Plato: The Creator of Natural Theology Lecture for Brazil (March 2009)

Natural theology has a long and complex history that is closely connected with the origin and evolution of western philosophy. In a sense, natural theology is inseparable from a rational (or scientific) enquiry for a first principle (arche) and it is thus a search for wisdom as it was understood by Greek philosophers.

This is all the more true in that the Greeks initially

understood the ultimate arche to be divine.1 More precisely, if one considers that the discovery of nature (phusis) and of reason (logos as a critical and argumentative discourse) are inseparable for the Greeks and also that, for the phusiologoi,2 the word theos or god is often employed to qualify phusis, one can appreciate Werner Jaeger’s statement that natural theology begins with the Presocratics.3 It true that the phusiologoi conceived the relation between god and the world round them as the subject of a secular study and debate, a subject explained, criticized and modified by human reason according to principles arising from theoretical argumentation. However, does this mean that they were offering arguments for the existence of god? Even Xenophanes, the first to give a critical analysis of the anthropomorphic conception of god and to replace it with a new notion of god, does not propose a proof of the existence of god, as James 1

See for example Thales DK 11A22; Anaximander DK 12A11; Anaximene DK 13A10, B2. As G. Vlastos has noted (“Theology and Philosophy in Early Greek Thought”, Studies in Greek Philosophy, vol. 1, The Presocratics [Princeton , 1993], 1) theos is listed more often than the word phusis in the Diels/Krantz index Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. 3 W. Jaeger, Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers (Oxford, 1947), 37; see also, M. Morgan “Plato and Greek Religion,” in The Cambridge Companion to Plato (Cambridge, 1992), 240; and M.R. Wright, Cosmology in Antiquity (London/New York, 1995), 166. 2

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Lesher has clearly shown.4 Unless one believes as do M.R. Wright or Lloyd Gerson, that a rational discourse on nature (and hence on god) is the same as an argument or proof of the existence of god or gods, there was no argument attempting to demonstrate the existence of god before the existence itself was contested.5 The first arguments did not attempt, as far as I know, to prove the existence of traditional gods, but rather to argue that gods (or a god) guaranteed the order of the physical universe. This explains why the first attempts to explain the existence of god were of a teleological nature. My aim here is to show precisely why the Plato of the Laws (notably, Laws 10) should be considered as the true creator of “natural theology” (theologia naturalis or physicos). To do so, I will attempt to retrace, albeit briefly, the history of the concept and the expression theologia naturalis in antiquity. By “natural theology,” I understand a rational discourse that aims to demonstrate that god (or the gods) organizes and governs the world. In this sense, natural theology and the physico-teleological (or physico-theological) argument for the existence of god are closely related. The position to be defended here meanwhile is that the natural theology of the Laws is similar to that which we generally attribute to Stoics. This natural theology demonstrates that god (or reason) governs nature and that god is immanent in nature (or even identified with it) and not external to it.6

4

J. H. Lesher, Xenophanes of Colophon (Toronto, 1992), 114-119. Wright seems aware that there cannot be theology without teleology. L. Gerson: ”I have been arguing that natural theology, taken as a scientific search (my italics) for an ultimate arché, is virtually identical with the activity of a search for wisdom as the Greek philosophers understood it.” (God and Greek Philosophy. Studies in the Early History of Natural Theology [London/New York, Routledge, 1990], 82. 6 On the other hand, Plato does not argue (unlike the Stoics) that the universe is periodically annihilated. 5

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The Classical Origins of “Natural Theology” In the modern sense, the term “natural theology” is used in contrast to “revealed religion”; it is the attempt to prove the existence of god by philosophical arguments. It is characterized as natural not by virtue of any intimate or teleological relation between the nature of the universe and God (the traditional Stoic meaning of the term which I am tracing back to Plato), but rather because the arguments and proofs that it develops are accessible to the “natural reason” of all humans. In sum, it appeals to knowledge that is available without recourse to any special revelation from supernatural sources. From this perspective, all of the traditional proofs for God’s existence (cosmological, ontological, teleological etc.) fall within the scope of natural theology.

The origin of the modern meaning of natural theology is nonetheless closely

connected with the ancient meaning. However, it is also a reaction to it.

The Stoic origins of the expression theologia natural In his De civitate Dei, Augustine (A.D. 354-430) informs us that the expression “natural theology” was first used not in contrast with revealed religion, but rather in opposition to “mythical theology” and to “civil or political theology.” (CD 6.5) Augustine traces this opposition back to a famous Roman scholar, Terentius Varro (116-27, B.C.E.) a contemporary and friend of Cicero. In his Antiquitates rerum humanarum et divinarum Varro distinguishes three kinds of theology (tria genera theologiae): mythical, civil and physical (CD 6. 5). Mythical theology is the province of the poets; civil theology is the concern of the people;

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natural theology – the nature of the divine as it is revealed in the nature of reality7 – is the objective of the philosophers. Only natural theology could legitimately be considered religion, because for Saint Augustine the expression “true religion” meant literally: a religion that was true. Mythical theology was based on a fantastic, fabulous world. As for civil theology, already in decline in this period, Varro hoped to save it: for him, this religion derived its validity from the authority of the state, an authority that was independent of, and prior to religion (CD 6. 4; Varro argues that cities first came into existence and then instituted divine things, so that divine things were instituted by men!). For Varro, religion was one of the fundamental aspects of social life, a thesis strongly contested by Augustine. According to him Varro’s state religion had no more validity than the myths of the poets. It is inconceivable for Augustine that the true religion could be limited to a single State. God is essentially universal, and must be worshipped universally (CD 6.4). Thus, according to Augustine, “the true God is God, not by opinion, but by nature” (CD 6.8). There is no doubt that Augustine finds support for his universalism in the natural theology of the Greeks. In contrast, mythical and civil theology have nothing to do with nature, they are but artificial conventions, merely the work of humans (CD 6.8 and Jaeger [1947],3); the very concept of natural theology is constituted by this contrast in theologies (CD 6.6). Augustine is thus working from the well known antithesis between phusis (nature) and nomos or themis (convention).8 From the point of view of natural theology, dealing with the gods of the poets or those of the state amounts to the same thing, according to Augustine. Varro’s tripartite division was thus an attempt at a synthesis of doctrines for the purpose of defending the

7 8

CD 6. 5,8. CD 6. 8 “The true God is God, not by opinion, but by nature...” [trad. R.W. Dyson] 4

gods of the state, something Augustine did not fail to note.

