WAF MUN 2016 28th -30th December

Background Guide for the All India Political Parties' Meet

AGENDAS AGENDA 1: Discussion on Kashmir conflict. AGENDA 2: Discussing the Demonitisation move of the government Message from the Executive Board

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MESSAGE FROM EXECUTIVE BOARD आदरणीय राजनेताओं, It is my pleasure to welcome you all to the All India Political Parties' Meet at WAFMUN, Jaipur. In the three days of the conference, we would be discussing the Kashmir Issue and would hope to bring to a direction of how to tackle the Kashmir Crisis. To all the prospective leaders it is my advice to be through with your research and be well updated with the current scenario in Kashmir. The committee would be bilingual (Hindi and English), so you can prepare yourselves accordingly. Consider this as a golden opportunity to establish friendships for life and expand your social horizons. If you need even the smallest bit of help, remember we arethere!
 All the best for your research! Jai Hind, Jai Bharat! Regards, Executive Board AIPPM


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ABOUT AGENDA 1

Kashmir has been at the heart of a territorial dispute between India and Pakistan since the two nations gained their independence in 1947. Both claim Kashmir. In 1948 the then-ruler of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, who was holding out for independence, acceded to India on condition that the state retain autonomy in all matters except defense, currency and foreign affairs. The accession was provoked by the invasion of Pakistani raiders and an uprising of villagers in the western part of the state. Fighting between India and Pakistan ended with U.N. intervention; since 1948 the cease-fire line has been monitored by the U.N. Military Observer Group on India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). The far northern and western areas of the state are under Pakistan's control; the Kashmir valley, Jammu, and Ladakh are under India's control. U.N. resolutions calling for a plebiscite to determine the final status of the territory have been rejected by India, which claims that because Kashmiris have voted in national elections in India, there is no need for a plebiscite. Pakistan maintains that a plebiscite should be held. Several of the militant groups in Kashmir have also called for a plebiscite but argue that an independent Kashmir should be an option. On July 2, 1972, India and Pakistan signed the Simla Accord, under which both countries agreed to respect the cease-fire line, known as the Line of Control, and to resolve differences over Kashmir "by peaceful means" through negotiation. The Simla Accord left the "final settlement" of the Kashmir question to be resolved at an unspecified future date. Since then, the Simla Accord has been the touchstone of all bilateral discussions of the Kashmir issue, even though the accord itself left the issue unresolved. India's efforts to manipulate elections in Kashmir and suppress dissent have marked Kashmir's history since 1948, but it was not until 1986 that discontent within the state found wider popular support. In that year the state's ruling National Conference (NC) party, widely accused of corruption, struck a deal with India's Congress Party administration that many in Kashmir saw as a betrayal of Kashmir's autonomy. A new party, the Muslim United Front (MUF), attracted the support of a broad range of Kashmiris, including pro-independence activists, disenchanted Kashmiri youth and the pro-Pakistan Jama'at-i Islami, an Islamic political organization, and appeared poised to do well in state elections in 1987. Blatant rigging assured a National Conference victory, which was followed by the arrests of hundreds of MUF leaders and supporters. In the aftermath, young MUF supporters swelled the ranks of a growing number of militant groups who increasingly crossed over to Pakistan for arms and training. The major militant organizations were divided between those advocating an independent Kashmir and those supporting accession to Pakistan. In the late 1980s, the groups began assassinating NC leaders and engaging in other acts of violence. Some groups also targeted Hindu families, and a slow exodus of Hindus from the valley began. After the elections, militants of the JKLF and other groups stepped up their attacks on the government, detonating bombs at government buildings, buses, and the houses of present and former state officials, and enforcing a statewide boycott of the November 1989 national parliamentary elections. One month later, JKLF militants abducted the daughter of Home Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, then freed her when the government gave in to demands for the release of five detained militants. That event, together with a surge in popular protest against the state and central governments, led the central government to launch a massive crackdown on the militants. On January 19, 1990, the central government imposed direct rule on the state. From the outset, the Indian government's campaign against the militants was marked by widespread human rights violations, including the shooting of unarmed demonstrators, civilian massacres, and summary executions of detainees. Militant groups stepped up their attacks, murdering and threatening Hindu residents, carrying out kidnappings and assassinations of government officials, civil servants, and suspected informers, and engaging in sabotage and bombings. With the encouragement and assistance of the government, some 100,000 Hindu Kashmiris, known as "Pandits," fled the

