Translated and updated version of Dumitru Sandu, Spaţiul social al tranziţiei, Iaşi: POLIROM, 1999 Updatings in chapter 2 and extensions in chapter 5. Translation by Samuel Onn. Bucharest 2002

Contents TRANSITION AS EXODUS. INTRODUCTORY ESSAY ..................................................................................1 INTENTIONS ..........................................................................................................................................................1 TRANSITION AND REFORM ....................................................................................................................................1 QUANTITATIVE PHENOMENOLOGY ........................................................................................................................3 ANALOGY APPROACH OF TRANSITION ...................................................................................................................4 EXODUS WITHOUT MOSES IN AN IDEATIC CANAAN ................................................................................................7 1.

IN SEARCH OF THE LOST ROAD..........................................................................................................11 A CULTURE OF DISSATISFACTION?.......................................................................................................................11 FROM WHERE DO THE DIFFERENCES COME? .........................................................................................................13 REFORM AS PROJECT OF SOCIAL CHANGE ...........................................................................................................17 REFORM AS SOCIAL MODERNIZATION .................................................................................................................23

2.

“INHABITANT” OF THE STATUS SPACE ............................................................................................29 OPTIMISM BETWEEN ELECTORAL AND ECONOMIC CYCLES ...................................................................................29 CHANGE AS SOCIAL PARADIGM ...........................................................................................................................33 SOCIAL SPACE OF OPTIMISM ................................................................................................................................41 DISSATISFACTION BETWEEN RESOURCES AND SOCIAL DEFINITIONS......................................................................43 SOCIAL TYPES OF PESSIMISM/OPTIMISM ...............................................................................................................45 LONG TERM SATISFACTION ..................................................................................................................................49 CAPTIVES IN STATUS SPACE .................................................................................................................................51 LIBERALIST AND COMMUNITARIAN IDEOLOGIES ..................................................................................................56 CONCLUSIONS .....................................................................................................................................................63

3.

PRODUCTIVE SOCIABILITY .................................................................................................................71 SOCIAL CAPITAL AS A FORM OF INTERACTION ......................................................................................................71 TRUST AS A FORM OF SOCIAL

EXCHANGE ............................................................................................................72

TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS .......................................................................................................................................74 THE REGIONAL SPACE OF TRUST ..........................................................................................................................84 THE EMPIRICAL STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL..................................................................................................89 THE “ROOTS” OF SOCIAL CAPITAL........................................................................................................................91 CONCLUSIONS .....................................................................................................................................................94 4.

THE ENTREPRENEURIAL ELITE .........................................................................................................98 ENTREPRENEURSHIP AS A SOCIAL INNOVATION....................................................................................................98 ENTREPRENEURSHIP AS AN ANSWER TO THE CHALLENGES OF THE ENVIRONMENT ................................................99 ENTREPRENEURS BY DESIRE, INTENTION AND BEHAVIOUR .................................................................................101 WHERE DO ENTREPRENEURS COME FROM? ........................................................................................................107 ENTREPRENEURS AND TRUST IN THE RURAL ENVIRONMENT ...............................................................................110 WHO ARE THE ENTREPRENEURS IN THE AGRICULTURE OF TRANSITION? .............................................................112 INCOME AS A SIGN OF ENTREPRENEURIAL ORIENTATION ....................................................................................119 PROFIT AND INVESTMENT AS SIGNS OF ENTREPRENEURIAL ORIENTATION ...........................................................123

THE PATH OF THE LEASE ....................................................................................................................................128 CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................................................................................130 5.

COMMUNITY AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT ............................................................................134 VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT AS STOCK OF CAPITAL .................................................................................................134 Village total capital .....................................................................................................................................134 Village and commune...................................................................................................................................137 Village size ..................................................................................................................................................137 Centrality of village location .......................................................................................................................138 Income and geographic location..................................................................................................................139 Predictors of village development ................................................................................................................140 REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AS STOCK OF REGIONAL CAPITAL ..............................................................................145 Historical regions and cultural areas ..........................................................................................................145 Development level of regions .......................................................................................................................148 Development regions as projects .................................................................................................................151 Urbanization and rural development ...........................................................................................................152 Regional stocks of human capital.................................................................................................................153 COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AS ACTION ............................................................................................................161 Community cohesion and action ..................................................................................................................161 Perceived needs ...........................................................................................................................................164 Trust as cement among leaders, institutions and people...............................................................................166 Community participation .............................................................................................................................170 Participatory development projects in rural communities ............................................................................172 CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................................................................................175 ANNEX 1: DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES USED FOR ANALYSIS .......................................................................180 ANNEX 2.SOCIAL SPACE AS STRUCTURE OF ASYMMETRIC RELATIONS: REGRESSION ANALYSIS .....................185 ANNEX 3. FACTOR ANALYSES............................................................................................................................198

Tables and figures Table 1-1. Social State of Some Central and Eastern European Countries Before Beginning Transition (1989)................................................................................................................................................16 Table 1-2. Social State of Some Central and Eastern European Countries at the Beginning of Transition ..........................................................................................................................................................17 Table 1-3.The Criteria for Evaluating the Performance of Reform..........................................................26 Table 2-1. Attitude towards privatization of enterprises.1990 .................................................................40 Table 2-2. Social space of optimism.........................................................................................................42 Table 2-3. Social types of optimism/pessimism .......................................................................................46 Table 2-4. Factors that influence the chance to adopt a certain type of optimism/pessimism .................48 Table 2-5. Predictori of long-term satisfaction .........................................................................................50 Table 2-6. Pro–active orientation classified by types of social space.......................................................54 Table 2-7. Ideal types of ideological orientation in the period of post-communist transition..................58 Table 2-8. The status profile of social types according to their ideology.................................................60 Table 2-9.Predictors of the main types of ideological orientations. .........................................................62

Table 2-10.Evaluation of the miner’s protest (mineriade) in January 1999 according to type of ideology ..........................................................................................................................................................67 Table 4-1.Entrepreneurship from the point of view of challenges and answers.......................................99 Table 4-2 The operational definition of entrepreneurial types...............................................................102 Table 4-3.Intention to open a business by residential environment (%) ................................................102 Table 4-4.The profile of the status or rural entrepreneurs.....................................................................103 Table 5-1. Rural population composition by village size .......................................................................138 Table 5-2.Diversity of village development by location within commune and by distance to nearest city ........................................................................................................................................................138 Table 5-3. Quality of roads by village location ......................................................................................139 Table 5-4. Main source of income for the rural households, function of commune location (%)..........140 Table 5-5. Predictors of village development indicators ........................................................................140 Table 5-6. A multiple regression model predicting village development...............................................142 Table 5-7. Predictors of infant mortality rate at commune level, 1994-1996.........................................143 Table 5-8. Counties function of village development and urbanization degree .....................................153 Table 5-9. Indexes of human regional capital HUMAN........................................................................154 Table 5-10. Human capital per county....................................................................................................159 Table 5-11. Housing characteristics by distance between village to the nearest city .............................164 Table 5-12. Who should solve village problems: “qualified evaluators”* .............................................166 Table 5-13. Who should solve village problems: “non-qualified evaluators”........................................166 Table 5-14. Level of trust in key institutions in rural communities , 1997-2002 ...................................167 Table 5-15. Predictors of trust in mayors from rural communities.........................................................168 Table 5-16. Predictors of trust in key institutions and actors of rural communities...............................169 Table 5-17. Attending mayor house activities by location and trust variables.......................................170 Table 5-18.Predictors of community participation .................................................................................171 Figure 1-1. Reform in the Family of Social Changes ...............................................................................19 Figure 2-1 Percentage of Optimists in the Population (1991-2002) .........................................................31 Figure 2-2. Rates of Annual Growth in Average Daily Calorie Consumption per Inhabitant and Real Salary Earnings.1991-2000...............................................................................................................32 Figure 2-3. Spaces and processes of transition: conceptual model...........................................................38 Figure 2-4.. Percentage of people satisfied with the way they live, by age categories. 1995-2002 .........45 Figure 2-5.Long-term satisfaction in the causal context of status space ..................................................52 Figure 2-6.The theoretic model of social space spheres ...........................................................................53 Figure 2-7. A phenomenological perspective of social structure .............................................................65 Figure 2-8.The system of indicators used to describe the social structure phenomenologically..............69 Figure 5-1.Indicators of village global capital........................................................................................135 Figure 5-2.Components and weights for the index of level development of the village LEVEL98 ......136 Figure 5-3. Development level of communes.........................................................................................142 Figure 5-4. The vicious circle of poverty in the plain communes of the South regions.........................144 Figure 5-5. Historical regions of Romania: total and urban population .................................................145 Figure 5-6. Cultural areas of Romania within historical regions............................................................146 Figure 5-7. The agroregions of Romania................................................................................................147 Figure 5-8. Average development of villages by historical region and cultural area within regions .....148 Figure 5-9. Indicators for the assessment of judet (county) development..............................................149 Figure 5-10. Development level of judets (counties), 1998 DEVJUD98 ...............................................150 Figure 5-11. Development and historical regions...................................................................................151 Figure 5-12. Education capital at county level, 1992 .............................................................................155 Figure 5-13. Human capital at county level. 1995..................................................................................156 Figure 5-14. Average level of village human capital by counties ..........................................................157 Figure 5-15.Education capital and material capital for counties ............................................................158

Figure 5-16. Factors in favorising / unfavorising the human capital development at district level .......160 Figure 5-17. Participatory development within the structure of local development...............................162 Figure 5-18. Actors and structures involved in community cohesion phenomena.................................163 Figure 5-19.Problematic aspects of village life in the perception of villagers .......................................165

Social Space of Transition Transition as Exodus. Introductory Essay

Intentions Transition means change, that is to say a multitude of intermediary situations between two states of relative equilibrium that are identified by experience, knowledge or design. In the case of postcommunist transition, the origin is the socialist realism of the 1980’s, the intended destination, whether explicitly or implicitly, constitutes a market economy and democracy, democratic capitalism associated with well-being, competition and freedom. Whatever name is given to it, can this change be unique? Have there been similar changes in history? Is it uniform change? Is it occurring in the same way in whole of the former communist space? But inside these countries? What are its lines of force and its essential actors? This work tries to get as close as possible to answering the above questions. The path chosen is that of a monograph on socio-cultural Romania of the 1990’s. What type of monograph? That of exhaustive research into the social life of a country in the full process of transformation? No, that which I attempt is a sociological monograph from the perspective of social space, of the configurations of the relations that orders the “flux” and “magma” of post-communist transition in this country. In order to reconstruct the world passing from socialism to capitalism/a society of well-being based on freedom, competition and competence, I have split social space into subspaces – that of status, community, region, subjects etc. I have tried to see, at the level of subspaces, where the human experiences are to be found that are associated with satisfaction and dissatisfaction, optimism, trust, tolerance, religiousness, liberalism, entrepreneurship, migration etc.

Transition and Reform The nucleus of post-communist transition is the double reform of achieving a market economy and democracy. At first glance, I have explained the vague concept of “transition” by means of another equally imprecise concept. What is post-communist reform? What are its essential determinants – a unique process, with uniform or multiform development? The concise answer to this question starts with the hypothesis that it is possible to identify a class of social changes unleashed by the plans of the elite and implemented by means of interaction between the elite and the masses, on the basis of some mechanisms of persuasion, contagion or constraint. The name that this normally goes under is that of reform. The clothing of the concept thus defined dresses very well the body of religious reform of the 16th century, those brought by communism through restraint and the different waves of European and Latin-American democratization following World War II. (O'Donnell, G., Schmitter, Ph., Whitehead , 1986).

1

Dumitru Sandu Transition and post-communist reform are not two different processes, rather they are two perspectives on the same process of structural change from a centralized economy and totalitarian organization to a market economy and democracy. The reform approach follows the changes from the perspective of the plan, of the target condition that is being aimed for – the society of well-being, based on freedom and competition. Market economy and democracy are two possible names, two possible preferred models, historically founded for this aim of transition. The operational definitions and names that are given to it can differ – market socialism, modern society etc. – but the features of the market economy and of democracy, after the traumatic communist experience, can not be eliminated from the identification of the target conditions provoked by the structural changes in the former societies of state socialism. The perspective of transition is more complex, involving more terms of reference than the reform approach. Judging a social condition from the perspective of the transition of the 1990’s in Romania involves reference to existed during communism and to what is expected to exist based on the reform plan and the similar experiences of history. The measurement of distances between present and past and between present and “desirable future” is subsumed under the perspective. The perspective of transition is broader also because it includes those changes which are associated with the actual effects of the processes of democratization and the development of the market economy. The concept of transition has, in addition, a mark of evaluation. Transition is a “passing”1 from one state to another. But not just any passing, rather it is a passing that, in the vague evaluation of those that experience it, would best be as short as possible, be put behind them as quickly as possible. The hypothesis of the existence of a tendency in the linguistic practice of the social sciences could be formulated in order to name as transition2 the changes and the passing experienced that have a most uncertain evolution and unwanted effects when taking place. There exists the tendency to label social transformations accompanied by crises as “transitions”3. On the level of the same linguistic practices of the social sciences there appears the tendency to associate the term “transition” with changes that are short-term or wanted as such. Long-term changes are given most often the name of “transformations”. The works of great impact in the social sciences create models for terminological practice. It is very likely that “the Big Transformation” of Karl Polanyi (1944), as a classic work of analysis of the passing from capitalism based only on the principle of the market to capitalism in which institutions of social protection begin to be operate, contributed substantially to the crystallization of a way of using the term “transformation” in the social sciences. But “the Big Transformation” is of long-term duration. The double movement was that of limiting the expansion of market mechanisms by means of social protection mechanisms. Once lived through, the changes get a precise name.

2

Social Space of Transition To reduce transition to a historical period is not sufficient. Basically, Romania has been going through transition ever since 1830. Just as many other peripheral states have been doing. It is important to emphasize the fact that, through the transition concept an approach is proposed by measuring the distances between present and origin and destination reference conditions, and also to identify mechanisms that allow the change between two temporal reference points. And it is more correct is to distinguish between transition as a period and transition as method of approach.

Quantitative Phenomenology Regardless of the perspective adopted, the structural change from a socialist organization to one based on competition and democracy remains complex, with many components, twists, phases and strategies. The bigger the overlap between the space lived in by the author and that analyzed, the more difficult the reconstruction of this structural change in a scientific plan. Axiological neutrality and the keeping of correct measure in the relationship between the essential and the ephemeral constitute a difficult challenge under these conditions. In wishing to keep as close as possible to the aim of axiological neutrality, I have followed systematically the support of theoretical construction and of highly standardized analytical instruments. The annexes to this work represent an attempt to describe the social space of the country as a configuration of relations that can be measured using regression and factor models. In order not to lose the reader that prefers less formalized scientific construction, I have adopted in the contents of this work simplified formulations of the analyses in the annexes. Even with this amendment to the form of presentation, quantative analysis centred on relations remain dominated by the danger of “loss” of the social agents and of ignoring the constitutive role of subjectivity in social life. I have attempted to address the respective risk by means of an approach that could be given the name “quantitative phenomenology”. In Sociology, phenomenology is established as approach under interpretative sociologies that are centred on subjectivity, the constructive role of social agents, social definitions, “the world of life” etc. (Schutz, 1975). The collection and interpretation techniques of the data associated with phenomenological approaches are those of the qualitative kind. A more or less artificial opposition between qualitative and quantative approaches is present in the comparisons between interpretative and objective sociology. At the level of symbolic interaction, for example, there appears the profound worry about the dehumanized character of the social life approach in terms of variables4. The empirical foundation of this work is constituted by survey data based on sampling that is representative at a national level. However imaginative the questions posed, survey data at the individual-familial level feeds a strong pressure of atomization of the interpretations and of reduction of social life to a groups of standard individuals. I have tried to avoid as much as possible such a 3

Dumitru Sandu sociological trap as result of theoretical construction, multi-level approaches and typological construction. The aggregation of these approaches together with analysis focused on quantative relations was carried out with the intention of finding again the subjectivity beyond the multitude of objective restraints and methodological standardizations. For every type of social space in which I have arrived analytically, I have attempted to place in conjunction objective and subjective measures, agents, relations, constraints and opportunities. Quantitative phenomenology could be the label of subsummation of such an approach, with multiple methods thus conjugated and orientated that the quantative measures contribute to the identification of the subjective, constructivist presence of the different agents in social space. What this volume does not include amongst the constituents of quantative phenomenology is the community study capable of putting back into context opinions and behaviours, to give them structural meaning. This deficiency is partially substituted for by multi-level approaches, by the association of opinions and individual behaviours with community and regional variables. Quantitative phenomenology is an attempt at understanding the “the world of life” constituted by intersubjectivities by passing from analyses in terms of variables to analyses which reconstitute significant contexts for human experiences by multi-level analyses, typologies, profiles, and community studies. It is, in effect, an approach by multiple methods orientated towards the identification of subjective aspects for which different objective variables or combinations of objective variables matter. From the perspective of quantative phenomenology it is necessary that phenomena such as poverty be approached through objective and subjective indicators, community development be viewed simultaneously through conditions of community satisfaction and through community satisfaction etc. The types of social situations which give account of the variation of behaviours and opinions are an essential instrument for increasing the chance of nearing the “the world of life” and nearing social life as experience. Analogy Approach of Transition The coming closer to the whole, to the real complexity of post-communist reform or transition processes can be achieved by calling on the power of analogies. Out of the long series of relevant metaphors I have retained as particularly useful those of biblical exodus, the game of chess and the treatment of a sick person.. The adoption of any one of them is accompanied not only by a game of correspondences, but also by the reference to different philosophies or concepts of reform. A succinct actualization of the relevant analogies in the introduction is made with the intention of suggesting a picture of the whole 4

Social Space of Transition concerning post-communist transition before proceeding to the analytical “dissections” in the actual chapters of the work. The exodus of the Jews is described in the Bible as mass flight from the Egypt of the Pharaons in order to escape slavery and to arrive in the promised land, “in a fertile and large land, in a land flowing with milk and honey, in the place of the Canaanite, the Hittite, the Amorite, the Perizzite, the Hivite, and the Jebusite” (Exodus, 4:8). Leaving slavery is begun and organized by divine order. As also in the case of reform, departure is from a known origin, from a land of suffering, to a promised land, unknown but ideatically identified. The journey takes 40 years. During the journey, the Jews receive from God, through Moses, the Ten Commandments, rules for organizing the holy tent, work days and festive days. There are founding laws, social and religious laws. The time of exodus is extremely rich in events, in social education phenomena, phenomena of opposition between leaders, between leaders and members of the community etc. The isomorphism between the biblical phenomenon and that of transition can be established on multiple levels. Just as in the case of exodus, we again find a process of voluntary passing from a land of slavery to a promised land (democracy, well-being, freedom etc. in the case of transition). As in the biblical sequence, change aim and plan of escape from slavery are given. The project of reform belongs to the elite. The function of the reforming leaders is, as in the case of Moses, not only that of conceiving the project for change, but also that of finding means to maintain the population on the path of reform, despite all difficulties. Chess is another type of analogy that can be used when considering post-communist transition. For all morphologic components of the game, functional equivalents at the level of the social process are found easily: game of chess players pieces rules game strategies resources for winning the game clear definition of the final situation for winning the game

= = = = = =

processes of transition agents of reform a) actors manipulated/influenced by agents, leaders b) material capital of agents institutions politics, reform strategies human capital as reform resource indicators for estimating the stage or reform

The opposition between transition as exodus and transition as a game of chess leads to the clear identification of two concepts of the reform process. In the first case, the vision of dependence on the path is determined – the change is pre-determined (Rona-Tas, 1998) by the point of departure (divine will in the biblical sequence), experience of the partial reforms in the pre-transition period (resources of material capital, human capital and social capital that exists in the society for the case of reform process).

5

Dumitru Sandu The analogy of the game of chess refers to the conception of transition as process with internal determination. The strategy is the principal factor directly influencing the result. The actors with resources of human capital and with their strategies are those that “play the game”, decide upon the fate of reform. And not just any actors, but, in particular, it is the leaders, the functional equivalent of the players who move the pieces in a game of chess. Chess pieces are carriers of ambiguity. On the one hand they signify the material resources of the agents. They are the visible stock with whose help the player can win the game. This is the associative metaphor between player and pieces. There is, however, also a metaphor based on the opposition between player and pieces: the first is the actor of the elite, agent of construction, and the pieces are the symbol for masses, for those who experience the reform due to some mechanisms of restraint or social contagion. In the reforms effected by constraint of the kind promoted by soviet occupation, the chess pieces are not resources, rather they are the masses. At the limit, in democratic reforms, the chess pieces are material resources. In fact, even in democratic transitions, the metaphor of chess pieces can be read in both senses, as reference to the resources of the elite and as the masses that are influenced by the elite. These two analogies, that of chess and that of exodus, refer to concepts with different functions. Through references to the succession of events of an exodus kind, justification is obtained for the slow rhythm of transition (“more than 40 years were needed to arrive in Canaan”) or possibly the narrative structures relevant to “how the process went”. Transition as a game of chess is closer to the constructivist vision – reform can be carried out, depending on the way in which rules and pieces, strategies and resources are combined in order to achieve the goals. As also in the game of chess, where all pieces are individualized by the starting position and by the syntax which is associated with it (Marcus, 1987:348), in the process of transition every category of social actors is individualized through initial disposable resources and the type of normative-institution system that regulates his moves. The exodus analogy emphasizes the opposition between the masses and the elite, whereby with the chess analogy attention is directed towards categories of actors and strategies. However, it is true that both analogies and, implicitly, the concepts that are associated with them, can function in a justified context (“why the process is developing in this way”), a cognitive context (“how was the course of the change”) or a pragmatic context (“how can action be taken”). From all three points of view – knowledge, justification or action – the exodus and chess visions of reform can be completed. Reform and transition are simultaneously dependents of path and voluntary construction. What both analyses lose is speed, the mode of development of the process. In association with the exodus image, the speed of the process is slow and pre-determined. In the analysis of the game of chess the problem of speed does not occur. 6

Social Space of Transition For the completion of the analogy image of reform, in order to include other aspects, the metaphor of the sick was called upon. From this perspective reform can be gradual or “shock”, just as also can be the treatment of a sick person by drugs or surgery respectively. With this same logic, the stabilization of inflation must precede or accompany liberalization and privatization. Both the metaphor of the sick person as well as the game of chess favour meditation on the types of strategies: gradualist – shock type, survival or attack, mobilization of reduced resources or of a high level of resources etc. Practically, transition as exodus is the lack of human strategies, it takes place simply as a result of historic destiny. The three images-guide of reform no longer meet at the level of the elite, but at the level of ordinary people. On the level of individual lives the societal project is experienced either as exodus, a game of chess or as method of treatment of illness. The entrepreneurs are clearly the chess players of transition. The poor, non-entrepreneurs, the poor from the areas of poverty about whom will be spoken in this work are, most likely, the carriers of an exodus philosophy. For them change will come of its own or, if possible, they will avoid it. Entrepreneurs are not the same. Some start businesses for profit, with the hope of rapid and considerable winnings. The philosophy of transition as a game of chess and radical treatment is specific to them. They accept the risks of the operation that is change. However, there also exists the survival type of entrepreneur. For him engagement in business is not so much a way of becoming rich, rather it is a means to survive. He oscillates between the philosophy of exodus and that of drug treatment or surgery.

Exodus without Moses in an Ideatic Canaan Normally, the conditions of transition are less durable than the points of equilibrium in which they appear. There are, however, societies in which transition is a near permanent state. Romanian society seems to be one from the respective series. As the totalitarian-communist reform of after 1944 began, Romanian capitalism was far from being strongly established on all socio-economic levels and sectors. For large segments of the rural population, for example, agricultural subsistence was the main mode of socio-economic organization. The inter-war period was one of consolidation of the capitalist economy and of the state of national unity. At the beginning of the 1930’s, Stefan Zeletin estimated that “Romania is still in a period of transition from the old agricultural regime to the new modern, capitalist regime: the old regime was done away with, but its traces had not yet been totally eliminated, and the new regime hadn’t got out of its swaddling clothes” (Zeletin, 1997:493). The dictatorship of Carol II, that is that of Antonescu, the war and the following soviet totalitarianism put a stop to the capitalist and 7

Dumitru Sandu politico-administrative transition processes. The economic, social and political transitions that began after the first World War were far from having been completed in the 1940’s. Communism came with reform by constraint - soviet, to the letter and in spirit. There began a new transition, a transition towards communism. Its distinguishing mark was the discontinuity, the break with what there had been before. A intentional break that was taken up and imposed in all spheres of life. A new kind of man of the communist type was wished for which would only then appear if all connection with the past was cut. Nonetheless, the lines of force of the past had to be clearly destroyed by means of communist irradiation, by means of the negation of private property, individual freedoms, civil society as group freedom, competition etc. If there existed in some societies, as in the Hungarian or the polish societies, room for partial reforms of capitalist-democratic orientation, in Romania there was only the question of passing from the soviet occupation to the communism of Dej and afterwards to that of Ceauşescu. In the whole socialist world, the project of transition to communism failed. The revolutions of 1989 mark this failure symbolically. From then on a new “double” transition towards a market economy and democracy is beginning. It is, in fact, also like the transition from capitalism to socialism, a transition of a total nature. The major difference resides in the fact that the mechanisms of realization are predominantly voluntary. A return to normality is desired overwhelmingly by the population. A careful examination of what happened in the relation between intentions and action leads to the finding that, for the time being, the post-communist transition of Romania took place more in the direction of underdevelopment, and the achieved construction was more on the level of a society of survival (Pasti, Miroiu, Codiţă, 1997). Communism is an historical sequence of voluntary changes carried out by violent measures of cooperativizing agriculture, abolishing some social categories by physical extermination, imposition of a way of life based on fear, duplication, atomization of social relations. In its content there also exist, however, components of modernization and social mobility. The growth in stock of school education (Holmes, 1997:239) is such a component of modernization for all socialist countries. In fact, the tension between the expectations of a population with a considerable stock of education and the mode of social organization based on force is one of the important factors that fed the revolutions of 1989. Increasing considerably the stock of education, communism intensified an immense force of modernization at the individual level. Under totalitarian or authoritarian conditions, individual modernity remained for an overwhelming part of the population at a latent level. Why latent? For the simple reason that individual modernity cannot exist that appears outside of a liberal-democratic institutional framework. After 1989, the reform of setting up the market economy and democracy began. It was a new road, not only of abandonment, but also of negation of the totalitarian-communist reforms. There began a new transition by the same already common procedure of negation of the previous transition.

8

Social Space of Transition The modern history of Romanian thus appears as a succession of non-achieved transitions that negate one another reciprocally. It seems to be the question of a series of exoduses without Moses, without political leaders who are capable of bringing the population out of the desert. Which of the figures with political profile of a maximum visibility of the 70 years of history can be considered saving or exemplary not through intentions or social projections but through achievement in national space? Naturally, between them there are enormous differences. Contexts, geopolitical pressures, abilities and very different intentions. Which of them, however, can be invoked without hesitation as effective figure and not intentional saving? In all these years, the promised land existed more in a confused-ideatic environment than as credible image or reality at the end of the road. Intentions, ideology of salvation were aplenty. The real social-historic journey was mostly on roads with dust from Shur, Sin or Sinai (Exodus,15-19). Hope of hidden, positive continuity remains. Although slow and winding, the road nonetheless seems to have an ascending course. This can be seen, not only in the industrial figures, agricultural figures or figures for GDP, but also, in particular, in the figures of growth in education stock and of the reduction in infant mortality5. From where does the discontinuity of transitions and the twists and turns of “exodus” towards well-being and social freedom originate in the case of Romania? Do they come from the extremely rugged configuration of the part of the world in which we live, or from the absence of a Moses in the drought in the encountered desert? Historical experience seems to suggest the answer of double determination of the discontinuities of the transition – the geopolitical configuration and the absence of providential leaders. Or maybe it is a matter of other factors that are situated in the cultural layers of determinism. However, this land of values is so heterogeneous and with an action so mediated that its invocation is full of traps that could only be avoided in another work, explicitly and inspiredly devoted to the topic. The book tries to give a sociological picture of Romanian post-communist transition at micro(individual) and meso- (regional/community) levels. The key data sources are the surveys organized by Open Society Foundation OSF in Romania under the title of “Public Opinion Barometer” (POB) or the surveys the author of the book conducted for different international companies in Romania after 1989. His research work for World Bank, PHARE programmes and University of Bucharest on social capital or (regional) development topics constituted the starting points for the majority of the chapters. The official and survey data of univariate nature cover, function of their availability, the period 19902002. Multivariate analysis focuses on different moments, favouring , in the majority of the cases, the points in time with the data sets containing the best predictors for reference variables.

9

Dumitru Sandu The book is organised by six chapters in the logic of passing from subjective to objective dimensions , from latent dimensions to overt behaviours, from individual to community and regional aspects of social life. The first chapter introduces the main concepts for analysing reform processes

in post-

communist transition and give some comparative data that are relevant for the path dependency of the transition processes. Chapters two and three analyse latent dimensions of social life as related to satisfaction, ideologies and trust on the basis of survey data. Optimism, pessimism, satisfaction and change ideologies are analysed in relation with the status space. Human, material an social capital are the key predictors of satisfaction and social ideology indicators. Social capital is considered to be a form of “productive sociability”. Chapters four and five reach key aspects of overt behaviours

of population in private

(entrepreneurship) and public life (social movements). Status inconsistency is proved to be a significant predictor of public action attitudes and behaviours of the population. The last chapter aggregate data as to give an image of the community and regional Romania. Community and regional development are conceptualised and measured as specific stocks of human, material, symbolic, vital and social capital. Different indices of village and county development have been tested not only for methodological but also for policy foundation values. The last part of this chapter concludes on community development as public action in the transition context.

10

The Social Space of Transition 1.

In Search of the Lost Road

A culture of dissatisfaction? The things happening here and now in the Romania of the turn of the millennium, on the border between story and engineering, between the road that projects itself, for which travel plans are made, or upon which effectively the journey of life is made. A journey lived as hope, disappointment, drama or fulfilment. For whom hope, disappointment, drama or fulfilment? How and why? Engineering is a substantiated promise, well-founded on design and measure. Story is desire, imagination. Which design and which desire? The design is called reform, the re-founding of society on the mechanisms of the market economy and democracy. The desire is also simple, easily expressed – dignified life, freedom and fulfilment of basic human needs and needs of self-realization. The “engineers”, builders of the reform project, are initially the politicians, experts which serve them or those that oppose them or ignore them, and the international institutions that come from the world “beyond” to which both desires and projects lead. At the beginning, the social logic of engineering and of reform nearly overlaps the logic of the fairytale, the collective imagination about what market economy and democracy will be. The road to be travelled seems unique and easy. The “dragon–guardian” of communism was decapitated by a revolution. Really a revolution? Yes, a political revolution, even if it was “stolen” or christened as “coup d’état”. With some simple materials – free press, a certain kind of privatization and a slightly friendlier but nonetheless all-powerful state - it was believed that the new construction would be realized. Capitalism, unemployment, inflation, poverty beyond already existing limits? Not at all. They had not appeared, not in the story written by the imaginary collective, also not in the projects of the new engineers of the reform. It still oscillated between a reformism of negation – “it must be different than it was before” – and a utopian reformism – “we will have well-being but without large social costs and in particularly without detailed restructuring”. In the meantime, the rupture between what is said and what happens, between desire and reality, continues to increase. The unwanted characters of transition – inflation, unemployment and poverty – begin to speak through their own simple ever more conspicuous presence. The anonymous narrator realizes that the reality that he lives in, the road on which he effectively travels, is both very far from his own desires and from the images that the engineers of the new power propagate. The logic of reality opposes rebelliously the affectionate logic of the vague project of transition but also of the project given by the engineering of the power. The tensions between the road-project of reform, the road hoped for by millions of travellers, and that on which these travellers are also obliged to travel, amplify themselves. 11

Dumitru Sandu Who is to blame – the politician-designer or expert of power, the executant-administrator, or simply the traveller who doesn’t know what he wants or doesn’t know how to travel on the new road? In 1996, the traveller, as voter, decided that the guilty party was the designer. Consequently he exchanged the mainly left leaning designer for one mainly leaning to the right. Additionally, the latter made promises in precise terms – “we will work with x number of real experts and will undertake “contractually” that we will change the face of the country in x number of days”. The voters gave the new designers an immense capital of trust. Trust in government grew after the elections 1996 by a minimum of 20 percent, and that in parliament by over 16 percent6. Signs of the truth appeared rapidly. The new team in power was far from being a team. There were a minimum of four teams. Each with its own agenda and leaders, with divergent directions: Christian-democrat (PNTCD), liberal (PNL), social-democrat (PD) and ethnic (UDMR). The population took back the gift of trust accorded to the institutions of power7. The conflict of different agendas and the imposition of the algorithm of occupation of positions began. Inexplicably, the fact was forgotten that there was a single large beginning for all private and party agendas. This had to be an economic one. It was necessary initially to answer the following questions: what still needed to be done with the large industrial companies that work on losses and with large subsidies? How could small and middlesized companies be stimulated? Natural solutions of search began to appear. The making redundant of the miners in exchange for many salaries, given unconditionally by way of compensation, was such a beginning. After a short period of enthusiasm for and acceptance of the solution, signs of inadequacy began to appear. The redundant did not become entrepreneurs, rather they simply became people with no living resources. The rates of unemployment in the zones effected by redundancies multiplied a few times and associations formed of those that had left the mines (Maria Larionescu, Cosima Rughiniş, Sorin Rădulescu :1999, 131-140,206-208). The attempt after 1996 of the second government to repeat the solution for the redundancies following the previous model was vehemently rejected by the miners. Thus the new mineriade (miner’s protest) of January 1999 took place. Seemingly, they were similar to those of 1990 and 1991. In fact, their hard nucleus was represented by the social movements aimed at correcting some government resolutions which ignored the role of the regional politics and the social politics that were necessary to restructure some of the single industry zones. It was clear evidence that the miners had learnt the lessons of transition quicker than the government. The generalization of the feeling that the much promised reform was more of a mirage created by the politicians than a strategy for its own survival lead to the transition being perceived more as a closed path or, in any case, as a journey without end. A departure from the communism, yes, but without a credible destination that could be reached within the period of a generation.

12

The Social Space of Transition In the absence of a political, managerial elite capable of constructing the institutions necessary for the reform, the economy passed ever more into to the informal, grey zone. This process seemed to be associated with that of an increase in corruption. In order that the informal economy runs well, it is necessary that public institutions are weak and corruption efficient. It is difficult to say how corruption evolved on electoral cycles. It is well known, however, that the dissatisfaction of the population with the efficiency of the government in the fight against corruption has nearly tripled as social presence in two years8. Naturally, the feeling of dissatisfaction as such carries with it the burden of the real phenomenon of the increase in corruption, but also an increase visibility of the fight against corruption, and an ever increasing level of the population’s expectation of the institutions of power which had won the elections to a large extent by playing the morality card and the card of promised competence. What are the grounds for this feeling of general dissatisfaction in the population? Is it really a question of the spread of poverty, corruption and incompetence constructed by political algorithm? The politicians that feel themselves directly responsible for what happens in the country tend to answer that it is a question, naturally, of real problems, but also of a culture of dissatisfaction that either this people has in its deep mentality layers or that it is systematically put into the minds of this people by means of surveys, the press, opposition parties etc. In the same way, with somewhat more sophisticated arguments, also the less competent survey commentators make pronouncements, emphasizing the idea that actually the deep-rooted “negativism” of the Romanians is also to blame.

From where do the differences come? The first years of post-communist reform were years of hopes: without soviet dominance and without internal enemies (dictator, secret police, incompetent people with political power) coming back to normality would be much easier and would be carried out relatively quickly. The reasoning seemed to be correct: as soon as the cause of evil was done away with, good would come of its own just as plants grow healthily after the removal of weeds. However, this consensus of hope was followed by conflict and controversy, the unsafe road. Ever increasingly questions are posed as to the correctness of the elections. Are those in positions of political control indeed the most suited for the task they have to perform? Depending on the signals that they give, and on the values or interests of those that judge them, the new elite are labelled as neocommunists, technocrats or restorers of the order of the pre-communist period. No sooner has the old enemy with well specified name and identity disappeared, than fear of a new enemy appears. In the new context, the enemy remains localizable in internal space for some (the neo-communists, the restorers of the landowners and the monarchy) and external for others (the comminternists, the Hungarian 13

Dumitru Sandu revisionism, large capital from the western centre). The societal debate now takes place exactly in this dimension of the internal or external localization, of the national enemy. The more complicated the game of adopted symbols and that of the signals sent by the population, the greater the intensity of the debate: the representatives of the new power declare themselves to be warriors against communist totalitarianism, possibly former dissidents, but continue to speak in the techno speak of party meetings and see in every street movement, in every protest, a form of the legionaire movement or of restoration; for their part, the historical parties are rebuilding themselves in a confusing configuration, with former political prisoners, returned emigrants, and also former communist party activists or officers of secret police. The language and behaviour of the elite is not only anti-communist, but often also restorative, pro monarchy and sustains, explicitly or implicitly, the idea that things can be started again from year zero, from the situation which preceded soviet occupation. To this logic belongs to a large extent the political battle for restitutio in integrum, be it a question of land, forests or property. As the border between the moral-democratic motivation of returning property and that of the economic motivation of the personal interest of those that suggest public policy is not always easy to draw, the topic of restitution has been a major source of social conflict. Between historical justice and the socio-economic efficiency of the measures of public politics, many disputes have crystallized. Initially, the enemy was sought either outside the country or in the communist or capitalist past. However, the more the difference between hope and reality increased and the more differences in economic performance amongst the former communist countries grew, the more public debate was turned towards identifying the internal causes of the difficulties of transition. Why have countries such as Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic shown better performance in the reform process and other countries, such as Romania or Bulgaria, moved more slowly, with more twists on the new road of reform? Dependency on the path, on the economic condition at the starting point, is known to be a main source of the differences (Rona-Tas, 1998). Under these differences come the differences in human, material and institutional capital that are relevant for the efficiency of the reform. However, this explanation is insufficient. Consequently, supplementary explanatory factors, social and cultural factors, are called upon (see Text Box 1.1). Testing their effects is, however, difficult to carry out, be it also only because of the difficulties in measuring. Alternatively, analyses at the micro level are more efficient from this point of view, arguing the case of influence or individual modernity over the behaviour of reform. A possible “cultural complex of reform” is identified as interaction between modernity, trust and reformism (Sandu, 1996a). Another line of explanation of the intersocial differences in performance in the reform process is formulated in terms of pathology or social disfunctionality. Corruption and incompetence, bad social selection in the establishment of the new elite respectively, are identified in the public conscience or in 14

The Social Space of Transition specialist discourse as sources of social evil. The inefficient policies of the reform come to be seen as the cause of this social evil. The initial situation of the social-economic organism, the adoption of gradualist or shock therapies, together with the social, cultural and political environment in which reform is realized thus appear as principal explanatory categories for the differences in performance of post-communist reforms (Text Box 1.1). The public, specialist or layman’s discourse combines these factors in different ways and levels in order to explain why some countries fared better than others in the process of the post-communist reforms in Central and Eastern European Countries. It is very likely that, for different countries and for different components of the reform, the explanatory configurations are strongly differentiated. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic benefited from a better economic starting point in comparison with Romania, Bulgaria or Albania (see Table 1.1, Table 1.2).

Text box 1-1Source of Differences in Societal Performance in Realizing Reform INITIAL STATE, AT THE START OF REFORM Economic condition (path dependence): proportion state/private sector, level of technical modernization, managerial experience Experience of the partial reforms in communist period Level of integration in economic, social and cultural communication circuits with the developed capitalist countries MODE OF REALIZING THE REFORM Through slow, partial reforms of gradualist or shock type Sequence of political, economic measures: stabilization, liberalization, institutional reform; reforming of the goods, capital, labour markets etc. The relation between economic and political reform: economic reform without democratization (as in China), economic and political reform started simultaneously, political reform preceding economic reform. THE INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT OF REFORM Social environment Corruption, political clientism, negative social selection ethnic, confessional conflicts Social capital Political environment: presence of neo-communists/technocrats/forces of the right in power Cultural environment Stock of social modernity and human capital Religious differences (Orthodox/Catholicism, Protestantism) Level of development of democratic culture EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT OF REFORM financial favoritism/indifference/discrimination by the West political discrimination/indifference/discrimination by the West

Gradualism was the therapy principally adopted in the countries which started reform from a position of weak economic development. There is, however, no pattern that can be applied generally: Hungary also adopted a gradualist reform strategy. It benefited, however, from its considerable experience in carrying out partial reforms in the socialist period. The processes of social learning, of 15

Dumitru Sandu adapting to reform, were already underway when the whole of Central and Eastern Europe was caught in the flow of structural transformations after 1989. Poland is of one of the countries in which economic shock therapy was adopted after an important force of democratization (Solidarity) won full legitimacy as a result of the actions of 1980 – 1981 and the elections of June 1989, and the failed partial economic reforms of the period martial law. The simple attempt to decentralize the functioning of state companies without the promotion of stabilization, liberalization and privatization measures had accentuated the economic crisis, without any prospect of solution. The need for structural economic reforms was demonstrated even by the failure of the partial reforms. The political will to launch such reforms existed and was strongly reinforced by Solidarity. Additionally, the interests and desire of the West to make out of Poland a model example of postcommunist reform translated, amongst other things, into direct economic aid by the wiping off of half of Poland’s foreign debt. The international economic environment was, as such, extremely advantageous for polish reform. Table 1-1. Social State of Some Central and Eastern European Countries Before Beginning Transition (1989) Country

Slovenia Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic , Slovakia East Germany Hungary Poland Romania Bulgaria

Gross Domestic Product per Inhabitant *1992 (US Dollars) 6540

Percentage of Population Employed in Agriculture and Forestry**

Percentage of Population Employed in Service Sector**

11.5

40.6

10.6 20.0 26.4 27.9 19.31

40.0 42.6 36.4 27.0 34.0

2450 1930 2970 1910 1130 1330

1 – figures for 1988 *

- Source : World Development Report 1994 ** - Source : Statistical Year Book of Romania 1990. National Commission for Statistics

In Romania, the parameters that defined the road dependence had overwhelmingly negative values: an economy, strongly marked by worn out physical, moral infrastructure, by the consequences of the isolation of the 1980’s; the absence of any experience of the reforms of democratization or liberalization in the socialist period; a strong social tiredness (narrowly correlated with an extremely bad health condition of the population), installed as a result of the Ceauşescu experiments in the accelerated paying off of the country’s foreign debt of the country and the consolidation of totalitarianism; and the absence of any experience of democratization in the socialist period. The failure of the partial reforms had not been proved in the country in the socialist period.

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The Social Space of Transition Table 1-2. Social State of Some Central and Eastern European Countries at the Beginning of Transition Country Czechoslovakia East Germany Hungary Poland Romania Bulgaria Ukraine Rep. of Moldova Estonia Latvia Lithuania 1

Rate of Infant Mortality, 1990 11.52 7.61 14.8 14.8 22.7 14.8 12.9 20.71 12.4 11.41 14.32

Life Expectancy at Birth2 72

Urban Population, (percent)2

70 71 70 72 70 69 70 69 71

62 62 53 68 67 47 72 71 68

– 1989, 2 - 1991

Source: Statistical Year Book of Romania, 1992. National Commission for Statistics, World Development Report 1993. Investing in Health, World Bank, Oxford University Press. 1993 In the absence of any experience in democratization or partial economic liberalization, and under the conditions of the installation in power of a political force of the left (National Salvation Front, FSN), strongly connected to the immediate communist past, the therapy adopted in the economic plan was of the gradualist kind. Given this context, an attempt to accelerate the reform, launched in 1991 from the radial wing of the FSN, represented by Petre Roman, was stopped by social demonstrations (the mineriada (miner’s protest) of 1991) and obscure political games. Given this starting point, the society was not yet prepared for radical economic reforms and, on the level of the political class, there was no consensus on the optimal strategy for reform. Considering the ensemble of East European countries, it follows that the failed experiences of partial reform from the socialist period had an extremely important role in the structuring of the pattern of the reform. Although the succession of the changes strongly differed9 amongst the countries in this region, the process of constructing reform by trial and error, based on social learning capital seems to have been dominant. On such basis the social trust capital is constructed which the government needs in order to proceed with the adoption of structural changes and the implementation of some public policies associated with high social costs. Reform as Project of Social Change It is true that reform as real process is dependent on factors associated with year zero of the reform, the actual reform project and the environment in which the changes happen. The understanding of this project, however, confronts itself with extremely serious provocations. The reform project is reducible to a host of public policies and projects of institutional change. It has a societal referent. The 17

Dumitru Sandu initial conditions of post-communist transition, the environment in which these develop and performances of reform are very different: depending on content, they can be of an economic, political, cultural and social nature, and, depending on the level of manifestation, they can be localized by calling on societal, regional, community or individual approaches, calling on objective-factual or subjective data. If the reform project and the performances of the reform can be followed at the social level by means of analyses which operate with factors, levels and sequences of the change, then the knowledge of the reform process necessarily implies the conjugation of the perspectives, the compliment of macro and micro approaches and of tangible and intangible aspects of the change, the passing from knowledge based on factors to knowledge that operates with factors, relations and contexts. The answer to all these provocations can not be given except by accepting as starting point for the analysis a theoretical model of reform with a clear specification of its components with specific dynamic, and of the adequate perspectives for their approach. Such an undertaking is all the more necessary the more the analysis is orientated towards knowledge of the social aspects of the reform. The social is, per definition, vague and spontaneous, perceivable in particular by reference to highly specified activities, such as economic and political activities. Reforms, be they political, economic or religious represent, represent social changes or sectorial changes realized on the basis of a project which is drawn up by the elite and adopted by the masses as the result of some processes of persuasion, social contagion or constraint. The reforms make up part of changes that are realized starting from a plan (Figure1.1. Text Box 1.2). It may be a question of rapid changes in which the passing is emphasized from an illegitimate or social state, or a social state of dissatisfaction, to a new state without particular specification of the intermediary states through which must be passed. Typical of this point of view, are the political revolutions that lead to the replacement of a political regime or to coups d’état which result in a change of government. The coup de palais or the coup d’état aims to change the government or political leader. Accordingly, the event it builds is a functional one, not structural. Conversely, political revolutions are orientated towards to large, structural changes.10 Through these, structural events are built socially, in the sense of carriers of some structural changes. Contrary to revolutions and coups d’état, reforms imply changes that can be made during longer periods of time, starting from plans in which the intermediary steps, the states of transition, are of high importance. Considerable differences also exist, however, between reforms, even if all assume the process implementation of a project of institutional reform. Their amplitude and social impact are different. Economic reform in post-communist countries, for example, implies, in fact, the drawing up and implementation of a packet of policies and normative regulations, the construction of some institutions with the functions of economic stabilization, liberalization and privatization, etc. On a religious level, the changes promoted by Luther and Calvin in 18

The Social Space of Transition the 16th century were structural, they lead to the break with the roman catholic church. The reform promoted by them was of a structural nature. Conversely, the transformations promoted in the same century by popes, such as Paul III and Paul IV (formerly Cardinal Caraffa), or by the Oratorio of Divine Love, had as their aim reform from inside Catholicism, functional changes at the level of the catholic church (Wach, 1997: 120) In all the processes of reform three obligatory sequences can be identified: the construction of the reform plan, the institutionalization of which and its application or implementation. The reform plan can be built, integrally or only in embryonic form, in spaces that are exterior to the actual reform, in the spaces of revolutions or social movements. Structural reforms can have their roots as a plan in partial or functional reforms. The economic and political reforms of the Central and East European countries have their origins in the revolutions of the year 1989. These revolutions were carried out in the name of democracy, market economics and, for certain sections of the population, in the name of a liberalization or reforming of socialism.11 Some of these countries, such as Poland and, in particular, Hungary, also benefited, however, from the experience of some attempted partial reforms, on an economic or social level, in the socialist period. In these cases, the reform plan of the 1990’s had as basis not only the revolutions of 1989, but also the failed experiences of the previous partial reforms. The plan of structural reform was established with much more difficultly in countries that did not have the experience of the socialist partial reforms (Romania, Bulgaria). The place of the partial reforms was taken by the social movements (“University Square” in Romania, before the elections of May 1990) and the collective behaviours (the mineriadas (miner’s protests) of 1990, 1991 in Romania, Easter 1995: 263-272), and by the postponement of the start of reform. In its ideal-typical form, reform assumes changes generated by a plan adopted by means of mechanisms or persuasion, imitation, incentives or constraint. The mechanism of adopting the reform is essential for the content and the profile of the change. Persuasion and the imitation are mechanisms specific to democratic, voluntary reform. Figure 1-1. Reform in the Family of Social Changes PLAN OF CHANGE

structural

Does not exist/happens during the change

REVOLUTION SOCIAL REVOLT COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

functional event

TYPE OF CHANGE

Exist at the beginning of change

COUP D’ETAT

19

Dumitru Sandu

structural

SOCIETAL REFORM

process

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS functional

SECTORAL REFORM

Restraint is the method by which non-democratic, totalitarian or authoritarian reforms are realized. The majority of changes effected after the soviet occupation of Eastern Europe belongs to the series of totalitarian reforms realized by constraint. The cooperativising of agriculture carried out as a result of some threats in very different forms – from deprival of freedom in prisons or deportations to Bărăgan (Smaranda Vultur, 1997), to the blocking of the rights of the children of the rich or of the intelligentsia to be registered in different schools, or the system of economic sanctions – is a typical example of socialist reform realized by constraint. The agricultural reform which preceded the cooperativisation of agriculture was perceived differently by the deposed as by those put in possession of land - as infringement of property rights by the former und, most likely, as social justice by the latter. For the latter, the phenomenon was perceived in the line of some historical precedents amongst which the distribution of land that followed the First World War was the closest example, with a legitimizing function. The big religious Reform of the 16th century is, as social phenomenon, a bizarre uniting of voluntary adoption and adoption by constraint. The reformers (Wach,1997) were exceptional personalities who simultaneously brought about the beginning of some social movements and formulated at the same time the reform plans, starting from the model of primitive Christianity. The adoption of the Reform was at the beginning voluntary, as a result of some processes of persuasion and social contagion. Later, the more the religious reform was accompanied by a political component, by the transformation of religions into state religions, the more the violence started to enforce itself as corollary of Reform. The burning on the stake of the “heretic” Miguel Servet in 1553 in Geneva, with the direct involvement of Jean Calvin (Randell, 1996:27-30), or the religious wars associated with the Reform, could be considered to be relevant examples from this point of view.

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The Social Space of Transition Text box 1.1. Reform, transition and transformation Every change presumes a succession of states of the system or field of reference, between the initial state, passing through the intermediary states, to the final state or “target”. There are no changes for which only the initial and final states can be identified. There are, however, changes for which either the maximum visibility or the main interest refer only to the two extreme states. In such cases events are discussed as being as type of social change. If the intermediary states are also considered, the change is of the process type. For their part, the processes or events can aim for structures or functioning modes of the structures. The major changes are those of a structural nature and the secondary and minor changes are of a functional kind. From their intersection, four types of change are obtained: structure

function

process

STRUCTRUAL PROCESS

FUNCTIONAL PROCESS

event

STRUCTURAL EVENT

FUNCTIONAL EVENT

Reform is a change of the process kind, initiated by the elite, with a plan realized by the masses, based on some mechanisms of persuasion, contagion or restraint. Their obligatory components are the plan of change, the institutional construction belonging to the plan and the actual implementation of the change. Given the obligatory presence of some institutional components in its development, reform can also be considered as a type of institutional change. Social movements are collective actions for solving gradually some social problems through the definition and the support of some plans of institutional change12. As collective actions they have as actors groups with a reduced level of formal structuring – associations, interests groups, networks etc. They close either as a result of failed mobilization of the resources of change or due to the beginning of the actions of institutional change. Reforms can take over plans of institutional change that are constructed by social movements or political revolutions. The difference between social movements that are orientated towards structural changes and those that aim for the functional changes can be found in specialist literature, amongst others, in the distinction that Gundelach (1989:428) makes between major social movements and those that produce society by changing their institutional structures, and the secondary social movements which follow “the influence of those who make political decisions, without change of the institutional context”. The national social movements of the kind described by Tilly (1988) exemplify the major kind of movement, with impact on the production of the society. Revolutions describe attempts at planned structural change, of the event type, with a relatively rapid succession between the initial and final states. A functional change, realized by maintain the structure, even if it is produced quickly, can not be defined as revolution. The same change can be considered both as process and event, and with and without intermediary states. Accordingly, the structural social changes can be approached, on the limit, both as process, as with reform, and as event, as with revolution. Finally, between the two types of structural change there also exists a difference in the method of realization: the violence is more frequently associated with revolutions than with reforms. Revolts are attempts at structural change of the event kind which start without there being a precedent plan for development. In particular, the relation between revolutions, reforms and social movements constitutes a controversial specialist topic. The number of definitions which circulate in this field is immense. The afore mentioned definitions represent the result of a selection and a conceptual specification which I consider useful in the context of this work, consonant, at the same time, with the main tradition in the field. I do not believe, however, that these definitions need to be considered substantialistically, but, rather, methodologically. They describe not as many types of relation as, in particular, perspectives of approach of some 21

Dumitru Sandu social changes. Through “social movements” approaches are promoted that emphasize the role of the collective actors, with a low level of structuring, in the institutional and gradual solving or some social problems. The concept orientates the analysis to the changes from bottom to top, from the masses to the elite of power. On the other hand, “reform” orientates knowledge towards understanding the gradual changes which are produced from top to bottom, from the elite down to the masses, depending on a well determined plan of change. In the case of social movements, the project of change represents an output, but in the case of reform an input. Through “revolution” knowledge is orientated towards structural changes, towards the difference between an initial and a final condition. As also with social changes, revolutions have as purpose the solution of some social problems by the collective actors. If the reference is maintained by reference to this common mark, revolutions can and will be considered as social movements (Tilly, 1988). In the series of the relevant polarities, relevant for this work, it would also be worth mentioning, in context, those between reform and transition. The sociology of reform or the sociology of transition? Which of the two approaches is legitimate? Which is adopted in this work? Initially, I had the intention of writing a volume on the sociology of reform. Afterwards I realized that the type of approach constructed during working on this work is more likely to lead to a sociology of transition. It is not only a question of two processes, but also of two perspectives. Both the sociology of reform, as well as that of transition have social change as their object of study. In the first case, the perspective is that of the project of change – agents, processes, factors, fields which favour or block the realization of political and economic reforms, of democratization and of market economics. The sociology of transition adopts the comparative perspective at the current level in relation to the situations of the communist periods, with starting point after the revolution and with the aim conditions. The sociology of reform must be evaluative in its consideration of conditions and processes from the perspective of the plan of societal change. In the case of the sociology of transition, the emphasis falls on the state of fact, and comparisons. The evaluative approaches are less necessary in a strict scientific plan. A complete series of changes which take place after year “zero”, those of the revolutions of 1989, can not be evaluated strictly under the aspect of functionality for the processes of reform. It is a questions of changes which happen in the context of the collapse of communism and of the founding of the projects of democratic capitalism, but without being able to clearly establish their functionality for such a societal project. Finally, recently, the problem also arises of distinction between “transition” and “transformation”. In searching for the most adequate perspectives for approach to the changes in the former communist countries there appears also the idea of renouncing the theories of transition in favour of those of consecrated transformations. The argument of principle is that theories of transition have a teleological orientation. In their construction, the idea is implied that the meaning of change is given: “They are not constructed on casual premises, but on teleological premises......As part of this paradigm the question can not be asked . ... As opposed to the theories of transition which emphasize the attractive power of the future, the theories of transformation emphasize the role played by the past” (Rona-Tas, 1998). Also in the series of approaches which could give substance to the new theories of transformations, the theory of dependence on the road and that of conversion of capital is mentioned. Naturally, the terminological dispute is secondary. The type of perspective which is opted for is, however, important. Currently, it must be remembered that there are three competing perspectives: that of the reform with emphasis on the project of change, that of transformation orientated towards the identification of the role of the forces of inertia of the past, and that of transition. This latter perspective is assimilated in the approach of Rona-Tas with the perspective of reform and of the plan of change. If we consider the existing sociological literature (Centeno, 1994, Rona-Tas, 1994, Rona-Tas, 1998) and economic literature (Stiglitz,1997) in the field of post-communist transition, approaches therein promoted can be established that are capable of picking up past, present and future, the distance between a desirable future and past or present. Furthermore, there already exists a tradition of 22

The Social Space of Transition analyses dedicated to the changes of the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes (O'Donnell, G., Schmitter, Ph., Whitehead , 1986). Also, the notion of transformation is extremely broad, nearly overlapping that of change. As also with the latter, transformation can be gradual, structural, slow, rapid etc. It is true that theories of transition have a sort of teleological loading. He who adopts them no longer questions the fact that the destination of the road is known. It is equally true, however, that what is currently happening in postcommunist countries is overwhelmingly influenced, not only by what was - it is not only a dependence on the road - but also by a formidable dependence on strategy, on the societal plans, on the pressure from international organisms to impose either the “Washington consensus” or the doctrine of “post-consensus Washington”, or the “framework of comprehensive development”.13

The particular nature of post-communist reforms is their attempt to impose using democratic mechanisms. The revolutions and social movements which precede them have generated images-guide of the reform, of final states which they are aiming for. The actual project of reform is, however, the result of the construction by the elite. The masses contribute to the definition of the reform plan, firstly by electing the political elite that will produce the respective project. A vote for the political parties of the right or the left, with or without historical roots, liberal, socialist or Christian-democratic, is of its own a way of contributing to the definition of the reform project. The social movements and the collective behaviours have also acted as mechanisms by which the masses have involved themselves in the definition of the reform plan. For their part, the political elite or the non-political elite of the society contribute to the definition of the respective plan by means of messages broadcast by the mass media.