The fact that the Latin Varro used three Greek adjectives (mythicon, politicon, and physicon) to designate the tria genera theologiae (CD 6.5,12) suggests that this categorization is borrowed from a philosopher of the Hellenistic age (and most likely a Stoic). Augustine was among the first to substitute the Latin word naturalis for the Greek word physicos (CD 6.8). It was not until Raymond Sebond’s Theologia naturalis sive liber creaturum in the fifteenth century, however, that the expression theologia naturalis appears, at least as a book title. In fact, following Augustine work, the word “theology” (theologia) received such a bad reputation among Christians that in the Middle Ages it was associated with incredulity.

Abelard

experimented with the term when he employed theologia in the title of his work on Christian doctrine, but this immediately drew the wrath of St. Bernard.9 The word theologia went through the whole of antiquity with this double sense.

What are we to understand “natural or physical theology” (theologia naturalis ou phusike) to mean, if its origin dates back to the Hellenistic period? Augustine’s interpretation of this expression does not provide the specificity we need to answer this question. We do know thanks to him that it was associated with philosophy, that it goes back to the Presocratics (he identifies Heraclitus, Pythagoras, and Epicurus in CD 6.5), that its object is first causes and that it is universal in scope.10 These features are characteristic of natural theology for virtually all of

9

C.C.J. Webb, Studies in the History of Natural Theology (Oxford, 1915),16-7. “They [the philosophers] discuss [in their books] what gods there are, where they are, of what

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the history of Greek philosophy. Werner Jaeger concludes that like Varro, Augustine interprets Greek philosophy as (true) natural theology since it is “based on rational insight into the nature of reality itself,” a position he attributes to the very first philosophers.11 According to Clement Webb, the expression “natural theology” as used by Varro and his contemporaries must be understood in the Aristotelian sense of theologike: “the science concerned with the knowledge of the highest beings that the world contains.”12 More recently, Lloyd Gerson has read Augustine and Varro as taking “natural philosophy” to mean philosophical theology: a theology that does not exclude any argument in support of the existence of God (and nature).13 Nonetheless, the focus is less on the rational methodology – though this is of course implicit – than it is on the object of this theology: this latter being natural, the theology is aptly characterized as “natural.” “By observing nature,” one can recognize God as he is in reality without there being any question of supernatural (or suprasensible) gods.14 If this were true, it would be surprising if “natural theology” did not go back at least to the Stoics. Indeed, Cicero developed in some detail this famous Stoic doctrine, notably in book 2 of his De natura deorum, just as he witnessed with his friend Varro the final days of the Republic.

It is worth noting that that Cicero begins his De natura deorum with the observation that

kind they are, of what quality, for how long they have existed, whether they are made of fire, as Heraclitus believes, or of numbers as the Pythagoras thinks, or of atoms, as Epicurus says.” CD 6.5 (trad.R.W. Dyson). 11 W. Jaeger, 1947, 3. 12 C. Webb, 1915, 15. 13 L. Gerson, 1990, 1 (and note 1). 14 R. Bodéüs, Aristote et la théologie des vivants immortels, Paris, 1992, 57 moves in the same direction.. 6

the majority of philosophers take it for granted that the gods exist. In fact, according to him, it is the doubters (Protagoras) and the atheists (Diagoras and Theodore) who are rare. In his work he presents three positions: Velleius is the spokesman for Epicurians, Balbus for the Stoics, and Cotta for the Academicians or Sceptics. Velleius asserts (more or less against the Stoics) that the gods exist as a part of nature, but that they are not immortal, and what is more, that they are not concerned with human affairs. Balbus argues that the gods exist and that they take care of humans. Cotta, for his part, agrees that the gods exist (at least the gods of the civic religion), but attempts to refute the arguments advanced by Balbus concerning the nature, the providence and the universal rule of the gods (ND 3.6).

For the Stoics, the world is the substance of god and since god is the nature that sustains the world and makes things grow, theology and physics are inseparable.15 Physics is the part of philosophy that provides us with the terms and theories that allow us to understand that the world functions according to the laws of an all-encompassing omnipresent divine nature – a nature that is fully alive, productive, and which creates all of its products according to a rational plan. Without this knowledge, “living in agreement with nature,” the ultimate aim of humans, would be impossible to realize.16 The assumption from which the physics of the Stoics is derived is that there is but one unique order in the cosmos. Like their predecessors, they ask what elements and

15

See Diogenes Laertius 7.148-9 (SVF 2.1022, 1132) and Plutarch, On Stoic self-contradiction 1035A (SVF2.24). Plutarch uses ho peri tÇn theÇn logos to render ”theology“. For Epictetus (Discourses I, 6,12-22), with humans, god has introduced consciousness into the world. The relation between theology and physics is developped by Cicero through the voice of Balbus. (Cicero, De natura deorum II, 13-44.) 16 See A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge, 1987), 1. 266. 7

causal principles must underlie the cosmos in order to explain its order. Their answer is that it must be reason (logos) or god that is the active principle, and matter (hule), that is the passive principle. God and matter are therefore the principles of the world.17

The forms (or

characteristics) of all objects are explained by the presence in their matter of a divine principle which activates and shapes them. In other words, all objects – and even the universe as a whole – can be analyzed as a compound of matter and god. Matter needs god in order to have a particular entity and god needs matter in order to have an entity to inform.