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valley. By May 1990, rising tension between Pakistan and India following the escalation of the conflict in Kashmir raised fears of another war between the two countries. In late 1993, the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), an umbrella organization of the leaders of all the political and militant organizations fighting for independence, was founded to act as the political voice of the independence movement. However, rivalries within the APHC have limited its effectiveness. Charges of corruption have also tainted some APHC leaders. In the mid-1990s, Indian security forces began arming and training local auxiliary forces made up of surrendered or captured militants to assist in counterinsurgency operations. These state- sponsored paramilitary groups have committed serious human rights abuses, and human rights defenders and journalists have been among the principal victims. In May 1996, parliamentary elections were held in the state for the first time since 1989. Militant leaders called for a boycott, however, and there were widespread reports that security forces had forced some voters to go to the polls. During state assembly elections in September of that year as well, residents-particularly those living in Srinagar and other cities-also complained that the security forces had tried to counter a militant boycott by forcing some people to go to the polls. However, a large number appeared to have voted voluntarily. Following the election, the National Conference party formed the first state government since 1990. Farooq Abdullah, who together with leaders from the Congress Party had been responsible for rigging state elections in 1987, again became chief minister. On May 11 and 13, 1998, India tested five nuclear devices, and three weeks later, Pakistan responded in kind. The tests ignited a firestorm of criticism around the world and triggered sanctions by both countries' donors and trading partners. In the months following the tests, an upsurge in shelling and shooting by Indian and Pakistani troops stationed along the cease-fire line in Kashmir left over one hundred civilians dead. Following a the Indian prime minister's historic bus trip from New Delhi to the Pakistan border in February 1999, the prime ministers of both countries signed the Lahore Declaration in which they vowed, among other things, to renew talks on Kashmir and to alert each other of further arms tests. Following such a warning, on April 11,1999, India test-fired its long-range Agni missile, and on April 14 and 15, Pakistan did the same with its long-range Gauri and medium-range Shaheen missiles. India conducted another ballistic missile test on April 16; the exchange again raised international concern about the prospects for an arms race on the subcontinent. Rising tensions in the region have made clear that both India and Pakistan have legitimate security concerns related to Kashmir. But these concerns justify neither the abuses committed by Indian military and paramilitary forces nor Pakistan's support for fighters who have also committed serious human rights violations.

PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT

As of 1999, the major militant organizations fighting in Kashmir included the Hizb-ul Mujahidin, Harakat-ul Ansar and Lashgar-i Toiba. The latter two, in particular, are reported to include a large number of non-Kashmiris. Most of these groups support accession to Pakistan. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), the organization that spearheaded the movement for an independent Kashmir, declared a cease-fire in 1994. All groups have reportedly received arms and training from Pakistan. The weapons they have used include AK-47 and AK-56 assault rifles, light machine guns, revolvers, and landmines. The militants are also reported to have sophisticated night-vision and wireless communication equipment. Officially, the Pakistani government has denied involvement in arming and training Kashmiri militants, but the claim is generally not considered credible.