Reform as Social Modernization The post-communist reforms are normally reduced to a double dimension – market economics and democratization, to the so-called “double transition” (Centeno,1996). The social dimension of reform is invoked, but is studied relatively little. The creation of a policy of social protection is normally seen as the principal component or social reform. A comprehensive approach to social reform involves, however, reference to both faces of the social, as group life or life of consumption.

Text box 1.2.The Social as Group, Consumption and Socio-Human Capital The economic is the field of utilitarian production. Culture has as nucleolus the norms and values which standardize the ways of doing, being and thinking in the society. Politics is the sphere of the power relations in social life, of the regulation relations of the circulation of scarce goods. In contrast, the social remains a vague field. It is mostly identified with group life, interaction and social integration. This differentiation of the spheres of human life is synthetically expressed by Talcott Parsons (1982) by the theory of functional needs: adaptation (economic), achieving the goal (political), integration (social) and maintaining of the latent patterns (cultural). There also exists, however, a second sense of the notion of social, easily identified in public 23

Dumitru Sandu discourse. It is that of the social as field of the consumption and reproduction of human capital. From this perspective, education, demographic reproduction, health, household consumption, cultural consumption etc. appear as sub-field of the social. Accordingly, social policies are designed to solve the problems which arise in this area of consumption and reproduction of human capital. From the perspective of these two meanings, the stronger the crime and the more the poverty, the more dissatisfying is social life. There also exists a third meaning to the social, as the field of human life opposite to that of politics and economics. It is the field of forms of human life as spontaneous elections and constructions, routinised but informal. Consumption, interaction and values are seen as a whole, as a socio-cultural field. Operationally, the social can be approached as “space”, structured by positions, relations of force which arise from the relative proportion of the different forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1989, Bourdieu, Wacquant, 1992)14. A possible matrix of social space which is relevant to the procedure of this work can be defined depending on type of capital, level of accumulation of resources and perspectives of approach15: unit of accumulation

human

information

symbolic

values

material

goods

social

relations

type of action for investment

individual/ familial

community/ societal regional

organisati onal

knowing (education, knowledge, learning) believing (socialisation reflexivity, experience of life etc.) having being (interaction for durable useful realtions)

spontaneous-institutional, subjective-objective, Perspective of approach given by orientation of the process-action-phenomenon-structure mainly towards aspects type

Capital and resources are not two types of different entities, rather they are two perspectives on a zone of reality. Both capital and resources are accumulations for realizing some actions. The referent in the case of capital is the agent and the type of effort necessary for accumulation. Human capital, for example, presupposes the effort of knowledge and learning. For resources, the referent is the process of their formation and possibly the type of action which can use them. Capital is controllable by the agent and the resources can be accessible or inaccessible to the agent. The resources controlled by the agent, appropriated following an effort of investment, constitute capital. The criterion of differentiation of the socio-human type of capital constitutes the support of the stocks with function of capital and the nature of the realized investments for the establishment of these stocks. From this point of view, the conceptual option for “human capital” is in the line of Gery Beker, it also has, however, a certain particularity. There are, in Becker’s line of interpretation of human capital (1997), three components of which, that of the informational, given by the accumulation of knowledge, that of the psycho-biological, represented in the state of health, and that of the axiological, associated with values16. The inclusion of values in the series of the components of human capital creates certain operational and conceptual problems. The type of investment for education and state of health is different to that which leads to the 24

The Social Space of Transition adoption of some values. The adherence to belief, persuasion is specific to the values. Values are cultural entities which can be converted to material goods, productivity, power etc. That which is called “entrepreneurial spirit”, for example, represents a configuration of values – taking on of the calculated risk, openness to that which is new, valuation of labour etc. – favourable to the increased productivity. The type of capital, however, is not given by its function. Every kind of capital – material, human, social or symbolic – can be converted to nearly any other form. That which the identity of the capitals can offer is, in particular, the support and form of production thereof. The anchoring of symbolic capital in values is more in the conceptual line of Bourdieu for which the word is the support of symbolic capital.

By taking on the development of social and human capital, post-communist reform is aiming towards a re-launch of the processes of social modernization. A re-launch in which sense? Real socialism pretended to be a form of modernization. Under the aspect of the development of social capital, however, it was a failure due to the promotion of the processes of social atomization, of the cultivation of suspicion and of the lack of transparency, of the establishment of social order not on trust, but on institutional fear. From this point of view, socialism acted as an anti social modernization factor. It was not the same, however, in relation to human capital. On the one hand, socialism meant, in an early stage of its trajectory, a remarkable accumulation of learning stock, simultaneously with the processes of urbanization and of extension of the social inclusion of the population in different forms of learning. The raising of human capital to the societal level in the socialist period was done, however, following the logic of technological modernization, in order to raise production. This way of investing in human capital, without securing the institutional framework for real democratization, lead to the accentuation of a contradiction between “the modernity of technology” and “the modernity of liberation” (in the terminology of Wallerstein, 1995, 126-144). At the same time as the failure of the partial reforms and as the worsening of the economic crisis of socialism at the end of the 1970’s, the break between social investment in education and the attitude of power of blocking the chances to utilize human capital. The phenomenon was of maximum clarity in the sense in which Ceausescu totalitarianism operated in Romania: a society with computer scientists without computer science or with sociologists and psychologists without sociology and psychology of an applicable kind. The social disciplines with an essential role in modern life – sociology, psychology, pediatrics – were excluded, step by step, from the realm of universities in order to be suffocated and emptied of scientific content by placing them in the ideological space of the party schools. The revolutions of 1989 of Central and Eastern Europe have as essential function the re-launch of the processes of modernization. A new societal arrangement is necessary in order to reconstruct the social capital of the society, for a more efficient conversion of socio-human capital to material capital. A latent and inconsistent modernity should pass over to a manifest and consistent modernity between different domains. Economic liberalization, political democratization and development of civil society

25

Dumitru Sandu are the main types of changes that should contribute to the realization of the re-launch of modernization (Table 1.3). In context, the connection with modernity is useful, I believe, for drawing the distinction between: long term modernity, associated with the passing of societies from an agricultural stage to an industrial and, later, to a post-industrial and postmodern stage; modernity as perennial mechanism of change, as opposition between adherence to routine, to that which is constructed, versus adherence to what is new, to that which is being constructed. Identified modernity, in the logic of the dominating ideology, with the characteristics of the central

zones

versus

the

traditionalism

of

the

peripheral

zones.

Modernization processes in different meanings are combinations of changes which lead to the realization of the states mentioned. In one form or another, different ideologies of modernization have their origins in the French Revolution of 1789. Starting with that moment ideologies of modernization started to be structured which claim that normality is change, which support “the cult of change”. Liberalism is the nucleus of modernization ideologies (Wallerstein, 1995, 71-208). The three aspects signify manifestations of modernity and of formal modernization. By contents, modernity can be political (democratization), religious (secularization), economic (liberalization, market economics), social (development of civil society, accumulation of community, social capital etc.), technological17. The need to measure the progress achieved on the path of reform leads to the construction of some indexes which operate precisely on the dimensions mentioned. The typical example is the index of economic liberalization (World Development Report 1996, 13-14) which is constructed by aggregation of the indicators referring to liberalization of the internal commercial transactions, of the external commercial transactions and to the creation of new private companies. In the political plan, of the maximum relevance for the state of action of the reform are the level of separation of the powers of the state, multi-partyism and correctness of the electoral voting rounds. Under the social aspect, the level of realization of the reform is given by the development of the middle class, by reduction in poverty and the crystallization of civil society.

Table 1-3.The Criteria for Evaluating the Performance of Reform Economic life

Political life

Social life 26

Cultural life

The Social Space of Transition

Institutional change, by plans

Liberalization of markets, Privatization, Institutions of the market economy Closing of the inefficient companies

Multi-partyism, Correctness of elections, Separation of the powers of the state, Local autonomy Integration in progressive global structures of market economics and democracy

Nongovernment organizations, Efficiency in the fight against corruption, Efficiency in social policies

Modernization of the education system,

Spontaneous emerging change

Entrepreneurial orientations

Social movements in favour of democracy and market economics

Middle class Occupation in private sector

Manifest modernity Reformism

Level of realization of the reform plan

Economic growth

Democratization

Development of civil society, Reduction of Poverty

Cultural modernization

Free press, capable of passing on correct information

The fundamental equation of reform has as principal unknown the development of the middle class, the identification of the modalities of vaporization of this process. In different societies, depending on the particular situation of development, different ways of favour sing the middle class are necessary. In the context of the societies which are going through post-communist transition, of the Romanian society in particular, the privatization and development processes of the private sector seem to be the principal favorising conditions for the emergence of the middle class. For their part, the consolidation of the middle class can function as principal ingredient for the imposition of democratic mechanisms in wheels of social life. Development of the private sector, the middle class and democracy function as interconnected processes, with multiple reciprocal influences. The blocking that appears in one or the other of these processes can lead directly to the blocking of the whole functional circuit of the reform processes. A unitary concept, unanimously accepted by the middle class does not exist. The identification of which was done in different terms: of non-manual workers in opposition to the manual workers, of an amount of intermediary levels or groups, between rich and poor, of the class with a specific morale and culture etc. There exists a structural and a process vision in the definition of the middle class. Structurally, the mode of population distribution in the hierarchical dimension of the social structure is kept in view: Is this wealth distributed pyramidically, egalitarianly or in the structures of the diamond type (with the maximum concentration of the population in the middle of the income scale and the minimum at the extremes of maximum poverty and wealth)? The process perspective emphasizes the 27

Dumitru Sandu role that the intermediary segments have in the erecting of some new types of social organizations: who responds to the provocations of renewal and social rationalization? Regardless of whether the perspective adopted is of a process or structural nature, the analytical dimensions which are called upon are economic, social, political and cultural. Under the given conditions of a society in transition, orientated by the provocation of the reforms of economic and political liberalization, of maximum relevance is the interrogation in process terms: which social segments are reformist, which are mechanisms of social constitution of the nuclei which answer to the institutional provocations of reform and launch such provocations for the international field of reform? The formative nuclei of the middle class are beginning to appear in the Romanian social landscape. Feeble, without doubt, these nuclei begin to impose themselves as presences which can no longer be neglected. It is a presence that can be identified on a economic, political, social and cultural level. Can one speak otherwise than in a speculative way, based on simple impressions of the emergence of the middle class? The answer is affirmative. Synthetically, it can be said that the behaviour model of the middle class can be recognized most easily at the level of the segment of the population that in sociological investigations appears to be placed at the top of the economic hierarchy. If we hierachize the households of the population, depending on their material position, in the group of those that represent the richest 20% of households the presence of the members of the future middle class can be found. Romanian specialist literature and the public space of debates were preoccupied, in particular, with the poorest people. The preoccupation is, no doubt, natural given the size of the phenomenon of poverty in Romania. It is just as true, however, that escape from poverty can not be effected by passive measures of social protection, but, rather, in particular, by means of active measure of promotion of the activities that generate income, by means of stimulation of the processes of social, economic and political participation. But, at the centre of these processes must be precisely private initiative, the taking of risks, social creativity.

28

Social Space of Transition 2.

“Inhabitant” of the Status Space

Optimism between electoral and economic cycles “How do you expect your life to be in one year’s time?”. If a sociologist were to ask me such a question, my answer would depend on the plans that I have and their chances of success. If it is likely that I will receive money, material goods or acquire useful connections, I will probably answer “my life will be better” or even “my life will be much better”. If I do not have any well structured plans which come to mind when the sociologist applies the questionnaire to me, my response will probably be influenced to a large extent by previous experience, by the way in which things, for better or worse, have evolved for me. I will be optimistic if things have gone well for me and pessimistic if not. To put it another way, the way in which I see the future depends on the past. Similarly, I might very well tend to extend the current spirit: if I am content with the life I have, I could declare myself an optimist. My answer might also very well be “contaminated” from the chance of obtaining new spiritual goods. Others may procede differently. It is probable that they will not connect their own future to plans, past personal experience or their current state of satisfaction. They might think of their own future more depending on collective future, on the perception that they have of the general economic and political situation. Finally, optimism is a state of spirit that lives or dies by “contamination” with another state of spirit. Which are these? How far, directly or indirectly, are the connections which influence optimism are established? Do the states of spirit or the resources that each has at his disposal matter? All these are questions which can only be answered by observation and qualitative and quantitative analysis. Is it worth formulating such questions in a discussion about “the road of transition”, about the strategies of life that people adopt in the context of the postcommunist changes? I believe so. “Yes” because post-communist reform is not only carried out with laws, political parties and institutions. It is achieved also, or in particular, by means of plans, projects of individual or familial or group life. However, these projects are to a large extent summarized in optimistic or pessimistic states of spirit. A transition to market economics and democracy can only be imagined by critical people, orientated towards the evaluation of the functional deficiencies of institutions. It was with difficulty, however, that we could imagine a process of this kind with only dissatisfied and pessimistic people. In the end, a society of pessimistic people means a society without projects of individual development and selfrealisation. However, real change cannot exist in democracy without life plans and projects that have a chance of being successful. Optimism is exactly the condition of spirit by which chances of success of a multitude of plans, more or less structured, are positively evaluated. If optimism is such an important resource for reform then it is worth the effort to attempt its radiography on 29

Dumitru Sandu the social level and the reconstruction of its cycles. That is what I will continue to attempt. The principal relations to be clarified are those between optimism, on the one hand, and satisfaction, resources and culture, on the other hand. The general hypothesis from which I start is that of optimism that refers to personal life level is all the more, the higher the values that are registered for the conditions of satisfaction associated with past and present, the level available resources and the level of individual modernity. A person intolerant of risk and thereby of tradionalist orientation

18

has reduced chances to be optimistic because, in confrontation with time, the

taking on of risk is one of the indispensable strategies. The first reference to data in this chapter has as purpose the dynamic of individual optimism in Romania after. The way in which the data referring to optimism is ordered (affirmative answers to question of the kind “How do you expect your life to be in one year’s time?”) contradicts the interpretations of a subjective societal dynamic by means of the hypothesis of “negativist culture”. Personal or familial optimism is fairly stabile (Figure 2-1). The waves of hope appear, in particular, in connection with the moments of political change (in 1992 immediately after the elections, and in 1996 before the elections). The sudden change in optimism at the end of 1994 and the beginning of 1995 is more difficult to explain. The strength of growth discourages an interpretation in terms of selection fluctuations, sampling errors . The winnings in terms of hope in the period 1995 to1996, compared to that of 1994, could have as reason the improvement of quality of life, both on the level consumption of food products as well as of growth in spending power of the population (Figure 2-1). Both food consumption from the point of view of number of calories as well as real salaries recorded a clear improvement in 1995 as compared to 1994. The situation in 1995 was clearly better than that of 1994 from the point of view of quality of life. The fact that in autumn 1996 a considerable leap on the level of social optimism was recorded could have at least two explanations. One is electoral and the other economic. The high probability of realization of an electoral change is translated on the level of the spirit of the population into pre-election optimism. At the same time, given the fact that 1996 was an election year, members of the government avoided promoting reform measures with negative implications for the level of quality of life.

30

50

Social Space of Transition

43

40

40 37

37

35

35

34

34

30

31

31

30 28

28

32

31

28

28 26 24

23

27 25

23

24

optimism

20

percent optimistic persons

38

38 36

Figure 2-1 Percentage of Optimists in the Population (1991-2002) Source: for the period 1991-1993, survey by Research Office of USIA in Romania carried out by SOCIOBIT and , for the period 1994-2002, POB-OSF. For the period 1991-1993 the data was picked based on the question “In one year’s time how do you think the money situation will be in your household?”. In the POB-OSF surveys a variant of the question “How do you expect your life to be in one year’s time” was used. The sampling scheme was approximately the same for all surveys. The differences in the way of formulation of questions, in the sampling scheme and in the actual method of data collection induce measuring errors and reduce the compatibility of the data between certain times.

The decline in optimism recorded in the first part of 1995 is of short duration and could be the result of some effects of the method of collection of the survey data. On the other hand, the decline that begins mid 1997 is of long duration and of great profoundness. The negative trend is maintained without interruption for a duration of at least two years. During 1997, the erosion, the “burning” of social optimism, takes place in near normal rhythms. After pre and post electoral enthusiasm comes the start of reform, the start of exercising of political power in the action of government. Additionally, economic life conditions become even more problematic (Figure 2-2). The beginning of 1998 brings a first large scale political crisis. On the background of the intensification of the conflict between coalition partners, the re-shuffle of the government cabinet, including the prime minister, takes place. However, because trust in government is one of the significant factors of optimism, even in on the personal-familial level , in the first part of 1998 a real crash in social optimism takes place: 31

x02

vi02

v01

survey month and year

xi01

xi00

v00

v99

xi99

xi98

vi98

xii97

vi97

ix97

x96

iii97

iii96

vii96

xiii95

vi95

ix95

iii95

xii94

vi94

ix94

v93

iii94

x91

ix92

10

14

Dumitru Sandu in December 1997, 35% of Romanians believed that their lives would be better in a year’s time; in June of the same year, the respective was percentages was 10 points lower. The politicians had reason to be angry with sociologists – they had published the beginning of a process of not yet seen social dissatisfaction. In mid 1999, in the context of the stagnation of the reform process and heightening of the poverty of the population, after another two mineriadas (miner’s protests) in January of the same year, social optimism reached a minimum quota. The situation had not been so bad since September 1992, before the then general elections. 120 112 109

annual growth rate

110 107 107 100 caloric consumptioni

100

97 93 90

93

97

97

105

104 102 101 102 101

99 99

101

101 101 96

97

87

real salary earnings

83 81 80

77

70 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Figure 2-2. Rates of Annual Growth in Average Daily Calorie Consumption per Inhabitant and Real Salary Earnings.1991-2000 Source: Romanian Statistical Yearbook, 2001, CNS

The aggregated and already discussed data suggest the hypothesis of a “captive optimism”, which is neither constant nor randomly fluctuating. It seems to be “closed” into the cells of social space (Text Box 2-1). Depending on how these cells of social space expand or contract modifications to the life plans of the people are produced. Strictly speaking, social optimism was always dependant on social space. The phenomenon of captive optimism is identified for the social situations in which, after a period of the opening of hopes, a restriction of the opportunities takes place, or in which social pessimism becomes the predominant state. The metaphor of captive optimism19 is adequate for the Romanian case to which we refer, in particular in the period 1997 to 1999. By aggregation, depending on the dimension “the prospective positive or negative evaluation”, the content of the phenomena of social optimism-negativism is given by individual 32

Social Space of Transition life plans. Optimism implies the existence of a multitude of life plans or of vague evaluations of possibilities of action. The larger the number of life plans or of perceived possibilities of action, the more accentuated is the optimism and the higher its intensity.

Text Box 2-1. The Analytical Structure of Optimism The unit of theoretical analysis for the social phenomenon of optimism is the prospective evaluation of a positive kind with actional content. Such an evaluation can be empirically identified on the level of strongly structured plans, intention of actions or simply on the level of vague desire to act in a particular way. A change perceived as possible in the nearest or furthest environment of life, having as function the increase in opportunities of action for the satisfaction of own needs represents an elementary unit of optimism. These elementary units have a social circulation assured by communication and social diffusion processes. They do not, normally, circulate in an isolated, atomized way, but in thematic groups. Freedom, winnings, consumption, entertainment, social safety etc. are all possible topics for social optimism. Analysing this phenomenon implies the identification of: actors, elementary units, topics of optimism-pessimism, and structures that favour associations between topics and actors of the evaluation of optimismpessimism. The road to the structures that favorize or defavorize for optimism passes through analytical efforts in terms of variables, case studies, qualitative analysis etc. As the result of the intersection of some such variables and the transformation of the attributes spaces, social spaces of optimism result. The more favourable the structures of social life for the emergence or plans, intentions and desires for new action, the more open the respective social space. By contrast, closed social spaces are those in which optimism “does not grow”. Here plans do not receive a form, the desires of self-fulfilment are blocked. Totalitarianism of the communist or fascist kind functions for the masses as closed rooms. For the elite of the respective system the system is different. They can perceive their own living space as being open from the perspective of the advantages that they have, of the possibilities of action that are associated with them. The house of optimism is a flexible house, with spaces that expand or contract as opportunities for action increase or decline, with communications openings or blocking walls. The inhabitants can be tenants, the owners or the builders. The plans and the evaluations which give life to the plant of optimism can be strictly limited by others and that means that the inhabitant of the house of optimism is tenant, beneficiary of what he is given, of what he purchases. However, he can also be owner or builder, the complete master of his future plans.

Change as Social Paradigm20 Different phenomena of optimism, pessimism, satisfaction regarding the current way of living, trust in institutions etc. has not only an internal specific dynamic, but also a non-specific dynamic associated with the global dynamic of perception of social changes, and it is to this that I will orientate the analysis in continuation. Change and reform have become key words of the post-communist period in the societies of Central and Eastern Europe. Public, scientific or ideological, media discourse or the discourse of direct communication have come to be structured depending on families or subfamilies of syntagma associated with changes in general, with reform in particular. Through overuse, words, as also money, wears out. Demoneterizing the linguistic family of change is 33

Dumitru Sandu accompanied by growth in its capacity of social significance. As the concept becomes more vague in public use, an enriching of its symbolic capital takes places. The way in which people talk in such periods say ever more about their mentalities and their strategies for life. For many, what matters is change on the level of “strong” structures of society institutions, social groups and infrastructure. The space of “real”, “essential” changes is considered to be that of the normative or morphologic structures (in the sense given by Durkheim to the word). The opposite point of view considers that true change is that which takes place in the register of moral values: what people believe and represent is more important than what can be seen and easily measured in social life. The changes in the book of moral values are often seen as an intangible precondition for restructuring the tangible level of social life, given by behaviour, institutions, infrastructure, built environment etc. Here there arise appreciations such as “we cannot have democracy and democratic institutions until we have a different mentality, a different culture, that is truly democratic”. It is, basically, the opposition between the conception that “making roads and institutions matters” and the conception that “what people believe is in fact important”, between the conception of change through institutions or rules versus values. In both conceptions the change is effect or difference. In very few cases is the conception of change seen as an element of change or, if this is admitted, then the admission is made mainly in relation to structured, scientific or political conceptions. The public conception of change does not seem to be seriously taken into account, as an element of change or even as a factor of restructuring. And yet the representations of change become an integral part of change. They are not only effect. From the perspective of these considerations, what happened to the social, diffuse conception, of change in Romania of the 90’s appears as being a subject of maximum relevancy. Practically as well as theoretically. Such a conception is effect, cause and element of change. Thus the difficulty in understanding it, but also the justification of the effort. An effort to understand a section of recent social history at social mentality level. The theme, however, appears so complex that it discourages a systematic, scientific approach. It seems to be destined more for a strictly essayist approach. There are chances to handle the issue as much as possible in the area of scientific understanding. They derive from accepting the fact that social mentalities and representations can be “read” by means of social behaviour tools and through social controversy themes. The method in which social movements, collective behaviour or social phenomenon such as elections, migration or crime are structured is of clear relevance to the social themes and mentality of change. Voting, as a social phenomenon is particularly significant for the social paradigms of change. The last electoral period in Romania – the parliamentary and legislative elections in 1996 offer another chance to emphasize the active role 34

Social Space of Transition of social conception of change in the transformations associated with change. It is a privileged situation in which it appears that it mattered less what the politicians said and more what the population believed about change and the role political actors in change. The mass media seems to have mattered in this process to the extent it has entrenched beliefs, fears and social conceptions. The impact that social conception has over change in the reform process is comparable to the trustworthy–untrustworthy phenomenon (inter-indiviual, institutional, intergroup). Social conceptions of change are a weak articulation of an interpretive hypothesis on the causes of social problems, tendencies in social evolution and prescriptions regarding the methods of solving the respective problems. Trust is an evaluation of environments of interindividual, group or institutional interaction. The more the environment of referenced interaction – others as people, others as groups or institutions – is perceived as being more predictable and favourable to performant and/or moral actions, the higher the level of trust placed in it will be. In its maximum form, a person can be completely trustworthy only if what he has previously done proves morality, performance and stability in his behaviour. It is not enough to have proved only morality and professionalism. Also it is necessary that all these traits appear under conditions of stable, consistent or predictable behaviour. Together, the social conception of change and the trustworthy–untrustworthy phenomenon give the essential content of the environment in which behaviours of choice such as voting and behaviours such as consumption, saving and investment or migration are produced. They make up the most dynamic “soft” environment of transition. The entrance into the spotlight of these “soft” environments of social interaction, their increased relevance to institutional behaviours and for the processes of change is in full consonance to the logic of reform, to the necessity of structuring new specific environments for democracy and market economy. From now on I will refer only to the attitude and social conception of change as an element of the respective environment. In different social environments different social answers are given to three types of questions: why is change necessary? what purpose is the purpose of achieving it? and by what means? In other words, people are interested in why change is necessary, what end must be reached and by what means. Around these questions that are explicitly or implicitly formulated in public speech or in daily social interaction, three thematic families are structured regarding the fundamentals, finality and instrumentality of change. Together, the answers and the 35

Dumitru Sandu questions subordinate to these thematic families give the content of the social paradigm of change. The themes of social change as elementary units of diffuse conceptions on change are elaborated either in a justifying context – why does change have to take place? – or a pragmatic context – in what areas do the changes have to take place?.

Justifying context of change:

NEGATIVE STATES Of the present/past immediate

The pragmatic context of change:

INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT

ENDS (goals)

MATERIAL ENVIRONME NT

MEANS Of reaching the ends/ of overcoming the negative states HUMAN ENVIRONM ENT (actors)

CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT (values/principles )

In the terms of these distinctions the following hypothesis can be formed on the social logic of change in Romania in the ‘80’s and ‘90’s: In the period of pre-transition of the ‘80’s in Romania the themes of change were associated more with the justifying context rather than the pragmatic one, more questions arose of why change needs to take place rather than where; Throughout the early transition in 90-92, the themes of changes moved, in the justifying register, from focusing on the negative states of the past to the ends of the reform and after that to the means of achieving the reform; In the register of pragmatic themes, the social logic of change starts from the interest for the tangible area of social life – institutions and resources – for it to move, afterwards, towards the least tangible of the human and cultural environment of change.

In a justifying context, the themes are constituted as rationalizations of change from the perspective of negative states, of rejection, of the present in connection to the goals and the means of reaching these goals. In a pragmatic plan, the themes aim at not the grounding but the content of change – institutions, resources or material goods, the human or cultural environment of change. Beginning with the distinctions in the method of structuring of social paradigms of change, another set of hypotheses can be formed: The paradigms of change are fundamentally differentiated according to the nature and amplitude of the transformations that are to be induced in the short term. Political revolutions presume a short-term structural change, at the level of the political regime. The transition to 36

Social Space of Transition democracy from authoritarism or totalitarianism in Latin America, Southern Europe (O’Donnell, Schmitter, Whitehead,1986) and in Eastern Europe was achieved, beginning with the 1970’s, either through negotiation among the elite or the collapse of the regime in power. Those are concrete ways of carrying out a transfer of power. The existing political or sociologic analyses were not strongly orientated towards the research of the relationship between negotiation and collapse. The connection between the change itself and the social paradigm of change has not been researched very much either. What is happening is, very probably, a process of interaction between behaviours/events of change and the social paradigms of change. If, in the period of pre-transition, the elite and the negotiation between them were able to play an essential role in change, after the moment of rupture, marked by the revolution, the social models of change start becoming more important. In the new context what people believe starts to matter as long as the mechanisms that are instituted are democratic. The social paradigms of change are directly translated in electoral behaviours, social movements or structures of voluntary associations (Figure 2-3). The old analytical model, intensely promoted by the political scientists that handled Eastern Europe, focused almost exclusively on institutions and political elites, begins to lose its relevancy. The space of masses, with a multitude of collective behaviours, social movements, associative behaviours and social themes of controversy, becomes more and more active, more difficult to ignore. Entering normality, there where it tends to manifest itself, is fully marked by these processes. The institutional changes, the axis of reformist transformations, have a double facet, formal and behavioural. The formal aspect is the one projected by the elite. The institution as such, however, lives by means of the institution of behavioural patterns in accordance with the projected norms. Such an institution has no room in the space of action of the masses. The method in which the new institutions are assimilated derives, on one hand, from their formal content and, on the other hand, from the resources and social paradigms that structure the living universe of different social segments. The Romanian society of the 1980’s was a blocked society. Beyond economic and institutional incapacity to function, what emphasized this trait was the absence of the horizon of change. The need for change was clear at the level of the common conscience. How the transformation was to be achieved, by what means and based on what model was difficult to infer under the conditions of the specific totalitarianism of the Ceausescu regime and of an Eastern European system still dominated by the Soviet Union. In the absence of a social model of change, social imagination was centred almost exclusively on the survival of the individual and the micro group.

37

Dumitru Sandu After 1985, with the start of reform in the Soviet Union and as the events in Poland demonstrated that change was possible, especially in private spaces of informal communication, there appeared the tendencies to structure new themes that, along with the theme of the necessity of change, the theme of finality is also crystallized, of a model that can be aimed for. A model in which Gorbaciov’s Perestroika, the Polish solidarity, western market economy and democracy occupied central positions and were combined in different proportions. It was still a model of emergent change, with reduced social diffusion, present more as a project of social innovation, openly stated by the few dissidents and taken as reference system by the social segment of “silent modernism”. November 1989, with the bizarre XIVth congress of the Romanian Communist Party, strengthened the public feeling of evaluation of the internal situation of Romania as being totally out-dated, artificially frozen in the middle of an unstoppable torrent of change in all of Eastern Europe. Figure 2-3. Spaces and processes of transition: conceptual model Processes of pre-transition T1. Forming the paradigms of change

T2. Pre-transition behaviour

THE SPACE OF THE MASSES

Social paradigms

Associative phenomenon Distancing from the structures of power

THE SPACE OF INTERACTION MASSES-ELITE

Latent modernism

THE SPACE OF THE ELITE

Paradigms of the elite

Political revolution T3. Events

Processes of reform T4. Redefining the paradigms of reform

T5 Pro and anti reform behaviour

Popular movemen ts

Social Paradigms

Definition of the social reform through voting, social movements, collective behaviour Associative behaviour

Reformism of pre-transition

Change of the political regime

Social controversy of the models of reform Conversion of latent modernism into manifest

Institutional change

Organization for change Dissidence

Negotiati on among the elite / collapse of the regime

Paradigms of the elite

Negotiation of governing

38

Social Space of Transition Paradigm of change

The spaces of the masses/elite Latent modernism

Mental model of response to the necessity, finality and instrumentality of change. The social paradigms are those that function at the level of the different social segments and have a small degree of structure. The multitude of actions and phenomenon whose subject are the social segments with political, social, economical power of a low/high level. The value orientation based on rationality and openness to change, with a low degree of manifestation due to the authoritarian/totalitarian context.

At a social level, the one-dimensional paradigm of change remained dominant, defined by necessity, because of the impossibility of continuing in the same way. Silent dissidence and modernism began to work with a model in which there also appeared elements of finality, a model in whose direction change can be made. The means of change were not yet discernable. The negotiation processes between the elite, like those in Poland or Hungary, were inconceivable in the frozen, dogmatic-totalitarian environment in Romania. The internal pressure of social discontent, on one hand, and the external pressure of events that proved that change can be made by means of popular movements without the risk of Soviet intervention such as that in Prague in1968, lead to the revolutions in 1989 in Timisoara and Bucharest. The initial model of change with which most of the population began was one of denial of communism, more as a state of fact than as ideology, and superficial acceptance of a market economy. In April 1990 the following was established from a representative sample on a national21 level: 85% of the population interviewed held the opinion that “a free market economy is essential to our economic development”; A democratic system, with more than one party was approved of by 75% of the people interviewed. The image of the market economy, however, was a contradictory one. More than half (55%) of those who believed that a market economy was the solution for the country’s development also believed that “all state enterprises should remain state property”. In a type of market economy in which privatization did not take place, what belonged to the state shall remain the state’s. In rural areas, the belief that the market economy is important but state enterprises should remain completely in the state hands was even stronger, being present in two thirds of the rural population favourable to market economy. At that time not even an anticipative reform seemed to have been structured, an acceptance of reform with a somewhat clear definition of the goals at a society level, without defining the means and costs of achieving the reform. It was more a reform of negation, as a reaction to the rejection of communism. Opinion polls pointed to this, showing, also for 1990, an overwhelmingly negative reaction to the word communism and a contradictory perception of capitalism22. The market economy was not only associated with the idea of maintaining a very 39

Dumitru Sandu strong state sector in the economy, but also with the emotional distancing from capitalism: of the total of those who appreciated that a market economy is necessary for the Romanian economy, 41% declared that they have negative feelings towards the word capitalism, 37% neutral and only 22% positive. The break between rural and urban environments was clear from this point of view: half of the rural population were hostile to the word capitalism compared to only one third of city dwellers. The years 1990 and 1991 were characterized, not only by block denial of communism as an imposed and failed trait, but also by a process in which society was finding its way. It was, possibly, the post-December period of highest social controversy. The social movement associated with University Square in Bucharest, the collective behaviours that followed in the days of 13th to 15th June in Bucharest, the four miner’s protests (mineriade) etc., fully show the intensity of this controversy. Power and property are the major themes that marked public debate and, implicitly, social controversy. With regard to privatization, the tendency of its conditioned acceptance was dominant, mainly for small and middle-sized enterprises or for the service sector. In the rural areas, the negative attitude of total rejection of privatization was extremely strong.

Table 2-1. Attitude towards privatization of enterprises.1990 % Private property Must not be limited

Rural 14

Urban 29

Total 22

Limited to small enterprises Limited to middle-sized enterprises Permitted only for the service sector

18 10 8

21 17 7

20 13 8

Disapprove in any form No answer Total

27 24 100

12 13 100

19 18 100

Source: opinion poll of the Research Office of USIA, May 1990, data collected by the Urban Sociology Laboratory

The theme of change is central for any electoral debate. Politicians incorporate in their slogans the most varied promises of change, formulated in syntagms that were approved of. The electorate chooses, not initially according to the slogan, but

according to the

rationalizations it builds beginning from its own requirements and definitions of the social situation. Identifying social themes is possible more when looking at electoral behaviour than from reference to electoral slogans. The correlation between the structure of votes and the nature of social problems is of a nature that makes social paradigms of change intelligible.

40

Social Space of Transition The founding elections of 1990 stood under the sign of denial reformism as a social paradigm of change. In 1992 the thematic environment was dominated by anticipative reform, by the discussion of the institutional means to achieve reform. The last elections in 1996 came under the sign of reaction. Anticipative reform presumes, as does anticipative socializing, an acceptance in principle of reform, through its objectives, without it being actually lived through. Once inflation, unemployment and social insecurity as costs of transition begin gaining ground, the attitude towards reform is differentiated more and more between social spaces, between configurations of status resources and communitarian environment of life. The themes that define the paradigms of change specify these types of attitudes to reform. The social definition given to reform through the totality of electoral options in 1996 – local, parliamentary and presidential - elections is characterized by: supporting a reduced number of political parties, much smaller than the members of parliament had favoured through the super-tolerant threshold of 3% for entering parliament; affirmation of an alternative idea, to search for solutions by rotating the political forces in power, relatively independent of the power of convincing of those who lead them; supporting the need to penalize corruption, to take the information given by the press in relation to this subject seriously; the attempt to achieve reform, not only by means of new institutions, but by means of new people as well; understanding the fact that the people that are in the presidential body and in power probably matter more than the president. Of course, all these interpretations are hypotheses, the specific connection between them and electoral behaviour being made in detail in an empirical, analytical context, effectively reuniting poll data and data for electoral behaviour. Social space of optimism Who are the optimists? The answer common sense gives is of the following type – people with resources, the well off who have no reason to fear tomorrow. As in many other situations, such an answer is partially true. For he who is interested in the “hard” relationships that are maintained beyond the random moment, reality appears somewhat different. After “talking” to thousands of people and “filtering” their answers through various analytical sieves, the specialist reaches a partially different picture than the one common sense portrays (Table 2.2).

41

Dumitru Sandu Optimism seems to be fed not so much by the objective material state of a person or household, but by the frame of mind he is in. It is a type of irradiation of the present state of satisfaction towards the future23. But not only. A certain tendency to accept risk also intervenes. You consider it normal to live under risk conditions; you are more inclined to define the future in a positive way. The data on optimism seems to support “the hypothesis of uncertainty” (Firebaugh, Sandu, 1998) formulated in connection with reformism. For societies in transition, uncertainty is a major provocation. Under conditions of heightened uncertainty, it is motivated by the hypothesis of uncertainty, people tend to adopt the new models of reformist behaviour not first according to the material gains expected, but by their cultural capacity to confront risk. Using data from a national opinion poll carried out in Romania in 1993, the idea is argued that economic reform has as its main intermediary variables the individualist ideology, economic optimism and tolerance to risk. Economic optimism, even on a significant level, influences reform less than tolerance to risk (Firebaugh, Sandu, 1998: 533-535). Tradionalistic people for whom risk, novelty and search are dangerous and stressful are inclined to define the future pessimistically. A positive perception of the present institutional environment also facilitates the definition of the future in a positive light. The government, police and army are institutions of immediate relevancy to the way in which people protect their future. In the series of objective characteristics, of status, which matter directly to optimism, only age and sex are worth mentioning. Youths and women manifest a higher degree of optimism than men and elders24. Table 2-2. Social space of optimism Categories of relevant Satisfaction with current way of life factors for satisfaction/optimism Objective characteristics of status Elderly Youths Wealthy households People with connections

Definition of the social situation in which they live

Villagers Consider the communitarian environment as integrated Satisfied with the local community Satisfied with income

Satisfaction with the present in relation to the immediate past

Women

Not elderly Youths People with connections Villagers

Satisfied with income

42

Optimism

Youths

Social Space of Transition Satisfied with workplace

Satisfied with workplace

Consider themselves healthy

Value orientation Trust in government

Trust in government

Satisfied with present way of life Feel thy have a better life than one year ago Orientated towards accepting risk Trust in government Trust in institutions of order

*The table is an interpretation of the regression models presented in Table R 1 in Appendix 2.

Dissatisfaction between resources and social definitions The present state of diffuse satisfaction, the satisfaction with the present way of life, is much richer in direct determinants than optimism (Table 2.2 and table R1 in the annex). Its variation from one person to another is influenced less by value orientation than by the level of the specific satisfactions. Firstly, the money you have matters, and secondly the local community in which you live. In decreasing order of importance, there then follow the satisfactions referring to one’s own state of health and workplace. Diffuse satisfaction is not only a sum of the different particular states of satisfaction. The effective level of material resources, goods and income, as well as of relational capital, also have direct influence on the diffuse state of satisfaction–dissatisfaction. This finding is extremely important. Based on this, it can be sustained that the answers people give in polls to extremely general questions of the type “how satisfied are with your way of life?” bring information that is not only about frames of mind. Through them a certain knowledge of the objective material states of people is also gained. Of course, values, culture, the level of aspirations matter. The evaluation of satisfaction tells also, however, of the objective degree of satisfaction of human needs. From this it follows that no matter the level of material aspirations, influenced in a large measure by education, age and residential environment, global satisfaction is also direct related to resources. Paradoxically, the elderly are the population category that is most content with their living conditions. The most discontent are adults. Youth is usually located between the two above-mentioned categories. For the elderly the fact is for the most part explainable given the fact that the level of their aspirations is generally lower. Desiring less from life, they are thus content with less. On the other hand, for mature people between 30 and 50 the accentuated state of discontent is not only (and maybe not first of all) explained by their higher level of aspirations, but also the problems they face, mostly due to the higher responsibility they have in 43

Dumitru Sandu the family. The above mentioned hierarchy of satisfaction tends to be maintained in the long term (Figure 2-4) The curves of satisfaction in relation to age follow electoral and economic cycles, as do the curves of optimism. As with optimism, the population’s global satisfaction grew strongly at the end of 1996 and the beginning of 1997. The strongest positive jump took place with the elderly. They expected the most from the new political juncture. The mature population is less receptive to electoral cycles. It appears that active people that have reached the middle of the cycle of family life are more realistic. They don’t expect much from political change. This particular prudence is also valid for young people. The descending trend that started in 1997 for optimism is also similar for global satisfaction. These two phenomena, so strongly correlated at an individual level, also register a similar evolution at the social level. The disparity between the social quantity of satisfaction for the elderly and for the mature meets with fluctuation. In periods in which economic crisis is not strong, the disparity tends to be large. The deterioration of living conditions seems to bring a narrowing of the disparity between the satisfaction of the elderly and of the mature. Such hypotheses seem to be supported by the data available from opinion polls. In 1995 and 1996, the percentage of satisfied elderly people was higher than that of mature people by 10 to 15 percent. In 1999 the respective difference reached only 6%. As with optimism, global satisfaction is also consonant with the relationship of trust in institutions. A positive perception of institutions of government and order directly favour the global state of satisfaction.

44

Social Space of Transition

33 29 25

26

25

21

21

22

xi01

v02

xi00

18

v01

22

xi02

30

18

v00

v99

xi98

vi98

xii97

ix97

vi97

iii97

x96

vii96

iii96

xiii95

vi95

tineri maturi varstnici vi95 45 33 43 38 70 xiii95 44 36 44 40 iii96 49 49 41 5735 aged young 60 vii96 38 34 37 52 40 4939 49 39 48 x96 36 48 48 50 43 44 iii97 42 42 44 57 46 40 vi97 41 39 44 41 ix97 48 41 52 46 40 4241 xii97 39 42 41 48 41 32 39 vi98 44 35 32 35 38 0 27 30 33 36 35 34 36 xi98 48 38 49 0 v99 31 30-59 years 21 0 old 27 20 v00 27 22 25 21 xi00 23 18 18 v01 26 21 29 10 xi01 28 21 26 v02 27 22 25 xi02 40 30 33

month and year of survey

Figure 2-4.. Percentage of people satisfied with the way they live, by age categories. 1995-2002 Source: POB-OSF. The age categories used are: youth 18-29 years, mature 30-59 years, elderly 60 years and over; The psychological context of diffuse satisfaction or dissatisfaction is considerably differentiated depending on age category (Table R2). For everyone, the reference to cash income and the local community in which they live is fundamental. How much they earn and where they live are factors that are imposed in the sphere of satisfaction – dissatisfaction sources. Beyond these the differentiations are notable. Material goods and effective level of income per person in the household, for example, matter to people in the middle of their active life. The youth and elderly appear to be less under the influence of these factors. In the periods of the beginning and the progress of active life the need for relationships is especially high. Accordingly, their level appears as a significant factor for the diffuse satisfaction of the young and mature but not the elderly. On a practical level, the most difficult thing seems to be achieving a state of satisfaction by mature people who have reached the middle of their active lives. In this case, especially if we are speaking of men, a conjunction of a large number of factors is required to increase the state of satisfaction with life. This finding is fully justified, taking into consideration the fact that a large number of problems and responsibilities specific to family life are concentrated in this segment of the population.

Social types of pessimism/optimism

45

Dumitru Sandu The previous discussion permits a first approximation of the traits of the social space of diffuse states of optimism/pessimism and satisfaction/dissatisfaction. It is a first outline of social space cells that favour or discourage states of optimism and satisfaction. We are still far from understanding the “social chemistry” of the specific conditionings of the optimism–satisfaction phenomenon. The social reality is not organized on variables but on structures that are interconditioned. People are happy or satisfied or optimistic not because they live in a rich community or because they have large salaries or because they are healthy. They react to the way such variables combine with each other. More than that, in spite of the fact that optimism and satisfaction with the present state are positively associated, in reality we often find contradictory situations of unsatisfied optimists or satisfied pessimists. The type of emotional inconsistencies previously mentioned cannot be detected and understood from the perspective of the calculation made with separate values. A nearing of reality is only possible by identifying some social kinds of ways of referring to reality by considering simultaneously the attributes of optimism and satisfaction. The main combinations of social evaluations in the present-future dimensions found in the Romanian reality of 1990, are: Chronic pessimism

=

Recent pessimism Temporally stable Reaction optimism Continuous optimism

= = = =

“now it is bad and it will get even worse” “now it is good but it will be bad” “it will be the same” “now it is bad but it will get better” “now it is good and it will get even better”

At least for the “captive optimism” period of 1997-1999, the dominant process is the one of larger and larger segments moving from the continuous or reaction optimism area to the chronic pessimism one. (Table2-3). It was natural for this to happen under the conditions of an escalating economic, political and social crisis. The condensation and expansion processes of the “shadow/darkness” or “light” social spaces have a direct correspondent in the circulation of social types of temporal reference to the world.

Table 2-3. Social types of optimism/pessimism 2001/1

2001/2

2002/1

2002/2

-

2000/2

+

now it is bad and it will get even worse now it is good but

2000/1

-

1999/2

Section type 1999/1

Type of attitude

1998/2

RECENT PESSIMI

Evalu ation of the future

1998/1

CRONIC PESSIMI SM

Eva luat ion of the pre sent -

1997/1

Social types of optimism/ pessimism

18.1

29.5

25.5

34.8

40.2

25.9

24.9

22.2

25.6

27.2

19.4

8

10.7

4

3

3.8

2.6

2.2

2.2

3

3

8.3

46

Social Space of Transition SM TEMPOR ALLY STABILE REACTI ON OPTIMIS M CONTIN UOUS OPTIMIS M

+/-

0

-

+

+

+

it will be bad it will be the same now it is bad but it will get better now it is good and it will get even better

30.8

37.8

38.1

37.7

42.8

42.3

47.7

40.7

45.7

45.2

43.2

19.8

11.7

11.3

14.1

9.5

18.3

17.1

22.5

15.5

15

17.7

23.0

13

14.5

9.4

4.5

9.6

7.7

12.4

11

9.7

16.7

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

Source: POB-OSF. + positive evaluation, - negative evaluation, 0 evaluation of stability

To each type of social space mentioned there corresponds a specific social space and a configuration of status or cultural characteristics (Table 2-4). To emphasize this specifity I have referenced the causal profile of each type of optimism–pessimism to the median of those who believe their life will not change. Chronic pessimists, for example, are poor, elderly city dwellers unhappy with the city they live in and with the government. Not far behind, from the causal profile point of view, we find recent pessimists, those who are content with their life but believe that the future will be worse. How and why can a man be content and pessimistic at the same time? Signs for searching for an answer offer the analyses that specify who the people are that are in such a situation. As with chronic pessimists, recent pessimists are elderly. However, they are mainly from urban areas. Their material status is better and they consider themselves relatively healthy. Why are healthy and relatively wealthy people so inconsistent in their evaluation of the present and the future? Is not their pessimism one of “appearance”, to criticize for the sake of criticizing? It is possible but highly unlikely. All the data up to know has indicated a clear anchoring of temporal evaluations in different niches or cells of social space. As an alternative an unidentified, specific factor remains which is responsible for the pessimism of the content and relatively wealthy. In search of an answer I continued the “sifting of data” by including political orientation in the logistic regression model. I compared strictly recent pessimists with the chronic variety25. New reasons of satisfaction result and only one strong reason to justify pessimism. Supplementary reasons for satisfaction are the fact that recent pessimists, unlike the chronic variety, are in a better situation, not only from a material point of view, but also in terms of connections. Additionally, they trust the government and are satisfied with the city they live in. The grounds for their pessimism are to be found in the fact that their living standards declined in the previous year. Recent experience thus tells them that it is probable that the future will be worse than the present. Their mental orientation is of the following type – “now things are good but they will get worse because we already have 47

Dumitru Sandu experienced a previous year in which our lives got worse and worse”. It should also to be remembered that most of those who say this are not opposition sympathizers but are simply wealthy villagers that still have faith in the government. A clearer refute of the theory of “the Romanian who criticizes for the sake of criticizing”, because he is “negative” was difficult to find. The reaction optimism is the attitude of young people who at present have problems and are discontent. Their material state is of a medium level. What characterizes them is the founding of optimism on the relational capital they have. The opposition between continuous optimism, consistent with the state of satisfaction and reaction optimism, inconsistent in reference to satisfaction, is in good measure overlapped by the opposition between the material resource optimism and the relational one. Table 2-4. Factors that influence the chance to adopt a certain type of optimism/pessimism

Considers to be healthy SANATOS* Education EDUCANI* AGE Is female (1 yes, 0 no) Goods BUNURI* Income per person in the hhd in the last month Network capital RELATII* Faith in the government IGUVERN* Satisfaction towards the anticorruption activity of the government (4 points scale) Fortune through work and merit (1 yes, 0 no) WORK* Communitarian satisfaction SCOMUNITAR* Urban dweller (1 yes, 0 no)

Types of optimism/pessimism compared Chronic Recent Reaction Continuous pessimism/ pessimis optimism/ optimism/ temporally m/tempo temporally temporally stable rally stable stable stable 0 + 0 0

Continuous optimism/ chronic pessimism

Continuous optimism/reacti on optimism

0

0

0 + 0 0 -

0 + 0 + 0

0 0 0

0 0 0 + +

0 0 + +

0 0 0 + +

0

0

+

0

+

0

-

0

+

+

+

0

-

0

0

+

0

0

0

+

+

0

-

0

-

0

+

+

+

-

+

0

-

-

+

Source POB-OSF, 1998. Each column of the table presents the sense of the relation between the dependant variable on the column and predictorul on the line that results from applying a logistic regression model. The statistically significant relations are represented with +/- for p=0.05 positive or negative. The statistically insignificant relations are marked with 0 in the corresponding logistic regression model. As a whole, the type of analysis in this table is subordinate to the logistic regression algorithm for polytomic variables (nested regression) (Fox, 1997:467-478). *See annex 1.

48

Social Space of Transition The polarities that structure the space of optimism are not only the ones previously mentioned – “reaction” versus “continuous” and “material resources” versus “relational resources”. Other possible structures must be sought in the sphere of reference between the different forms of capital and in the active, dynamic or passive nature of optimism, relatively declarative. The result of the previous analysis was that there is a significant association of forms of optimism with material and social–relational capital. What is the role of human capital in structuring a positive attitude in reference to the future? Education does not seem to be associated with attitude towards the future (Table 2-2, Table 2-4). However, there is an association of social types of optimism with certain types of values, with the axiological forms of social capital. Reaction and continuous optimists, for example, demonstrate a large capacity for risk taking. Conversely, chronic or recent pessimists have a high aversion to novelty and risk. Approximately 40% of optimists demonstrate a large capacity for risk taking, compared to only 29% of pessimists. Optimists willing to act by taking risks form the category of “dynamic” optimists26.

