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CROSSROADS: WHERE THEOLOGY MEETS HALACHA—A REVIEW ESSAY*

Sometimes, important ideas are voiced largely in response to a challenge. For example, the Rabbinic responses to Karaite objections regarding the oral tradition that stand as some of the most significant Jewish works of the medieval period were composed only as a reaction to opposition.1 Similarly, the rabbis of the Mishnah formulated their important definitions of heresy only after being confronted by the Sadducees and other deviant sects.2 Confrontation forces scholars to grapple with texts and ideas, formalize previously incomplete or private deliberations on a topic, and present them to public scrutiny. Such a process began approximately fifteen years ago when, in the inaugural issue of The Torah u-Madda Journal, R. Yehuda Parnes, at the time a popular lecturer in Talmud at Yeshiva University’s Rabbi Isaac Elchanan Theological Seminary, presented a concise and thoughtful halachic argument that attacked the academic study of Judaism.3 According to Maimonides, R. Parnes argued, any area of study that requires analysis of views contrary to the traditional tenets of Judaism is forbidden. Thus, presumably, the study of philosophy and the Bible on the university level is prohibited, as are the pursuits of archaeology and ancient history. The argument was not new but had never been presented in such a forum. This clear challenge to “Torah u-Madda” in the journal dedicated to its study, a testament to the courage of the journal’s editor, was answered by three important articles.4 The first response, written by two prominent Orthodox academic scholars, Professors Lawrence Kaplan and David Berger, was a moving combination of halachic analysis and public soul-searching.5 The second, by Professor Shalom Carmy of Yeshiva College, expanded upon the first, adding many important practical and philosophical considerations.6 The third response came four years after the original article and focused not on the prohibition of pursuing forbidden subjects but, rather, on the delineation of certain views as permitted and others as *Marc Shapiro, The Limits of Orthodox Theology: Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles Reappraised (London, 2004). 221 pp.

doi:10.1093/mj/kjh020 Modern Judaism Vol. 24, No. 3, © Oxford University Press 2004; all rights reserved.

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prohibited. Marc Shapiro, then a graduate student at Harvard, took issue with R. Parnes’s use of Maimonides’ thirteen principles of faith to define acceptable beliefs.7 As Shapiro demonstrated with clear arguments and documented with encyclopedic endnotes, respected rabbis throughout the ages have denied that Maimonides’ thirteen principles are normative. R. Parnes’s attempt to limit study to opinions that correspond narrowly to the thirteen principles was, according to Shapiro, an ahistorical exercise that ran counter to centuries of traditional Jewish thought. How, Shapiro asked, can we push aside views that were once fully acceptable? Shapiro’s article generated shock waves in the Modern Orthodox community, as it eloquently and thoroughly articulated a view espoused privately by many scholars. Armed with Shapiro’s article, rabbis and lecturers felt justified in preaching a more theologically open Orthodoxy. A few years after the publication of Shapiro’s important article, Professor Menachem Kellner of Haifa University published a book arguing that articles of faith are neither an authentic nor a normative part of traditional Judaism.8 This popular work was similar to Shapiro’s in its clarity and thoroughness but also in promoting a more theologically unbound Orthodox Judaism. The impact of these two works has been enormous. Indeed, their general ideas have been adopted by what can only be called “the New Left” of Orthodoxy. Now, eleven years after the publication of his article, Shapiro has published a much anticipated book-long treatment of the thesis underlying his essay. The book, The Limits of Orthodox Theology: Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles Reappraised, is masterly in its clarity of expression and thoroughness (as was his first book, Between the Yeshiva World and Modern Orthodoxy: The Life and Works of Rabbi Jehiel Jacob Weinberg).9 Shapiro addresses his topics so completely that the book can truly serve, as the publisher’s blurb on the book flap advertises, as an encyclopedic reference for these subjects. Additionally, the Littman Library has once again lived up to its reputation for excellence, providing a handsome, superbly edited, and thoroughly proofread tome. Overall, Shapiro’s work is excellently researched, well written, and beautifully published. Nevertheless, the book contains a number of errors and inconsistencies.10 Additionally, the absence of a complete translation of Maimonides’ principles is a glaring oversight. However, these are generally overshadowed by the other impressive qualities of the book. In any case, in this review I prefer to address Shapiro’s main thesis, one that I believe to be so mistaken as to cripple this fine piece of research. However, before we begin I see a need to address a methodological issue. Every communicator, when deciding how best to present a topic, needs to consider the intended audience and frame his comments

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appropriately. Shapiro begins his book discussing the arguments of R. Yehuda Parnes, a traditional Talmudist, and then proceeds to argue not with a Talmudist but with an academic. Many of the positions that Shapiro cites throughout the book are irrelevant to a traditional scholar. Thus, for example, the argument that many rabbis of the Talmudic period believed in a corporeal God would be dismissed by a traditional Talmudist with a mere wave of the hand.11 Similarly, the debatable claim that R. Avraham Ibn Ezra believed in Creation from preexisting matter would also be rejected.12 Indeed, a good deal of the book is based on disputed academic interpretations, as duly noted by Shapiro, and the traditional scholar is certain to set aside such speculative arguments, many of them quite radical, as more fantasy than fact. Shapiro would have done well to separate and emphasize the sources that have validity in the Bet Midrash because, as the book stands, it proves little to the traditional Talmudist. Furthermore, though for an academic scholar Shapiro is remarkably open to the wide literature of traditional rabbinic writings, to the traditional Talmudist Shapiro demonstrates a subtle but persistent lack of proper respect to the authorities he cites. This is certainly off-putting to the traditional Talmudist. To the academic scholar, however, Shapiro raises a great many interesting issues that will certainly continue to be debated for years to come.

HALACHA AND AGGADAH

Now, to the central point. The basic premise of Shapiro’s approach is that the area of Jewish thought is a field in which there are no binding conclusions.13 One scholar’s theology can never be universally required belief. This is not the once-dominant claim that Judaism requires only action and not belief.14 According to this largely discredited theory, any and even no belief is acceptable in Judaism. Rather, the claim is that whenever sacred beliefs have once been disputed, there is no way officially to close debate and make one side doctrinally binding. For example, the Talmud debates whether God rewards only in the “world-to-come” or also in this world.15 Because this debate is theological rather than practical, it cannot be resolved. Shapiro’s theory has a very solid basis. Rabbinic literature contains many parallel currents but can be broadly divided into two paths— halacha and aggadah. The former deals with issues of practice and commandments: How must we act? The latter contains homilies and ruminations on a multitude of religious experiences but also, relevant to our topic, discusses theology. Regarding aggadah, Maimonides has famously written that “when there is any division of opinion among

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the Sages which does not affect any rule of practice, but is concerned exclusively with establishing an understanding of a point of doctrine, there is no need to decide in accordance with any one of them.”16 Any thought that has ever been offered by a legitimate authority remains a valid option. This is different from halacha, where minority opinions can become obsolete and unviable. In halacha, there is an evolutionary process through which disputes are analyzed, positions become normative, and minority views can, at times, be pushed into the realm of theory.17 In aggadah there is no need for practical conclusions, so this entire process is unnecessary. Therefore, minority opinions are never pushed aside and remain forever viable for consideration. Some detractors have privately argued that Shapiro is incorrect because everything in life is determined by halacha. This includes the regulation of beliefs and, therefore, a halachic “decisor” has the ability to rule that certain views are outside of the acceptable range. However, this critique, one that some might term pan-halachic, runs into problems with the above words of Maimonides.18 My contention is that Shapiro’s theory is fatally flawed not because everything is defined by halacha but because the list of items so determined is broad enough to include the beliefs that define Judaism. My disagreement with Shapiro revolves around this specific passage in Maimonides and its parallels. He analyzes this section but, according to my understanding, employs an imprecise reading of Maimonides’ words that leads to his incorrect conclusions. It is not true, as Shapiro seems to claim, that Maimonides demands a limited pluralism in all theological matters.19 Maimonides, with his precise and masterly usage of language, specifically writes that there is no need to decide among opinions—to invoke the “halachic process”— when the issue does not affect practice. He carefully uses similar wording in all five places in which he discusses this. Never does Maimonides say that there are decisions between views in halacha and not in aggadah; he always formulates this principle in terms of affecting practice and not affecting practice. According to Maimonides, the question of whether the decision-making process applies to a topic is not a halacha versus aggadah issue but, rather, a practice versus theory one. Even an aggadic topic is subject to the halachic process if and when it affects practice. Therefore, there are certain areas where halacha and aggadah—practical and theological Judaism—intersect, and in those cases, where there is a need for practical aggadic conclusions, the halachic process is imposed on aggadah. Shapiro’s magnificent edifice rests on this single, crucial issue, and, unfortunately, I believe his foundation to be in error. A careful reading of Maimonides’ words yields a conclusion 180 degrees opposite Shapiro’s. If I have in some way misread his view, I first apologize to both Shapiro and the