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Central government forces operating in Kashmir include the Indian Army and India's federal security forces, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), and the Border Security Force (BSF). The army's role in the conflict expanded in 1993 with the introduction of the Rashtriya Rifles, an elite army unit created specifically for counterinsurgency operations in Kashmir. The Rashtriya Rifles have been the main force in charge of counterinsurgency operations in Doda, Rajouri and Punch. As of June 1999, some 400,000 army troops and other federal security forces were deployed in the valley, including those positioned along the Line of Control. In May 1999 India deployed thousands of additional troops to the Kargil region. The local Jammu and Kashmir policemen are generally not involved in counterinsurgency operations, largely because they are believed to be sympathetic to the insurgency. However, in 1995 the Special Task Force (STF) and the Special Operations Group (SOG), counterinsurgency divisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Police made up of non-Muslim non-Kashmiri recruits, including some former militants, were formed apparently to create the impression that the counterinsurgency effort had local support. These police forces frequently operate jointly with the Rashtriya Rifles. Since at least early 1995 Indian security forces have armed and trained local auxiliary forces made up of surrendered or captured militants to assist in counterinsurgency operations. These forces, who function outside of the normal command structure of the Indian army and other security forces, nevertheless are considered state agents under international law. These groups participate in joint patrols, receive and carry out orders given by security officers, and operate in full view of army and security force bunkers and camps. Some members of these groups are even housed in military compounds. They include Ikhwan-ul Muslimoon and Muslim Mujahidin. (I)Article 370 of the Indian Constitution Article 370 has been the biggest impediment to integration of J&K State into Indian Union. That it was incorporated in the Indian Constitution by the machination of two individuals – Shiekh Abdullah and Nehru is all the more regrettable. Nehru had to eat the humble pie when he had to arrest the Sheikh for his divisive and anti national stance on 8 Aug 1953 but he did not let go of his concept of keeping J&K a separate entity. In 1957, some top leaders of National Conference led by Mr Qasim split the party and formed a group called Democratic National Conference (DNC). It had abrogation of Article 370 on its agenda. Nehru would not brook any opposition to his policy of keeping J&K a separate entity. He told the leaders that a new threat (China) is emerging and it is an inopportune time to raise this issue and forced them to drop their demand. Nehru thereafter decided to withdraw the Kashmir conspiracy case against Sheikh Abdullah. This case had been going on since May 21, 1958. The formal orders however were issued by Govt of India on 8 April 1964. It is often forgotten that J&K state is not a homogeneous entity. Apart from Valley Muslims, Jammu has a predominantly Hindu population while Ladakh has a mix of Buddhist and Muslims. Then you have the Gujjars & Bakarwals. Why is Article 370 detrimental to the full integration of J&K state into Indian Union? Firstly the Central Govt can make laws only with concurrence of the State govt, practically giving it the Veto power. Article 352 and 360 for declaration of national and finanancial emergency respectively cannot be applied in Kashmir. While a citizen of India has only Indian citizenship, J&K citizens have two citizenships. Anti Defection Law is not applicable to J&K. No outsider can buy property in J&K state. The beneficial laws such as Wealth Tax, Gift Tax & Urban Land Ceiling Act and intermarriage with other Indian nationals do not operate in J&K State. Even Article 356 under which President of India can impose his rule in any state can not be enforced in J&K without consent of the Governor who

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himself is an appointee of the President. State of J&K can refuse building of any cantonment on any site or refuse to allot land for defence purposes. Article 370, included in the Constitution on a temporary provision should have been gradually abrogated. This has not happened in sixty years. In fact whenever someone mentions this, vested interests raise an outcry that legitimate rights of Kashmiris are being trampled up .. Stated agenda of National Conference is return to pre 1953 status. Why should a state of Indian Union have a special status? It conveys a wrong signal not only to Kashmiris but also to the separatists, Pakistan and indeed the international community that J&K is still to become integral part of India, the sooner Article 370 is done away is better. (II)AFSPA CONTRIBUTION The continuing application of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act to the State of J&K in the rapidly changing situation has attracted much debate, often heated. Chief Minister J&K Omar Abdullah has in fact announced withdrawal of the application of the law in certain areas, whereas the army has stoutly argued in favour of continuing with the status quo . In 1997, the Apex Court had laid down a number of dos and don‘ts for AFSPA. According to the Supreme Court guidelines, any person arrested and taken into custody in exercise of the powers under Section 4(c) of the Central Act should be handed over to the officer-in-charge of the nearest police station with the least possible delay, so that he can be produced before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours of such arrest, excluding the time taken for journey from the place of arrest to the court of the magistrate; the property or the arms, ammunition etc., seized during the course of a search conducted under Section 4 (d) of the Central Act must also be handed over to the officer-in-charge of the nearest police station together with a report of the circumstances occasioning such search and seizure. The other major guideline says that the provisions of the CrPC governing search and seizure have to be followed during the course of search and seizure conducted in exercise of the power conferred under Section 4 (d) of the Central Act; and a complaint containing an allegation about misuse or abuse of the powers conferred under the Central Act shall be thoroughly inquired into. The debate around the continuation of the AFSPA has centred around the following issues: • Complete Revocation of AFSPA. • Partial Revocation of AFSPA. (Disturbed Area status lifted from certain parts of State) • AFSPA be amended to include specific safeguards and provisions thereby ensuring that current concerns are met. •

