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“Creeping Spatiality”: The Location of Nous in Plotinus’ Universe J. WILBERDING

ABSTRACT There is a well-known tension in Plotinus’ thought regarding the location of the intelligible region. He appears to make three mutually incompatible claims about it: (1) it is everywhere; (2) it is nowhere; and (3) it borders on the heavens, where the third claim is associated with Plotinus’ affection for cosmic religion. Traditionally, although scholars have found a reasonable way to make sense of the compatibility of the first two claims, they have sought to relieve the tension generated by (3) by both downplaying the importance of cosmic religion to Plotinus and reinterpreting his spatial language metaphorically. In this paper I argue that both of these maneuvers are unsatisfactory. Rather, it is possible to reconcile Plotinus’ metaphysics with the world-view of cosmic religion (CR world-view), i.e., to retain the spatial sense of Plotinus’ language without making his metaphysics incoherent. In the first part of this paper, I show that cosmic religion is not just an awkward appendage to Plotinus’ metaphysics. After explaining what cosmic religion involves, I argue that the CR world-view is in fact central to his natural philosophy. Then, I turn to the problem of the compatibility between cosmic religion and Plotinus’ thought. By carefully considering how Aristotle’s Prime Mover is present to his universe, I show how we can make claims (2) and (3) compatible for Plotinus. Then, I argue that Plotinus’ own account of the omnipresence of soul and its powers’ actualizations in particular locations provides a parallel to the problem of the compatibility between (1) and (3), and further that these two accounts can be combined to resolve completely the tension between the CR world-view and Plotinus’ metaphysics. In the final section, I discuss the implications this has for our understanding of the soul’s ascent and descent.

There is a feature of Plotinus’ thought that has long been a source of embarrassment to scholars.1 It concerns the compatibility of cosmic religion and Plotinian metaphysics, and more specifically the supposed ‘location’ of the intelligible region next to the heavens. That Plotinus held such Accepted April 2005 1 I would like to thank Ian Mueller, John Phillips and the audiences at the 2004 ISNS and central APA conferences. The editors of Phronesis and an anonymous referee also provided very helpful comments and questions. Special thanks should go to David Rehm, who read and provided extended comments on earlier versions of this paper. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2005 Also available online – www.brill.nl

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a view is made clear in many passages of the Enneads. He says, for instance, in IV.3.17.3-4: “For if heaven is the better part of the region perceived by the senses, it borders on the last and lowest parts of the intelligible.”2 To this, however, Armstrong appends a dismissive note with which many scholars would agree: There is here a certain ‘creeping spatiality’. Plotinus does not really think that any part of the material universe, even the highest heaven, can be nearer to the intelligible than any other, because the intelligible is not in space at all. But here his language is influenced, perhaps not only by the ‘cosmic religiosity’ of his time, but by his favorite myth in Plato’s Phaedrus.3

Yet Armstrong’s charge is not simply that Plotinus indulges in inappropriate metaphor. For he grants that it is much more than Plotinus’ language that has been influenced by “the ‘cosmic religiosity’ of his time.” As he says in a note on IV.3.15, “[p]hilosophical cosmic religion was something which Plotinus took seriously . . . But it occupies a place of moderate importance in his thought, and is not easy to reconcile with other aspects of it.”4 Hence, Armstrong is suggesting that Plotinus’ thought is philosophically confused: Plotinus endorses the cosmic religious view that the heavens are nearer to the intelligible, and yet he also holds that the intelligible is ‘not in space at all’ and therefore cannot be nearer to any one part of the sensible world than to any other. In fact the potential confusion runs even deeper than this, since Plotinus makes a total of three claims about the intelligible region that appear to be incompatible with each other. Armstrong points to two of these: that it is situated next to the heavens, and that it is not in space at all. Yet Plotinus also insists that it is everywhere. Hence, we need to resolve both how the intelligible region can be both everywhere and nowhere, and how the world-view of cosmic religion (henceforth, CR world-view) which places the intelligible region next to the heavens is reconcilable with each of these two claims.

2

Armstrong’s translation. Vol. 4, 88n1. The ‘favorite myth’ is found at Phaedrus 246d-247e. For a similar sentiment, see Bréhier La Philosophie de Plotin, 185: “Plotin emploie encore comme symbole la topographie fantastique de l’univers, mise à la mode par la religion du salut. Mais il est aisé de voir qu’il n’y a plus pour lui de différence locale entre les diverses régions où passe l’âme dans son ascension. La différence d’ ‘ici’ et de ‘làbas’, de supérieur et d’inférieur ne signifie plus que la différence entre la dispersion dans le sensible et la concentration intérieure.” 4 Vol. 4, 82-83n2. 3

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I shall focus on the latter problems, since a reasonable solution to the former problem has already been put forward.5 The former difficulty again was that prima facie being everywhere and being nowhere are different and incompatible properties. To be everywhere is to be at every location, whereas to be nowhere is to be at no location. However, it is made clear in the Enneads that Plotinus thinks not only that these properties are compatible, but even that they are nearly equivalent.6 It is reasonable to understand Plotinus here as more or less paraphrasing Plato’s account of the Forms which are described as present insofar as they are participated in, and yet remain by themselves or separate. Thus, to say that the intelligible region is nowhere is to say that it is separate from sensible things, and to say that it is everywhere is to say that all things participate in it. This allows us to see why Plotinus treats being everywhere and being nowhere as nearly equivalent, since participation and separation seem to be two sides of the same coin.7 However, as Armstrong’s comment reveals, even if we can make sense of Plotinus’ claim that something is both everywhere and nowhere, it remains difficult to understand how either of these properties is compatible with the CR world-view. According to the CR world-view, all things can be placed on a scale ranging from the profane to the divine, and this scale maps more or less neatly onto the physical scale ranging from the center of the universe to its periphery, with the most profane at the center and the most divine at the periphery.8 Since for a Platonist such as Plotinus