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reader and then question why Shapiro did not take his readers in the following direction and draw a very different conclusion than the one he did.

MANDATORY BELIEFS

It is quite apparent that, barring claims that medieval rabbis rewrote our religion, Judaism is a faith in which certain beliefs are obligatory and binding. The evidence is readily apparent and quite abundant. Indeed, there are clear statements throughout the halachic literature that there are mandatory beliefs—according to some, commandments and, according to others, obligations more fundamental—not least of which is Maimonides’ list of the thirteen fundamental principles of Judaism. Shapiro already agrees to this.20 Lest the reader think that the idea of mandatory beliefs is solely a Maimonidean concept, it should be pointed out that other important scholars agreed with him. Whereas the commandment to believe in (or know) God is somewhat controversial, both the Hinukh and the Semag count the belief in the unity of God as a positive commandment.21 Furthermore, one of the earliest Jewish medieval philosophical works is R. Bahya Ibn Pakuda’s Hovot ha-Levavot, whose very name is best rendered as “Obligations of the Intellect.”22 Among these obligations he includes knowing that the world has a Creator and that He created the world ex nihilo, affirming the unity of God “with all your heart,” and accepting His service in one’s heart.23 It is quite evident that many Rishonim, even among Ashkenazim, agreed with Maimonides’ statement in Sefer ha-Mitzvot that there are commandments regarding beliefs.24 For example, R. Yitzhak of Corbille, in his Semak, lists a number of mandatory beliefs: [It is a commandment] to know that He who created the heavens and the earth, He alone rules above, below, and in the four directions. . . . To know means in exclusion of [agreement with] the philosophers who say that the world functions on its own through chance [mazal] and has no guide at all. Even the splitting of the Sea of Reeds, the exodus from Egypt, and all the miracles that have occurred were through chance [mazal]. . . . Dependent on this is the question that is asked a person during his judgment after death, “Did you anticipate redemption?” . . . This is what [the commandment] is: Just like I want you to believe in Me, that I took you out [of Egypt], so too I want you to believe that I am God, your Lord, and that I will gather you and redeem you in the future.25

Semak here tells us that we are obligated to believe in God, that He created the world, and that He still guides the world. Semak further lists affirming the unity of God as an obligation.26 R. Yitzhak also counts a

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prohibition against thinking that the Torah is not from Heaven and against disbelief in the words of the Sages.27 Additionally, he notes an obligation to follow the directives of a true prophet, implying a requirement to believe in prophecy.28 We see that Semak lists a number of Maimonides’ principles as beliefs that every Jew is obligated to affirm. A Jew must believe in God (Maimonides’ principle 1; Semak’s mitzvah 1), His unity (principle 2; mitzvah 2), that He created the world (principle 4; mitzvah 1), that He communicates to prophets (principle 6; mitzvah 25), that the written and oral Torah are from God (principle 8; mitzvah 12), and that God will redeem us in the future (principle 12; mitzvah 1). The idea of mandatory beliefs neither began with Maimonides nor was limited to strict Maimonideans. Indeed, it should come as no surprise that kabbalists also accept that there are certain beliefs that are commanded.29 The question to which the recognition of mandatory beliefs inevitable leads—What if one does not and cannot believe?—is one on which an entire literature has been written.30 However, the problem of inadvertent heresy is not our topic, whereas the concept that is, that of mandatory belief, is presupposed by those who struggle with its consequence. These beliefs, whose acceptance is considered by normative Judaism to be obligatory, are part of the intersection of halacha and aggadah, and it might be legitimately claimed that the determination of exactly what one must believe is a matter of practice and, therefore, is subject to the halachic process of decision making.31 What this implies regarding the nature of belief, and how it is possible to impose belief on a thinking person, I defer to another time and will, instead, address here another, less complex case of beliefs that affect practice.

FUNDAMENTAL BELIEFS

So far, we have only seen that there are required beliefs in Judaism. If we were to conclude that these beliefs are so fundamental that one who rejects them is subject to practical consequences, then we would see not only that there are mandated beliefs but that there are beliefs that have clear practical ramifications and are, therefore, unquestionably subject to the halachic process. Given the understanding of the passage in Maimonides on which I based this excursus, a compelling conclusion would be that one of the crossroads of aggadah and halacha is the definition of heresy. There, beliefs translate directly into practice.32 The Talmud contains many discussions of different types of heretics, a classification whose precise definition is unclear. Who, exactly, is considered to be an epicurean, a sectarian, and a rejecter (epikorus, min, and kofer)?33 However

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one defines them, these categories of deviants bear practical ramifications. For example, the shehitah of an epicurean is not kosher.34 A Torah scroll that is written by a sectarian must be burned.35 One is not even permitted to answer “Amen” to a blessing recited by a sectarian.36 Also important, although difficult to comprehend in today’s world, is the obligation to lower a rejecter into a pit.37 But who is a heretic? The precise delineation of which beliefs place someone in the different categories of heretic is relevant to practice and is therefore a halachic issue.38 Does someone who believes that angels, and not God, created the world fall into the category of sectarian and therefore recite an unanswerable blessing?39 This is a practical question that needs to be determined via halachic methodology. Furthermore, sidestepping the issue of personal status, generally speaking heresy itself may not be studied or taught, and there is, therefore, a need for a precise halachic definition of it.40 I am not proposing here that halachists may force beliefs on others. I am quite intentionally avoiding such a claim that would inevitably lead to many philosophical and practical problems. Instead, I am suggesting that halachists may draw a circle around specific beliefs and declare that these are acceptable and others are not. They neither define what is true nor tell others what to believe but only state what is within bounds and what is not. Our practical needs require such definitions to forestall halachic paralysis. Maimonides was the first to define clearly these categories of deviants, and his definitions were so compelling that they were largely accepted by subsequent halachic authorities—largely but not entirely; disputes existed. These were, though, disagreements over the definitions and bounds of acceptable beliefs and not over the existence of such bounds.41 However, overall, Maimonides’ definitions as laid out in his thirteen principles and later codified in his Mishneh Torah were accepted as halachically authoritative, even by those who were not philosophical Maimonideans.42 One might object, as Menachem Kellner has, that both before and after Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah, no code listed the fundamental beliefs of Judaism.43 This, he claimed, proves that other halachists disagreed with Maimonides’ view that there are defining beliefs that are determined by halacha. I would suggest that there is a different explanation for this phenomenon and that other halachists explicitly agreed with Maimonides. Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah is unique in being comprehensive both as a halachic code and a list of commandments. In a daring and controversial attempt to encapsulate the entire oral Torah in one book, Maimonides explained in his Mishneh Torah every commandment in the Torah, whether currently practical or not. The entire