Long term satisfaction Optimism is not only a facet of cumulative satisfaction in connection with the dynamics of their own conditions of life. What could have been called “long term satisfaction” is nothing else than an aggregation of particular states of satisfaction in connection to the past, present and future. To consider separately the three perceptions of their own conditions of life represents a useful analytical approach with the condition that it is not singular and it should not ignore the fact that the respective phenomenon is that of a cumulative perception of social time. Proof that long-term satisfaction is a consistent phenomenon at the social level resides in its strong anchoring in social space. Such satisfaction has deep roots in material and social capital. Intense phenomena of long-term satisfaction correspond to high levels of these forms of capital. Not only those that have important material resources and a useful sphere of social relations and extended efficiency positively relate to the past, present and future, but also those who dispose of social capital that is associated with trust. Trust in central institutions such as the government and in leaders of institutions such as managers or in opinion leaders such as intellectuals and journalists is also a significant factor in consolidating long term, continuous satisfaction. The social institutional tissue evidently is important for the state of satisfaction – dissatisfaction of the population not only through its normative nature but also through the quality of the institution leaders, of the (official) founders of opinion especially. Human capital intervenes in determining long-term satisfaction more through its value 49

Dumitru Sandu component than through the information–education element. In strongly specified analytical models (as the one in Table 2-5) where possible effects of a large number of factors are controlled, the level of school education appears as an insignificant predictor for long-term satisfaction. On the other hand, orientation towards work is important, the way of relating to the present political power. People who believe that the main way out of a crisis is work and who have faith in the political power in existence at the moment of the poll tend to have higher levels of long-term satisfaction. It is obvious that global, long term satisfaction is not only an aggregation of specific satisfactions. Even if their role is controlled, the objective variables that capture the role of material capital, of social capital, of value orientation and of local–regional development conditions remain the significant predictors of the satisfaction–dissatisfaction states. In turn, the variables of specific satisfaction – with the community, income, health, workplace and purchasing power – continue to act with considerable strength on global satisfaction, even if objective variables regarding material, social and human capital are included in the analysis. The result, therefore, is that in people’s answers to questions regarding satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the past, present or future there is a large quantity of information. It is information subtly aggregated by complicated psychological mechanisms. Signs of this complexity are also offered by previous analyses that focus on predictors that are significant for the social intensity of the phenomenon Table 2-5. Predictori of long-term satisfaction Categories of predictors

COMPOSTIE VARIABLES OF STATUS

MATERIAL CAPITAL

SOCIAL CAPITAL

Predictors

Education

Age Age squared Was a manager before 1989 (1 yes, 0 no) Wealth index BUNURI Income per person Main source of income is the private sector (1 yes, 0 no) Conventional number of animals in the household ANIMALE98 Surface of agricultural property Relational capital RELATII Trust in managers, intellectuals, journalists Trust in the government 50

Dependent variable – long term satisfaction, SDURATA Urban+rural Urban model 1 model 2 0 0 0

0

+ -

+ -

+ -

+ 0

+

+

+

+

+ +

+ +

0 0

0 0

+

+

0

0

+ +

+ +

0 +

0 0

+

+

+

+

+

+

0

+

rural

Social Space of Transition VALUE ORIENTATIO NS

SPECIFIC SATISFACTIO NS AND FEARS

REGIONAL – COMMUNITY DEVELOPME NT

Valuation of WORK

+

+

0

0

Right wing political orientation (proEmil Constantinescu) Fear of unemployment (1 yes, 0 no)

+

+

+

+

*

-

-

0

Fear of inflation (1 yes, 0 no) Satisfied with the anticorruption actions of the government Satisfied with personal health Community satisfaction Satisfaction with income County development index DEVJUD98

* *

+

+

0

* * * 0

+ + + 0

+ + + 0

+ + + +

0 +

0 +

0 +

0 0

0.22

0.35

* 0.34

* 0.36

Quality of community life QLIFEUR Positioned on a European road (1 yes, 0 no) Lives in an urban area (1 yes, 0 no) R2

Source POB-OSF,1998. Each column of the table presents the sense of the relation between the dependant variable on the column and the predictor on the line that’s results from applying a logistic regression model based on the smallest squares. The statistically significant relations are represented with +/- for p=0.05 positive or negative. The statistically insignificant relations are marked with 0 in the corresponding logistic regression model. The values of the beta coefficients are presented in the table in Appendix R4 The variables that are not included in the analysis for the reference model are marked with *. An example of way of reading: the conditions of the past, present and future life tend to be perceived as worse and worse by older people, regardless of the residential area.

Captives in status space Age is by far the most important predictor of long-term satisfaction. The elderly are unhappier with their lives than the young (Table R4). Why? Because they have less material and social resources, because they are poorer in terms of goods, income and useful connections and because their health is in biologically conditioned decline. However, there is a positive circuit of influence from age to satisfaction through the intermediary of expectations. The level of expectations that elderly people have of life tends to be lower than with young people. Or, tendentially, high satisfaction values correspond to low levels of expectations. Revealing is the case of communitarian satisfaction, one of the few, particular forms of satisfaction that connects positively to age27. Long term satisfaction and, in general, defining phenomenon of the situation seem to be “closed” in the status space as a nucleus of social space. Status space is quadri-dimensional, being structured according to individual, family, communitarian and regional characteristics. At 51

Dumitru Sandu an individual level, age and education are the most important characteristics of status. In a family plan, wealth or material level and relational capital are more important. From the aspect of communitarian characteristics, rural and urban types are of most importance, followed by the level of development of the locality28. Finally, the level of the region’s development gives the regional element. Development level of county DEVJUD

0.15 Education -0.28

0.05 -0.05 0.24

0.35 Age -0.07

0.17

0.12 URBAN rezidence

Quality of life in locality QLIFE

-0.13

Connections -0.07 RELATII

Long term 0.15 satisfaction SDURATA

0.21

0.07

Material capital BUNURI

0.14 0.12

Figure 2-5.Long-term satisfaction in the causal context of status space Model path with manifest variables. The configuration of the model does not differ significantly from that of the data: p=0.31 for χ2=6.07 and 5 degrees of liberty. On the arcs of the graph path coefficients are marked that are significantly different to 0 for p=0.05. Source: POB-OSF, 1998.

Long-term satisfaction is “closed” in status space in the sense of a strong dependence on almost all of its elements (Figure 2-5). The relations are established on the elements of resource and level of expectations. Increased material resources at a family, communitarian and regional level favour a positive perception of the quality of life. The empirical relationships between the regional, communitarian and individual-family status and those associated with the definition of the situation (Figure 2-6) are arranged according to a model of hierarchic spheres. Each of the spheres represents an organization system of material, human, social and symbolic capital29 with institutionalized and uninstitutionalised elements. The most general sphere is the social, national and global one. By successive inclusion regional, communitarian and individual–family spheres are subordinated to the above mentioned sphere.

52

Social Space of Transition Social space Top-down causality from macro- to microlevel

Regional-community space Individual-family status space

Definitions of social situations

Consumptions behaviors INDIVIDUAL LIFE EXPERIENCE

Value orientations

Choice behaviors

Bottom-up causality from micro- to macrolevel

Figure 2-6.The theoretic model of social space spheres Life in social space can be classified in multiple ways. The type of data I work with obliges one to conceptualize these experiences in categories of definition of situations, value orientation, and choice and consumption behaviour. For each of these elements of life experiences status constraints and opportunities can be identified. With their help “the world of life” (Schutz, 1970), can be understood as a flux of personal experience in the universe created by social space. People’s lives progress in essence between the limits given by individual–family and regional–communitarian capital. Social spaces given by the intersection of regional– communitarian characteristics with those that define human, material and social capital are relatively stable in time. A comparison between the situations in 1998 and 1999 suggests a hypothesis of mobility of family–material capital in the direction of a larger association with communitarian–regional variables. From where does such a hypothesis arise? It is suggested by the sets of factorial analyses in the tables in annex 4. In 1998 the material capital of a household appears in the same factor or variable grouping as education, relational capital and age. In May 1999 the configuration is different. Material capital becomes more and more connected with communitarian–regional capital. People who live in richer communities and regions are themselves richer. Age is imposed in defining individual–family capital: young people have more education and larger networks of useful connections at their disposal. It is still premature to draw a conclusion about the way in which relationships between family and communitarian capital change. The question can be asked as to whether we are talking of a consequence of the general impoverishment process. In such situations it is possible for a greater “tie” to be made between status capital and the communitarian–regional environment and with biological 53

Dumitru Sandu characteristics. Impoverishment makes people more dependent on the environment in which they live and on their biological condition. Could we be speaking of an increase in the importance of human capital, of its autonomization in reference to the material capital? It is possible for such a process to be taking place?. A refining of the type of analysis (see regression models in tables R11 and R12) indicates the fact that the “roots” of material capital remain relatively stable. City dwellers with a higher level of education, from developed counties, tend to have a higher level of material capital and income. The relative impact of regional development on income seems to be on the rise (table R12). This finding supports the previous hypothesis of an increasing dependence of material capital on the region of residence. Education is maintained as the most important predictor of income level. The second most important factor fluctuates. In June 1998 this factor was residing in urban or rural areas. Later, regional development took second place in importance in influencing level of income. The hypothesis of a progression in regional income as poverty is emphasized seems to be taken into consideration. From the intersection of the composite variable of stocks of capital (CAPITAL) and regional communitarian development (COMREG) there result the main causal configurations that generate classes of specific behaviour, social or cultural types. The pro–active orientation of the population is reduced almost linearly by moving from “rich in rich areas”, “rich in poor areas”30 types to “poor in rich areas” and “poor in poor areas” (Table 2-6). Entrepreneurial orientation, for example, is far from being randomly distributed by social spaces. In particular, people with maximum capital at an individual–family level as well as people with maximum access to communitarian–regional resources; in other words, the rich in rich areas take risks in opening businesses. Immediately below them as entrepreneurial propensity we find the rich in poor areas. The greatest difference appears at the middle of the scale between those who have medium resources but live in either poor or rich areas. The zone type of influence is considerable. For a similar level of status resources, found in the middle of the reference scale, the probability of adopting entrepreneurial behaviour is much higher in poorer areas than in the rich ones. At the same point, by comparing the same type of social spaces the greatest differences are registered with regard to individual modernity, measured in this case through aversion to risk. People with medium status resources living in rich areas are more open to new things, have a higher acceptance of risk than those that have similar resources but live in poor areas. (Table 2-6).

Table 2-6. Pro–active orientation classified by types of social space Status space

54

Social Space of Transition Individual–family capital Regional–communitarian resources

Reduced

Reduc High level ed The The poor poor in in rich poor areas areas Pro–active orientation indexes Aversion to risk 40.00 17.72 RISCAVER98 Favourable orientation to the maximum state 29.66 22.54 MAXIMAL98 Potential of public involvement 0.24 0.26 INFLUENT98 Entrepreneurial orientation 0.15 0.33 ORANT98 Using “gifts” as a means of solving personal 26.06 33.33 problems in public space GIFTS98

Average

High level

Total

Reduced High level Reduc High level ed The The rich rich in in rich poor areas areas 30.11

-10.86

-20.25

-54.82

-0.02

26.49

12.31

13.22

-0.50

17.13

0.31

0.32

0.44

0.41

0.33

0.48

0.83

1.01

1.15

0.66

30.15

38.08

30.65

42.56

33.55

Source: POB-OSF, 1998 The two dimensions used to defined social space (individual–family capital and communitarian–regional resources) were generated as scores by the factorial analysis presented in the annex, table F1.

Using “gifts” to solve personal problems in relations with public institutions is also a trial of social activism under the conditions in which the respective institutes do not function properly. This deviant activism is, as are the individual modernism or entrepreneurial trends, strongly dependant on status space. What matters more in this case are the communitarian– regional resources. In relatively rich areas, regardless of the status resources, the behaviour of bribing is more frequent than in the poor areas (see table R7 from Appendix 2). The population in the intra-Carpathian areas – Transylvania, Banat and Crisana-Maramures – is more reluctant to give bribes than the population of extra-Carpathian areas (Moldova, Muntentia, Dobrogea, Oltenia and Bucharest). City dwellers who give bribes are usually from poor cities of rich counties from the Old Kingdom. On the other hand, for villagers, the favourable combination for bribing is rich city in rich county from the extra-Carpathian arc. In the city, bribing is a behaviour of a person with material resources and in the village it seems to be more the behaviour of a “modern” type, for people who take risks. The presence of status space as a causal configuration for “the world of life” is obvious not only by relating to satisfaction–dissatisfaction phenomena or choice behaviour. Individual– family consumption is also fully influenced by the different forms of capital and communitarian–regional resources. I will consider by way of example the case of consumption at household level in rural areas. The rural household remains a unit of analysis of extreme 55

Dumitru Sandu relevancy to communitarian-regional resources. As there is an individual consumption behaviour, there is also a household one, between the two types of units there being permanent interaction. Food and non–food consumption by the rural household is overwhelmingly determined by the available stocks of capital. Available human and material capital dictates, in good measure, the level of consumption expenses, monetary and non–monetary (annex table number R4). In households with a high educational stock and with important agricultural production resources the level of consumption expenses is high. In the same series of human resources the structure of household member occupation has a significant role. The presence of at least one wage earner and, in lesser measure, of at least one pensioner directly contributes to the rise of potential consumption. On the other hand, the presence of farmers and implicitly agriculture as a source of income under the conditions of controlling the other factors contributes to the reduction of consumption. Agricultural occupations continue to bring poverty. The optimum configuration of a rural household for well-being is the one where there are no farmers and at least one wage earner and one pensioner31. Rural poverty, measured by the level of consumption, is maximum in households made up only of farmers, with a low level of education, run by widowed or divorced women, orientated in particular towards cereal cultivation and owning small plots of land. Rural consumption is strongly dependent on the city, on the position of the village in comparison to the city. The situation of consumption is better in villages closer to bigger cities. Consumption at a household level varies significantly depending on the development of the village and county of residence. A household in a village with good social infrastructure, in a developed county, clearly has a larger probability of well-being than a household in a poor village, in a poor county. Community social infrastructure is not a factor of direct influence on family consumption. Rather it is a low number of doctors and teachers in a rural village with a high rate of infantile mortality that indicates a situation of communitarian poverty and the increased probability of the whole communitarian service system functioning badly.

Liberalist and communitarian ideologies In the status space that results from intersecting individual capitals and communitarian regional capitals one finds not only situation definitions but also values and ideologies. Which are the main ideologies of the experienced transition? What is their dependence on status space? In general, ideologies are systems of faith or substitutes for faiths (prejudice, preconceptions etc.) explicitly used to orientate human actions at an individual or social level32. 56

Social Space of Transition At society’s level, the main ideologies that are confronted in the long term, beginning with the 18th century, are liberalism, conservationism and socialism (Wallerstein, 1995). However, there are also ideologies that found strategies for the lives of individuals, the methods of relating to family, community, state etc. The faith people have in migration, for example – is it good or bad, must be adopted only by young people, is an indicated strategy of life etc. – is an example of an ideology with direct impact on the way decisions are made, independent of resources or available information (Sandu, De Jong, 1998). The ideologies of the post–communist transition period are extremely diverse. As is all periods of rapid historical change, they have very fertile ground at their disposal. A possible way of classifying them would be one that distinguishes ideologies of change and communitarian type ideologies. In the series of ideologies of change liberalism, nostalgic – communist visions, social – democracy, Christian – democracy, modernism are included. Each of these offer answers that are more or less different in relation to the role of the state in social life, valuing property, openness to new things, acceptance of risk etc. Communitarian ideologies offer models that relate to the family, local community, region, nations, ethnic groups, religious groups, church etc. The data available supports the validity of such a hypothesis of grouping transition ideologies (see table F4 in the annex). Liberal doctrine is defining for the ideologies of chance that are in social controversy. The supporters of this doctrine are identified in an empirical plan, with the help of poll data, by the fact that they have positive opinions on the restitution of property, on the minimal state in the political field and on the integration of the country in the Euro–Atlantic structures (EU and NATO). This type of liberalism centred on private property and on adopting a model of development consonant with the western one, is, at the same time consonant with supporting the Democratic Conventions. Also, being liberal and a partisan of the Romanian Democratic Conventions is strongly associated with a type of individual modernism, with the tendency of accepting the ideology of risk as a strategy of life. At the opposite pole are people who reject the liberal ideology, risk and the Convention. The second dimension of structuring ideologies of transition is the communitarian one. Analyzed poll data indicates the fact that people that manifest a higher degree of religiousness are at the same time orientated to having faith in a larger measure in other people, different ethnic groups and the state’s institutions of order, such as police and the justice system. It is also specific to them to have a higher degree of identification with the society or nation to they belong to (they are “very proud to be a citizen of Romania”). They way the mentioned ideological variables are classified suggests that in the present Romanian society the main themes of social controversy are associated with change and 57

Dumitru Sandu community. The ideological attitudes supported in the two areas are relatively independent. Through the dichotomization and the intersection of the two ideological dimensions a relevant typology for presenting ideological orientations in Romanian society at a diffuse social mental level is obtained (Table 2-7).

Table 2-7. Ideal types of ideological orientation in the period of post-communist transition Ideologies of change

Communitarian ideologies Secular – Religious – individuality communitarian orientation LIBERAL LIBERALINDIVIDUALIST COMMUNITARIAN PRAGMATICPRAGMATICINDIVIDUALIST COMUNITARIAN

Liberalism Pragmatism (adoption of ideologies according to context or weak ideological structuring) Conservationism (rejection of liberal models)

CONSERVATIVE - INDIVIDUALIST

CONSERVATIVECOMUNITARIAN

The extreme types of maximum consistency are the liberal individualist and the conservative community orientated. The liberal individualist values private property highly and considers that the state should not intervene in the activity of political parties and in controlling the mass media. The western model of development is the one the seems to be the one that can be used for Romania or that at least agrees on integration in Euro–Atlantic structures. They are highly modern people but with a weak communitarian orientation. For them church, nation and community are not very important. Individuality seems to be their basic orientation in social interactions: they do not believe in God, they do not trust others as people or as groups and they are not proud to be Romanians. The communitarian conservative has all the opposite traits of the liberal: he is in favour of a maximal state, proves to be distrusting in relation to western states and believes restitution of private property is to be carried out conditionally, possibly only in very small measure. On the other hand the options of faith are very strong: he proves to be a religious person, with a high level of trust in others and in institutions. The individual – liberal is the person in favour of minimal state intervention and the individual. The communitarian– conservative is the man of the state and community. His life strategy is based on external forces – divinity, state and community. The individual–liberal builds his life strategy by himself, relatively independently, based on laical values and is anti communitarian. However, there are also intermediary types. The communitarian liberal is a sui–generis combination of modernism and traditionalism. He relates to the state and property in a liberal way but his ideology of human interaction is communitarian. In the same register of 58

Social Space of Transition intermediary types the individual–conservative is worth mentioning. For the latter the world is dominated by private property, minimal state intervention and community. In the idea of community the human as well as the divine world are included. The pragmatic type is the “average man” with a liberal attitude of average profile. He is neither conservative nor liberal. He either blends them together or ignores them. Some “pragmatists” are individualists others are communitarian. Before seeing how this typology works for the available data, it should also be mentioned that the notions of liberal and conservative, with reference to the systems of mass faith, have different meanings according to context. Implicitly, relating is carried out on the type of situation in the referenced society. In the context of the 90’s, in ex-communist countries, liberalism tended to be perceived firstly as denial of communism and, in particular, as denial of maximum state intervention in social life. In the context of a society with a long capitalist tradition of democracy and market economy, the liberal is perceived as a person with a system of faiths that “support the economic intervention of the state and expansion of individual liberties; libertarian orientation supports the expansion of individual liberties but is opposed to economic intervention; the populist agrees with economic intervention but not with expanding individual rights.” (Lilie, Maddox, 1981) The typology of mass faiths that I propose for use in understanding the transition ideologies can easily be found in reference to that proposed by Lilie and Maddox and the classic one from the beginning of the 19th century: The typology based on the liberalist ideology of the 19th century

liberal (minimal state intervention, increased individual liberties)

-

The typology of the mass faiths system in current American society (Lilie&Maddox, 1982) liberal (for government intervention in the economic sphere and the increase of individual liberties) libertarian

Central conservative orientation (restrictions on individual freedom and minimal government intervention in the market) conservative

-

populist (supports the intervention of the government and the limitation of individual liberties)

Typology of the ideologies in the period of transition

-

conservativeindividualist

-

liberal-individualist

-

pragmatic

-

liberal-communitarian conservativecommunitarian

The six ideal types of liberals or conservatives have a strong identity in social space. Values and specific status capital and form of communitarian–regional resources are their associates. The social types of ideological content are of extremely large social consistency. The

59

Dumitru Sandu high degree of structuring the social profile is for each of the six ideological types is surprising (Table 2-8). The six social–ideological types are arranged almost hierarchically from the point of view of available capital and communitarian–regional resources to which they in principle have access. The individualist liberals are the wealthiest, with the highest relational and human capital. Living in developed towns in developed counties, which in 1996 were overwhelmingly in favour of CDR and Emil Constantinescu. There are the towns in which the communitarian environment was and is very favourable to change. In terms of age, they are the youngest group. Total Liberalindividualist

Liberalcommunitarian

Pragmaticindividualist

Pragmaticcommunitarian

Conservativeindividualist

The status profile indexes *

Conservativecommunitarian

Table 2-8. The status profile of social types according to their ideology

Age 53.40 44.67 47.75 43.50 46.82 41.95 46.39 Average number of years of school 8.21 8.86 9.16 10.37 11.08 11.29 9.84 graduated EDUCANI Modern GOODS in the household 0.94 1.06 1.26 1.36 1.59 1.60 1.30 Relational Capital RELATII99 1.13 1.11 1.13 1.53 1.50 1.86 1.38 Average level of income per person 702.60 724.52 721.25 897.96 1143.34 1193.01 897.66 in the last month (thousands of lei) VENPERS Percentage of people from the group 31 30 37 44 44 53 40 that where managers before 1989 Percentage of people that are 19 19 23 32 31 37 27 currently managers Percentage of people in urban areas 42 54 46 60 58 66 55 Percentage of men 45 44 46 49 50 58 49 Mass-media consumption MEDIA -35.93 -32.65 -7.96 19.21 28.14 27.35 0.00 Average level development of town 46.47 61.32 52.90 72.37 62.52 84.91 63.44 of residence QLIFE/UR Level of development of county of 0.26 2.71 3.00 3.90 6.02 6.07 3.65 residence DEVJUD95 Percentage of people in towns near 30 44 39 57 56 61 48 European roads EURO Percentage of votes for Emil 47.78 51.85 50.35 54.36 55.68 60.76 53.44 Constantinescu in the town in 1996 EMIL96 All values in the table for which the type of statistic is not mentioned represent averages. The analysis is relevant only for the social profile of the ideological types. The percentage of these types in the adult population of the country cannot be identified by the methodology on which the table is based: the degree of liberal or communitarian orientation is given by the position of the individual on a scale of factorial score at whose level there are only standardized levels (series with 0 average and standard deviation of 1).

The communitarian conservative is opposed to the individual liberal not only in values and attitude, but also in terms of resources and the capital that he controls. His mark is poverty of capital: low level of education, relational and material capital. The towns and counties in 60

Social Space of Transition which such a conservative lives are among the poorest. If the individual liberalist is made up mainly of men that live in the city, the communitarian conservative is made up mainly of women from rural areas. Thus, with this analysis, a cultural dimension of opposition between polar social types of “rich in rich area” versus “poor in poor area” is identified. As expected, a conservative–communitarian culture for the poor and a liberal individualist one for the rich is easily identified. Clearly, it is a question of the “rich” and the “poor” in a relative way, in the context of Romania in the 90’s. Why are some liberals of an individualist orientation and others of a communitarian one? Once the inspection of the poll data has been formulated, by applying a processing algorithm, an answer can be obtained: liberal individualists as compared to communitarian ones tend to be younger men from towns where modernism and liberalism are strongly valued. Surprisingly, the highest percentage of ex-leaders from the communist period is of liberal individualists (Table 29)33. This finding leads to the hypothesis of considering managerial experience during communism as a factor of liberal orientation. The fact that leadership experience in the communist period refers mainly to the professional aspect (“did you have at least three subordinates”), and not the political one, is underlined. Of course, it would have been optimum for there to be information collected with questionnaires in relation to the political functions of the people interviewed as well. Even in the absence of such data, the finding that professional leaders of communism are currently in an overwhelming proportion liberal individualists is significant. The fact of being a leader at the respective time significantly contributed to the style of liberalism they adopted – individualist and not communitarian. Regarding styles of conservationism, individualist or communitarian, the determination is much simpler. In this case what matters is only age: to be younger leads to individualism and to be older favours communitarian orientation. Towards the centre of the ideological scale, in the are of the pragmatists who are neither liberal nor conservative, the differentiation between individualists and communitarians is made, in particular, in connection with a good material state. Wealthier people have a higher tendency to adopt the individualist style of pragmatism than the communitarian one. In General, liberal–modernism ideologies are fuelled by a high level of education or, and more generally, by consistent stocks of human capital. This finding is consistent with the results obtained in polls made in different countries. The modern–liberal ideologies are favoured not only by individual characteristics – high levels of education, income and media information – but also by the communitarian environment of life. In the towns where, in 1996, more votes were registered for the candidate of the centre–right political formation CDR, that is for Emil Constantinescu, there is found a large propensity of individuals with ideologies of modernism 61

Dumitru Sandu and liberalism. The voting pattern at a local level seems to be a good indicator of the liberal– conservative orientation of the population.

Table 2-9.Predictors of the main types of ideological orientations. Dependant variables Predictors

Ideology favourable to Ideology favourable to change the community CHANGE COMMUNITY

Age Average number of years of school graduated EDUCANI Modern GOODS in the household Relational Capital RELATII99 Average level of income per person in the last month (thousands of lei) VENPERS Percentage of people from the group that were managers before 1989 Percentage of people that are currently managers Percentage of people in urban areas Percentage of men Mass-media consumption MEDIA Average level of development of town of residence QLIFE/UR The level of development of county of residence DEVJUD95 Percentage of people in towns near European roads EURO Percentage of votes for Emil Constantinescu in the town in 1996 EMIL96 R2

(-0.01) 0.17

0.24 (0.04)

(0.04) (0.01) 0.09

(0.04) (0.00) (0.02)

(0.04)

-0.07

(-0.01) (-0.02) 0.04 0.14 -0.09

(-0.02) (-0.06) -0.05 0.07 (-0.02)

(0.001)

(0.03)

(0.05)

-0.07

0.14

-0.11

0.16

0.09

Source POB-OSF, 1999. Each column of the table presents a multiple regression model with standardized partial regression coefficients. All the beta coefficients that are not in parentheses () are significant for p=0.05. For the definition of the variables see tables A1 and A3. The data from the World Value Survey indicate the fact that the major tendency at the level of 41 societies is that the belief in adopting a conservative attitude ("our society must be decidedly defended from subversive forces") is stronger where the level of education is lower. Thus, of the cumulated segment of 41 societies 12% of those with higher education are registered as having the same opinion. The corresponding percentages for those with medium and low levels of education are 17% and 23% (Inglehart, Basanez and Moreno, 1998,V249). The contingency charts reported for the same variable dependant on conservativisms indicates the emphasizing of the phenomenon along with the rise in the degree of poverty (reduction of income, respectively ). Finally, conservativism is reduced for people and societies in which the post-materialist values have a higher extension in comparison to the material ones. Women are more conservative than men. Even though the way in which conservatism/liberalism are measured in the World Value Survey and in the present study are different, the results are consistent: liberalism tends to be stronger amongst educated men with a high level of income.

The Bravais-Pearson correlation between the index of the development of the town and the favourable orientation towards change CHANGE is positive (r=0.08, significant for p<0.01). At the time when the status variables are controlled – education, media consumption etc. – the meaning of the relation between the ideology of change and the development of the town

62

Social Space of Transition changes – a higher modernism appears for people with high human capital from relatively poor towns. In such cases it seems to be a question of the effect of answering the conditions of the adverse environment, given especially by people with a high level of capital stock. Even though it may seem surprising, the result of this analysis is supported by other data as well. Inspecting some older polls, form 1991 and 1993, allowed a hypothesis to take shape that the highest degree of modernism is found with people with rich capital resources in poor areas (Sandu, 1996a, 117). In General, under the conditions in Romania in the 90’s, the communitarian ideologies are mainly supported by isolation and tradition. This fact becomes more obvious if we relate to the nucleus of communitarian ideologies, respectively the state of religiousness. People who believe most in God are elderly women, with a low level of education, with reduced migration experience, living in poor counties. It is a state of religiousness that appears mostly as a reflex of regional poverty and of low level of human capital. Of course, religiousness is not reduced to this type of conditioning through poverty of resources. At the moment, however, this is the dominant type in Romania. It should also be noted that leadership experience in the communist period appears as a favouring factor of laical type orientations. People that were connected to professional leadership in the communist years are less religious. It is very probably a question of the effect of more intense exposure to communist propaganda.

Conclusions The primary matter from which the life experiences of people are interwoven, “the world of life”, is given by evaluation, faith, consumption and choice. Or, more precisely, it is about defining situation, value orientations, consumption behaviour and choice behaviour. The different combinations that give the content of experience of life at an individual or family level are according to personal history and the game of constraint – opportunity from the level of superior spheres such as communitarian–regional or societal. Whatever people feel – satisfaction, discontent, optimism, pessimism etc. – as well as what they consider desirable or reproachable, the values that structure their life are in good measure “closed in status space”. Through the formula of captivity or closure of human experiences in the described perimeter of objective characteristics we see a situation of strong dependence on what people feel, believe and know, according to their available capital and the resources of the environment in which they live. “The world of life” in periods of transition, especially for poor societies, tends to be one of constraint. Status constraints are replacing more and more the political constraints from 63

Dumitru Sandu the communist era. The capitals that people have and the communitarian–regional resources that they have access to are fundamental to the way they live and organize their lives. “The world of life” from the post–communist transition period in Romania of the 90’s can be relatively easily read on three axes or with the aid of three perspectives – that of social spaces, of situation definitions and that of undertaken ideologies. Almost nothing that happens in the sphere of individual–family experiences can escape the reductionalism of these plans. From the perspective of social space the opposition between the rich in rich areas and the poor in poor areas is important. Propensity towards social activism, towards dynamic manifestation, is reduced by moving from those who have consistent stocks of capital and live in communitarian – regional rich space, towards those that are poor in poor areas. The former accept risks easier that the latter, they have an entrepreneurial orientation that is better crystallized, they expect less from the state and more from themselves. The social space of status is strongly structured according to the relationship between stocks of individual–family capital and communitarian capital. The two types of stock are significantly dependent: the richer the region or community of residence, the greater the stock of individual status capital (table F3 in the annex). The essential aspect for the perspective of defining situations is the one of long term satisfaction, the one created as an effect of interaction between the evaluations of the present, the present related to the past and future. In a way it was to be expected that long–term satisfaction, given by the method of relating to the past, present and future, is “captive” in status space. The capital of available or accessible connections and material goods seems to be the most important factor for long-term satisfaction. Those that have available connections and material goods are more durably satisfied. Yet, behind them hangs heavily the influence of the communitarian– regional environment and of the complex of variables associated with age and education. Long-term satisfaction does not come only from combinations of capital and resources. This diffuse feeling is also under the significant, independent influence of specific fears and satisfactions. The fear of inflation and unemployment considerably reduces the general level of satisfaction towards life. Similarly, discontent with the government’s activities, with one’s personal health and income in the household are significant, specific factors. All these particular forms of satisfaction – dissatisfaction have specific dynamics, relatively independent to that of general satisfaction and resources. Dependence on the path at a group level and project dependence, dependence tied to expectations of future evolution of the life environment act in the direction of strong social differentiation. What should be noted is that in this period in Romania it is not so much the existence of classes but the existence of social groups whose profile can easily be “read” through 64

Social Space of Transition social types. The social structure of the country can be described as an interaction between status or capital groupings and the ideological and situation defining groups. In other words, the interaction between being rich/poor, liberal/conservative and satisfied/unsatisfied is what gives the content to current Romanian social structure. All the types of elementary groups, made up according to a reduced set of criteria, is projected at the level of cumulative groups (Sorokin, 1998,27-30) of great complexity, identified by their life styles. In this last series, the elite entrepreneurial, political, cultural groups, middle class, marginal groups etc. are worth mentioning. Is the inclusion of situation defining groups and of the ideological ones in the general picture opportune? This topic can be debated. The decision to include them in a phenomenological picture of social structure comes from the salience with which such groups imposed themselves in the exploratory empirical analysis, which evolved within the capitol. What people believe and feel is not only influenced by what they own, the capital they have, but also influences the different forms of capital. This, in fact, is the main premise of the phenomenological perspective of the social structure. And as transition to capitalism is not only achieved with resources but also with social definitions and beliefs it is important that the essential terms of the process are placed in the same conceptualization which in the present situation is one of “social structure in phenomenological perspective”. IDEOLOGICAL GROUPINGS individualist-liberal communitarian-liberal pragmatic-individualist pragmatic-communitarian conservative-individualist conservative-communitarian

DEFINITION OF THE SITUATION GROUPINGS continuity optimists reaction optimists temporal stable recent time pesimistics cronic pesimistic

STATUS GROUPINGS poor-rich people in poor-rich zones

LIFE STYLE CUMULATIVE GROUPINGS middle class economic elites (entrepreneurs, employers etc.), marginal groupings

Figure 2-7. A phenomenological perspective of social structure The nucleus of understanding the phenomenological perspective of social structure is the idea that values, satisfaction and behaviour are, in essence, under the direct or indirect influence of 65

Dumitru Sandu the relation between status capital and communitarian capital, between what people have as goods, beliefs, information and connections and what they can have as members of a local community or region. The typical example for the importance of the relation between personal and communitarian–regional capital is individual modernism. The data analyzed proves the idea that modern ideologies and behaviour are more frequent for the rich in poor areas, for the people that have available individual–family capital but who live in poor areas. In the absence of an approach that would emphasize the individual–community relationship, such a regularity could not be emphasized. The ideologies themselves are themselves a factor of social structuring. The inclusion of ideological groupings in the ensemble configuration of social structure of societies in transition, of Romania’s in the 90’s in particular, is based on the premise that, eventually, the different social orders result from beliefs and resources. What people have and believe dictates in good measure their life strategies, civic implication, economic orientation and, finally, their arrangement in cumulative social groups. The overlapping of ideological groups and capital groups is extremely strong. Going from individualist liberalism through the communitarian liberalism,

individualist

pragmatism,

communitarian

pragmatism,

communitarian

conservationism series to communitarian conservationism is done by almost linearly reducing human, material and social type capital. Similarly, the level of regional development reduces as the same movement from individualist liberalism to the communitarian variety takes place. It is surprising to see how much people depend on their beliefs, including religious belief, on what they own and where they live. Religiousness, for example, is strongly dependent on status characteristics that are not a result of personal efforts, are not gained, but are attributed or inherited. People with a maximum degree of religiousness are elderly women who live in villages in poor regions, lacking migration experience in their lifetime. Only school education and leadership experience in the communist period, negatively correlated with religiousness, are status characteristics gained through personal effort. This high dependence on inherited status characteristics seems to be a characteristic of poor societies in the transition process. The migratory return to cities/villages phenomena are symptomatic of the emphasizing of the dependence of ways of life on traditional contexts, for re-traditionalisation (Barbara Adam, 1996,140) of societies in crisis or with failures in the modernization process. The tension between the ideologies of change with their liberalist and conservative alternatives and the communitarian ones expressed through individualism and communitarian orientation is long term. The have and will mark the space of public debate on transition. For each of the three major elements of social structure in the period of transition specific tendencies can be registered. The “waves” of the experienced liberalism, communitarian 66

Social Space of Transition orientation, and long-term satisfaction and of the variation of status capital have correlated dynamics, dependant of the rhythms of reform. In the beginning, right after 1989 it was about a denial reform associated with a very generous “gift” faith placed by the population in the new government. The denial reform defined the new emergent society as a denial of the pathologic characteristics of communism, as a society that is no longer run by a totalitarian and centralist system. It was more a denial of the state of fact and the punctual way than the ideology. Market economy was accepted superficially without ample privatization (Table 2-1). The elections in 1992 were dominated by an anticipative reform. The discussion of means begins. Everything progresses, however, as in anticipative socialization. Reform is still talked about more than experienced. The period of 1992 – 1997 remains one of hesitation between reaction and anticipated reform. A clear installation of reaction reform, the one expressed as a reaction to the way in which a reform is carried out or not, can bee seen in 1998 and 1999. The last miner’s protest (mineriade) in January 1999 was a clear expression of reaction reform. The population began to react violently to a restructuring policy that progresses without the necessary accompaniment of regional compensation policies for the suffering induced by the loss of jobs and there being a lack of alternative viable work places. The evaluation of the event, at the level of common conscience, is made strictly according to the type of ideology that models the conscience of the respective person (Table 2-10).

Table 2-10.Evaluation of the miner’s protest (mineriade) in January 1999 according to type of ideology

Type of ideology of the person interviewed

conservativecommunitarian Conservative-individualist pragmatic-communitarian pragmatic-individualist liberal-communitarian liberal-individualist Total

Medium grade given to actors associated with the events in Costeşti-Vâlcea in January 1999, for Miners who Local Miron Prime minister took part in populations in Cosma, the Radu Vasile the march league with the leader of the miners miners 5.53 5.29 4.63 5.44 5.28 4.79 4.64 3.43 3.43 4.49

5.19 4.74 4.57 3.47 3.57 4.44

4.54 3.89 4.01 2.93 2.85 3.78

4.86 6.31 5.76 7.36 6.56 6.09

Source: POB-OSF, May 1999. Each subject was asked evaluate each of the actors that took part in the events on a scale of 1 (very bad behaviour) to 10 (very good behaviour). To define the types of ideology see Table 2-7.

The typology built by intersecting the two ideologies proves to be extremely relevant to interpreting a social movement of the miners’ protest (mineriade) of January 1999. From conservatives to liberals, and from communitarian to individualists, the grade given to miners or 67

Dumitru Sandu locals involved in the protest decreases continuously. The monotonous type variation of the evaluation is no longer registered in connection to the “pacifier” Radu Vasile. In this case, for the same level of liberalism or conservativeness, the maximum grades are given by the people with a communitarian orientation. This fact can be related to an increasing value that communitarian ideologies give the actions with a socio–integration character. Finally, in connection to the evolution of the indexes of optimism–pessimism and satisfaction–dissatisfaction after 1991, arguments of rejection are made of the thesis that explains the rising discontent of the population through strictly cultural factors such as “the Romanian’s or the voter’s criticism”. The analysis of the series of data for almost ten years indicates the fact that the variation of social curves is mainly explained by electoral and economic cycles. Right after the elections (1992) or even a little before a predictable electoral victory (1996) “social eruptions” of optimism are registered. It is a type of optimism associated with “gift faith” attributed to the new leaders. Between the electoral cycles, however, the processes of impoverishment play very strongly. For the interpretation of the evolutions connected to optimism, the concept of “captive optimism” appears. It is a social phenomenon that appears after periods of eruptions of expectations, hopes. After the elections in 1996, the years 1997 – 1999 were years of captive optimism. Social pessimism becomes dominant in connection to the emphasis of poverty and the delay of the saviour reforms promised by the new power. Begun as exploratory research, the analysis of social space of status finally leads to the identification of a system of indexes for the phenomenological analysis of social structure under the conditions of post–communist transition. The three types of social groups – status, ideological and definition of social status – result from the intersection of a multitude of criteria presented in the tree in Table 2-8. The description of the social structure is phenomenological in the sense that it includes, obligatorily, the subjective indexes next to the regular, and objective one. The new social structure in Romania, during its forming, moves along lines of structuring given by resources and modernism. The ideology of modernism is positively associated with long-term satisfaction phenomena. The people with strong modern and liberal orientation are, at the same time, optimistic perceiving progress in their life. Communitarian ideologies marked by religiousness, nationalism and generalized faith, seem to have a closer dynamic to that of the resources than to that of the ideology trend of modernism. Reduced individual, family and community resources characterize people that are community orientated. Faith and religiousness seem to be more a reaction to poor environments than a value option in the true sense of the word. 68

Social Space of Transition The “modernism ideology” factor has a very close structure to that of the “cultural complex of reform” (COREF). COREF was defined (Sandu 1996a) as a “hard” attitude structure, formed by association with modern individuality, reform and positive diffuse definition of the environment of interaction. Modernism and reform as ideologies of active change were presented as a COREF nucleus, using poll data from 1991, 1993 and 1995. On resuming the issue, with a set of data from 1999 and a completely different methodology, an identification of a factor is reached that has practically the same structure as what I named COREF. It is the MODERNISM factor from Table F2 in annex. Individual modernism and reform clearly appear in the same factor of level II aggregation. Individual modernism, reformism given by liberal ideologies and positive defining of situations through optimism are associated in a unique factor known as MODERNISM on level I aggregation. The sole difference to the empirical definition of COREF in the study from 1996 resides in the position faith has. In defining COREF interpersonal trust was associated with optimism in diffuse defining of the situation.

level I

+

MODERNITY* +

level II

+

long time satisfaction SDURATA*

modernisation ideologies SCHIMBARE*

present better than future ACUM/IERI

liberal ideologies LIBERAL*

satisfaction on present SPREZENT

individual modernity PRORISC

OPTIMISM

right voting Vot pro-CDR

+ level III +

RESOURCES*

+ regegional develop. COMREG* +

capital stocks CAPITAL*

communitarian ideologies COMUNITATE*

EDUCATION

religiosity*

wealth BUNURI*

trust*

network capital RELATII*

national orientation MANDRU

+ urban/rural residence

+

+ +

+

locality development QLIFE/UR* +

+

+ County development DEVJUD*

+

Figure 2-8.The system of indicators used to describe the social structure phenomenologically Indexes from level two are factorially grouped in accordance with the arboreal structure that leads to level 1. The five level II indexes were included in a VARIMAX – PROMAX factorial model and generated level I factors. The two big dimensions of social structure, the subjective MODERNISM and the objective RESOURCES are positively correlated (0.14 correlation between the generated factors). Each of the level II latent variables is determined as a factorial score according to level III indexes. All variables marked with an asterix are either factorial score, numbering or sum type indexes. Their description is made in tables A1 and A3. The meanings of the correlations between factors or between factors and variables are marked with + and -.

In the new structure used to analyze social structures and status space, trust appears not in association with optimism but with communitarian ideologies, in association with religiousness and the national feeling. Inconsistency has many sources. Faith in the model with data from 1999 is a complex measure that includes not only interpersonal trust, but also that of groups and institutions. Additionally, in the new model, built through the aggregation of multiple factorial analyses, there appear other variables that were taken into consideration in “The Sociology of 69

Dumitru Sandu Transition”, the study from 1996. Particularly appears religiousness, a variable with a much larger power of attraction on faith than optimism. The supplementary proof of consistency between COREF, in the definition from 1996 and MODERNISM in the acceptation of 1999 is the fact that the “rebel” variable referring to faith appears in all the models from 1996 in a marginal position in the cultural complex of reform (Sandu, 1996,263,266). Finding COREF in the ensemble of variables that are defining to the social structure emphasizes the fact that social groups of transition, relevant to the degree of social differentiation and to the way in which social life is spontaneously organized, include as an essential element of the structure of the attitude to reform and individual modernism. Social structure of transition is given by a combination of resources and attitudes that favour or do not favour the progress of reform. The most conclusive example for the relevancy of the proposed point of view can be found in relation to the entrepreneurs. They are clearly a group of the new economic elite of society. Their identification as an element of social structure cannot be made only through referring to resources but also to subjective variables. The famous entrepreneurial spirit is nothing other than a manifestation of modernism and reform, under the given conditions of transition.

70

Social Space of Transition

3.

Productive Sociability34

Social capital as a form of interaction Social capital (SC), no matter the style of the school or the author (see, for example, Putnam 1993, Coleman, 1990) that handles the subject, is considered as a stock of values relevant to sociability. Their function is to favour the positive definition of the interaction models and to reduce the costs of transactions in the processes of interaction. In a very synthetic way, it can also be said about CS that it is productive sociability that has consequences for the increase of stocks of capitals such as material, human or even social capital. Depending on the space of interaction where the consequences of productive sociability appear, we can refer to personal social capital as well as family, communitarian, organizational and society capital. Faith, association and tolerance form the nucleus of SC’s values. Implicit reciprocity is the fundamental, latent dimension of all these values. Social fabric is built and maintained by highly specific interests but also by diffuse expectations of satisfaction of the need of reciprocity within the processes of interaction. The idea that sooner or later, directly or indirectly, I or those like me will receive something in exchange for what I have given is the basis of faith, tolerance and association. Tolerance is the weak form of interpersonal or intergroup faith35. Both phenomena imply a positive definition of the other and the reduction of transaction costs. A tolerant person, will, most probably, be characterized by a high degree of adoption of an opening culture, based on faith. Faith and tolerance are both forms of manifestation of the same open culture. The difficulties in measuring SC relate to the fact that the notion signifies a sub-set of values that is part of a larger set belonging to what could be named the “culture of openness”, a culture that favours communication and sociability. Trust, tolerance and orientation towards cooperation works in close ties with openness to new experiences, accepting calculated risk and morality36. The culture of openness is specific to “open social spaces” characterized by high status and environmental resources37. The group of values that forms the core of open culture is identifiable as an empiric reality through studies of a number of cultures such as the study of world values in 1990-1991 labelled as the “cultural syndrome of well-being”. From the point of view of such a study, post–materialistic values are very close to trust, tolerance, and balance of positive feelings38. A second reason for the difficulty of measuring SC is that the notion refers to a function and not an entity. It is the function of certain forms of sociability to contribute to the costs of transactions and the reduction of social complexity. Like money, power and love, trust and its associated values form a communication environment39. The rules of reciprocity of the environment favour the reciprocity of the exchanges, “we” versus “I”, “tomorrow” versus “today”. 71

Dumitru Sandu Social capital is an umbrella concept. It is like a building in which several families of concepts reside. The rooms of the buildings (i.e. the size of the concept) sometimes communicate, sometimes do not. As one can see from the outside, the building is the same in cities as well as villages. When one looks closer, from the inside, is the image of similarity still valid? Is social capital structured in the same way in villages and cities? Analogically speaking, who are the residents of the building of social capital? Strictly speaking, they are not people. They are a type of strange beings built from relationships. The data of the study could refer only to certain rooms in the building, in other words those occupied by person – person, person–institution or person–group relationships. They cannot speak of institution–institution relationships. Even the relationships between people or person–institution type relationships are not completely visible through survey data. From surveys we simply obtain people’s evaluation of these relationships, not an objective image of them.

Trust as a form of social exchange Trust in others as groups or as people and trust in institutions, an essential element of social capital, makes up one of the cultural foundations of societies. It works as an exchange environment in the situation in which formal norms are not adequate. The procedural opposite of trust is negotiation. In the situation of economic transactions, change is produced by comparing supply and demand, costs and benefits, by reference to prices, norms with high degrees of specification, with a reduced discretionary space, contracts. The exchange environment is one with terms specified through formal or informal definitions and the exchange itself is produced as a consequence of estimating the quantitative ratio between costs and benefits. Costs and benefits also exist in the case of exchange relationships based on trust. Yet, they are not directly comparable, they cannot be estimated using a common unit of measurement such as money. Plus, the degree of mediation between investment and reward is much higher. Exchange based on trust takes place in a diffuse environment, without contractual norms or deadlines. The particulars of trust can be best observed if one proceeds to its integration in the series of social change phenomenon, next to the gift, (Mauss, 1993), giving away or remembering the dead. The last type of behaviour is, at first glance, typical for unilateral transfers, of the “something for nothing” series. In fact, it is a symbolic exchange in which the donor, the one giving something away (“dar de pomenire” in Romanian), receives in exchange to conforming to traditional norms either prestige and satisfaction for the simple fact of conforming. The function of the alms gift is or can be double – of consolidation/gaining status and maintenance of the symbolic communitarian environment. If the function of the gift is strictly communitarian, to strengthen tradition, then the type of change initiated is one by which the donor

72

Social Space of Transition receives a reward not as an individual but as a member of the community. The benefit of his individual action can be identified at an over-individual , group, belonging level. Exchange function

Exchange procedure

Normative frame

Negociation

formal

profit from formal transactions

informal

profit from informal transactions

Trust investment

diffuse

status advantages: increase or mainenance of

human capital

social capital building institutional environment

integrating cultural institutions by trust

building community environment by increase or maintenance of

community material capital

community human capital community social capital

Figure 3-1.Trust as a form of social exchange40 Trust in institutions is comparable to the alms gift. The recipient of the “gift of trust”, the institution, has an impersonal existence. A specific counter-gift is not expected from it. The benefit can be communitarian or social. Especially for new institutions, trust appears as a founding gift, as a useful investment to ensure the symbolic functioning environment of the institution. In the case of the new democracies in Eastern Europe, the mechanism of the institutional founding gift worked fully for the new governments or political parties. It is not I who benefits from my investment of trust but others who are in a similar situation to mine, in an undefined time frame and in undefined ways. The relationship of trusts, be it interpersonal, group or institutional, is dynamic. The flux of investments of trust changes as the signals I receive from the beneficiary, directly or more often indirectly, confirms or refutes my expectations. The typical mediation factors between investor and beneficiary are friends, neighbours, relatives, acquaintances, and the written or non-written press. The signals that are received through these channels by the one who gives his trust are added to the direct signals and lead to the re-evaluation of the level of fluctuation of trust. It is a re-evaluation that does not contain only, or firstly, appreciations with regard to cost–benefit but appreciations of the distance at

73

Dumitru Sandu which the beneficiary of trust is found on scales of honesty, performance, cultural similarity, belonging to the same social world (Munch, 1992: 149-152). The phenomena of trust can be better understood if they are considered as part of a culture of openness in which the fundamental values are honesty, acceptance of calculated risk, openness to novelty, cooperation (Sandu 1996b). The culture of trust is, in its turn, specific to “open social space” (Sandu, 1996a), characterized by wealth of status and environmental resources. Closed social spaces, those with poor people in poor areas, have as a particular distrust, a fundamental characteristic of closed cultures. Trust in institutions41 Trust in institutions in post-communist societies in Eastern Europe was tackled more structurally and synchronically than dynamically, in time42. This dynamic is especially active. The variation in time of trust in institutions is an essential dimension of legitimizing the processes of economic and political reform. Emphasizing the temporal regularities of trust in institutions is, consequently, part of the process of understanding the legitimacy of the process of post–communist reform. The subchapter is dedicated to this objective. In the first part I will argue the idea that the moments of major democratic change in social life are accompanied by the manifestation of certain phenomenon of allocation of trust as a “gift” of civil society to the new democratic institutions. As the changes produced are more profound and the promise of economic change is bigger, the bigger the gift of trust is. In the second part of the subchapter I emphasize the common and specific factors that influence the individual variation of trust in institutions. Inter-individual trust is pointed out as a root for trust in institutions. The institutional reconstruction of society involves not only the elaboration of certain normative documents at a central, regional or local level. The process takes place on a much larger plane and includes the social redefinition of the role of institutions. Certain articulations of such a process can be followed from the perspective of institutional trust. The opinion polls and mass media contributed substantially to outlining three types of contrasting images for the case of Romania of the 1990’s: •

Institutions in decline of trust with the government as an exemplary model of negative evolution,

•

Institutions of high–positive stability with the army and church as exemplary, positive models,

•

Institutions in the process of healing under the aspect of credibility, with the police and Romanian Information Service (SRI) as possible relevant examples. The decline, the highly positive stability and the healing (recovery) are, thus, the main processes

that trust in institutions supports. The variant of oscillating evolutions is a composite one, resulting from 74

Social Space of Transition short–term combinations of the three tendencies mentioned. Can only one explanation be given for all these types of evolutions? If the answer is “yes”, the interrogation of the sources of differentiation of the direction of the tendencies will, of course, follows. The answers are seriously complicated considering the fact that the recordings from the opinion polls are frequently contradictory and the social research that can follow the same issues through the same questions is at this moment a rarity in the space of Romanian social research. Even given the insufficient stability of the poll data, the problem of explaining the tendencies in the evolution of the level of institutional trust must be tackled. This type of trust is one of the essential points of entry in the understanding of the legitimacy of state institutions in the new context. The degree of trust in the state, in its legislative, executive and judicial institutions is a measure of the legitimacy of the state43. For institutions such as churches where the relationship is not suprasubordinate, of domination, trust is no longer relevant for legitimacy but for functionality or institutional performance. Overall, the variation in the level of trust in institutions in the period of post–communist transition can be explained by: Variations of institutional behaviour, actual or intentional

Changes in the method of organization of institutions, institutional decisions with an impact on the population, the amplitude of the institutional changes promised or achieved by democratic mechanisms

Variation of public image of exemplary personalities for the given institution at a central and local level

Method of mediatization

III. SOCIAL DEFINITION

Social redefining of the role of institutions

What should the institutions do Re-evaluation of the method in which they acted in the past

IV.CONTAGIUNE /CONVERSION BETWEEN THE SPECIES OF TRUST

Interdependence of the phenomena of trust of different types

I. BEHAVIOUR

II. PERSONALITY

Personal decisions with a public impact

The phenomenon of irradiation of trust from one institution to another Phenomenon of inertia of trust in the same institution Influence of interpersonal trust on institutional trust

Trust in post–December governments evolved through “free falling” until the elections in September 1992 (Table 3-1). The very high level of trust registered in the first part of 1990 has no explanation specific to this institution. It is about a type of compensatory trust: distrust in the former political class of communism had reached extremely high values before December 1989. The lack of legitimacy of the nomenclature was very clear. The collapse of Ceausescu-ism and the bringing of other characters to the forefront of political life was accompanied by the launch of a generalized compensatory trust phenomenon – institutional and non-institutional. The common sense logic seems to 75

Dumitru Sandu have that “those whom we removed were so bad, we hated them so much that it is not possible for those who have come now/whom we brought to be worse. Thus we can invest trust in them.” This cost is conjugated in very good measure with the societal and individual optimism, with the idea that democratic and economic reform will take place quickly without significant social costs. It was at the same time a type of founding trust: the new government was given a social “gift” with a capital of trust. At the end of 1991, thus very quickly, the average level of trust in the government was reduced by almost half as compared to 1990. The comparison with what was, how bad the Ceausescu regime was, was made less and less. What the government actually did at a local and central level, the way they made decisions and were mediatized began to matter. From faith given compensationally, by reference to the distrust in the former nomenclature, there came trust that had to be gained by one’s own governing behaviour. In the meantime the role of the government was socially redefined. It is very probable that the dominant social definition of the role of governing included as essential dimensions the insurance of individual liberty, of order, protection and social justice. Distrust in the government and, in general, in “power” was higher as local problems were perceived as being more serious, as discontent with the infrastructure and local corruption grew higher (Table 3-2). Trust in government and parliament followed a similar evolutionary path: after the very high levels in 1990 there followed a linear decline until 1992, before the elections. After the elections that year a small reversal of the phenomenon was recorded. Unfortunately we do not have data from post electoral opinion polls for 1992. Nonetheless, between 1992 and the following elections in 1996, trust in power, government and parliament is maintained at relatively constant levels. After the elections in 1996, marked by the victory of the Democratic Convention in Romania (a political entity that strongly tended towards right wing views), trust in government and parliament reached very high levels, in comparison to those in 1990. The road seems to have been similar for trust in justice. Throughout 1997, however, trust in state institutions came back to its tendency to decline. The government, for example, falls from a level of trust of 62% in December 1996 to only 36% in December 1997, only to reach a disastrous 23% in may 1999. The three political changes that mark the road of trust in institutions in the 1990’s in Romania are the Revolution of December 1989, the elections of September 1992 and the elections of November 1996. The change in December 1989 was intercepted in the plane of public conscience as being fundamental, as a huge opening of hopes. The elections in 1992 did not bring to power a new political force. Instead the elections in 1996 mark a moment of rupture. A right wing political force and a new president were installed in power based on the elections. The founding trust that the new power was “gifted” with was larger as democratic change was bigger. In the period between the moment of revolutionary and electoral change, trust was no longer given as a founding force but more as an evaluation one, based on a mechanism of comparison between expectations and offer. The initial 76

Social Space of Transition expectation of the investor of trust – civil society made up of the voters – is compared to the offer or answer of the one in which the trust has been invested – parliament, government etc. If the offer is below the level of expectation, the stock of trust is reduced. The discord between electoral promise and the governing fact is sanctioned by the retraction of the capital of trust. The increase, maintenance or retraction of trust is produced in correlation with the sphere of expectations – how long before one can rely on a factual answer to the investment of trust. The dominant sphere of expectancy for the production of the positive effects of reform was of approximately one year in March 199744. As at the end of 1997 the reform promised by Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea’s government was far from being

level of trust

achieved, the retraction of civic trust in the institutions of power was a normal consequence.

