CTR n.s. 7/2 (S^ing 2010) 3-18

THREE EXEGETICAL FORAYS INTO THE BODY-SOUL DISCUSSION

Joel B. Green Fuller Theological Seminary, Pasadena, CA

I. INTRODUCTION T h e default hermeneutical position by which many people today make sense of the Bible's anthropology is a dualist one. By dualism, I refer to the position that postulates, in addition to the body, a second, metaphysical entity, often called a soul or spirit, to account for human capacities and distinctives. By referring to dualism as a hermeneutical position, I mean only that many, especially non-specialist, readers of the Old and New Testaments read with the assumption that the theological anthropology of the Christian Scriptures assumes and supports body-soul dualism. In his recent book, Surprised by Hope, N.T. Wright observes, "We haVe been buying our mental furniture for so long in Plato's factory that we have come to take for granted a basic ontological contrast between 'spirit' in the sense of something immaterial and 'matter' in the sense of something material, solid, physical."1 Although Wright goes on to deny that such a view was characteristic of the regnant cosmologies of the first-century world of the apostles or of the NT writings themselves, this reference to our "mental furniture" helps to explain the ease with which moderns might find dualism in the Christian Bible, and especially in the NT. In a series of publications, I have argued against this position, dismantling the assumptions that allowed a dualist reading particularly of

N. T. Wright, Surprised by Hope: Rethinking Heaven, the Resurrection, and the Mission of the Church (New York: HarperOne, 2008) 153-54.

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the NT but also of the OT witness to the creation of the human family in the "image of God." In my book, Body, Soul, and Human Life: The Nature of Humanity in the Bible, I summarized and carried this argument forward by addressing an array of issues, including how best to understand "image of God" as this is presented in Genesis 1, the potential contribution of linguistics, Greco-Roman philosophical backgrounds, and biblical perspectives on human health, sin, conversion, and eschatology.2 Insofar as dualist readings of the biblical materials are the consequence of dualist presuppositions about the essence of what it means to be human, this interest in background, linguistic, and theological concerns is pivotal. To borrow a metaphor, in the working of crossword puzzles, themes—like "the 1960s" or "U.S. Presidents"—provide broad clues for how to work out the specific words needed to complete the puzzle.3 Similarly, if we take for granted the popular view that human beings consist of bodies and souls, then we can see how this assumption has provided clues for making sense of any number of biblical texts. My work in Body, Soul, and Human Life was in part oriented toward urging a change of "theme," so to speak. To be more specific, it was an attempt to undercut the assumption that human beings must be understood in dualist terms by urging that this assumption is generally not supported in the Christian Scriptures. I went on to argue that, as a whole, the Christian Scriptures bear witness to and are best understood in terms of a monist anthropology. Monism claims that it is unnecessary to postulate a second, metaphysical entity, such as a soul or spirit, to account for human capacities and distinctives. A number of Christian philosophers support a range of monist positions—like deep physicalism or nonreductive physicalism or a constitutional view of the human person—in order to explain how this is so without reducing the human person to his or her biochemistry.4

Joel B. Green, Body, Soul, and Human Life: The Nature of Humanity in the Bible (Studies in Theological Interpretation; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic; Carlisle: Paternoster, 2008). See also Joel B. Green, ed., What about the Soul? Neuroscience and Christian Anthropology (Nashville: Abingdon, 2004). 3 1 am borrowing this metaphorfromJohn J. O'Keefe and R. R. Reno, Sanctified Vision: An Introduction to Early Christian Interpretation of the Bible (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005) 45. For deep physicalism, see Gregory R. Peterson, Minding God: Theology and the Cognitive Sciences (Theology and the Sciences; Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003); for nonreductive physicalism, see Nancey Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies? (Current Issues in Theology; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and for the constitution view, see Kevin J. Corcoran, Rethinking Human Nature: A Christian Materialistic Alternative to the Soul (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006). See further, Joel B. Green, ed., In Search of the Soul: Perspectives on the Mind-Brain Problem (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2010).