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work is prefaced by a list of all 613 commandments, and each section is prefaced by the commandments related to its content.44 The Mishneh Torah was an unprecedented and unrepeated synthesis of a Sefer ha-Mitzvot and a Shulhan Arukh. That is why, for example, R. Yosef Caro’s Shulhan Arukh does not say that there is an obligation to repent and confess; all it mentions is the custom to recite a confession as part of the Yom Kippur ritual.45 Similarly, the Shulhan Arukh does not state that there is an obligation to believe in God and His unity. The listing of “obligations of the intellect” is an exercise of the philosophic and “lists of commandments” literature but not the codes. Mishneh Torah is also a code and a list of commandments. The “obligations of the intellect” in the Mishneh Torah are part of a list, not of a code. However, the original premise of Kellner’s claim—that Maimonides included the fundamental principles in his code, whereas later authorities excluded these principles from their codes—is not entirely accurate. The main place where Maimonides listed the fundamental principles is not in his halachic code Mishneh Torah but, rather, in his Commentary to the Mishnah. It is in this work that Maimonides asserted that these principles are binding on all Jews and that whoever rejects any of them is not a member of the community of Jewish believers. Maimonides’ commentary, and not his code, is where he made his bold assertion of the doctrines of Judaism.46 Mention of these principles in the Mishneh Torah is always incidental.47 They are mentioned because they either form a part of a mitzvah being listed or are part of a brief digression.48 The central passage of the fundamental principles in the Mishneh Torah in which they are all, more or less, listed is part of a discussion of repentance, the world-to-come, and exclusion from that world. Anyone who rejects a fundamental principle has no place in the world-tocome. Because the Shulhan Arukh has no discussion of the laws of repentance, it is no surprise that it also does not contain a list, similar to Maimonides’, of the fundamental principles of Judaism. However, just as in the Mishneh Torah, there are incidental mentions of the existence of fundamental principles in the Shulhan Arukh that are quite informative.

Fundamental Beliefs in Shulhan Arukh Before we proceed to analyzing the references to fundamental beliefs in Shulhan Arukh, I would like to clarify an important distinction. As we have seen already from Semak and many others, there are certainly obligatory beliefs in Judaism. What we will be looking for now are not just mandatory beliefs but defining beliefs. Someone who does

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not accept an obligatory belief is either not fulfilling a positive commandment or violating a prohibition (or both). In many respects he or she is no different from someone who, for example, does not wear tefillin daily or eats nonkosher food. But someone who does not maintain a defining belief is rejecting not just a mitzvah but the Jewish faith. Because this belief defines Judaism, one who rejects it has turned away from not just a law but the religion. Another important distinction is that we are looking specifically for the rejection of beliefs and not the rejection of beliefs in conjunction with the violation of proscribed behavior. For example, someone who publicly violates the laws of Shabbat is considered to be like a Gentile in certain respects because, by publicly violating Shabbat, that person has demonstrated that he or she rejects the belief that God created the world.49 This is not a relevant example for us because this individual has demonstrated both deviant beliefs and deviant behavior. We are looking for the results of someone who only rejects Jewish belief, for that alone will demonstrate that such rejection, and not any particular action, entails halachic repercussions. Even within these rigid conditions we can still see that the author of the Shulhan Arukh accepted the concept of fundamental principles of Judaism and even incidentally offered partial lists of these principles. The various terms that can refer to a heretic, such as sectarian (min) and epicurean (epikorus), are not used consistently in the Shulhan Arukh. Partially because of censorship and partially because the author frequently quotes verbatim from diverse sources, a term such as epikorus can mean different things in different contexts: it can mean an apostate to a different religion, a Jewish idolater, or a heretic. It is therefore impossible to infer solely from the Shulhan Arukh’s use of a term that the author believes that rejection of a fundamental belief has halachic ramifications. In one place, however, in the Shulhan Arukh, the term epicurean unquestionably refers to one who rejects belief. In Hoshen Mishpat 34:22 the Shulhan Arukh writes, “Informants to oppressors, epicureans, and apostates are lower than Gentiles and are invalid as witnesses.” Here, epicurean cannot mean apostate because apostate is listed next. It cannot mean Jewish idolater because, if so, there would be no need to further list apostate. Rather, it must be referring to a heretic.50 It is no surprise, therefore, to learn that this is almost an exact quote from the Mishneh Torah.51 When the author of the Shulhan Arukh accepts a Maimonidean ruling based on Maimonides’ view that rejecting a fundamental principle is heresy, he implicitly affirms the entire Maimonidean system of defining beliefs. This halacha alone is definitive proof that the Shulhan Arukh accepts Maimonides’ categorization of a heretic. But there is more evidence.

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The Talmud relates the process by which a rabbinical court accepts a convert, and Maimonides quotes it almost verbatim (albeit in Hebrew translation of the original Aramaic).52 There is, however, one detail Maimonides includes that the Talmud does not, thus emphasizing the philosophical point. Maimonides writes, “We inform him of the principles of faith, which are the unity of God and the prohibitions of idolatry. We discuss these in great length.”53 This addition to the text is rightly seen by many as reflecting Maimonides’ emphasis of the fundamental principles that define Judaism.54 Because these principles define Judaism, a convert’s acceptance of them is a critical part of the conversion process. The Shulhan Arukh quotes this halacha with Maimonides’ addition to the passage.55 Clearly, the author of the Shulhan Arukh is ratifying Maimonides’ emphasis of the fundamental principles of Judaism as being defining beliefs. In another area the Shulhan Arukh is even clearer: “A Jewish epicurean, that is, those who worship idolatry or sin spitefully—even if he [only] ate nevelah or wore sha’atnez spitefully he is an epicurean— rejecters of Torah and prophecy who are Jews, it is a mitzvah to kill them.”56 Here we see specifically that those who deny the sixth through eighth fundamental principles—those of prophecy and Torah—are subject to execution (given very specific circumstances whose parameters are beyond the scope of this essay).57 Not surprisingly, this is taken directly from the Mishneh Torah.58 But the fact that the Shulhan Arukh quotes it means that the author accepts Maimonides’ proposition that denial of fundamental principles is a rejection of Judaism.59 Perhaps relevant is the Shulhan Arukh’s ruling that one may not lend money with interest to Karaites, who reject the oral Torah and therefore the eighth principle, solely because they are like “captured babes” who were raised with heresy and are therefore not considered people who actively reject Judaism.60 Evidently, absent this mitigating factor, one would have been permitted to lend with interest to Karaites because they reject the eighth fundamental principle of Judaism.61 It could, however, be argued that Karaites’ rejection of the oral Torah leads directly to deviations in practice. Those deviations in practice, and not those in belief, could be the source of the permission to lend to them with interest. We have seen that there are clearly certain beliefs that Jews are required to hold. Furthermore, there are beliefs that define Judaism and whose rejection leads to inclusion in the halachic categories of heretic.62 Classification as a heretic is a halachic issue because there are practical consequences—for example that one’s shehitah becomes unkosher. Therefore, the delineation of what heresy is and who is considered a heretic is a matter that can and must be determined via

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the halachic process. Although this decision-making process is no guarantee of a consensus, as even a minimal review of the halachic literature will show, it provides us a framework within which to investigate the status of fundamental beliefs in Judaism. As we shall see, some aspects of Maimonides’ thirteen principles have been deemed binding by an overwhelming consensus.