Status quo. • Application of Ranbir Penal Code, the equivalent of the Indian Penal Code (With additional safeguards for security forces) • Operate Under Unlawful Activities (Prevention Act) 2008 (With additional safeguards for security forces. (a), for the commission or suspicion of any of the following offenses: acting in contravention of any law or order for the time being in force in the disturbed area prohibiting the assembly of five or more persons, carrying weapons or carrying anything which is capable of being used as a fire-arm or ammunition. To justify the invocation of this provision, the officer need only be ―of the opinion that it is necessary to do so for the maintenance of public orderǁ and only give ―such due warning as he may consider necessaryǁ. The army can destroy property as per Section 4 (b ) if it is an arms dump, a fortified

position or shelter from where armed attacks are made or are suspected of being made, if the structure is used as a training camp, or as a hide-out by armed gangs or absconders. Besides, the army can arrest anyone- without a warrant under section 4 (c)-who has committed, is suspected of having committed or of being about to commit, a cognisable offense and use any amount of

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force ―necessary to effect the arrestǁ. Under section 4 (d), the army can enter and search without a warrant to

make an arrest or to recover any property, arms, ammunition or explosives which are believed to be unlawfully kept on the premises. This section also allows the use of force necessary for the search on Article 21 of the Constitution i.e. the Right to Life which is very basic to the Fundamental Rights. This law also overrides the CrPC. The CrPC establishes the procedure for police officers to follow for arrest, searches and seizures, a procedure that the army and other paramilitary are not trained to follow. Hence the apex Court‘s concern that when the armed forces personnel act in aid of civil power; it should be clarified that they may not act with broader power than the police and that these troops must receive specific training in criminal procedure. While explicating the AFSPA bill in the Lok Sabha in 1958, the Union Home Minister stated that the Act was subject to the provisions of the Constitution and the CrPC. He said ―these persons [military personnel] have the authority to act only within the limits that have been prescribed generally in the CrPC or in the Constitution.ǁ If this is the case, then why was the AFSPA not drafted to say ―use of minimum forceǁ as done in the CrPC? If the government truly means to have the armed forces comply with

criminal procedure, than the AFSPA should have a specific clause enunciating this compliance. Chapter X of the CrPC deals with the maintenance of public order, which provides more safeguards than the AFSPA. Section 129 in that chapter allows for dispersal of an assembly by use of civil force. The section empowers an Executive Magistrate, officer-incharge of a police station or any police officer not below the rank of sub-inspector to disperse such an assembly. It is interesting to compare this section with the powers that the army has to disperse assemblies under section 4 (a) of the Act. The CrPC clearly specifies the ranks which can disperse such an assembly, whereas the Act grants the power to use maximum force even to non commissioned officers. Moreover, the CrPC does not state that force to the extent of causing death can be used to disperse an assembly. Sections 130 and 131 of the same chapter set out the conditions under which the armed forces may be called in to disperse an assembly. These two sections have several safeguards which are lacking in the Act. Under section 130, the armed forces officers are to follow the directives of the Magistrate and use as little force as necessary in doing so. Under 131, when no Executive Magistrate can be contacted, the armed forces may disperse the assembly, but if it becomes possible to contact an Executive Magistrate at any point, the armed forces must do so. Section 131 only gives the armed forces the power to arrest and confine. Moreover, it is only commissioned or gazetted officers who may give the command to disperse such an assembly, whereas in the AFSPA even non-commissioned officers are given this power. The AFSPA, then grants far wider powers than the CrPC for dispersal of an assembly. Moreover, dispersal of assemblies under Chapter X of the CrPC is slightly more justifiable than dispersal under section 4 (a) of the AFSPA. Sections 129-131 refer to the unlawful assemblies as ones which ―manifestly endangerǁ public security. Under the AFSPA the assembly is only classified as ―unlawfulǁ leaving open the possibility that peaceful assemblies can be dispersed by use of force. Chapter V of the CrPC sets out the arrest procedure the police are to follow. Section 46 sets out exactly how arrests are to be made. It is only if the person attempts to evade arrest that the police officer may use ―all means necessary to affect the arrest.ǁ However, subsection (3) limits this use of force by stipulating that this does not give the officer the right to cause the death of the person, unless they are accused of an offence punishable by death or life imprisonment. This power is already too broad. It allows the police to use more force than stipulated in the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (see section on International law below). Yet the AFSPA is even more excessive. Section 4(a) lets the armed forces kill a person who is not suspected of an offence punishable by death or life imprisonment. And although it cannot be so construed legally, the public is convinced that this has allowed the