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To return to the metaphor, changing the theme of a crossword puzzle transforms the patterns of thought by which one makes sense of the puzzle's clues, but it does not relieve one of the task of working out those clues and piecing the puzzle together, word by word. In the same way, if I have successfully undermined the working assumption that the biblical materials ought to be understood in dualist terms and demonstrated that major biblical-theological currents can be understood in monist terms, the work of exegesis of particular texts nevertheless remains. In fact, one of the typical responses to my writing or teaching on matters of theological anthropology, in which I affirm anthropological monism, is the raised hand of someone asking, "What about... ?" These words are followed by one of a handful of predictable NT texts that seem clearly to teach (or at least to assume) body-soul dualism. My initial reaction is to observe that we are so accustomed to a dualist reading of these texts that we fail to see immediately or even entertain how they might make sense within a monist anthropology. That is, the "narrative" within which we read the data shapes profoundly what we take to be obvious and self-evident. The question remains nevertheless whether we are able to make sense of those texts from within an overall monist understanding of the Bible's theological anthropology. In this essay, then, I propose to take up, seriatim, three texts that have seemed, to some discussion partners at least, to militate against an overall monist interpretation of the Bible. These texts are 2 Cor 12:1-4; Matt 10:28; and Rev 6:9-10. I will demonstrate that, at the very least, these texts do not demand a dualist interpretation and, to the contrary, are very much at home with a monist understanding of the human person. II. 2 CORINTHIANS 12:1-4: PAUL'S "OUT OF BODY EXPERIENCE"? It will be helpful, first, to set the text before us: It is necessary to boast; nothing is to be gained by it, but I will go on to visions and revelations of the Lord. I know a person in Christ who fourteen years ago was caught up to the third heaven—whether in the body or out of the body I do not know; God knows. And I know that such a person—whether in the body or out of the body I do not know; God knows—was caught up into Paradise and heard things that are not to be told, that no mortal is permitted to repeat. (2 Cor 12:1-4;NRSV) The history of interpretation of this text has surfaced a number of issues that continue to attract critical debate, but only one of these is central to my concerns—namely, the nature of Paul's experience, and particularly the possibility that this experience must be understood as his soulish

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departurefromhis own body.5 What is remarkable in this text is that Paul twice admits his somatic agnosticism: I know a person in Christ... was caught up to the third heaven whether in the body or out of the body I do not know; God knows

that such a person was caught up into Paradise whether in the body or out of the body I do not know; God knows

The basis of Paul's emphatic agnosticism regarding his bodily state has attracted a variety of explanations, with a number of scholars suggesting that Paul's apparent indifference is integral to his rhetorical responses to his opponents at Corinth.6 That is, if he had identified himself as having had a heavenly journey, he would have played into the view of those who claimed for themselves elevated status on the basis of revelatory experiences. Alan Segal theorized that the mystical guild had not yet reached clarity on the nature of ecstatic journeying and that this ambiguity is reflected in Paul's statement. "Paul's confusion over the nature of his ecstatic journey to heaven provides a rare insight into firstcentury thinking, since it demonstrates either a disagreement in the community or more likely afirst-centurymystic's inability to distinguish between bodily and spiritual journeys."7 Irrespective of how we negotiate

I assume with most scholars that Paul's reference to "a person in Christ... such a person" is a self-reference; cf., e.g. William Baird, "Visions, Revelation, and Ministry: Reflections on 2 Cor 12:1-5 and Gal 1:11-17," JBL 104 (1985): 651-62 (653-54); Christopher Forbes, "Comparison, Self Praise, and Irony: Paul's Boasting and the Conventions of Hellenistic Rhetoric," NTS 32 (1986): 130; Bert Jan Lietaert Peerbolte, "Paul's Rapture: 2 Corinthians 12:2-4 and the Language of the Mystics," in Experientia, vol. 1: Inquiry into Religious Experience in Early Judaism and Early Christianity (ed. Frances Flannery, Colleen Shantz, and Rodney A. Werline; SBLSS 30; Atlanta: Scholars, 2008) 159-76 (163); James D. Tabor, Things Unutterable: Paul's Ascent to Paradise in Its Greco-Roman, Judaic, and Early Christian Contexts (Studies in Judaism; Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986) 114-15; and among recent commentators, e.g. Victor Paul Furnish, 77 Corinthians (AB32A; Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984) 543-44; Murray J. Harris, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005) 835. See, however, Michael Goulder, "Vision and Knowledge," JSNT 56 (1994): 53-71. See, e.g. Furnish, II Corinthians, 545; Tabor, Things Unutterable, 121; Baird, "Visions, Revelation, and Ministry," 654; Andrew T. Lincoln, Paradise Now and Not Yet: Studies in the Role of the Heavenly Dimension in Paul 's Thought with Special Reference to His Eschatology (SNTSMS 43; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) 71-86. Alan F. Segal, Paul the Convert: The Apostolate and Apostasy of Saul the Pharisee (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990) 39; cf. idem, "Paul and the Beginning of Jewish Mysticism," in Death, Ecstasy, and Other Worldly Journeys

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these options, what we cannot escape is what Paul himself not only recognizes but actually emphasizes—namely, that he simply does not know the status of his body during this episode. And if someone were to argue that Paul seems able at least to entertain the possibility of a disembodied state ("whether . . . out of the body") it must also be affirmed that he seems not to imagine an embodied state ("whether in the body") as a hindrance to even this elevated form of spiritual experience. Moreover, we cannot escape the reality that major streams of the traditions of philosophical anthropology and of interpretations of mystical experiences of ascent gave Paul the wherewithal to interpret his experience. In fact, analogous reports in the wider world are mixed, with some reports clearly identifying the heavenly journey in terms of soul 8 flight and others in terms of embodiment. In terms of the latter, for example, the Testament of Abraham (Recension B) has it that the Lord's directions to the angel Michael, "Go and take up Abraham in the body and show him everything . . . , " are followed with the narrative report that "Michael left and took Abraham up onto a cloud in the body. . . ." (8:13).9 In material influenced by Platonic dualism, on the other hand, ascension took the form of soul flight apart from the body (e.g. Philo, Dreams 1.36). As a general rule, reports of rapture experiences in the Jewish tradition speak to the embodied nature of the phenomenon, whereas those in the Hellenistic tradition trace the journey of the disencumbered soul. Interestingly, in the early history of reception of Paul's autobiographical note, the tendency was strong, though not unanimous, to read Paul's experience as an ascension sans his body.10