5

See Gerson (1994) 18 and O’Meara (1980) passim. Cf. V.2.2,20-21; III.9.4,4-6; V.5.9 passim; VI.8.16,1-2. 7 This interpretation might at first appear to understand these terms ‘nowhere’ and ‘everywhere’ in a more metaphysical sense as opposed to a straightforward spatial sense. But as I shall show below, there is some spatial sense to these terms. Neither of the standard alternatives to local separation – namely ontological (x can exist independently of y) and definitional (x can be defined independently of y), see Fine 35ff. – adequately captures what Plotinus is after. Intelligible substance is present everywhere insofar as its dunãmeiw and lÒgoi are active in all sensible things (I shall call this ‘instrumental proximity or presence’ below), and they are nowhere insofar as the substances themselves (Nous, the Forms) are separate from all sensible things in the sense of not being in a place. This is presumably why Plotinus is comfortable using ‘nowhere’ as analogous to ‘separate’. 8 In fact, many thinkers in this tradition, including Plotinus, place the most divine things outside of the universe’s periphery. Hence, ‘hypercosmic religion’ would be a more suitable label. In what follows I shall continue to refer to this as ‘cosmic religion’ and leave it an open question as to whether the highest divinity is at or beyond the periphery. 6

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the intelligible is more divine than the sensible, the CR world-view leads one to say that it is located at or around the periphery of the universe. But this is ‘hard to reconcile’ both with the intelligible region’s being nowhere and with its being everywhere. These difficulties led scholars to a metaphorical interpretation of Plotinus’ spatial remarks. On such an interpretation, Plotinus is not really saying that the intelligible region is located at or around the superlunar region. Rather, the intelligible region is present everywhere. All Plotinus is saying is that the heavens are in some sense superior to the sublunar things – presumably in the sense that the superlunar things are more like intelligible things than their sublunar counterparts are. This metaphorical interpretation, then, does preserve something resembling the spatial hierarchy of the CR world-view, but it refuses to explain this hierarchy in terms of the intelligible region’s proximity to the superlunar region. But if the CR world-view is ‘hard to reconcile’ with Plotinus’ metaphysics, this is not so bad – so Armstrong’s line of interpretation goes – because cosmic religion and its world-view are only ‘of moderate importance’ to his thought. I shall argue that the CR world-view is in fact of premier importance to Plotinus’ cosmology so that we are forced to admit that the apparent irreconcilability of cosmic religion and metaphysics is indeed a serious problem. Then, I shall suggest a way to resolve this problem. Aristotle’s discussion of the Prime Mover will offer us some help with the first difficulty by illustrating how something can be separate and not in a place and yet located next to the heavens. Following this, I shall show how Plotinus’ own discussions of the soul’s omnipresence and its powers’ actualizations in specific locations provide a parallel for the other difficulty. I shall subsequently show how these two accounts can be fitted together in order to reconcile the CR world-view with Plotinus’ metaphysics. In doing so I shall be putting Plotinus back into the (hyper-)cosmic tradition that begins with Aristotle, prominently includes Xenocrates, and probably culminates in ibn Gabirol who actually refers to the intelligible region as the ‘tenth sphere’ of the heavens.9 Finally, I will sketch out the consequences this has for our understanding of the individual soul’s ascent and descent. *** The centrality of the CR world-view to Plotinus’ natural philosophy can first be glimpsed in his explanation of the everlasting nature of super9

The Kingly Crown, §§24-6.

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lunar living things, that is the stars and planets, where he appeals to the superiority of the celestial place. In II.9.5,14-15 Plotinus challenges the Gnostic view that the heavenly bodies are no less ordered and free of affection than we sublunar beings are: “As if the immortal soul had taken care to choose the worse place!” This thought is echoed in II.2.3,15 where the soul that resides in heaven is said to be ‘in a good [place]’ (§n égay“). All of this comes out most clearly in II.1.5, where Plotinus is concerned to explain why superlunar bodies persist everlastingly whereas sublunar ones do not. Here we learn that the superiority of the celestial place is not merely a function of the superior matter present there; rather, these are two distinct features. For Plotinus’ explanation appeals both to the inferior sublunar matter and to the inferior nature of the sublunar place itself: a human soul is unable to keep its body everlastingly organized “because it uses worse bodies for its making and is in a worse place.”10 It is, however, in Plotinus’ explanation of elemental and celestial movement that the CR world-view really comes to the fore. Showing this requires a slight excursion, since Harder has suggested that Plotinus’ views on this issue changed over the course of his life and are ultimately incompatible with each other.11 However, I believe that a careful look at the passages in question uncovers an overall consistency. The earliest and most complete account is found in the first section of II.2(14), the only treatise devoted entirely to the issue of celestial motion. This explanation begins by appealing to the nature of fire out of which Plotinus – following Plato’s Timaeus – constitutes the heavens:12 its nature is to be in motion.13 Further, the natural motion of body is rectilinear.14 If we take these two statements together, we should expect celestial fire to keep moving in a straight line, thereby leaving the universe, but of course this is not what happens. Plotinus explains why in II.2.1,25-29:

10

II.1.5,9-10. Plotins Schriften, vol. 1b, 534-5. Cf. Theiler’s remark on VI.4.2,35 that this account is ‘hardly’ that of IV.4.16,30. 12 Plato argues in the Timaeus that the heavens are composed of all four sublunar elements but that they are mostly of fire (31b4-32c4, 39e10-40b8). For Plotinus this means that the heavens are composed of corporeal light, a species of fire (II.1.7,2426). The other three elements are not present per se, rather their characteristic qualities are present: elemental air is not present but its softness is; actual water is not, but its cohesive power is; earth’s solidity is present, but not earth itself. See II.1.7 and Wilberding (forthcoming) ad loc. 13 II.2.1,23-24. 14 II.2.1,17-18. 11

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It is an act of providence – or rather something in the fire that it has from providence such that when it is in heaven it moves in a circle of its own accord. It desires to go straight but there is no place left, so it bends back and slides around the area it can; for beyond itself it has no place.