BELIEF AND HALACHA

Although Maimonides’ thirteen principles are not the last word in Jewish theology, as Shapiro has expertly demonstrated, regarding the halachic definition of acceptable beliefs they are the firm basis of later authoritative consensus. As an example, let us examine the belief in the incorporeality of God. Maimonides lists that belief not only as the second positive commandment but also as the third of his thirteen principles.63 Someone who believes that God can assume a physical form has, according to Maimonides, a mistaken understanding of God and is therefore a sectarian (min).64 Indeed, he writes that maintaining this belief is worse than idolatry.65 Of course, Maimonides did not invent the concept of the incorporeality of God. It can be traced back to earlier Rishonim, Geonim, and even the Tanna Onkelos, who, in his Aramaic translation of the Torah, consistently avoided anthropomorphic terms.66 However, in Maimonides’ time at least some prominent scholars took the many anthropomorphic phrases in the Bible literally and believed that God could appear in a physical form if He chose to do so. Perhaps most famous among them was R. Daniel the Babylonian, who corresponded with Maimonides’ son.67 Clearly, at that time the halachic definition of a sectarian was a matter of debate. As this is a matter of theology, do we apply Maimonides’ principle that we do not decide among opinions? Absolutely not. As we have seen, Maimonides’ precise language is that this principle only applies when it “does not affect any rule of practice.”68 The definition of heresy does affect the rule of practice, as we saw above, and therefore is to be determined using halachic methodologies. In our specific case of belief in the incorporeality of God, this definition of acceptable belief has been universally accepted for centuries and falls into the category of sugya di-shma’ata that cannot be abrogated.69 Though at the time Maimonides’ principle was a matter of debate and was not conclusive, it has since been ratified by centuries of halachic consensus. Anyone who currently holds this belief, absent mitigating factors, is considered a heretic. Though R. Daniel the Babylonian may not have been a heretic in his time, because the halachic definition of heresy has since

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crystallized, anyone today who would follow his belief would, again absent mitigating factors, be considered a heretic.

Two Examples: Creation Ex Nihilo and Intermediaries As further illustration, let us take the case of belief in Creation ex nihilo. Many scholars have asserted that there is an obligation to believe that God created the world from nothing (yesh me-ayin).70 Others even included it in their fundamental principles of Judaism, thus making it part of the definition of heresy.71 However, when Maimonides initially wrote his thirteen principles he did not include belief in Creation from nothing among them.72 Furthermore, in his later Moreh Nevukhim (Guide for the Perplexed) Maimonides stated that, though belief in the eternity of the world undermines religion, there is nothing theologically wrong with the belief in Creation from preexisting matter.73 Although Maimonides was convinced that Creation ex nihilo is correct, he did not consider the Platonic notion of Creation out of something to be heresy.74 Later in life, however, Maimonides evidently changed his view. In his “Letter on Astrology” he wrote, “It is the root of the Torah that God alone is primordial and that He has created the whole out of nothing. Whoever does not acknowledge this is guilty of radical disbelief and of heresy.”75 He made a similar comment in his “Treatise on Resurrection.”76 Most significantly, toward the end of his life Maimonides revised his thirteen principles to include Creation from nothing.77 Within the framework presented here, the two apparent views of Maimonides can be understood. Originally, Maimonides held that belief in Creation from nothing is not a definition of a halachic category. Because it is totally divorced from practice, and a rabbinic view affirming Creation from something can be detected, Maimonides could not require belief in Creation ex nihilo even though he personally considered it to be true.78 However, later in his life he changed his mind and determined that Creation from nothing is part of the defining characteristics of heresy and, therefore, other beliefs are halachically unacceptable.79 This is in stark contrast to many other beliefs that are totally divorced from practice. For example, the concept of gilgul, the transmigration of souls, has been hotly debated since the Geonic era. Although it is a fundamental kabbalistic concept, some philosophers dispute its truth.80 However, as, within the Maimonidean framework, lack of belief in gilgul does not make one a heretic, both points of view remain valid today. From a Maimonidean perspective, there is no onus to believing or not believing in gilgul. However, a belief that has

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practical ramifications, such as belief in God and His unity, does not necessarily remain open to all rabbinic opinions. If and when a consensus emerges around a particular belief, it becomes accepted into halacha and, even before a consensus emerges, a decisor may choose to follow one view over another.81 This dichotomy between beliefs that are subject to halachic decision and those that are not, the basis of our departure in these pages from Shapiro’s approach, is not an innovation. Indeed, Maimonides’ language in his Commentary to the Mishnah suggests the need for such a distinction. Immediately after Maimonides finished listing the required doctrine for all Jews—on what must have been the very same page— he wrote that there is no need to decide among theological views.82 Clearly, Maimonides was assuming that there is a difference between the former beliefs, which are binding, and the latter beliefs, which are not. Marvin Fox wrote the following regarding these two types of aggadah: We have here a balanced tension between necessary beliefs that are to be imposed from above, if need be, and the whole range of beliefs that Maimonides treats as open to a variety of views. The major task is to determine which beliefs are necessary and to establish criteria for that necessity. This is a project in which he was engaged in one form or another, throughout his life. From his early work in the Mishnah until some of his last writings, he never turned away completely from concern with the formulation of a balanced tension between officially prescribed doctrines and freedom of thought.83

Some beliefs define the boundaries of Judaism, whereas others are open to debate. Based on the analysis here, it would seem that even those doctrines that were once open to debate can be closed if they are subject to the halachic process and that process so dictates. Let us now look at a case in which Maimonides’ ruling is not normative. Maimonides’ fifth principle is that only God is worthy of worship; we may only pray to Him and not to anyone or anything else. In this case Maimonides is clearly taking sides in a Talmudic debate and ruling in a halachic manner.84 However, Maimonides’ strict pesak halacha (halachic ruling) in this theological matter was never fully accepted. Despite its approval in many theological and halachic works, there were always those who, while agreeing with the main principle, objected to the breadth of its application.85 There are Rishonim and Aharonim who permitted requesting angels to intercede with God on one’s behalf.86 Because there was never a consensus on this issue, Maimonides’ word was not final. However, the remainder of this principle, belief in the inefficacy of prayer for assistance to a being other than God remains intact. Such a belief is universally acknowledged as being outside the bounds of acceptable views and is therefore codified into law.87

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Judaism has always fostered inquisitiveness. One can hardly study Talmud without seeing that almost everything was subject to challenge and debate. Nonetheless, without a defined theology Judaism is not a true religion. It must define what constitutes Jewish belief and what does not. Otherwise, other religions and even atheism can lay claim to being faithful to traditional Jewish beliefs. Although definitions may vary in breadth the need to delineate boundaries should be self-evident.88 Maimonides’ boundary was his thirteen principles. It is my contention that this theological definition is also a matter of practical halacha. A heretic is both a theological and a halachic outcast. Therefore, the boundaries of Judaism must be determined through halachic means, utilizing concepts such as pesak and consensus. During the time of the Temple, the Sanhedrin defined the limits of acceptable beliefs. In the post-Sanhedrin era rulings that are similarly binding are possible only through unanimous agreement.89 Such rulings have become the universal principles that define normative Judaism. Exactly which beliefs have been universally accepted and are therefore absolutely binding and which are still subject to halachic debate must still be catalogued. The task of this essay is not to provide such a catalogue but rather to prove the existence of a framework and to demonstrate that the halacha must determine the boundaries of heresy and acceptable belief. Moreover, if failure to accept beliefs that are still a matter of dispute can have practical ramifications, a qualified halachic decisor may declare, at least for those subject to his rulings, which beliefs are acceptable and which are not. Such activity is not limited necessarily to Maimonides’ thirteen principles but to what the halachist determines are the defining beliefs of Judaism.90 For example, if a halachic decisor concludes that belief in the transmigration of souls is so fundamental to Judaism that it constitutes a defining belief, he has the right to declare it as such. One further matter requires discussion. When a halachic decisor rules on a particular definition of heresy, what happens to alternate views? It is not unrealistic to envision two expert, world-renowned halachists differing on such a matter. What this would mean, evidently, is that each scholar effectively writes the other out of normative Judaism, rendering his colleague’s teachings on the subject forbidden to those not permitted to study heresy.91 Not only is this a possible scenario, it is one that has occurred repeatedly throughout Jewish history.92 Without an authoritative Sanhedrin to demand halachic unity, disagreements are inevitable. Such is the reality in which we live. We can only pray that the responsibility laid upon the shoulders

