GOVT 238: How Leaders Decide Department of Government & International Affairs Sweet Briar College Professor Spencer D. Bakich [email protected] Spring 2013 MWF 10:00-10:50 Location: Benedict 301

Office Hours: M/W. 12-1:00, or by appointment Gray Hall 211

The world is a complex place, and international politics is a particularly nettlesome game to play. Nevertheless, leaders have to play the game, and they have to play it well. Simply put, those individuals who are placed in a position of leadership of a country are ultimately responsible for the fates of millions of lives. If they shirk their responsibilities, if they are hoodwinked by leaders of other countries, if they cannot manage the bureaucracies that they “command,” if they succumb to psychological obstacles, and/or if their judgment is mired by ideological blinders, then their state is placed in harm’s way. This course examines factors that influence high-level decision making in international politics. While we are of course concerned with how states behave, the actual object of our inquiry will be on the decisions that induced particular behaviors. We want to know what factors influenced a leader’s decision, how the decision was made, and the extent to which the decision was carried out. Specific aspects of decision-making that will be examined include: cognition and affect (i.e., psychology), the nature of bureaucracy, the structure of the policymaking process, political ideology, and international communication. The course is balanced between theory and history, exploring specific historical examples of strategic decision-making in war and peace. Required Texts: Betts, Richard K. 2007. Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security. New York: Columbia University Press. Hess, Gary R. 2009. Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, and Iraq. 2nd ed. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Schafer, Mark, and Scott Crichlow. 2010. Groupthink Versus High-Quality Decision Making in International Relations. New York: Columbia University Press. Yetiv, Steven A. 2004. Explaining Foreign Policy: U.S. Decision-Making and the Persian Gulf War. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Additional readings are assigned and are marked by an asterisk (*). These readings are available on the GOVT 238 Google Docs page. Course Requirements Your performance will be assessed on three criteria. 1) Attendance and participation are required and expected (20% of final grade). 2) A mid-term essay, due March 1 (30% of final grade). 3) A final essay, due May 10 (50% of final grade). 1

Grading criteria:  “A” denotes excellent command of readings and lectures, incisive analytical faculty, as well as mature and independent judgment.  “B” denotes good command of readings and lectures, good analytical faculty and good judgment. (Note that a “B” is a good grade for the instructor.)  “C” denotes significant deficiencies in at least one of the criteria (i.e., readings, lectures, analysis and judgment).  “D” and “F” denote significant deficiencies in more than one of these criteria.

1/23: Introduction to the course Rationalist Approaches to Decision Making 1/25: The Rational Actor Model (10 pages) *Graham T. Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” The American Political Science Review, 63, 3 (Sept. 1969), 689-98. 1/28: Rational Actor Model and the Persian Gulf War (40 pages) Yetiv, Explaining Foreign Policy, chapters 1-2, pp. 18-57 Decision Making and the Individual 1/30: Personality * Robert G.L. Waite, "Leadership Pathologies: The Kaiser and the Führer and the Decisions for War in 1914 and 1939," in Betty Glad, ed., Psychological Dimensions of War (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1990), 143-168 2/1: Cognition, Emotion, and Decision Making I *Lebow, Richard Ned. 1981. Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Pp. 101-147. 2/4: Cognition, Emotion, and Decision Making II *Rosen, Stephen Peter. 2005. War and Human Nature. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. Pp. 27-70. 2/6: Cognition, Emotion, and Decision Making III Yetiv, Explaining Foreign Policy, chapter 3, pp. 58-81 2/8: Prospect Theory *Robert Jervis, "Political Implications of Loss Aversion," Political Psychology (1992): 187-204 2/11: Prospect Theory II—Cuban Missile Crisis *Mark L. Haas, “Prospect Theory and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 45 (2001), pp. 241-270.