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army to overlook custodial killing of the atrocious kind perpetrated in Machhil, which triggered widespread disturbance in J&K in 2010. In April 2010 three young men, Muhammad Shafi Lone, Shahzad Ahmed and Riyaz Ahmed were killed in what was claimed to have been an armed encounter with terrorists in Machhil, a township nestled in the Kazinag mountain range, close to the LoC, in Kupwara District. Responding to complaints of a fake encounter staged to claim the reward for killing infiltrators, Chief Minister Omar Abdullah asked the police to make enquiry, which in its preliminary report identified an Indian Army Major as instrumental in the killing of the three who, far from being ‗infiltrators‘ from across the LoC were laborers, residents of Nadihal, in Rafiabad Under the Indian Penal Code, under Section 302, only murder is punishable with death. Murder is not one of the offenses listed in section 4(a) of the AFSPA. Moreover the 4(a) offences are assembly of five or more persons, the carrying of weapons, ammunition or explosive substances, none of which are punishable with life imprisonment under the Indian Penal Code. Under section 143 of the IPC, being a member of an unlawful assembly is punishable with imprisonment of up to six months and/or a fine. Even if the person has joined such unlawful assembly armed with a deadly weapon, the maximum penalty is imprisonment for two years and a fine. Moreover, persisting or joining in an unlawful assembly of five or more persons is also punishable with six months imprisonment, or a fine, or both. The same offence committed by someone in a disturbed area under the AFSPA is punishable with death. This again violates the Constitutional right to equality before the law. Different standards of punishment are in place for the same act in different parts of the county, violating the equality standards set out in the Constitution. Because of these features which directly contravene democratic polity there would be a good case made out for the complete revocation of the AFSPA. (III)ETHNO NATIONALISM IN THE KASHMIR VALLEY Before that the idea of ethnicity-based nationalismwas alien to Kashmir. Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz invented it and later propagated it with the help of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and Moulvi Masoodi. They coined a special term for it—Kashmiriyat, which signified that ―Kashmirisǁ were a separate quom (nation) by virtue of their common ethnicity, language, culture, habits and habitat, political interests, etc. The term ―Kashmiriǁ is a vague and tricky one. It could be applied to mean the inhabitants of Kashmir Valley as also the

inhabitants of the entire former Princely state of Kashmir. It was a time when Muslims had their guns directed against Dogra (Hindus) despotism. Punjabi Muslims, Allama Iqbal including, extended them full support. They set up All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference on October 16, 1932. Those days political atmosphere in British India was heading toward a turning point. Hindus and Muslims had parted ways politically. AIML was gaining ground. Allama Iqbal (an ethnic Kashmiri by the way, and highly respected figure in Kashmir) had floated the idea of a separate Muslim homeland: Even in recent times, Pandits (and Dogras) did not support JKLF‘s idea of an independent Kashmir because that would mean secession from Hindu India. JKLF, in their turn, although professedly secular and nationalist, committed most of the 219 Pandit killings until the last week of February 1990 when they left the Valley en mass. Simultaneously Muslims raised the slogan: ―Aye zalimo aye kafiro Kashmir hamara chhod do (You infidels, get out of our Kashmir)ǁ against Indian armed forces especially CRPF. It frightened the Pandits thinking that the slogan was directed against them. Soon Pandits started selling their Valley-based properties without giving a thought to their return. Muslims purchased these properties, in defiance of the ban imposed by militant outfits like Hizbul-Mujahideen, because these were available on nominal prices.

