightfully pointed out that Sheikh Mujib echoed the same inflexibility with regard to the creation of a Bengali identity after independence as the Pakistani elites did in relation to the imposition of Urdu on East Bengal.47 Consequently, the imposition of Bengali identity has provoked much discontent among Bangladesh’s indigenous people whose ethnic identity was to be buried. The consequence was the eventual eruption of violent conflict. Bengali identity in East Pakistan was created itself on basis of the myth of a “Golden Bengal” to assert its own claim to a separate identity rather than to accept that which the Pakistani elite attempted to impose. This construction of a Golden Bengal was carried out in East Pakistan through popular arts and cultural activities.48 Preindependence political rallies asked the question: “Sonar Bangla Soshan Keno” (Why has Golden Bengal turned into a graveyard now)?49 The Muslims-Bengalis of East Bengal attempted to create a national “Bengali-Muslim” identity on the basis of a historical claim to

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Bengal. Although the myth of Golden Bengal was meant to comprise the whole of Bengal, the political reality meant that East Bengal’s national claim was asserted on the basis of a truncated Bengal. The result is that the construction of Bengali identity effectively denies claims by any other ethnic group to form their own identity within the state of Bangladesh. In contrast with Bengali national identity, a form of Bangladeshi nationalism was proposed in the mid-1970s by the Bangladesh Nationalist party (BNP). This sought to provide a nationalist ideology that would include everyone residing in the country irrespective of their ethnic origins. In a constitutional amendment, the word “Bengalee” was replaced by the word “Bangladeshi” to provide a new, more general meaning based on the state rather than an ethnic Bengali identity. Thus, Bangladeshi nationalism was to provide for a different kind of totality by focusing on citizenship as a marker of national identity, something that Bengali nationalism could not do, based as it was on a specific ethnic identity. Although there was a possibility of bringing the indigenous people within the fold of this inclusive conception of civic Bangladeshi nationalism, the insurgency had already begun. In addition, the BNP generally maintained an intolerant attitude towards particular issues related to the indigenous people. The party has maintained that far too many concessions had been made in the 1997 Peace Accord that compromised the interests of the majority. Moreover, while in power in 2005, the BNP-led government started to acquire lands in the CHT region, contradicting the provisions of the Accord. BNP’s unswerving outlook on the matter was very much apparent as the BNP Chairperson Begum Khaleda Zia termed the PCJSS leader Santu Larma as “terrorist” in a statement made in the Parliament in 2011.

THE CREATION OF BENGALI FIRST-NESS A different twist in the struggle over national identity came with new claims that Bengalis, rather than the groups claiming indigeneity, had actually been the first settlers in the CHT region.50 This introduced a new strategy in the denial of the claims of the indigenous people to any particular rights in the region. The creation of “Bengali first-ness” was based on the writings of colonial administrators who had asserted that the indigenous people of the CHT region were in fact migrants from the nearby Arakan region.51 More specifically, it is based on the report of a colonial administrator’s first encounter with a hill tribe that is said to have taken place in 1777.52 However, some studies indicate that the indigenous people of CHT came from Myanmar from the 15th century onward, although these studies remain silent on the issue of who really were the original settlers of the CHT region.53 Nonetheless, the colonial creation of “tribalism” and the derogatory status awarded to the indigenous people as “wild tribes, crude, primitive, and aboriginal” therefore