(ed. John Collins and Michael Fishbane; Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995)93-120(109). For assessment, see loan Petru Culianu, Psychanodia I: A Survey of the Evidence concerning the Ascension of the Soul and Its Relevance (Leiden: Brill, 1983); Gerhard Lohfink, Die Himmelfahrt Jesu: Untersuchungen zu den Himmelfahrts- und Erhöhungstexten bei Lukas (SANT 26. München: Kösel, 1971) 32-41; Mary Dean-Otting, Heavenly Journeys: A Study of the Motif in Hellenistic Jewish Literature (Judentum und Umwelt 8; Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1984); Alan F. Segal, "Heavenly Ascent in Hellenistic Judaism, Early Christianity and Their Environment," ANRW 2.23.2 (1980): 1333-94; Martha Himmelfarb, Ascent to Heaven in Jewish and Christian Apocalypses (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). o

ET in E. P. Sanders, "Testament of Abraham: A New Translation and Introduction," in OTP 1:871-902 (899); italics added. See the survey in Riemer Roukema, "Paul's Rapture to Paradise in Early Christian Litertaure," in The Wisdom of Egypt: Jewish, Early Christian, and Gnostic Essays in Honour of Gerard P. Luttikhuizen (ed. Anthony Hilhorst and George H. Van Kooten; AGJU 59; Leiden: Brill, 2005) 267-83. Roukema concludes that interpretations of Paul's journey, whether with or without his body, correspond to differences between the negative valuation of human physicality in

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Indeed, given the definitive categories of Platonic dualism, had Paul been working from within that anthropological framework, he would have known wMi certainty whether it was in or out of the body. Similarly, given the ample literary evidence of soul ascent, had Paul experienced this "vision and revelation" as soul ascent, he would certainly have had the categories for declaring it in just these terms. To put it more forcefully, had Paul been influenced at this point by Platonic dualism, "he would have known quite well that the only way to go to heaven, to ascend beyond the sublunar sphere, is by leaving the body behind."11 Someone might urge that Paul's confusion on the question of the status of his body was due to the perplexity accompanying an "out-ofbody experience." Were one to do so, this would not be a case of an anachronistic imposition of a contemporarily studied phenomenon on a first-century autobiographical account. After all, reports of out-of-body experiences are well known from ancient times up to the present in folklore, mythology, and religious narratives.12 These experiences may have led people long ago to think of themselves as a soul or spirit inhabiting a body since they represent in phenomenological terms a kind of disembodied version of what we would eventually come to know as Cartesian dualism. Out-of-body experiences are typically brief episodes in which a person's conscious self seems to take leave of the body and to look back on the body as though it belonged to someone else. People talking about their out-of-body experiences report that their "selves" are temporarily not bound to the limits of their bodies. The mind seems to take up a position above or to the side of the body from which the mind is able to see the body in its former position, whether standing or sitting or lying down.13 Out-of-body experiences are surprisingly common. Many of us tend to think of out-of-body episodes as the product of a brain disorder,

Gnostic circles and the more positive appreciation of the body as part of God's creation within catholic Christianity. 11 Alan F. Segal, "The Afterlife as Mirror of the Self," in Experientia, vol. 1: Inquiry into Religious Experience in Early Judaism and Early Christianity (ed. Frances Flannery, Colleen Shantz, and Rodney A. Werline; SBLSS 40; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2008) 19-^0 (22). For bibliography, see Olaf Blanke et al., "Linking Out-of-Body Experience and Self Processing to Mental Own-Body Imagery at the Temporoparietal Junction," Journal of Neuroscience 25, no. 3 (2005): 550-57 (551); Olaf Blanke et al., "Out-of-Body Experience and Autoscopy of Neurological Origin," Brain 127 (2004): 243-58 (244). For definitions, see Thomas Metzinger, Being No One: The SelfModel Theory of Subjectivity (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2003), 489; Blanke et al., "Out-of-Body Experience," 243; Dirk De Ridder et al., "Visualizing Out-ofBody Experience in the Brain," The New England Journal of Medicine 357, no. 18 (2007): 182^-33 (1829).