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Some Pandits now demand setting up of ―Exclusive Townshipǁ for them in the Valley so that they could return. Muslims smell a ―Zionist-typeǁ conspiracy in this ―Pandit enclaveǁ demand. The reality is that most Pandits don‘t want to return to a place, which is enveloped, in political uncertainty. Furthermore, Muslims oppose Pandit yatras (pilgrimages) to various mountain lakes and shrines in Kashmir under the pretext of saving the fragile environment of Kashmir. Yet they did not (and do not) care a fig about fragile environment while purchasing timbers vandalized by smugglers from Kashmir forests at cheapest rates. Pandits (and other Hindus) are hell bent upon carrying out these yatras in large numbers not to derive any spiritual solace but to pursue their political agenda of establishing their exclusive claim on Kashmir Valley. (IV) EXTREMISTS UPSURGE Militancy in the disputed region of Kashmir has been major fuel for discord between India and Pakistan since the 1980s. Attacks in the region began to increase in scale and intensity following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when foreign insurgents flooded the region to join the Afghan Mujahadeen. The majority Muslim region has its own local militant groups, but experts believe most of the recent Kashmir and Kashmir-based terrorism has been the work of foreign Islamists who seek to claim the region for Pakistan. A spate of Islamist cross-border attacks into Indian-held territory, the December 2001 storming of the Indian parliamentin New Delhi, and the 2008 Mumbai attacks have all reinforced Kashmir's standing as the significant bone of contention between India and Pakistan. Both states have nuclear weapons, making Kashmir one of the world's most dangerous flashpoints.

ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT

Kashmir has been a constant source of tension since 1947, when the British partitioned their imperial holdings in South Asia into two new states, India and Pakistan. For Pakistan, incorporating the majority Muslim province of Kashmir is a basic national aspiration bound up in its identity as an Islamic state.Islamabad's official line on Kashmir, which the United States echoed as recently as June 2009, is that incorporation into either India or Pakistan must be determined by Kashmiris. Meanwhile, India sees the province as vital to its identity as a secular, multiethnic state. Movements for an independent Kashmiri state, such as the Kashmir Freedom Movement and the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front, also exist and have many supporters. India now holds about two-thirds of the disputed territory, which it calls Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan controls about one-third, which it calls Azad (meaning "free") Kashmir. China also controls two small sections of northern Kashmir. India and Pakistan fought two wars over the region in 1947 and 1965, and a limited conflict in 1999. At least fifty thousand people have died in political violence in Kashmir since 1989. Though flare-ups have occurred on both sides of the line, violence in Kashmir has decreased dramatically. According to the Indian Home Ministry, the number of violent incidents in 2008 was the lowest in twenty years (AFP) at seven hundred, a 40 percent drop compared to the number of incidents reported in 2007. The South Asia Terrorism Portal reports that 2008 also marks the first time civilian casualties have been under one hundred since 1990.

TERRORIST GROUPS

The U.S. State Department lists three Islamist groups active in Kashmir as foreign terrorist organizations: Harakat ul-Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Lashkar-e-Taiba. The first group has been listed for years, and the other two were added after the December 2001 Indian parliament attack. All three groups have attracted Pakistani members as well as Afghan and Arab veterans who fought the 1980s Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

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· Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM) was established in the mid-1980s. Based first in Pakistan and then in

Afghanistan, it has several hundred armed supporters in Pakistan and Kashmir. The group is responsible for the December 1999 hijacking of an Indian airliner and numerous attacks on Indian troops and civilians in Kashmir. Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front Harakat members have participated in insurgent and terrorist operations in Myanmar, Tajikistan, and Bosnia.

· Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) was founded in 2000 by Maulana Masood Azhar, a Pakistani cleric. The group seeks

to incorporate Kashmir into the state of Pakistan and has openly declared war on the United States. JEM has carried out attacks on Indian targets, the Pakistani government, and various sectarian minority groups within Pakistan. Acts of terrorism attributed to the group include the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament and a series of assaults in 2002 on Christian sites in Pakistan. The Pakistani government has also implicated JEM for the two assassination attempts on former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. According to the U.S. State Department, the group has at least several hundred armed supporters as well as tens of thousands of followers.

· Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), active since 1993, was formed as the military wing of the well-funded Pakistani Islamist

organization Markaz-ad- Dawa-wal-Irshad. The group, one of the largest and most proficient of the Kashmir-based terrorist groups, has claimed responsibility for a number of high-profile attacks on Indian targets in Jammu and Kashmir, as well as within India. India says that over the last several years the group has split into two factions, alMansurin and al-Nasirin. There is wide speculation that LeT was responsible for the July 11, 2006 string of bombings on Mumbai's commuter railroad, though a spokesman for the group denied any involvement. The Indian government alleges that LeT was responsible for coordinating the 2008 Mumbai attacks.

IMPORTANT ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION:

1) The effect of the concept of ―Kahmiriyatǁ on the region‘s isolation with the nation 2) Can article 370 of the Indian Constitution be revoked? 3) Internal problems in Kashmir such as lack of education, extremists insurgency etc. 4) Ways to regain political stability in the region.