There are two main points here: fire has an initial corporeal inclination (§fi°menon)15 to go straight, but since there is no place outside of the universe, this inclination ultimately leads to circular motion. An important detail is filled in in the sequel: providence gives fire a second inclination – for soul.16 The rest of the explanation follows. If soul were located at any one place in the celestial region, the fire would move in a straight line to that location, but soul is in fact everywhere in the heavens, so that fire’s inclination for soul draws it in a circle.17 To this extent, one can even say that soul is leading18 the heavenly body in a circle. Hence, in a sense one can say that the circular motion of the heavens is ultimately due to the circular motion of the soul, which is in turn attributed to its desire for and imitation of Nous.19 Harder lists five other passages in the Enneads that address the issue of celestial motion, but there is nothing in any of them that does not fit into this picture. In IV.4(28).16 Plotinus very briefly reiterates many of these same points. Soul is spread throughout the heavens and has its own circular motion on account of its desire (§fiem°nhn) for what is ontologically prior to it – Nous and ultimately the One.20 Further, just as in II.2.1, we are told that the celestial body, qua body, has an initial inclination (§f¤esyai) to move in a straight line and hence to exit the universe,21 but that this inclination results in circular movement. This is just what we were told in II.2.1,25-29. The rest of the details of II.2.1’s account is missing, but we can hardly expect Plotinus to attend to all the specifics in a nine-line summary.22 II.1(40).3 also clearly retains the account found in 15

II.2.1,27. aÈt∞w pãnth §f¤etai, II.2.1,44. 17 II.2.1,43-44 and 49-51. 18 periãgoi, II.2.1,38; êgousa, II.2.1,46 and 48; êgein, II.2.1,46; kine›, II.2.1,46; kinoËsa, II.2.1,47. 19 II.2.1,1ff. 20 IV.4.16,24-27. 21 IV.4.16,29. 22 There is perhaps the following slight difference: whereas in II.2.1 the desire to move straight is replaced by a second desire for soul which then provides for circular motion, in IV.4.16 the desire to move straight itself is said to result in this circular motion (so too VI.4.2,34-36). But even this can be accounted for by saying that the initial desire to go straight is a desire for soul (as VI.4.2 suggests). For in this way 16

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II.2.1. Here, again, fire is said to be of a nature to keep moving. Moreover, its initial desire is to move in a straight line and thus exit the universe.23 Yet, since there is no room for it outside of the universe,24 it acquires a second natural motion by being drawn by soul in a circle.25 Two additional passages (III.7(45).4,28-31 and III.2(47).3,28-31) on celestial motion are very compressed and hardly support a charge of inconsistency.26 A final passage, VI.4(22).2,32-49, deserves slightly more attention, though not because it is incompatible with II.2 but rather because it augments that account. [T]his [sensible universe] goes towards that [intelligible universe] from everywhere with its parts and discovers it everywhere as a universe and greater than itself. Hence, since it will receive nothing more in extension – for it would come to be outside of the universe – it wanted to travel around it; and since it could neither envelop it nor come to be inside of it, it was content (±gãphse) to have a rank and place where it would be preserved as a neighbor to that which is both present and, again, not present. For that can be by itself, even if something wants to be present to it. Where the body of the universe meets it, it meets the universe; therefore, there is no longer any need to [go] further, rather it turns in the same [place], since this is all there is that enjoys that [intelligible universe] as a whole with every one of its parts. For if that were itself in place, [the sensible world’s parts] would need to travel there and to proceed there in a straight line, and one of the parts of this [universe] would be in contact with one of the parts of that [universe], and there would be proximity and distance. But if there is neither proximity nor distance, it must be present as a whole. And it is wholly present to each of those [things] for which there is neither proximity nor distance and which are capable of receiving [it].

Here many of the details of II.2.1 are repeated: Fire cannot keep moving upwards since there is no more room for it;27 for this reason the fire desires

fire’s inclination to go straight and its inclination to move in a circle are in a way two different inclinations and in a way a single inclination for soul. 23 II.1.3,14-16. 24 II.1.3,17. 25 II.1.3,18-20. 26 In III.7(45).4 the cause of the universe’s circular motion is said to be ‘a sort of desire for substance’ (l. 31), which again echoes the account of II.2. This is glossed as a ‘hastening to the future’ (l. 29), but this remark is too opaque to be assumed incongruous. In III.2(47).3 celestial motion is once more due to the soul’s desire for and imitation of Nous (ll. 29-31). All that is added is that soul seeks nothing outside itself, and this simply repeats a point found in II.2.1 and VI.4.2: since soul is throughout the heavens, the celestial body can surrender itself to circular motion. 27 VI.4.2,35.

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(§boulÆyh) to move in a circle.28 Furthermore, this desire to move in a circle is identified as a desire for an ontologically prior substance that occupies the entire heaven, and we are reminded that if this substance were in any particular part of the heaven, the fire would move in a straight line to that place rather than moving in a circle.29 All of this we have seen before. But here we also learn that the upward motion of fire – which was previously described simply as an inclination of the body – is now additionally characterized as resulting from a desire for the intelligible universe: the sensible universe ‘goes towards’ the intelligible ‘with its parts,’ that is with fire, and when this fire approaches the limits of heaven, ‘it will receive nothing more in extension.’ However, ‘there is no longer any need for it to [go] further,’ because it has reached a place where it is ‘preserved as a neighbor’ to the intelligible.30 This excursion into Plotinus’ explanation of natural motion not only displays an overwhelming uniformity (contra Harder); it also confirms that the CR world-view is not just a foreign addition to Plotinus’ metaphysics brought in from his attachment to cosmic religion. For it plays a key role in explaining natural motion, and it does so in two ways. First, the upward motion of fire results from a desire for the substance ontologically prior to it. Therefore, this substance31 must be connected somehow with the periphery of the universe, since this is where the fire seems to be headed. Second, the circular motion of the heavens is explained by this substance’s ubiquity throughout the heavens. If it were in any specific location of the heavens, the fire would move in a straight line to that place.32 And if it