100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

church

justice

parliament

. 99 9 9 00 00 01 01 02 02 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 8 v. 19 ep. pr. ep. ep. ec. ep. un. 99 ay. ov. ay. ov. ay. ov. ne. ct 1 M A O J N N N Ju No ep. S D S S S M M v S No

Figure 3-2. Trust in the church, justice and parliament 1990 - 2002 The traditional, non-representative institutions such as the church and the army, maintain a very high level of trust. In their case, obviously, other mechanisms than the founding gift or the correction by comparison between level of civic expectation and institutional offer are at work. Historical experience, the role such institutions played in the life of the respective society, seems to be the deciding factor in structuring trust. A second explanation for the very high trust associated with traditional institutions may be the social need of stability, of identifying certain durable frameworks, in the conditions in which the representative institutions prove to still be fragile with high fluctuations of performance. In the context of Romanian society, justice tends to be perceived more as an intermediary institution, between the traditional ones, of great stability and the representative ones, which are relatively fragile. The prime minister as a symbolic personality for the government has a very large influence on the trust in this institution: 90% of the people who do not trust the prime minister also do not trust the 77

Dumitru Sandu government; 61% of the people who trust the prime minister declare that they also trust the government45. The considerable difference between the two percentages suggests a different causality for the degree of distrust, respectively, trust. Distrust in the government seems to be connected to the evaluation of the prime minister more that trust in the respective institution. To put it another way, a negative image of the prime minister reflects negatives on the social image of the government; on the other hand, a positive social representation of the leader of the government leads less to the structuring of a positive image of the government as a whole. The decline in the trust of the government cannot be explained fully by its behaviour or performance, by the social representation associated with the prime minister or the cabinet ministers that he runs or by the social representations regarding the role of the respective institutions. A trend effect also seems to be at work: once the tendency to reduce trust is installed, it reproduces itself as a tendency as long as in the behaviour of the government no changes or major events intervene. An example of short-term change of the tendency of reduction of trust in the government is given by the miner’s protest (mineriade) in 1991. The surveys that were carried out before and after the event allowed the registration of an increase in trust in the government46. The change could be interpreted as social disapproval of the forced way in which Petre Roman was replaced as a result of the political games associated with the arrival of the miners in Bucharest. The rise of trust in the government appears in this context as a positive, compensatory evaluation for an injustice.

Table 3-1. Evolution of trust in institutions and people, 1990-2002 Date of survey

April1990 November 1990 September 1991 September 1992 (pre-electoral poll) April 1993 September 1994 September 1995 December 1996 (Post electoral poll) March 1997 September 1997 December 1997 June 1998 November 1998 May 1999 November 1999

Percentage of people who declared they had high or very high levels of trust in the: Govern Parliam Army Church Police Justice Televis Other ment ent ion people * 79 90 77 36 73 57 67 63 85 75 59 42 37 82 66 33 40 45 39 33 20 81 79 43 20 32 26 31

24 19 24

87 79 85

83 80 83

51 53

42 37 47

62

57

86

85

56

51

46 42 36 27 28 23 11

39 34 27 19 20 20 10

80 84 78 69 74 75 66

85 86 76 85 86 88 83

48 46 42 41 45 49 34

44 36 35 28 30 30 20

78

45 55

34 16 25 36

33

36 28

Social Space of Transition Percentage of people who declared they had high or very high levels of trust in the: Govern Parliam Army Church Police Justice Televis Other ment ent ion people * 13 9 73 85 43 28 29 13 9 67 86 43 20 31 44 33 72 89 47 29 32 49 36 76 88 41 28 29 37 27 77 88 49 33 38 29 77 88 48 33

Date of survey

May 2000 November 2000 May 2001 Nov.2001 June 2002 Oct 2002

Source: opinion polls from the Research Office of USIA for 1990-1994, carried out by CURS until 1991 and then by SOCIOBIT; 1995 survey carried out by the Sociology Department of the University of Bucharest on “Voting behaviours of the population” (COMALP); 1995 survey carried out by the Sociology Department of the University of Bucharest on “Electoral Mechanisms”. 1997 – public opinion barometers of the OSF. All the segments used in these polls operated with the same table of segments proposed by the author of the present study: probabilistic, bi-stage, with a layering in the first stage of 18 cultural arias and 5/7 types of localities. To describe the segments Dumitru Sandu, 1996a and D.Sandu, “Annex 1, The Design of Segments for the 1998 Barometer”, in Ionica Berevoescu , Dan Chiribuca.., 1999. The question used to measure inter-individual trust was “Do you think you can trust most people?”. The answers were given on a scale of one to four except for 1992, 1993, 1994, 1999, 2001 when a dichotomist scale was used.

The effect of the variation of trust in the government and, generally in institutions, are found at the level of the processes and major events of the post–communist transition – privatization, democratization, electoral choice etc. Trust in the government, for example, has a very high rate of conversion into votes47.

Table 3-2. Factors that favour (+) or do not favour (-) inter-individual and institutional trust 1995 Factors of influence48

Dependant variables: the level of trust in the: Institutions of “Power” Army Church

Justice

City hall

Others (interper sonal)

-0.06 -0.07

-0.07 -0.05

-0.12 -0.06

+0. 09 +0.07

-0.03 +0.18

-0.12 +0.01

-0.08 -0.06

-0.07 +0.03

+0.08 +0.13

+0.07

+0.07

-0.03

-0.03

+0.04

+0.05

+0.01

+0.02

+0.11

+0.01

0.04

+0.04

-0.09

Interpersonal trust

+0.15

+0.17

+0.12

0.02

+0.16

+0.16

*

Material satisfaction Considers the problems of local infrastructure to be

+0.16 -0.10

+0.10 -0.11

+0.01 -0.08

+0.08 -0.01

+0.15 -0.10

+0.12 -0.05

+0.08 -0.02

Education Is male (1-yes, 0-no) WEALTH95 Age Rural dweller (1-yes, 0 –no) Seriousness of county social PROBLEMS (poverty )

(Prime minister, government, president)

public order (Police and secret service SRI)

-0.09 -0.05

-0.04 +0.02

-0.05 +0.06

-0.10 +0.20

-0.06 +0.01

+0.09

79

Dumitru Sandu Dependant variables: the level of trust in the: Institutions of “Power” Army Church

Factors of influence48

Justice

City hall

Others (interper sonal)

-0.08

-0.08

-0.20

-0.08

+0.14 +0.00

+0.43 -0.04

+0.07 -0.06

+0.01 -0.04

-0.01 +0.03

0.13

0.30

0.11

0.12

0.07

(Prime minister, government, president)

public order (Police and secret service SRI)

-0.09

-0.12

-0.05

+0.02 -0.09

+0.03 -0.05

0.22

0.11

serious Considers crime and local corruption to be serious Belief in GOD Individual modernism MODERNITY95 R2

Factor not included in the explanatory model for the type of trust on the column Path coefficients insignificantly different to 0 for p=0.05 Example of reading: age is the most important explanatory factor of trust in political power. The increase in age with a standard deviation is accompanied by the rise of the level of trust in power with 0.20 standard deviation on the scale of trust, all the other conditions being equal (keeping under control the influence of the other factors).

Under a causal aspect, institutional trust presents a strongly differentiated mosaic image (Table 3-2): •

interpersonal trust in an important determining factor for all types of institutional trust, with the exception of that referring to the church. Especially trust in justice, police, city hall and SRI are favoured by high values of inter-individual trust. Three of the four institutions mentioned have mainly a local sphere of action. The result is, particularly for the trust invested in the local authorities, the social capital of inter-individual trust matters. In communities with strong interindividual trust the values of trust in local institutions are also high.

•

Trust in the army and in power are commanded mainly by age: the older a person is the more he tends to place trust in the respective institutions;

•

Trust in the church has a strongly differentiated causal configuration to that associated with trust in the army, in spite the fact that factorial analysis groups these two varieties of trust in the same factor. In both cases it is a traditional orientation. Trust in the church presumes, however, a traditionalism of belief (belief in God), whilst trust in the army has a more age and ecologic traditionalism: the people who trust the army are mainly old men who live in poor areas of the country. Religious determination also acts in the case of trust in the army but in smaller amounts than for the church.

•

If from the predictors of trust in the church the one referring to the belief in God is eliminated, the causal configuration for this type of trust does not change substantially. To the significant predictors mentioned in Table 3-2 the level of education is added – people with a high level of scholastic 80

Social Space of Transition instruction have less trust in the church. The fact that inter-individual trust does not appear as a significant predictor of trust in the church either in this variant of construction of an analysis model is to be noted. •

Even though trust in the army and church has very high levels, the respective phenomena are far from being uniform as degree of intensity in reference to the membership of social status.

•

Trust in the army, church and justice has a strong traditional base through the determination it supports from religiousness: people who believe in God tend, at the same time, to manifest high levels of trust in justice, the army and the church.

•

Institutional trust has a strong determination that comes from the area of satisfactions in connection with the method of social organizations, with the efficiency of social institutions. To put it another way, it is strongly influenced by the nature of the definitions given by the population for the local social situations (infrastructure, corruption etc.). Material satisfactions favour a positive structuring of institutional trust. Surprisingly, wealthy people tend to have a critical attitude towards institutions but those satisfied by their material situation (with a low level of material aspirations, probably) are more trustworthy. On the other hand, the poor are less trusting of others than the wealthy. A more reduced capital favours institutional trust but does not favour inter-individual trust.

•

Individual modernism is accompanied by a critical attitude towards institutions, especially in relation to institutions of political power. Its influences on inter-individual trust are not manifested significantly under a statistical aspect. Trust in institutions is a well crystallized attitude (Figure 3-3, Figure 3-4). 0.36 Trust in God

Trust in Military and Church 0.38

0.08

0.80 0.09

Trust in Government, Parliament and Presidency 0.54

0.47 0.72 Interpersonal trust

0.23

0.17

Trust in institutions 0.06 0.62

0.73 Trust in Law and Police 0.54

0.07 Interethnic trust

Trust in mass-media 0.40 0.10

Figure 3-3. The structure of phenomena of trust, 1995 All the numbers on the oriented graph’s arcs indicate values of the standardized partial regression coefficients. All these coefficients are significantly different from 0 for p=0,05. The ellipse shows the latent variable of the model and the rectangular shapes observable variables. The model is adequate for the data :

81

Dumitru Sandu p=0.42; minimum discrepancy divided in the number of degrees of liberty is as it should be, respectively very close to 1 CMIN/DF=1.02. The multiple determination coefficients for the endogenous variables are noted near the names of the respective variables. The calculations are made using AMOS. Source: poll carried out by COMALP, 1995. The variables are defined in annex A2.

The very deep roots of institutional trust are interpersonal trust and religious belief. The more these have higher values the more probability that trust in institutions will be higher. It is true that they explain relatively little of the variation of institutional trust. Their impact, however, is significant. The result is that institutional performances as such can be important for the phenomenon of trust in institutions but are not alone sufficient. The attitude towards institutions also has a cultural foundation, given by the culture of trust in general and religiousness. Respect towards institutions goes, to a significant extent, together with trust in others and the state of religiousness (belief in the after life, heaven, judgment day). Even though religiousness supports the trust in the church and the army in particular, its effects are not only limited to these forms of trust. 0.36 Trust in Military and Church 0.29

Trust in God 0.06 0.07

0.16

Interpersonal trust

0.11

0.54 Trust in institutions 0.06

0.44

Trust in Government, Parliament and Presidency 0.34

0.30 0.19

0.90 Trust in Law and Police 0.84

Interethnic trust 0.16

Figure 3-4. The structure of the trust phenomenon, 1999 All the numbers on the orientated graph’s arcs indicate values of the standardized partial regression coefficients. All these coefficients are significantly different to 0 for p=0.05. The ellipse shows the latent variable of the model and the rectangular forms observable variables. The model is adequate for the data: p=0.08; GFI=0.999 The multiple determination coefficients for the endogenous variables are marked next to the names of the respective variables. The calculations are made with AMOS. Source, POB-OSF, may 1999. The variables are defined in annex A3.

Text Box 3-1. Religiousness and political orientation A comparison between the configuration of relations at a time difference of four years (1999 versus 1995) indicates that the hypothesis of the existence of a modernization process in the sphere of the structures of the collective mind is plausible. In 1995 (Figure 3-3) yet another strong relationship of contamination by religion of the trust in the political power was recorded. The people that had a higher level of religiousness manifest, at the same time, a strong trust in the governments, parliament and presidency. Four years later trust in political power came out of the influence or contamination of religiousness (Figure 3-4). Why these differences? It can be presumed, as I mentioned above, that in the mean time the processes of modernization contributed to a larger autonomisation of the mental spheres, to specifying them. Religiousness continued to act more on the trust in 82

Social Space of Transition the church and the army and the trust in the institutions of power became more and more tied to their effective performances. Also the power in 1999 is not the same one as in 1995. At least on a declaration plane, the left wing political forces were replaced with right wing ones. After PDSR came to power CDR, with PNTCD as a nucleus, followed. Behind this abstract game of statistic correlation, could the influence between the left wing political orientation and religiousness relationships be found? To answer the question we will try to find out what the state of religiousness is of those who support Ion Iliescu and Emil Constantinescu. The two personalities were picked as symbols for two different political and opposed lines. The former signifies in the eye of the voter left wing orientation, and the latter right wing orientation. As with any symbol, they are polisemic. The two are not only “right wing” and “left wing” but the first is a “free thinker” and the second shows signs of being a good Christian – Orthodox. If in public perception the religiousness of their leaders would matter the most, then one would expect to register a positive association between the sympathy for Emil Constantinescu and religiousness and a negative one between the same phenomenon and the sympathy for Ion Iliescu. If the associations are inversed and the religious prefer Ion Iliescu whilst those who are less religious and even atheists head more towards Emil Constantinescu then the explanation must be modified. In the case of such a finding the hypothesis that religious traditionalism prefers solutions that are relatively conservative promoted by left wing parties becomes plausible. If the image of political leaders has a good polisemic load, the situation is not the same with the parties they represent or are associated with. Here the religious significance almost disappears altogether. CDR and PDSR have relatively clear political and strongly opposed connotations. The dimension of religiousness is present in their public image, but more faded. Only 3% of Romanians considered in 1998 that in the PDSR contains the most people who believe in God. The corresponding percentage for PNL was 1% and for CDR was no different at 4%. It is true that the PNTCD registered a very high percentage in this chapter, of 15%, people who believed that the respective party had in its make-up the most people who believed in God49. But lets see how, in the public mind, religiousness is effectively associated with political option.

Political orientation: the person would vote for: PDSR CDR ION ILIESCU EMIL CONSTANTINESCU

Religiousness RELIGIOZITATE99

Possesions BUNURI99

+ 0 +

+ -

+

0

Satisfaction as compared with income SVENIT99 + +

Source: POB-OSF, may 1999. The statistic correlations significant for p=0.05 are marked with +/-, positive or negative. The insignificant relations statistically speaking are marked with 0.

Those with a high level of religiousness tend to vote more for CDR than PDSR, more towards the left wing than the right wing. For different reasons they significantly support the two leaders of different political orientations. They most probably vote for Iliescu because he represents their political orientation of relatively poor people. They are not too interested in the fact that he is a leader whom has a different orientation in matters of religious beliefs. Those who vote with Emil Constantinescu do not do it just because they find themselves in the complex of symbols Constantinescu–PNTCD, political and religious values, which are close to them. The religious people in 1995 were force by the previous political evolution to divide. One part, the poorer, probably, remained faithful to the symbolic complex PDSR + Iliescu and another part, the richer, migrated to the Constantinescu + CDR pole. It is true that the index of religiousness is relatively equal for the sympathizers of the two political 83

Dumitru Sandu personalities (average 2 for each of them, on the index RELIGIOZITATE99) but the material state is better in the case of the sympathizers of Emil Constantinescu (average of the BUNURI99 index equal to 1.38) than those sympathizing with Ion Iliescu (average of the BUNURI99 index equal to 1.08). Overall, the strong association between religiousness and left wing political orientation is maintained even when the effect of the material states is controlled (through partial correlation processes). The finding indicates that fact that there is a cultural determination of this association. A certain traditionalism is common to religious orientation as to the actions of the left wing political parties under the conditions of post-communist transition.

Ethnic tolerance has a unique status. It is positively associated with interpersonal trusts and some particular forms of institutional trust. It does not have, however, a significant contribution to influencing the level of institutional trust as such. Under the aspect of content, institutional trust is clearly structured on four dimensions (Figure 3-3): trust in “power”, with the government, parliament and the presidency as the main terms of reference, trust in institutions of order (justice and police), trust in the mass-media and trust in institutions of national tradition – the army and the church. All these four types of trust are positively tied to each other, the proof of the effective existence of an institutional trust phenomenon. The regional space of trust50 As a foundation of human interaction, trust has, most often, a strong territorial identity. It is a type of culture of openness that integrates, more or less, in regional or communitarian cultures (Putnam, 1993). How do the trust phenomena vary in Romania in historic regions and smaller cultural areas, and within the respective regions? What role do the phenomena of regional and communitarian development play in the conditioning of trust? Is trust more a phenomenon of status or communitarian–regional conditioning? The profile of trust of a cultural area (Table 3-3), as a relatively homogenous grouping under a cultural aspect within a historical region, was estimated through values of INTERPERSONAL, INTERGROUP (with a reference to 5 ethnic groups – Hungarians, Germans, Jews, gypsies, Romanians) and INSTITUTIONAL (with reference to institutions of political power, mass-media, public order, church and army trust. (Table A2). In Romania there are 8 historical regions – Moldova, Muntenia, Oltenia, Dobrogea, Bucharest, Transilvanya, the Banat and Crişana-Maramureş. The first 5 form the group of extraCarpathian provinces and the last three the group of intra-Carpathian provinces. These historical regions have no administrative status. They do, however, have cultural profiles specifically tied to the historical influences they went through, the level of development, ethnic and religious composition. These areas

84

Social Space of Transition are not homogenous from neither an economic point of view nor from a cultural one. Due to this fact, their relevance as units of cultural analysis must be carefully considered. Certain phenomena and socialcultural processes continue to have a historical regional identity, whereby others do not. The role to proceed to the necessary identifications of this type falls to specialists. Beginning with such a request, I argued the use of defining certain cultural areas (see chapter 5), as groups of counties within historical regions, more homogenous than theses. They are probably cultural areas, built through cluster analysis, starting from social morphology indicators. The data in Table 3-3 presents the profile of trust of the 18 cultural areas. Interpersonal trust has the smallest values between the cultural areas of Moldova and Oltenia. At the opposite pole, with a maximum level of the particular index, we have Cluj and Mureş and the city of Bucharest. Distrust is present especially in poor areas.

Table 3-3. Average values of the trust parameters by cultural areas, 1995 Historical region

Cultural area

MOLDOVA

Susana Neamt Bacau Vrancea Galati Iasi Botosani Vaslui Arges Dambovita Prahova Braila Buzau Ialomita Calarasi Giurgiu Teleorman Olt Dolj Mehedinti Valcea Gorj Constanta Tulcea Alba Hunedoara Brasov Sibiu Cluj Mureş Covasna Harghita Bistrita-Nasaud Salaj Maramures Satu Mare Arad Bihor Timis Caras-Severin Bucharest

MUNTENIA

OLTENIA DOBROGEA TRANSILVANIA

CRISANAMARAMURES BANAT BUCHAREST

Average value of trust parameters interpers intergroup institutional onal 1.0 -3.7* 2.0*

Average level of development of the area -7.8

-3.2* -3.5* -0.2

-0.9 2.5 0.2

-0.6 0.7 -1.5

2.0 -18.0 2.7

0.2 1.8

-3.3* -1.2

0.6 4.3*

-3.3 -14.0

-3.4* -2.9* 1.3 1.4 1.6 2.9* 1.3 -2.8

-2.2* -2.4 0.7 -1.1 -0.3 3.4* 3.3 -3.2

0.4 -0.3 0.5 2.8* -2.8* -1.0 -6.3* 1.4

-4.8 -0.9 8.4 5.8 17.0 14.7 6.0 -3.8

-1.5

2.2

1.7

2.9

-1.2 0.6 2.0

2.5* 1.7 3.1*

3.0* -0.4 -3.5*

7.2 14.8 **

* Situation for which there is a correlation significantly different to 0 (for p=0.05) between the indexes of trust in the column and the cultural area in the row (code of 1 for membership of a person to an area and 0 for residing in another area). The sign of the correlation is identical to the one of average. An example of reading the data: intergroup trust for the area made up of the counties Suceava, Neamţ, Bacău, Vrancea is below national level. Between reduced intergroup trust and living in these counties there is a strong tie, significantly different from 0. ** The higher value of the other areas, not calculated as such due to the technical restrictions of not including the capital city in the analysis, with aberrant vales statistically speaking. The indexes of the area are calculated as county averages of the index DEVJUD95, balanced with the population of the county.

85

Dumitru Sandu Source: COMALP poll carried out by the Sociology Department of the University of Bucharest, September 1995.

Generally, the more developed a county is, the higher the level of interpersonal trust is (rDEVJUD INTERPERSONAL

=0.10, p=0.01 ). Similarly, intergroup trust rises with the rise of the level of development

of the county (rDEVJUD INTERGRUPAL=0.14, p=0.01). On the other hand, institutional trust tends to be more reduced in developed counties (rDEVJUD INSTITUTIONAL = -0.14, p= 0.01). The population of these areas is more critical of the institutions. However, the relationship is of a trend nature. The situation in cultural areas points out a whole series of deviations from this norm. The two western counties, Arad and Bihor have a high level of social–economic development. Their population is characterized, however, by high values of institutional trust. In Moldova, the poor counties, Botosani and Vaslui, would be expected, according to general regularities, to have a very high value of institutional trust. In fact, they come very close to the national average. A very strong heterogeneity of the culture of trust can be remarked upon within historical regions. Each of the cultural areas of Moldova has a specific model of culture of trust. The same heterogeneity appears for the areas in Muntenia and for those in Transilvanya. Only Oltenia and Crişana-Maramureş seem to be historical regions with relatively homogenous models of trust. Especially in the case of Oltenia a model of general distrust is imposed at an interpersonal and intergroup level. The dependence of the trust phenomenon on the level of development of the county and historical region is considerably reduced or disappears altogether when in the analysis status variables are introduced (Table 3-4). Interpersonal and intergroup trust has higher values for older men with good educational resources and wealth. The poor are more distrustful, orientated in a smaller measure towards and open life style, based on trust. Generally, the richer the material and human capital, the higher the probability that it commit in a larger measure to interactions based on trust. Table 3-4. The territorial prediction of trust Predictor

Wealth Education Age Male (1 yes, 0 no) Orthodox religion (1 yes, 0 no) Lives in a city (1 yes, 0 no) Lives in Oltenia (1 yes, 0 no) Lives in Moldova (1 yes, 0 no) Lives in Banat or Crisana – Maramures Lives in Transylvania County development parameter DEVJUD R2

Type of trust as dependent variable Interpersonal Intergroup Institutional trust trust trust 0.11* 0.14* -0.05 0.10* 0.21* -0.09* 0.13* 0.04 0.14* 0.08* 0.07* 0.01 0.08* -0.06* 0.10* 0.01 0.07* -0.13* -0.11* -0.07* -0.01 -0.07 -0.05 0.01 -0.04 0.04 0.10* 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.08* 0.07* 0.14* 0.12*

* The coefficients significantly different to 0 for p=0.01. On the last row of the table the coefficients with multiple determination are marked. All the other values in the table are standardized partial regression coefficients. Their positive or

86

Social Space of Transition negative sign indicates the direction of the relation between the predictor and the dependant variable, directly or inverse proportional to their co-variation. Source: COMALP poll carried out by the Sociology Department of the University of Bucharest, September 1995

Religious belonging is strongly associated with ethnical belonging (Trebici, 1998)51.. The Romanian population is mainly Orthodox. The ethnic minorities are mainly Catholic, Protestant or Neoprotestant. Due to this situation, association with the statistic variable designates by “ChristianOrthodox confession” measures the confession as well as the ethnic membership. For the Romanian – Orthodox population a high level of interpersonal trust is specific but a relatively low level of intergroup trust. People of Protestant–Catholic denomination or neoprotestant, of a different origin than Romanian, tend to be mainly distrustful in daily interpersonal and institutional interaction. That is how the extremely high level of institutional distrust is explained for the counties with a mainly Hungarian population, Covasna and Harghita (Table 3-3). On the other hand they declare high values for the component measures of the intergroup trust parameter. This type of trust has highest values in cultural areas with a multi-ethnic composition (Cluj-Mures and Arad-Bihor). The areas with a homogenous population where Hungarians are the minority are not characterized by high interethnic tolerance. Living in the city favours intergroup tolerance and institutional criticism. The specifity of the trust phenomena in historical regions, when the influence of the relevant variables is controlled, is of an extremely low level (Table 3-4). Only Oltenia and the western area, made up of Banat and Crisana-Maramures seem to have a culture specific to trust. Interpersonal and intergroup distrust is predominant in Oltenia. This is independent of the level of family or area poverty. For the western provinces, the specific mark is made up of a high level of institutional trust. Age is the most important predictor for interpersonal and institutional trust. Intergroup trust, is, by way of contrast, independent of age but strongly dependent on educational resources. The phenomena of institutional trust seem to be more strongly dependant on regional and local development. In the areas with high parameters of social-economic development, the level of expectation for the performance of institutions is higher. Correspondingly, criticism of institutions seems to be stronger. It is true that in developed counties, institutional trust is lower. For the same reasons, in more developed counties the parameter of institutional trust is lower (rDEVCOM INSTITUTIONAL = -0.09, p=0.01). Intergroup and interethnic trust, especially, tends to be higher in more developed cities (rDEVURB INTERGRUPAL=0.16,p=0.01

) and counties (rDEVCOM INTERGRUPAL=0.06, p=0.01). In the cities and counties

with high development parameters, individual modernism is greater. No possible effect of social desirability can be ignored, the tendency of well-informed people of media clichés is to answer questions regarding interethnic tolerance with clichés assimilated through media consumption.

87

Dumitru Sandu Table 3-5. Trust in the life style: positive relations (+), negative (-) and of independence (0) (“In the following years, which do you Interpersonal think will be the key to success in life in our trust country?” )

Intergroup trust

Institutional trust

VALUES OF LIFE STRATEGIES Work vs. relations

+

0

+

The schooling you have vs. connections

+

+

+

Cooperation vs. individual effort

+

0

0

Honesty vs. dishonesty

+

0

+

Working in the private sector vs.. the

0

+

-

0

0

-

state sector Residential mobility vs. stability Adoption of novelty vs. routine

0

+

-

One’s own effort vs. inheritance

0

+

0

RELATIONAL CAPITAL Stock of useful social CONNECTIONS

+

+

+

Talks frequently with the neighbours

+

0

+

Talks frequently with friends

+

+

-

Visits relatives frequently

+

0

+

MASS – MEDIA Consumption

+

+

-

Prefers music shows

+

+

+

Prefers news programs

+

+

+

CULTURAL CONSUMPTION

Prefers televised sports shows

+

+

0

Prefers political shows

+

+

+

Considers himself to be have faith

-

0

+

Goes to church frequently

0

0

+

RELIGIOUSNESS

The signs of + or – indicate values of the coefficients of correlation that are significantly different to 0 for p=0.05. The relations of statistic independence have been marked with 0. Example of reading: people who have a high level of the interpersonal trust parameter value work more than connections as a strategy for success in life.

Trust is dependent on status resources and the conditions of the environment not isolated in itself, but as an element of a culture of openness (Table 3-5). People who declare that they trust others as people or as groups are, at the same time characterized by life strategies based on honesty, acceptance of risk, work and educational effort, cooperation. Their social relational capital is richer than of those characterized by distrust. They are integrated to a large extent in relationships such as friendship, relatives, neighbours or acquaintances with which they can develop different types of exchanges. They have high media consumption and prefer TV shows broadcasting music, sports, news and politics.

88

Social Space of Transition The cultural and social profile of those who trust in institutions is a combination between a culture of openness and conservationism. They support values of honesty, work and education. Unlike those who show a higher level of interpersonal trust, people who believe especially in institutions, have a low media consumption, prefer to work for the state, love routine more than novelty and are religious. The dissociation between religiousness and interpersonal trust is a fact that deserves extra analysis. Why do people who believe in God tend to have less faith in people? A possible hypothesis is the different cultural configurations in which the two cultural characteristics function: trust is a particularity of an open culture and religiousness is more part of a complex of a closed culture, mainly traditional. Trust, basically, is a social status phenomenon. In particular elderly men with high levels of instruction and wealth make investments of trust in one another or groups other than their own group. The regional and communitarian environments where the parameters of modernization and development have high values are favourable especially for intergroup trust and for scepticism of institution performance. The empirical structure of social capital At least three “concept-occupants” live in the home of social capital: trust in institutions, distributed trust and relations or connections of interest (RELATII98) (Figure 3.5). Diffuse trust is the most important element of social capital. In particular, this type of trust appears through interpersonal trust, ethnic tolerance and interpersonal interaction for visits, discussions and parties. Ethnic tolerance seems to be the most important indicator of diffuse trust. If you trust the national minorities then you are inclined to trust other people generally and to interact more often with them through visits, conversations and parties. Frequency of us eful l relations

Is member in asssociations

Trust in order institutions

Trust in mayor house

- 0.21 0.54

0.86

0.32

NETWO RK CAPITAL

0.58 TRUST IN INSTITUT

0.52 0.43 0.59 trust in social groupings

SOCIAL CAPITAL

0.90 -0.21

DIFFUSE TRUST

0.42

Interpersonal trust

0.50

0.50

Interethnic toler ance

89

0.24 Intensity of interpers. interactions

Dumitru Sandu

Figure 3-5. The structure of social capital in rural communities The oval shapes indicate latent variables. The rectangles specify manifest variables that were measured directly. All the numbers are path coefficients, coefficients that differ significantly from 0 for p=0.05. The program AMOS was used to build the path model with latent variables. The deduced correlations associated with the presented model do not differ significantly from the empirical ones: χ 2 =20,61, p=0,11. The path diagram indicates a factorial analysis of the second degree 52. The error terms for each endogenous variable are not presented in the diagram.

Trust in institutions is measured with the available data through trust in the army, police, courts of law and the Romanian Secret Service (labelled as institutions of order), trust in the city hall and certain categories of institutional actors (reporters, intellectuals and managers). The usefulness of connections is considered greater if the person is a member of different associations and has a larger number of connections to solve problems connected to health, justice, police, administration, banks and finding a job.

Calitate de membru în asociaþii

Usefull re lation s inten sity

0.35 NETWORK CAPITAL

trust in order institutions

0.18

Trust in mayor house

0.82

0.42

iNTERACTION INTENSITY

0.58

TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS 0.43

0.64

0.43 Trust in social gr oupings

SOCIAL CAPITAL

0.78

0.27

DIFFUSE TRUST 0.66 0.31 Interethnic tolerance

Interpersonal trust

Figure 3-6. The structure of social capital in urban communities The oval shapes indicate latent variables. The rectangles specify manifest variables that were measured directly. All the numbers are path coefficients, coefficients that differ significantly from 0 for p=0.05. The program AMOS was used to build the path model with latent variables. The deduced correlations associated with the presented model do not differ significantly from the empirical ones: χ 2 =18,20, p=0,15. Three covariations that are not marked in the graph in the figure were allowed in the model, namely those error variables associated with: relations of RELATII98 interest– intergroup trust, membership in an association–interpersonal trust, trust in institutions of order–relations of RELATII98. 90

Social Space of Transition

The rural social capital seems to be fractured in the relations with interpersonal trust and trust in other institutions. Interpersonal trust is positively associated with diffuse trust but negatively associated with the intensity of useful connections RELATII98. People with a high parameter of useful relations in rural communities have a tendency to lack trust. Similarly, they have little trust in state institutions at a central level. The people in this category interact more than other categories of the population with state institutions. In the context of a malfunctioning of this official frame of social organisation, their lack of trust in state institutions is a normal reaction. Models of interaction in rural communities are different from those in cities. As a consequence, a different structure of social capital between the two communities is expected. The poll observations support such a vision. A major difference refers to the place or significance of interpersonal interaction. In villages, the intensity of this interaction is significant for diffuse trust. In cities, the same variable is significant for the sphere of relations (see, Figure 3-5, Figure 3-6). To put it simply, visits, discussions and parties have a different meaning in the two communities. In villages, they are a proof of diffuse trust and orientation towards cooperation. In cities, the same types of behaviour are relevant for the way in which these interests are satisfied. Urban interaction is more concentrated on interests than rural interaction. Urban social capital is less fractured than is the case for villages. For city dwellers, interpersonal trust is no longer negatively related to relational social capital. Similarly, trust in institutions is no longer negatively associated with the intensity of relations as in the case of the village population. The “roots” of social capital Social capital has roots in status, value, residence and region. The configuration of the roots is different according to the type of social capital. Even if we take into consideration a large range of possible factors of conditioning, the explained variation of trust (Table 3.6, Table A2) is very low. This means that it has very deep cultural levels that are difficult to identify. The few prediction factors that can be measured and are significant, must be considered carefully, because they can be useful as a base for understanding the phenomenon of social capital. Table 3-6.Predictors of trust variables for people in rural communities Predictors

Dependant variables in the multiple regression model

91

Dumitru Sandu Trust in institutions of ORDER

Trust in the CITY HALL

INTERPE RSONAL trust

ETHNIC tolerance

INTERGR OUP trust

AGE (-000) 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.13 Education -0.13 -0.08 -0.08 (0.04) (0.05) MALE (1 yes, 0 no) (0.04) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03) (-0.02) Durable GOODS (-0.04) (0.00) (-0.04) (-0.05) (0.03) Rural development -0.09 (-0.06) (-0.02) 0.06 (-0.02) DEVJUD Aversion to risk 0.10 0.08 (-0.02) (0.01) (-0.02) RISCAVER Satisfaction with own 0.11 0.10 (0.05) 0.07 0.11 income Localization in central or 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.23 (0.05) western regions of the country CENTWEST R2 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.03 Average 0.95 0.59 -54.25 -28.09 -4.39 Standard deviation 45.45 66.01 53.34 36.12 41.64 Source of primary data: The barometer of public opinin of the OSF, 1998. The volume of the rural subsegment N=1103. All the path coefficients that are not placed between () are significant for p=0.05.

Education tends to present itself as a predictor related inversely proportionally, in the case of rural communities, with the parameters of trust in interpersonal interaction and in institutions. People with higher education in villages have a larger fan of relations of interest. Trust in institutions is especially low in the case of people living in the country with a higher level of education. Ethnic tolerance does not seem to be greater with village dwellers with a better education. This relation is positive and significant in the case of educated people in the urban environment: they are more tolerant towards other ethnic groups. The subjective well being of village dwellers is more relevant for the attitudes of trust than objective well being. A material status selfdefined as being better is favourable for a higher trust in institutions, for ethnic tolerance and for trust in different groups that include actors of certain institutions (reporters, intellectuals, managers). Ethnic tolerance, one of the key parameters of diffuse social capital in rural and urban communities, is explained, mainly, by regional factors, by culture and regional development. The localization of people in central and western areas of the country (Transilvanya, Banat and Crişana-Maramureş) is a factor which favours ethnic tolerance (Table R8). Regional localization matters for tolerance especially in rural areas. The rural population in more developed counties and communes that are more heterogeneous from 92

Social Space of Transition the religious and ethnical point of view is more tolerant of other ethnic groups. The lack of tolerance or its low levels are specific to weakly developed areas or to a homogenous population, form the East and South of the country. Among the status variables, subjective well being is one of the most relevant factors for ethnic trust. A good material status, according to its own definition, is favourable to ethnic tolerance in rural and urban communities. Objective possessions do not matter significantly. Education is not connected linearly to ethnic trust. People with university education from cities and villages are more tolerant. In villages, people with weak education are also more tolerant. People with average education in villages are among the most intolerant (Table 3.7). Table 3-7. Ethnic tolerance by residence and education Level of completed education Illiterate Elementary School Secondary school Professional High school College University

Rural Urban Total segment segment -23 -24 -23 -25 -23 -25 -33 -24 -30 -29 -26 -27 -28 -23 -24 -16 -15 -15 -24 -12 -14 -28 -21 -24 Source of primary data: The public opinion barometer of the OSF, 1998. The values in the table are averages of the ETHNIC tolerance parameters, with a possible variation between –100 (maximum intolerance) and 100 (maximum tolerance).

Aversion to risk is negatively correlated to ethnic tolerance only for the urban population. The higher the inclination to accept risk is, the higher the ethnic tolerance. A small aversion to risk is a basic characteristic of individual modernism 53. Due to the fact that this predictor is present significantly only in the case of the urban population, a hypothesis can be formed that ethnic tolerance is more intensely tied to the culture of modernism in cities than in villages. Rural tolerance and, generally, diffuse social capital is more dependant on personal status than personal culture which is independent of status. The density of social relations in which the person that is involved has a directly useful element (the parameter RELATII98) given by the number of possible useful connections for solving practical problems and the facet of RELATII98 potential associated with the frequency of INTERPERSONAL interactions. Connections of RELATII98 are more dense in the case of people with higher level of education and richer material possessions, localised in central and western areas of the country and who experienced the leaders before 1989 (Table 8). Culturally speaking, these people take risks, are open to new experiences and practice a high exposure to mass media. This is the

93

Dumitru Sandu profile of people with many connections, no matter whether they live in the city or in the village. Table 3-8. Predictors of the variables, which measure characteristics of social networks Predictori

Dependant variable – density of connections of RELATII98

Dependant variable – intensity of INTERPERSONAL interactions

rural urban rural urban AGE98 (0.04) -0.12 (0.04) -0.12 MALE98 (1 yes, 0 no) -0.06 (-0.02) (-0.04) (-0.01) Durable GOODS98 0.15 0.16 0.08 (-0.01) Aversion to risk RISCAVR98 -0.06 -0.08 (0.03) (-0.01) Localization in central or 0.08 0.08 0.06 (0.01) western areas of the country CENTWEST Education 0.19 0.19 -0.08 (-0.04) MANAGER during 0.09 0.05 (-0.01) (-0.03) communism (1 yes, 0 no) Subjective HEALTH 0.07 (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) MEDIA98 consumption 0.14 0.06 0.11 0.10 Orientated towards (-0.05) (-0.04) 0.13 0.09 RELATIVES98 R2 0.21 0.18 0.05 0.04 Source of primary data: The public opinion barometer of OSF, 1998. The volume of the rural subsegment N=1103. All the path coefficients that are not between () are significant for p=0.05.

In cities, the people with an extended sphere of connections are younger. In villages, surprisingly, they are women. The observation is valid only for the hypothetical control of the other status variables, in particular education. Up to high school level, the involvement of men and women in the networks of RELATII98 is approximately the same. At this level women are more involved in connections of RELATII98 than men. On a scale from 0 to 6, the average parameter of RELATII98 is 3.5 for rural dwelling women as against 2.6 for men living in the countryside. The second aspect of involvement in networks – intensity of INTERPERsonal interactions – has a different causal profile. In the countryside, people who are most active in visits, discussions and parties are fairly rich people but with little education localized in central and western regions of the country. Their network is made up of relatives, first of all. For city dwellers, the intensity of interpersonal interactions is conditioned first of all by the strength of the ties with relatives. Conclusions 1. Viewed from the perspective of trust, Romanian society of the 1990’s is strongly divided. Areas of negative consensus, areas of positive consensus and areas of intense social controversy mark the field of institutional trust. The church and the army are typical institutions for the area of positive 94

Social Space of Transition consensus, of high trust. The parliament and government represent, with the exception of ”electoral gift” moments, the area of negative consensus, of minimum levels of trust. Justice, the SRI and the police are found in the area of maximum social controversy, with values very close to the weight of trust and distrust. 2. Trust in representative institutions of the state evolved, in post-communist Romania of the 1990’s, through the game of two basic mechanisms – the mechanism of the founding gift and the one of adjusting investments according to the difference between expectations and offer. The new institutions of democracy – parliament and government, in particular - receive from civil society a quantity of trust that is becomes larger as the changes that are brought about democratically or are credibly promised increase in profoundness. The spectacular increase of trust in representative institutions in 1990 and 1996-1997 is associated with just such a phenomenon of founding trust. The decline of trust in power is explicable by the adjustment of civic capital invested in representative institutions of the state under the conditions of certain services of the institutional actors below the level of expectation. 3. Traditional institutions - the church and the army – stay especially under the sign of religious type value orientation. Also, for trust in the army, age matters as well – the older the age, the more the trust in the army. 4. Religiousness and interpersonal trust make up two of the most important “cultural roots” of trust in institutions. No matter the performances of the state institutions, environments of interpersonal trust and religiousness will manifest increased preferences for supporting institutions. 5. Interpersonal trust works within a culture of openness, marked by valuation of work, cooperation, educational effort and morality. Far from being a superficial trait, trust is strongly correlated with values of strategies of life, with organization of life on foundations of sociability and social capital. On the other hand, trust in institutions appears as a combination of culture of openness and conservativeness. 6. The reduced material capital favours trust in institutions of power and traditional ones but reduces inter-individual trust. Generally, inter-individual trust becomes richer as material and human capital increases its values. Poverty, of any kind, material or informational, is unfavourable to interpersonal trust. 7. Accessibility to useful social relations is conditioned significantly by experience of the leadership in the communist period and wealth. The possession of material resources and experience of the leadership before 1989 are key factors for the degree of diversity of useful social connections. The observation is in accordance to the theories that say that in the period of post-communist transition there was a type of conversion of leaders during communism to business men 54.

95

Dumitru Sandu 8. Having access to people in key institutions which are relevant to business and for day to day life is a factor that favours trust in institutions. The data of the study shows clearly that people who have the highest trust in state institutions are those with the least education, with many personal relations in those institutions and who are generally inclined to trust other people. 9. Rural social capital is clearly structured in four dimensions: a) diffuse trust and cooperation, b) trust in institutions, c) relational capital, and d) integration of official institutions through their proper functioning. The data of the study can reveal only the content of the first three dimensions. Considering these limitations, the first conclusion that supports the hypothesis of an operational social capital, that effectively “works”, not only that of an umbrella, multidimensional concept: diffuse trust, trust in institutions and NETWORK capital (RELATII) are manifestations of a sole, latent dimension, that can be labelled social capital (Figure 2). 10. Rural social capital is more “fractured than urban social capital. Interpersonal trust in rural communities is negatively related to the intensity and degree of expansion of the network of social relations. 11. The major difference between rural and urban social capital refers to the place or significance of interpersonal interaction. In villages the intensity of this interaction is significant for diffuse trust. In cities, the same variable is significant for the fan of useful personal relations (Figure 2 and Figure 3). In short, visits, discussions and parties have a different significance in the two communities. In villages they are proof of diffuse trust and cooperation. In cities, the same types of behaviour are relevant to the way in which their interests are achieved. Urban interaction is concentrated more on interests than the rural interaction. 12. Ethnic tolerance is one of the strongest signs of social capital’s intensity in a rural or urban community. Integration of ethnic tolerance in the analysis of social capital is very useful in emphasizing the complexity of the phenomena of productive sociability. Regional localization matters for tolerance especially in rural areas. The rural population in more developed in counties and in communes that are more heterogeneous from an ethnic and religious point of view is more ethnically tolerant. The lack of tolerance or low levels of the latter are specific to poorly developed areas, inhabited by a homogenous population, localized in the south and east of the country. 13. Aversion to risk is negatively related to ethnic tolerance only in the urban population. The higher the inclination to accept risk, the higher the ethnic tolerance. Low aversion to risk is the basic characteristic of individual modernism. Due to the fact that the predictor is significantly present only in the urban population the hypothesis that ethnic tolerance is closely tied to the culture of modernism in cities more than in villages can be formed. Rural tolerance and, generally, diffuse social capital are more dependant on personal status than the independent personal culture of status, specific to the different cultural regions. 96

Social Space of Transition 14. The regional culture of trust in Romania is identifiable especially at the level of cultural areas, as subdivisions of historical regions. Distrust in others is specific to the counties in Oltenia and in the east of Moldova. On the other hand, trust in institutions has high values especially in developed counties in the south of the Crişana-Maramureş provinces but also in poor counties in the cultural area of Teleorman-Giurgiu-Ialomiţa-Călăraşi. The condition of being an ethnic minority is favourable to the development of a culture of institutional distrust. 15. Trust has a regional dimension especially under its institutional and intergroup aspects. Generally, however, regions matter for the phenomenon of trust not so much for their specific culture. The essential role falls on the social composition and level of development of the region. Through the means of the regional social structure, effects of an apparent regional culture of trust are produced. The moment in which the variables of social structure are controlled, very few regions of Romania retain any longer a specific of regional culture of trust.

97

Dumitru Sandu 4.

The entrepreneurial elite

Entrepreneurship as a social innovation In chapter two I sketched a picture of the country’s social structure from the perspective of social space and of the essential relationships that structure human interaction at a social level respectively. The conclusion was arrived at that the main dimensions of social structure in Romania in the period of transition are the level of available resources and the ideologies of modernization. The new social structure of the country, with a middle class, capitalists, marginal/unflavoured groups, is thus made up, not only according to resources but also according to beliefs, values, cultural models. I also mentioned the case of entrepreneurs as being of maximum significance for the phenomenological approach to social structure by taking into consideration certain subjective dimensions along side the objective ones. The middle class is still far from being created in a society in which reform happens slowly, with frequent stops and starts, starting with the unfavourable conditions in 1990 and later confronted with the provocations of an agitated regional environment, with a political class in forming. No matter the type of group taken as referent for the analysis of social structure in this stage of change of Romanian society, I find the emphasis of the forming mechanisms to be essential. The weight they have in the general social picture is less important and, in any case, is still difficult to estimate under the conditions of “rare” numbers, of a relatively weak national informatics system for social aspects. The case of entrepreneurs is one of maximum importance to understand the mechanisms of formation of the new capitalist type social structure. The analyses in this chapter will focus on them55. To be an entrepreneur in a forming market economy is a social innovation. It means learning a new role that is far from what communism proposed or, more precisely, imposed as a model of socialization. To learn a new role in an unfavourable environment – that is the biggest challenge for rural entrepreneurs in Romania. They make up an elite in terms of creativity, resources and productive performances56. The environment at the beginning of the 1990’s was discouraging: poverty, decrease of demand in urban markets due to general economic decline, an inefficient economy, the change from production cooperatives built by force to a private agriculture lacking the basic resources for a modern agriculture. How frequent is entrepreneurial behaviour? What are the mechanisms of adoption and diffusion? Who were the first to adopt new ways, what is their social, economic and cultural profile? What are the structural constraints of the diffusion process? Which factors influence the speed and the selectivity of diffusion? The list of relevant questions for this subject could go on. For this chapter it is enough to concentrate on the role social capital (CS) played in influencing entrepreneurial orientation. Consequently, it will be a chapter that connects the information in chapters 98

Social Space of Transition two and three, between social space and social capital. To answer the question “what role does entrepreneurial social capital play in Romania of the 1990’s” we must have a wider view of the main factors that favour entrepreneurial behaviours. This is what I attempt in the first part of this chapter. In the second part I will focus my analysis on a particular kind of entrepreneur – the entrepreneur of agriculture. This is a typical case of a creative answer to a particularly adverse business environment.

Entrepreneurship as an answer to the challenges of the environment Entrepreneurship can be considered not only as a social innovation, but also as a set of questions to the challenges of the environment. The most structured challenges are those of uncertainty, poverty, corruption and regional disparity (Table 1). In a very uncertain social and economic environment, being careful in relationships with others is a life strategy. In situations of social transition not only does the public scene change with its events and settlements, but also the behaviour of the people - many grow poorer while others grow richer. Adopting a new life strategy for survival or for success is part of the general process of building a new society. Behaviours are not so predictable. The rules of behaviour are exceptional. You clearly rely on those who are very close to you (relatives and friends in society), but not too much on strangers. Due to the changes in the behaviour models, many previous acquaintances move closer to the situation of a stranger that you are very careful with in your interactions with that person. The high frequency of failing in business ventures is a key factor, which strengthens uncertainty and its answer – distrust, caution. Different forms of capital – human, material, useful connections and those linked to trust – will play a role in initiating and developing a business, in confronting risk and uncertainty. However, being an entrepreneur is not a simple combination of the different types of capital. Their main catalysts will probably be of a cultural nature. Taking risk or an aversion to risk and adopting market ideologies will probably play the role of key variables in the appearance of entrepreneurial behaviour (Figure 4.1). The challenge of the uncertain environment, of tolerance to risk and distrust could go together. Distrust is a reaction to a negative definition of the environment. On a personal level, distrust is a negative definition of the social situation. At a communitarian level, through aggregation, its function is to increase costs, transactions and, implicitly, to reduce communitarian social capital.

Table 4-1.Entrepreneurship from the point of view of challenges and answers Challenges of the business environment UNCERTAINTY. Inflation, small public events but with big consequences, difficulty in handling structural reforms under the conditions of poverty. Little 99

Hypothetical answers in the behaviour of the entrepreneurs Valuation of prudence. Prudence in relationships with unknown people. Rise in lack of interpersonal trust and not

Dumitru Sandu information on demand, opportunities, legislation. The short life span of many companies and the frequent failure of business activities.

taking risks during entrepreneurial practices.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT NOT STRUCTURED FOR BUSINESS. CORRUPTION

The increase of lack of institutional trust during entrepreneurial practices

SMALL DEMAND AND WEAK RESOURCES. Small urban demand for agricultural products. High poverty in villages. Increase in unemployment.

Diffuse entrepreneurial behaviour. Formal and informal entrepreneurship.

HIGH REGIONAL VARIATION OF BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES

The region as a relevant factor for entrepreneurship. Structured regions according to development criteria are more important to business than cultural regions.

Distrust is more a form of a survival strategy, as opposed to trust which is a strategy for growth or development. The environment can transform an initial feeling of distrust into a spiral of growing negative definitions or to reduce their intensity once they accumulate during the course of the interaction. Tolerance to risk is a practical way to recognize that the environment is new and changing. It is a means of going form the latent modernism that existed in certain social segments under communism to an active modernism of capitalism.

100

Social Space of Transition

milieu challenges

Uncertainty. Poor resources. Poor information on business opportunitiesLe gislature inconsistencies and shorcomings High regional and community variation of business environment

capitals involved in entrepreneurship

MATERIAL CAPITAL

TRUST RELATED SOCIAL CAPITAL

HUMAN CAPITAL

ideology level

behavior level

RISK TAKING ORIENTATION

ENTREPRE NEURIAL INTENTIONS

INTERPRETATION OF THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT. Prudence and trust

SUPPORT OF FREE MARKET IDEOLOGY

NETWORK CAPITAL

ENTREPRE NEURIAL BEHAVIORS

Figure 4-1. The analytical components of the entrepreneurial processes

Entrepreneurs by desire, intention and behaviour The proportion of effective entrepreneurs in the total active population of villages was very low in 1998, at approximately 4%. In the cities, the corresponding percentage was double. The entrepreneurial orientation of the population is not limited to this sphere. It also includes the segment of population that expresses a desire to open a business or enterprise, or those who at least wish they had one. Entrepreneurs “by intention” and “by desire” (Table 4-2) represent approximately 20% of the adult rural population and over a third of adult urban population. The three categories of entrepreneurs have a very different status profile. In general, entrepreneurs are younger than non-entrepreneurs. The newest entrepreneurs are those in the stage of intentions. The oldest entrepreneurs are those who already have a company. Entrepreneurs by their behaviour are richer than those who are in the stage of intention57. They are mainly recruited from amongst the ex-leaders of communist times and from the segment of present managers.

101

Dumitru Sandu Table 4-2 The operational definition of entrepreneurial types Entrepreneurial behaviour Has a private Intends to business open a business no no no no yes yes yes yes

no no yes yes no no yes yes

Type of entrepreneurs * Would open a business if had a large amount of money no yes no yes no yes no yes

0. non – entrepreneurial 1. entrepreneurial “by desire” 2. entrepreneurial “by intention”

3. entrepreneurial “by behaviour”

*Entrepreneurs by desire and those by intention are ideal types. In reality, a person that intends to open a company also shows the desire to eventually use a large sum of money for business. Desire and intention are associated. The entrepreneur by desire is an ideal type in the sense that it refers only to those who have a desire to open a company which is not accompanied by behaviour and intention, not to all those who wish to start a business. The need to operate with ideal and non-empirical types is associated also with the intention of this study to establish a correspondence between the type of entrepreneur and the entrepreneurial values and the sequences of the diffusion process of social innovation which is called entrepreneurship. The survey data with which we are working does not allow for a distinction between entrepreneur and employer. At a conceptual level it exists in the plan of empirical data, but such delimitation has never worked. The four types make up, at the same time, values of the ordinal variable “entrepreneurial orientation” (see table A1 in the annex, the definition of the ORANT98 variable).

Table 4-3.Intention to open a business by residential environment (%) Entrepreneurial type Non entrepreneurial Entrepreneurial by desire Entrepreneurial by intention Entrepreneurial by behaviour Total % N

Rural 73.9 9.9 11.8 4,4 100 1103

Urban 56.5 13.1 22.7 7.7 100 1355

Total 64.3 11.7 17.8 6.2 100 2458

Source: POB-OSF, 1998

The entire set of data in Table 4-4 and Table 4.5 suggests the image of a process in which those who adopted entrepreneurship earliest were mostly ex and present managers. This fact is in concordance with the general perception (Rona-Tas, 1998) that at the root of the process one finds the conversion of useful social connections made during communism to material capital for budding private enterprises of capitalism in the present.