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like epilepsy or schizophrenia, or as the result of a hallucinatory drug. However, most reports of out-of-body experiences come from ordinary people in ordinary life circumstances, with estimates of the prevalence of out-of-body experiences ranging from some ten percent of the general population to twenty-five percent among students. Even though we have reports of out-of-body experiences from ancient times, they have been studied only in recent decades. The results might read like science fiction, but they are very much a part of contemporary brain science. A part of our brains known as the temporal-parietal junction is known to play a key role in the experience of embodiment—that is, the sense of being spatially situated within one's body—which is itself a key element of selfhood. Studies have shown, then, that one's imagined selflocation and actual body location share neural mechanisms.1 A Swiss neuroscientist, Olaf Blanke, observed that, when he electrically stimulated this part of the brain, a patient with no prior history of out-ofbody experiences now experienced one. Blanke's experiment was conducted with the patient fully awake and aware of her surroundings. Nevertheless, she informed the researchers that she could now see the world, including herself lying on the bed, from an elevated perspective.16 Similar results were reported subsequently by Dirk De Ridder et al., who reported on the case of a 63-year-old man who presented with intractable tinnitus—that is, a persistent ringing in the ears in the absence of external sound. Stimulation with implanted electrodes overlying the temporalparietal junction on the right side as a means of suppressing his tinnitus induced out-of-body experiences.17 Recently, neuroscientists have induced out-of-body sensations less invasively, through events of multi-sensory conflict. The brain processes sensations from multiple sources (say, seeing, hearing, and touching) to determine the placement of the body in a particular space. What happens when those multiple sources disagree? Their in-body experience is In fact, a religious body in Oregon, which blends Christian and Brazilian indigenous religious beliefs, recently won therightto import and brew a hallucinogenic tea for its religious services (cf. "Ashland Church Can Brew Hallucinogenic Tea for Services, Judge Rules," The Oregonian [March 20,2009]; http://www.oregonlive.com/news/index.ss^2009/03/ashland_church_can__brew_h alluchtml [accessed March 23,2009]). The tea, brewedfromthe ayahuasca plant, contains trace amounts of the chemical dimethyltryptamine or DMT, which can cause psychedelic phenomenon, including the visual and audio sensations characteristic of an out-of-body experience. 15 E.g. Shahar Arzy et al., "Neural Basis of Embodiment: Distinct Contributions of Temporoparietal Junction and Extrastriate Body Area," Journal ofNeuroscience 26, no. 31 (2006): 807Φ-81. Olaf Blanke et al., "Stimulating Illusory Own-Body Perceptions," Nature 419 (2002): 269-70. 17 De Ridder et al., "Out-of-Body Experience."

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interrupted and they experience themselves occupying space separate from their bodies.18 This brief discussion of out-of-body experiences leads to two conclusions. First, it is unlikely that Paul recounts in 2 Cor 12:1-4 an outof-body experience since otherwise he might have reported with certainty that this "vision and revelation" was indeed "out of the body." These studies lead to a second, ironic conclusion: Out-of-body experiences are generated in our bodies, by our brains. Far from proving that there is an ethereal self that can separate itself from our material bodies, out-of-body experiences demonstrate rather the wonderful complexity of our brains as they situate us in time and space in ways that we mostly take for granted. If reference to out-of-body experiences does not move us beyond Paul's somatic agnosticism, it at least pushes us in a helpful direction of inquiry. First, this brief discussion allows us to set to the side an ontologically distinct "soul" or "spirit" as a necessary component of an explanation for the phenomenal experience of being outside of one's body. Second, it suggests the prudence of thinking about the ecstatic experience of the body in relation to normal or typical body consciousness. In fact, neurobiological study has documented a wide range of extraordinary phenomena under the general category of "disorders of body perception."19 The result of these studies, often focused on patients with disorders,20 is the identification of areas of the brain implicated in processing perception of one's body. And this has opened fresh paths for scientific exploration of the nature of religious experience, and particularly the neural correlates of religious, spiritual, and/or mystical experiences. Although "neurotheology" has sometimes been associated with extravagant claims to the contrary, these experiments explore only the embodied quality of those experiences, and neither impinge in any way on their significance to the persons and communities who report or enjoy those experiences nor speak for or against the external reality of God.21 Recently, see H. Henrik Ehrsson, "The Experimental Induction of Out-ofBody Experiences," Science 317 (2007): 1048; Bigna Lenggenhager et al., "Video Ergo Sum: Manipulating Bodily Self-Consciousness," Science 317 (2007): 109699. 19

Cf. Georg Goldenberg, "Disorders of Bodily Perception," in Behavioral Neurology and Neuropsychology (ed. Todd E. Feinberg and Martha J. Farah; New York: McGraw Hill, 1997) 289-96. 20

Many of these stories make for fascinating reading—see, e.g. Oliver Sacks, The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat and Other Clinical Tales (New York: Touchstone, 1985); and Todd E. Feinberg, Altered Egos: How the Brain Creates the Self{Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 21 See especially the useful study of Anne L.C. Runehov, Sacred or Neural? The Potential ofNeuroscience to Explain Religious Significance (Religion, Theologie und Naturwissenschaft 9; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007).