28

VI.4.2,35-36. VI.4.2,43-47. 30 The final lines of this passage are easily misinterpreted. Plotinus is not now denying what he just said, namely that upward motion of fire is a motion toward the intelligible. The point is rather the same one he made at II.2.1,49-51: if the intelligible were at any specific location in the heaven, then the celestial body would move in a straight line to that point rather than moving in a circle. Plotinus might have someone such as Cleanthes in mind who identifies the ≤gemonikÒn of the universe with the sun (SVF 1.499 and 2.644). Likewise, in l. 41 it is not the entire universe that is turning; rather, only the celestial spheres do this. 31 Sometimes Plotinus says that this substance is soul (II.2.1) and sometimes that it is Nous (VI.4.2). Presumably, this discrepancy is to be explained in the following manner: when fire is being considered as a mere body, it seeks soul, but when fire is being considered as a part of the ensouled universe, it seeks Nous. In either case the centrality of the CR world-view is shown since soul and Nous must have similar spatial connections to the periphery of the universe. 32 Plotinus’ explanation of celestial motion takes over from Aristotle the idea that 29

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were present in the sublunar region in the same way, there would be circular elemental motion there as well. However, even if it has been shown that the CR world-view plays a significant role in Plotinus’ cosmology, it still remains to be seen whether the CR world-view is compatible with Plotinus’ metaphysics. Recall that the compatibility problem has two faces – how something that is nowhere can be located in a particular location, and how something that is everywhere can be located in a specific location. In the next section we shall see how Aristotle deals with a problem similar to the former. *** Aristotle initiates – but also provides the tools to solve – this problem in his discussion of what is beyond the heaven in De Caelo 1.9. He begins this discussion by using his theory of natural place to argue that no body can exist outside of the heaven. Having already established that there are only three primary types of simple body – that which moves toward the center (earth), that which moves from the center (fire)33 and that which moves in a circle (aether) – and that each of these has its natural place within the universe, he concludes that none of these could exist naturally outside of the universe. But neither could they exist there unnaturally by virtue of the principle that if a place is unnatural for some simple body, there must be another simple body for which it is natural.34 A similar argument shows that it is not even possible for a simple body to come to be outside of the universe, and these same conclusions hold for composite bodies as well, since these would have to be composed of simple bodies.35 From here Aristotle proceeds to draw three conclusions: outside of the universe there is neither place nor void nor time.36 Each of the arguments hinges on Aristotle’s own definitions of these terms. Part of the definitions of ‘place’ and ‘void’ is the ability to receive body,37 but as was just shown it is impossible for body to be present outside of the universe. Likewise,

the matter of the heavens moves by virtue of a desire (for example, II.2.1,44) for an ontologically prior substance. 33 Initially, Aristotle leaves air and water out of the picture. In DC 4.4 he brings them in as relatively light and heavy, respectively. 34 DC 278b25-279a1. 35 DC 279a1-11. 36 DC 279a17-18. 37 DC 279a12-14.

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‘time’ is defined as ‘the number of movement,’ and movement in turn requires the presence of body.38 Aristotle, however, does not conclude that nothing exists outside of the universe. Rather, he says: Therefore, the things there (téke›) are not of a nature to be in place, nor does time make them grow old; nor is there any change in any of the things that have been ordered beyond the outermost circuit; rather, these things are unalterable and impassible, have the best and most self-sufficient life, and persist for all time.39

This is a clear statement that sums up the paradox we are confronting: how can Aristotle in one breath say that anything is both ‘there’ and yet not ‘in place’? It would be helpful to start by addressing the issue of what ‘the things there’ are meant to be. Although this passage has been much debated, it seems right to follow Simplicius, as many modern commentators do, in taking this passage to refer to the Prime Mover.40 This fits with the description of the Prime Mover that we find in the Physics and Metaphysics, where it is called not only impassive41 and alive,42 but also separate from sensible things.43 Moreover, Aristotle argues that it must not have any magnitude (m°geyow), since what has magnitude must be limited, and hence would not possess the unlimited power needed to cause unceasing motion. To say that it is without magnitude is equivalent to saying

38

DC 279a14-16. DC 279a18-22. 40 In DC 290.1ff. Modern commentators who accept this view include W.D. Ross, Aristotle Metaphysics, vol. 1, cxxxiv; L. Tarán, Review of P. Moraux, Aristote Du Ciel (Les Belles Lettres, 1965), Gnomon 46 (1974), 121-142 at 129; V. Goldschmidt, ‘La théorie aristotelienne du lieu’ in Mélanges de philosophie greque (J. Vrin, 1956), 107; R. Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, 133n36. For the sake of simplicity I shall speak in the singular of the Prime Mover – despite the plural téke› at 279a18 and aÈtå at a19 – though some of the exegetes listed above take Aristotle to be referring to all of the unmoved movers. It seems to me, however, that only the unmoved mover of the outermost sphere stands a chance of existing ‘beyond’ the heaven. Simplicius reports that Alexander tried to read this passage as a description of the fifth nature comprising heaven itself (In DC 287.17ff.), and among modern scholars Moraux also endorses this line of interpretation (Aristote Du Ciel, xlvi n5 and lxxv). Simplicius provides convincing arguments against this reading (290,1ff.). 41 Phys. 258b14-15, 260a17-19; Meta. 1072b7-8, 1073a11-13. 42 Meta. 1072b28. 43 Meta. 1073a4-5. 39