It is important to note that for the Stoics the argument for the existence of the gods is not strictly speaking distinct from the demonstration of divine providence. The teleological argument is therefore a recurring theme since it defends both the existence and the providence of the gods. The Stoic Balbus sums up their method in the following way:

“I therefore assert that it is by the providence of the gods that the world and all its parts were first compounded and have been governed for all times. The defense of this thesis is usually divided into three parts by our school. The first part derives from the reasoning which proves that the gods exist: once this is granted, it has to be conceded that the world is governed by their counsels. Second is the part which proves that all things are under the control of a sentient nature, and that nature’s works are all of utmost beauty: once this has been established, it follows that they are generated from animate origins. Third comes the topic which derives from our awe at things in the heavens and on earth. First, therefore, either it must be denied that the gods exist, as Democritus in effect does by introducing his “likenesses” and Epicurus his “images”, or, if it is granted that the gods exist, it must be admitted that they do something distinguished. But there is nothing more distinguished than governing the world. Therefore the world is governed by the gods counsels.” (De natura deorum II, 75-6 : trans. Long and Sedley.)18

17

See in particular Diogenes Laertius 7.134 (SVF 2.300). It is irrelevant for the case at hand that the world is surrounded by an infinite void which is nonetheless a ”something“ (SVF 2.503). 18 Contrast this with Sextus Empiricus “report of a very interesting Stoic argument for the soul’s 8

It therefore follows that, according to the Stoics, theology must be natural because its object is natural, notwithstanding their commitment to a rationalist methodology. Moreover, it is important to note that “natural theology” is seen as the only effective way of refuting atheism because it demonstrates both the existence and the providence of the gods. Henceforth, to deny either the existence or the providence of the gods was to embrace atheism. Religion will be natural, and therefore universal, or it will not be at all.

What about Aristotle? Can we characterize his theology as natural? If so, he should be considered as the precursor of the Stoics. Jean Tricot and Richard Bodéüs apparently support this view. According to Tricot, Aristotle is, so to speak, the father of natural theology, since he was the first to offer a strictly philosophical argument to prove god’s existence.19 This interpretation

self-moving quality which is reminiscent of Plato’s argument in Book 10 of the Laws: “The substance of what exists, they [the Stoics] say, since it is without any motion from itself and shapeless, needs to be set in motion and shaped by some other cause. For this reason, as when we look at a very beautiful bronze we want to know the artist (since in itself the matter is in an immobile condition), so when we see the matter of the universe moving and possessing form and structure we might reasonably inquire into the cause which moves and shapes it into many forms. It is not convincing that this is anything other than a power which pervades it, just as soul pervades us. Now this power is either self-moving or moved by some other power. But if it is moved by another power, this second power will not be capable of being moved unless it is moved by a third power, which is absurd. So there exists a power which in itself is self-moving, and this must be divine and everlasting. For either it will be in motion from eternity or from a definite time, for there will be no cause of its motion from a definite time. So, then, the power which moves matter and guides it in due order into generations and changes is everlasting. So this power would be god“ (Against the professors 9.75-6: trad Long and Sedley [SVF, 2, 311]). 19 J. Tricot. Aristote. La Metaphysique. nouvelle édition avec commentaire, Paris, 1981, II, 672 (note 2): “Any essay on natural theology, any speculation on the essence of the divine [...] are indebted, in a way, to these famous pages [of book Lambda where the speculation on the immutable reality constitutes the best example in antiquity of an ordered reflexion by the natural 9

assumes that, prior to Aristotle, there were no arguments for the existence of god, and that he was thus the forerunner of the Stoics. For his part, Richard Bodéüs explains that despite the primacy of metaphysical issues over theological ones in book Lambda of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, the fact remains that Hellenistic thought was strongly influenced by Aristotle’s new philosophical approach, in which the study of god is inseparable from the study of nature.20 According to Bodéüs, this explains why the Stoics thought that the scientific knowledge of god was of the same order as physics and why Chrysippus, identifying the universe or the law of the universe with god, “proposes what will be called for the first time [sic] a ‘natural theology’”.21 Aristotle’s solution, so he thinks, reunites in a way Plato’s sensible and super-sensible worlds. This unification of god and the world is, for Bodéüs, the sine qua non of natural theology (a view with which I concur), which explains why he believes that natural theology strictly speaking begins with the Stoics.

I would argue that Aristotle’s theology (as it is characterized by Bodéüs ) has strictly nothing to do with “theology” – natural or otherwise – in the sense in which I have been discussing it. Aristotle’s unmoved mover (to which Bodéüs refers) is not the efficient cause of motion, but its final cause as object of desire and love: Metaphysics, 1072b3).22 Although

light of human reason].” 20 R. Bodéüs, Aristote et la théologie des vivants immortels, Paris, 1992, p. 55. 21 R. Bodéüs, 1992, 56. 22 If Aristotle makes his prime mover a final cause rather than an efficient cause, it is because the efficient cause generally acts by entering into contact with what comes to be. Indeed, in his view, contact entails reaction. Therefore, if the prime mover had been an efficient cause like other efficient causes in the sublunar world, it would have been in some measure affected or changed by the motion it initiated. This would be inconsistent with his position of a prime mover as pure 10

Aristotle does use the word “god” (theos) to qualify his first cause, he describes it as a purely intellectual activity (noesis; Metaphysics 1072b13ff) which is not affected by the universe even if, as the final cause, it is the principle on which the universe depends and to which it aspires (Metaphysics 1072b13ff;1075a11ff). It is clear that for Aristotle, God’s thought does not control natural changes from without (God is himself the object of divine knowledge). On the contrary, natural objects have their ends in themselves.23