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2/13: Leadership and Agency—Is a Theory of the Individual Possible? *Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In,” International Security, 25, no. 4 (Spring 2001), 107-46. Decision Making and Group Dynamics 2/15: The Group and the Individual in Decision Making Schafer and Crichlow, Groupthink Versus High-Quality Decision Making in International Relations, 5-52. 2/18: Advancing a New Decision Making Model Schafer and Crichlow, 53-78. 2/20: Low- vs. High-Quality Decision Making: Carter and Reagan Schafer and Crichlow, 81-103, 123-142. 2/22: The Iraq War Decision and Conclusions Schafer and Crichlow, 211-250. 2/25: The Persian Gulf War Yetiv, Explaining Foreign Policy, 104-120. Mid-Term Essay Prompt Posted 2/27: No Class Scheduled Professor available for individual meetings 3/1: Revenge of the Rational Actor? *Elizabeth N. Saunders, "Transformative Choices: Leaders and the Origins of Intervention Strategy," International Security, Vol. 34, No. 2, (Fall 2009), pp. 119-161. Mid-Term Essays Due The Foreign Policy Process The Bureaucratic Environment 3/4: Bureaucracies (in)Action *Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” 698-718. 3/6: Bureaucracies (in)Action II *Welch, David A. 1992. The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect. International Security 17, no. 2 (October 1): 112-146.

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3/8: Cases of Bureaucratic (in)Action *Peter L. Bergen, Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden--from 9/11 to Abbottabad (New York: Crown, 2012), chs. 10-12 3/11-3/16: Spring Break—No Class Civil Military Relations 3/18: Ideology and Organizations *Snyder, Jack. 1984. Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984. International Security 9, no. 1 (July 1): 108-146. 3/20: Agency and Leadership I *Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime (New York: Free Press, 2002), chs. 2 (on Lincoln) and appendix (theory of civilian control). 3/22: Agency and Leadership II *Peter D. Feaver, "The Right to Be Right: Civil-Military Relations and the Iraq Surge Decision," International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, (Spring 2011), pp. 87-125. Intelligence and Decision Making 3/25: The Inevitability of Intelligence Failures Richard K. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence, pp. 1-52. 3/27:Expertise and Influence as Enemies of Intelligence Betts, pp. 53-103 3/29:9/11, WMD, and the Dogs that Didn’t Bark Betts, pp. 104-123, 183-194 National Security Council and the Interagency Process 4/1: The Structure of the Interagency Process *Fred I. Greenstein and Richard H. Immerman, “Effective National Security Advising: Recovering the Eisenhower Legacy,” in Inderfurth and Johnson, 46-52. *“Editors’ Introduction,” in Inderfurth and Johnson, 97-106 *Vincent A. Auger, “The National Security Council System After the Cold War,” in Inderfurth and Johnson, 107-23. 4/3: Models of Using Information and Advice *Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice, (Bolder, CO: West View Press, 1980), ch. 8. *Michael Lewis, “Obama’s Way,” Vanity Fair, (October 2012), 23 pages. 4/5: Information Institutions and Strategy in War *Spencer D. Bakich, America At Limited War: Information Institutions and Strategic Performance in Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf and Iraq (ms. 2013), chs. 1-2.

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Case Studies 4/8: The Korean War: Strategic Beliefs and Motives for War Hess, Presidential Decisions for War, pp. 8-40 4/10: The Korean War: Executing the War Hess, pp. 41-74. 4/12: The Korean War: Explaining Strategic Performance *Bakich, ch. 3. 4/15: The Vietnam War: Strategic Beliefs and Motives for War Hess, pp. 75-112. 4/17: The Vietnam War: Executing the War Hess, pp. 113-152 4/19: The Vietnam War: Explaining Strategic Performance *Bakich, ch. 4 4/22: The Persian Gulf War: Strategic Beliefs and Motives for War Hess, pp. 153-198 4/24: The Persian Gulf War: Executing the War Hess, pp. 199-220 4/26: The Persian Gulf War: Explaining Strategic Performance *Bakich, ch. 5. 4/29: The Iraq War: Strategic Beliefs and Motives for War Hess, pp. 221-248 5/1: The Iraq War: Executing the War Hess, pp. 249-277. 5/3: The Iraq War: Explaining Strategic Performance *Bakich, ch. 6 Final Exam Prompt Posted 5/6: Concluding Remarks *Bakich, ch. 7 5/10: Final Essay Due

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