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that it is partless (émer°w) and indivisible (édia¤reton) – in other words, that it lacks extension.44 Now it is clear that Aristotle is facing one of the same problems as Plotinus. Both mention that there is something that has proximity relations and yet is nowhere, and both identify this something with Nous.45 How, then, can Aristotle say that this intelligible substance is both ‘there’ and ‘not in place’? The answer will depend on how one understands ‘there.’ If it is not ‘there’ in the straightforward sense of being in a place, what alternatives are there? Ancient commentary has recorded two:46 either (a) in a different spatial sense or (b) in a metaphorical sense. (a) According to the former the Prime Mover is located at the periphery of the universe, but it is nevertheless not §n tÒpƒ. That is to say, it is located but it is not located in a place. This is the interpretation offered by Sextus Empiricus who reports: “according to Aristotle the primary god is the limit of the heaven.”47 This is perhaps not necessarily incompatible with saying that the god is outside of heaven, since a limit of a whole is neither within the whole nor a part of the whole. Rather, it is “the first point inside of which all parts are (o ¶sv pãnta pr≈tou).”48 Hence, Damascius can say “the limit is always outside of the limited.”49

44 Phys. 266a10-11, 267b17-26; Meta. 1073a5-11. As Ross notes ad 1073a5: “A. has not, strictly speaking, shown that the primum movens is without extension, but he has proved something from which it readily follows (cf. ll. 7-11), and d°deiktai expresses this fact, though rather loosely.” This is, of course, not equivalent to being non-spatial, since a point is also partless and indivisible (Phys. 185b18, Meta. 1002b4), but nevertheless has position (Meta. 1016b25-26, 30-31, 1084b26, etc.). 45 For Aristotle, cf. Meta. 1072b18-27, 1074b15-1075a10. Indeed, it is surprising how close Aristotle’s own location of this noetic substance comes to Plato’s account in the Phaedrus where the Forms are said to be in the Íperourãniow tÒpow – the place beyond the heaven (Phdr. 247cff. NB: Simplicius, who as we shall see is anxious to interpret away the spatial sense of ‘outside’ in the De caelo, is also quick to construe this Íperourãniow tÒpow as logical space – the interrelational order of the Forms (In Phys. 541,3-12 and 641,35-642,4)), given that Aristotle appears to be criticizing the Phaedrus’ account in the passage we shall be looking at shortly (DC 275b6-11). Plotinus, who identifies Nous and the Forms, is surely drawing on both sources. 46 Alexander could be seen as offering a third. He takes this entire passage to be about the fifth element that comprises the heaven so that ‘there’ would refer to the celestial region. See note 40. 47 PH 3.218 and M 10.33. 48 Metaphysics 1022a5. As Alexander notes (In Meta. 412,28-30), “the true limit is a limit not in the sense of being a part but in the sense of being what is truly last, for example, the surface in the case of bodies.” 49 In Parm. 121,17. As a variation of this more literal interpretation, one might say

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(b) According to the latter metaphorical interpretation, the Prime Mover is not outside of heaven in any spatial sense; rather, Aristotle is simply saying that it transcends the nature of sensible substance. Simplicius offers such an interpretation of this passage: Perhaps it is said about the intelligibles since they are beyond corporeal nature and in this way said to be ‘outside’ of it. For again when he was investigating whether there is something outside of the heaven, he did not say that ‘outside’ is being used in a spatial sense.50

The metaphorical interpretation has the virtue of neatly sidestepping the problem of how a non-spatial substance can have proximity relations. Nevertheless, I think it is easy to see the illegitimacy of the metaphorical interpretation of 279a18-22. The arguments that immediately precede 279a18-22 rule out Simplicius’ suggestion that by ‘outside of heaven’ Aristotle means ‘transcending corporeal nature.’ The whole point of 278b25279a18 is to argue that there is no body outside of heaven. If by ‘outside of heaven’ Aristotle meant ‘beyond corporeal nature’ as Simplicius suggests, there would be no need for any argument at all, since it is obviously true that no body transcends bodily nature. This point is driven home by Aristotle’s choice of words at 278b25, where he is careful to use ‘outside of the outermost revolution’ which clearly cannot be glossed as ‘beyond corporeal nature.’51 This leaves us with the spatial interpretation offered by Sextus, which is rendered coherent by Aristotle’s physical definition of place as the limit of the surrounding body.52 The physical character of this theory is in full view in 278b25-279a18 where Aristotle insists that place must be able to receive a body. Since there can be no body outside of the universe, there is no place outside of the universe. This allows for incorporeal, intelligible substances to be there (and consequently to have proximity relations)

that ‘the things there’ are not at the periphery but beyond it, as Xenocrates seems to suggest of the Forms (Fr. 83), and cf. Elders (1966) 144. Yet there is no evidence that suggests Xenocrates said the Forms are ‘not in place.’ One drawback to this interpretation is that according to it Aristotle implicitly assumes that there is mere extension, since this alone could allow him to say that there is something (incorporeal) outside of the outermost rotation without there being any place there. 50 In DC 290,25-28. 51 This is not the place to go into all of the exegetical difficulties surrounding this passage. This consideration is sufficient to show that Aristotle has some kind of spatial thesis in mind, as opposed to an ontological one. 52 For a fuller study of Aristotle’s conception of tÒpow, see Algra (1995) 121ff.