Aristotle was clearly aware of the originality of his theological approach. In fact, he coined a new term to distinguish his science from that of his predecessors: theologike as opposed to theologia.24 Theologike does not have the gods as its object, rather it “deals with things which are both separable [from matter] and immutable”25 – although in Metaphysics Epsilon (1026a1718), he sees these separable and immutable things as responsible for the visible divine things, that is, the celestial bodies.26 As we all know, there is a lively debate concerning the relation between the meaning of theologike and the science of God as the unmoved mover of the first sphere and the supreme principle on which depend the sensible universe and the world of nature

actuality. In sum, we must imagine the unmoved mover as moving the celestial bodies as the good moves us, that is, as an object of their desire and love. On this point, see G.E. R. Lloyd, Aristotle, Cambridge, 1968,142. 23 The earth seeks it natural place, an acorn naturally grows into an oak tree, a young boy naturally grows into a mature adult. 24 In Metaphysics 1026a 18-23, theologike is equivalent to first philosophy for Aristotle. 25 Metaphysics, 1026a16. At Metaphysics1064a33, Aristole speaks of a separate and immutable reality. Meanwhile, it is important to note that theologike is contrasted with physike whose reality is also separate but mutable, and with mathematike whose reality is non-separable but immutable (Metaphysics, 1026a16). All three are theoretical sciences. 26 See R. Bodéüs, 1992, 64 ff. who argues that one is an extension of the other. 11

(ho ouranos kai he

phusis).27 Indeed, there is no occurrence of theologike in all of Book

Lambda. Nonetheless, this controversy has little bearing on our topic. However, the fact that this higher theoretical science is independent of physics for Aristotle must be stressed because his notion of divinity and /or theology as independent of nature explains his lack of interest in providence, the immortality of the soul and atheism.

Aristotle coined the term theologike to distinguish his theology from that of his predecessors (theologia). Theologia refers exclusively to the speech of the poets on the traditional gods; the poets are (the) theologoi or those who theologousi. The word theologia therefore corresponds to Varro’s mythical theology. Aristotle contrasts the theologoi with the phusikoi or the phusiologoi : those who theorize about nature.28

Let us return to the Presocratics and consider their understanding of natural theology. We saw that the divinization of nature did not begin with Plato. The notion of divinity was inherent in the concept of phusis from the very first Greek cosmogonies; thus certain phusiologoi – such as Anaximander and Heraclitus – did not hesitate to use a vocabulary with moral connotations to describe the order that governs the universe. However, the fact remains that for the phusiologoi in general the order that makes our world a cosmos is natural, that is, immanent in nature (phusis).29 In sum, for these thinkers the destiny of the universe and the destiny of humanity (and

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Metaphysics lambda, 1072b14. For a recent discussion, see Bodéüs, 1992, 62. Nonetheless, Aristotle is often critical of them, see for example On the Heavens 298b28-9 and On the Soul 406b26. 29 As G. Vlastos correctly notes :”all of them [the physiologoi] would account for this order [in 28

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even the destiny of society) could only be determined by phusis, a blind necessity (ananke), without any recourse to an intentional cause.

Natural theology and its arguments are in certain measure a reaction to the Presocratic writings of the peri phuseos type. Aristophanes aptly captures their influence on the moral, political and religious thinking of his time in his parody of the jargon of the “physicists” in the Clouds (376ff.; 1036-82). He introduces the notion of ananke (blind necessity identified with phusis itself), a cosmic force at work in all Presocratic thinking, to trivialize the importance of Zeus and to show that Zeus does not care for us (otherwise, Zeus would have struck with lightning the perjurers rather than his own temple: Clouds, 404ff.). In fact, in the famous exchange between Just and Unjust Reasoning, Aristophanes gives an example of the antilogical method of the Sophists and the moral problems that it raises (the weaker argument defeats the stronger). Plato, in his analysis of the accusations raised against Socrates (Apology, 18b, 19b), does not miss the intimate relation between the Sophistic method and Presocratic physics: at 26b, Meletus, Socrates’ accuser, confuses him with the physicist Anaxagoras (500-428) who also was accused of impiety around 433-32 for having professed that the heavenly bodies are nothing but lifeless incandescent rocks (DK 59A21, A42). That Anaxagoras was accused of impiety for professing such views shows that the Athenians still held the heavenly bodies to be divine. Indeed, Anaxagoras was among the first to be charged with atheism. Previously, because

nature] by the natures of the components of the universe without appeal to anything else, hence without appeal to a transcendent ordering intelligence.” (Plato’s Universe, Seattle, 1975, 24). It is in this that consists the substitution of natural (or rational) causes for supernatural (or mythical) causes to explain how the present order of things originated and continues to work. 13

the Ionian tradition had long identified the divine with the living phusis – in other words, the arche – of the cosmos, the Milesian concept of phusis could be seen to ascribe divinity to the heavenly bodies. But from the moment that Anaxagoras associated phusis

with a remote

Intelligence (Nous) that was at the origin of the cosmic process, he rejected the traditional view that the heavenly bodies incarnate the divine. The heavenly bodies were thus demoted to mere lifeless incandescent rocks.30

Of course, criticism of the gods on moral grounds emerged very early. Xenophanes (570-475) reproached Homer and Hesiod for attributing to the gods all that which in mortals is blameworthy and shameful;31 Pindar (518-446) followed in his path.32 Aeschylus (525-456), for his part, employed all of his genius to transform the ancient conception of an unjust, impetuous and violent Zeus, that is, Zeus the tyrant, into a Zeus who assures the Justice on which the new Greek state was built. Euripides (480-406) asserted in his Heracles (339-46) that even the most exalted god was morally inferior to a human in an analogous situation.33 And in the Ion, he rebuked the gods for holding humans to a standard which they themselves failed to live up to.34 But Euripides went even further. In a fit of rage in the Bellerphon (frg. 286), he exclaims:

There are no gods in heaven. To believe in such old wives’ tales is folly. You have only to look around you. Tyrants murder, rob, cheat and ravage, and are happier than the pious and peaceful. Small god-fearing states are quickly overwhelmed by the military might of

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The atomism of Democritus led to the same conclusion. D.K. 21 B11, 12. 32 Olympian Ode 1.28ff. and 1.52. 33 On this point, see F. Solmsen, Plato's Theology, New York, 1942, 20. 34 Ion, 436-51. 31

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those larger and more wicked.35