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served to create a sense of Bengali superiority.54 However, the hill tribes also appear to have had contacts with the plain people, that is, the Bengalis, since the Mughal period, although this is almost beside the point. Other studies suggest that the plain people generally had “an invincible objection to enter the hills. They [were], I believe, principally deterred from settling there by the insalubrity of the climate, which seems to be deadly to their race, although innocuous to the hill people.”55 With the Awami League back in power in 2009, the issue of indigenous identity in Bangladesh has taken a serious backward turn once again. This is due primarily to the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution, adopted on 30 June 2011. This amendment sought to redefine the Fifth Amendment (1979) of the Constitution that had replaced “Bengalee” in the original constitution of 1972. Overriding the Fifth Amendment, the latest amendment reads: “The people of Bangladesh shall be known as Bengalee as a nation and the citizens of Bangladesh shall be known as Bangladeshis.”56 The Prime Minister signaled the official position of her government before the bill was placed before the National Parliament by asserting that “As citizen [sic] our identity is Bangladeshi, and as nationality our identity is Bengalee.”57 Thus, it appears that “Bengalee” has been elevated to a prime ideological position in the Awami League’s politics. Although, in the same speech, the Prime Minister added that “[l]ike the Bengalees [sic] all ethnic groups would have their own identities, such as Santals, Chakmas, Garos, etc.,”58 the legal supremacy of the Bengalis has once again been established over all other ethnicities within Bangladesh through the Fifteenth Amendment. As one scholar has pointed out: Article 6 [of the Constitution] provides the state machinery with a brutal policy weapon to be employed against ethnic minorities. It nullifies the ethno-political existence of indigenous non-Bengali peoples who have been living in this land since time immemorial. It gives a very dangerous “legal signal” to state bureaucrats, law enforcers, and particularly army officials deployed in the hill districts. “We” don’t care for the “others.”59

The statement of Foreign Minister Dipu Moni indeed indicated as much when she asserted that, under the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution, non-Bengali people residing in Bangladesh are neither indigenous nor hill people. Rather, they are ethnic minorities. Arguing that the term “indigenous people” is a misnomer, the Foreign Minister stated, “Unfortunately, Bangladesh and the ethnic Bengalee nation remain a victim of global misperception about the ancient anthropological roots, colonial history and our identity as a nation.”60 She went on to suggest that the Bengalis were the original settlers of Bangladesh according to archeological findings, while the

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ethnic minorities arrived later, thereby justifying the claim of the “first-ness” of the Bengalis. In a reaction to this rather extreme assertion of Bengali nationalism, Chakma Raja Devasish Roy has pointed out that, as Bangladesh has ratified Article 107 of the International Labour Oraganization (ILO) Convention, indigenous people do not have to reside in a place for millennia to prove their authentic claim to the land as per that specific provision.61 Moreover, in the context of the Foreign Minister’s assertion that the elevated status of 1.2% of the people of a country would compromise the rights of 98% of the population, in detriment to the national interest, Roy has argued that the acceptance of indigenous identity does not curtail the rights of ethnic Bengalis. In any case, if the issue of migration is brought to the fore in determining who the original inhabitants of Bangladesh were—Bengalis or the indigenous people—the ethnic origins of Bengali-speaking or Urdu-speaking people of Islamic faith would be categorized as immigrants from present-day India or Myanmar. In an interesting development, the Foreign Minister’s insistence on Bengali first-ness, based on the anthropological findings of the Wari Bateshwar excavations, have been nullified by further research.62 The excavation surrounding the Wari Bateshwar area, which supposedly supports the claim that the Bengalis were the original inhabitants of the CHT region for over 4,000 years, is not situated within the geographic border of present-day Bangladesh. This is indeed a blow to the Bengali first-ness claim, although it does not appear to have impeded the efforts of the political leadership in pursuing its creation of Bengali supremacy over the indigenous people. This can be seen in the ongoing Shah Bag movement protests. These started ostensibly to demand “justice” in relation to the treatment of war criminals of 1971 but have been co-opted into the overarching political creation of Bengaliness. The indigenous community, which initially participated in the movement, has become increasingly alienated as political slogans demand that Bangladesh be a place for Bengalis only, reflecting similar post-1971 assertions.63 While the indigenous people have sought to revise this so that it would include both Bengalis and indigenous communities, the Shah Bag movement appears to be repeating an overarching supremacy of the Bengalis over all the other identities that reside within the state of Bangladesh. As the 16th anniversary of the Peace Accord took place in 2013, the political commitment to enacting the Peace Accord seems to be confined to pen and paper only. Since the treaty was signed by the Awami League government, it is often assumed that the onus of realizing the accord lies with the party. However, it is ironic that the current Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, whose leadership was considered vital in making the breakthrough and signing the Peace Accord, has visited the region only twice since the signing ceremony in 1997. It has also been alleged that, although the