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without being in a place. Moreover, this interpretation finds some additional confirmation in a very opaque passage in Physics Y: The mover must not experience any change. And what is moved must not experience any change with respect to the mover in order that the motion be uniform. The mover, then, must be either in the center or in a circle, since these are the principles. But the things nearest to the mover are moved fastest, and the motion of the circle is of this sort. Therefore, the mover is there.53

By Aristotle’s own account, the outer limit of heaven is itself not in a place, since there is no body outside of it that surrounds it.54 Nevertheless, it has proximity relations to other things: the sun is closer to it than the moon. And by placing the unmoved mover at the periphery of heaven, the unmoved mover also has these proximity relations without being in a place.55 In other words, Aristotle provides us with a way of understanding how something can be ‘nowhere’ (and separate from sensible things) and still be in a specific location. Moreover, nothing prevents us from understanding Plotinus’ claim in the same manner, and indeed some things speak for it. Like Aristotle, Plotinus identifies being nowhere with not being in a place,56 and Plotinus seems to share Aristotle’s conception of tÒpow insofar as he agrees with Aristotle that the universe is not §n tÒpƒ57 and that there is no tÒpow beyond the universe.58 In this way we can make intelligible Plotinus’ claim that Nous is nowhere and yet located at the edge of the universe.59

53

Phys. 267b4-9. Phys. 212b8-10. Well documented by later authors, for example Sextus Empiricus M 10.31; Eudemus Fr. 80; Themistius Phys. Para. 120,15-20; Simplicius In Cat. 150,2; Philoponus In DA 100,9-10. We can say it is in place katå sumbebhkÒw insofar as its parts are in place. 55 It should be noted, however, that Sextus’ suggestion is clearly better suited to Phys. 267a18-22 (cf. MA 3-4) than to DC 279a18-22. After all, ‘outside the heaven’ in DC 279a18-22 cannot simply refer to the periphery of the heaven for the same reason that it could not be understood as ‘transcending the heaven’. For if this were its meaning, the preceding arguments become unintelligible: Why would it require any argument that a body cannot exist at a limit? But whereas Simplicius’ metaphorical interpretation cannot recover from this objection, Sextus’ can, if we suppose that Aristotle is leaving it open here as to whether ‘outside of the heavens’ refers to more than just the periphery (cf. Meta. 1022a4-5). 56 V.2.2,19-21; V.5.9,18-21. 57 V.5.9,26-28. 58 II.1.3,17. There was in fact an ancient debate over this matter, see Sorabji 125-41. 59 Simultaneously, this might begin to explain why Plotinus would use ‘nowhere’ 54

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*** This leaves the second face of the problem. We still need some way of making sense of the claim that something is ‘everywhere’ and yet still in a specific location. I think the best way to make sense of such a claim is to start with a similar but more familiar difficulty in the Enneads concerning soul. Plotinus repeatedly states that the soul is everywhere present as a whole without parts60 and that parts of soul are not present in parts of the body.61 Nevertheless, Plotinus’ thesis that the soul is everywhere as a whole has in some way to accommodate the spatially scattered actualization of psychic powers such as sight and hearing. The power of sight, for example, is exclusively actualized in the eye, and the power of hearing in the ears. He accommodates this by maintaining that not all body is equally capable of receiving these powers of soul.62 Certain material conditions have to be in place for certain aspects of soul to appear. For all powers of perception, for example, a specific organ is required. Thus, although no part of soul is spatially restricted to a certain place in the body, there are parts of the body where certain functions of the soul (which are present everywhere)63 are performed exclusively. The dÊnamiw of sight, for example, is present everywhere but is only performed (or actualized) in the eyes, and the dÊnamiw of hearing is everywhere but only actualized in the ears. If this sounds strange, it might be helpful to compare these ubiquitous powers of soul to radio and television waves which, despite being present nearly everywhere, require (functioning) radios and televisions for their actualization. Plotinus even gives a similar account of reason. We are told that the lower soul responsible for sensation, impulse and imagination ‘borders upon’64 reason in the sense that each of these powers makes use of reason in some way.65 Moreover, we are told that although these three powers of soul again exist throughout the body, their actualization begins in the brain.66 By putting all of this together, Plotinus allows himself to say in a sense roughly synonymous with ‘separate’, since his intelligible region – like Aristotle’s Nous – is separate and not in place. 60 IV.2.1,62-76; IV.3.22,14-15; VI.4.3,27-31; VI.4.13,18-19; VI.9.5,40-46. 61 IV.3.20. See Schwyzer col. 537,52-54. 62 VI.4.3,10-11. 63 IV.3.23,19-20 and cf. VI.4.9,36. 64 geitonoËsa, IV.3.23,23. 65 IV.3.23,27-34. 66 IV.3.23,8-21.

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that ‘the reasoning part is in the brain67 – not in the sense of being in a place but because what is there [viz. the lower soul] ‘enjoys’ it.”68 This means that even though reason is not really in a place, there is a place where it, as it were, comes into play, in a manner similar to the powers of perception coming into play in the sense organs. This short discussion seems to reveal a new way of understanding presence and proximity. How is the power of sight present to the eye and how is reason present to the brain? Until this point it looked like we were faced with only three alternatives. (1) We could understand this talk of proximity and presence in a straightforward spatial manner: x is present to or near y iff y in its entirety is located at or near the place of x. (2) Or we could understand it in the revised spatial manner found in Aristotle: x is present to or near y iff x is located at or near y but not located in a place. (3) Or else we could understand them in a metaphorical and ontological sense: x is present to or near y iff y’s rank in being equals or approximates that of x. Yet none of these seems to capture the case we have here. Both spatial interpretations are ruled out, the former because Plotinus says that both reason and the power of sight are not in place, and the latter because they are said to be everywhere. But the metaphorical explanation clearly misses the mark as well. The problem with the metaphorical reading is that it simply goes too far by getting rid of all spatial meaning. Even if the brain did, ontologically speaking, rank higher than the rest of the body, Plotinus is saying more than this here. And yet, even if Plotinus wants to deny that reason and the power of sight are in any one location, he is still delivering a spatial thesis here. It is a spatial thesis in the sense that Plotinus is saying something about reason’s relation to a specific location. Hence, what is needed here is a fourth sense of presence and proximity that is spatial in this minimal sense without putting reason and the power of sight in a location. I think Plotinus’ meaning is best captured by what we might call ‘instrumental proximity’: x is instrumentally present to or near y iff x ‘enjoys’ or makes use of y, that is iff the material conditions at or near x are such that y – or more specifically, one or more of the dunãmeiw or lÒgoi of y – can manifest itself there.69 67 §ke› oÔn tÚ logizÒmenon. Harder correctly takes §ke› to refer to the brain. Armstrong, no doubt with ll. 25-26 in mind, takes §ke› to refer to the perceptive part, but that makes the tÚ §ke› in l. 34 unintelligible. 68 IV.3.23,33-34. 69 Plotinus is not adverse to characterizing the relation of the body to the soul in terms of that of an instrument to its user. When he does so, he generally has the lower