The fact that Euripides linked the poets with the origin of most of the stories (muthoi) which are neither true, nor worthy of the gods is one thing,36 but his refusal to believe in the existence of the gods in the face of the prosperity of the wicked and the suffering of the just indicates a profound and troubling change that is in stark contrast with Aeschylus’ time. The Athens of Aeschylus was marked by a deep optimism: the citizens had just experienced the favor of the gods of the city (theoi astuanaktes kai poliouchoi) who defended them from the Barbarians.37 Furthermore, the gods were the guardians of these “human” laws. There was a belief in providence and in the traditional values whose principle was the justice of gods. In contrast, Euripides’ Athens was that of the Peloponnesian war (431-404 B.C.E.) one of the most sinister and absurd conflicts to have afflicted the world. That war demonstrated that the traditional gods (civil or cosmic) did not defend the righteous who suffered as much as, if not more than, others. The providence of the gods and the existence of a nomos capable of governing with true justice began to be doubted. Under these circumstances it is hardly surprising that critics who contested the existence of the gods, who asserted that the gods were indifferent to human affairs or that they were not worthy of worship, should proliferate. Plato who cites these three forms of impiety in Republic II, 365d-e, thought, at least initially, that they could be

35

I owe this quote to W.K.C.Guthrie, The Sophists, Cambridge,1971, 229. I am also using his translation. It is also cited by A. J. Festugière in the same context in La révélation d'Hèrmes Trismégiste II. Le Dieu Cosmique, [1949] Paris, 1983, 162 (RHT from now on). 36 See Heracles, 1341-46. 37 Aeschylus, Suppliant Women, 1018 ff.. 15

resolved by reforming traditional education.38

However, the phusiologoi and their peri phuseos

writings represented a far graver

problem in his eyes. The Sophists who argued that the law and morality guaranteed by the gods did not truly exist by nature, but derived from convention, found a real and effective support in the works of the peri phuseos type. Whereas a rational explanation of the origin and evolution of society reduced the civil and traditional gods to human conventions, the theories of Anaxagoras and Democritus even stripped the heavenly bodies of the divinity that had hitherto been attributed to them. For the Sophists, the paradeigmata aretes designated anything that could be found to be contemptible in the behaviour of the gods of traditional religion. What remained then was a phusis stripped of divine attributes and transformed in accordance with the beliefs of the Sophists – notably, with their beliefs that might is right and that one’s egoistic passions should not be restricted.

According to Plato, atheism is a disease which recurs periodically and which afflicts a certain number of minds (Laws 10.888b). The cause of atheism is not the inability to master pleasures and desires (Laws 10.886a-b) but rather the ancient and modern theories to which the atheists appeal. It is therefore necessary to persuade and to teach (peithein kai didaskein) the

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In Republic 2.379a5-6, Plato employs for the first time the expression theologia to characterize his new ”rational“ theology. Nonetheless, this theology is modelled on the intelligible forms and, therefore, cannot be considered a ”natural theology.” Moreover, although this theology is ”rational“ it offers no arguments in support of the existence of God (or the gods). For a more detailed analysis of this passage in the context in question, see. G. Naddaf, ”Plato’s Theologia Revisited,” Méthexis 9, 1996, 5-18. 16

atheists by means of sufficient proofs (tekmeria ikana) that the gods exist (hes eisi theisi: Laws 10.885d2-3). Clearly Plato is not addressing himself to the average citizen but to powerful and penetrating minds (Laws 10.908c3), who will only be satisfied with proofs that nature offers of divine intelligence and providence.

As I noted above, there is no evidence of arguments for the existence of the gods before their existence was contested, and these first arguments were not attempts to prove the existence of the traditional gods but rather a god or gods who guaranteed the world order: the first attempts to explain their existence were thus of a teleological nature.39 The proof from the order of the universe (or from the perfection of human beings) is obviously tied to the notion of a god who orders the universe and who continues to care for it after he created it.40 To whom can this argument which is closely connected with natural theology, be credited?

Diogenes of Apollonia (c.423), the disciple of Anaxagoras, must be considered at least as a precursor of teleology, since he clearly asserts that the world and its parts, as well as the major natural phenomena such as the seasons, night and day etc., are regulated in the best possible way (hes anuston kallista) by a divine intelligence (DK64B3). Intelligence (noesis) is thus postulated from the outset as immanent to air (aer), such that air is considered as the unique principle of intelligence. It then follows that air’s active intelligence is the cause of all of the diversity in the universe. Yet, Diogenes does not seem to have advocated the notion of a final cause, that is, a

39 40

Festugière, RHT, 75. Festugière, RHT, 76. 17

cause in which humans (and notably philosophers) would recognize the idea of the good.41 Indeed, to claim that the order which governs the universe depends on a divine and intelligent principle, does not mean that this order entails a divine intention on which human destiny would depend. This is why there is no evidence in Diogenes work that the gods are concerned with us or of any preoccupation with atheism.

The earliest clear evidence of a doctrine of one or more governing and providential gods is found in Xenophon’s (c.430-354) Memorabilia (1.4 and 4.3). In 1.4, Xenophon relates a conversation between Socrates and a reputed atheist: Aristodemus. Xenophon provides Socrates with arguments in support of providence and the existence of gods that stress the teleological character of both the macrocosm and the microcosm. In 4.3, Xenophon relates a conversation on divine providence between Euthydemus and Socrates that shows that the gods, through the benefits which follow from the heavenly bodies (light, seasons, night and day, etc.), demonstrate their providence and watch over our well being.

Since we do not know the source of these arguments, it is difficult to reach a decision about them. That they are represented as coming from Socrates (although the influence may have come from Diogenes) would suggest that he was well versed in the theories of the physicists. But it also suggests that he developed his own views about nature in order to defend the existence and providence of the gods. Such physical speculations would, in his eyes, have a clear ethical

41

For an excellent critique of the standard interpretations of Diogenes, see André Laks. Diogène d'Apollonie, Lille, 1983. 18

value. What is certain is that the Stoics, who recognized Socrates as their precursor in natural theology, found a source of inspiration in the Memorabilia.42

Xenophon’s teleological

arguments are far inferior to Plato’s, but it is quite possible that Plato influenced Xenophon on this point.43 The gods in Memorabilia 4.3.16 appear to be the gods of the state rather than the cosmic gods. Moreover, Socrates does not explain why reason cannot arise in us from a combination of the “irrational” elements. Nor does Xenophon’s Socrates address the aporia of evil when attempting to demonstrate that the universe is divinely ordered, a crucial question which Plato develops in the Phaedo.