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of the halachist is wielded with responsible restraint. The resulting philosophical implication of differing views over what constitutes the normative defining beliefs of Judaism—that halacha is an imperfect, human approximation of Divine truth that is generated through the use of all available valid tools—is a concept that is sufficiently complex and counterintuitive to require lengthy treatment.93 However, this cannot limit a halachic decisor from ruling according to the opinions and precedents he considers appropriate, as he does in all halachic matters. But what happens when a decisor declares a position held by some medieval scholars to be heretical? Or even a Talmudic position that, for example, implies the corporeality of God? Do those writings become prohibited also? Presumably so, for what is now considered heresy may not be studied even if it was once considered acceptable. However, the Talmud need not be censored because interpretations are plentiful and students can easily understand any passage in consonance with their beliefs, which were certainly originally determined with full consideration of the Talmud. Indeed, thousands of philosophically untrained laymen cover the entire Babylonian Talmud in the seven-and-a-half-year Daf Yomi cycle and still maintain that Maimonides’ thirteen principles are incontrovertible. Other “problematic” texts tend to be obscure and, in a time in which the Talmud is king, remain unstudied by anyone other than experts who, presumably, are sufficiently prepared for controversial material.94 Many readers will certainly cringe while reading this paragraph. However, although censorship is anathema to academia, it is inherent in the prohibition against studying heresy, despite the law’s details and exceptions, and is therefore integral to normative Judaism.95 An incident from approximately thirty years ago supports the general concept advocated here. In 1975, when the commentary on the Torah of R. Yehudah he-Hassid was first being prepared for publication from manuscript, the editor showed the work to his local rabbi, who, upon reading the galleys and discovering statements contrary to the accepted tenet of Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, consulted with the famous halachist R. Moshe Feinstein.96 R. Feinstein declared the commentary a forgery and forbade its publication. The editor was subsequently summoned to a religious court, led by the highly esteemed halachists R. Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and R. Yosef Shalom Elyashiv of Jerusalem, that ruled that the editor may publish the commentary but without the controversial passages.97 Evidently, R. Auerbach and R. Elyashiv did not believe the commentary to be a forgery but still felt that a passage contradicting what is to them a fundamental belief may not be popularly studied, even if

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written by a venerated sage. They were certainly not claiming that R. Yehudah he-Hassid was a heretic but that halacha has developed over the millennium since the commentary was written and what might have been merely an eccentric view at the time is now entirely unacceptable. Thus, the problem that started Shapiro on his task, that a large portion of Jewish literature runs counter to Maimonides’ principles and must, therefore, be forbidden to students, has a multipronged solution.98 One the one hand, Maimonides’ principles have a certain degree of fluidity, and the halachic decisor retains the right to rule on those areas that still remain in flux. Moreover, reinterpretation of texts or, more commonly, the adoption of existing alternate interpretations, is employed. Furthermore, much of the “problematic” literature remains largely (but not entirely) untouched in the Orthodox world today, as Shapiro himself notes.99 Shapiro’s apparent conclusion, that past views force current scholars to be more theologically open, is incorrect. Like Maimonides, contemporary halachists retain the right to define heresy, albeit within the parameters of what has been unanimously accepted. In an ironic twist, that which Shapiro has demonstrated as still being in flux is precisely the material on which halachic scholars may rule and, should they see fit, reject as heresy. BROOKLYN, NY

NOTES

I would like to express my thanks to R. Micha Berger, Dr. David Riceman, and Dr. David Berger for their comments and assistance with an early draft of this review. R. Chaim Rapoport’s spirited challenges were of great assistance and are deeply appreciated. Of course, I alone bear responsibility for the final contents of this essay. 1. R. Saadia Gaon’s Emunot ve-De’ot ( Jerusalem, 1970) and R. Avraham Ibn Ezra’s commentary to the Torah (Jerusalem, 1976) are only two examples of the large and vibrant anti-Karaite literature. 2. See note 33. See also Gil Student, “The Mehitzah Controversy: Fifty Years Later” (forthcoming), n. 106, regarding the laws of separation of sexes in the synagogue. 3. R. Yehuda Parnes, “Torah u-Madda and Freedom of Inquiry,” The Torah u-Madda Journal, Vol. 1 (1989), pp. 68–71. 4. “Torah u-Madda” (“Torah and Knowledge”) is the official motto of Yeshiva University. For more on the meaning of this term, see R. Norman Lamm, Torah u-Madda (Northvale, N.J., 1990).

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5. Lawrence Kaplan and David Berger, “On Freedom of Inquiry in the Maimonides—and Today,” The Torah u-Madda Journal, Vol. 2 (1990), pp. 37–50. 6. Shalom Carmy, “The Nature of Inquiry: A Common Sense Perspective,” The Torah u-Madda Journal, Vol. 3 (1991–1992), pp. 37–51. See also R. Parnes’s response to these two critiques in R. Yehuda Parnes, “Response and Closure,” The Torah u-Madda Journal, Vol. 3 (1991–1992), pp. 90–97. 7. Marc Shapiro, “Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles: The Last Word in Jewish Theology?” The Torah U-Madda Journal, Vol. 4 (1993), pp. 187–242. See M. Shapiro’s letter that served as a precursor to his article in The Torah U-Madda Journal, Vol. 3 (1991–1992), pp. 153–154; and M. Shapiro’s response to letters in The Torah U-Madda Journal, Vol. 5 (1994), pp. 182–189. 8. Menachem Kellner, Must a Jew Believe Anything? (London, 1999). 9. Marc Shapiro, The Limits of Orthodox Theology: Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles Reappraised (London, 2004); and Marc Shapiro, Between the Yeshiva World and Modern Orthodoxy: The Life and Works of Rabbi Jehiel Jacob Weinberg (London, 2002). 10. So as not to be accused of making baseless accusations, I provide the following few examples: First, immediately after discussing some comments of R. Yitzhak Abrabanel in his Rosh Amanah (Ramat Gan, 1993), Shapiro (The Limits of Orthodox Theology, pp. 7–8) struggles with the question of why Maimonides omits explicit mention of the thirteen principles from his Mishneh Torah. Shapiro inexplicably overlooks Abrabanel’s discussion of this matter in Rosh Amanah, chap. 19. See notes 46–47. Second, Shapiro’s (The Limits of Orthodox Theology, pp. 8–13) consideration for six pages of the theory that Maimonides only brands as a heretic someone who audibly speaks heresy is ludicrous, as any study of the corpus of Maimonides’ writings or even a basic philological analysis will indicate (compare Mishnah Sanhedrin 10:1 with Mishnah Avot 2:4). Third, there are a few places in which an idea is proposed that is later clarified without informing and revising the earlier discussion, for example, the discussion of “competing systems of dogma” on page 14 and the clarifications on pages 20 and 32 that the proposers of these competing systems only disagreed on classification and not content; and the discussion of inadvertent heresy on page 10 and the delay until page 33 to note the opposing view. Fourth, Shapiro (The Limits of Orthodox Theology, p. 153) misunderstands statements by R. Yitzhak Arama and R. Menahem ha-Meiri that the Sages were inconsistent in their terminology regarding the hereafter and the postresurrection era. Shapiro considers these statements to be an equation of these concepts when they are nothing more than an explanation of the difficulty of understanding these ideas because of the lack of rigor in rabbinic usage of terminology. See earlier in the paragraph by R. Arama cited by Shapiro that he believes in the resurrection of a soul into a body. For similar statements about the inconsistency of rabbinic terminology regarding postmortem and eschatological issues, see R. Avraham Ben ha-Rambam, Milhamot Hashem, ed. Margoliyot ( Jerusalem, n.d.), p. 61; and R. Yosef Caro, Kessef Mishneh (published alongside the standard text of Mishneh Torah), Hilkhot Teshuvah 8:2. 11. Shapiro, The Limits of Orthodox Theology, pp. 49–52. 12. Shapiro, The Limits of Orthodox Theology, p. 71.