102

Social Space of Transition Table 4-4.The profile of the status or rural entrepreneurs

Average age Percentage of men % Average number of school years EDUCANI98 Average mark for the durable GOODS parameter Percentage who have a personal car % Average level of income per person (lei) VENPERS98 Average surface area of land in ownership (ha) Parameter of livestock development ANIMALS (average) The parameter of the level of education at a family level EDSTOCK (average) Number of ADULTs in the household (average) Percentage of people who WERE managers* during communism % Percentage of people who are managers * at present% Capital of RELATII98 Average level of county development DEVJUD95 Number of people residing in intraCarpathian regions %

Nonentrepreneur

Types of entrepreneurs By desire By intention

By behaviour

51.93 44 7.81

39.56 56 10.64

36.27 62 10.49

42.53 61 10.78

48.45 48 8.54

0.58

1.27

1.19

1.37

0.75

17 266410

43 397614

38 448019

63 418457

24 307118

2.17

2.22

2.23

2.88

2.22

2.33

4.48

2.90

2.89

2.62

5.58

7.35

6.14

6.66

5.87

2.70

3.09

3.12

3.22

2.81

9

17

15

27

11

2

10

08

31

5

1.03 -1.28

2.11 -0.01

2.17 2.45

2.51 4.01

1.33 -0.48

29

39

42

55

33

Total

Source: The public opinion barometer of the OSF, 1998. In each cell of the table, average values of percentages corresponding to the parameter in the row and the category of population in the column are noted. * The have at least three people who are their subordinates.

In rural areas, in the same segment of those who adopted entrepreneurship early there are a large proportion of people who have large lots of land. In theory, the larger amount of land owned by the rural entrepreneurs can similarly be considered as a source of enrichment. Entrepreneurs had larger possessions from the beginning of their careers and increased their possessions during their career as entrepreneurs. Rural entrepreneurial behaviour is found in particular in relatively wealthy households, with a larger number of adult members. A high number of adult members in the old families shows that the first rural entrepreneurs came from rural families that were not overly affected by migration. In specialist terms, the “pioneers” of rural entrepreneurship were selected with higher intensity from the segment of agricultural specialists and people with an economic training.

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Dumitru Sandu Table 4.5. The status profile of urban entrepreneurs

Average age Percentage of men % Average number of school years EDUCANI98 Average grade for the durable GOODS parameter Percentage of those who have a personal car % Average level of income per person (lei) VENPERS98 Average surface area of land in ownership (ha) Parameter of livestock development ANIMALS (average) The parameter of the level of education at a family level EDSTOCK (average) Number of ADULTs in the household (average) Percentage of people who WERE managers* during communism % Percentage of people who are managers * at present% Capital of RELATII98 Average level of county development DEVJUD95 Number of people residing in intraCarpathian regions %

Total

48.21 42.00 10.83

Types of entrepreneurs By desire By intention 37.12 34.61 48.00 56.00 12.27 11.71

39.97 55.00 12.60

43.04 47.00 11.35

1.28

1.61

1.55

2.12

1.45

30.00

47.00

44.00

74.00

39.00

509187.84

525591.30

584117.73 1025715.51

566209.49

0.53

0.41

0.41

0.69

0.50

1.20

0.83

0.73

1.05

1.04

7.56

9.33

7.59

7.57

7.80

2.61

2.83

2.81

2.68

2.69

16.00

17.00

12.00

30.00

16.00

7.00

13.00

10.00

36.00

11.00

1.52 6.50

2.17 4.82

2.28 7.54

2.91 5.43

1.88 6.43

32

39

39

43

35

Nonentrepreneurs

By behaviour

Source: The public opinion barometer of the OSF, 1998. In each cell of the table average values of percentages corresponding to the parameter in the row and the category of population in the column are noted. *They have at least three people who are their subordinates

Former agricultural engineers, technicians and economists of cooperatives or agricultural enterprises were among the first to get involved in the first wave of rural entrepreneurship (Table 4-6). The second and third waves of recruitment were more heterogeneous. The more recent the wave of entrepreneurship is, the more heterogeneous are it social sources. From a territorial point of view, rural entrepreneurship tends to be localised in particular in counties with a high degree of development. For the urban environment the maximum level of development of the counties of residence is registered not for entrepreneurs by behaviour but for entrepreneurs by intention. The profile of the status of the three types of entrepreneurs is suggestive for the profile of the diffusion process of entrepreneurship . Entrepreneurs by behaviour signify the first wave. Entrepreneurs by intention and desire can be considered as possible signs for the second and, the third waves of this process, respectively. The second and third wave will no longer be made up of ex or present leaders. Non-managers will be more and more present on the scene of private economic development. The third 104

Social Space of Transition wave will, very probably, be dominated by people who, in the rural environment, rely on raising animals as a main source of entrepreneurship. They are those who have accumulated goods and other resources to be in the position of entering the business world. As with the rural and also the urban situation, the third entrepreneurship wave can be characterized by the increased economic activism of people with a higher level of human capital.

Table 4.6. Rural Entrepreneurs by the specialisation of the last level of completed education Last type of education completed None Technical Agricultural Economic Other Total

Nonentrepreneurs

By desire

88.6+ 58.569.7 48.961.4+ 73.9

4.516.3+ 6.6 21.3+ 14.8+ 9.9

Entrepreneurs By intention By behaviour 4.919.8+ 14.5 17.0 18.0+ 11.8

2.15.4 9.2+ 12.8+ 5.8 4.4

%

Total Number

100 100 100 100 100 100

533 258 76 47 189 1103

Source: The public opinion barometer of the OSF, 1998

For each cell of the table adjusted standardized residuals were calculated, as a standardised difference between the expected frequencies and the theoretical values. The +/- sins show a cell with significant positive/negative association between the values in the column and in the line for p=0.05. Example interpretation of the cells: 12.8% of people who graduated from economic schools, of an average or high level, are entrepreneurs by behaviour. The association between being an entrepreneur and graduating from an economic school, is significant for p=0.05. The prediction is based on the fact that the highest level of education is registered for entrepreneurs by desire. At the same time the hypothesis of an ideological effect coming from education cannot be omitted: people with high levels of education but with weak entrepreneurial abilities and a relatively low level of income can state their entrepreneurial orientation only vocally, as an effect of social desirability, but without effectively adhering to the project. Entrepreneurs by desire represent the segment of population that has the maximum degree of feminization in entrepreneurial orientation. This phenomenon is especially obvious in the urban environment (52% of entrepreneurs by desire in this residential environment are women). Also at the urban level a maximum dimension of the number of adult people per household can be found. In consequence the hypothesis of a possible parentage for the feminine entrepreneurship can be stated for the third wave of urban entrepreneurship, supported by a higher level of education. The segmentation of the population according to the degree and type of entrepreneurial orientation is fully justified not only through its specifity of social profile but also through that of a cultural profile associated with these segments (Table 4-6). 105

Dumitru Sandu The ideal type of entrepreneurship by behaviour is characterised through the positive definition of the situation, high degree of acceptance of risk and high valuation of work. People who come close to this type believe, in concordance with what is known about the entrepreneurial spirit in good Weberian tradition, that in life one can succeed on one’s own through work58 and through acceptance of risk and the ability to answer the challenges posed by the environment. The difference in nuance appears between the rural and urban entrepreneur. In villages, self achievement through work is more strongly supported than in cities. On the other hand, urban entrepreneurs count more on acceptance of risk in business. The difference could be expressed in relation to the higher level of religiousness in villages than in cities (Table 4.7). The strongest contrast, maybe, between urban and rural entrepreneurs appears in connection to the mentality of the state. The maximal interventionist state is strongly rejected by businessman in cities. For entrepreneurs from villages, the state appears almost as salvation, particularly if the intervention is economic. Consequently, it is to be expected that the types of entrepreneurs that develop in the two respective environments will be highly different.

Table 4-7. The cultural profile of the population according to their entrepreneurial orientation and residential environment. Entrepreneurs by desire

Entrepreneurs by intention

Entrepreneurs by behaviour

Entrepreneurs by behaviour

Non-entrepreneurs

Entrepreneurs by intention

Parameters 1998 Long term satisfaction -3.0 SDURATĂ Communitarian -5.2 satisfaction SCOMUNITARA Aversion to risk 38.0 RISCAVER MEDIA Consumption -54.0 WORK Orientated% 11.0 Pro MAXIMAL state 28.3 Parameters May 1999 Long term satisfaction 1.0 SDURATĂ MEDIA Consumption -49.5 WORK Orientated% 15 Like of PROFESSION 0.48 RELIGIOUSNESS 2.1 Pro maximal state in a -6.6 political plane MAXPOL Pro maximal state in an 64.5

Urban Entrepreneurs by desire

Non-entrepreneurs

Rural

8.0

28.0

29.0

-15.0

11.0

12.0

26.0

-29.13

-20.5

-8.7

-15.29 -13.9

-18.8

-12.9

-5.0

-15.0

-15.0

-4.0

-23.0

-41.0

-74.0

12.0 10.0 14.1

14.0 9.0 18.9

27.0 20.0 22.5

19.0 6.0 13.9

42.0 5.0 14.4

45.0 7.0 4.4

33.0 14.0 -5.1

14.0

8.0

7.0

-13.0

18.0

8.0

30.0

8.1 10 0.33 1.8 -16.5

11.8 11 0.52 2.0 -7.8

39.2 12 0.62 1.5 -30.3

17.0 8 0.53 1.8 -33.8

47.6 10 0.48 1.6 -55.8

35.0 6 0.45 1.6 -39.8

49.4 13 0.66 1.8 -49.7

60.5

64.8

44.7

62.3

51.4

49.1

41.4

106

Social Space of Transition

Entrepreneurs by desire

Entrepreneurs by intention

Entrepreneurs by behaviour

Non-entrepreneurs

Entrepreneurs by desire

Entrepreneurs by intention

Entrepreneurs by behaviour

economic plane MAXECON Orientated towards the communist PAST Pro western orientation PROVEST

Urban

Non-entrepreneurs

Rural

19.2

-5.3

12.8

-2.1

-4.3

-43.5

-16.8

-31.5

1.4

1.8

2.0

2.2

1.6

2.0

1.9

2.1

Source POB-OSF, 1998, May 1999. In each cell of the table average values or percentages corresponding to the parameter in the row and the category of population in the column are given.

At first glance the fact that behaviour entrepreneurs or entrepreneurs by intention have a longer term satisfaction than non-entrepreneurs is surprising. The finding seems to be in contradiction to the comparative research at a society level which indicates the fact that there is a higher number of entrepreneurs in societies with a high degree of unsatisfaction with their life and society (Wildeman, Hofstede et all, 1998). It should be noted first of all that the data we are using to analyse the relation that is made with the individual and in Wildeman, Hofstede et all’s research, the referent is the national society. Even if the analysis is maintained only at an individual level like in the case of our data, the satisfaction profile for the entrepreneur is a relatively contradictory one. On one hand they are happy with the life they lead, but as we will see in another subchapter, their social criticism has high levels. Their trust in institutions is lower than the non-entrepreneur (Table4-10). In fact, for different types of entrepreneur the relation with satisfaction is different. It is very probable that the level of satisfaction for entrepreneurs by behaviour is higher than for the other categories of entrepreneurs, the fact of the matter being, as we know from the analysis of status, that they are materially better off. With entrepreneurs by intention or by desire communitarian unsatisfaction is manifested in particular. They most probably perceive the local communities in which they live as an obstacle on their road to self achievement

Where do entrepreneurs come from? Entrepreneurial orientation is higher for younger people who have a lot of connections and material capital. Education itself is not a favouring factor for entrepreneurship. What matters is “relative personal education to the stock of family education59”. Personal education can be higher, equal or lower than the general level of family education. A type of educational inconsistency at the family level, similar to “status inconsistency” (Lensky, 1954) is favourable to entrepreneurial orientation in the case of young males with a higher educational status than the rest of the family members. From this point of 107

Dumitru Sandu view it can be considered that being more educated than the rest of the family members is a challenging situation that favours entrepreneurial orientation. Entrepreneurs tend to be the most educated people in families with a relatively low degree of education. Useful social connections are also a key variable which favours entrepreneurial orientation. Their role seems to be bigger in communities in villages than urban communities (Table 4-8).

Table 4-8. Predictors of entrepreneurial orientation Predictors

Constant AGE MALE (1 yes, 0 no) Education Personal education raised in reference to the family of membership EDRELATIV Durable GOODS RELATII The density of the connections used Location in central or western regions of the country Would PROTEST in public places if necessary Aversion to risk RISCAVER PROPRIV In favour of privatization R2 Number of cases

Rural sample Unstandardised regression coefficients

Standardised regression coefficients

Urban sample Unstandardised regression coefficients

Standardised regression coefficients

(0.22) -0.01 0.18 (0.01) 0.17

* -0.15 0.11 (0.01) 0.08

0.78 -0.01 0.19 (-0.01) 0.20

* -0.24 0.09 (-0.01) 0.08

0.15 0.08

0.15 0.15

0.14 0.05

0.13 0.10

(0.04)

(0.02)

(0.07)

(0.03)

0,04

0,06

(0,02)

(0.02)

-0.10 0.09 0.23 1083

-0.10 0.11

-0.10 0.08 0.18 1347

-0.09 0.08

1083

1347

Source of primary data: The public opinion barometer of the OSF, 1998. The volume of the rural sub sample N=1103. All path coefficients that are not placed in () are significant for p=0.05 Geographic localisation does not seem to be a relevant factor for entrepreneurship once we control age, education, social connections and aversion to risk. This is a significant difference in comparing the explanatory factors for social capital and for entrepreneurship. Social capital is strongly rooted in geographic localisation. Entrepreneurship does not depend as much on regional culture independent of status variables. As expected, rural and urban entrepreneurs take risks, are open to new experiences and support the ideology of privatisation. Rural entrepreneurs, more than urban ones, have a high potential for civic action, declaring themselves ready to protest in public space if the need arises. The finding is consistent with the “hypothesis of uncertainty” (Firebaugh, Sandu, 1998) formulated in connection to reformism. For societies in transition, uncertainty is a major challenge. Under conditions of increased uncertainty, the hypothesis mentioned argues, people tend to adopt new models of reformist behaviour not only, or not first of all, according to expected gain, but by their cultural capacity to confront risk. Using data 108

Social Space of Transition from a national survey carried out in Romania in 1993, the idea is argued that economic reformism has as main intermediary variables the individual ideology, economic optimism and tolerance of risk (Firebaugh, Sandu, 1998: 533-535). The data from this volume referring to entrepreneurial orientation indicates the significant role of tolerance of risk. In particular, entrepreneurs by intention are affected by this factor of a cultural nature (Tables 4-9, 4-10). The hypothesis of uncertainty and of the essential role of risk is more adequate for explaining the intentions than the reformist behaviours. The above mentioned factors favour entrepreneurship in different configurations for different types of entrepreneurship (Table 4-9). To refer to a segment of population that is as homogenous as is possible I will consider only the case of rural entrepreneurship from now on. Rural entrepreneurs by behaviour in particular have a rich relative education, a lot of connections and material capital. Ideologically, they are orientated pro-privatisation. Entrepreneurs by intention, those who are decided to open a business, have the most specified causal profile. They are young people, with rich material and social resources, with a low aversion to risk and with a lot of ability to be active in public places. Entrepreneurs by desire have the most vague profile. They are young people with a good material condition, who support the ideology of privatisation. Table 4-9. Factors that favour (+) or discourage (-) entrepreneurial behaviour in the rural environment

AGE MALE (1 yes, 0 no) Education Personal education in reference to the family EDRELATIV Durable GOODS RELATII The density of the connections used Location in central or western regions of the country Would PROTEST in public places if necessary Aversion to risk RISCAVER PROPRIV In favour of privatization

Entrepreneurs by behaviour 0 0 0 +

Entrepreneurs by intention + 0 0

Entrepreneurs by desire 0 0 0

+ +

+ +

+

0

0

0

0

+

0

0 +

-

0 +

Source of primary data: POB- OSF, 1989. Each column of the table summarises the results of a logistic regression model in which the type of entrepreneur is a fictively dependant variable. The insignificant coefficients for p=0.05 are marked with 0. An increase in the chances for the situation of being an entrepreneur of the type marked by the variable in the column is marked with a +. An decrease of the chances for the event associated with the dependant variable and with the predictor in the row is marked with -. Example of reading the table: the chances of being an entrepreneur by behaviour are increased by the growth of the value of the factor CONNECTIONS, controlling all the other three predictors.

Entrepreneurs by desire from rural areas differ from the other two types of entrepreneurs by the fact that they have no social connections to help them in business. Culturally speaking, the most

109

Dumitru Sandu pronounced profile from a cultural point of view is that of the entrepreneur by intention. Only in their case is aversion to risk extremely low.

Entrepreneurs and trust in the rural environment Entrepreneurs by behaviour from rural communities are among the people who have the lowest levels of interpersonal trust. They believe a lot less than other categories of the population in the correctness of other people and the institution of order (police, army, justice, SRI). Their ethnic tolerance and trust in groups with a different status (journalists, managers, intellectuals) is among the highest. It is as if an entrepreneur would say – “groups that are different from us are alright. We do not like interacting very much with state institutions and individuals who are different”. How can we explain this difference between interpersonal and institutional trust and trust in ethnic and non-ethnic groups? It is very possible that this is due to the models of interaction connected to their work. Institutions of order that represent the state have a negative image in the minds of the entrepreneurs. Table 4-10 . Parameters of trust by type of entrepreneur and residence Parameter of trust in

Rural sub segment Non-entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs by desire Entrepreneurs by intention Entrepreneurs by behaviour Urban sub segment Non-entrepreneurs Entrepreneurs by desire Entrepreneurs by intention Entrepreneurs by behaviour

Other people INTERPERS

Status groups Ethnic INTERGROUP groups ETHNIC

Institutions of normative order ORDER

Politically dependant institutions POLITIC

-54 -50 -61 -66 -73 -61 -59 -63 -67 -61 -58

-4 -5 2 -7 0 -5 -7 1 -6 7 -5

1 3 -3 -4 -13 -13 -11 -9 -17 -23 -7

-23 -22 -23 -28 -26 -30 -31 -16 -36 -37 -27

-28 -29 -24 -31 -17 -21 -23 -15 -21 -17 -24

Source: POB-OSF, 1998 Entrepreneurs interact with state institutions more than other people for the purpose of starting a business and continuing it. A bureaucracy that eats a lot of time and is often corrupt brings a lot of unsatisfaction and lack of trust. The fact that almost two thirds of rural entrepreneurs have family businesses that have closed is significant. In the case of entrepreneurs by intention and desire, the number is below 21%. The reason for closing a business can be connected to the market itself, to the institutional context of business, to the costs of the transaction associated with the circulation of the inputs and outputs, the human quality of the partners etc.

110

Social Space of Transition The practice of entrepreneurship under the conditions of an unstable economy and of a society marked by an anomalous phenomenon (the malfunctioning of the social norms for ordering social interactions) implies a low level of interpersonal trust (Figure 4-2). To be an entrepreneur at an advanced stage – from desire to intention, to early practice and later to regular practice within a personal company – is in concordance with lower levels of interpersonal trust. High frequencies of closing and starting up businesses again is proof of how hostile the business environment is. Social capital is a condition and an effect of entrepreneurship. It is a factor of conditioning through networks of CONNECTIONS and is an effect through the phenomenon of trust. In particular, interpersonal trust seems to be negatively affected by practicing entrepreneurship in an unorganised environment. The negative relationship between entrepreneurship and interpersonal trust is manifested only in rural communities. In urban communities the relationship is insignificant from a statistical point of view. The difference between the two types of communities from this point of view indicates the existence of more hostile conditions for entrepreneurs in rural communities in comparison to urban communities.

111

Dumitru Sandu

Leadership experience in communism

Trust in order institutions 0.06

0.10

Risk aversion

-0.16

0.13 0.09 -0.08 Accesibility to useful relations 0.18

0.23

0.11

Education

0.17 -0.11 0.20

Age

0.09

-0.09

-0.16 Modern durable goods in household

0.16

Entrepreneurship 0.20

-0.10

Interpersonal trust 0.02

Figure 4-2. A path model of entrepreneurship and social capital in rural communities All the numbers in the graphic are path coefficients that are significantly different from 0 for p=0.05. The path model was built using the AMOS program. The theoretical correlations associated with the models presented do not differ significantly from the empirical ones: χ2=13,85, p=0.24.

Human capital is a key factor for the entrepreneur’s social capital. Higher studies are accompanied by a higher inclination towards entrepreneurship and a more active criticism of institutions and fellow citizens. (Figure 4-2). A more detailed analysis, controlling more predictors, shows that not just education itself matters for rural entrepreneurship as relative education. The more educated a person is in the context or his own family, the higher the probability of that person’s adopting adopting innovation, which is called entrepreneurship. Aversion to risk is the second key factor of human capital relevant to entrepreneurship and social capital. The way in which this cultural factor is connected to social capital is differs according to the type of interaction. A high ability to take risk is favourable to the development of a large network of useful connections and entrepreneurship. The same ability is accompanied by a low level oft trust in institutions.

Who are the entrepreneurs in the agriculture of transition? From the general case of the entrepreneurs from urban or rural areas I will move on to the particular case of the rural entrepreneur in agriculture. Through the particularization of the term of

112

Social Space of Transition reference detailed information can be obtained on the mechanisms that facilitate or block the entrepreneurial activity. Private agriculture in Romania of the 1990’s is, overwhelmingly, one of subsistence. The normal consequence is the fact that its practice is made on small surfaces. To say though that Romanian agriculture of the 1990’s is in a crisis only due to the breaking up of the property caused by the return of land is insufficient and can generate over simplifying interpretations. It is known that there are many situations in which agriculture proves to perform well on low areas of land. It is not only about, in the case of the issue of private agriculture in Romania, an effect of agricultural organisation, reduced resources of the private agriculturists under a human or material aspect. It is also about the effects of agricultural policies and the general economic environment. The policy of credits and agricultural subsidies for the private sector has remained an inefficient one. The credits directed towards agriculture have, to a large extent, served to keep characteristics specific to the period of the centralised economy, marked by political and not by economically founded decisions60. The demand for agricultural products in general, and particularly in cities, dropped at the same time as poverty was accentuated. Given these conditions, the competition of external agricultural producers is felt more and more by the small agricultural producer from the countryside. D. Low resources for agricultural production

productivity foragricultural work

+ +

+ C. Low level income from agriculture

+

+ A. Economic depression, nonadequate agricultural policy

+ B. Low demand for agricultural products on the market

+

Figure 4-3. The vicious circle of the relationship resource–production–income in private agriculture. (loop C,D,E, conditioned by the values of blocks A and B) In a synthetic picture of the problems of Romanian agriculture practiced in the private sector, immediate causes, effects and conditions can be distinguished. The major problem remains that of low agricultural productivity. In the series of immediate causes responsible for this situation, the weak mechanisation, reduced access to modern means of practising agriculture and the non-correlation of resources must be mentioned first61. The low productivity of work in agriculture leads directly to the obtaining of low income. In turn these are the main cause of the low level of resources they have available for agricultural production. 113

Dumitru Sandu The consistency and stability of the vicious circle for the resources–productivity–income relationship is given by the general economic environment of transition, of inadequate agricultural policies (Figure 43). The different post–December governments did nothing else but to consolidate the respective vicious circle. Neither the famous bet with agriculture initially promised by the government, nor the political change in 1996, marked by replacing PDSR with CDR and the coalition formed around the Convention did not show signs of efficiency in breaking the vicious circle of agricultural inefficiency. Even though most of the family agricultural households function in a system of subsistence, following an economic rationality which lacks the mechanisms of a market economy, the economic picture of private agriculture is far from homogenous. The different methods of organization of a rural household and the orientation towards market economy are what give the content of such diversity. It is expected that the diversity of private family agriculture is, in essence, under the sign of the ecological environment and family structure. The necessary resources for agricultural production, supply and demand of agricultural products depend on these two big categories of factors – the communitarian– regional environment and the composition of the household. The effort to decipher such diversity is not only justified scientifically, localized in the sphere of sociologic knowledge of the economy, of social problem’s or changes from rural environments. There is also an immediate practical stake, associated with the possible substantiation of agricultural and rural development policies from the perspective of an understanding of the diversity of the situations that structure rural family economy. Social life has always been more inventive than those who study it or propose to modify it through different policies. In consequence, its close examination can lead directly to suggestions of means of solving the social problems through political projects, of development. The main producer of new models of economic and social life in the rural environment is the agricultural entrepreneur. He is the one who takes the risks of passing from agriculture of subsistence to one of achievement, based on profit and risk. He is the one who turns the peasant agricultural household into a farm, an enterprise administrated using capitalist type logic. The road to find the entrepreneur in the present Romanian agriculture, which is dominated by crises, problems, and blocks, may seem useless or demanding or hazardous. And yet, that is not so. The identification of agricultural entrepreneurs in such a troublesome environment, economically and socially speaking, is difficult but not impossible and, in any case, not without use. The presence of the entrepreneurial spirit at the level of the masses of farmers is a measure of the penetration of market economy in this production space. One cannot speak of a real market economy in agriculture without farmers wishing to make a profit, invest, and seek raw materials of maximum performance for their activity. To put it another way, the presence of farmers as agricultural entrepreneurs is essential. At least as important as the presence of specialized markets such as that of land, services for agriculture or work force.

114

Social Space of Transition What is the space that the entrepreneurial spirit occupies in agriculture at the beginning of the transition to the market economy? Strictly marginal? Associated with certain economic or social conditions, or randomly distributed? What is the relationship between intentions and entrepreneurial behaviour? The basic hypothesis from which this subchapter starts is that entrepreneurs of family agricultural units are the product of specific environments of a family, communitarian and regional nature. Their number is almost impossible to specify. However, the environments in which they appear or those that are hostile to them can be specified by successive approximations. The grid used for identification is built from questions regarding sources of income, investments, expenses for production, economic opinions and intentions specific to rural families (Figure 4-4). The more frequent the agricultural sales and investments for the level of the family of reference, the more production is based on technology and modern inputs, the larger the surface area leased, and the higher the intention of future agricultural expansion and investments, the higher the probability of adopting entrepreneurial behaviour in the area of family agriculture. The signs of entrepreneurial behaviour are thus connected to the presence of leasing, sales, investments, use of modern technology and the intentions to invest. There are as many ways to enter the entrepreneurial world. From their aggregation there results what could be called “the space of entrepreneurial behaviour”. It is a space with a variable geometry depending on the communitarian-regional environment, the resources of the household and the intensity of the entrepreneurial spirit at the level of the members of the household. Entrepreneurs are individuals with resources, motivation and specific value orientation. Their resources and culture are strongly dependant on the resources and family or household culture of which they are a part. For the case of agricultural development of an entrepreneurial family type in the current conditions in Romania, the family household is the main cultural and entrepreneurial resource environment. The local attempts that started from the absolutism of the validity of the models of approach of rural entrepreneurs (of Latin-American or western inspiration) only or mainly according to the individual, were marked by serious problems of validity of the information collected. Who makes the decision to allocate resources to agriculture, who decides on the method for cultivating the land, how are the agricultural products capitalized on? The head of the household, a certain person from the household defined as an entrepreneur or the household through its adult members? These kinds of questions are asked of rural research. An answer, which relies mainly on the individual actor in administering agricultural problems of the household, is risky. History and culture continues to have its word. The household continues to be the generative matrix of organization of family agriculture. The environment, which it ensures, is more or less favourable to entrepreneurial orientation. The task of establishing from case to case the relationship between individual and household in taking economic decision falls to empirical research. 115

Dumitru Sandu The entrepreneur is not a reality but an ideal. He is found in reality in different degrees and different behaviour or attitude configurations. Of course, obtaining profit by the means of organizing an enterprise is their characteristic and dominant note. In different stages of life and in different contexts they are different by the emphasis they put on a certain entrepreneurial orientation. The total entrepreneur is the one who, on order to obtain long-term profit, maximizes investments, sales and acquisition of means of production. Achieving investments and acquisitions of intermediary raw materials are not only behaviours but also intentions in this case. The total entrepreneur is interested not only in immediate income but also that of the distant future, long term income. The totality of his entrepreneurial orientation resides in the fact that it is behavioural as well as intentional, as much in the area of production as in that of commercializing produce.

Outputs

Inputs B.do invest in agriculture

C.lese in

D.intend to invest

E.use modern technologies

A. sell agricultural products with profits sell agricultural products without profits do not sell agricultural products

Figure 4-4. The space of entrepreneurial behaviour (reunion of the spaces A,B,C,D,E)

The potential entrepreneur is the one who intends to develop an enterprise, to invest. At present, the rhythm of economic inputs and outputs from his enterprise is low, in comparison with the corresponding rhythm of the proper entrepreneur or total entrepreneur. The tradesman is a type of “partial” entrepreneur, focused on sale. Even though it is above average, the rhythm of inputs is relatively low in his case. The outputs, that is sales, have a more intense rhythm than inputs. It is the case of the speculative entrepreneur. The farmers of the beginning of transition in Romanian are mainly peasants or farmers focused on personal consumption. They produce for their personal consumption, with minimum rhythms of input (fertilizer, pesticide, herbicide, specialized services etc.) for agricultural production. The entrepreneurial behaviour is foreign to them, they do not buy, the do not sell, they do not invest and they do not make plans for agricultural investment. Their number of the total agricultural households is hard to estimate. The most dynamic segment is that of entrepreneurial farmers, those who invest, buy inputs, sell agricultural products in a sustained rhythm and systematically build plans of expansion of their personal

116

Social Space of Transition household. Between entrepreneurial farmers and those of subsistence there are a series of intermediary types. The closest to active entrepreneurs are the potential entrepreneurs. The rhythm of economic input in their household is above average but still low. The sales are slightly below average. On the other hand, the stocks of plans and motivation for the expansion of agricultural activity are particularly high. The farmer that buys the bare essentials for achieving production, without investing in the agricultural inventory, but who manifests a high rhythm of sales is, again, an intermediary type. He is neither peasant nor entrepreneur. Or he is a type of partial entrepreneur, on a short-term basis, without structured projects for the long term. The agricultural entrepreneur is an emergent social type, produced through complex processes of social construction. The problems associated with the vicious circle of the resources-production-income relationship (Figure 4-5) are answered in a social plane also by building a new social role, the one of the entrepreneur. The names under which they appear are different – “lease holder”, “chief of the family agricultural society” etc. It is about all those who succeed in the agricultural world haunted by natural risks and inconsistent agricultural policies. As with any new social role, the role of the entrepreneur is built from what existed in the given social context, from the models transmitted from other, from the models transmitted from other societies. Market orientation at the level of TYPE OF FARMERS

RELEVANT CATEGORIES FOR SUBTYPES

INVESTMENTS AND INPUTS

OUTPUTS

Yes

Yes

active or total entrepreneur

focused on investments vs/inputs

Yes, mainly for investments

No

potential entrepreneur oriented on investments

having resources for investments from agricultural or non-agricultural activities

No investments Yes inputs

Yes

trade entreprebneur

with or without investment projects

No

No

traditional farmer oriented on subsistence

subsistence agriculture limited to behaviors or of attitude and behavior type

Figure 4.5. Types of farmers according to their orientation towards market economy

The role of the agricultural entrepreneur is defined, in the context of transition to a market economy, by identifying certain enrichment practices with the means of agricultural production and by the social evaluation of such practices. The cultural definition of the role comes after the identification of the practical means to exercise it, after social creativity has been exercised in achieving certain 117

Dumitru Sandu objective combinations and means that can be satisfied through games specific to the role. The name, labels and evaluations of the role are posterior to this sequence. In the present stage of transition in Romanian agriculture, the role of the entrepreneur is in the pre-normative phase. Reforms, whether political, economic or religious, are social changes achieved on the basis of a project drawn up by the elite and adopted by the masses as a result of processes of persuasion, social contagion or constraint. The post-communist reforms are guided by such projects that are meant to lead to the building of a market economy and democracy. However, they cannot be reduced to a simple scheme of the type challenge–answer, to a project compiled by the elite and an answer given by the masses. The process of reform implies multiple interactions between the projects and different authors. The masses and the elite model reciprocally their projects according to new ideologies, problems and opportunities. What is called transition is nothing more than the process of social definition of projects of change and their implementation. The project of reform is achieved by means of an ample process of social construction of reform. Individual life projects connected to social projects, social controversies, definition of the new themes of controversy, and the crystallization of new social types with specific life strategies are all part of this spontaneous process. The reconstruction of the entrepreneur in agriculture as a specific social type is one of the multiple processes of the social construction of reform. The purpose of the present subchapter is to decipher the social processes that lead to the make up of a new social type and a diversity of solutions which social creativity employs in solving its problems in the agricultural area with the help of new social roles. Starting with the survey data, I will identify the signs of manifestation of the process of social construction of the agricultural entrepreneur, the particularities of social spaces in which the probability for it to appear is maximum. The major axes of structuring these spaces are:

The individual–family resources

Specific human capital: technical knowledge in the area of agriculture or mechanics The material capital to launch the businesses General human capital given by the stock of personal and family education Social capital in terms of connections

Communitarian–regional opportunities

Quality of the land Low price or low price of lease of land Cheap, available workforce The level and dynamics of regional demand of agricultural products The accessibility to dynamic urban markets in the context of demand of agricultural products

The cultural permissiveness of the environment to entrepreneurial behaviour

The degree of structuring of a culture of openness, characterized by acceptance of risk, interpersonal trust, trust in business people, cooperation etc.

118

Social Space of Transition Income as a sign of entrepreneurial orientation The pensions in the state sector are the main source of income for rural households which own at least 0.5 ha of arable land (Table 4-11). Approximately 30% of agricultural rural households are in this situation. The next main source of income is the salary in the state sector (for 25% of rural households). In third place, at approximately 21% of rural agricultural households, is the income originating from the sale of agricultural products62. The wealthiest families63 are those that obtain their income from salaries. At the opposite end of the scale, that of maximum poverty, are families who live mainly from the CAP (Cooperative for Agricultural Production) pensions and from the sale of agricultural products. Not all families who declare that they obtain money mainly from the sale of agricultural products are poor. Table 4-11.The distribution of rural agricultural households according to the main source of income and the total level of income (%) Main source of income in the household

State salary Salary from the private sector State pensions Sale of agricultural products CAP pensions Others

Level of income per person in the household Very low Low High Very high Below Between between over quartile quartile 1 quartiles 1 quartiles 3 and 2 2 and 3 9.7 22.6 26.3 41.4 7.7 33.3 20.5 38.5

Total % N

100 100

186 39

15.5 46.4

28.6 22.5

32.3 15.9

23.6 15.2

100 100

220 151

54.3 39.2 25.0

23.9 20.3 24.9

19.6 17.6 24.3

2.2 23.0 25.8

100 100 100

46 74 716

Source:POB-OSF,1998. The households that have over 0.5 ha of agricultural land are considered to be agricultural households. This represents 69% of the total rural households in the segment

Agricultural entrepreneurs, those that make up the social type of interest in this context, are, most probably, localized at the level of this category. They obtain gains mainly from agriculture and the total level of gains in the household is close to average or even above (over quartile 1). We will try from now on to identify the profile for agricultural households at whose level the chance of entrepreneurial practices is higher starting from the segment of households previously mentioned. According to the above mentioned premises and the nature of the available data, I accepted the hypothesis of increased chances for agricultural entrepreneurial behaviour for households that declare that they obtain their main income from agriculture and have a total level of income per person in the household (no matter the source) larger than the that indicated by the quartile 1. Approximately 11% of the agricultural households are in the same situation. How does making an income mainly from agriculture and not being poor (in the quartile 1 of income) “add up”? Obviously the answer to the question will not 119

Dumitru Sandu automatically lead to identifying the characteristics of the rural entrepreneur. Starting from this point, inferences can be made which will bring us closer to the ideal type of agricultural entrepreneur. Table 4-12. Favourable conditions (+) or unfavourable (-) for raising animals in individual agricultural households Criteria

The average age of the adults The average age of the adults in the household squared Education stock in the household Number of adults Number of children under 15 in the household Agricultural land owned in ha (logarithmic transformation) Amount of arable land of the total agricultural land in the village Increase of the population in the village 1992-1996 Parameter of human capital in the commune UMANCOM Distance to the closest city of over 30 thousand inhabitants (logarithmic transformations) County development parameter DEVJUD95 R2

Number of animals in the household Swine Bovine Sheep Fowl + -

+ -

0 0

0 0

Conventional number of animals in the household UVM 0 -

+ +

+ 0

0 0 0

0 0 +

0 + 0

+

+

+

+

+

+

-

-

+

0

-

0

0

0

0

+

0

0

0

0

+

0

0

0

+

+

0

0

0

+

0.16

0.11

0.05

0.06

0.14

Source:POB-OSF, 1998. To each column in the table there corresponds a model of multiple regressions whose predictors are noted in the “criteria” column. The dependant variables in the model are given by the logarithm of the number of animals in the household. The calculations are made on the 759 rural households in the segment that have over 0.50 ha of arable land. The +/- sign indicates a positive/negative partial regression coefficient, significantly different from 0 for p=0.05. The situations in which the partial regression coefficient is insignificantly different from 0 are marked with a 0. On the last row of the table the multiple determination coefficients are noted.

Households with increased chances of entrepreneurial behaviour in agriculture are mainly those that raise a large number of animals, in areas of fields (Table 4-12). The surfaces of land they own are significantly larger than other rural households. Breeding of animals is the main predictor of entrepreneurial behaviour in private family agriculture. Consequently, it is important to identify the main conditions that are favourable to this type of agricultural activity. The households of livestock raisers are relatively young households, with a large number of members and also with large areas of land in their ownership. The villagers of animal raisers are mainly found in socially-economically developed counties.

120

Social Space of Transition 0.14 Development level of county DEVJUD95

Modern goods in the household 0.15 DOTARE 0.29

0.10 0.13

0.09

Education stock in the household 0.11

-0.13

-0.29

0.12 Salaries from state sector are one of Average age of income sources of the -0.25 the adults in the household (1 yes, 0 household no) 0.30

Household has high income level got from agriculture (1 yes, 0 no) 0.22 0.27 0.16

0.13

0.31

0.32 Share of arable out of the total agricultural land in commune

Agricultural area ownd by the household

0.23 Conventional number of cattle in the household

Number of adults in the household

0.11 -0.17

Figure 4-6.. The path model for identifying the characteristics of agricultural households that have agricultural products as their main source of income and are not poor. Source: the barometer of socio-human resources of the reform 1998. Path coefficients of standardized partial regression are marked on the graphs arcs. The model is adequate for the data, the difference between the matrix of observed correlations and the one built on the basis of the theoretical model being insignificant for p=0.54. In order to estimate the coefficients, the method of the smallest number of squares WLS was used. The calculations were made in LISREL8. The logarithm of the surface of arable land in ownership was taken to was to reduce the degree of obliqueness of statistic distribution. Similar procedures were followed for the population of the village. DEVJUD95 is a synthetic measure of the degree of development of the county built as a factorial score from another 6 parameters referring to human capital in the county, the infrastructure of distribution of drinkable water, the degree of use of the workforce, the quality of sanitary services and the degree of ageing of the population . The multiple determinations corresponding to each exogenous variable is marked within the block that marks the variable. Even though all the multiple determinations are significantly different from 0 for p=0.01, their level is low. On the other hand, the model as a whole is characterized by a high degree of adequacy for the data. And it is exactly this configuration with a high degree of sociologic and statistic consistency which is followed through the analysis. The relative value of the chi-squared divided by the number of degrees of freedom is equal to 0.93. In practice it is considered that a model is adequate for the data if the relative value of chi-squared to the number of degrees of freedom is smaller than 2.64. The model allows inter-correlation between all exogenous variables, These have not been introduced in the graph to simplify the image. The calculations are made on 759 cases representing the total of rural households in the segment that work in their own households and have at least 0.50 ha. These represent 64% of the total rural households, according to the segment data. If of the total households that have as a main source of income agricultural products the poor ones are eliminated, those found in the first income quartile, then the segment is identified in which one probably finds entrepreneurs. The intensive practice of animal raising, a large number of adult people, relatively young in comparison to the other categories of households, mainly identify the respective households.

The configuration of favourable conditions for raising animals differs for bovine, swine, sheep and fowl.

Table 4-13. Explanation of the sale of agricultural products by household resources and localization (path coefficients) Dependant variable 121

Dumitru Sandu Independent variables

The value of the agricultural products sold excluding from the analysis households that do not sell such products *

Value of the sold agricultural products *

Number of conventional animals in the household UVM Arable land in ownership (ha) Localization in the southern agricultural regions of the country (The Central Romanian Plane, The Lower Danube, South Oltenia) Endowing the household with modern EQUIPMENT for agricultural production ** Holds the opinion that raw materials necessary for agriculture can easily be obtained in the area, inputs (1 yes, 0 no) Percentage of arable land from the total of agricultural land of the village (parameter of localization in the field or in the mountains) Parameter of urban accessibility ACCESS**

0.31

0.32

0.22 -0.17

0.16 -0.12

0.13

0.05

0.10

0.06

0.08

0.17

0.07

0.09

Education stock Uses fertilizer, herbicide (1 yes, 0 no) Average age of people in the household over 14

(0.05) (0.04) (-0.01)

0.06 0.10 (-0.02)

R2 Number of cases

0.30 872

0.27 1611

Source of primary data: Agricultural survey, the World Bank/European Union, December 1996 * To reduce the obliqueness of the dependant variable a logarithmic transformation of it was made. For the case in which the sales were 0, the value 1 was added to it. The coefficients in parentheses are not significantly different to 0 at the level of p=0.05. The first model, without households that do not sell agricultural products is the most faithful due to the fact that in this case the dependant variable is closer as distribution to the normal one. The obliqueness of the distribution (=0.076) does not differ significantly from 0 for p=0.05, the standard error of the obliqueness parameter being equal to 0.08. The parameter of bluntness significantly differs from 0 for p=0.05 (bluntness parameter =0.597, standard error =0.163). ** See annex 1.

Agricultural households with increased chances of adopting entrepreneurial behaviour in agriculture are situated mainly in fields, in villages with good development infrastructure (Figure 4-6). The level of development of the county in which the village is situated has a contradictory role in reference to the entrepreneurial behaviour in agriculture. In the developed counties, the raising of animals in the private sector of family households is more intense, from a socio-economic point of view. This way, indirectly, the development of the county favours the behaviours of sale of the agricultural products of animal origin. In developed counties, the tendency is for the main source of income for rural households not to be from agriculture. Consequently, a lower level of rural–agricultural households for which sale of agricultural products is the main source of income is found. The size of the agricultural surface in ownership is mainly relevant for the activities of raising animals. The more agricultural land in ownership, the higher the number of animals tends to be. The cereal crops in family households prove to be the main resource for subsistence.

122

Social Space of Transition A more detailed analysis of the variation of the volume of the sale of agricultural products brings supplementary information in connection to the types of social situations favourable to entrepreneurial behaviour. The tendency is for the respective sales to be more intense in households that (Table 4-13): •

Raise animals,

•

Live in villages of fields close to cities,

•

Have personal equipment available for mechanized work in agriculture,

•

Have increased access to the procurement of modern chemical means to care for plants. Due to the fact that all these relationships are strong, significant, the hypothesis that there

already exists an important segment of farmers who practice entrepreneurial family agriculture can be sustained. They are characterized simultaneously by the fact that they carry out production with the help of personally mechanized means, using fertilizer and herbicide, and sell a good part of their products at markets. From a geographical point of view, the most intense sale of agricultural products is not made in the southern agricultural regions of planes, but in other areas of the country.

Profit and investment as signs of entrepreneurial orientation The signs of great relevance for entrepreneurial behaviour are making profit and investments. The data from the agricultural survey in 1996 for measuring the production expenses and the profit obtained from the sale of agricultural products are relatively weak, affected by multiple measurement errors. However, their careful examination allows the emphasis of certain significant regularities and typologies for the area of interest of this study. The base typology that is obtained distinguishes between farmers of integral subsistence, farmers of partial subsistence, entrepreneurs orientated towards short-term profit and entrepreneurs orientated towards long-term profit or investment. All these four categories must be considered as fuzzy groups, with relatively indistinct borders. The profit from individual agricultural households varied in 1996 between approximately 10 million lei gain and –10 million lei net losses65. Approximately 9% of households did not sell agricultural products and did not spend money on agricultural production. They represent the group of integral subsistence. Most rural agricultural households (52%) practice a type of agriculture of partial subsistence. In their case the difference between the agricultural income and the expenses for labour in agriculture is relatively low (+/- 600 thousand lei). The number of households that achieve a relatively high profit (more than 600 thousand lei) was 21% in 1996. The fourth type is made up of households that are very active in the area of agricultural investments but have finished the year with net losses (18% total agricultural households). 123

Dumitru Sandu The households of partial subsistence sell very little of their agricultural produce and spend less on fertilizer and mechanized projects. The level of their investments is, in addition, low (Table 4-14) The entrepreneurial types of farmers are more active that those of subsistence, from the point of view of sales, purchases and investments. Some entrepreneurial households focus on profit and others on investment. The investments are 3.6 times more intense in the former than in the latter type of household. Market behaviour is specific to farmers orientated towards profit. The average value of sales of agricultural products is 7.3 times higher in households orientated towards profit than in households orientated towards investment. The intention to invest by buying animals, land or agricultural equipment is at its highest with farmers orientated towards investment and at its minimum with those from the integral subsistence category. The two measures of the investment behaviour – actual expenses for investments and the intention to invest – are highly consistent (their correlation is r=0.14, significantly different from 0 for p=0.01). It seems to be not only a stage of economic development of the households but also a certain entrepreneurial style: those who invested continue to think of investment projects and those orientated towards profit immediately maintain the intention to invest at a very low level. The intention to buy a tractor in the next 5 years is 27% for the type of farmer orientated towards investment and 23% for the type of farmer focused on immediate profit, 14% for partial subsistence farmers and 2% for total subsistence farmers. Use of modern inputs – fertilizer, pesticide, herbicides and selected seeds – is much more frequent for farmers orientated entrepreneurially than for those of subsistence. The farmers orientated towards profit use modern inputs more than those orientated towards investment. The behaviour of leasing land or working it in “parts” is more frequent at the level of the entrepreneurial farmer (25%27%) than for those of subsistence (2% for the type of total subsistence and 7% for those in the category of partial subsistence). The entrepreneurial types of households have a clear localization in agricultural regions. Transylvania and the Western Plane have the highest concentration of entrepreneurial farmers (approximately 50% of the households). The investors are localized mainly in the Western Plane and those who tend to maximize profits in the short term are mainly found in Transylvania. The subsistence agriculture is localized mainly in Plateau Moldova, the Southern Sub-Carpathians and Southern Oltenia (more than 2/3 of agricultural individual households).

Table 4-14. Economic behaviours of the agricultural households by entrepreneurial type or subsistence type Parameters of economic

Type of agricultural household

124

Social Space of Transition behaviour Average value of agricultural investments for acquisition of land, agricultural equipment and planting of trees (thousand lei) The average value of sales of agricultural products (thousand lei) The average value of agricultural expenses for inputs (thousand lei) The percentage of those who bought chemical inputs from the total category of farmers The percentage of those who bought seeds The percentage that used veterinary services The percentage of those who used mechanized work services International orientation towards investment (the average of the INTENTION parameter) The percentage that used paid workforce

Total Partial subsistence subsistence 41

255

Orientated towards investment 2352

0

268

468

3415

945

0

355

2242

789

759

14

37

52

62

43

17

40

64

57

46

31

70

76

78

70

27

75

78

78

72

-43

2

53

31

13

17

30

34

43

32

Orientated towards profit

Total

644

700

Source of primary data; Agricultural poll, World Bank/European Union, December 1996

Localization in comparison to the city is not particularly relevant for the differentiation of farmers in the subsistence–entrepreneurial polarity. But what does matter from the point of view of localization is access to the distribution markets for inputs, fertilizer and, in particular, veterinary services. Farmers orientated towards profit tend to have greater access to chemical inputs: 51% of farmers from this category in comparison to 37% of the total segment, consider that they can obtain chemical inputs relatively easily; 75% of the total of farmers orientated towards immediate profit define their access to veterinary services are being one without difficulty, in comparison to 67% of the total segment. Farmers who are closer to the entrepreneurial type have richer resources available to them. As it was to be expected, they are younger. Their households have a higher educational stock available than subsistence farmers. A typical subsistence agricultural household has only 2.37 ha of land in comparison with more than 3.5 ha. The contrast is also strong in terms of available mechanical equipment for agricultural production (tractor, plough for the tractor, combine harvester, trucks): 15% of entrepreneurs have such equipment in comparison to only 2-5% of subsistence farmers.

125

Dumitru Sandu For farmers orientated towards investment the main source of income is not agricultural. The entrepreneurial households have not only higher non-agricultural income, but also a better equipped household in terms of modern goods for long-term use (car, colour television, telephone, refrigerator etc.). This finding supports the more general hypothesis of entrepreneurial behaviour in agriculture as a constitutive part of the modernism of the household. Subsistence farmers raise a low number of animals. Livestock breeding is clearly an essential source for entrepreneurial agriculture, in particular for the style of entrepreneurs orientated towards immediate profit. The entrepreneurs that are looking for immediate profit own a larger number of animals than those orientated towards long-term profit. They are not defined by the human quality of farmers, as is the case of entrepreneurs orientated towards profit. The latter are younger, more educated and come from families with a more members. From the point of view of the amount of agricultural land, the size of the household is not a significant factor that favours entrepreneurial investments. Using modern inputs is specific to both types of entrepreneurs in agriculture.

Table 4.15. Resources of agricultural households by entrepreneurial or subsistence type Resource parameters Total subsistence Average age of people over 14 The parameter of the EDUCATION stock Average value of nonagricultural income Household modernism parameter MODERNISM (averages) Percentage of household that have mechanical equipment Conventional number of animals UVM (averages) Hectares of land in ownership (averages)

63.0 6.4

Type of agricultural household Partial Orientated Orientated subsistence towards towards investments profit 56.3 51.1 53.5 7.4 8.1 7.9

Total

55.3 7.6

2348

2771

3716

2911

2936

1.9

2.3

3.2

3.1

2.6

2

5

16

15

9

-64

-23

26

55

0

2.37

2.58

3.53

3.72

2.98

Source of primary data; Agricultural poll, World Bank/European Union, December 1996

The data of this subchapter thus support the hypothesis that most agricultural households in Romania practice subsistence agriculture. Approximately 60% of households that are not involved in agricultural associations live in an agricultural system of subsistence with a weak orientation towards the market economy, low investments in agriculture and very low agricultural profits. Table 4-16. Predictors of agricultural entrepreneurial behaviour (models of logistic regression) Predictors

Parameters of entrepreneurial behaviour (dependant variables are coded with 1 for the presence of the attribute and with 0 for its absence) Intention Intention to Has sold Has Has traits Has traits 126

Social Space of Transition to invest in agriculture

Average age of the adult members of the household EDUCATION stock Non-agricultural income The parameter of modernism for the household MODERNISM Conventional number of animals UVM Size of the agricultural surface in ownership Amount of arable land in the village of the total agricultural land Urban accessibility ACCESS Localization in the agricultural regions Transylvania or the Western Plane (1 yes, 0 no) Localization in the agricultural regions of the South East (1 yes, 0 no) Localization in the agricultural region of the Southern Sub – Carpathians (1 yes, 0 no) Cox-Snell R2

-

invest in agricultural equipment, purchase of land, purchase of equipment -

agricult ural products

bought fertilizer, pesticide, herbicide, seeds

of an entrepreneu r orientated towards profit or investment

of a subsistence farmer *

+

+ +

+

+

+

+

+

+

-

+

-

+

-

+

-

+

+ +

0.15

+

0.10

-

-

-

-

0.19

0.17

-

0.11

0.18

Source of primary data; Agricultural poll, World Bank/European Union, December 1996

A positive sign indicates the fact that a rise in the independent variable of one unit, controlling the values of the other independent variables, is accompanied, on average by the increased chance of the event being successfully achieved from the dependant variable with a quantity given by exp (B). The relationship between predictor and dependant variable is, in this case, positive. The negative sign indicates the negative relationships between predictor and the dependant variable. The empty cells correspond to the statistically insignificant relationships. Example of reading: an increase of one unit on the scale of the parameter number of conventional animals UVM, controlling the other predictors, is accompanied, on average, by an increase in the chance of investing in agriculture.

127

Dumitru Sandu The path of the lease Approximately 8% of the rural households that have over 0.20 ha of agricultural land that they cultivate individually are on leased land, with or without an officially registered contract. Who leases land? Their characteristics can say something in reference to the motivation and resources they employ in their new economic role. The answer to the question is essential to the understanding of the important ways in which entrepreneurs are formed in agriculture. The available data supplied by the barometer of socio-human resources indicates the fact that the lease-holders come, for the most part, from households with small amounts of agricultural land in ownership but with important relational social capital resources (Figure 4-7). They are people who have connections available that can help solve different problems, more than those who do not lease land. In turn, their connections are associated with education, age, position before 1989 in structures of management, and with the level of development of the local community. Families with relational social capital are younger, with a stock of education that is above the rural average and contain at least one member that was in a leadership position before 1989. A previous position of leadership converts into present social capital, of immediate relevancy to economic behaviour. The quality of a leader before 1989 has a double impact on the level of the rural world. On one hand, it contributed to the accumulation of a considerable social capital and in this way favoured the adoption of active economic behaviours in entrepreneurial agriculture. On the other hand, the same quality is associated with owning larger agricultural surfaces. Those who were managers in the rural world of the 70’s and 80’s have, as a tendency, higher agricultural surfaces. On this circuit from the position of leadership in the communist period through to a better financial situation, the effect on the adoption of entrepreneurial behaviour is different. The households in which there was at least on leader in the communist period but who own larger agricultural surfaces than the rural average, tend not to adopt the role of lease holder. For the land they own is enough. The social pressure to become a lease holder is the result of a conjunction of being young, owning little land and having a considerable relational social capital. The amount of land they own is enough for them. For people with a relatively high level of education in the rural context, with relatively wide spread landed properties, the lease was not a preferential life strategy. At the same time, it should be noted that the presence of positions of leadership during the communist period in the rural world was significantly more frequent in the environment of families with relatively high levels of education.

128

Social Space of Transition

M ean age of adut persons in th ehousehold

Leaser in (1yes,0 no) 0.36

-0.32

-0.14 -0.23

0.15 0.19

0.10

0.12

-0.42

-0.08

Education stock in the household 0.08

Size of the ownd land0.07

0.23

Location in plain area (1 yes, 0 no)

0.11

0.15 W as leader before 1989 (1yes,0 no) 0.06

0.15

-0.11

-0.13

-0.14 -0.23 County development index COUNTDEV

0.35

0.12

Scope of UTILIT Y social relations 0.17

Figure 4.7. The causal context of the role of the lease holder (path model) Source: POB-OSF, 1998. The analysis is made on the total 804 rural households that function in an individual system with at least 0.10 ha of agricultural land. Of these, 8% lease land formally, with a contract, or informally. The agricultural poll in 1996 indicated that 7% of rural households lease land (Sandu, 1997). The path model is created using AMOS. The difference between the matrix of the observed correlations and the implicit matrix that results from the theoretical model is insignificant for X2=12.69, 7 degrees of freedom and p=0.08. The standardized partial regression coefficients are marked on the arcs of the uniquely orientated graph. The disorientated arc indicates the covariance relation. Within the marking bloc of the endogenous variables the coefficients of corresponding multiple determination are noted. The coefficients that have not been included in parentheses () are significantly different from 0 for p=0.01. The level of development of the village is measured according to the described algorithm for DEVCOM3 in box 1. The education stock in the household is estimated using the same procedure described for EDUCATION in box 2. The relational social capital is a parameter of dominant personal opinion IOPD (Sandu, 1996a) built from 6 primary parameters that refer to the presence of personal connections for the solution of certain health problems, a job or in relations with the police, city hall, bank, court etc.

