When do cooperation and commitment matter in a monetary union ? by Hubert Kempf and Leopold von Thadden
Vivien Lewis (Ghent University and Goethe University Frankfurt)
IMFS Workshop "Recent Developments in Macroeconomic Policy" 11th April 2011
Vivien Lewis (Ghent Uni and Goethe Uni Frankfurt)
Discussion Kempf-von Thadden 2010
Paper Summary Comments and Questions Conclusion
What the Paper Does What the Paper Finds
What the Paper Does
Model Setup : Game-theoretic view of …scal and monetary policy in monetary unions Players : private agents, …scal authorities, central bank Game characterised by : (1) order of moves (‘commitment’) (2) coordination between players (‘coalitions’) Question : When are commitment and coordination irrelevant ? Relevance : Commitment and coordination are costly institutions Contribution : Reconcile di¤erent …ndings in the literature
Vivien Lewis (Ghent Uni and Goethe Uni Frankfurt)
Discussion Kempf-von Thadden 2010
Paper Summary Comments and Questions Conclusion
What the Paper Does What the Paper Finds
What the Paper Finds
Irrelevance Result : In a LQ-framework, coordination and commitment are irrelevant if : (1) all players share same policy targets (2) there are as many instruments as there are policy targets Then all direct spillovers disappear at Nash Equilibrium (NE) In non-LQ-framework, need that direct spillovers are zero at NE. Nash Equilibrium = simultaneous move, no coalitions Direct spillover = e¤ect of one player’s action on another’s payo¤ Linear-Quadratic (LQ)-framework : - state vector = linear function of players’actions - payo¤ = weighted sum of squared deviations of states from targets
Vivien Lewis (Ghent Uni and Goethe Uni Frankfurt)
Discussion Kempf-von Thadden 2010
Paper Summary Comments and Questions Conclusion
Game Theory vs Ramsey Optimal Policy Monetary vs Fiscal Coordination Policy Preferences in Monetary Unions
Game Theory vs Ramsey Optimal Policy Policy interactions : Here : dynamic (discretionary) policy making : policies react to other players’actions Ramsey : one-o¤ formulation of contingency plans at time 0 Coordination vs non-coordination : Here : allow for non-coordinated monetary and …scal policies Ramsey : coordinated optimal monetary and …scal policies ) Gali-Monacelli (JIE, 2008) ; Ferrero (JIE, 2009) Welfare : Here : private agents and policy makers may have di¤erent payo¤ functions Ramsey : maximise welfare of representative agent
Vivien Lewis (Ghent Uni and Goethe Uni Frankfurt)
Discussion Kempf-von Thadden 2010
Paper Summary Comments and Questions Conclusion
Game Theory vs Ramsey Optimal Policy Monetary vs Fiscal Coordination Policy Preferences in Monetary Unions
Monetary vs Fiscal Coordination
In KvT-framework : Monetary union = coalition to coordinate monetary policy Start from assumption of being in MU : monetary coordination is costless (taken as given) So : asymmetric treatment of monetary and …scal coordination Two questions : How are …scal and monetary coordination di¤erent ? Endogenise monetary coordination : choice to establish (or join) MU ? Breakup of MU ? Games within central bank ?
Vivien Lewis (Ghent Uni and Goethe Uni Frankfurt)
Discussion Kempf-von Thadden 2010
Paper Summary Comments and Questions Conclusion
Game Theory vs Ramsey Optimal Policy Monetary vs Fiscal Coordination Policy Preferences in Monetary Unions
Policy Preferences in Monetary Unions
In KvT-framework : Necessary condition for "Irrelevance Result" : identical policy targets Is this true in actual monetary unions ? EMU in Europe : Pre-EMU : policy preferences of countries arguably not aligned High-in‡ation countries bene…t from joining MU with low-in‡ation Germany Possible alignment of preferences through "endogenous optimal currency area" theory
Vivien Lewis (Ghent Uni and Goethe Uni Frankfurt)
Discussion Kempf-von Thadden 2010
Paper Summary Comments and Questions Conclusion
Conclusion
Overall : Elegant paper. O¤ers general framework to organise thoughts on macro policies in a monetary union Remarks : Game theory vs Ramsey optimal policy Extension : endogenise monetary coordination Di¤erence between monetary and …scal coordination Alignment of policy preferences : a feature of monetary unions ?
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