Indeed, in the Gorgias or the Phaedo (that is, prior to the Republic), in which Plato describes the soul as imprisoned in the body, there seems to be an irreconcilable dualism between the mind and the body, between the sensible and the intelligible worlds.44 This dualism presents a major obstacle to correct ethical behavior as well as to the correct ordering of the universe. Matter, inferior in quality, effectively resists the divine intellect, and therefore the good.45 In the new cosmology of the Timaeus and Laws 10, Plato attempts to resolve this duality.

42

See De natura deorum, 2.18; 3.27. For a recent discussion of this passage, see J. DeFilippo and Ph. Mitsis, ”Socrates and the Stoic Natural Law,” in The Socratic Movement ed. P. Vanderwaerdt, Ithaca, 1994, 252-271. They refer, in particular, to the Memorabilia 1.4 to show to what degree the Stoics are endebted to Socrates. Plato [sic] is not even mentioned! 43 The date of the composition of the Memorabilia remains uncertain, but the teleological arguments attributed Socrates are similar, albeit significantly inferior, to those found in later dialogues, such as the Timaeus, Philebus and the Laws. 44 Gorgias, 493a ff., Phaedo, 114d, 53b-c, 69c, etc.. 45 Although evil is closely connected with matter, evil as opposed to good, is not identical to matter. 19

He accomplishes this by affirming, first, that soul, as the principle of motion, is closely connected with the movements of the body; next, that there can be no more an intellect without a soul than there can be a soul without a body, such that the world soul whose end is to be selfmoving, contemplates the ideas and thus everlastingly continues in an orderly movement; and finally, that the world soul and the individual souls are constituted of a mixture of three ingredients intermediary between the sensible and intelligible worlds (this explains how the soul can know the objects of both worlds). In this case, in order for the intellect to form an order, it must come to terms with matter, as the principle of multiplicity and differentiation, in contrast with intelligence. The dualism of the Phaedo gives way to a theory arranging (organizing) the necessity of matter and the necessity of intelligence. Intelligence wins or rather predominates (Timaeus 47e-48a, 68e). Of course, disorder still has its place, but no longer as an essential evil, but rather as a secondary or lesser evil.

This brings us to Plato’s Timaeus. The Timaeus is the first historia of the peri phuseos type that can be described as creationist. Prior to Plato evolutionism was the norm. A narrative of the creationist type requires above all that a creator god, the demiurge, be present prior to the constitution of the universe and that this god be independent of matter. Since this demiurge relies on techne, everything in the world must be the consequence of a divine intention. This point is crucial, for each time that Plato asserts that the world order is due to divine intention, he contrasts his assertion with the theory of his adversaries for whom nature and, therefore, the world order, are due to a spontaneous process that developed and continues without recourse to

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any intention (Sophist, 265c, Philebus, 28d).

There are four elements which support the ontological structure of the Timaeus: the demiurge, intelligible forms, sensible things and space. However, the demiurge represents the keystone to the whole system, for in order to produce the sensible things, which are images, he must organize the spatial medium by fixing his eyes on their model, the intelligible forms. From this perspective, the demiurge appears as a sort of nous distinct from both the intelligible forms, the spatial medium and his creation, the sensible world. Although teleology is omnipresent in the Timeaus, nonetheless, there are no arguments in support of the immortality of the soul, the existence of god, or divine providence. In fact, this dialogue is so deprived of arguments strictly speaking, that it is strange that it is considered by some as the very model of scientific research.46

If Plato characterizes the Timaeus as a “likely story” ( eikos muthos or eikos logos), it is so for at least three reasons. First, the Timaeus is a description of the production of the sensible world, that is, a cosmogony (whereas in Laws 10, we have a description of the world as it is, a cosmology), and since the sensible world is only a changing copy (eikos) of a model (paradeigma), its description can only be provisory and likely (eikos). Second, since the state of the world before and during its production escapes any direct or even indirect perception, Timaeus can only “imitate” in the order of discourse what seems to him to have been the

46

See for example L. Brisson and I. Meyerstein for whom, in the Timaeus, Plato employs for the first time the method which was to be employed in any research which pretends to be “scientific”: a list of axioms and rules of inference. Inventer l'univers: le problèm de la connaissance et les cos cosmologiques, Paris 1991, 10-11. 21

procedure of the demiurge. Third, the cosmogonical accounts of his adversaries (theologoi and phusikoi) are not likely because they confound “true cause” with “secondary causes”.

For these three reasons the production of the world described in the Timaeus must be considered as an “non-verifiable” discourse. However, this is not the only problem. None of Plato’s predecessors or adversaries (in the Greek tradition) would have accepted the principle of a demiurge and the world of intelligible forms. To overcome this problem, Plato must therefore demonstrate by means of rational arguments (logoi, Laws 10.886d5; 887a6; 887b7; 890e2; 891c1) and without appeal to the concepts of a demiurge or of intelligible forms that the physical universe exhibits divine intelligence and providence. Plato is fully aware of this. This is precisely what he attempts to do in Laws 10 in his refutation of those who deny either the existence of the gods, or their providence, or both. This refutation, according to the tradition which we have traced in these pages, is the condition sine qua non for a natural theology. This demonstration (apodexis 887a, 893b, or epidexis 892c, 899d) of the existence and providence of the gods is all the more important in that Plato identifies impiety as the cause of the collapse of the society of his time. By upholding that law, morality and the gods are in no way natural, but merely the products of

human conventions (888d-890a), the peri phuseos works of the

evolutionary type are thus perceived as responsible for the social collapse.