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ABOUT AGENDA 2 UPDATES ON DEMONITISATION:On 8 November, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the biggest-ever demonetisation exercise India has ever seen by abruptly withdrawing Rs 500 and Rs 1,000 notes from public use in a bid to clamp down on black money, fake currency menace, terror funding and corruption. The PM said there are certain exemptions for the first 72 hours, including permission to use old currency in government hospitals, for buying fuel, medicines, train tickets, airline tickets, in government buses and for paying utility bills. Exchange of notes were initially allowed up to Rs 4,000 while cash withdrawal at ATMs was capped at Rs 2,000 per card per day and withdrawal at banks were allowed with a limit of Rs 10,000 per day and Rs 20,000 per week. Since then, rules have changed many times. After a month of demonetisation, the country is still reeling under the cash crunch as banks branches and ATMs are still struggling to meet the cash demand from common people. The demonetisation-resulted cash crunch has hit the economy hard, especially in the rural areas. The Narendra Modi-government and opposition parties are still fighting in Parliament over the merits and demerits of the note ban. The stated long-term gains are still unclear, while the immediate challenge for the government is to ensure cash shortage eases in the minimum time. Here is a timeline of how the days have passed in the last one month of the note ban: 9 Nov: Banks and ATMs remained closed for the public on the first day of demonetisation
 The BSE Sensex ended the day about 339 points lower
 The rupee plummeted 19 paise to 66.43 against the US dollar
 Govt announced deposits above Rs 2.5 lakh to face tax, penalty on mismatch
 Govt suspended highway toll till November 11 midnight
 Major banks extended working hours till 8 pm; waived ATM charges. 10 Nov: Long queues to exchange and deposit annulled notes witnessed at banks across India which opened for public while ATMs continued to remain shut
 Bank stocks surged up to 12 percent as analysts speculated that banking sector is expected to benefit when more money flows into the formal sector. 11 Nov: ATMs open for the first time after demonetisation announcement.

But, after opening, most ATMs

went dry in a few hours with people drawing the maximum possible amount; long queues beginning to see across the country
 RBI assures public that enough currency is available with banks for exchange
 Govt extends exemptions for using old Rs 500 and Rs 1,000 notes till 14 November midnight
 Toll waiver on national highways extended till 14 November midnight by the govt. 12 Nov: PM Modi hints at more steps to unearth black money.
 Week-end rush adds to woes; anger, impatience at banks; ATMs ran dry on cash. 13 Nov: Queues gets longer at banks, ATMs Sunday sees no let up in rush; long queues continue outside banks, ATMs
 For the second time in a week, RBI assures public that there is no need to be anxious and enough cash is available with banks. But that assurance isn't reflecting on the ground
 Exchanged limit increased from Rs 4,000 to Rs 4,500
 ATM withdrawal limit increased from Rs 2,000 to Rs 2,500