129

Dumitru Sandu

Conclusions The social diffusion of entrepreneurship in rural communities is strongly favoured by relational capital, by the useful connections that a person can activate. Villagers which have many useful connections with people from institutions (in administration, banks, health system, police etc.) have higher chances of becoming entrepreneurs. To become an entrepreneur is a status and cultural problem. The probability of reaching this new socio-economic position is higher for people who are pretty well off, who have a high level of education in the family. The level of education itself does not matter so much as the inclination towards entrepreneurship, as relative education. A type of inconsistency of the family in the educational status is favourable to entrepreneurship in the situations in which a member of the family, adult, young and male is more educated than the other adults of the same family and if he is risk orientated. Accessibility to useful connections is significantly conditioned by experience of leadership during the communist period and by wealth. The possession of material resources and leadership experience before 1989 are key factors for the degree of diversity of the useful social connections. This observation is in concordance with the theories that state that during the postcommunist transition period a type of conversion of the leaders took place - from communism to business66. From a practical point of view, on the basis of the observations of this analysis, the idea can be formed that the ability to take risk is more important than interpersonal trust for the diffusion of entrepreneurship, given the conditions in the rural areas in Romania. Entrepreneurship, as with any other social innovation, began to diffuse in waves that have a differentiated selectivity. The characteristics of the first, second and third waves can be recognized at the level of the entrepreneurs by behaviour as compared to those by intention and those by desire. Entrepreneurs by behaviour or those in the first wave are rich, particularly in terms of relative educational capital, material and NETWORK capital (RELATII). Ideologically they are in favour of privatization. Entrepreneurs by intention, those who are decided to open a business, have the most structured causal profile. They are young with many social connections and lots of material capital, with a low aversion to risk and with the developed ability to be active in public spaces. Entrepreneurs by desire, those who do not intend to open a business but would do so if they had a large sum of money, have the most vague profile. They are young, have a good material situation, and support the idea of privatization. They are different from the other two types of entrepreneurs because of the fact that they have no serious social connection 130

Social Space of Transition to help them in developing a business. Culturally speaking, the most crystallized profile is that of the entrepreneur by intention. Only in their case is the aversion to risk particularly low. Entrepreneurial agriculture is carried out in two major forms – the maximization of short-term profit or focus on long-term investments. The first type is associated with the breeding of livestock and the second with the vegetable sector. Using modern inputs is common to both types of farmers. Their entrepreneurial behaviour is aided by environmental conditions that favour access at lower costs to chemical fertilizers, selected seeds, herbicides, etc. The bigger the agricultural property is, the higher the probability of adopting commercial entrepreneurial behaviour, independent of the age of the adult members of the household. Conversely, entrepreneurs orientated towards investments tend to be younger, members of large families, independent of the size of the landed property they own. Starting from these findings the hypothesis can be supported that entrepreneurs orientated towards profit are entrepreneurs of material resources while those orientated towards investment mainly operate according to the human capital they have available to them (Table 4-16). Investments and orientation towards the sale of agricultural produce tends to be favourable to young households that handle animal breeding and which own large pieces of agricultural land. Investments are particularly favoured by the increase of access to nonagricultural income. Localization near a city is a favouring factor of adopting commercial behaviour of selling the agricultural products. Using modern raw materials for agricultural production is part of the attitude complex of modernism measured through education stocks and the quality of the endowments of the household. Modern agricultural households, with a high level of human capital and with modern consumption models tend to develop agricultural models based on using selected seeds and fertilizer. Subsistence agriculture is the dominant model for households with little agricultural land, with a small number of animals, located far from the city and with weakly equipped with modern goods for consumption in the household. The entrepreneurial and subsistence models in agriculture have a high specifity by agricultural region. Investors are located mainly in the Western Plane agricultural region and those who maximize profits in the short term, by selling agricultural products, are identified in Transylvania, in particular. Subsistence agriculture is the specific model for Plateau Moldova (the counties Botoşani, Iaşi and Vaslui), Southern Sub-Carpathians and South Oltenia. Agricultural regions are territorial delimitations of high relevancy, not only for the way in which the agricultural land is used at a regional level, but also for the types of agricultural entrepreneurial behaviour. From a sociological point of view, their significance is much larger 131

Dumitru Sandu than that which is reducible to agricultural behaviour. Their configuration suggests the hypothesis that historical regions are not only cultural realities but also groups of macro regions with an agricultural identity. The ratio between historical regions and agricultural regions supports another older hypothesis of heterogeneity of historical regions, a hypothesis formulated by the delimitation of the cultural areas of Romania (Sandu,1996a). Some of the agricultural regions have a very close configuration to that of cultural areas. This is the case for the agricultural regions of the Central Romanian Plane, South Oltenia and Plateau Moldova. An incontestable advantage of agricultural regions is given by the fact that they allow the connection between the agricultural information that is synthesized at county level and the social and economic information presented at the same level. The four categories of agricultural households of total subsistence, partial subsistence, commercially orientated entrepreneurship and entrepreneurship orientated towards investment represent empirical types that were found by analyzing the survey data. They concord in good measure with the theoretical expectations formulated at the beginning of the study (Figure 4-5). The first two types of subsistence correspond to the theoretical type of the traditional farmer. He is far from the market in attitude as much as in behaviour. The type orientated towards immediate profit is, in fact, the particularization of the commercial entrepreneur. The farmer that gives investments priority and who registers serious losses is closer to the theoretical type of the potential entrepreneur. What I called in the orientative sketch as being an “active entrepreneur” or “total” is hard to find in the data that is available and, most probably, in the social reality of the present Romanian village. Even though they only exist in small numbers in the rural world, lease holders as agricultural entrepreneurs have a well-outlined profile. They come from relatively young families, with little agricultural land but with a very high level of relational social capital. The social propensity to lease land or take it in parts is, therefore, associated with this type of social situation characterized by a type of status inconsistency – relative poverty at the level of the landed property in contrast with a high potential of work given by youth and with particularly high relational capital. In turn, connections as a resource convertible into economic capital, are richer for relatively young families in which there exists at least one person that had a leadership position before 1989 and residing in relatively developed villages. In fact, there is a “hard” causal triangle between education, the leadership role in the communist period and relational capital. People with a high level of education from rural areas had a greater chance of occupying a leadership position in institutes and enterprises before 1989 and at present have a relatively high level of social capital available. This finding indicates the existence of a capital of association, of a socio-human type, with the explanation that the social aspect refers mainly to 132

Social Space of Transition useful social relations, convertible into other forms of capital. This hard nucleus of socio-human capital orders a good part of economic behaviour.

133

5.

Community and regional development67

The social space of the Romanian society in transition was considered up to this point mainly at the individual and family level. Community and regional variables appeared mainly as context or interpretation factors. We already know that social capital, social status, social ideologies and entrepreneurship are differentiated not only at individual/family level but also by types of local communities and regions. If communities and regions are significant for the way the individual life is structured, it is legitimate to go further and ask what is the social status of communities and regions within the post communist transition of society: what are the key lines of their differentiation? What are the spatial points of the society where is mostly concentrated the poverty and the development? Is community poverty a simple aggregation of individual or household poverty? What are the principal determinants of community actions? These are the questions addressed by this chapter. Village development as stock of capital Local community development could be considered as stock of capital, process or action. In order to understand development as process or action, the basic reference is to community as stock of different types of capital. Communities in general are forms of social life characterized by shared values or intense social interaction or territorial proximity. Function of the dominant feature one can identify cultural communities in terms of shared values, interaction communities if interaction is their main cement and territorial communities if proximity is the defining characteristic. A relationship or a grouping is of a community type to the degree it has associated a higher probability of cooperation or solidarity. Proximity, interaction or similarity are clues of community only to the degree they increase the probability of solidarity. Such a view is in line with the long standing tradition of Tonnies, Durkheim and Weber68. Local communities that are of interest in this chapter could be considered from two basic points of view as socio-cultural units of different degrees of cultural and social integration or from the point of view of their development. The development approach is, in its turn, deeply rooted in the perspective of community capital. Village total capital Community capital is an aggregation of human, social, vital, symbolic and material capital: HUMAN CAPITAL SOCIAL CAPITAL VITAL CAPITAL MATERIAL CAPITAL SYMBOLIC CAPITAL

stock of informations and abilities stock of networks , trust and cooperation potential demographic volume , population health and youngness amount of public and private goods member's support for modern vs traditional values

The concept underlying the following analysis is that of community poverty as different of individual/household poverty. The usual living standards measurement surveys LSMS measure the

Social Space of Transition

poverty level by consumption indicators at the household and individual level. Poverty is not only an individual/household phenomenon but also a community one. In order to be able to reduce the global poverty one should be informed on all the facets of the phenomenon. Village is a special type of local community that will be largely used in this chapter as to open the debate on community development in Romania.Village poverty could be defined as high probability of low individual and public consumption at the level of the reference cluster of households forming a village. If one consider the same topic from the point of view of capital theories one could say that the village development is given by the levels the different stocks of capital have in that case. Village global capital is a combination of human, housing, vital, symbolic and regional capital (Error! Reference source not found., Figure 5-2). Forms of community capital

Indicators

Human capital

Education stock Participation rate (salaried people to 1000 inhabitants) Agriculture employed population Mass-media consumption*

Housing capital

Dwelling with running water Dwellings of low quality walls Electrified dwellings

Vital capital

Village population as absolute figure Village relative population within commune Old/young population

Social capital

Network capital of the population* Trust in other persons* Trust in local institutions* Community participation* Local institutions integration*

Symbolic capital

High individual modernity as revealed by the low fertility rates vs. low modernity associated with high fertility

Regional capital

Distance to the nearest city Size of the nearest city* Public transportation to reach the cities* Central vs. peripheral location of the village within commune etc. Migration pulling/pushing phenomena at village level Share of active population in the commune integrating the village

Figure 5-1.Indicators of village global capital All the indicators, excepting those marked by *, have been used to built the village development index LEVEL98. Community level studies presented in chapter for included also qualitative forms of community capital as networking, participation etc.

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Dumitru Sandu

Second order indices

Education stock EDSTOCK

0.36

Participation rate EMPLOYEE

0.39

AGRICULTURE employed population

-0.37

Dwellings with running WATER

0.62

Dwellings of LAND walls

-0.50

Dwellings provided with ELECTRICITY

0.38

Children born by 15-49 years old women

Third order indices

Human capital index UMANVIL

0.31

Quality of housing buildings QBUILDING

0.27

Demographic modernity of the village

-0.21

0.48

%population of 15-59 years old

0.28

% population in the village out of commune population

0,46

Distance to the nearest city

0.52

Village level geographical data

Village population (ln transformation)

Distance to the nearest city of 30+ thou. inhabitants

0.52

Location close to an European road

-0,34

Peripheral village (1 yes,0 no)

0.12

Commune level updating factor

Measures at village level using census data

Primary indicators of development

Out-migration rate from commune, 1998

+0.47

Temporary net migration at commune level, 1998

0.44

%population of 15-59 years old in commune,1998

0.44

Demographic potential

0.21

Village ISOLATION

-0.20

UPDATING factor using commune level data

0.28

Index of village development LEVEL98

Figure 5-2.Components and weights for the index of level development of the village LEVEL98 All the coefficients are factor scores. The model says essentially that the poorest villages are those of low human capital, poor quality of the housing, high fertility rate, High isolation and low demographic potential in the environment of low developed communes. Human capital is the most important predictor of village development/poverty. The KMO index for the final factor analysis is 0.77. For variable’s definition see Table

136

Social Space of Transition

A2

Before considering the Romania’s villages from the point of view of the synthetic measure presented above it is useful to give a purely descriptive image on village diversity on less aggregated indices. Village and commune Villages are rural social units, clusters of neighbouring households with a common social life. They do not have an administrative status like cities or communes. They have only an identity in the local social memory. Communes are in Romania the only rural administrative units formed by one or more villages. The about 10 million rural population of the country lives in 2,686 communes. The number of villages that cluster in the communes is of about 12,600. The number is available only at census moments. The last census in the country was in 1992. At that moment the total number of villages in communes was of 12661.There are also about 300 villages that are integrated into cities as urban administrative units. The average number of persons per village in 1992 was of 817. Very small villages of less than 20 persons were recorded to be 184 . The average number of persons per commune in 1998 was of 3781. The large majority of the communes, 92%, are constituted by at least two villages. The fact is significant for the relevance of the distinction between centre and peripheral villages within the same commune. A central village is the locus for the mayor house and other local institutions as mail centre, health units etc. Usually the level of living in the central villages where about 49% of the rural population lives is higher than in the peripheral villages69. Village size Number and population of villages is changing due to the change in administrative definitions – some communes become towns, some villages are included into cities – or to demographic movement of population – natural or migratory movement70. The fragility of some villages is easy to understand if one mentions that about two hundred villages in Romania were of an individual size of less than 20 persons, the equivalent of an average of 5-6 households. It is clear that such a village is more a hamlet. It is recorded as village due to the social and historical consciousness that there was some time in the history a village with a significant number of inhabitants. Village size is a highly relevant figure from the sociological and economic point of view. As a matter of fact, size variation is also a variation in community human capital: the larger the village the higher its education stock and the share of its population involved in qualified jobs (Table 5-1). The participation rate – as measured by the number of salaried people to 1000 inhabitants – were of about three times higher in large compared to small villages in 1992. In present time Romania, being small means to a large degree being poor in terms of villages.

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Dumitru Sandu

Table 5-1. Rural population composition by village size Village size (inhabitants)

Under 20 21 - 100 101 - 500 501 - 1000 1001 -2000 2001 -3000 3001and more Total

Average value per village in the size category of the index referring to: % of old persons % of 15-59 old Education Salaried people to 1000 (more than 59 years persons stock* inhabitants years old) 51.5 43.2 5.7 104.4 34.8 50.8 6.3 146.4 28.4 54.0 6.7 197.2 24.2 56.0 7.0 230.4 22.1 57.0 7.1 244.4 20.2 58.2 7.1 261.2 17.9 58.8 7.3 280.1 26.4 55.0 6.9 214.3

Data source: NCS. 1992 census Centrality of village location Centrality of the village within commune and its distance to the nearest city are two key factors of direct influence on village global development. The best situation is in central villages that are close to cities and the worst in the peripheral ones that are far from cities (Table 5-2). Population composition is much more favourable to development in the first category compared to the second. Living in central village and close to city allowed for a higher education stock, younger population with more modern orientations (as measured by lower level of fertility). Housing infrastructure is also much better in proximity of the cities for commune chef-lieu. Provision with running water is about three times more frequent in central villages-close to cities than in isolated ones. The two criteria – location of the village within commune and versus the city – are so important differentiation factors that one can think of the usefulness of targeting special development policies function of their values. Table 5-2.Diversity of village development by location within commune and by distance to nearest city Village development indicators (average values per village)

Population indicators Village population, estimation by 1998 % persons of more than 60 years old, 1992 % persons of no more than primary education,1992 % persons of high school or university education,1992 % population employed in agriculture, 1992 Proxy measure of demographic modernity (born children to 1000 women)

Central villages within Peripheral villages commune, located within commune, located All villages close to far from close to far from city larger than 20 people city city city

1993.0

1544.5

615.1

448.1

813.4

21.8

24.5

25.5

28.3

26.0

36.6

41.8

41.4

47.8

43.2

13.3

11.7

9.5

6.6

9.1

39.3

54.1

46.8

62.9

52.5

1687.9

1804.6

1758.2

1896.5

1805.2

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Social Space of Transition

Village development indicators (average values per village)

Housing indicators, 1992 %dwelling of clay walls % dwellings with running water system % electrified dwellings % unoccupied dwellings

Central villages within Peripheral villages commune, located within commune, located All villages close to far from close to far from city larger than 20 people city city city 37.4

46.4

34.8

42.4

39.0

14.8 95.3 8.4

11.1 93.3 9.6

7.5 90.5 10.4

5.2 84.8 11.7

7.9 89.2 10.5

Data source: Living Standard Measurement Survey (AIG), 1999, NIS and the village data basis of the University of Bucharest research program “ COMREGals Community and regional analysis – role of human and regional capital Human and social capital in the regional and community development”. A village is considered as far from cities if it is located at more than 20 km from it (own computations, D.S.)

Development is closely related to location for the Romania’s villages. Distance to the nearest city is as important as central location within the commune (Table 5-3, Table 5-6). Communication opportunities considerable increase the probability of high development level. The most developed village communities are close to large cities and modernized roads and far from the border or periphery of the judets (counties). Table 5-3. Quality of roads by village location %

Village type

distance to the nearest city

central village central village central village peripheral village peripheral village peripheral village

0-6 km 7-14 km 15+ km 0-6 km 7-14 km 15+ km

Road in front of the house made of clay stone asphalt 21,2 13,5 65,4 30,6 54,2 15,3 37,4 36,1 26,5 35,0 60,0 5,0 42,0 38,6 19,3 44,2 38,7 17,2 38,5 38,0 23,5

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Data source: Public Opinion Barometer of OSF, May, 2000. Representative random sample at national level. Rural subsample N=812. As the sample was designed to be representative at population level, we weighted the data to reach a representative sample at household level.

Income and geographic location The main source of monetary income for more than one third of the rural household is pensions. The second one in importance is salary from state sectors, up to one fifth. Income from private agricultural and non-agricultural sectors are less important, each of the sources reaching about one tenth of the rural households. The share of income sources is to a high degree consistent with activity status of the population: 35% out of the total adult population in the villages is at pension and salaried people form 17%71. Geographical location is also important as it is related to occupational structure of the population. Plain villages are poorer than hilly and mountain ones due to the fact that agricultural population is more numerous in plain areas. 139

Dumitru Sandu

The variation of the income pattern is considerable function of the geographical area (Table 5-4). Agriculture counts more in the plain communes but even here it is the main source for no more than 15% of the households. Private non-agricultural sector has the greatest impact in mountain areas of the countryside. Table 5-4. Main source of income for the rural households, function of commune location (%) Commune location in Main source of income for the Mountain Mountainhousehold area hilly area Salary form state sector 31.0 20.4 Non-agricultural private 19.8 16.1 sector Pensions 32.6 44.5 Other forms of state transfers 2.7 2.9 Agricultural income 10.7 5.1 Other 3.2 10.9 Total 100 100

Total Hilly-plain area 23.3

Plain area 16.2

21.8

9.4 42.1 6.3 8.2 10.7 100

12.0 37.2 5.5 15.5 13.6 100

14.0 38.4 4.5 11.1 10.1 100

Data source: Public opinion barometer of Open Society Foundation, November, 2000, rural subsample of 823 households, sampling design –three stages, stratified, probabilistic selection. Commune location is established function of the share of arable land out of total agricultural land in the commune where from the household is selected. Mountain commune are considered those having less than 25% arable out of total agricultural land. The plain communes are characterized by more than 75% arable land in the total agricultural area. 50% is the threshold between mountain-hill and hilly-plain communes. My own computations (D.S).

Predictors of village development Human capital of the village, as measured by education stock, participation rate and nonagricultural employment, has a very specific regional location. Understanding the context of education stock of the villages is basic for the understanding of the village poverty (Table 5-5). It is lower in plain villages from Moldova, far from modern roads and cities. Not only has the mere distance given village isolation over the nearest city. It is also a result of the fact of not being close to a modern road and to being situated at the periphery of the judet (county). City accessibility contributes to increasing village education stock not only through the medium of distance but also in relation with city size. Location close to large cities is a factor favouring higher levels of rural education.

Table 5-5. Predictors of village development indicators

140

Population increase 1992/1977

Living floor area per dwelling SLL

Index of quality for housing buildings

General fertility rate proxy variable GFR

Participation rate

Predictors

Education stock

Dependent variables in the regression models

Social Space of Transition

General fertility rate proxy variable GFR

Index of quality for housing buildings

Living floor area per dwelling SLL

Population increase 1992/1977

% arable area out of total agricultural area of commune ARABIL Distance to the nearest city (ln transformation of the variable KM) Peripheral village within commune (1 yes. 0 no) Population of the nearest city to the village (ln transformation) Village located close to European road (1 yes. 0 no) located at judet (county) periphery LNPOP92 Index of county Development DEVJUD95 Percentage of 15-59 years old population Location in Moldova (1 yes. 0 no)* Location in Transylvania (1 yes. 0 no)* Location in Banat or CrisanaMaramures (1 yes. 0 no) Location in Dobrogea (1 yes. 0 no) Location in Oltenia (1 yes. 0 no) Population in 1977 (ln transformation) % dwellings with electricity R2

Participation rate

Predictors

Education stock

Dependent variables in the regression models

-0.16

-0.12

0.07

-0.29

0.00

-0.15

-0.14

-0.18

0.09

-0.08

(-0.01)

-0.03

-0.12

-0.09

0.08

-0.03

(-0.01)

-0.06

-0.05

0.07

(-0.01)

-0.03

-0.02

(0.00)

0.08

0.09

-0.07

0.08

0.06

(0.01)

-0.03

-0.02

0.02

(0.00)

0.02

(0.01)

0.23 0.16

0.18 0.13

0.04 0.03

0.30 0.18

0.28 0.08

* (-0.02)

0.31

0.44

-0.22

0.13

0.07

*

-0.03

-0.26

0.23

-0.13

(-0.01)

0.03

0.09

-0.15

(-0.02)

0.20

0.23

-0.11

0.10

-0.14

-0.05

0.07

0.32

-0.03

(-0.00)

-0.03

0.07

-0.02

0.09

(0.01)

0.18

-0.04

0.05

0.13

-0.04

(0.02)

*

*

*

*

*

0.08

* 0.40

* 0.50

* 0.13

* 0.41

* 0.27

0.15 0.11

Each column of the table presents the results of a multiple regression model with standardized path coefficients. Variables in the models are defined in Table A2. All the coefficients non-included into () are significant for p<0.05. The units of analysis in the models are 12497 villages. As this is practical all the “population” of the rural villages, significance is computed in a conventional way as if data were a time sample.

The fact that the main poverty pockets of the country are in the East and South parts of the country (Table 5-6) is to a large degree conditioned by education and agriculture distribution. It in these parts of the country that rural education stocks are lower and occupation in agriculture is higher. The plain environment is favourable to agriculture as low income generating activity. Occupation in agriculture is in itself less favourable to an increase of education stock of the persons. In the conditions

141

Dumitru Sandu

of Romania one can speak of a “plain poverty complex” as genuine combination of low human capital and low income associated with working in agriculture (Sandu, 1996a).

Very poor commune Poor communes Developed

Figure 5-3. Development level of communes The index of commune development is an aggregation of the development values for the villages within the same commune LEVEL98

Table 5-6. A multiple regression model predicting village development Village development index LEVEL98x= (LEVEL98x is the factor score for all the components of LEVEL98 excepting those referring to distance and isolation, included as predictors in the set of right hand predictors. It is a model that predicts village development by pure location factors. No “circular effect” is possible between dependent variable and predictors.)

-0.32* East-Moldova location of the village (BT IS VS GL) -0.29* village to city distance +0.28*central village within commune -0.14*share of arable out of total agricultural land of the village +0.14*village location in North Muntenia (AG DB PH) +0.12*village location close to a modernized road -0.10*location in the Vest Moldova region (SV NT BC VR) +0.10*location in Banat-Crisana-Maramures regions +0.10*location in South-East Transylvania (BV SB CV HG) -0.06* location in South-East Muntenia (BZ BR CL IL G TR) +0.04*location in Dobrogea -0.02*location in North-West Transylvania (CJ MS SJ BN HD AB) -0.03*village located at judet (county) periphery +(0.01)*ln(population of the nearest city) All the beta coefficients not included into () are significant for p=0.01. As practically all the villages of the country from rural areas are included into the data set of the computations, the significance level is only conventional. R2 =0.44, significant for p=0.01, N=12377 villages. Reference category for regional variables – Oltenia.Ilfov villages

142

Social Space of Transition

surrounding Bucuresti have been excluded from analysis due to their very high level of development, as exceptional cases from the statistical point of view. Symbols in parenthesis are used for the names of counties forming different subregions. Bold letters indicate names for subregions within historical regions.

The quality of the housing is a very important factor for the population health. Infant mortality as a tough measure of the health situation is highly influenced by the variation of the housing situation among different communes. Communes of high number of houses of clay walls and of small size have a higher infant mortality rate. In terms of dwelling size what mostly counts is the number of rooms. Having more rooms per house is more important than having a larger living floor area72. Influence of housing conditions on infant mortality is high even when one control for the effects of education and regional location. Education stock of the rural community is also, by itself, an important factor of child health. Communes with higher levels of education stock tend to have lower infant mortality. As for location factors, what mostly contributes to higher levels of infant mortality are village location in plain areas, in small villages and in Old Kingdom historical regions. Plain location is less favourable than mountain location for children health even if controlling for human and material capital factors. Large distances to the nearest cities favour also an increase of rural infant mortality. The distance factor seems to be less important than human and material capital factors. If the population of a commune is spread in many small villages the probability of low infrastructure conditions is higher and consequently the infant mortality is also higher. Analysis in Table 5-7 indicates the fact that infant mortality is lower for the communes that have higher degrees of population concentration in a village. Table 5-7. Predictors of infant mortality rate at commune level, 1994-1996 Predictors

Unstandardized Coefficients B Std. Error (Constant) 94,65 9,51 % of 60+ years old population, 1992 -0,61 0,07 % of 15-59 years old population, -0,74 0,13 1992 Education stock, 1992 -1,96 0,70 Average number of rooms per -2,86 1,38 dwelling Average living floor area per 0,13 0,10 dwelling, 1992 % of dwellings with clay walls, 0,05 0,01 1992 % of commune population in the -2,77 1,31 largest village % of arable land out of agricultural 0,04 0,01 area Population of the nearest city of -0,07 0,38 more than 30 thou. inhabitants (ln transform.) Distance to the nearest city of more 0,14 0,44

143

Standardized Coefficients Beta

t

Sig.

-0,26 -0,18

9,95 -8,87 -5,63

0,00 0,00 0,00

-0,08 -0,08

-2,80 -2,07

0,01 0,04

0,05

1,28

0,20

0,13

5,23

0,00

-0,04

-2,12

0,03

0,07

2,93

0,00

0,00

-0,19

0,85

0,01

0,32

0,75

Dumitru Sandu

Predictors

Unstandardized Coefficients B Std. Error

than 30 thou. inhabitants (ln of number of km) Location in central-west regions R2

-5,30 0.11

1,09

Standardized Coefficients Beta

t

Sig.

-0,17

-4,88

0,00

Computations for 2581 communes. Significance levels are indicated in a conventional way as if considering the rates as temporal sample.

« To different degrees, the poor communes from the South region are in this situation due to the long term functioning of a kind of vicious circle: population of low development potential -Æ low income -Æ out-migration to Bucuresti-Æ low development potential of the population. The context favouring the functioning of this vicious circle is given by poor infrastructure, dominant agricultural economy in the south, poor urban network of settlements and proximity to Bucuresti » (Figure 5-4)73.

Selective out-migration of youth and educated people to Bucharest

Population of low development potential

Low income, poverty

Poor infrastructure Dominant agricultural economy Unbalanced urban setlement network Proximity to Bucharest

Figure 5-4. The vicious circle of poverty in the plain communes of the South regions74 The poverty dynamics of the villages is approximated by the demographic dynamics. An identification of the conditions of demographic decline or increase of the villages is relevant for their poverty increase or development. Results of regression analysis from Table 5-5 suggest that poverty tends to increase in villages of small size that are peripheral within commune and isolated from cities of a significant size of at least 30 thou. inhabitants. Poor levels of community infrastructure, electricity

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providing especially, favoured demographic decline. Function of geographic location, the highest decline was recorded for plain villages. It is here that the poverty had the sharpest increase.

Regional development as stock of regional capital Historical regions and cultural areas The most visible regions of the country in terms of public debate are the historical regions (Figure 5-5). There are 7+1 (Bucharest, the capital city of the country) such regions: Moldova, Muntenia, Dobrogea, Oltenia, Banat, Crisana-Maramures, Transylvania and Bucuresti, the capital city. They are simply cultural and historical units, not administrative ones75. Linguistics differences are non-significant among Romanians living in these different regions.

Romania's population by historical regions, 1.01.2000 urbanization % out of degree of the country population region (%) Muntenia 19,4 43,9 Moldova 21,6 45,5 Oltenia 10,7 45,5 Crisana-Maramures 9,0 50,6 Banat 4,6 60,2 Transilvania 19,9 61,0 Dobrogea 4,5 66,6 Bucuresti 10,2 88,8 Total % 100,0 54,8 N 22455485

CRIŞANAMARAMUREŞ

Muntenia Moldova Oltenia Crisana-Maramures Banat Transilvania Dobrogea Bucuresti Total

Persons that graduated at least high school, (%), 1992 20.6 21.7 24.1 23.1 27.4 26.6 26.6 43.1 25.6

Botosani

MOLDOVA

Suceava Iasi

Bistrita Nasaud

Salaj Bihor

Neamt

Cluj Harghita

Mures

Bacau

Arad

Timis

People of more than 60 years old, (%),1996 16.9 19.8 19.6 17.1 17.2 16.7 13.9 18.0 17.7

TRANSILVANIA

Satu Mare Maramures

Sibiu Alba 3 Hunedoara 4

Covasna

Galati

5 6

Brasov

Vrancea

Buzau

BANATCaras Severin

Hungarians in the region population (%) 1992 0.1 0.1 0.1 21.2 6.5 23.9 0.2 0.4 7.1

Vilcea

Gorj

Prahova Buc. Ilfov

Olt

111 12 12 222

Teleorman

OLTENIA

Braila

Arges

Mehedinti Dolj

Vaslui

Tulcea

Ialomita Calarasi Constanta

DOBROGEA

Giurgiu

MUNTENIA

Figure 5-5. Historical regions of Romania: total and urban population The most relevant regions for targeting poverty and for regional analysis are the cultural areas (Figure 5-6) as sub regions of historical regions or groupings of judets (counties) that divide the development regions. Counties from the same cultural area are similar in terms of urban development, rural development, land use patterns, ethnicity and religious related culture.

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Dumitru Sandu

Figure 5-6. Cultural areas of Romania within historical regions (Source: Dumitru Sandu, 1996a. The cultural areas have been generated by a cluster analysis using variables referring to rural development of judet, urban development, land use, religious structure and historical region). It is a map that incorporates mostly sociological information. Bold lines indicate the approximate limits of historical regions and thin lines are limits of cultural areas (both of them are not administrative units). Figures refer to percentage of urban population in the area at 1.01.2000. The 18 cultural areas are largely used, due to their sociological significance, as stratification criterion in a significant number of national surveys in Romania.

The development profile of the rural communities is given by the differential concentration of human capital as education, participation rate (salaried people to 1000 inhabitants) and non-agricultural employment. The rural regions with the lowest human capital are in the eastern and in the south parts of the country. As a matter of fact there is a rather continuous band of low human capital on the East and South border, starting from Botosani and going South up to Ialomita and continuing to the West up to Mehedinti ( see Figure 5-14). The low human capital judets are also to a very high degree plain area judets. There is a striking overlapping between rural human capital and agroregion maps (Figure 5-7)of the country.

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Figure 5-7. The agroregions of Romania (Source : MAF, EC, WB Private Agriculture in Romania. Household Survey, Bucuresti, 1997, p.1-5. ¤Each agroregion is indicated by a specific shadow. Figures specify the share of arable out of total agricultural land in judet). Bold lines indicate the approximate limits of historical regions (that are not administrative units) and thin lines are limits of judets as regional administrative units.

The lowest human capital is in Moldova historical region and the highest one Transylvania and Dobrogea. The other historical regions are more heterogeneous in terms of rural human capital. The highest differences are in Muntenia or Valachia between the North and South judets. North with Arges, Dambovita and Prahova is by far more educated and non-agricultural employed than the South formed by plain judets of Teleorman, Giurgiu, Calarasi and Ialomita. Similarly, the North part of rural Oltenia is richer in human capital than the South part of the same region. Three historical regions - Transylvania, Banat and Crisana-Maramures – are quite similar by their high stocks of human capital. The poorest parts of these regions from the point of view of human capital are Salaj and Bistrita-Nasaud in Transylvania and Satu-Mare and Maramures in CrisanaMaramures. Housing infrastructure has the best quality in Transylvania and the poorest one in Eastern judets of Moldova and east Muntenia. Excepting Moldova, all the other historical regions are rather heterogeneous, with consistent gaps in terms of human capital, infrastructure and agricultural potential (as measured by the land use patterns). The best way to summarize the within historical regions differences have been codified in a map of cultural areas of the country (Figure 5-6). An examination of this map of cultural areas makes clear that the poorest rural regions are those of low human capital and urbanization. Village development index shows clearly significant breaks within historical regions if one considers the above-mentioned cultural areas (Figure 5-8).

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Dumitru Sandu

BUCURESTI

19

BUCURESTI

BANAT

BANAT

CRISANAMARAMURES

MM SM

9.4 6.8

AD BH

6.1 13.8

BV SB 12.2

CV HG

TRANSILVANIA

AB HD

8.9

CJ MS

7.2

BN SJ

4 5.7

DOBROGEA

DOBROGEA

GJ VL

OLTENIA

4.3

DJ MH OT

2.1

AG DB PH

10.1

G TL IL CL

MUNTENIA

3.5

BZ BR -3.7 -8.5

3.1

GL IS BT VS

Historical region

-10

0.9

BC NT SV VR

MOLDOVA

-5

Cultural area

0

5

10

15

20

Village development index LEVEL98

Figure 5-8. Average development of villages by historical region and cultural area within regions East Moldova has the lowest level of village development. The break between North Muntenia with Arges-Dambovita –Prahova judets and the rest of the region is sharp. Villages are much better developed in the North compared to South and East judets. Transylvania has very developed villages in its South (Brasov-Sibiu) and East (Covasna and Harghita) parts. The poorest villages of this region are in Bistrita-Nasaud and Salaj judets.

Development level of regions At the regional level the most appropriate unit for regional development measure is the county (judet).The same conception as in the case of village development allowed for the construction of an index of county development DEVJUD98. It has four dimensions – human capital, employment, material capital and demographic traditionalism. Developed judets have high values for human and material capital, for population employment and for demographic modernity. The opposite is true for poor judets. A set of 11 primary indicators is the basic input for computing the four dimension-indices and finally the DEVJUD index (Figure 5-9). All of them are provided by official statistics of National Commission of Statistics. Consequently is possible to update the index each year.

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Social Space of Transition Secondary indicators

0.30

-0.26

Human capital

Unemployment

Primary indicators

0.50

Persons that graduated at least high school out of total 12+ years old population , 1992

-0.31

Infant mortality rate

0.46

Letters sent from judets by inhabitant

0.52

Unemployment rate

-0.29

Participation rate as salaried persons to 1000 inhabitants

0.51

Rate of out-migration to other judets

0.29

Private cars to 1000 inhabitants

0.27

Living floor area per house

0.33

Telephone subscriptions to 1000 inhabitants

0.30

Percentage of houses having access to running water , 1992

+

General fertility rate (children born by women of 15-49 years old)

Judet development index 1998

0.32

-0.30

Material capital

Demographic traditionalism

Figure 5-9. Indicators for the assessment of judet (county) development If not otherwise specified, primary data indicators are computed for 1998, using NCS data. All the figures are factor score coefficients. A similar procedure as the one used for classifying commune development was tested for judets (counties) in order to simplify the computing algorithm by replacing z scores with UTIMAX and factor score aggregation with summation and averages. The correlation between the factor score index DEVJUD98 and its non-weighted version is of r=0.80. The correlation of factor score version with the degree of urbanization of judet is of r=0.73; the correlation between urbanization and the simple version of DEVJUD is of only 0.58. This is the main reason of the decision to adopt for public use the factor score version of DEVJUD.

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Development level, 1998

Satu Mare Maramures Bihor

Salaj Cluj

Arad Timis

BistritaNasaud

Suceava Iasi Neamt

Mures

Alba

5.2 to 20

Botosani

Harghita

Bacau

0 to 5.2 -6.1 to 0 -24 to –6.2

Vaslui

Covasna Galati Brasov Vrancea Caras Severin Arges Buzau Prahova Gorj Vilcea Braila Tulcea Dimbovita Mehedinti Ialomita Calarasi Dolj Olt Giurgiu Constanta Teleorman Hunedoara

Sibiu

Figure 5-10. Development level of judets (counties), 1998 DEVJUD98

150

very developed developed poor very poor

Development regions as projects Another type of regionalization that is more and more present in the public life and debate is related to the eight development regions ( Figure 5-11). They are pragmatic territorial units that have been designed by a group of Romanian and PHARE experts in 1996-1997 and accepted by Romanian Government as basis for the regional policy of the country (see Law 151/1998 of regional policy in Romania). Figure 5-11. Development and historical regions

(Bold lines indicate the approximate limits of historical regions and the shadows the groupings of judets of the same development region)

The development regions do not have and administrative status. They function as a kind of voluntary association of judets that are neighbours and have similar problems and complementary opportunities of development. Each one has a Council and an Agency of regional development, connected to National Agency of Regional Development. Regional Agencies for Development are new institutional structures that are still in search of their identity. Interest and policy groups at national and local level are in a process of contesting or supporting the new institutions of regional development. The ways the Regional Agencies of Development are designed contribute to a decentralization of the country in spite of the fact that the development regions are not administrative units. As a significant number of projects started to be accomplished on the basis of the new institutional structure, the development regions began to show up their practical function. One of the key advantages of these regions is that they contribute to fostering cooperation among neighboring judets that have similar or complementary problems/resources. A disadvantage of this territorial design is that its units are heterogeneous. The South region, for example, is one of the most heterogeneous one. This is why targeting community or regional poverty with the use of development regions is a serious mistake. Using development regions as analysis units is also a pit-fall. In search of simplification in regional statistics, NIS adopted, at the suggestion of EUROSTAT, development regions as statistical regions.

Dumitru Sandu

In Romania, the development regions as units of regional policy were defined by criteria of functionality and cooperation potential among groups of districts. There were attempts of defining some sub-regions of development, in the matter of sub-units, which could be relevant for development actions. The subregions could be groups of districts or localities in the same region, which are homogenous by characteristics or development problems. The Green Chart, who specifies the principles of regional development policy, mentions 14 subregions, two for each 7 of the 8 development regions (Guvernul României and

Comisia Europeană., 1997). The variations of the index for regional

development were the reason for limiting these subregions. This kind of index, built by the aggregation of 12 indexes, is strongly dependent on effects of compensation and the aggregation algorithm. Its functionality in substantiating specific regional development actions is quite low, especially because the great degree of aggregation that characterizes it. Specific regional programs, with specified aims, have to limit some subregions, function of indexes with a great precision, a lower degree of aggregation and a higher transparency where significance is concerned. Groups of territorial units –districts or localitiesthat are homogenous under the aspect of human capital, could form such subregions. Once they are limited out, these could offer a ground of orientation for different socio- economic problems. Poverty or richness in human capital has a high inertia in territorial profile. For this reason, identifying the way the human capital is regionalized could help identifying some development subregions, which are highly relevant and stabile during time. By this present chapter we begin an exploration oriented to satisfy such demands. Urbanization and rural development The relation between rural development and urbanization of the region is an important one for all the development programs. Rural life is far from being isolated of cities. Rural poverty is different if the villages are located close or far from cities. Dolj and Teleorman, for example are two judets from the South part of the country having similar values for rural development. Both of them are considered as having villages of poor development level. But it is very likely that village poverty is more severe in Teleorman than in Dolj due to the fact that urbanization degree is higher in the second than in the first judet. Urbanization degree is of 53% in Dolj, compared to 35% in Teleorman. Considering these aspects one can refine the classification of judets from the point of view of rural poverty by considering also the urbanization level. Table 5-8 captures the results of such a classification. The poorest conditions for rural life are in Vaslui, Botosani, Vrancea, Buzau and Teleorman. The villages of these judets have very low development indicators and are in an environment of low urbanization. Severe poverty close to large cities is specific for the villages of Iasi, Galati and Braila. The opposite case of developed villages in the context of low urbanization can be identified for the case of Suceava and Dambovita judets. The best situation seems to be for the developed villages in the environment of highly urbanized judets as Sibiu, Brasov, Hunedoara and Ilfov.

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Table 5-8. Counties function of village development and urbanization degree Average level of development of the villages in the county* Urbanisation degree of the county (judet) Low (under 45%)

Very poor

Poor

Developed

High developed

1** Vaslui Botosani

5 Valcea Olt

9 Suceava Gorj

13 Dambovita

Vrancea Buzau

Ialomita Calarasi Giurgiu

10 Maramures Mureş

14 Arad Covasna Harghita

Telorman Bistrita-Nasaud Salj Neamt Medium-low (46-55%)

Medium-high (56%-65%) High (over 65%)

2 Iasi Bacau Mehedinti Dolj 3 Galati 4 Braila

6 Tulcea Bihor Satu-Mare

Areges

7

11 Alba

8

12 Cluj Constanta

Prahova 15 Timis Caras-Severin 16 Sibiu Brasov Hunedoara Ilfov

*The index of village development is presented in Dumitru Sandu (coord), The villages of Romania: development, poverty and social capital. Updating targeting for RSDF, World Bank, Bucuresti, 1999. Judet measure is an average of the values for the villages from judet, weighted by village population. Village development index is a factor score of 17 indicators referring to human capital, quality of the housing, demographic potential and modernity, village isolation.** Score of rural development of the judet incorporating also information on the urban context of the rural life.

Regional stocks of human capital The key root of regional differentiation relies in the distribution of human capital. Disregarding the manners of defining it, the human capital, which is the first central interest in this frame, is mainly measured by the school education. The greater the education investments are, the higher the human capital is. The theoretical analyses, though, recognize the fact that the development of human capital is achieved not only by school education but also by professional training in employment and investments in health care (Becker, 1997). There is, however, a pressure the available data exert on the analytical efforts: the superior offer of human capital measurements by education is directly reflected in the prevalent orientation of the analyses which opperationalize the human capital mainly by school investments.

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Dumitru Sandu

No matter how it is measured, the human capital is a central variable not only in sectorial analyses on income, fertility or social mobility. The variable has an important explicative and pragmatic part in the regional analyses. For a society like the Romanian one in the 90’s, which is in the process of launching a regional policy, the understanding of unparity in human capital could be extremely helpful in directing the regional policy. The regional stocks of knowledge and abilities shall function as a main resource in regional development. A correct point-out of the educational unparity, of the causes and consequences could be relevant in building a regional policy. No matter where they start from and by what means they will act, the regional policies will have to consider the territorial configurations of human capital, the advantages and disadvantages resulting from the educational profile for different regional units, in order to achieve their major objective in reducing the unparity in development. The regional stock of knowledge and abilities, having direct or indirect consequences on income and productivity, can be directly measured, function of the available data, by values of education and population health. A measuring of the professional stock of knowledge at a regional level remains something we hope to achieve. All three components of human capital- the educational one, the professional one and the population health one- function in relation to the regional medium of communication.76 The more this medium is opened to the exterior of the region, the more the chances of augmenting the capital stocks are. The endowment of the population with TV-sets and telephones and the intensity of the communication by mail process can be relevant in order to characterize the regional way of communicating. On these premises, the regional human capital development index (HUMAN) is built (Table 5-9) by aggregating some indexes referring to the stock of knowledge, population health and the intensity of indirect communication phenomena (mass-media and post-office) The stock of knowledge is measured by of high school, faculty or post-high-school graduates ponder out of the total population in the reference district. The higher the values of medium level of education and communication mediated by infrastructure channels and the lower the values of infant mortality, the higher the human capital stock is in a district. The three variables used for measuring the regional human capital are empirically correlated,

due to the causal relationships among them and de to the fact they refer to the same

unobserved directly dimension (human capital)77 Table 5-9. Indexes of human regional capital HUMAN78 The form of human capital

Index used for measuring

Reference period 1991 index

educational capital

high-school, faculty or post-high school graduated ponder out of the total population over 12 EDUCAT

1992, census data

1995 index 1992, census data

sanitary capital

infant mortality rate INFANT79

1989-1991

1993-1995

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Social Space of Transition

communication medium

factorial score with TV subscription indexes, subscriptions for phone-sets, letters posted out of the district. (All indexes are relativised by reporting them to 1000 inhabitants) COMUNIC

1991

1995

The education distribution throughout the territory is essential for the regional configuration of the whole human capital. The education chart and the human capital one (Figure 5-13, Figure 5-15) overlap to a great extent. The education stock is minimum in exactly the same areas the human capital in general has the lowest values: in the East, in Vaslui and Botosani and in the South, in Teleorman subregionGiurgiu, Ialomita and Calarasi. Subcarphatic Moldavia is also characterized by a reduced education stock, below the country media. This poverty in educational resources is continued in the north, in Transylvania- Bistrita-Nasaud and Salaj districts- and in the South- Buzau district.

Figure 5-12. Education capital at county level, 1992

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Dumitru Sandu

Figure 5-13. Human capital at county level. 1995 Poor districts under the educational aspect are mainly placed in plain areas and have a reduced degree of urbanization.80 Human capital has a maximum value in Timis, Arad, Brasov, Cluj and Sibiu districts (Table 5-11). Out of the five districts mentioned, only Timis, Cluj and Brasov have, at the same time, maximum education capital. The extreme values of maximum and minimum human capital are axially distributed, on territories, which are mainly contiguous. The major development axis of human capital is medially placed, on the lone of Timis, Hunedoara, Sibiu and Brasov districts. This axis has a consistent extension in Muntenia through Arges, Prahova and Bucharest districts ( Figure 5-12). In the North and South there are two other ribbons of territories with above the medium human capital. The Transylvania ribbon is made up of Alba, Mureş, Harghita and Covasna districts. The southern ribbon is made up of Caras-Severin, Gorj, Valcea and Dambovita districts. Cluj appears to be the only island of human capital strongly developed. Around it there are districts with inferior values of the index used for measuring the human capital. Before the social restructuration produced by the communist period by industrialization, agricultural cooperativisation and urbanization, the historical regions were still an important matrix for regional differences in human capital (Golopenţia, A. and Georgescu, D.C.,1948). After that, as a consequence of the mentioned processes and of the extension of the area covered by mass education, the historical regions’ borders become less important in the human capital regionalization. Powerfully

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Social Space of Transition

structured nuclei, like Brasov-Sibiu, maintain though a high level of human capital concentration over long periods of time. Table 5-10 presents the values of human capital for districts and development macroregions. The West region is the most homogenous one and the South region is the most heterogeneous.81 The problem-areas under the human capital perspective are not only limited to Botosani-Vaslui in the East and Calarasi-Ialomita-Giurgiu-Teleorman in the South. These are the most obvious, with the maximum deficit. A bad situation is recorded, though, also in Neamt, Suceava, Vrancea, Olt and Mehedinti districts. On the whole, the regional human capital is almost consistent: its educational, professional and sanitary components tend to have similar values at level of the same district. The problem of human capital consistency is mainly discussed related to its educational and sanitary components. Brasov, Sibiu and Cluj are districts where both the education stock and population health have high positive values. In consequence, their human capital is characterized by a high consistency. The consistency is high also at the other extreme of the low-human-capital-stock districts. Giurgiu, for example has the lowest education capital throughout the country and an extremely high value of infant mortality, signalling a low level of sanitary capital. The picture of regional rural capital is to a large degree similar to the picture of county human capital (compare Figure 5-13 and Figure 5-14).

Figure 5-14. Average level of village human capital by counties Human capital of the village is measured by education stock, employment and agricultural employment of the population. Bold lines indicate the approximate limits of historical regions (that are not administrative units) and thin lines are limits of judets as regional administrative units.

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Dumitru Sandu

35

16

30

14

M a

12

Education capital

25

t e

10 20

r i

80

a l

15 60 10

40

mat erial capit al

5 0

20 Gi ur gi u

B ot o s a

C al ar a si

Ia lo m it

T el e or m a

Bi N V st e a ri a sl ta m ui N a

S u c e a

Vr a n c e

B Ol B u t a c za a u

S T B D al ul r a a aj c i l m b e o vi

S A at r a u d M ar e

C ar a sS e v er

C o v a s

G al at i

H ar g hi ta

M ar a m ur e

M Bi M V Al D G I a e h ur al b ol or si h or e c a j j e s e di

Pr A a rg h e o v

H Si C T i u bi o m n u n is e st d a o nt

B Cl r a uj s o

0

Figure 5-15Education capital and material capital for counties The education capital is measured by the high school, faculty and post-high-school graduates ponder out of the total population over 12 years old, in the 1992 census. The number of automobiles estimates the material capital for 1000 inhabitants in 1994.

The maximum inconsistency situation characterizes Constanta, Iasi and Hunedoara districts, which have an education capital more developed than the sanitary one.

Constanta, for

example, has a 39 range on the education stock scale and only a 2 range on the population health scale. It is a question why, in these cases, health range isn’t similar to education range. The ability of a district of producing or attracting education capital is translated, among others, in the households’ material capital level: the higher the education stock in a district, the higher the automobile number per 1000 inhabitants (Figure 5-15). This link continues to be signifying even if we control or cast out the effect of other variables like urbanization range, medium age per district, historical region, by statistical procedures. The mechanisms that make such a link work at social level are still to be analyzed. It is of course a problem of cumulative effects of life style, the manner of achieving the development of the private sector, the correlation between the distribution of the rare resources in society and education, a.s.o. For now, the fact itself deserves to be mentioned as a relevant one. The deviation cases from the association tendency between the educational capital and material capital are also to be mentioned. Iasi district is typical for the cases of districts that have a material capital much below the one expected in relation to district’s education stock level. But in Mureş district, the automobile endowment of population is much over the expected level in relation to the same education stock. The two extremes indicate the fact that the territorial units have a different ability to convert the education capital into a material capital. It’s possible that the different rhythms and

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Social Space of Transition

performances in the development of the private sector are one of the most important factors in explaining the regional ability differences in converting the educational capital in material capital. Table 5-10. Human capital per county Districts per development regions and subregions

NORTH EAST

SOUTH EAST

SOUTH

SOUTH WEST

Botoşani Vaslui Iaşi Suceava Neamţ Bacau Galaţi Brăila Constanţa Tulcea Vrancea Buzău Dâmboviţa Arges Prahova Ialomiţa Giurgiu Călăraşi Teleorman Olt Mehedinti

Dolj WEST

NORTH WEST

CENTRE

Gorj Vâlcea Arad Timiş CaraşSeverin Hunedoara Bihor Cluj BistriţaNăsăud Salaj Satu Mare Maramureş Sibiu Braşov Harghita Alba Covasna Mureş

HUMAN capital 1995

HUMAN capital 1991

-189 -125 3 -69 -71 -43 -37 15 65 -46 -77 -21 -42 56 77 -164 -186 -132 -114 -84 -11 40 -3 26 81 159 -21

High school, faculty, post-high school graduates ponder EDUCAT 1992 17 18 26 19 19 21 23 22 29 21 19 20 22 27 26 17 15 17 18 20 23 26 26 24 23 29 23

Medium development index of COMUNICatio n 1995 -137 -118 14 -115 -43 -5 -43 58 225 -46 -59 -18 -93 -23 76 -25 -90 -95 -94 -143 -77 3 -104 -89 142 183 -9

-183 -136 -16 -99 -79 -61 -16 42 100 -59 -77 -17 -32 66 66 -134 -163 -146 -118 -90 -60 37 7 26 106 157 16

32 26 31 24 26 27 24 20 30 26 24 18 20 17 24 33 29 28 26 24 29 25 23 16 15 22 20

57 27 229 -34

80 68 211 -74

28 24 32 19

57 68 208 -38

27 25 15 21

-31 -9 -7 187 223 37 45 50 90

-25 17 -4 219 209 40 49 24 102

21 22 23 28 32 23 25 23 24

-12 10 -51 203 184 0 -23 32 87

18 23 20 16 17 17 17 19 17

INFANT mortality rate 1993-1995

HUMAN 95 is calculated as a factorial score from EDUCAT, COMUNIC and INFANT. COMUNIC is the factorial score determined by the TV subscriptions, TV-sets subscriptions and mailed mail (values in relation to 1000 inhabitants). The factorial scores have been multiplied by 100. The higher their absolute value, the more the reference

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Dumitru Sandu

districts divert from the national media. The negative values indicate deviations below the medium and the positive onesdeviations over the medium.

The more a district attracts migrants from across its borders and the more it has specialists in education and health areas, the more developed its human capital. (Figure 5-16)

FAVOURISING FACTORS

UNFAVOURISING FACTORS

occupying in edcation and health The higher the absolute value of a coeficient corresponding to a factor, the higher its influence on district's human capital. The (-) sign of the coeficient indicates a reversed relation of porportionallity between the factor and the capitall -0.44

-0.5

immigration from another d

age of urbanisation

0.42

0.39

0.30

district placed in M ld -0.4

-0.3

-0.2

-0.1

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

negative (-)or positive (+) influence on human capirtal (beta coeficients)

Figure 5-16. Factors in favorising / unfavorising the human capital development at district level82 A higher number of occupied persons in these areas signify a higher investment for sanitary and education capital achievement and a better infrastructure for education and health at the same time. A district’s migratory attraction or rejection is important in determining its ability to maintain or develop the human capital. Mainly, it is to be expected that high level regional human capital situations exist, on the ground of some mechanisms of internal, intradistrict production, of attraction from the exterior, from other districts, attraction of high level values of education, sanitary and professional capital. Cluj, for example, represents a category of districts able to endogenously develop high stocks of human capital: its educational-sanitary infrastructure is among the best ones in the country while its migratory attraction is relatively reduced. Mureş, Prahova and Arges districts have their place in the same series. The mainly exogenous development of human capital seems to be specific for Brasov, Timis, Hunedoara and Constanta districts. Relatively higher levels of immigration than the ones for the sanitary-educational infrastructure characterize these. Not only is the sanitary and educational infrastructure development important for the investments in human capital, but also the migratory attraction. The arrival of an important number of persons in a district mainly implies that they are provided with a supplementary number of jobs and dwelling spaces. In other words, the immigration is reducible to a series of investments in jobs and dwellings. In the centralized system of socialist economy, such investments were a state characteristic. Ever since after 1998, as the market economy developed, they have been transferred in the private area.