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The virtue of this new sense is that it retains some spatial significance without sacrificing the non-spatial character of the substances in question, and for this reason I believe that instrumental proximity more accurately reveals the meaning behind Plotinus’ spatial language. For Plotinus, there are locationless entities that nevertheless come into play in certain locations, and this is to be explained by the varying receptivity of the different locations of the sensible world. For our purposes it is important that this quite general Plotinian idea also applies to the World-Soul.70 It, too, is strictly speaking everywhere throughout the universe, and yet one could still say that its proper abode is the celestial region, since this is where it makes its own nature most manifest. In fact, the celestial region’s relation to the World-Soul is quite analogous to that of the brain to the individual human soul. As we saw above, the brain functions as the instrumental ‘location’ of the perceptive soul and of reason. The same seems to be true of the celestial region: This, too, is another way of putting it: there is the ultimate power of soul which begins at the earth and is interwoven through the whole universe, and there is the power of soul which is naturally perceptive and receives the opinionative kind of reasoning; this keeps itself above in the heavenly spheres.71

Given Plotinus’ strict belief in the non-localization of psychic faculties, this can only be understood in the manner outlined above: strictly speaking, both powers pervade the universe, but certain material conditions prevent the perceptive power from being actualized in the sublunar region. Plotinus repeatedly says that the celestial matter is purer and better than the matter found in the sublunar region.72 Presumably, the sublunar matter is incapable of actualizing the perceptive power of the World-Soul, preventing it from being actualized, and it is only in the purer environment of the heavens that this function can be performed. And the reasoul and in particular its role in sensation in mind (cf. I.4.16,27-29; IV.3.19,25-26; IV.3.23,8-9; IV.7.1 passim; VI.3.10,6-7), though even here he prefers to think of the body as a natural instrument (IV.3.21,15-19). However, in I.1.3 he applies the instrument analogy to the higher soul’s relation to body because here he is emphasizing different features of the analogy than he usually does, namely that the user remains unaffected by the instrument and does not form a unity with it. (Of course, the instrument analogy can just as easily be used to express a unity or harmony between body and soul, cf., for example Porphyry Ad Gaurum 13.7.) 70 IV.9.1,8-9. 71 II.2.3,1-4 and cf. III.4.6,25ff. 72 II.1.4,8-10; II.1.5,9; II.1.6 and 7 passim; II.1.8,22f.; II.9.8,35-36; IV.4.37,17 where I take ‘nature’ to mean ‘bodily nature’; IV.8.2,7-8.

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soning power, too, is said to be present in the heavens in the same manner.73 It would hardly be true to Plotinus’ thought to redescribe these circumstances either by saying that the reasoning and perceptive powers are located in the celestial region (since these powers would no longer be nonspatial), or by saying that they are on an equal ontological footing with the celestial region (since this eliminates all spatial implications). What is required, again, is the instrumental sense of proximity. We could summarize our conclusions up to this point as follows. Plotinus has been charged with confusion because he claims that certain substances, e.g., soul and the intelligible region, are both ubiquitous and present only in certain locations. But we have seen that his theory of soul is coherent if we understand this spatial language instrumentally. And so, rather than charging Plotinus with confusion regarding his account of the intelligible region, we should look to clear him of this charge by explaining in a manner similar to his account of soul his claim that the intelligible region is everywhere and yet neighbors upon the heavens. In what sense does the intelligible region ‘border upon’ the heavens? Aristotle’s account of the Prime Mover provided us with a way of understanding how something such as Nous could be in a specific location with proximity relations and yet still be nowhere. The above account of instrumental proximity provided us with a way of understanding how something such as Nous could be in a specific location with proximity relations and yet still be everywhere. The question that remains is whether it is possible to put these two accounts together, and I think it is. The intelligible region is everywhere in the sensible universe to the extent that its dunãmeiw and lÒgoi are instrumentally present in all sensible things. But where is the intelligible region itself fully present? The answer must be ‘nowhere,’ and this answer must be understood in the sense outlined above: It is at the edge of the universe, which is technically not in place. One might object that on this account the dunãmeiw and lÒgoi of the intelligible region are locally separated from the intelligible region itself, but this objection misses the mark. Consider as an analogy an opaque blue disc of radius r1 covered by a translucent yellow disc whose smaller radius r2 approaches but is not equal to r1 and whose hue’s saturation is greatest at the center and decreases proportionately to distance from the center. Blue would appear in its pure form only at the edge of the composite, and yet blue’s effects, namely the various shades of

73

II.2.3,1-4 and 17-18.

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green, would be present throughout the composite disc with the exception of the periphery. Here it would certainly be odd to complain that blue’s effects are locally separated from blue. We should understand the interaction between the intelligible region and matter in a similar manner. The manner and degree of its presence will depend on the place in question and in particular on the matter in that place. This is what we see in instrumental proximity – the presence of the intelligible region is a function of matter. The more deficient the matter, the less present the intelligible region. Since celestial matter is better than sublunar matter, the intelligible is more present in the heavens. Hence the celestial things better exhibit the five categories of the intelligible world.74 But all matter is by its very nature deficient, and so the intelligible region (being) can only be fully present where there is no matter (non-being) whatsoever – and this is precisely at and perhaps beyond the periphery of the universe. *** All of this will, of course, have certain implications for our understanding of the descent and ascent of the individual human soul, since this doctrine is a corollary of the CR world-view. Although all soul is ubiquitous and not localized in any one place, the CR world-view calls for souls to journey through the cosmos. The idea seems to be that insofar as our souls are divine and eternal, they should be in the heavens. Since this celestial residence cannot obtain simultaneously with our earthly residence, it must be the case that our souls are in heaven precisely when they are not in human bodies. Thus, at birth one’s soul descends through the heavens into its future body, and at death it flies back to the celestial region. The descent is often accompanied by an accumulation of an ‘astral body,’ which the soul sheds when it ascends again.75 Here again scholars are often anxious to interpret away all spatial meaning into ontological metaphor.76 Franz Cumont, for example, insists:

74

They excel at being insofar as they are everlasting and monogen°w. Their circular motion is the best kind of motion (Phys. VIII.8) and is at once a kind of rest (Phys. V.9, 240a29ff.), which itself could serve as an example of sameness and difference. 75 On the soul’s descent, cf. IV.3.15,1ff.; IV.3.17,1ff.; IV.3.32,23-24; IV.4.5,11-13. On its ascent, cf. IV.4.5,13-14. Tracing the origins of these ideas and Plotinus’ debts in particular is a speculative task that we will gladly sidestep. 76 Cf. Bréhier, La Philosophie de Plotin, 185 and D. O’Meara, Plotinus: An Introduction to the Enneads, 27, and Structures hiérarchiques dans le pensée de Plotin, 56. J.M.

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Il ne peut être question d’un déplacement local pour une âme immatérielle. Sa chute est une transformation purement psychique. De la méditation intérieure à laquelle elle se livre dans le monde intelligible, elle passe à l’état où elle reçoit des impressions et subit des émotions dans le monde sensible.77

Here, as before, it is certainly right to say that there is some ontological metaphor in the account of the soul’s ascent and descent. Indeed, these scholars even have VI.4.16,10-13 on their side, where Plotinus says: It is clear that what those men [viz. Plotinus’ philosophical predecessors] mean by [the soul’s] ‘coming’ must be understood as the body’s nature coming to be there [viz. in soul] and partaking in life and soul, and in general this ‘coming’ is not to be understood in terms of place (topik«w), but rather in terms of this sort of communion.

But we should be careful not to read too much into this passage. Clearly, Plotinus is claiming that in some sense the soul does not descend spatially. This is no surprise, since strictly speaking the soul is already everywhere. But does Plotinus mean to eliminate all spatial implications? Kinetic presence is presumably analogous to static presence. Just as, strictly speaking, a soul is not statically located in a particular body, so too does the soul’s ubiquity prevent it from being kinetically located, that is from journeying from one part of the cosmos to another. But we have seen that it is a central feature of Plotinus’ psychology that a soul can be instrumentally present to a particular body just as powers of soul can be instrumentally present to particular parts of a body. If Plotinus’ static spatial language is best understood instrumentally, then it is reasonable to understand his kinetic spatial language in the same manner. This suggests that we understand the ascent and descent of the soul as follows. If for a soul to be ‘present’ in a particular body is for it to manifest itself through its concern for that particular body, then for a soul to ascend is for it to relinquish this concern. And this would be equivalent to saying that the specific matter of this body no longer determines the location where the soul comes into play. But neither is it the case that the soul no longer manifests itself anywhere. There is rather some other material that determines a new focus of the soul’s concern, and this focus is the world as a whole and the heavens in particular.78 That is to say, for an individual soul to ascend is for it to cast off its individuality and, at Rist, Plotinus: The Road to Reality, 190-192, seems to take the spatial journey of the soul seriously. 77 Franz Cumont, Lux Perpetua 355 (in C. Zintzen (ed.) (1977), see pp. 29-30). 78 IV.8.4,6ff. (cf. III.2.4,10-11 and IV.3.12,8-12).

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least initially, to share in the universal responsibility of the World-Soul. When understood in this way, Plotinus’ metaphysics need not drain the doctrine of the soul’s ascent and descent of its spatial flavor, nor need we consider the CR world-view as a mismatched partner to Plotinus’ metaphysics. Department of Philosophy Williams College, Williamstown Bibliography Algra, Keimpe (1995). Concepts of Space in Greek Thought. Leiden: Brill. Armstrong, A. Hilary (1966-1988). Plotinus Enneads. Text and translation with notes. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Cumont, Franz (1949). Lux Perpetua. Paris: Librairie orientaliste Paul Geuthner. Reprinted as ‘Plotin’ in C. Zintzen (ed.). Bréhier, Émile (1928). La Philosophie de Plotin. Paris, Boivin & Cie. Elders, Leo (1966). Aristotle’s Cosmology: A Commentary on the De Caelo. Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum. Fine, Gail (1984). “Separation,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 2, 31-87. Gerson, Lloyd (1994). Plotinus. London/New York: Routledge. O’Meara, Dominic J. (1980). “The Problem of Omnipresence in Plotinus, Ennead VI,4-5: A Reply,” Dionysius, 4, 61-73. —— (1975). Structures hiérarchiques dans le pensée de Plotin. Leiden: Brill. —— (1993). Plotinus: An Introduction to the Enneads. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Harder, R., R. Beutler and W. Theiler (1956-71). Plotins Schriften. Text and translation with notes. Hamburg: Meiner. Moraux, P. (1965). Aristote Du Ciel. Paris: Les Belles Lettres. Rist, J.M. (1967). The Road to Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ross, W.D. (1924). Aristotle Metaphysics. 2 Volumes. Text with commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schwyzer, H.-R. (1951). “Plotinos,” Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, XXI, 1, Stuttgart: Druckenmüller, 471-592. Sorabji, Richard (1988). Matter, Space and Motion. London: Duckworth. Tarán, L. (1974). Review of P. Moraux, Aristote Du Ciel (Les Belles Lettres, 1965), Gnomon, 46, 121-142. Wilberding, James ( forthcoming). Plotinus’ Cosmology: A Study of Ennead II.1 (40). Text, Translation and Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Zintzen, C. (1977) (ed.). Die Philosophie des Neuplatonismus. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.