Before beginning his demonstration, Plato briefly explains the position of his adversaries in the form of an historia peri phuseos (an account which describes and explains how the present order of things, that is, the world, humanity and society, originated and developed from a

22

primordial state, see Laws 10. 888d-890d). According to his adversaries, whom he considers as atheistic materialists, the present order of things emerged by chance (tuchei) from four primary inanimate (apsucha) elements or principles: earth, air, water and fire (889b). This is what the materialists understand by phusis(891c).

In order to demonstrate divine existence and

providence – the true guarantors for the State and its laws – Plato has recourse to versions of two famous arguments: the cosmological and the physico-teleological arguments, both of which are needed to defend his position. Plato employs the cosmological argument to show that the soul (psyche), which his adversaries hold to be a product posterior to the four elements, is in fact prior. Indeed, Plato who understands by phusis the primary source of generation (as do the materialists, 892c), connects phusis more with soul than with the four souless (apsucha) elements. Soul is movement that moves itself, and only such a movement can be the primary source of generation; for it is prior, in existence and in dignity, to the series of movements transmitted by bodies. Consequently, if the universe was really generated (something all his predecessors maintained), it is impossible according to Plato that the present order of things was able to emerge from its initial state without the initial impetus of a moving principle, a principle which is identified with phusis as arche and which, if it were to cease to act, would bring about the end of the universe ( Laws 10. 895a5-b1). In short, without soul, the primordial state of things would forever remain inert.

However, this first argument is not sufficient for soul is not the supreme principle that Plato has in mind when he thinks God. Indeed, soul is neutral and as such it is susceptible to good or evil depending on the circumstances. Now since God or the divine is by nature good,

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Plato must determine which principle will assure in a permanent way, the goodness of the soul. This principle is obviously nous (intelligence), which is exhibited in the harmony it establishes and sustains in the visible motion of the natural world (see Laws 12.966e).

This, however, remains to be demonstrated, and doing so is precisely the aim of the physico-teleological argument. This demonstration depends essentially on one thing: its ability to prove that the movements of the heavenly bodies are of the same nature of those of nous, that is, circular, uniform and constant (898a-b; this simile is taken from a previous classification of movements at 893d). But how does one go about this? Plato supposes that a simple observation of the heavenly bodies will suffice to convince one that their movements and those of the intellect are identical and, consequently, that it is the ariste psyche (identified with God) which cares for the entire universe (897c; 898c). However, in reality, the demonstration is much more complex. The observation of the sky (that is, observational astronomy) reveals that the movements of the heavenly bodies are not regular, but wandering. Mathematical astronomy, on the other hand, can show that the heavenly bodies move in circles or, what amount to the same thing, intelligently. Indeed, in Laws 7.821e Plato affirms that the paradox of the irregular motion of bodies has only recently been resolved and that astronomy can now be considered as a science which is “noble, true, beneficial to society and completely acceptable to God.”47 Mathematical astronomy successfully demonstrates that each planet has a geometric trajectory that corresponds

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Laws 7.821a8-b1. See also Laws 12. 966e-967c. In the Epinomis, a dialogue with a distinctly Platonic sound, astronomy is not only considered as the most important science (990a), the science that everyone should study (at least to a certain degree) from youth, but more importantly, the science without which a happy social existence is impossible (992a). 24

to the movements determined by observational astronomy. In the final analysis, it is astronomy which enables the physico-teleological argument to prove that the soul which animates the heavenly bodies is necessarily good, something the cosmological argument could not successfully prove. As G.E.R. Lloyd judiciously notes: “The success of the astronomers in making sense of the apparent irregularities in the movements of the heavenly bodies both stimulated and appeared to vindicate those who believed – as most ancient philosophers and scientists alike believed – that the world as a whole is the product of rational design.”48

Astronomy now seems to replace dialectic as the highest science (see Laws 12.967a-d) It alone confirms the conviction of those who believe that the universe as a whole is the product of a rational design (there is nothing of this sort in Xenophon); the condition sine qua non to demonstrate the existence of god (or the gods), it will remain one of the corner stones of the teleological argument until at least the time of Descartes.49 Once this demonstration is assured, Plato can affirm, as he did in the Timaeus, that the rule of life consists in imitating, as perfectly as possible, the sensible world that surrounds him. In sum, the human soul must imitate the movements of the world soul which are manifested in the form of the perfectly circular and

48

G.E.R. Lloyd, Early Greek Science, London 1970, 98. Thus Leonard Lessius (1554-1623) in his De providentia numinis and Marin Marsenne (15881648) in his L’Impiété employ essentially physico-teleological arguments (relying, moreover, on the most recent astronomical discoveries) to demonstrate the existence of God in opposition to the atheism as it is expounded by Cicero in his De natura deorum. Descartes is in fact the first to argue that it is easier to demonstrate the existence of God than the existence of the physical universe. In sum, it can no longer be affirmed that God exists because the physical universe exists. This explains the strange, but now comprehensible way, with which Descartes begins his sixth meditation: “The only thing that remains for me to examine is if material things exist.” (Il ne me reste plus maintenant qu’à examiner s’il y a des choses matérielles.” 49

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uniform movements of the heavenly bodies: the visible gods.50 Instead of arguing, as Vlastos does,51 that Plato’s hypothesis according to which the movements of the heavenly bodies are circular is an a priori conviction, it seems that Plato’s position and conviction is clearly based on observation; the observation that the movements of the celestial bodies are clearly responsible for the seasons, the alternation of night and day, and according to the Timaeus, number (47a-b), and therefore that they must be circular and uniform.