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In this context, intense immigration districts are favourable media to investments, and therefore, favourable to human capital development. Leaving aside the migratory attraction and the health and education infrastructure, the age of urbanization for a district acts as a specific factor in favouring the human capital development. The more time the population of the reference territory has been exposed to the urbanization effects, the higher the probability that its human capital stock be more developed. In the model used in the analysis in Figure 5-16, the age of urbanization was estimated by the urban population ponder that the district had in 1930. The urban human capital is clearly superior to the rural one, under the aspect of education, population health and the general stock of information broadcasted by mass-media channels or sent by mail or telephone system. The difference among historical regions is mainly the rural human capital: the districts outside the Carpathian arch, from Moldova and Muntenia, Dobrogea and Oltenia, differ from the ones inside the Carpathian arch-Transylvania, Banat, Cressona, Maramures- especially at rural level. The human capital stock is higher in the first mentioned areas than in the latter. Going beyond the super aggregated image given by whole-district data, there is recorded a series of surprises. Constanta, for example, has a very good situation if evaluated as a whole district (the 35 range on a scale from minimum to maximum human capital). The villages in Constanta have though a very poor situation under the human capital stock point of view, of a level close to the one in Botosani and poorer than the situation for the villages in Tulcea or the ones in Calarasi or Ialomita. Community development as action Community cohesion and action Community and regional development as stocks of capital are rather stable. Transition to market and democracy processes change their distribution in a slowly way. Actions of community and regional development are only one of the mechanisms for this change. Understanding their regularities is of theoretical and practical high significance. Did community participation started to work as an effective mechanism of community change? What are the prerequisites of community participation? Are social entrepreneurs and community participation entirely new phenomena in the context of postcommunist transition? What is the role of social capital in community development actions? That is the family of questions that I address in this last part of the chapter. First of all is useful to make clear some of the theoretical tools that are relevant for the discussion. Examples are mainly from the area of rural community development. Local development takes place by participatory and non-participatory forms of action. Both of them could be efficient in different forms and in different local contexts.

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Community and regional development interlink in very numerous ways to bring rural development. Different ideologies of locale development move between full participatory development and nonparticipatory development guided by non-local institutions (Figure 5-17). Local developm ent

institutional actions without participation

local institutions

consumption activities

income geratinhg activities

individual actions of local development functions

in crisisis situations

in informal institutions

as sponrtaneous colective action

in NGOs

in local government

by projects

non-participatory

non-local institutions

participatory

Figure 5-17. Participatory development within the structure of local development Local development by participation is not only a development phenomenon but also a possible perspective on the more general phenomenon of community cohesion. Participating in local development processes is part of that cohesion phenomenon. Community cohesion is the degree of consistency in the multiple relations among values, norms, institutions and role playing of community actors for meeting the needs of community viability, of its capacity of reproducing its stocks of human, social and material capital. Community actors could be considered from the point of view of cultural or social cohesion. The approach of cultural cohesion is interested in the presence of values of trust, tolerance and cooperation in the mentality of the local population and in the degree of communication among the key community institutions (churches, schools, town hall, health units, and production firms). The social cohesion perspective underlines on social relations, networks and community participation

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Cultural cohesion perspective

Values and norms of trust tolerance cooperation

Communication among institutions for education, religion, administration, health,work

Social actors

Groups

Formal and informal leaders

Non-leader community members

Social cohesion perspective

Social relations of cooperation, conflict

Community participation

Networks

Figure 5-18. Actors and structures involved in community cohesion phenomena Community cohesion is important not per se but in relation with community viability. A community could be considered as viable to the degree it has a proper functioning of the mechanisms to generate local development The level of development for a given community is a proxy for its viability. One cannot imagine on long or medium term a community that is highly developed but has mechanisms of low viability. Or, vice versa, a highly viable community cannot have a low level of development. By dichotomizing and crossing the two variables one can get a typology of communities:

A. COMMUNITIES OF HIGH COHESION AND HIGH VIABILITY

B. COMMUNITIES OF HIGH COHESION AND LOW VIABILITY

C. COMMUNITIES OF LOW COHESION AND HIGH VIABILITY

D. COMMUNITIES OF LOW COHESION AND LOW VIABILITY

Community cohesion is not a continuous phenomenon in time. It is more a potential for cohesion that is manifest by events of community participation, in situations of community representation or crisis. Some phenomena as distrust that are relevant for low cohesion of the community are not necessarily bad or dysfunctional. They can contribute in some circumstances to community development or viability. Especially in transition societies of high instability, distrust could be associated with entrepreneurial behaviour. Being cautious in relations with the others is a legitimate strategy in an unstable environment where market institutional arrangements are emerging.

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Traditional communities are of type B, with high cohesion but low viability. Modern communities tend to be of type A or C. Rural communities of present time Romania are very likely more of the type C if located near urban centres and of type B or C if located far from large cities. A profile of rural community development actions in the country could be designed by reference to the perceived needs in the villages, trust phenomena towards local institutions and authorities as precondition of community action and concrete forms of community participation. This is what the chapter will do in continuation.

Perceived needs Jobs and roads are the most critical aspects of the rural life in the view of the villagers (Figure 5-19). Next in importance in their views are problems related to public services of health, education, public transportation and cleaning up. The dissatisfaction with the roads is easy to understand if one considers the fact that about 40% of the rural households have clay roads in front of their house. The situation is bad especially in peripheral villages that are located far from cities (Table 5-11) It is very likely that running water perceived needs are also very high due to the fact that about three quarters of rural households do not have running water from private or public sources . Table 5-11. Housing characteristics by distance between village to the nearest city % Characteristic House is connected to running water system

House connected to gas system House is connected to sewage system

Bathroom in the house The house has the roof or walls in a very bad shape

State

Total

Distance to the nearest city 0- 6 km 7-14 km Yes, in individual system 1,3 11,2

15+ km 12,1

11,1

Yes, in public system No Yes

41,9 56,9 41.6

10,7 78,1 8.8

11,4 76,5 12.3

13,7 75,2 14.1

No 58,4 Yes, in individual system 10,2

91,2 6,8

87,7 4,4

86,0 5,3

Yes, in public system No No Yes Yes

15,1 74,7 67,7 32,3 7,5

4,8 88,4 84,9 15,1 10,3

3,6 92,0 82,9 17,1 12,4

4,7 90,0 82,1 17,9 11,6

92,5 10,8

89,7 26,1

87,6 30,5

88,4 28,2

89,2 22,6 24,8 52,6 5,2

73,9 38,1 45,7 16,2 4,9

69,5 41,3 36,5 22,2 4,1

71,8 39,2 37,3 23,5 4,4

No The furniture in the house Yes is very poor No The road in front of the clay house is made of stone asphalt How satisfied are you with very unsatisfied

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Characteristic

State

Total Distance to the nearest city 0- 6 km 7-14 km 15+ km your house unsatisfied 17,2 19,9 26,1 24,2 satisfied 57,9 62,8 58,7 59,4 very satisfied 19,6 12,4 11,1 12,1 Data source: Public Opinion Barometer of OSF, May, 2000. Representative random sample at national level. Rural subsample N=812. As the sample was designed to be representative at population level, we weighted the data to reach a representative sample at household level. Percentages are computed for each variable by column.

Roads, cleaning up, schools, health or job problems should be solved mainly, in villager’s view, by mayor house (Table 5-12).

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

% considering that the aspect is problematic for their 36 35 38 43 58 61

30

29

% considering that the aspect is not problematic for 64 67 53

33

59

57

60

39

6

3

4

jobs

roads

health units

7 3 Noncleaning schools up

5

6

public housing transp.

4 public order

Aspects of rural com m unity life

Figure 5-19.Problematic aspects of village life in the perception of villagers

Data source: Public Opinion Barometer of Open Society Foundation OSF, data collected in October 1998 by METROMEDIA TRANSILVANIA. Figures resulted as answers to the question „Do you think that at the level of your locality are there or not problems related to jobs?”. The same question was formulated for roads, health units, cleaning up, schools, public transportation, housing and public order. All the survey of OSF worked with random samples that are representative at the national level. Rural sub- sample for the reported survey was of 533 adult persons. There are also some other local problems as running water that were not included into the pre-established list.

It is especially for roads and cleaning up problems that the view is adopted. The role of the locality inhabitants does not seem to be perceived as very important. Even for activities, like cleaning up of public space, where the role of the community participation should be important, the dominant actor in local perceptions is assigned to mayor house. Government is the second actor the villagers mention as important for solving their community problems. It is only for health and school problems that the role of government and mayor house are perceived as rather equally important.

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The central authority as key solving actor is labelled in different ways by villagers as “government”, or “ state” or “president”. Table 5-12. Who should solve village problems: “qualified evaluators”* % Should be solved by.. mayor house local council judet council

Problems related to: roads cleaning up 70,8 77,3 2,7 2,1 1,0 0,5

schools 36,9 1,6 1,1

health units 38,6 2,8 0,9

jobs 32,1 2,1 1,4

government president state

10,8 1,0 1,7

2,6 0 0,5

33,7 2,1 4,3

35,3 2,3 6,0

25,2 2,8 13,8

people other

0,3 6,1

9,3 1,5

0,5 11,8

0,5 7,4

4,5 11,0

DK/ NA

5,1 6,2 8,0 5,6 7,2 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 Data source: Public Opinion Barometer of Open Society Foundation OSF, October 1998, rural sub-sample. * Persons considering that there is such a problem in their locality. They are “qualified evaluators” by the special focus on the problem. The list of institutions that could solve the problem was not pre-established.

Table 5-13. Who should solve village problems: “non-qualified evaluators” Should be solved by Problems related to: roads cleaning up mayor house 12,5 42,9 local council 0,0 0,0 judet council 12,5 0,0

schools 30,0 0,0 0,0

health units 9,1 0,0 0,0

jobs 0,0 0,0 0,0

government president state

12,5 0,0 0,0

14,3 0,0 0,0

10,0 0,0 0,0

9,1 0,0 9,1

16,7 0,0 0,0

people other

0,0 12,5

0,0 0,0

10,0 0,0

9,1 9,1

0,0 0,0

DK/ NA

50,0 42,9 50,0 54,5 83,3 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 Data source: Public Opinion Barometer of Open Society Foundation OSF, October 1998, rural sub-sample. * Persons considering that there is not such a problem in their locality. They are “non-qualified evaluators” by the low focus on the problem. The list of institutions that could solve the problem was not pre-established.

Trust as cement among leaders, institutions and people

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Local government institutions and CBOs are, in principle, very important actors of local development. They succeed to be importance in practice to the degree local population trusts them. Understanding the configuration of trust in local leaders and institutions is equivalent to understanding a basic precondition of local development. Trust in local institutions and their representatives give the cement for community participation. This is the reason we focus on the configuration of trust in institutions for local population in this sub-chapter. Trust in local government is much higher than trust in central government but lower than trust in church (Table 5-14). Church is the most trusted local institutions in the villages. Priests or pastors have lower level of trust than the church. The same regularity is valid for mayor compared to mayor houses. Systematically the mayors get lower trust than city halls. Police, another local institution with trust is a rather controversial institution with half of the villagers trusting it and the other half manifesting distrust. Confidence in central and local government follows in time electoral patterns. The lowest levels of trust are before the elections and the highest ones after the elections. At the individual level, for specific communes one can get a good indicator of the quality of the local mayor if he or she succeeds to be reelected. A re-elected mayor is, generally, a sign that there is durable trust relationship between people and the local mayor.

Oct. 02

June 02

Nov 01

May 01

Nov.00

May 00

Oct 99

May 99

Nov.98

June 98

Sept 97

March 97

Table 5-14. Level of trust in key institutions in rural communities , 1997-2002 ( %)

Trust in 43.2 41.0 27.5 30.5 26.5 13.4 14.1 12.5 47.7 52.0 47.3 41.2 Government * Trust in mayor 57.2 46.1 38.4 Trust in mayor 48.3 57.4 49.1 53.4 59.2 46.5 41.7 house Trust in police 57 51.7 47.9 52.8 56.3 41.6 50.7 49.0 52.8 46.9 60.2 52.2 Trust in priest/ 80.4 76.8 77.1 pastor Trust in 88.5 92.1 88.8 90.9 91.7 88.5 92.3 88.0 93.4 91.0 93.9 92.4 church Data source: Public Opinion Barometer of OSF, 1997 -2002, representative random samples at national level, rural subsamples. Figures are percentages of people trusting very much or much the reference institution or actor. Percentages are computed out of total rural subsample. * Post 2000 elections period.

At the individual level, trust in local and central government are related in a positive way (Table 5-16 ). Mayor house and mayor are perceived not only by their activities but also from the point of view of central government performance.

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The local perception on mayor has as principal influencing factor the degree of information on mayor house activities. The higher the stock of information on what the institution is doing, the higher its positive perception. The second factor as importance for trust in local mayor is trust in government (Table 5-15). From the status point of view what mostly counts are age and wealth. Old and poor people are more inclined to trust rural mayors. Mayor house is also perceived from the point of view of safety environment – the stronger the feelings that the village streets are safety, the higher the confidence into the mayor. This type of trust is also a matter of civic competence: the persons that feel more able to influence local government activities are also persons of higher confidence regarding the local mayor. The findings suggest that improving the relation between mayor and citizens is possible not only by higher levels of activity of the institution-serving people but also by increasing the visibility of its actions. Some of the actions promoted by the mayor house are more visible than the others. Investing in schools and health units is less visible than building infrastructure. This is one of the reasons the time budget and activities of the mayors could be oriented more towards more visible activities. Table 5-15. Predictors of trust in mayors from rural communities Predictors B Std. Error Beta Sig Constant 2,63 0,32 0,00 Age 0,01 0,00 0,14 0,00 Man (1 yes, 0 no) -0,14 0,07 -0,07 0,06 Education 0,02 0,02 0,05 0,31 Modern endowment of household1 -0,10 0,05 -0,08 0,05 Distance to the nearest city of more than 30 thou. inhabitants 0,00 0,00 -0,10 0,01 Location in peripheral village -0,11 0,07 -0,06 0,13 (1 yes, 0 no) Religious orientation2 -0,03 0,03 -0,03 0,42 Mass-media consumption3 -0,03 0,04 -0,03 0,53 Informed on the mayor house activity 0,28 0,04 0,25 0,00 Feels safe on the streets -0,15 0,04 -0,13 0,00 Civic competence 0,12 0,05 0,10 0,01 Trust in other people 0,03 0,08 0,01 0,74 Trust in government 0,25 0,05 0,19 0,00 0.20 R2 Data source: Public Opinion Barometer of OSF, May, 2000. Representative random sample at national level. Rural subsample N=624. 1 Index of modern endowment in the household constructed by counting the presence of colour TV, freezer or automatic washing machine. The maximum value of the index is 3 and the minimum one 0. 2 Counting index of religiosity given by the number of positive beliefs in life after death, heaven or doomsday. Range of values between 0 and 3. 3. Factor score of the three four points scales referring to reading newspapers, watching TV and listening to the radio.

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The patterns of trust are highly differentiated function of the reference institution or actor. Trust in institutional actors like mayors, and priests are more personalized than trust in institutions. Old persons are more trustful in mayors and priests but their attitude towards mayoralty and church is not structured function of age. Education does not differentiate significantly among different categories of villagers in terms of trust in institutions. One exception is the reference to church. Less educated people are more inclined to trust church. The images the institutions have are to a significant degree function of the perception of their representatives. If the image on mayor is good there is a high probability of trusting also the mayor house. Similarly, a positive image on priest/pastor is easily converted into a similar one on church. At countryside, the It seems that in isolated villages that are far from cities, the local controversies on mayors and priests are higher than in near to city villages. Closed communities are more inclined to develop negative evaluations on these two types of community actors. The reasons are not very clear. Table 5-16. Predictors of trust in key institutions and actors of rural communities Dependent variables in the regression model (Each column presents in a simplified way a multiple regression model) Predictors Trust in mayor Trust in mayor Trust in Trust in Trust in church house police priest 0 Age + 0 + 0 0 Man (1 yes, 0 no) 0 0 0 0 Education 0 0 0 0 Modern endowment of household 0 0 0 Distance to the nearest city of more 0 0 + than 30 thou. inhabitants Location in peripheral village 0 (1 yes, 0 no) 0 0 0 0 + Religious orientation2 0 0 + + 0 Mass-media consumption3 0 0 0 0 Informed on the mayor house * activity + + * * + Feels safe on the streets + 0 * * 0 Civic competence + 0 * * 0 Trust in other people 0 0 0 0 + Trust in government + + * * * Trust in mayor * + * * * Trust in priest * * * + 0.14 R2 0.20 0.54 0.09 0.24 Data source: Public Opinion Barometer of OSF, May, 2000. Representative random sample at national level. Rural subsample N=812. + significant positive regression coefficients; - significant negative regression coefficients; 0 coefficients that are not significantly different from 0 at p=0.05. * predictor not included into equation. 1 Index of modern endowment in the household constructed by counting the presence of colour TV, freezer or automatic washing machine. The maximum value of the index is 3 and the minimum one 0.

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2 Counting index of religiosity given by the number of positive beliefs in life after death, heaven or doomsday. Range of values between 0 and 3. 3. Factor score of the three four points scales referring to reading newspapers, watching TV and listening to the radio.

Community participation A survey in 14 villages of Romania carried out for two different projects of World Bank in 1999 allows for a first identification of the factors influencing rural community participation. Attending mayor houses activities – from meetings to direct work participation, is directly related to location and trust variables. The total participation rate in the 14 villages included into the survey was of about 40%. The rate is considerably higher for the persons trusting the mayor of their commune and living in central villages (Table 5-17). The opposite situation of low trust and peripheral location of the reference village contribute to a very low participation. Table 5-17. Attending mayor house activities by location and trust variables Attend mayor house meeting or activities Total Type of village no yes % N No peripheral 71,7 28,3 100 120 No central 63,8 36,2 100 138 Yes peripheral 62,2 37,8 100 156 Yes central 45,5 54,5 100 198 59,0 41,0 100 612 Data sources: WB social assessment study in Saxon villages for cultural heritage project (coord. of second phase Manuela Stanculescu) and PREM grant on social capital (coord. Dumitru Sandu), 1999. Each village subsample mounted at more than 30 randomly selected persons. Number of cases N=590. The sample was selected from 6 Transylvanian villages and 8 Muntenia villages. Trust in mayor

It is normal recording a positive direct relationship between mayor house activities and the degree of trust into the mayor. Democratic participation is a matter of voluntary involvement and trusting the mayor is a basis of consent for participation. Why does it count also the village type? Participation to mayor house activities is higher in central than in peripheral villages. The finding is striking. On the one hand mayor house participation is higher for traditional people of high religiosity and trust social capital (Table 5-18). On the other hand, traditional orientations are higher in peripheral than in central villages. In these conditions would be normal having higher public participation in peripheral than in central villages. In fact the reverse is true. The fact could be explained in relation with the tendency of favouring central villages by mayor house actions. As the content of the activities organized by mayor houses is oriented in such a way is normal having lower participation of the population from peripheral villages. They are simply less affected by the results of the works promoted by mayor houses. Obviously, this is not the case all the time. There are also a lot of activities that are good for the whole commune or for peripheral villages. The above-mentioned tendency is only

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a statistical trend recorded at the level of the 14 villages included into the survey. It is very likely that the trend is valid for the whole countryside. Attending mayor house activities are determined by far more factors than trust in mayor, village centrality and traditional orientation of the population. There are many other individual and household determinants of the phenomenon (Table 5-18). At the household level counts wealth, education stock and medium age of adults. Institutional community participation to mayor house activities is higher for richer households of high education stock and younger adults. Involvement of household members in entrepreneurial activities is also significant for mayor house activities participation. If someone in the family failed with a private business, the participation is lower. The finding could be explained by reference to the linkage between entrepreneurial activities at village level and the mayor house. The local government is a kind of interface between local and nonlocal world of bureaucracies. The mayor house counts for the entrepreneur from the point of view of taxes and other legal regulations. There could be also linkages of interest among mayor house officials and local entrepreneurs. Failure of private business could be put, in a right or wrong way, in relation with the functioning of the mayor house. This is, very likely, why one records a low participation rate for the households that failed with a private business. The finding of the positive relation between mayor house activities participation and the fact of having somebody in the family that was professional leader before 1989 support the initial hypothesis of community participation as related to local networks of interests. Participation to mayor house activities seems to be higher for families of higher network capital associated with leadership experience. Local participation to development actions is dependent to a large degree not only of resources and institutional arrangements but also of perception of the villagers on what are their problems and who should contribute to meeting them. Even if these views are very different from one community to another, a global view for all the villagers could be useful as to give an idea of what are the perceptions of beneficiaries on the necessary actions and the best actors to solve the problems. This is exactly the purpose of the next sub-chapter. Table 5-18.Predictors of community participation Predictors

Central village in commune

Dependent variables “Do you , usually….. attend mayor attend church pay in attend house organized time taxes wedding or activities?” activities?” at mayor christening 1 yes, 0 no house ?” parties?” 1 yes, 0 no 1 yes, 0 no 1 yes, 0 no + 0 0 0

171

“Do you think that it is only mayor house that should take care of locality?” 1 yes, 0 no 0

Dumitru Sandu

Predictors

Dependent variables “Do you , usually….. attend mayor attend church pay in attend house organized time taxes wedding or activities?” activities?” at mayor christening 1 yes, 0 no house ?” parties?” 1 yes, 0 no 1 yes, 0 no 1 yes, 0 no

“Do you think that it is only mayor house that should take care of locality?” 1 yes, 0 no

(1 yes, 0 no) Man (1 yes, 0 no) + 0 + 0 0 Modern endowment of + 0 0 + household Average age of adults in hhd 0 0 0 0 Age of the interviewed 0 0 0 0 Education stock in hhd + 0 + 0 Education of interviewed 0 0 + 0 Frequency of reading + 0 0 + 0 newspapers Sells agricultural products + 0 0 + Somebody in the family failed with a private business 0 0 0 0 before (1 yes, 0 no) Somebody in the family was + 0 0 0 0 professional leader before 1989 Trust in other people (1 yes, 0 no) + + 0 + + Trust in mayor (1 yes, 0 no) + * 0 * * Trust in priest (1 yes, 0 no) * 0 * * * Intensity of religious attitude 0 + 0 Intensity of religious practice + + + 0 0 Data sources: WB social assessment study in Saxon villages for cultural heritage project (coord. of second phase Manuela Stanculescu) and PREM grant on social capital (coord. Dumitru Sandu), 1999. Each village subsample mounted at more than 30 randomly selected persons. Number of cases N=590. The sample is selected from 6 Transylvanian villages and 8 Muntenia villages. 0 non-significant Exp (B) for p=0.05 + greater than one, significant Exp (B) for p=0.05 (significant positive relation) - smaller than one, significant Exp (B) for p=0.05 (significant negative relation) * predictor not included into equation

Participatory development projects in rural communities A very special form of community participation is that involving participatory development projects (PDP). Local institutions, community based organizations CBOs , social entrepreneurs and villagers are the key actors in such projects. The great shift in local development after 1989 is the emergence of PDP as solutions to local problems. Voluntary association of villagers under the leadership of social entrepreneurs (Box 5-1) was a rather rare phenomenon under the communist regime but was present. Community studies from 1970s revealed that in some communities, traditional neighbourhood organized as to accomplish complicated works of public water management for household needs (Sandu, 1977). But the phenomena of PDP got entirely new dimensions after 1989. The possibility of 172

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getting funds for local publics works beyond the government channels, though the medium of foundations or international institutions acted as powerful stimulus to self-organizing communities. Even state money started to be distributed for community poverty alleviation by grants mechanisms. This is the case with the Romanian Social Development Fund RSDF, a World Bank inspired institution. The newly established institution of RSDF (since 1998) proved to be a very appropriate mechanism for mobilizing local energies to cope with community poverty. Its action is associated with that of some NGOs or even local institutions directed by democratic leaders favourable to participatory development. It is true that their number and efficiency for community are very different from commune to commune, from village to village or from region to region. What is remarkable in the functioning of RSDF (Box 5-2) is the fact that it tries to combine community poverty alleviation with building community social capital on the basis of a scientific diagnosis of community poverty. It was for that institutions that the whole set of poverty maps presented in this book, at village, commune and county level, have been elaborated. Even the concept of community poverty was defined and promoted in the Romanian literature as starting from the needs of RSDF 83. Box 5-1.Initiators of community development projects as social entrepreneurs Leaders of participatory development projects (PDP) are, frequently, social entrepreneurs. They take risks of personal and group nature in order to reach a public good. “The dictionary defines an entrepreneur as an individual "who organizes, manages and assumes the risks of a business enterprise." It is generally understood that this individual operates in the for-profit world, undertaking these activities for personal benefit. A social entrepreneur engages in these same tasks, but in the nonprofit arena and for an entirely different reason -- to benefit the members of a target audience and society in general. There are many similarities between successful entrepreneurs in the for-profit and nonprofit sectors. Both start with ideas and envision possibilities. Both are faced with the daunting challenges of creating demand, acquiring resources and operational zing concepts. Both are action-oriented and focus on profitability. But there are some striking differences, as well (Thalhuber): For-profit entrepreneurs

Social entrepreneurs

Strength is in personal skills, knowledge and energy

Strength is in collective wisdom and experience of the organization and its key stakeholders

Focus on short-term financial gain

Focus on building long-term capacity of the organization

No limit on type or scope of ideas

Ideas based on organization's mission and core competencies

Profit is an end

Profit is a means

Profit pocketed and/or distributed to shareholders

Profit plowed back into organization in order to serve more people and/or achieve greater results

Risk personal and/or investor assets

Risk organizational assets, image and public trust

Be in charge of their own destiny rather

Enable organization to be in charge of its own

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Dumitru Sandu

than dependent on an employer

destiny rather than being dependent on funders' priorities”

Box 5-2. A case of participatory development project It the South part of the country, in Teleorman county there is small village called Socetu, located in Stejaru commune. The long standing tradition there was to have local development project only in conjunction with local authorities, the mayor house especially. In the case of bakery project that started in Socetu village in 2000, the situation was entirely new – a young family of former local traders was able to organize “a productive group” and to get a grant of about 14 thou. $ From RSDF for a kind of family business . A whole community debate that we will come back later was developed. Putting for the moment the local folklore on the project into parenthesis same basic facts could be mentioned: The initiators are, as in many other innovation processes, more or less “border people”. They are not marginal but at the border between different worlds: between the village and the city as former commuters to Rosiori de Vede or Bucuresti cities; between the production and consumption worlds as former traders at one of the shops in the village; between low and high educated people as husband, wife and their daughter graduated vocational or high schools. The great advantage for the innovation process is not only of mentality, of openness of mind but also from the point of view of network and human capital. The founder family of the RSDF project is formed by a husband ( 47 years old, vocational school, former seller in a village shop, native from Socetu, commuting experience in Bucuresti and Rosier cities), wife ( 49 years old, high school, former seller in a village shop, native from Moldova historical region, accountant experience ,commuting experience in Bucuresti and Rosiori cities ) and daughter ( 20 years old, graduated a high school of agriculture and food industry profile, used in the production group for the most complicated accounting tasks). The three persons of the founding family are also the committee for project coordination (husband – president, wife –treasurer and daughter – secretary).For the initiation of the project they functioned as a nucleus of socio-human capital. It is important to note that their success is related not to family human or social capital but to their combination of socio-human capital. Accounting abilities seem to be very important as to initiate the process and to lay the foundation for the business at lower costs. A similar combination of capital is present in the case of another family in the village that started to do an application for a grant to do a village mill: the father is fiscal agent of the mayor house and his son is on the way of graduating an economic faculty. The most dynamic person in the production group of 11 persons (out of which at least five are close relatives) is the wife of the founding family. She is the person that heard at radio a broadcast on the opportunity of taking a grant from RSDF and convinced the husband to abandon the unsure city job for a family business in Socetu. With the occasion of the focus group in Stejaru we invited representatives from all the four villages of the commune, key local institutions and also the president of the bakery project. The last one came for the meeting with an invited person, his wife – the treasure of the group. No more convincing proof of the importance of the wife for the business. The new production group emerged not only as a result of a family business interest and a rather high consensus that a bakery is needed into the village. An important part played also a diffuse network of local interests. Mayor house is an important player in this network. First of all, some of the necessary data for demonstrating that the village is poor are more available at the level of mayor house (infant mortality rate, number of old people, number of TV sets etc.). Secondly, the mayor house should open a special registry with the production groups in commune and also give the endorsement that some forms that are necessary for the application are legal. The mayor has an important part to play in the whole process. In case of a possible conflict between the applicants and the mayor house, the process could go on but with more difficulty. The mayor house in Socetu case was cooperative. But some officers of the mayor house did not loose the opportunity to make the applicants understand that their institution and interests should be also considered: ”Initially, the former mayor house received me well when I tolled him about the project. But second

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time, when I came to effectively start doing the forms for the application file, he changed completely – much more reluctant, busy or as if forgotten the whole story. .. I did the application file before the June local elections. After the elections, one member of the new mayor house leadership did not forget to tell me that he has also a company of building works and, he tolled, why not to involve it in making the reconstruction works for bakery. ” (Interview with one member of coordination committee of the project). At the survey moment no other PDP was under way in Stejaru commune. There were some intentions generated or crystallized by the bakery project or by the visit of World Bank teams there. The Socetu bakery project was still on the way of being accomplished during the community study period but it is clear that it has an extremely powerful effect on the community life. It is not only community controversy that is stimulated but also there is an increase of employment chances. There are specific plans not only for employment in the production unit and delivery point inside it but also to make a small local network of delivery points.Relativs networks have a privilege part in this emerging network. The fact is part of the situation that trust capital is higher at the level of such networks. Relying on relatives for business is a fact. It could have positive and negative consequences function of the situation. Later time evaluations could offer an answer to the implicit questions raised by this business orientation. The shuck produced by the bakery project at Socetu-Stejaru was great for the local establishment related to mayor house or agricultural associations. Initially they referred to the core family of the productive group in a formal way or with consistent spots of silence. Once we got their confidence, we were tolled that the winner of the grant “is not representative for the village”. And we found also that “they got the money due to some relatives that they have at Bucuresti”. The implicit evaluation was that “he is not but I, the person talking to you, I am representative”. The irritation of the local establishment was not so much in relation with the bakery project. In fact, establishment or non-establishment, the majority of them recognize that the small enterprise will be extremely useful for the old population of village. The main source of controversy is related to what will follow. And not in general, but in economic terms. Bakery is good in the village as almost all the household have wheat, are old, living from a symbolic agricultural pension of 150 000 – 200000 ROL (less than 10$) per month. And else, the houses are along a central road of about 5 km that is hard to travel without a car stuff for the very rich) or a bicycle. But more than a bakery is needed – at least and urgently, a mill. There is an old one at the border of Socetu. But the quality of the flour it produces is very bad. This is why in the commune started a competition of who is able to run the business of a new mill. There are at least three explicit competitors – a very efficient leader of an agricultural family association, a family group of high accounting abilities (university level for the sun and high school level for the father) and the production group that runs the bakery. The last two actors are oriented in the direction of SDF as funding source. The fact that one group succeeded to start a business with an external grant was a kind of ferment that mobilized the energies for others to try doing something similar. The success of the income generating activities project of bakery brought not only ideas of similar entrepreneurial projects. It also contributed to mobilizing local social entrepreneurs to design infrastructure projects. The leader of an agricultural association from Bratcovu, one of the poorest villages of Stejaru commune, started to collect information on where from to take the money for solving a severe local problem related to potable water. The design of the project started under the direct impact of the bakery project .

Conclusions 1. The approach of community and regional development as stock of spatial capital proved to be of clear relevance for the analysis. 1.1. Developed cities, villages or regions are nothing else than spaces of aggregation for high values of human, social, material and vital capital. At the opposite end, community or regional poverty if a synthetic name for aggregation of low values in human, social, material and vital capital.

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1.2. The usual living standards measurement surveys LSMS measure the poverty level by consumption indicators at the household and individual level. Poverty is not only an individual/household phenomenon but also a community one. .That kind of poverty could be accurately understood in terms of community total capital. 2. In spite of the severances of development problems, the country is highly differentiated. First of all there is high territorial differentiation. After measuring the development level for all the about 12500 villages of the country one can see easily that within each historical region there are sharp differences among sub regions. There is large development gap between North Muntenia and South-East Muntenia, between West and East Moldova or between South. West Transylvania and the rest of this region. There is no “best regionalization” map. The regional diversity of the country could be revealed only by different types of maps. The cultural borders are mainly revealed by historical regions (Figure 5-5) and cultural areas (Figure 5-6) as subregions within historical regions. The differences in development level are accurately depicted by maps of county development (Figure 5-10) or maps of village/commune development (Figure 5-3). The so-called development regions are project regions designed as to favour the implementation of the new regional policy of the country (Figure 6-11). As for the agricultural diversity of the country, this is significantly revealed by the agroregions (Figure 5-7). The most homogeneous regions on cumulative criteria of cultural, economic, social and geographical nature are the cultural areas. 2.1.1. The fact that the main poverty pockets of the country are in the East and South parts of the country (Table 5-6) is to a large degree conditioned by education and agriculture distribution. It in these parts of the country that rural education stocks are lower and occupation in agriculture is higher. The plain environment is favourable to agriculture as low income generating activity. Occupation in agriculture is in itself less favourable to an increase of education stock of the persons. In the conditions of Romania one can speak of a “plain poverty complex” as genuine combination of low human capital and low income associated with working in agriculture. 3. The ecological differentiation of the country at the rural community level is obvious especially in terms of human, material, social and vital capital. 3.1. The quality of the housing is a very important factor for the population health. Infant mortality as a tough measure of the health situation is highly influenced by the variation of the housing situation among different communes. Communes of high number of houses of clay walls and of small size have a higher infant mortality rate. In terms of dwelling size what mostly counts is the number of rooms. Having more rooms per house is more important than having a larger living floor area84. Influence of housing conditions on infant mortality is high even when one control for the effects of education and regional location. Education stock of the rural 176

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community is also, by itself, an important factor of child health. Communes with higher levels of education stock tend to have lower infant mortality. As for location factors, what mostly contributes to higher levels of infant mortality are village location in plain areas, in small villages and in Old Kingdom historical regions. 3.2. Centrality of the village within commune and its distance to the nearest city are two key factors of direct influence on village global development. The best situation is in central villages that are close to cities and the worst in the peripheral ones that are far from cities (Table 5-2). Population composition is much more favourable to development in the first category compared to the second. 3.3. There are marked differences among local communities in terms of human capital. For the initiation of development projects these differences are fundamental ones. Education stock of the local population and the stock of social entrepreneurship are the most important aspects of local human capital. 4. Community actions of more or less participatory nature are function of perceived needs and local resources in terms of social entrepreneurship, institutional capabilities, and social capital and past experiences of the community. 4.1. Jobs and roads are the most critical aspects of the rural life in the view of the villagers (Figure 5-19). Next in importance in their views are problems related to public services of health, education, public transportation and cleaning up. 4.2. The images the institutions have are to a significant degree function of the perception of their representatives. If the image on mayor is good there is a high probability of trusting also the mayor house. Similarly, a positive image on priest/pastor is easily converted into a similar one on church. 4.3. It seems that in isolated villages that are far from cities, the local controversies on mayors and priests are higher than in near to city villages. Closed communities are more inclined to develop negative evaluations on these two types of community actors. The reasons are not very clear. 4.4. The local perception on mayor has as principal influencing factor the degree of information on mayor house activities. The higher the stock of information on what the institution is doing, the higher its positive perception. The second factor as importance for trust in local mayor is trust in government (Table 5-15). From the status point of view what mostly counts are age and wealth. Old and poor people are more inclined to trust rural mayors. Mayor house is also perceived from the point of view of safety environment – the stronger the feelings that the village streets are safety, the higher the confidence into the mayor. 5. A study on 27 villages of the country (Sandu, 2000) revealed that there are very few regularities on where is the highest probability of participatory development projects PDP phenomena: 177

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5.1. diversity of factors and conditions favouring participation and local initiative is the only basic rule; 5.2. local institutions and social entrepreneurs of formal or informal type are the most active possible actors for CDD; 5.3. in terms of factors favouring participatory development , the most important are past experiences , networks of social connections and institutional opportunities allowing for microprojects agency 5.4. social capital as trust and cooperation propensity is a potential resource existing to different degrees in different communities. But there is no fatality for development deriving from potential social capital: it is enough to have information on opportunities, to see models, to have access to resources , awareness of specific problems, leaders and the potential converts to action; 5.5. social capital is relevant for development only in connection with human capital; 5.6. social entrepreneurs are the key figures for bringing high development dynamics in communities. There is no rule on the self selection of such role models. They could be mayors, priests, medical doctors, mechanics, farmers etc. What they have in common is larger information horizons, dedication to local community and good social capital (as high prestige and/ or high connection capital). 5.7. there are four basic types of local development dynamics resulting from crossing two dimensions: high and multiple dynamics vs stagnant communities and communities of topdown development and communities of participatory development. The typology is function of the intensity of local government or local population inputs for development. At one extreme are the communities – commune or villages – of very high and complex dynamics. Here there is an excellent combination of PDP and Commune Hall activities for development. The opposite type is that of stagnant communities of very low public actions of the population and of the local government. 6. In the large array of community and regional phenomena, migration is by far the most relevant one. Return migration from cities to countryside and international circular migration are directly related to the poverty-development problems of the Romanian transition. The sharp decline of the village to city commuting after 1989 largely contributed to an increased pressure for international circular migration of the rural people (Sandu, 2001). Ethnic, religious, family and past experience networks have been largely activated as to allow for a considerable increase of formal and informal circular migration abroad. The circular migration is a phenomenon of complex conversion of human, social, material and symbolic capital. Each of them could be at the origin or at the end of the migration process.

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Annex 1: Description of the variables used for analysis Table A 1. Operational definition of the main individual/family level variables Variable label and name

Description of the variable

ACUM/IERI Present vs past life evaluation AGESTOCK98 ALCOHOLS consumption

Evaluation of own life at present compared to one year before (five points scale) average age of adult persons in the household Frequency of alcohols consumption: factor score of frequency of drinking beer, wine and strong alcohol (each of the items measured on a 6 points scale (6 daily to 1 no time) (number of cows*0.35+ 0.35*no. of pigs+no.of sheep*0.12+0.04*no of poultry) member of an association (1 yes, 0 no) Factor score defined by the variables DECIDED, ONEPARTY in a PCAVARIMAX factor analysis with the variables TOLERPOL, MIDDLE,CIVICLOC, CIVICTOT,MINERS, VILLAGRES , DECIDED, ONEPARTY. dummy variable for being man (1 yes , 0 no) Agreement with the statement that the level of living in the country was before 1989 , compared to the present times “much better “ (5), “better” (4), “the same” (3), “worse” (2), “much worse” (1). self-assessment as being rich (10)... or poor (1) Counting index of household endowment with colour TV, refrigerator and automatic washing machine ( 0 for non of them and 3 for all of them) “How frequently do you go to church? “ 5 once in a week, 4 once in a month, 3 several times a year, 2 once in a year or less, 1 not at all “Do you think that people like you can influence important decisions taken at the level of your locality?” (four points scale , 1 “in a very little degree” … 4 “to a very high degree”) “Do you think that people like you can influence important decisions taken at the level of the country?” (four points scale , 1 “in a very little degree” … 4 “to a very high degree”) Agreement with the statement “It is better to have for country leadership a decided leader than several people with different ideas” (four points scale, 1 total disagreement…4 total agreement) Factor score defined by the variables MIDDLE and TOLERPOL in a PCAVARIMAX factor analysis with the variables TOLERPOL, MIDDLE,CIVICLOC, CIVICTOT,MINERS, VILLAGRES, DECIDED, ONEPARTY. Agreement with the statement that „things in our country are going in the right (1) or in the wrong direction (-1). „ By 0 is scored non-answer. Factor score with five variables: hhd income per person, hhd possession of colour TV , automatic washing machine, freezer, car. Possession variables are of the type dummy. Recoding it as to have 33% cases in each category derives a categorical form of the variable: 1 hhd o flow wealth, 2 hhd of medium wealth and 3 hhd of high wealth.

ANIMALE98 index of livestock in the hhd ASOCIAT98 AUTHORITARIAN orientation for public action

BARBAT98 man Better level of living before 1989-subjective estimation LIVING89** BOGAT rich BUNURI Durable goods in the household CHURCH going frequency CIVICLOC Civic competence at local level CIVICTOT Civic competence at central level DECIDED Preference for authoritative political leader DEMOCRATIC orientation for public action

DIRBUN ECONOMIC status of the household (hhd)

EDUCANI Education level of the person EDUCH Education stock of the adult persons in the hhd ETNIC Ethnic tolerance

GIFTS98

0 illiterate, 4 primary, 8 gymnasium, 10 vocational school,12 high school, 14 post-high school, 16 high education Average of the education stock per adult person using the values of the variable EDUCANI for each of the adults in the hhd. Recoding it as to have 33% cases in each category derives a categorical form of the variable. index of confidence in other ethnic groups than its own. There have been 5 questions about the person’s opinion (very good, good, bad, very bad) on five ethic groups (Romanians, Hungarians, Gypsy, Germans and Jews). A counting index was computed by considering the number of ethnic groups, different of her/his own, positively evaluated. Minimum is 0 and maximum is 4. frequency of offering presents for solving personal problems to mayor house, court, police, hospital, school, job. Each of the six items is scaled 1 for „always”, 0.5 for sometime and 0 for no time.

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Variable label and name

Description of the variable

GOD95

“Do you consider yourself as a person that believes in God ?.”, a four points scale

Household SIZE IDENTITYco Intensity of county identity

Number of members in the household “To what degree you feel attached of the county where you live?” with answers on a four points scale (1 “to very little degree” ….4 “to a very high degree”) four points scale (1..4) Recoding INCONSIST generates inconsistency as categorical variable: 1. as negative inconsistency for INCONSIST<-0.5, 3 for positive inconsistency (INCONSIST>0.5) and 2 for consistency (INCONS between –0,5 and 0,5) Determined as difference between observed economic status of the household (ECONOMIC) and the expected economic (ECONED) status function of the education stock in the hhd. INCONSIST=ECONOMICECONED ECONED=-0.99 +0.18*EDUCG, R2ECONOMIC EDUCG =0.24

IGUVERN trust in government INCONScateg

INCONSIST Status inconsistency

INCONSn Negative status inconsistency INCONSn1 Negative status inconsistency INCONSp Positive status inconsistency INCONSp1 Positive status inconsistency INFLUENT98 Potential of public involvement INTERGRUP Intergroup trust

INTERPERS98 Interpersonal trust

INTERPERS99. Index of interpersonal trust for 1999 data LIBERTY It was more liberty before 1989 LOCALITY Attached to locality MAXIMAL Support for maximal economic state**

MAXIMAL4 Support for maximal state

MEDIA consumption

MIDDLE Preference for

It is computed as censored below variable from the squared values of INCONSIST smaller than -0.5 It is computed as censored below variable from the absolute values of INCONSIST smaller than - 0.5 It is computed as censored above variable from the squared values of INCONSIST smaller than 0.5 It is computed as censored above variable from the values of INCONSIST smaller than 0.5 scaled 2 if accepts that can influence local and national decisions, 1 if accepts that can influence only local or national level decisions and 0 if non of the two influences are considered as possible. An index of trust in journalists, managers and intellectuals. Each scale is coded with four values between -1 maximal distrust to 1 maximal trust. A simple average gave the score of intergroup trust Three scale are aggregated: agreement with the statement that „one can trust the majority of people”, „the majority of people are fair” and „the greatest number of people try to help others”. Each scale is coded with 1 for agreement, -1 for disagreement and 0 for NA/DK. Interpersonal trust index is a simple average of the three scales. agreement with the statement „one can trust most people” (1 yes, 0 no)

Agreement with the statement that the liberty in the country was before 1989 , compared to the present times “much better “ (5), “better” (4), “the same” (3), “worse” (2), “much worse” (1). “To what degree you feel attached to the locality where you live? “ with answers from “very high degree” (4) to “to a very little degree” (1) Average of two scales of agreement with the statements that the state should intervene for controlling prices and for reducing unemployment. Each item is scaled with –1 for “in a very little degree”, -0.5 “in a little degree”, 0 “DK”, 0.5 =in a high degree”, 1 “in a very high degree”. To be more expressive 100 multiply the average. Average of four scales of agreement with the statements that the state should intervene for controlling prices , for reducing unemployment, for controlling press and for controlling political parties. Each item is scaled with –1 for “in a very little degree”, -0.5 “in a little degree”, 0 “DK”, 0.5 =in a high degree”, 1 “in a very high degree”. To be more expressive 100 multiply the average. Factor score of three variables referring to the frequency of reading newspapers, listening radio and watching TV, each of them scaled on a four point scale (4 daily.... 1 monthly). 100 multiply the score. Agreement with the statement “The best political way is the negotiated

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Variable label and name

Description of the variable

MIDDLEed political solutions MINERS Support for the way miners acted in January 1999 during their rebellion movement MODERNITY95

(middle) one” (four points scale, 1 total disagreement…4 total agreement) “ At the beginning of this year, in January, the miners from the Valley of Jiu left for Bucharest and followed clashes from Costesti and the agreement from Cozia. For the way the miners acted during these events, what grades would you assign them on a scale from 1 (very bad) to 10 (very good)?” counting index of preference for values of individual modernity (new vs old ideas, taking vs not taking risk, opennesss to change vs conservatism, looking for more gain vs focusing on preserving what one has ) Agreement with the statement “It is good to have in the country one single political party” (four points scale, 1 total disagreement…4 total agreement) considers that one year from now on will live 1 much worse... 5 much better 3 is entrepreneur, 2 intends to open a business but does not have one, 1 would desire to open a business having much more money, 0 does not have , intends or desire to open a business. Average score of trust in judiciary and police. The degree of trust is scaled from 1(very much) 0.5 (much) 0 (non-answer) –0.5 (little) –1 (very little). Factor score defined by the variables CIVICLOC and CIVICTOT in a PCA-VARIMAX factor analysis with the variables TOLERPOL, MIDDLE,CIVICLOC, CIVICTOT,MINERS, VILLAGRES , DECIDED, ONEPARTY. Factor score of trust in government, parliament and presidency of the country. The degree of trust is scaled from 1(very much) 0.5 (much) 0 (nonanswer) –0.5 (little) –1 (very little). Counting index with the number of “yes” to two questions asking the opinion if he/she considers that the NEAO and UE integration of the country is useful. Minimal value 0 and maximum 2. Categorical variable generated by a quick cluster analysis function of REBELLION, AUTHORITARIAN, DEMOCRATIC and PARTICIPATORY variables. Four groups are generated around each of the defining variables Factor score defined by the variables MINERS and VILLAGRES in a PCAVARIMAX factor analysis with the variables TOLERPOL, MIDDLE,CIVICLOC, CIVICTOT,MINERS, VILLAGRES , DECIDED, ONEPARTY. Index of NETWORK capital (RELATII), counting the number of “yes” to a set of six question asking if the person has connections to solve problems related to health, judiciary, administration, police, bank, job. Counting index of the intensity of religious attitude with values between 0 and three functions of the yes (1) or no (0) answers to the questions referring to the belief in life after death, heaven and doomsday judgment. factor score of three items multiplied by 100: agreement with the statements that „customs are important as a guide in life”, „a well paid and unsure job is to be preferable to a sure but poor paid job”, „new thing are to be preferred to the old ones in life” Satisfied with his/her own health (direct four points scale)

ONEPARTY Preference for one party political system OPTIMISM Optimism ORANT4 Entrepreneurial orientation ORDINE Trust in order institutions PARTICIPATORY orientation for public action

POWER Trust in power institutions PROWEST Support for NATO and UE integration PUBLIC action orientation

REBELLION orientation for public action

RELATII network capital

RELIGIOZITATE Religion attitude RISCAVER Aversion to risk

SANATOS Considers to be healthy SCOMUNITAR

SDURATA Long term satisfaction Self-ACHIEVED person SPREZENT Satisfaction on present life conditions TOLERPOL Tolerance to different political views

average of the satisfaction scores on public transportation, health services, cleaning of the locality and leisure facilities. Each item was rescaled as to have 1 for maximum satisfaction, 0.5, 0 , -0.5, -1 for maximum dissatisfaction. Index of temporal perception of life conditions built as factor score from SPREZENT, OPTIMISM, ACUMIERI „Do you think of yourself in the last week as delighted of what you did?” (1 yes, 0 no) scaled as to have -1 for very dissatisfied , -0.5 dissatisfied, 0 non-answer, 0.5 satisfied, 1 very satisfied Agreement with the statement “It is a good thing to reach an agreement with those having a different political opinion” (four points scale, 1 total disagreement…4 total agreement)

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Variable label and name

Description of the variable

TRUSTgov Trust in government VILLAGERS Support for the way the villagers associated with the miners acted in January 1999

“How much trust do you have in Government?” with answers on a four points scale (1 “very little”…. 4 “very much”) “ At the beginning of this year, in January, the miners from the Valley of Jiu left for Bucharest and followed clashes from Costesti and the agreement from Cozia. For the way the villagers from Valcea county associated with the protesting miners acted during these events, what grades would you assign them on a scale from 1 (very bad) to 10 (very good)?”

WEALTH95

factor score of the items: has a private car, refrigerator, colour TV, video recorder, telephone and of self estimated income „How did you think the majority of the people that got rich succeeded in Romania?” 1 “by work” 0 “other means”

WORK is the main success rout

Table A 2. Operational definition of the main community/regional level variables Variables

Measurement level year

AGRICOL Percent of population employed in agriculture ALTITUDE Index of geographic location of commune. function of the share of arable land in the total agricultural area of the commune: plain (over 75 %). plain-hilly (51% - 74%). hilly-mountain (26%-50%). mountain (under 25%) CHILDREN Percent of village population under 15 years old CONFIG Classification of village from the point of view of structure or configuration of Development in 1992. accomplished by confirmatory k-means cluster analysis (see appendix 2): 1 very poor traditional villages. 2 poor and modern villages. 3 mid type villages, 4 developed villages, 5 very developed villages DEMPOT Demographic potential of the village: factor score of the village population (ln transformation) and percentage of 15-59 age old population DEVJUD95 Index of judet Development in 1995 computed as a factor score DEVJUD98. Index of county development built in a different file with data for 40 counties of the country. Component variables are also indices of human capital, unemployment, material capital and general fertility rate at the county level (Sandu, 2000) EDSTOCK Education stock of the population: (graduates of no more than primary school*4+ gymnasium graduates*8+ graduates of vocational schools*10+ high schools graduates*12+ posthigh school graduates*12+ higher education graduates*16)/ population of more than 12 years old ELECTRIC Percentage of dwellings connected to electric network EMPLOYEE Percent of salaried people EUROPEAN Commune location close to an European road (1 yes, 0 no) GFR Proxy variable for general fertility rate: number of live born children to 1000 women of 15-40 years old ISOLATc Index of commune isolation: factor score of distance to the nearest city of more than 30 thou. Inhabitants, distance to the nearest city irrespective of city size, location close to an European road (1 yes, 0 no) and location at the county periphery (1 yes, 0 no) KM Distance from the central village of the commune up to the nearest city of more than 30 thou. inhabitants, on the shortest and best road LANDWALLS Percent of dwellings in buildings of poor quality of land walls LEVEL98 Index of level Development of the village at the last census moment corrected for 1998 commune Development : factor score of UMANVIL .QBUILDING. GFR. UPDATE98. DEMPOT multiplied by 1000 LNPOP92 Natural logarithm of village population in 1992 MIDAGE Percent of village population of 15-59 years old PERIFJUD Commune location at judet periphery (1 yes, 0 no) PERIFSAT Peripheral village within commune (1 yes, 0 no) POP77 Village population at 1977 census POP92 Village population at 1992 census

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Village Village

1992 1992

Village

1992

county

1998

Village

1992

Village Village

1992 1992

Village

1992

commu n e

Village Village

1992

Village Village

1992 1992

Village Village

1992 1992

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POP9277 Increase of village population in 1992 compared to 1977 (%) PROBLEMS Seriousness of county social problems (poverty ). Factor score at community level with values referring to average dwelling size, livestock development in locality, urban accessibility QBUILDING Index of quality for housing buildings: factor score of WATER, ELECTRIC, LANDHOUSE QLIFEUR Level of development for the locality of residence (persons in the same locality got the same score) Factor score computed in a different file with data for each of the 2948 localities of the country with the variables: rate of out-migration, rate of infant mortality and rate of natality for the period 1994-1996. As natality is affected by the age structure was used its expected value function of percentage of more than 60 years old population in locality. For having a direct scaling the final factor score was multiplied by –1. ROOMS Number of rooms per dwelling SLL Living floor area per dwelling (sq meters) UMANVIL Human capital at village level: factor score of AGRICOL. EMPLOYEE. EDSTOCK UNOCUP Percentage of unoccupied dwellings UPDATE98 Commune Development in 1998: factor score of temporary net migration 1997, emigration rate 1996-1997 and percentage of 15-59 years old population in 1998. WATER Percent of dwellings equipped with running water from public network or private system

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1992 1995 n e

Village

1992

locality

19941996

Village Village Village

1992 1992 1992

Village commu

1992 n e

Village

1992

Social Space of Transition Annex 2.Social space as structure of asymmetric relations: regression analysis85 a) Status space Table R 1. Prediction of satisfaction and personal optimism Dependent variable Predictors Satisfaction on present life (4 points scale)

Consider that today lives better than one year before (5 points scale)

Hopes to live better next year (5 points scale) -0.05 (0.02)

Man (1 yes, 0 no) (-0.01) (-0.02) Aged more than 60 years 0.07 -0.05 old (1 yes, 0 no) Less than 30 years old (1 0.05 0.15 0.06 yes, 0 no) BUNURI Possession of 0.13 (0.02) (-0.01) durable goods Income per person in hhd 0.06 (0.02) (-0.02) RELATII Network capital 0.07 0.06 (0.02) Satisfied with the quality of 0.06 (-0.01) 0.06 social relations (4 points scale) SCOMUNITARA 0.15 (0.04) (0.03) Community satisfaction Satisfaction on own 0.27 0.23 (0.02) monetary income (4 points scale) Satisfaction on own job (4 0.07 0.10 (0.03) points scale) Satisfaction on own health 0.09 (0.03) (0.03) (4 points scale) Trust in government (4 0.07 0.06 0.11 points scale) Urban resident (1 yes, 0 no) -0.15 -0.09 (0.00) Level of county (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) development DEVJUD * * 0.06 Trust in order institutions (factor score for trust on police, military, law and secret information services) RISCAVER Risk aversion * * -0.06 Fear of unemployment (1 * * (-0.04) yes, 0 no) Satisfaction on present life * * 0.13 (4 points scale) Consider that today lives * * 0.34 better than one year before (5 points scale) R2 0.28 0.17 0.28 Data source: Public opinion barometer of Open Society Foundation POB- OSF, 1998. Each column in the table present a multiple regression model with beta coefficients. All figures that are not included into () indicate coefficients that are significant for p=0.05.