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Awami League prioritized the realization of the Peace Accord as one of their electoral promises during the 2008 election, their commitment has remained unfulfilled and rhetorical.64

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CONCLUSION It is evident that the politics of identity in Bangladesh continues to emphasize a singular Bengali identity that owes it ascendance to its majority position in the country, thus giving it “positional dominance.” By institutionalizing it as law, Bangladesh is at the same time effectively denying the right of any other identities to challenge Bengali claims to constitute the national identity, thereby claiming monopoly rights for the majority in creating statehood. In Balibar’s terms, this is a precise use of nationalism as a “projective” ideology.65 Similarly, we may recall Hobsbawm’s argument on how a state creates “national” institutions to reassert claims to statehood and nationality by encouraging people to reimagine the bondage of nationhood.66 Furthermore, a Gramscian analysis suggests that the activities of the Awami League indicates a classic example of cultural hegemony under which political civil society “constructs” the ethos and values of the society according to their own vested interests.67 The rights of the Bengali majority thus become paramount. This has effectively delegitimized the place-based identity of Bangladesh’s indigenous people whose minority status has rendered them powerless in the face of the positional dominance of Bengali identity. It is also clear that international norms concerning the status and rights of indigenous minorities have had little effect, except to encourage the perverse notion that Bengalis, through the idea of first-ness, are in fact the indigenous people of the country. This, however, is unlikely to convince anyone within the international movement for indigenous recognition and rights.

NOTES 1. See Kawser Ahmed, “Defining ‘Indigenous’ in Bangladesh: International Law in Domestic Context,” International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 17: 47 (2010). 2. Anthony D. Smith, “Nations and History,” in Montserrat Guibernau and John Hutchinson, eds., Understanding Nationalism (UK: Polity Press, 2001), 23. 3. John Eade, “Ethnicity and the Politics of Cultural Difference: An Agenda for the 1990s?,” in Terence Ranger, Yunas Samad, and Ossie Stuart, eds., Culture, Identity and Politics: Ethnic Minorities in Britain (UK: Ashgate, 1996), 58. 4. John Brown Childs and Guillermo Delgado-P, “On the Idea of the Indigenous,” Current Anthropology 40(2): 211 (1999). 5. Ibid., 211. 6. Ibid., 211. 7. M. Carmen Hidalgo and Bernardo Hernandez, “Place Attachment: Conceptual and Empirical Questions,” Journal of Environmental Psychology 21: 274 (2001). 8. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 38.