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Examples are increasingly available. Andrew Newberg and his colleagues have conducted several related studies. These include, for example, a single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT) brain imaging of accomplished Tibetan Buddhist meditators, which yielded results compatible with deafferentation of (or blocking neural input to) the posterior superior parietal lobe and parts of the inferior parietal lobe during profound unitary states. This provided the neural basis of a seemingly timeless and spaceless loss of a differentiated sense of self that, among Christians, would be experienced as a sense of mystical union with God, but among Buddhists would be experienced nonpersonally as Nirvana.22 They have also conducted a SPECT study measuring cerebral blood flow in Franciscan nuns in meditative prayer. This study found increased activity in the prefrontal cortex, and the inferior frontal and inferior parietal lobes, with changes in the prefrontal cortex reflecting an altered sense of body consciousness during the prayer state.23 Similarly, Mario Beauregard and Vincent Paquette conducted a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study of the brain activity of fifteen cloistered Carmelite nuns while they were subjectively in a state of union with God, and on this basis reported that mystical experiences are mediated by several brain regions and systems.24 Although he is not concerned with the neurobiological substrates of Paul's experience, Bert Jan Lietaert Peerbolte does locate Paul's account within this same category of "an altered state of consciousness." Thus, Paul is confused about the status of his body, implying that the boundaries of his self had been blurred, and he interpreted his experience as a revelation from outside himself and as a journey into the divine realm.25 Colleen Shantz, who is concerned with the neurobiology of Paul's experience, reaches an analogous conclusion.26 In short, although questions remain regarding Paul's heavenly journey, we have seen that this text does not provide the basis either for arguing that Paul understands the human person in dualist terms or that, irrespective of Paul's theological anthropology, Paul's experience proves a dualist view. Paul himself emphasizes his agnosticism regarding his embodied state during his heavenly journey, and comparative study has Andrew B. Newberg et al., "The Measurement of Regional Cerebral Blood Flow during the Complex Cognitive Task of Meditation: A Preliminary SPECT Study," Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging 106 (2001): 113-22. Andrew B. Newberg et al., "Cerebral Blood Flow during Meditative Prayer: Preliminary Findings and Methodological Issues," Perceptual and Motor Skills 97 (2003): 625-30. Mario Beauregard and Vincent Paquette, "Neural Correlates of a Mystical Experience in Carmelite Nuns," Neuroscience Letters 405 (2006): 186-90. 25 Lietaert Peerbolte, "Paul's Rapture," 169-73; cf. Segal, "Afterlife," 23. 26 Colleen Shantz, Paul in Ecstasy: The Neurobiology of the Apostle 's Life and Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 87-108.

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shown that the sort of ecstatic experience the apostle recounts is explicable without recourse to an entity such as a human soul or spirit distinctfromthe body. III. MATTHEW 10:28: KILLING THE BODY, BUT NOT THE SOUL Again, we begin by citing the relevant text. Do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul; rather fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell. (Matt 10:28; NRSV) Before examining this saying of Jesus in more detail, let me clarify my position on the nature of the biblical witness by asking, "What if Matt 10:28 does in fact bear witness to a dualist anthropology?" First, I want to underscore that, if one were to argue that Matt 10:28 testifies to body-soul dualism, this would not be the same thing as saying that the historical Jesus was an anthropological dualist. This text on its own allows no such trump card to be played, if in fact one were inclined to play such a trump card.27 Not only did Jesus speak in Aramaic, so that the Greek text of Matthew's version of this saying cannot be said to represent the historical Jesus pure and simple, but also we have a parallel in Luke 12:4-5 that leaves open a different way of making sense of this saying. Luke's parallel reads, "[D]o not fear those who kill the body, and after that can do nothing more. But I will warn you whom to fear: fear him who, after he has killed, has authority to cast into hell. Yes, I tell you, fear him!" (NRSV). There, we can read Jesus as saying no more than that those who are persecuted should take comfort in knowing that martyrdom is only the end of one's existence in this world, and not the ultimate end of one's life. Accordingly, the use of psyche in Matthew would refer not to "soul" but to "vitality." Second, however, even if one were to argue that Matt 10:28 referred to a dualist anthropology, this would not undermine my overall argument. This is because I have argued not that we have or need lock-step uniformity on this or any other theological position in the Christian Scriptures, nor that a dualist position is unbiblical or otherwise categorically excluded by the biblical data. I have urged instead that the witness of the biblical materials is at home with a range of monist positions that account for human capacities and distinctives on physicalist terms without reducing the human person to his or her biochemistry.

Were any inclined to do so, they would face important issues of the status of a reconstructed historical Jesus for theological method. The church has never recognized the canonical status of any historian's Jesus, but has instead found its authority in the Old and New Testaments that bear witness to him.