185

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Table R 2. Prediction of diffuse satisfaction by age categories Satisfaction on present life (4 points scale) aged persons mature young of more than persons 30persons 1859 years old 59 young 29 years old old Man (1 yes, 0 no) (0.08) -0.05 (-0.02) Age -0.11 0.06 (0.08) Education (0.08) (-0.06) (0.06) BUNURI Possession of durable (0.07) 0.19 (0.03) goods in the hhd Income per person in hhd (0.07) 0.05 (0.05) RELATII Network capital 0.09 0.06 (0.01) Satisfaction on own health (4 0.10 0.08 0.14 points scale) Satisfaction on own monetary 0.29 0.31 0.29 income (4 points scale) SCOMUNITARA Community 0.16 0.14 0.21 satisfaction Trust in government (4 points (0.02) 0.10 0.10 scale) 0.09 (0.01) (-0.02) Trust in order institutions (factor score for trust on police, military, law and secret information services) resident of a rural commune (1 0.12 0.13 0.17 yes, 0 no) resident of a small town of less (0.05) (0.03) (0.01) than 30 thou. inhabitants resident of a medium city of 30 -0.09 (-0.01) (0.03) thou. to 100 thou. inhabitants R2 0.30 0.26 0.30 Data source: Public opinion barometer of Open Society Foundation POB- OSF, 1998. Each column in the table present a multiple regression model with beta coefficients. All figures that are not included into () indicate coefficients that are significant for p=0.05. Table R 3. Prediction of objective well-being Dependent variables Predictors BUNURI Possession of durable goods in the hhd u urba r n+ru ral b a n AGESTOCK9 0.08 8 average age 0 of adult . persons in hhd 0 8

186

Income per person in hhd rur al

urban+r ural

urb an

ru ra l

0.0 8

-0.06

(0.0 5)

0. 1 0

Social Space of Transition

Predictors

EDUCH Education stock in the hhd was manager before 1989 (1 yes, 0 no) QLIFEUR development level of locality*

DEVJUD development level of county Person of 3059 years old (1 yes, o no)

children in the hhd (1 yes, o no)

main income source in the hhd is from private sector salary main income source in the hhd is state salary main income source in the hhd is from private agriculture

ANIMALE98 Livestock in the hhd

Dependent variables BUNURI Possession of durable goods in the hhd u urba r n+ru b ral a n 0.12 0 . 1 0 0.12 0 . 1 2 0.06 ( 0 . 0 4 ) 0.20 0 . 2 4 0.04 ( 0 . 0 4 ) (( 0.03 ) 0 . 0 2 ) 0.16 0 . 2 1 0.17

(0.0 2)

0.12

0 . 1 7 ( 0 . 0 1 ) ( 0 . 0 5 )

187

Income per person in hhd rur al

urban+r ural

urb an

ru ra l

0.1 8

(0.01)

(0.0 2)

0.1 4

0.08

0.0 9

(0. 0 3) 0. 0 7

0.0 8

(0.02)

(0.0 1)

(0 .0 4)

0.1 5

0.09

0.0 9

0. 1 0

(0. 04)

-0.14

0.1 7

0. 1 4

(0.0 5)

-0.15

0.1 5

0. 1 8

0.1 0

0.13

0.1 6

0. 0 9

0.2 2

0.10

0.0 8

0. 1 9

(0. 04)

(0.04)

0.2 2

(0. 0 4)

0.1 8

(0.02)

(0.0 3)

(0 .0 4)

Dumitru Sandu

Predictors

ha of own land

urban resident (1 yes , 0 no) R2

Dependent variables BUNURI Possession of durable goods in the hhd u urba r n+ru b ral a n 0.05 0 . 1 4 0.24 *

Income per person in hhd rur al

urban+r ural

urb an

ru ra l

(0. 02)

(0.03)

(0.0 4)

(0 .0 6)

*

0.13

*

*

0.28

0 0.2 0.11 0.1 0. 4 2 1 . 0 1 6 Data source: Public opinion barometer of Open Society Foundation POB- OSF, 1998. Each column in the table present a multiple regression model with beta coefficients. All figures that are not included into () indicate coefficients that are significant for p=0.05. * see table A2

Population structure

Table R 4. Predictors of rural household consumption Predictors

Nonstan dardised regressi on coeffici ents

Free regression term

12.47*

HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS Adult, numbers (over 15)

0.40*

Adult, square numbers

-0.04*

Child, numbers (under 15)

0.10*

Child, square numbers

-0.01*

188

S t a n d a r d e r r o r s 0 . 0 1

0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0

Sta nda rdis ed regr essi on coe ffic ient s

0.7 9

0.4 6 0.1 7

0.0 4

Social Space of Transition

Physical resources

Human resources

Predictors

Nonstan dardised regressi on coeffici ents

Free regression term

12.47*

HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS Age of household head

0.01*

Square age of household head

-0.001*

Female-headed household (1 Yes, 0 No)

-0.13*

Household education level

0.04*

At least one wage-earner (1 Yes, 0 No)

0.17*

At least one farmer (1 Yes, 0 No)

-0.10*

At least one pensioner (1 Yes, 0 No)

0.06*

Livestock growth index (cattle head) (square root)

0.22*

Arable landownership, area (square root)

0.08*

Vineyard and orchard ownership, area (square root)

0.14*

189

S t a n d a r d e r r o r s 0 . 0 1

0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1

Sta nda rdis ed regr essi on coe ffic ient s

0.2 7

0.3 2 0.0 9 0.1 9

0.1 4

0.0 8 0.0 5

0.2 5

0.0 4

0.0 5

Dumitru Sandu

Predictors

Nonstan dardised regressi on coeffici ents

Free regression term

12.47*

HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS Pasture and hayfield ownership, area (square root)

0.003*

Has land in landholding company (1 Yes, 0 No)

-0.04*

Human resources

Location resources

COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS Lowland community (1 Yes, 0 No)

0.04*

Distance to nearest city with a population of over 30 thou. (ln conversion)

-0.04*

Population of nearest city with over 30 thou. (ln conversion)

0.06*

Health care personnel in 1000 people (square root)

0.03*

Teaching personnel in 1000 people (square root)

0.03*

Infant death rate in 1000 people 1994-1996 (square root)

-0.01*

COUNTY DEVELOPMENT INDEX

0.002*

R2

0.60*

190

S t a n d a r d e r r o r s 0 . 0 1

Sta nda rdis ed regr essi on coe ffic ient s

0 . 0 0 0 . 0 1

0.0 02

0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0

0.0 3

0.0 2

0.0 4 0.0 8

0.0 4

0.0 3

0.0 2 0.0 2

Social Space of Transition

Rural households in the 1996 Integrated Household Survey sample totalled 16733. 66 cases were dropped because of missing variables. The extreme cases on the multivariate distribution according to predictors and the dependent variable were also dropped (220 cases). The model was applied to a total number of 16447 cases. All non-fictitious type predictors codified as 1 and 0 are converted by deducting the respective average. Significantly different from 0 coefficients for p=0.01. Primary data sources: NCS The dependent variable in the model from table R4 is household consumption deflated by the monthly rate of inflation for 1996. Consumption per adult equivalent is lower in larger households (with many children and/or adults) where educational achievements are lower and farming is the major occupation, which have no pensioner or wage-earner member, and own few livestock numbers and little arable or pasture land. More than the number of children, it is the number of adults that affects everyday consumption. The scale effect on consumption is clearly inferable from the available data and can be linked to the number of both children and adults. The chances for consumption to be lower are higher if the household head is female. Of outmost significance are a household’s human resources which include the education stock and occupation by sector. Absence of members of working age in farm households is associated, especially in the plains, with membership of farming associations the economic efficiency of which is, for the most part, low. Accordingly, membership of agricultural associations links up with poverty and low household consumption. Although less significant (see standard and non-standard regression coefficients), the community resource characteristics are also relevant for consumption. Consumption is higher in communities that are located not far away from cities and benefit from better health care and education infrastructure, whatever the household composition and resources. An inverse proportionality of infant mortality rate to consumption index shows that, beyond previously-mentioned geographic or non-geographic determinants, household consumption has a direct socially determined effect measured by infant mortality. The county development or growth level is a significant consumption determinant, no matter what the household or community characteristics are. The more developed a county, the higher household consumption. This finding supports the idea that consumption has household, community and regional determinants. Accordingly, rural development policies should be targeted at each level. Rural household consumption is basically determined by household size, available human resources and farming type. Poverty is deep in large-size households with low educational achievements, no salaried source of income and engaged in crop, rather than livestock, farming.

Table R 5. Prediction of durable satisfaction Predictors

COM POS TIE VAR IABL ES OF STA TUS

Education

Age

Age squared

Was a manager before 1989 (1 yes, 0 no) MAT ERIA L

Wealth index BUNURI

Dependent variable – durable satisfaction SDURATA urban+rural urban rural M M o o de de l l 2 1 (0.01) (0.01) ((0. 0. 0 0 7) 1) -0.73 -0.49 0. 0. 6 9 6 1 0.63 0.42 0. 0. 5 8 6 0 -0.08 (-0.06) 0. 0. 0 0 8 6 0. 0. 0.09 0.07 1 0 2 8

191

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Predictors

CAPI TAL

SOCI AL CAPI TAL

VAL UE ORIE NTA TION S

SPEC IFIC SATI SFA CTIO NS AND FEA RS

Income per person Main source of income is the private sector (1 yes, 0 no) Conventional number of animals in the household ANIMALE98 Surface of agricultural property Relational capital RELATII Trust in managers, intellectuals, journalists Trust in the government Valuation of WORK Right wing political orientation (proEmil Constantinescu) Fear of unemployment (1 yes, 0 no)

Dependent variable – durable satisfaction SDURATA urban+rural urban rural M M o o de de l l 2 1 (0.05) (0.05) 0. 0. 0 0 4 8 0. 0. (0.04) 0.07 0 0 6 5 0. 0 9

0. 0 8

(0.02)

(0.06)

0. 0 6 0. 0 9 0. 1 3

0. 0 4 0. 0 7 0. 0 7

(0.01)

(0.06)

0.10

(0.02)

0.08

0.07

0. 1 3 0. 0 8 0. 1 1

0. 0 8 0. 0 5 0. 0 9

(0.05)

0.13

(0.04

(0.05)

0.09

0.09

0. 0 4 0. 0 9 0. 0 7

-0.05

(-0.03)

-0.08

-0.10

0.08

(0.04)

0. 1 0 0. 1 0 0. 2 6

0.07

0.16

0.10

0.10

0.26

0.26

Fear of inflation (1 yes, 0 no)

Satisfied with the anticorruption actions of the government Satisfied with personal health Community satisfaction Satisfaction with income

192

Social Space of Transition

Predictors

Dependent variable – durable satisfaction SDURATA urban+rural urban rural M M o o de de l l 2 1 (-0.01) 0.06 (0 (0 REGI County .0 .0 ONA development 2) 2) L– index DEVJUD98 COM (-0.03) (-0.01) (Quality of (MUN 0. community life 0. ITY 0 QLIFEUR 0 DEV 2) 2) ELO Positioned on a 0. 0. 0.10 (0.03) PME European road (1 0 0 NT yes, 0 no) 6 6 * * Lives in an urban 0. area (1 yes, 0 no) 0. 0 0 7 6 0.34 0.36 0. R2 0. 3 2 5 2 Data source: Public opinion barometer of Open Society Foundation POB- OSF, 1998. Each column in the table present a multiple regression model with beta coefficients. All figures that are not included into () indicate coefficients that are significant for p=0.05. Table R 6 . Prediction of societal optimism („things are going in the right direction”) Dependent variable : « Things in our country are Predictors going in the right direction » DIRBUN total urban rural sample subsamp subsampl le e average income per person in hhd 0.04 (0.04) 0.06 satisfaction with money income 0.05 (0.02) 0.08 trust in government 0.17 0.15 0.19 optimism 0.19 0.22 0.14 MAXIMAL Support for the idea of maximal -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 state in favour of privatisation 0.06 (0.06) (0.07) considers that the government worked well to 0.09 0.12 (0.03) improve level of living (4 points scale) considers that the government worked well to 0.06 (0.04) (0.07) prevent corruption (4 points scale) education stock in the hhd 0.10 (0.12) (0.07) population in residence locality (ln from total (-0.01) (0.01) (-0.03) population) county development DEVJUD (-0.02) (0.01) -0.08 R2 0.18 0.20 0.15 N 1186 816 Data source: Public opinion barometer of Open Society Foundation POB- OSF, 1998. Each column in the table present a multiple regression model with beta coefficients. All figures that are not included into () indicate coefficients that are significant for p=0.05.

193

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Table R 7. Prediction of the behaviour of offering gifts in institutions for solving personal problems GIFTS Predictori Dependent variable “frequency of offering presents for solving personal problems to mayor house, court, police, hospital, school, job. Each of the six items is scaled 1 for „always”, 0.5 for sometime and 0 for no time. “ urban+ru urban rural ral Man (1 yes, 0 no) (0.01) (0.01 (-0.01) ) age (-0.02 ((-0.04) 0.03) education 0.07 0.09 (0.03) BUNURI99 Durable goods in the hhd (0.01) ((0.02) 0.01) Average income per person in the hhd 0.07 0.08 (0.04) Risk acceptance (0.04) (0.02 0.07 ) Satisfaction with income (0.03) 0.05 (0.02) Residence in intra-Carpathian regions of -0.21 -0.19 -0.22 the country County development DEVJUD 0.22 0.20 0.11 Quality of life in locality QLIFE/UR (-0.03) -0.17 0.10 R2 0.09 0.13 0.05 Data source: Public opinion barometer of Open Society Foundation POB- OSF, 1999. Each column in the table present a multiple regression model with beta coefficients. All figures that are not included into () indicate coefficients that are significant for p=0.05.

Table R 8. Regression of material capital on other forms of capital Dependent variable: material capital BUNURI Predictors June 1998 November May 1999 1998 Intercept 0.20 0.07 0.18 age -0.01 (-0.01) -0.01 education 0.23 0.23 0.25 urban residence (1 yes , 0 no) 0.20 0.28 0.18 County development DEVJUD 0.01 0.01 0.01 Locality development (0.00) 0.001 0.001 QLIFE/UR R2 0.28 0.32 0.26 Data source: Public opinion barometer of Open Society Foundation POB- OSF, 1998, 1999. Each column in the table present a multiple regression model with unstandardised coefficients. All figures that are not included into () indicate coefficients that are significant for p=0.05.

Table R 9.Regression of income per person on other forms of capital Dependent variable on other forms of capital Predictors June 1998 November 1998 Intercept age (0,03) (0,02) education 0,17 0,31 urban residence (1 yes , 0 no) 0,12 0,05 County development DEVJUD 0,06 0,10 Locality development (-0,02) 0,08 QLIFE/UR R2 0,06 0,16

194

May 1999

(0,01) 0,33 0,10 0,17 (0,04) 0,23

Social Space of Transition

Data source: Public opinion barometer of Open Society Foundation POB- OSF, 1998, 1999. Each column in the table present a multiple regression model with un-stardised coefficients. All figures that are not included into () indicate coefficients that are significant for p=0.05.

Table R 10. Predictors of religious orientation RELIGIOZITATE* Predictori Unstardise d regression coefficient s

Standardi sed regressio n coefficie nts

intercept 2.12 age 0.01a 0.06 urban residence (1 yes , 0 no) -0.05 -0.02 man (1 yes, 0 no) -0.36a -0.13 education -0.07a -0.08 BUNURI durable goods in the hhd 0.04 0.04 County development DEVJUD -0.01a -0.08 Locality development QLIFE/UR -0.001 -0.05 manager before 1989 (1 yes, 0 no) -0.26a -0.07 Was born in locality (1 yes, 0 no) 0.15a 0.06 R2 0.07 Data source: Public opinion barometer of Open Society Foundation POB- OSF, 1999

14.86 2.57 -0.65 -6.28 -2.91 1.51 -3.26 -1.81 -3.20 2.16

a - significant coefficients for p<0.01

Education

MALE (1 yes, 0 no) Durable GOODS Rural development DEVJUD Aversion to risk RISCAVER Satisfaction with own income

Intergro upe trust INTER GRUP

toleranc e ETNIC

Interper sonal trust INTER PERS9 8Ethnic

Trust in order instituti ons ORDIN Trust in city hall

b) Productive sociability (social capital) Table R 11 . Predictors of social capital for urban population Dependent variables in multiple regression equations Predictors

AGE

(0.0 0) (0.04 ) (0.01 ) (0.04 ) 0.08

(0.00) (0.05)

(0.05)

0.08

0.07

(0.04)

0.09

0.07

(0.04)

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.00)

(0.02)

0.06

(0.02)

(0.00)

(0.00)

(0.07)

0.09

(0.10)

(0.01)

-0.07

0.09

(0.09)

0.09

0.06

(0.05) 0.17

195

Standar d error

Dumitru Sandu

Localization in central or western regions of the country CENTWEST R2 Average

0.07

(0.08)

(0.05)

0.24

(0.00)

0.03 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.05 -4.69 17.68 61.28 21.15 13.2 1 Standard 47.4 0.81 62.03 38.97 40.87 deviation 6 Data source: Public opinion barometer of Open Society Foundation POB- OSF, 1998. Each column in the table presents a multiple regression model with stardised coefficients. All figures that are not included into () indicate coefficients that are significant for p=0.05. Table R 12. Full models explaining rural and urban ethnic tolerance, 1998 Ethnic tolerance as dependent variable predictors Urban sample Rural sample standardise unstandard standardise d ised d regression regression regression coefficient coefficient coefficient s s s intercept * -58.25 * age 0.06 0.15 (0.03) man (1 yes, 0 no) (0.02) (1.90) (0.05) graduated primary (0.01) (1.87) 0.10 school (1 yes, 0 no graduated high school (0.03) (2.59) (0.06) (1 yes, 0 no graduated university 0.11 10.50 0.09 (1 yes, 0 no BUNURI material (0.02) (0.74) (-0.05) capital satisfaction on monetary income risk aversion RISCAVER

unstandard ised regression coefficient s -50.40 (0.06) (3.62) 8.26 (5.72) 12.63 (-1.98)

0.06

2.98

0.08

3.53

-0.06

-2.39

(0.02)

(0.79)

(0.05) (0.96) 0.10 1.33 DIVERSITATE religious diversity in local community county development (0.00) (0.00) 0.07 0.25 DEVJUD 0.20 16.35 0.19 14.43 residence in centralwest regions of the country R2 0.08 0.10 Data source: Public opinion barometer of Open Society Foundation POB- OSF, 1998. Each column in the table presents a multiple regression model . All figures that are not included into () indicate coefficients that are significant for p=0.05.

Table R 13. Models explaining ethnic tolerance for Romanians and Hungarians, 1999 Predictors

ETNIC Ethnic tolerance as dependent variable Ethnic Romanians Ethnic Hungarians from Romania

196

Social Space of Transition

unstandard ised regression coefficient s

standar dised regress ion coeffic ients

unstandard ised regression coefficient s

standardise d regression coefficient s

intercept -86.28 -111.24 urban residence (1 (-5.34) (-0.57) -24.48 -0.28 yes, 0 no) man (1 yes, 0 no) (0.92) (0.10) (-0.33) (-0.01) education 3.67 0.12 (3.27) (0.10) DEVJUD county (0.14) (0.04) (-0.41) (-0.06) development age 0.33 0.12 0.48 0.19 locality size (ln of 2.00 0.10 8.40 0.32 population) average personal 0.003 0.05 (0.003) (0.07) income per hhd BUNURI material (-0.93) (-0.02) (-5.28) (-0.15) capital of the hhd RELIGIOZITATE 2.50 0.07 6.06 0.19 religious orientation INTERPERS99 26.65 0.28 21.12 0.24 interpersonal trust R2 0.13 0.26 Data source: Public opinion barometer of Open Society Foundation POB- OSF, 1999. Each column in the table presents a multiple regression model . All figures that are not included into () indicate coefficients that are significant for p=0.05.

197

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Annex 3. Factor analyses Table F 1. Factor structure of status space, 1998 Commun Factors alities IndividualRegionalfamily capital* community CAPITAL98 development* COMREG98 Urban residence (1 yes, 0 no) 0.80 0.18 0.67 locality development QLIFE/UR 0.79 0.04 0.62 county development DEVJUD 0.62 0.08 0.39 RELATII network capital 0.03 0.71 0.51 education 0.36 0.71 0.63 age 0.04 -0.67 0.45 BUNURI material capital 0.44 0.59 0.54 percent eigenvalues 37.89 16.68 Data source: Public opinion barometer of Open Society Foundation POB- OSF, 1998.Extraction with PCA and rotation with VARIMAX. * loading coefficients

Table F 2. Factor structure of status space, May 1999. Model 1 Factors Regionalcommunity development* COMREG98

Individualfamily capital* CAPITAL98

Urban residence (1 yes, 0 no)

0.83

0.09

locality development QLIFE/UR

0.80

0.05

county development DEVJUD

0.60

0.01

BUNURI material capital

0.51

0.48

age

0.01

-0.73

RELATII network capital

-0.02

0.74

Education

0.47

0.60

C o m m un ali tie s 0. 70 0. 64 0. 37 0. 50 0. 55 0. 54 0. 58

percent eigenvalues 37.24 17.98 Data source: Public opinion barometer of Open Society Foundation POB- OSF, 1999.Extraction with PCA and rotation with VARIMAX. * loading coefficients

Table F 3. Factor structure of status space, May 1999. Model 2 Factors Communityregional development* Urban residence (1 yes, 0 no) 0.85 locality development QLIFE/UR 0.81 county development DEVJUD 0.56

198

Consolidation of individualfamily capital* 0.12 0.09 0.13

Co mm unal ities 0.73 0.66 0.33

Social Space of Transition

RELATII network capital -0.14 0.85 0.74 BUNURI material capital 0.42 0.63 0.57 Education 0.43 0.62 0.57 percent eigenvalues 41.70 18.13 Data source: Public opinion barometer of Open Society Foundation POB- OSF, 1999.Extraction with PCA and rotation with VARIMAX. * loading coefficients Factor rotation by OBLIMIN results in the same configuration of factors and the two factors correlate to the level 0.28. Model 1 1999 is constructed for comparability with the model using 1998 data. Model 2 1999 omits age, Factor structure is more simple than in model 1 meaning by it the it is easier to interpret the factors and there are no “impure” or composite variables with high loadings in the two factors.

Table F 1 . Factor structure of transition ideologies Factors Change ideologies * SCHIMBA RE

Commun ity ideologie s* COMUN ITATE 0.05 0.07

Commu nalities

Liberal orientation LIBERAL99 0.76 0.57 would vote for right oriented coalition of 0.63 0.40 Democratic Convention CDR (1 yes, 0 no) Support the statement that “only those taking risks 0.49 -0.15 0.27 can win” (1 yes, 0 no) is proud of being Romanian citizen (1 yes, 0 no) -0.08 0.65 0.42 RELIGIOZITATE religious orientation -0.11 0.64 0.42 generalized trust (factor score of interpersonal, 0.33 0.63 0.50 order institutions and ethnic trust) percent eigenvalues 23.31 19.82 Data source: Public opinion barometer of Open Society Foundation POB- OSF, 1999. Extraction and rotation methods are PCA and VARIMAX. KMO index is rather low of 0.55. The same data set analysed by maximum verosimiliy method for extraction of the factors results in the same factor structure, with a : p=0.45. A rotation by OBLIMIB give the same configuration of loadings by factors and a very small correlation between factors. * loading coefficients

Table F 2. The factor structure of the transition social space Factors Modernity Resources Comm MODERNITA RESURSE unalitie TE s Durable satisfaction SDURATA 0.71 0.10 0.5 Modernity ideologies SCHIMBARE 0.69 0.23 0.49 Regional-community development COMREG 0.16 0.79 0.63 Capital stocks CAPITAL 0.51 0.72 0.69 Pro-community ideologies COMUNITATE 0.47 -0.53 0.58 Percent eigenvalue 34.37 23.45 Data source: Public opinion barometer of Open Society Foundation POB- OSF, 1999. Extraction and rotation methods are PCA and PROMAX. KMO index is rather low of 0.57. Structure matrix coefficients are noted in the table as correlations between factors and variables. PROMAX is an algorithm of rotation. Correlation between factors is of 0.14.

199

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1

A whole volume of history sociology focused on the transformation of the devălmaş (form of traditional village with large community ownership and decision mechanisms) villages (Stahl, 1998) illustrates the tendency of giving specific names to the processes or changes which have effected these communities: “enslavement of village communities”, “territorial expansion”, “passing from the feudal domain to the estate worked by compulsory labour”, “form of passing from .. to ..”. The labelling of some changes like “transition” is practically absent in the work mentioned. 2 The idea of transition is associated with that of crisis. Illustrative in this sense is Wallerstein’s discourse. He considers that at this moment the modern world system is in crisis and that we find ourselves in transition to another mode of organisation: “The modern world system is coming to the end of its existence. At least another 50 years of terminal crises or chaos, respectively, will be necessary before we will be able to hope of entering a new order (Wallerstein, 1995, 144). 3 “Crises” is an inevitable concept (of high frequency in the analysis of post communist-transition in the case of Romania) in association with the concepts of “social politics”, “poverty”, “well-being” etc. (see, for example, Zamfir, 1999:113-148) 4 “There is no doubt that the current analyses, focused on the variables, and which deal with topics or fields of groups which involve interpretation processes, ignore such processes. (Blumer, 1969:132). Blumer admits that in research that operates with dependant and independent variables, the interpretation may be a kind of intermediary variable. The solution, however, doesn’t seem to him to be adequate, given that “interpretation is a formative or creative independent process. By means of this, meanings are constructed that are neither redetermined, nor determined by the independent variables.” (Blumer, 1969: 135). Without doubt, interpretation is a creative process. Naturally, interpretations are psychological actions of context. There is, however, also the fact that persons living in similar contexts end up having similar interpretations. In so far as context variables, with the help of which types of situations are constructed, are associated with the individual opinion data, the contextual determination of the interpretations can be more easily reconstituted or interpretations can be inferred by placing some profiles of agents of social actors in social contexts. 5 The rate of infant mortality was 175.6 per thousand in 1930. At the beginning of the communist transition in 1950, this indicator had the value of 116.7 per thousand, so that, as a result of the near linear decrease, the value for 1989 was 26 per thousand and that of 1998 was 20 per thousand. Despite this decrease, the social situation in Romania in the 1990’s continues to be that of a periphery country, just as in the 1930’s. Our neighbours in post-communist transition have indicators of infant mortality considerably lower. Thus, in 1996, the figures for infant mortality for Bulgaria were 15.6 per thousand, for Hungary 10.9 per thousand, for Poland 10.2 per thousand and for the Czech Republic 6.0 per thousand (Source: Statistical Year Book of Romania 1998, National Commission for Statistics and Romania in Figures, National Commission for Statistics, 1999). The second indicator of social development significant for the evolutions from the communist period is education stock. At the beginning of the interval, in 1956, the section of the population over 11 years that had finished secondary school or university was 6.2%. At the last census in 1992, at the beginning of post-communist transition, this figure was 23.6% . An increase of nearly four times this percentage shows clearly the enormous accumulation of human capital realised at the societal level. Naturally the quality of this capital can be discussed in connection with the character of education in the respective period. Despite such relativisation, the fact of accumulation of human capital in the communist period cannot be ignored (Source: Romanian Demographic Year Book.1996, National Commission for Statistics). 6 From 26% in October 1996, before the general elections, to 45% in March 1997, according to the “socio-human resources of reform” barometer of opinion, sponsored by the Foundation for Open Society and carried out by different institutes for public opinion polls selected on the basis of a public tender. It is very likely that the increase in “gift trust” was much higher, measured after the elections. In continuation we will refer to this data source through acronyme POB-OSF. 7 Between March 1997 and May 1999, the amount of the population which had trust in government was reduced from 45% to 23%. The decline in the number of those having trust in parliament was similar, from 39% to 20% (POB-OSF). 8 From 28% In March 1997 to 82% in May 1999 (POB-OSF). 200

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9 The Balcerowicz plan operated with the exemplary role model, applied in Poland beginning in January 1990. Its main components were macro-economic stabilisation, liberalisation directed towards the reinstallation of different markets, privatisation, assurance of the social protection net and mobilisation of the international financial assistance for supporting of the reform. 10 ″Revolutions are attempts by the subordinated groups to transform the social bases of political power″ (Kimmel, 1990:6) 11 The idea that all street demonstrators in the eastern European revolutions of 1989 thought the change to be only orientated towards market economics and democracy represents more of a post-factum realisation. There were also portions of the population which participated in the street demonstrations in the hope of being freed from totalitarianism and of building a democratic socialism that would bring an improvement to the standard of living, without, however, removing the fundamental socialist structures (Pasti, 1995: 257) 12 The orientation of the social movements for changing institutional order can be seen again both in the case of the national social movements specific to the 19th Century and in the case of new social movements. Charles Tilly (1988:1) names as national social movements “a sustained provocation of the state authorities in the name of a population that depends on a reduced level of formal power in the relations with the state”. Heberle, one of the founders of modern studies of social movements, considers that their main objective is “to establish the fundamental changes in the social order, in particular at the level of the basic institutions of property and work relations” (apud Gundelasch, 1989: 428). 13 See, for example, the interview with James D. Wolfensohn, the president of the World Bank, in Transition, volume 10, number 3, 1999. The comprehensive development frame (CDF) is synthesized from Wolfensohn by means of the CDF matrix. This has two dimensions. The first refers to the preconditions for lasting development and for the fight against poverty, and the second refers to the actors in the fields of development. The preconditions for lasting growth are considered to be: a) structural needs of development (efficient government, efficient legal system, well organised finance system, efficient social protection system), b) human needs (institutions of education and knowledge, institutions of health and the population), c) physical needs (water supply and sewage system, energy, roads, transport and telecommunications, lasting development, environmental protection), d) specific rural, urban and private sector strategies, e) special national aspects. The actors of the field of development are considered to be the government bodies on the national, state, and local level, civil society in all its forms, the internal and foreign private sector and the international agents. 14 Social space is conceptualised by Bourdieu (1989) as a system of relations between social positions. The distribution of the agents in social space is given by the volume of capital that they posses and by its structure as relative amount in the relation between the economic, cultural, social and symbolic capitals. The first three are fundamental. Symbolic capital is conceived as the manifestation of the other three as source of legitimisation, it is “the power accorded to those who have obtained sufficient recognition to be in a position to impose recognition” (Bourdieu, 1989:23). Cultural capital is, in essence, the existing informal capital in institutionalised, objectivised and incorporated form. Social capital is “the sum of the actual or virtual resources that accumulate at an individual or group level by virtue of the implications in a lasting network or reciprocal knowledge and recognition relations. Political capital is considered to be a special form of social capital. In general, capital is defined as “the accumulation of work (in materialised or incorporated form) which allows the agents or groups of agents to posses social energy” (Bourdieu, Wacquant, 1992:118-119). 15 For a definition of the sense which I have given to the four analytical concepts of process, structure, action and phenomenon see Sandu 1987:30-33, and for the definition of the forms of capital see Sandu, 1996. 16 I use the notion of human capital in the sense given by Gary Becker (1997). In general, capital is defined as a stock by means of which “income or other similar results, useful over a long period of time” are produced (Beker, 1997,17). Human capital is a information stock, condition of health and value with the function of capital: “Schooling, a practical computing course, figures on medical care and courses on the virtues of punctuality and honesty represent such capital in the sense that they improve health, they increase the profit or increase strongly the appreciation of a person..” (Beker, 1997,17). ”The main characteristic that differentiates human capital from other types of capital is that which, by definition, the first one is embodied into the person that invests” (Becker, 1997,124). 17 On this line of content, Wallerstein (1995,127) distinguishes between the modernity of technology and the modernity of freedom. The history of the modern world system is, in his opinion, the history of conflict between the two modernities: “Between 1500 and 1800, the two modernities seemed to be in tandem. Between 1798 and 1968, their latent conflict was kept under control by means of the attempt of success of the liberal

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ideology to claim that the two modernities are identical. However, after 1968 the mask fell. The two modernities are in open battle (Wallerstein, 1995, 143). In his vision, the revolutions of 1989 are a continuation of those of 1968. 18 The syndrome of individual modernism is described by Alexander Inkeles (Inkeles, Sasaki, 1996:572 ) with a set of seven attributes: • Open to new experiences, • Statement of independence of traditional authorities, • Belief in the effectiveness of science and abandoning fatalism, • High motivation for oneself and children in the direction of self occupational and educational achievement • Careful planning of activities • Civic participation • Effort of permanently being informed and preference for national and international news compared to sports, religion or local. 19 The situations of captive optimism are identified in speciality literature on revolution and social change as situations in which relative frustration is emphasized by the increase of distance between aspirations and the possibilities of satisfying them, between “it would be right to be” and “it is”. It is the situation of manifestation of James Davis‘ “J curve” (Calvet, 1998,98). 20 The subchapter presents a slightly modified form of the study previously published in the Sphere of Politics 46-1997. 21 The poll data mentioned for 1990 were produced by the Urban and Regional Sociology Laboratory (at present CURS) for the Research Office of USIA. I pondered the segment of 1565 people of 18 years old and over to make the representation according to the level of education and reached a number of 1072 cases. 22 In the same poll from note 1 a pack of questions was formulated preceded by the preamble “People have different reactions to the words that describe political ideas. As I read such words please tell me what feelings (reactions) you have – positive, negative or none at all”. The given words and distribution of answers was % Words of reference Democracy Front Social democracy Party Capitalism Communism 23

Percentage of people who claimed to have …… feelings negative neutral positive 3 14 83 13 21 66 8 55 37 25 38 37 42 38 20 80 18 1

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100

Lucian Pop in Ionica Berevoescu ,D.Chiribucă, M.I.Comşa...,1999, proves with the POB-OSF data, June 1998, that optimism is strongly dependent on the evaluation of the previous dynamics of one’s own level of life. In connection to the factors that favour optimism L.Pop concludes that “predictions that individuals make in connection to their future situation do not depend on their individual resources as education, but more on their perception of opportunities the system offers them …” (p.24-25). The perception of a state of emphasized corruption is identified as a favourable factor for optimism. 24 37% of women aged between 18 and 29 considered they would be better off in a year’s time compared to only 18% of optimistic men over 59 (source POB-FDS 1998). 25 The comparison was made on the basis of a logistic regression after I selected from the data only from people who were either chronic pessimists or recent pessimists. Predictor are the same as in table 1-3. I also included the evaluation of the past compared to the present (NOW/YESTERDAY98). In the conditions in which the fictitious, dependent variable is 1 – recent pessimism and 0 – chronic pessimism, predictor with b coefficients exponentially, significantly different to 0 for p=0.05 are HEALTHY (+), GOODS (+),VENPERS (+), RELATIONS (+), IGUVERN (+), SCOMUNITAR (+), URBAN (-) AND NOW/YESTERDAY98 (-). The sign in parentheses indicates the meaning of the relationship between predictor and the dependant variable for the regression coefficient b. 26 The dynamic optimist type is described by Max More (1997): “Dynamic optimism is a constructive, active and power generating (empowering) attitude which creates successful conditions by focusing and acting on the 202

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possibilities and opportunities.” This type of optimism is opposite to the passive one. Dynamic optimism is described by More using 12 attributes, 5 referring to positive interpretation of the experience and 7 significant for achieving positive results: 1. emphasizing positive aspects of life 2. avoiding self pity, considering life not as it should be but as it is 3. the tendency to overcome limits, “a constructive skepticism that tends to lead to overcoming limits created by habit” 4. feeling of abundance – admitting the fact that the world is full of opportunities 5. humour 6. rationality 7. orientation towards self perfection 8. experimentalism 9. self confidence 10. self value 11. taking on personal responsibilities 12. selective behaviour in relation to the environment, seeking out those who can help and inspire. Thus defined, dynamic optimism overlaps, I believe, individual modernism (Inkeles,1996). 27 Communitarian satisfaction tends to be higher for older men with a low level of education and strong interaction with neighbours. In their case the level of expectations of the life environment seems to be more reduced. The rural–urban differentiations of this phenomenon disappear in the case in which the level of development of the town is controlled. Communitarian satisfaction is greater for local communities that have a more developed level of life: SCOMUNITARA98 = 0.04*MAN98+0.06*AGE98-0.16*EDUCATION98 +(0.01)*GOODS98 +(0.03)*RELATIONS98-(0.05)*URBAN98 +0.08*QLIFE/UR +0.06*NEIGHBOURS98. Partially standardized regression coefficients, not included in () are significantly different to 0 for p=0.05. R2=0.04. Source POB-OSF, 1998. Positive association of long term satisfaction with the age variable squared could also be interpreted in the sense of capturing the element at a low level of expectations, associated with age, through this transformation. 28 QLIFE/UR is the index used to measure the level of the quality of life for communes as well as cities (see Table A2). The hypothesis of building this index is that even though villages and cities are very different, the quality of local life, no matter the demographic or residential size, it can be “read” through the demographic phenomenon of infantile mortality, fertility and migration. The cities in which the level of life is higher, infantile mortality, emigration and fertility are at low levels. 29 Social space is conceptualized by (1989) as a system of relations between social positions. The distribution of agents in social space is given by the volume of capital they own and its structure as a relative percentage in the relationships between economic, cultural, social and symbolic capitals. The first three are fundamental. Symbolic capital is conceived as a manifestation of the other three as a source of identification, it is “the power given to those that have obtained sufficient acknowledgement to be in the position to impose acknowledgement” (Bourdieu, 1989:23). Cultural capital is, in essence, informational capital existent in an institutionalized form, objectified and incorporated. Social capital is “the sum of present or virtual resources that accumulate at an individual or group level with the purpose of involving oneself in a durable network of connections and reciprocal acknowledgement”. Political capital is considered a particular form of social capital. In general, capital is defined as an “accumulation of work (in materialized or incorporated form) that, when it is achieved on a private, exclusive basis by agents or groups of agents allows them to own social energy in the form of live or objectified work.”Bourdieu, Wacquant, 1992:118-119). 30 In the previous study (Sandu 1996a) I used the syntagm of “status space” in a limited sense for the situations in which invidual–family capital has high values but the localization is in poor areas. In the respective space we identify the presence of rich people in poor areas, people with high levels of individual modernism. In the context of the present analysis the notion of status space is used in a larger sense, to designate the totality of social positions resulting from the intersection of status variables that measure the different forms of capital– human, material or social. In structuring this space age comes in as a composite, status variable significant for the three forms of capital previously mentioned. Status space is contra-positioned to that of communitarian–regional and societal, in this sense. 31 The set of fictitious variables referring to human resources in the table in annex R4 is conceived in such a way that using it does not bring multi-colinearity. The reference category, that of households formed only 203

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of people that are not wage earners, pensioners or farmers (solely domestic, for example) represent 3% of rural households of the total segment of 16733 cases. 32 Defining ideology as a system of positive and normative beliefs appears with Shils (apud Boudon, 1986, 33). The meaning adopted by Boudon is different. Ideology, considers the latter, is “a doctrine based on a scientific argument and endowed with a credibility that is either excessive or unfounded” (Boudon, 1986, 52). The definition given by Boudon is in good measure reducible to Shils’ definition if we consider the fact that an unfounded doctrine is in fact founded on beliefs or their substitutes such as preconceptions, prejudice etc. 33 The comparison of liberal individualists with communitarian ones is done through logistic regression in which only people that belong to one of the two categories remain. The logistic regression model is built by using predictors from Table 2-9. All the other logistic models with other pairs of ideologic types are built in the same manner of extraction from the data of those that refer only to the compared categories. In the interpretation the predictors are mentioned that register logistic regression coefficients of a significant statistic level for p<0.05. 34 This chapter represents a transformation of the study The Entrepreneurial Road: Without Trust but with Connections that I published in Romanian Sociology 2/1999. A first form of the material made up the content of the communication I presented on the 30th of June 1999 at the World Bank, Washington under the title Reinventing entrepreneurship by networks and (dis)trust. Transition challenges in Romanian Villages. The data was analyzed within the research grant “Entrepreneurship and Social Capital in Romanian Rural Communities”, accorded by the World Bank (1999). 35 Niklas Luhman considers that a basic function of trust is that of an increase of tolerance of uncertainty (apud Barbara Misztai, 1996:73). From this point of view, intergroup tolerance can be considered as being a consequence of trust. 36 The probity that the moral trait is included by Giddens in defining confidence as a concept that includes trust: “Trust can be defined as confidence in the seriousness of a person or a system, referring to a resulting set of data or events, where confidence represents the conviction in the probity or love of another, or in the correctness of certain abstract principles (technical knowledge) (Giddens, 1990:34). “Trust in people – says Giddens in the same study, underlining the importance of moral evaluations for trust – implies visible commitments in which indicators of integrity or of another type are sought (with a certain area of action),” (88) 37 Dumitru Sandu, 1996:114-122. 38 Ronald Inglehart 1997:.82. 39 Niklas Luhmann (1986:6) considers that love, money, power and trust are symbolic environments of change. He develops Talcott Parson’s theory of symbolic environments of identified interactions as being money, power, influence and generalized commitments (Talcott Parsons, 1982). 40 I made a first presentation of trust as a form of social change in the preface of the Romanian translation of John Davis’ volume, 1998. The diagram adds the idea that investment of trust contributes not only to status consolidation and building the social communitarian environment but also to developing institutional culture. 41 The subchapter is a development of the analysis I published in The Sphere of Politics, 40-1996, Trust as a resource of transition II. 42 An excellent comparative approach, of a synchronic-structural type is developed in Richard Rose, Christian W. Haerpfer,1994 . 43 “The state as an enemy”, “isolation of local powers” “the injustice of justice” or “the fragile trust between citizen and justice” are key syntagm in characterizing the legitimacy of the state for societies such as the one in Mezzogiorno. In this type of studies institutional distrust is the essential indicator of the lack of legitimacy ( Chritian :1995). 44 From the polls carried out by METROMEDIA for OSF in March 1997 it results that 50% of those interviewed believed that the reform program of the new government would succeed. Of these, 48% declared that they were willing to accept sacrificed for the duration of a year for the reform to succeed. 45 COMALP poll, financed by CNCSU, carried out by the Sociology Department of the University of Bucharest in September 1995. 46 In September 1991, the “social atlas of Romania” poll carried out by CURS indicated that 42% of people trusted the government. Only a few weeks later, in October, another poll carried out also by CURS registered that 46% of people trusted the government. At that time the trust in Petre Roman, the prime minister that was talked about due to the miner’s protest (mineriade) in October 1991, had a trust rating of 62%. 47 42% of those who showed trust in the government declare that they would vote with PDSR; of the total that did not have trust in the government, 44% declared they were undecided and 25% would vote with historical 204

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or liberal parties (COMALP poll, 1995)s. In May 1999 the relation was similar: 23% of those who trusted the government would vote with CDR as compared with only 10%, the corresponding percentage for the total of those who did not trust the government (POB-OSF). 48 Wealth is measured through the factorial score of self estimated variables, owning a car, a freezer, a colour television, a video and a telephone subscription and the parameters of material satisfaction is built by aggregating the information about satisfaction in reference to the home, income, long term household use goods and food; the seriousness of the problems associated with local infrastructure is measured as a factorial score from the evaluations of the seriousness of local problems in reference to medical services, day care centres, kindergartens, public transport and food stores; the parameters of the seriousness of local problems associated with crime and corruption is also made up as a factorial score. Individual modernism is measured by using a parameter of personal dominant opinion IOPD= 100*(p-n)*(k-ne)/k2 , where k is the number of items used to build the parameter, p – the number of positive answers fro the k parameters, n – number of negative answers and ne – the number of neutral answers. The parameter varies between 100 for all positive answers and –100 for all negative answers. The items used to measure individual modernism are: preference for justified actions, well grounded versus those carried out at random, preference for life strategies based on luck and risk, the rejection of habit as a principle by which man should guide his life. The seriousness of the social problems at a county level from which the subject is selected is measured as a factorial score from the amount of infantile mortality, unemployment, temporary relocation to another county and the average surface per household, values for 1994. For the entire set of models in chapter 3-2, the data comes for the COMALP poll, 1995. 49 Source POB-OSF, 1998 50 The subchapter results from the transformation and translation of the study published in 1999 (Sandu, 1999) 51 For a detailed analysis of confessional structure of the country and its dynamics, see Vladimir Trebici, 1998. 52 For details see K.Joreskog and D.Sorbom, 1989. 53 Openness to new experiences proved to be a key indicator of the individual modernism syndrome, Alex Inkeles, 1996. 54 See, for example, Akos Rona-Tas, 1994 55 The first part of the chapter is a developed form of The entrepreneurial path: without trust but with connections which I published in Romanian Sociology, 2/1999 and the second part reproduces the study Who are the entrepreneurs in the agriculture of transition? , Romanian Sociology, 1/1999. 56 “The term is applied in fact to certain functional groups, occupational with a high status (no matter the reason) in society” (Bottomore, 1964:6). 57 A first analysis of entrepreneurial orientation using data from the first wave of the OSF 1998 poll was made by Sebastian Lăzăroiu in I.Berevoescu, D.Chiribucă, M.Comşa, N.Grigorescu, A.Lăzăroiu, M.Pană, L.Pop, S.M.Stănculescu, 1999, chapter 2.5. S.Lăzăroiu is interested in the variation of entrepreneurship at a national level, without differentiating between the rural and urban communities. He distinguishes only two categories of entrepreneurs form the risk taking point of view. Our typology is projected on the basis of a different hypothesis, in other words of fulfilled desire, intention or behaviour which are relevant stages for adopting entrepreneurship as social innovation. Even if the data and the approaches are different, some conclusions of both analyses are the same. He identifies age, individual modernism and the sphere of useful CONNECTIONS as relevant predictors for entrepreneurship. Decreased interpersonal and institutional trust is also observed by both analysis. 58 Weber (1993) noted the clear correspondence between the predestination doctrine from Calvinism – professional success through work as confirmation of the state of grace – and the progress of capitalism. 59 A household includes many families. Due to the fact that the proportion of multi-family households is very low in Romania (92% of family households are made up of only one family nucleus, according to the data of a census carried out in 1992), I used “family” and “household” here as interchangeable terms. 60 For an analysis of the means of financing Romanian agriculture between 1991 and 1996, see Emil Daniel Teşliuc (1999) 61 . In 1996 no more than 5% of family agricultural households had a personal tractor. Approximately 20% purchased insecticides and pesticides and the percentage of agricultural households that purchased fertilizer was 32%. For the lack of correlation of resources, the fact that most households with relatively large areas of agricultural land are owned by old households, with poor money resources required for the acquisition of agricultural inputs is significant. (Sandu, 1997). 205

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62

The finding is valid for the agricultural poll in 1996 as well as for the socio-human resource barometer

in 1998. 63

In the contents of the study we use the notion of family with special reference to its economic functions, to the family household. In this work I use the notion of the family with special reference to its economic function. 64 James Arbuckle, 1997 65 Thirteen cases were eliminated from the study which were outside this interval. All the households that had at least one lot of land in agricultural associations were excluded from the analysis due to the fact that their economic behaviour was different to households that cultivate their land individually. The main elements that differentiates them are the costs of labour: households in associations generally do not pay directly for agricultural labour. After abandoning the 13 aberrant cases, statistically speaking, and after eliminating households involved in associations, the sample of 1650 cases fell to 1087 units of analysis. 66 See, for example, Akos Rona-Tas, 1994 67

The chapter is based on research report that the author of the book coordinated for World Bank in Romania in the period 1996- 2001 (focused on social capital and having Ana-Maria Sandi as project officer, rural development and state of agricultural households with Henry Gordon as project officer) and a research grant from the University of Bucharest „COMREG Role of social and human capital in regional development” (C8CNCSIS). 68 „A social relationship will be called 'communal' if and so far as the orientation of social actionwhether in the individual case, on the average, or in the pure type-is based on a subjective feeling of the parties, whether affectual or traditional, that they belong together. A social relationship will, on the other hand, be called 'associative' if and in so far as the orientation 0f social action within it rests on a rationally motivated adjustment of interests or a similarly motivated agreement, whether the basis of rational judgment be absolute values or reasons of expediency. It is especially common, though by no means inevitable, for the associative type of relationship to rest on a rational agreement by mutual consent.” (Weber, 1964:136) 69 Data source National Commission of Statistics, NCS, 1992 census data. 70 Teius, for example is a small town from Alba county having 7363 inhabitants in 1998. In 1992 its status was of a commune composed of 5 villages. A similar administrative change was recorded for Faget, a new town in Timis county. Goranu, Lespezi, Feteni and Salistea are four villages that in 1992 were recorded as rural units, component of Goranu commune, and have been redefined later on as component units of Ramnicu Valcea city. A similar redefinition was adopted for the villages of Cernele commune - Cernele, Cernele de Sus, Izvoru Rece and Rovine - that are now part of Craiova city. 71 Data source: Living Standerd Measurement Survey (AIG), 1999, NIS. 72 The finding is consistent with what was noticed in the 1980s considering the relation between the size of the urban houses and infant mortality (D.Sandu, “Conditiile de locuire si starea de sanatate a populatiei urbane” (Housing conditions and health status of urban population in Romania), in Stiintele sociale si politice din Romania, ASSP, 4/1982. 73 The idea is from the unpublished paper T.Hansen I.Ianos G.Pascariu V.Platon D.Sandu ,Profiles Of Romania Development Regions, Ramboll Consultancy Group, Bucuresti, October 1997, the chapter referring to the South development region. In the same chapter was noted that “breaking the vicious circle of local poverty could be possible, on the one hand by developing agriculture and, secondly, by developing communication infrastructure” 74 Idem. 75 . Moldova, in the Eastern part of the country (not to be confused with the Republic of Moldova) passed its history mainly under the influence of Turkish and Russian Empires. In the south, Muntenia and Dobrogea have been marked mainly by Turkish influences. Moldova, Muntenia, Dobrogea and Oltenia another southern province, united and formed , at 1859, the Principality of Romania, getting full independence from Turks at 1877. The other three regions – Transylvania in the centre of the country, Banat and Crisana-Maramures in the west of the country – got independence from Austro-Hungarian empire at 1918 and united with the “Old Kingdom” 76 The educational and professional preparation increase the stock of knowledge and habits of the individual, enrich his professional and general culture. The medical investments can have as an effect the enrichment of medical knowledge and the maintenance or the recovery of the health state, sine qua non conditions for the educational and professional capital stocking and for their efficient use. The medical capital is 206

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formed therefore of medical knowledge of the individual and of psychophysical skills which allow the accumulation and the application of educational and professional human capital. A broader meaning of “human capital” could include the investments for general culture information, others than those assimilated in the professional and educational space and the investments for consolidating attitudinal structures favourable to the human performance. The confidence, for instance, an essential component of the social capital that is destined to the maintenance and functionality of the social tissue, functions also as human capital. The investments for the achievement of the social capital have a completely different nature than the investments for the proper human capital. For this reason I think it’s preferable that the confidence should be considered as social capital having a human capital function. Without being operationalized, the notion of human capital, in broader meaning, appears at G. Becker too (1997: 66): “The general term of activity is preferred to occupation or to any other more concrete term, to show the fact that any type of investment from the human capital it’s allowed: not only the training at the workplace, but also the schooling, the information supplying, the medical assistance and the moral support.” 77 The saturation corresponding to the three variables resulted from an analysis of the main components on the values corresponding to the 40 counties (with Bucharest excluded due to its extreme values) are EDUCAT=0.92, INFANT=-0.68, COMUNIC=0.87. The factor composed of these three variables explains 68% of the variation of the data matrix. All standardization or correlation calculations are made without Bucharest, due to the extreme values, which characterize it. 78 The HUMAN regional capital development index is built as a factorial score from the indexes EDUCAT, INFANT and COMUNIC. This score is multiplied by 100. For each of the two reference years, 1991 and 1995, specific indexes are built . The measuring of the educational capital could only be achieved by census data. Therefore, the variation of 1995 index compared to 1991 index means some modification in human capital, due to infant mortality and communication medium, while the education stock is considered constant. Bucharest was excluded from the analysis de to the extreme values it presents for some of the indexes. 79 Infant mortality is a negative measure of the sanitary capital. The higher the values of this index for a given territory, the higher the probability that the medical knowledge stock and phsyco-fizical potential of action are lower. Health in itself means a high potential of phsyco-fizical action, of converting the educational and professional capital in performant actions. We consider the infant mortality values over periods of three years in the analysis ( 1989-1991, 1993-1995). The cumulated fluxes of this phenomenon can be a more reliant measure of the sanitary capital stocks than the annual ones. 80 The educational capital EDUCAT influence the health capital (measured through the reverse of the values of the variable infantile mortality INFANT) and the communication medium COMUNIC through the material capital (estimated through the number of cars in private property for 100 inhabitants in 1994). In the diagram from below there are noted the path coefficients corresponding to the relations between the different forms of regional capital and their predictors. The urbanization level of the county (urban population for 1000 inhabitants in 1995) influence the material capital at household level through educational capital. The health capital is so much bigger as the level of the family material capital is bigger and as the weight of the county territory placed in the fields (measured as percent of arable surface of the total agricultural surface) is bigger. It’s obvious, not the territory itself influence the health state, but the composition of the population and the culture type, associated with the localization in the fields. The causal model shows the fact that the medical capital variable is affected by indirect significant effects of education (0.29), urbanization (0.21), localization in Moldova (-0.14) and development of the communication medium. The path model described in the diagram has a concordance index GFI=0.93. The empirical statistical model doesn’t differ significant from the theoretical one (for the χ2 test, p=0.093). 81 The coefficients of human capital inter-county variation for the 7 development macro-regions are 4% West, 8% Southeast, 13% Centre, 14% Southwest, 15% NorthEast, 19% NorthWest, 32% South. The coefficients are computed as standard deviation weight of mean. Both the mean and the standard deviation for region were computed by weighting the population of the county in 1995. 82 The four factors specified in the model explain together 75% of the human capital inter-county variation. The analysis is made only on 40 counties, excluding the values for Bucharest due to its aberrant situation from statistical point of view. The migratory attraction is measured through the lifetime immigration rate (persons born in other county for 1000 inhabitants in the reference county, at the 1992 Census). The localization in Moldova is specified in the model through a dichotomous variable in which 1 means localization in Moldova and 0 means localization in other historical region 207

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83 See the research reports: Dumitru Sandu, Community poverty and disadvantaged groups. Study upon poverty targeting mechanisms of Romania Social Development Fund, World Bank, Bucuresti, January 1998; Dumitru Sandu (coord), The villages of Romania: development, poverty and social capital. Updating targeting for RSDF, World Bank, Bucuresti, 1999. 84 The finding is consistent with what was noticed in the 1980s considering the relation between the size of the urban houses and infant mortality (D.Sandu, “Conditiile de locuire si starea de sanatate a populatiei urbane”, in Stiintele sociale si politice din Romania, ASSP, 4/1982. 85 If not otherwise specified, the regression models are of the type multiple regression based on OLS method of estimation.

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