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9. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London, UK: Verso, 2006), 201. 10. Montserrat Guibernau, The Identity of Nations (UK: Polity Press, 2007), 17. 11. Kemal H. Karpat, The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001). 12. Manjusha S. Nair, “Defining Indigeneity: Situating Transnational Knowledge,” World Society Focus Paper Series, January 2006, http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/∼manjusha/ (accessed 13 June 2013). 13. Pankaj Mishra, Temptations of the West: How to be Modern in India, Pakistan, Tibet, and Beyond, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2006; Sanjib Baruah, India Against Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999). 14. Robert J. C. Young, The Idea of English Ethnicity (UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 2. 15. Ibid., 197. 16. S. N. Eisenstadt, “The Kemalist Revolution in Comparative Perspective,” in Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Ozbudun, eds., Ataturk: Founder of a Modern State (London, UK: Hurst & Company, 1997), 140. 17. Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2008). 18. Etienne Balibar, Politics and the Other Scene, trans. Christine Jones, James Swenson, and Chris Turner (London, UK: Verso, 2002). 19. Harun-Or-Rashid, The Foreshadowing of Bangladesh: Bengal Muslim League and Muslim Politics 1906–1947 (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 2003), 324. 20. BANGLAPEDIA: National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh, http://www.banglapedia.org/HT/ P_0226.HTM, (accessed 6 June 2013). 21. Amena Mohsin, “Identity, Politics and Hegemony: The Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh,” Identity, Culture and Politics 1(1): 82 (2000). 22. Khairul Chowdhury, “Politics of Identity and Resources in Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh: Ethnonationalism and/or Indigenous Identity,” Asian Journal of Social Sciences 36: 62 (2008). 23. Capt. T. H. Lewin, Hill Tracts of Chittagong and the Dwellers Therein (Calcutta: Bengal Printing Company Limited, 1869), 4. 24. The liberals have usually argued that the British policy was indeed used to segregate the Bengalis and the indigenous people, which could be interpreted as saying that had the British not created such a policy, the migration and settlement of Bengalis might not have assumed such a political issue in the present context. This has been one of the dominant views of Bangladeshi scholars writing on the CHT issue. For example, see Amena Mohsin, The Politics of Nationalism: the Case of the CHT , Bangladesh (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 1997). 25. Mizanur Rahman Shelley, The Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh: The Untold Story (Bangladesh: Centre for Development Research, 1992), 29. 26. Amena Mohsin, “The Chittagong Hill Tracts/Bangladesh,” Kreddha Autonomy Mapping Project, http://kreddha.org/mapping/downloads/CHT.pdf (accessed 6 June 2013). 27. Eshani Chakraborty, “Understanding Women’s Mobilization in the Chittagong Hill Tracts Struggle: The Case of Mahila Samiti,” Conference Paper Presented at 15th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia, http://coombs.anu.edu.au/SpecialProj/ASAA/biennialconference/2004/Chakraborty-E-ASAA2004.pdf, 6 (accessed 17 June 2013). 28. Nasir Uddin, “Politics of Cultural Difference: Identity and Marginality in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh,” South Asian Survey 17(2): 290 (2010). 29. Wilhelm van Schendel, “The Invention of the ‘Jummas’: State Formation and Ethnicity in Southeastern Bangladesh,” Modern Asian Studies 26(1): 126 (1992). 30. The Constitution of Bangladesh, http://bdlaws.minlaw.gov.bd/sections_detail.php?id=367& sections_id=24557 (accessed 6 June 2013). 31. Subir Bhaumik, Insurgent Crossfire: Northeast India (New Delhi, India: Lancer Publishers, 2008), 86. 32. As cited in Willem Van Schendel, A History of Bangladesh (New Delhi, India: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 186. 33. Shanti Bahini (Forces of Peace) was formed as early as 1973. See Iftekharul Bashar, “Bangladesh’s Forgotten Crisis: Land, Ethnicity, and Violence in Chittagong Hill Tracts,” International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, 3(4): (2011), http://www.hpu.edu/CHSS/History/ PapersCommentariesStudies/CTTA-April11.pdf (accessed 6 June 2013).