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To augment cash supplies, newly printed hard-to-fake Rs 500 notes were released in market
 The weekly limit of Rs 20,000 for withdrawal from bank counters has been increased to Rs 24,000. The maximum limit of Rs 10,000 per day on such withdrawals has been removed. 14 Nov: Government extended acceptance of Rs 500 and Rs 1,000 notes for public utility and fuel payment till 24 November
 Banks were closed on account of Guru Nanak Jayanti; queues gets longer at ATMs
 Cash withdrawal for current account holders increased to Rs 50,000 per week
 Note ban has led to 'financial chaos', said bank unions
 Charges on ATM transactions waived till 30 Dec
 Cash crunch continued; Parliament House ATMs too ran dry. 15 Nov: No respite from long queues at banks, ATMs
 Government asks banks to put indelible ink on the right hand finger of those exchanging banned 500 and 1,000 rupee notes
 SC refused to stay Centre's move to demonetise currency notes. 16 Nov: Chaos continue at banks; most ATMs ran out of cash
 SBI collected Rs 1,14,139-crore in deposits in last 7 days. 17 Nov: Government lowers the exchange limit for now-defunct 500 and 1,000 rupee notes to Rs 2,000 from the existing cap of Rs 4,500
 Cash withdrawal of Rs 2.5 lakh from bank account were allowed for wedding ceremonies
 Government eases cash withdrawal limit for farmers by allowing them to withdraw up to Rs 50,000 cash per week from bank.
 Don't hoard currency, sufficient notes in supply, RBI tells public
 Govt extended toll exemption on National Highways till November 24 midnight.
 Select petrol pumps allowed to dispense cash up to Rs 2,000 through debit card swipe.
 Some banks cut fixed deposit rates up to 1 percent. 18 Nov: No respite from queues, chaos; ATMs still fight cash shortage.
 Demonetisation to lower GDP growth by 0.3-0.5 percent, CARE Ratings says.
 Congress party alleges 55 died due to demonetisation, seeks PM's apology
 Proceedings in Parliament were washed out for the second consecutive day. 19 Nov: Queues got shorter at banks; long wait at ATMs continued. 20 Nov: With banks closed on Sunday, longer queues at ATMs 21 Nov: Farmers allowed to use old Rs 500 notes for buying seeds
 Bank received Rs 5.12 lakh crore of deposits and exchanged Rs 33,006 crore, RBI said in a release
 Demonetisation effect: GDP to fall by up to 80 bps, said DBS Bank. 22 Nov: 82,500 ATMs out of 2.2 lakh ATMs recalibrated to dispense new notes
 Some relief for cash-starved public, queues shortened as about 40 percent of total ATMs have started dispensing new Rs 500 and Rs 2,000 notes.
 RBI doubles Prepaid Payment Instruments limit to Rs 20,000.

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23 Nov: Goldman forecasts deceleration in GDP growth to 6.8 percent in FY17
 Rs 1.20 lakh crore deposited in SBI. 24 Nov: Government extends toll exemption on NHs till 2 Dec mid-night
 Notes ban to significantly disrupt economic activity, Moody's said in a release
 Government withdraws exchange facility of old currency notes and extends deadline for exemptions of using old Rs 500 notes up to 15 December midnight
 Queues get shorter at bank branches but continues at ATMs. 25 Nov: RBI says the facility to exchange old Rs 500 and Rs 1,000 notes will continue to be available at its counters
 India growth to slow to 6.5 percent on notes ban, Deutsche Bank said
 Demonetisation to slow down personal computers, phone sales in Q4, according to research firm IDC
 Notes ban to have negative impact on growth in short run, Fitch says
 Queues at banks thin, but some branches still faces cash pain. 26 Nov: Deposits in Jan Dhan accounts soars sharply by around Rs 27,200 crore to Rs 72,834.72 crore in just 14 days after the announcement of ban on old Rs 500 and Rs 1,000 currency notes 27 Nov: Rs 32,631 cr deposited in post offices since demonetization 28 Nov: Banks get about Rs 8.45 lakh crore worth of scrapped notes, RBI says
 After 3 weeks, queues at banks, ATMs shrinks but cash crunch remained. 29 Nov: Queues outside ATMs eases, but customers throng banks
 RBI relaxes withdrawal norms, nudges retailers to deposit cash. 30 Nov: RBI limits withdrawal from Jan Dhan accounts to Rs 10,000 a month
 Queues at ATMs, banks grow shorter but wait for cash continues. 1 Dec: Government says that old Rs 500 notes are valid till 2 Dec for fuel, air ticket purchase instead of 15 December announced earlier.
 Demonetisation takes a toll on manufacturing sector growth in November, according to PMI survey.
 BofA cuts FY17 growth forecast to 6.9 percent amid demonetisation
 Pay day rush: Banks resort to rationing of cash in order to handle the huge pay day rush at branches
 1.80 lakh ATMs re-calibrated to dispense Rs 500, 2,000 notes
 Cash shortage may slow down GDP to 6.5 percent in Oct-Dec quarter, Nomura says. 2 Dec: India Ratings lowers GDP forecast to 6.8 percent post demonetization. 3 Dec: Queues for cash on, toll collection resumes. 6 Dec: Tax dept seizes Rs 130 crore cash, jewellery and Rs 2,000 crore of undisclosed wealth has been admitted by taxpayers post demonetisation 7 Dec: RBI defends note ban and plays down its impact on economy. Demonetisation was not done in haste, says RBI Governor during the monetary policy presser
 Note ban impact on GDP growth only 15 bps, says RBI
 Rs 11.55 lakh crore or 76 percent of junked notes have come back into the system, RBI said.

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