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13. Shapiro, The Limits of Orthodox Theology, pp. 116–118; Shapiro, “Maimonides’ Thirteen Principles,” p. 204; Shapiro, The Torah U-Madda Journal, Vol. 5 (1994), pp. 182–189; Kellner, Must a Jew Believe Anything? Aside from Shapiro’s and Kellner’s works, this message has also been disseminated in lectures. For example, R. Dov Linzer of Yeshivat Chovevei Torah has reportedly been publicly speaking along these lines. My observation is that this attractive viewpoint has been accepted by many rabbis and knowledgeable laypeople. 14. Shapiro, The Limits of Orthodox Theology, pp. 29–32. 15. B.T. Kiddushin 39b. 16. Maimonides, Commentary to the Mishnah (published in the standard Vilna edition of the Talmud), M. Sanhedrin 10:3, cited in Shapiro, The Limits of Orthodox Theology, pp. 116–117. See also Maimonides, Commentary to the Mishnah, M. Sotah 3:3 and M. Shevuot 1:4; Sefer ha-Mitzvot, prohibition 133; and Ma’amar Tehiyat ha-Metim, in Iggerot ha-Rambam, ed. Yosef Qafah ( Jerusalem, 1972), chap. 4, p. 82. This might also be Maimonides’ intention in Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Mamrim 1:1: “Whoever believes in Moses, our teacher, and his law is bound to follow [the Great Sanhedrin in Jerusalem’s] guidance in the practice of religion (ma’aseh ha-dat) and to lean upon them” (The Book of Judges— Yale Judaica Series, trans. Abraham Hershman [New Haven, 1949], emphasis added). Maimonides seems to imply that only issues of practice can be ruled on by the Sanhedrin. See also Ya’akov (Gerald J.) Blidstein, Samkhut u-Meri be-Mishnat ha-Rambam (Tel Aviv, 2002), pp. 29–31. 17. Shapiro’s understanding of the halachic process is somewhat unclear. See Shapiro, The Limits of Orthodox Theology, pp. 116–117, 141–142; see also notes 69 and 81. 18. Abraham J. Heschel first coined the term pan-halachic in God in Search of Man: A Philosophy of Judaism (New York, 1955), p. 282. However, he was referring to the view that Judaism consists merely of laws, what others might call “Orthopraxy” (I thank Yisrael Dubitsky for quickly finding this exact reference). I use the term as used in Norman Solomon, The Analytic Movement: Hayyim Soloveitchik and His Circle (Atlanta, 1993), pp. 223–239, particularly p. 228, referring to the idea that halacha defines all aspects of life, even Jewish thought. 19. Shapiro, The Limits of Orthodox Theology, pp. 29–32. 20. Maimonides, Commentary to the Mishnah, M. Sanhedrin 10:1; Nahmanides, Glosses to Sefer ha-Mitzvot (published alongside the standard Sefer ha-Mitzvot), positive commandment 1; R. Menahem Kasher, Torah Shelemah, Vol. 16 ( Jerusalem, 1992), addenda chap. 5; R. Yeruham Perlow, Sefer ha-Mitzvot leRasag, Vol. 1 (Warsaw, 1914), commandments 3–4, pp. 141–152; and Shapiro, The Limits of Orthodox Theology, p. 33. The most notable exception is R. Hisdai Crescas (Or Hashem [Jerusalem, 1990]), hatza’ah (preface), who claims that beliefs cannot be imposed on a person. Regarding others, R. Perlow writes, “We have already explained that this too[, counting belief in God as a commandment,] is also the view of our teacher [R. Sa’adia Gaon], the Bahag and those with them. No one disagrees with Maimonides and those with him on the main point that ‘Anokhi’ is counted as a positive commandment” (Sefer ha-Mitzvot le-Rasag, p. 149, col. a). 21. Sefer ha-Hinukh ( Jerusalem, 1986), No. 25; R. Moshe of Coucy, Sefer Mitzvot Gadol (Semag) ( Jerusalem, 1995), aseh 25. Regarding whether the mitzvah

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is belief or knowledge, see R. Yosef Qafah’s edition of Mishneh Torah (Kiryat Ono, Israel, 1984), Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah, chap. 1, n. 4; R. Yosef Qafah, Ketavim, Vol. 2 ( Jerusalem, 1989), pp. 588–589; and Encyclopedia Talmudit, Vol. 2 ( Jerusalem, 1949), pp. 25–37. It is interesting to note that Nahmanides in his commentary to Exodus 20:2 and R. Moshe Hayim Luzzatto in his Derekh Hashem (New York, 1998), 1:1, require both belief and knowledge. 22. This is despite its common translation as “Obligations of the Heart.” R. J. David Bleich writes: “In medieval usage the heart is frequently spoken of as the seat of knowledge and the word lev used as a synonym for ‘intellect’ ” (With Perfect Faith [New York, 1982], p. 2n2). 23. R. Bahya Ibn Pakuda, Hovot ha-Levavot, trans. Yosef Qafah (New York, 1994), p. 3. 24. Sefer ha-Mitzvot, Shoresh 9. 25. R. Yitzhak of Corbille, Sefer Mitzvot Katan—Amude Golah (Semak) (Satmar, Romania, 1935), mitzvah 1. See also Hagahot Semak 4. Perlow (Sefer ha-Mitzvot le-Rasag, p. 146) offers a conjectural textual emendation in Semak’s words that includes a direct citation from Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah 1:1. 26. R. Yitzhak, Semak, mitzvah 2. See also Hagahot Semak 1. 27. R. Yitzhak, Semak, mitzvah 12. 28. R. Yitzhak, Semak, mitzvah 25. 29. See, e.g., R. Pinhas ha-Levy Horowitz, Shene Luhot ha-Berit ( Jerusalem, 1993), Sha’ar ha-Otiyot, aleph; and R. Moshe Alshikh, Torat Moshe ( Jerusalem, 1990), Deut. 5:4. Both accept Maimonides’ thirteen principles as binding. 30. See Menachem Kellner, Dogma in Medieval Jewish Thought (Oxford, 1986), pp. 98–100, 129–136, 151–155, 174, 183–184, 209–213. 31. For a puzzling example of the halachic process being applied to aggadah, see Ritva’s novellae to B. T. Rosh Hashanah (Jerusalem, 1988), 16a sv ha-mevin. 32. It should be noted that there is a distinction between someone who once accepted defining beliefs and then rejects them and someone who never accepted them. See note 57. 33. That the Talmud does not clearly define what heresy is and who a heretic is does not mean that there are no definitions at all. The halachic process is frequently reactive, articulating previously unstated assumptions only when challenged. David Berger writes: “Now it may well be that the Rabbis were impelled to single out these doctrines in the wake of attacks by the Sadducees and other sectarians, but this position does little to salvage Kellner’s overall argument. It means that the Rabbis did believe that membership in good standing in the community of Israel rested on certain articles of faith. Since they were indeed not interested in systematic theology, they did not articulate these principles until they were challenged, but once challenged, they fleshed out a position that they had always taken for granted” (“Book Review of Must a Jew Believe Anything? by Menachem Kellner,” Tradition, Vol. 33, No. 4 [1999], p. 83). 34. R. Yehudah Ashkenazi, Ba’er Hetev (printed alongside the standard Shulhan Arukh), Yoreh Deah 2:16; R. Yehiel Mikhel Epstein, Arukh ha-Shulhan (New York, 1961), Yoreh Deah 2:1; R. Zvi Hirsch Shapira, Darkei Teshuvah (Bnei Brak, Israel, 1998), Yoreh Deah 2:77.