However, in my opinion, Plato’s greatest achievement is that all of the arguments that he employs in his proof of the existence of god are empirical; he relies neither on a demiurge, nor on the world of intelligible forms. Modern and contemporary commentators have hardly noticed that in Plato’s demonstration the divine is in a sense immanent to the world. It is not by accident that Plato ends his argument with the famous expression attributed to Thales: “all things are full of gods” (theon einai plere

panta: 899b8). In other words, the gods do not transcend the

physical, and there is nothing to indicate that Plato had any need for a transcendental god in his argument. Nor is it necessary, as Taylor claims, to postulate a God who contemplates the forms in order to reproduce and explain the order in the world.52 This is why I believe that Plato is the creator of natural theology and more precisely of a natural theology similar to the one usually attributed to the Stoics. This is confirmed, in my opinion, both in the argument for divine 50

The structure of city of the Laws is circular because it is based on the movements of the celestial bodies and therefore on the cosmological model (Laws 5.745b-e). 51 G. Vlastos, Plato’s Universe, Seattle, 1975, 53 52 A.E. Taylor, Plato the Man and his Work, Oxford, 1928, 492. G. Morrow also suggests this in Plato’s Cretan City, Princeton, 1960, 10; 487 as does T. Saunders in “Plato’s later Political Thought,” in The Cambridge Companion to Plato (ed. By R. Kraut), Cambridge, 1992, 468. My understanding is that this position is, in fact, the norm. 26

providence and in the eschatological myth which follow his argument in Laws 10 in favour of the existence of gods.

The Argument in Support of Divine Providence If Descartes were of the firm conviction that proofs of the immortality of the soul and of God’s existence should suffice to convince one of divine providence,53 Plato is convinced of the necessity of a supplementary proof that takes into account the relation between the universe and ourselves. He attempts to demonstrate (endeixasthai: 900c7) the providential nature of God by means of arguments (logoi: 900b5, 900b7, 903a10) acceptable to everyone. These arguments are corollaries to the cosmological and teleological proofs we have just considered, but they are very different from the arguments for divine providence found in Xenophon; nothing in Xenophon’s arguments suggests that the universe was created in view of our well-being. As with the Stoics, there is a rigorous determinism which governs the universe.

According to Plato, that the ariste psyche takes care of the universe (900d) demonstrates, on the basis of empirical evidence, that there is a divine providence, and that the gods are good (agathoi) and necessarily virtuous.

As for shameful and impious acts, these can only be

attributed to humans. But we still do not know if the gods neglect small things (us) in favour of big things (the heavenly bodies). Now, if the gods were to neglect the little things, this could only be due to negligence or indolence; but these are qualities that are unworthy of gods; they must therefore take care of the little things. Moreover, since the gods who are by definition 53

See in particular the letter that precedes his meditations. 27

superior to humans (they know, see and hear all, 901d) are just as aware as physicians and other experts, then the neglect of small things would lead to a failure of the whole; this entails once again that the gods do indeed care for us. Plato does insist though that human affairs (anthropina pragmata), like the human soul, are parts of animated nature (empsuchou metechei phuseos, 902b).

It is important once again to note the absence of a transcendent god or an intelligible world. This God (or these gods) are immanent to matter (everything is full of gods, of divine techne). The same ideas are found in the eschatological myth (903b-905d). Plato characterizes this myth as a charm or a spell: “it seems that he [the impious youth] is still in need of words of charm [or an incantation myth]” 903b1-2), but it is still perfectly consistent with the preceding logoi. In fact, this muthos resembles a logos both in form and content. It begins with the reason for which the gods must take care of us: each part, as insignificant as it might be, is made with the perfection of the whole in mind and, by virtue of our common origin, each one of us is part of this whole (903d2-3; see also902b4-5). From this perspective, the whole does not exist for the sake of its part (or of the individual), but the part for the sake of the whole (903c5). Humans therefore have no privileged place in the universe; a sort of providential determinism, fatalism, or rigorous necessity governs the universe (it seems to me that this was absent in the Timaeus). God, the king (basileus, 904a6), checkers-player (petteutes, 903d5-6), world supervisor (ho tou pantos epimeloumenos 903b3-4), has a synoptic vision of what is best for the universe as a whole (904a). Thus, according to Plato, providence (our king, 904a6) has taken steps in deciding the sort of position (poian hedran) and in what regions (tinas topous) our souls should reside

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after death in order that the victory of good and the defeat of evil will be assured throughout the universe (904b).54

Providence does not, however, prevent each individual from being responsible for his or her voluntary actions (tais boulesesin, 904c1). Thus, during terrestrial existence, individuals must learn to dominate the mortal parts of their soul that determine their character. Likewise, the relocation of souls is always determined according to the quality or character of the soul at the time of death. Souls automatically move about according to the order and law of destiny (kata ten tes eimarmenes taxin kai nomon, 904b7; 903e1) Judgment after death is in fact eliminated for the “mover of the pieces” or checkers player (petteutes, 903d5-6) merely weighs the souls, as P.-M. Schuhl so aptly puts it.55 But how does the soul move in space (chora) after death? If, during its earthly life, the soul has only experienced minor character changes, it will move horizontally in space (to tes choras epipedon, 904c9). If it led a truly unjust life, it will set on the path to the depths of Hades, that is, in the lower regions ( topoi) of the universe (904d). Alternatively, if it led a life of divine virtue, it will follow a holy path to a higher or superior region (topos 904d8; see 904b). The soul thus moves to that area of physical space that corresponds to the character for which it has assumed responsibility during its life: birds of a feather flock together (904e6-905a1). Punishment and destiny are in a certain sense natural (904e7).

54

Plato summarizes at 904c the three positions he defends in this myth: 1) all things that have soul change; 2) the cause of this change resides in our choices; 3) in changing, the soul moves in conformity with the ordinance and law of destiny (after death). 55 P.-M. Schuhl, La fabulation platonicienne, Paris, 1947,105-108. 29

In the Laws, Plato only takes into consideration the physical universe. This supports the claim that both the world soul and the demiurge are immanent in matter. The world as a whole can thus be analyzed as a composite of matter (the four elements) and the world soul (ariste psyche) or demiurge. Plato’s natural theology thus prefigures that of the Stoics (considerably mote than Xenophon’s). His thesis differs from that of the Stoics notably in the sense that the universe is not periodically destroyed (904a). The fact does remain that the Platonic telos like the Stoic telos consists in living in conformity with universal reason (nous or logos). This brief overview of the archaeology of natural theology shows to what extent Plato is at the crossroads, so to speak, of the whole Western tradition. For this reason, Plato should be considered as the creator of “natural theology”. GERARD NADDAF YORK UNIVERSITY

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