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34. “Militarization in Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh: The Slow demise of the Region’s Indigenous People,” IWGIA Report, May 2012, http://www.iwgia.org/iwgia_files_publications_ files/0577_Igia_report_14_optimized.pdf, 13 (accessed 6 June 2013). 35. Amena Mohsin, “The Chittagong Hill Tracts/Bangladesh.” 36. Jenneke Arens and Kirti Nishan Chakma, “Bangladesh: Indigenous Struggles in the Chittagong Hill Tracts,” Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, http://conflictprevention.net/page.php?id=40&formid=73&action=show&surveyid=14 (accessed 13 June 2013). 37. Amena Mohsin, “The Chittagong Hill Tracts/Bangladesh.” 38. Abul Hasnat Monjurul Kabir, “Bangladesh: A Critical Review of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) Peace Accord” (Working Paper 2, The Role of Parliaments in Conflict and Post Conflict in Asia), http://www.academia.edu/2504753/Bangladesh_A_Critical_Review_of_the_Chittagong_Hill_Tract_CHT_ Peace_Accord, 18 (accessed 6 June 2013). 39. Abul Hasnat Monjurul Kabir, “Bangladesh,” 19. 40. “Militarization in Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh,” 8. 41. “Implementation of CHT Peace Accord: Will They, Won’t They?,” Indigenous Research Quarterly IV(1–2): (2009), http://www.aitpn.org/IRQ/Vol-IV/issue_1-2/story04.html (accessed 6 June 2013). 42. Inam Ahmed and Julfikar Ali Manik, “Attacks on Buddhist Temples: A Hazy Picture Arises,” The Daily Star, 3 Oct. 2012, http://archive.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=252212 (accessed 6 June 2013). 43. Phil Humfhreys, “Peace in Our Time?,” The Dhaka Tribune, 6 Dec. 2013, http:// www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2013/dec/06/peace-our-time (accessed 11 Dec. 2013). 44. This was argued especially in case of ethnic conflicts taking place in Africa and Southeast Asia. See, for example, Solomon C. Madubuike, “Ethnic Conflicts: Social Identity and Resource Control, Agitations in the Niger Delta,” IFRA.com, 2009, http://www.ifra-nigeria.org/IMG/ pdf/Solomon_C-_MADUBUIKE_-_Ethnic_Conflicts_Social_Identity_and_Resource_Control_Agitations_in_ the_Niger_Delta.pdf, (accessed 17 June 2013); Cyril Obi, “Nigeria’s Niger Delta: Understanding the Complex Drivers of Violent Oil-Oriented Conflict,” Africa Development XXXIV(2): (2009); Peter Vandergeest, “Racialization and Citizenship in Thai Forest Politics,” Society & Natural Resources: An International Journal 16(1): (2011). 45. Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), 162. 46. Ibid., 165. 47. Van Schendel, A History of Bangladesh, 186. 48. B. K. Jahangir, Nationalism, Fundamentalism and Democracy in Bangladesh (Dhaka: International Centre for Bengal Studies, 2002), 99. 49. Muhammad Ghulam Kabir, Changing Face of Nationalism: The Case of Bangladesh (Dhaka: The University Press Limited, 1995), 178. 50. Saila Parveen and I. M. Faisal, “People Versus Power: The Geopolitics of Kaptai Dam in Bangladesh,” International Journal of Water Resources Development 18(1): 201 (2002). 51. Lewin, Hill Tracts of Chittagong, 28. 52. Ibid., 21. 53. Shelley, The Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh, 26. 54. Uddin, “Politics of Cultural Difference,” 288. 55. Lewin, Hill Tracts of Chittagong, 7. 56. “Fifteenth Amendment: All Citizens are Bengalees,” The New Age, 12 June 2011, http://www. newagebd.com/special.php?spid=5&id=22 (accessed 6 June 2013). 57. “Citizenship Bangladeshi, Nationalism Bengali: PM,” BanglaNews24.com, 28 March 2011, http://www.banglanews24.com/English/detailsnews.php?nssl=ee49fef85e1bed67b9f530391b9c74d9&nttl =2012072617585 (accessed 6 June 2013). 58. Ibid. 59. “Fifteenth Amendment.” 60. “‘Indigenous People’ A Misnomer: Moni,” bdnews24.com, 26 July 26, http://dev-bd.bdnews 24.com/details.php?id=201888&cid=2 (accessed 6 June 2013). 61. “Raja Devasish Rejects FM’s Statement,” The Daily Star, 28 July 2011, http://archive.thedailystar .net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=196091 (accessed 6 June 2013).

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62. Rahnuma Ahmed, “Bengalis are Indigenous to Their Lands: An Archaeologist Contends,” The New Age, 9 April 2012, http://www.newagebd.com/detail.php?date=2012-04-09&nid=6612 (accessed 10 June 2013). 63. Pahari Promity, “An Adivasi Speaks: What Brings Me to Shahbag, What Pulls Me Back from It,” in Alal O Dulal, http://alalodulal.org/2013/02/25/shahbag-what-pulls-back/ (accessed 10 June 2013). 64. “6th Years of CHT Peace Accord: Govt Initiative Goes Against the Hill People: Sultana Kamal,” The New Age, 8 Dec. 2013, http://www.newagebd.com/detail.php?date=2013-1208&nid=75933#.UqX0afQW02u (accessed 9 Dec. 2013). 65. Balibar, Politics and the Other Scene, 58. 66. Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 67. Antionio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York, NY: International Publishers, 1971).

Lailufar Yasmin is Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh, and a doctoral candidate in the Department of Modern History, Politics and International Relations at Macquarie University, Sydney. She has written extensively on secularism in Bangladesh and South Asian issues. Her main research areas are religion and politics, ethnic issues, and South Asian politics.