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35. Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah 281:1; R. Avraham Zvi Hirsch Eisenstadt, Pit’hei Teshuvah (printed alongside the standard Shulhan Arukh), Yoreh Deah 2. See also Qafah’s edition of Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah, chap. 6, n. 18. 36. Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayim 215:2; R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Moshe (Brooklyn, 1995), Orah Hayim, Vol. 2, Nos. 50–51, and Vol. 3, No. 22. See also Shapiro, The Limits of Orthodox Theology, p. 17. 37. Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Rotze’ah 4:10; Shulhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 425:5, Yoreh Deah 158:2. See also note 57. 38. Of interest is the following from Lawrence H. Schiffman: “While our sources show no attempt on the part of the tannaim to read anyone out of the Jewish people on account of heretical beliefs, the Rabbis did impose certain restrictions on those whom they regarded as standing outside the accepted system of Jewish belief .” (Who Was a Jew? [Hoboken, N.J., 1985], p. 54). 39. See Ephraim Urbach, The Sages: Their Concepts and Beliefs (Cambridge, Mass., 1975), pp. 203–208. 40. On the idea that heretics may not teach because they might lead students to heresy, see Rashi, B. T. Avodah Zarah 15b sv ve-ein moserin; Tur, Yoreh Deah 153; R. Yehoshua Falk, Derishah (printed alongside the standard Tur), Yoreh Deah 1; R. Moshe Isserles, Glosses to Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah 1; Shulhan Arukh, Even ha-Ezer 22:4; R. Moshe Lima, Helkat Mehokek (printed alongside the standard Shulhan Arukh), Yoreh Deah 6; R. Shmuel Faibesh, Bet Shmuel (printed alongside the standard Shulhan Arukh), Yoreh Deah 7; R. Avraham Danziger, Hokhmat Adam (Brooklyn, 1978), 89:12; R. Hayim Halberstam, Responsa Divrei Hayim (Brooklyn, 2002), and Yoreh De’ah, No. 105. For the rule that one may not study heresy, see Sefer ha-Mitzvot, prohibition 47; and Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Avodah Zarah 2:2–3. On the precise delineation of this prohibition, see R. Nahum L. Rabinovitch, Yad Peshutah ( Jerusalem, 1997) and Hilkhot Avodah Zarah 2:2–3; R. Aharon Lichtenstein, “Torah and General Culture: Confluence and Conflict,” in Judaism’s Encounter with Other Cultures, ed. Jacob J. Schacter (Northvale, N.J., 1997), pp. 277–286; and Kaplan and Berger, “On Freedom of Inquiry in the Maimonides—and Today.” However one defines the parameters of the prohibition, one must concede that there exists some case in which it applies and that, for that case, heresy must be halachically defined. See Shapiro, The Limits of Orthodox Theology, p. 16n66. 41. Shapiro, The Limits of Orthodox Theology, p. 32. 42. Maimonides, Commentary to the Mishnah, B.T. Sanhedrin 10:1; Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Teshuvah 3:7–8 and elsewhere; Shapiro, The Limits of Orthodox Theology, p. 2. See also note 29. 43. Kellner, Must a Jew Believe Anything?, p. 67. 44. See Isadore Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides (New Haven, 1980), pp. 24–28. 45. See Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Teshuvah; Shulhan Arukh, Orah Hayim 607, 621:5, 623:3. See also Rema’s gloss to Orah Hayim 603:1, which is, of course, a statement not of the original Shulhan Arukh but of R. Moshe Isserles. 46. R. Yitzhak Abrabanel wrote in his Rosh Amanah, chap. 19: “But in his Mishneh Torah, the great Yad, it was his intention to clarify the commandments in the Book of God’s Torah only, as he explained in his introduction to his

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commentary. . . . It is thus clear from his words that his primary intention in these ‘Laws’ was to clarify the commandments as opposed to clarifying the principles which were already explained in the proper place, the Commentary on the Mishnah, as I said” (in Principles of Faith, trans. Menachem Kellner [Rutherford, N.J., 1982], pp. 166–167). 47. And they are sometimes only implicit. See Abrabanel, Rosh Amanah, pp. 168–169. 48. For belief in God, see, e.g., Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah 1:6; and for belief in God’s unity, see, e.g., Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Yesode ha-Torah 1:7. 49. See Rashi, B.T. Hullin 5a sv hai. 50. It could be countered that apostate here refers to a spiteful sinner as implied in the source of this statement, B.T. Avodah Zarah 26b. If so, epicurean here could mean an idolator or an apostate. However, in the other two places in the Shulhan Arukh for which this passage serves as a source (see note 60), the author is clear that those who reject Torah and prophecy are included among the referents of the passage. 51. Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Edut 11:1. See the textual variants cited in the Frankel edition, Hilkhot Edut 11:1, and Tur and Bet Yosef, Hoshen Mishpat, chap. 34. 52. B.T. Yevamot 47a–b; Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Issure Biah, chap. 14. 53. Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Issure Biah, 14:2. 54. See Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, p. 474; Kellner, Must a Jew Believe Anything? pp. 58–60; and Marvin Fox, Interpreting Maimonides (Chicago, 1990), pp. 336–337. Shapiro’s (The Limits of Orthodox Theology, p. 7) comments on this are surprising given the literature cited here. 55. Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah 268:2. 56. Shulhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 425:5, Yoreh Deah 158:2. 57. R. Avraham Yishayahu Karelitz (Hazon Ish [Bnei Brak, 1962], Yoreh Deah 2:28) made the widely accepted evaluation that this law does not apply today. See also R. Avraham Gombiner, Magen Avraham (printed alongside the standard Shulhan Arukh), Orah Hayim 385:1; R. Yisrael Meir Kagan, Ahavat Hesed (Brooklyn, 1989), citing Marganita Tava, para. 17; R. Moshe Feinstein, Iggerot Moshe ( Jerusalem, 1996), Orah Hayim, Vol. 5, 91:6; R. Avraham Yitzhak Kook, Iggerot Ra’ayah ( Jerusalem, 1984), Nos. 138, 171, 266, 311; R. Menahem Kasher, Ha-Tekufah ha-Gedolah ( Jerusalem, 2001), p. 100; R. Ahron Soloveichik, Parah Mateh Aharon ( Jerusalem, 1997), Mada, pp. 3ff.; R. Moshe Shternbuch, Teshuvot ve-Hanhagot ( Jerusalem, 1986), Vol. 2, p. 460, and Vol. 3, p. 480; R. Shmuel Wosner, Shevet ha-Levi, Vol. 5 (Bnei Brak, 1970), kuntres ha-mitzvot, No. 51; and R. Avraham Weinfeld, Lev Avraham, Vol. 1, No. 142 (Monsey, N.Y., 1977). This does not in any way disprove the contention that the author of the Shulhan Arukh accepted the idea of fundamental beliefs. Nor does it remove the issue from current practice because there are other areas, discussed above, that still apply today. 58. Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Rotze’ah 4:10. See Bet Yosef (printed alongside the standard Tur), Hoshen Mishpat, chap. 425, Yoreh Deah, chap. 158. 59. See the author’s remarks in Caro, Kessef Mishneh, Hilkhot Avodah Zarah 2:3.