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What, then, of this text in Matthew? Howard Marshall recognized long ago that this saying neither presumes nor requires a particular anthropology: "[T]he truth of the saying doesn't depend upon a particular theory of the body/soul relationship." This is because "body and soul" in biblical usage refers to the totality of human personality, with either term, "body" or*"soul," capable of describing the whole. "The difficulty arises from finding some suitable terminology to indicate that the death of the physical body is not the same as the destruction of the entire personality, and it is not easy, even in modern thinking, to avoid speaking of the soul." "Terminology," he concludes, "should not worry us unduly."28 Terminology does concern David Turner, however; in his recent commentary he states categorically and without argument, "The language of this verse assumes a sort of dualism of body and soul."29 More at home in the position Marshall has staked out is John Nolland, who explains in his commentary on the Greek text of Matthew that "'soul' and 'body' provide a comprehensive designation for all that makes us a person." He observes that we have no better word than "soul," but the presence of the body in the post-death state warns against a dualism of mortal body and immortal soul. He prefers to think of "soul" as "the inner aliveness of the person," not as an ontologically separate entity alongside the body.30 Given the sociocultural context of Judaism in the Second Temple period, we should not be surprised to find in the NT texts like Matt 10:28. The saying itself echoes the martyr-theology of such Hellenistic Jewish texts as Wis 16:13-14; 2 Mace 6:30, in which it is maintained that persecutors have access only to the body, but only God has power over the whole person. Accordingly, it is worth exploring whether such texts make use of a metaphorical rather than an ontologica! dualism, in which the "inner" and "outer" aspects of a human being are separated for the sake of mitigating the power of those who would persecute the faithful. Indeed, when examining the relevance of the NT materials to the monism-dualism controversy, the distinction between ontological and rhetorical dualisms must always be kept in mind, since biblical authors have employed conceptual and/or rhetorical distinctions as heuristic devices for speaking of what is in feet indivisible. This is true not only of the Greek-speaking writers of NT texts, but also of a number of Hellenistic philosophers for whom body and soul are not separable

I. Howard Marshall, "Uncomfortable Words—VL Tear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell' (Mt 10:28 R.S.V.)," ExpTim 81 (1970): 27680(279). 29 David L. Turner, Matthew (BECNT; Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008)279. John Nolland, 77ie Gospel of Matthew: A Commentary on the Greek Text (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005) 437,436,308-09.

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entities but aspects of a single whole. In other words, it cannot be taken for granted that first-century readers and orators would have heard anthropological dualism in the linguistic duo, soma and psyche, "body" and "soul." "Inner" and "outer" or "body and "soul"—linguistic pairs such as these often have métonymie or synecdochic function, just as the pair in Scripture, "flesh and blood," does not designate two different parts of the human being but rather "human agency" (as opposed to divine). Of course, failing to account for the use of literary devices such as these in the biblical writings, some go on to compound their error by attributing technical significance to the lexemes in question, with the result that what may have been indivisible (though rhetorically differentiated) becomes within the eye of the interpreter divisible (even if functionally inseparable). Interestingly, Matthew's usage elsewhere demonstrates that he does not generally use the terms soma and psyche in ways that support a dualistic reading here. For example, soma can be used with reference to a corpse (both John's [14:12] and Jesus' [27:58-59]) and the soma can also be thrown into hell (5:29, 30)—a possibility also admitted in 10:28. Matthew 6:22-23 provides a particularly interesting case. There, Matthew reports Jesus' words: The eye is the lamp of the body (soma). So, if your eye is healthy, your whole body (soma) will be full of light; but if your eye is unhealthy, your whole body (soma) will be full of darkness. If then the light in you is darkness, how great is the darkness! (NRSV) Here, soma certainly refers to physical sensation and physicality more generally while also including the integrated self capable of good or evil dispositions and of illumination and insight. I conclude that Matthew has not developed a denotative sense of soma that recommends a reading of soma in 10:28 in terms of body-soul dualism. To the contrary, Matthew's usage elsewhere allows plenty of room for the métonymie or synecdochic senses to which I have alluded. Psyche appears more often in Matthew's Gospel but provides no traction for a dualist interpretation in 10:28. It refers to (some)one's "life" or "self in the vast majority of cases (e.g. 2:20; 6:25; 10:39; 11:29; 16:25-26; 20:28) and not to an ontologically separate part of a person,

See, e.g. R. A. H. King, ed., Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behavior in Greco-Roman Antiquity (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2006); see also the representative chapters in John P. Wright and Paul Potter, eds., Psyche and Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment (Oxford: Clarendon, 2000). These studies help to demonstrate the fallacy of commonly heard claims that "the Greeks" thought in anthropologically dualist terms.