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60. Shulhan Arukh, Yoreh Deah, 159:2; see also Bet Yosef, Yoreh Deah, chap. 159, where this explanation is explicit. 61. See R. Shabtai Cohen, Siftei Kohen (Shakh) (printed alongside the standard Shulhan Arukh), Yoreh Deah 6. 62. Again, even if most people are subject to mitigating circumstances, there must be someone somewhere to whom these halachot apply. Furthermore, even without defining people as heretics, there is still a need to define heresy, as we saw above. 63. Sefer ha-Mitzvot, aseh 2. It is also implicit in the second principle. On the overlapping of principles, see Abrabanel, Rosh Amanah, chap. 9. 64. Mishneh Torah, Hilkhot Teshuvah 3:7. 65. Maimonides, Moreh Nevukhim (Jerusalem, 1977), 1:36. 66. See Ibn Pakuda, Hovot ha-Levavot, Sha’ar ha-Yihud, chap. 10, p. 3; Saadya Gaon, Emunot ve-De’ot 2:9; Otzar ha-Geonim (Haifa, 1943), Berakhot 59a, p. 131; Kasher, Torah Shelemah, addenda chap. 32; Encyclopedia Mikrait, Vol. 8 ( Jerusalem, 1950–1988), p. 745; R. Reuven Margoliyot, in Abraham Maimonides, Milhamot Hashem, p. 50n10. 67. See Maimonides, Milhamot Hashem, pp. 20–29. 68. See Maimonides, Commentary to the Mishnah, B.T. Sanhedrin 10:3, cited in Shapiro, The Limits of Orthodox Theology, pp. 116–117. 69. The category may also be called di-alma. See M. Sanhedrin 6a, 33a; Shulhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 25:2; Cohen, Shakh, p. 9; R. Avraham David of Botchach, Eshel Avraham (printed in the back of the standard Shulhan Arukh), p. 489; and R. Shlomo Zalman Braun, She’arim Metzuyanim ba-Halakhah, Vol. 1 ( Jerusalem, 1996), pp. 403–404. 70. See, e.g., Ibn Pakuda, Hovot ha-Levavot. 71. See the lists in Kellner, Dogma in Medieval Jewish Thought, chap. 10. 72. For the sake of illustration I am assuming that Creation ex nihilo was not implied in the original formulation of the fourth principle. However, many scholars believe it was. For a list, see Kellner, Dogma in Medieval Jewish Thought, p. 57; and Fox, Interpreting Maimonides, p. 253. 73. Maimonides, Moreh Nevukhim 2:25. I am well aware of, and intentionally disregarding, the literature claiming to have discovered an esoteric Maimonidean belief on this matter. 74. See Fox, Interpreting Maimonides, chap. 10. 75. Maimonides, “Letter on Astrology,” cited in Fox, Interpreting Maimonides, p. 253. 76. Maimonides, “Treatise on Resurrection,” in Iggerot ha-Rambam, ed. Yosef Qafah (Jerusalem, 1972), p. 95. 77. Maimonides, Commentary to the Mishnah, ed. Yosef Qafah ( Jerusalem, 1968), Nezikin, p. 212. Regarding the manuscript of this change, see Kellner, Dogma in Medieval Jewish Thought, p. 240n211. 78. See Pirke de-Rabbi Eliezer, chap. 3, cited in Maimonides, Moreh Nevukhim 2:26. 79. Maimonides’ thirteen principles can be generally categorized as defining beliefs regarding God, Torah, and reward and punishment (Abrabanel, Rosh Amanah, chap. 10). A belief that is necessary for these three topics is a fundamental belief and, therefore, a halachic category. It is my debatable

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suggestion here that Maimonides initially believed that Creation from nothing is not a necessary part of the belief that God preceded all (the fourth principle) but reconsidered and decided that belief in Creation from nothing is a required part of belief in God. 80. See Yitzhak Blau, “Body and Soul: Tehiyyat ha-Metim and Gilgulim in Medieval and Modern Philosophy,” The Torah U-Madda Journal, Vol. 10 (2001), pp. 1–19. 81. I have remained intentionally vague about the halachic process because the topic deserves treatment in itself. For a clear and simple presentation, see R. Aryeh Kaplan, Handbook of Jewish Thought, Vol. 1 (Brooklyn, 1979), chap. 12. 82. Maimonides, Commentary to the Mishnah, ed. Qafah, M. Sanhedrin 10:3, Nezikin, p. 145. 83. Fox, Interpreting Maimonides, pp. 45–46. See also R. Zvi Hirsch Chajes, Ateret Tzvi, Ma’amar Tiferet le-Moshe, chap. 4, in Kol Sifre Maharatz Chajes, Vol. 1 ( Jerusalem, 1958), pp. 419ff. As already stated, I defer to another time treatment of the implications of what Marvin Fox terms “beliefs that are to be imposed from above.” 84. See J.T. Berakhot 9:1; B.T. Berakhot 60b, B.T. Shabbat 12a–b, B.T. Sanhedrin 42b; Rashi, Shabbat; Rabbenu Tam, cited in R. Yosef Yozpa Hahn, Yosef Ometz (Frankfurt, 1928), No. 484; R. Yehuda ha-Hassid, Sefer Hassidim (Jerusalem, 1970), No. 205; and Nahmanides, Kitvei ha-Ramban, Vol. 1 ( Jerusalem, 1963), p. 171. 85. R. Yosef Albo, Sefer ha-Ikkarim, Vol. 1 (Jerusalem, 1995), p. 3; Maharal, Netivot Olam (Tel Aviv, 1982), Netiv Avodah, chap. 12; R. Moshe Sofer, Responsa Hatam Sofer (Jerusalem, 1970), Orah Hayim, No. 168. 86. R. Tzidkiyah ha-Rofe, Shibbole ha-Leket (Jerusalem, 1987), p. 282; R. Yisrael Brunna, Responsa Mahari Brunna ( Jerusalem, 1960), No. 275; R. Hayim Elazar Shapira, Minhat Elazar, Vol. 1, No. 68 ( Jerusalem, 1996); R. Hayim Elazar Shapira, Nimuke Orah Hayim ( Jerusalem, 1998), p. 559:3; Braun, She’arim Metzuyanim ba-Halakhah, p. 128:7; and Kuntres Aharon. For a survey of the medieval and early modern sources on this issue, see David Malkiel, “Between Worldliness and Traditionalism: Eighteenth-Century Jews Debate Intercessory Prayer,” Jewish Studies, an Internet Journal, Vol. 2 (2003), pp. 169–198. 87. Shapiro, The Limits of Orthodox Theology, p. 78. 88. See Shapiro, The Limits of Orthodox Theology, p. 29; Kellner, Must a Jew Believe Anything? p. 125; and Berger, “Book Review of Must a Jew Believe Anything? by Menachem Kellner,” pp. 82–83. 89. See note 69. 90. For different views, see Kellner, Dogma in Medieval Jewish Thought, chap. 10. 91. See note 40. 92. For a relatively recent example, see R. Moshe Stern’s Responsa Be’er Moshe (Vol. 8, No. 3 [Brooklyn, 1987]), in which he prohibits the use of books written by Zionists and those associated with Yeshiva University. I first came across this responsum in the Yeshiva University main study hall (bet midrash). Penciled on the inside of the study hall’s copy is a brief, unexplained note to see that responsum. 93. See Sefer ha-Hinukh, No. 496.

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94. This is much as it was in early Ashkenaz. See Ephraim Kanarfogel, “The Tosafist Oeuvre and Torah u-Madda,” The Torah u-Madda Journal, Vol. 2 (1990), pp. 52, 57nn8–9. 95. See note 40. 96. Perushe ha-Torah le R. Yehudah he-Hassid ( Jerusalem, 1975); see also Shapiro, The Limits of Orthodox Theology, pp. 109–110. 97. I follow here the episode as recounted by R. Shnayer Z. Leiman on a taped lecture of May 15, 1993, given at Sephardic Institute in Brooklyn. See Feinstein, Iggerot Moshe (1995), Yoreh De’ah, Vol. 3, Nos. 114–115. 98. Shapiro, The Limits of Orthodox Theology, p. 1. 99. Shapiro, The Limits of Orthodox Theology, pp. 157–158.