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distinctfromthe body. Indeed, the NRSV translates psyche as "soul" only four times—twice in our text, once where it is used metaphorically for God's affective capacities (12:18), and once in the recitation of the Shema (Matt 22:37; cf. Deut 6:5), where the sense is one's vitality. How, then, might Matt 10:28 best be read? That Jesus' saying introduces a dichotomy is obvious enough, but of what sort? In a word of encouragement, Jesus insists that one's persecutors in this world are incapable of destroying the life that God has given. How is this possible? The answer lies not in denying the finality of death, but in the anticipation of resurrection (see Matt 22:23-33). But the same word is one of warning: God raises the dead, body and soul (i.e. the person in his or her totality), and for those who do not maintain faithfulness in the midst of persecution, God is capable of destroying even the life he has given. IV. REVELATION 6:9-10: THE SOULS OF THOSE SLAUGHTERED The text in view reads as follows: When he opened the fifth seal, I saw under the altar the souls of those who had been slaughtered for the word of God and for the testimony they had given; they cried out with a loud voice, "Sovereign Lord, holy and true, how long will it be before you judge and avenge our blood on the inhabitants of the earth?" (Rev 6:9-10; NRSV) The puzzle of this text is not so much the word "souls," since this could just as easily be translated, say, as "lives" or "persons." Psyche refers to "life" in Rev 8:9; 12:11; 16:3; 18:13; and to one's seat of desires in 18:14. Those inclined to a dualist anthropology may find support for their view in 20:4 ("the souls of those who had been beheaded for their testimony to Jesus and for the word of God"), but the phrase could also refer simply to "those who had been beheaded . . ."; either way, martyrs are in view. Again, the mere presence of the English term "soul" in 6:9 is insufficient warrant to identify a dualist anthropology. More to the point is the difficulty posed by the presence in heaven of the dead prior to the end— that is, the final judgment and restoration of all things. That John's reference to "the altar" locates this scene in heaven is evident from parallels in Rev 8:1-5; 9:13; 14:17-18. This might suggest some sort of intermediate state for bodiless souls during the time between death as martyrs and anticipated resurrection. In reality, the portrait John represents does not require an intermediate state, much less a bodiless one and in this respect is not at all unique in the NT. We might be drawn immediately to the story of the rich man and Lazarus, which Jesus recounts in Luke 16:19-31. Upon death, Lazarus is carried immediately to Abraham's bosom, where " . . . there is no toil, no grief, no mourning, but peace, exultation and endless life" (T.

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Ab. 20:14).32 Similarly, the rich man is now suffering in Hades—not biding his time until the final judgment. Nor do Lazarus and the rich man appear as disembodied souls. Rather, Luke's account emphasizes continuity of personal identity in the case of both characters, highlights the relationship between the nature of one's earthly life and one's experience in the afterlife, and portrays these two in the afterlife as human agents with recognizable features and corporeal existence (who can thirst, speak, and, presumably, fetch water). With these hints of corporeality, we might compare the perspective of the Jewish Apocalypse ofZephaniah (probably from the early first century CE). There, Hades is portrayed as the place of punishment for the wicked, visible from heaven, with the two, heaven and Hades, separated by ariver.In 10:12-14, during his tour of heaven under the guidance of the great angel, the seer notes, "And I saw others with their hair on them. I said, 'Then there is hair and body in this place?' He said, 'Yes, the Lord gives body and hair to them as he desires.'"33 As Turid Seim correctly observes, material-oriented ideas such as this were known in Luke's Greco-Roman setting, but generally rejected in favor of spiritual ideas among the philosophically minded;34 this makes Luke's emphasis on postmortem embodied existence all the more noticeable. Luke 16:19-31 evidences a larger concern for Luke with what Jacques Dupont referred to as "individual eschatology"35—i.e. the fate of the individual immediately upon death—even if Luke's interest here neither overshadows nor interferes with his more thoroughgoing, corporate eschatology.36 A similar perspective is found in the Testament of Abraham, usually dated to the first century CE. In eh. 11 of the Testament we read of two gates, one for therighteouswho enter Paradise (or heaven, 20:12), the other for sinners destined for destruction and eternal punishment, with judgment occurring at the moment of death and not at the End. To the evidence of Luke 16 we might add other Lukan texts, especially Jesus' words to the one criminal crucified alongside him, 51

ET in Sanders, "Testament of Abraham," 895. ET in O. S. Wintermute, "Apocalypse ofZephaniah: A New Translation and Introduction," in OTP 1:497-515 (515). 34 Turid Karlsen Seim, "In Heaven as on Earth? Resurrection, Body, Gender and Heavenly Rehearsals in Luke-Acts," in Christian and Islamic Gender Models in Formative Traditions (ed. Kari Elisabeth Borresen; Rome: Herder, 2004) 1741 (1&-21). 35 Jacques Dupont, "Die individuelle Eschatologie im Lukasevangelium und in der Apostelgeschichte," in Orientierung an Jesus: Zur Theologie der Synoptiker (ed. Paul Hoffinan; Freiburg: Herder, 1973) 37-47. Cf. Luke 12:4-5, 16-21; 23:43; Acts 7:55-60; 14:22. 36 See the discussion in John T. Carroll, Response to the End of History: Eschatology and Situation in Luke-Acts (SBLDS 92; Atlanta: Scholars, 1988) 6071; Walter Radi, Das Lukas-Evangelium (ErF 261; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1988) 135-37. 33

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"Truly I tell you, today you will be with me in Paradise" (Luke 23:43); and, probably, Luke's account of Stephen's death (Acts 7:59). We find a similar eschatological perspective elsewhere in the NT as well, for example, in Phil 1:20-24. Reflecting on his impending trial, Paul expresses his hope that Christ will be honored either by his living or dying. Then he writes, "If I am to live in the flesh, that means fruitful labor for me; and I do not know which I prefer. I am hard pressed between the two: my desire is to depart and be with Christ, for that is far better; but to remain in the flesh is more necessary for you" (Phil 1:2224, NRSV). Here, Paul seems not to contemplate the possibility of an "intermediate state," nor even a period of "soul sleep," but immediate access to the presence of Christ. That is, either way, continuing his earthly existence or dying, he foresees no time when he would not be "with Christ."37 Taking this text together with Phil 3:21 ("He will transform the body of our humiliation that it may be conformed to the body of his glory . . ."), Walter Hansen argues, "Paul's emphasis on the continuity of bodily existence raises doubts that Paul ever contemplated a time of bodiless existence. Paul asserts that personal human existence is somatic existence." He goes on to urge that "Paul's definition of death as personal communion with Christ does not support the view that there is a cessation of personal existence, euphemistically called sleep, until the return of Christ and the resurrection of the body," and that "the hypothesis of an intermediate state radically conflicts with Paul's expectation of a continuity of somatic existence."38 This is debated territory, of course, but we have already begun to see how Paul might join Luke as a witness to the sort of eschatology envisaged by John in Rev 6:9-10.39 V. CONCLUSION I am under no allusion that exegetical "case studies" like these will carry the day in the body-soul discussion. This is due to several factors. As I intimated at the outset, one of these, perhaps the most important one, 37

Cf. Daniel J. Harrington, "Afterlife Expectations in Pseudo-Philo, 4 Ezra, and 2 Baruch, and Their Implications for the New Testament," in Resurrection in the New Testament: Festschrift J. Lambrecht (ed. Reimund Bieringer, Veronica Koperski, and Bianca Lataire; BETL 165; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002)21-34(26). 38 G. Walter Hansen, The Letter to the Philippians (Pillar New Testament Commentary; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009) 274. In a recent essay, Jerry L. Sumney has argued that Paul restricts this immediate access to God's presence to martyrs and others of exceptional faithfulness (such as apostles, like himself), and that Paul nowhere thinks either of an intermediate state (whether conscious or unconscious) for all believers or of an immortal soul ("Post-Mortem Existence and Resurrection of the Body in Paul," HBT 31 [2009]: 12-26).

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is the hermeneutics of dualism that shapes so much of our discourse, including discourse in biblical interpretation. Taught—whether by Plato or Descartes or by someone else—to think of the human person in terms of body-soul dualism, with the "self typically identified with the soul, it seems only natural to open the pages of the Christian Scriptures to find body-soul dualism. This is true generally in the modern West, where "souls" are so much the stuff of prime-time television and summer reading. Within the Christian theological tradition, this tendency is probably no less typical, since theologians over the centuries have often identified the uniqueness of the human person vis-à-vis non-human creatures in terms of the human possession of a soul. That this theological position is often articulated in terms of erroneous linguistics (e.g. about what soma and psyche "mean" in the Bible) or on the basis of erroneous exegesis (especially the identification of the "soul" with the "image of God" in Gen 1:26-27)40 is generally beside the point. The issue, rather, is often one of respect for the theological tradition per se as well as the sheer inertia of longstanding claims regarding body-soul dualism, which therefore must cohere with the theological anthropology of the Bible. (In short, I am suggesting that the ease with which people find body-soul dualism in the Bible is not because "it is there" but because the "science" of Descartes and his predecessors, including Plato has shaped the theological hermeneutics by which biblical texts are read.) Finally, of course, the list of biblical texts thought to teach or at least to assume anthropological dualism includes far more than the three I have briefly addressed in this essay. I have covered others as well, of course, in my book Body, Soul, and Human Life, I anticipate, though, that still others will be presented as counter-testimony, ad infinitum. This is because we are so accustomed to a dualist reading of the biblical materials that we fail to see immediately or even to entertain how these texts might make sense within a monist anthropology. My hope in this essay, then, is not that I might convert to my way of thinking those who hold to body-soul dualism (or even to a trichotomous view of the human person: body, soul, and spirit). Rather, I hope that these three exegetical forays have suggested the possibility that even those texts that seem so obviously to support a dualist position might make sense within a monist understanding of the human person. Taken from three segments of the NT canon, these case studies add to the argument for the coherence of the biblical witness with a theological anthropology that regards as unnecessary a metaphysical entity in addition to the body, such as a soul or spirit, in order to account for human capacities and distinctives.

On these two fallacies, see further, Green, Body, Soul, and Human Life, ch.2.

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