Heidegger and Duns Scotus on Truth and Language Author(s): Sean J. McGrath Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 57, No. 2 (Dec., 2003), pp. 339-358 Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20131978 . Accessed: 23/09/2011 17:45 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Philosophy Education Society Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Review of Metaphysics.

http://www.jstor.org

AND DUNSSCOTUS HEIDEGGER ON TRUTHAND LANGUAGE SEAN J. McGRATH

It

is shocking

surrounds trodden essential

that

voluminous

relationship Heidegger's field of "Heidegger and Theology," between relationship Heidegger's

revisionary doctor teenth-century and

Time.

of being, meaning refer.1 Further ing"

Gustav

part, nection.

forgetfulness

Ages, few

that the well

the acknowledge of truth and Duns

notion

Heidegger essence that is, to what "be (logos) does the word on Heidegger writes: than stands actuality "higher Scotus from Thomas possi (by distinction Aquinas), because

failed

that Gilson

to Metaphysics

influence

of being

was

being

is essentia. and

"essentialism," to recognize

gests that he completely misjudged ists between Aquinas's ontology was that Heidegger ately believed infectious

so

or

debt to the late thir Heidegger's on itself manifests the opening page of not about but about the asks, being,

subtilis

Siewerth, I have heard

Introduction

of the

literature

Aristotelianism.

For possibility."2 is than actuality bility higher the great enemy of Gilson,

1935

secondary

to the Middle

Scotus's

Being

in the

Even

his German

Etienne counter

used

con the Heidegger-Scotus to recommend Heidegger's

to his

undergraduates.

the polemical and Heidegger's. one with

of Scotism!3

He

the forgetfulness

him

This

relationship Siewerth

sug that ex

passion

in ridding

assumed of esse.

metaphysics that Heidegger's Had he read the

to: Department of Philosophy, Mount St. Mary's Col Correspondence MD 21727. lege, Emmitsburg, Martin Sein und Zeit (hereafter, Heidegger, "SZ"), 17th ed. (T?bingen: Max Niemeyer, and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh 1993), 2; English: Being of New York Press, 1996), 1. Hereafter, references (Albany: State University to SZ will list the German edition's page numbers, followed by page numbers from the English translation. 2 Ibid., 38/34. 3See Gustav "Das Sein als Gleichnis in Gesammelte Siewerth, Gottes," ed. Wolfgang Behler and Alma von Stock Werke, vol. 1: Sein und Wahrheit, hausen of this seminal Siewer (D?sseldorf: Patmos, 1975). A translation thian text is soon to be published by Andrzej Wiercinski through The Herme neutic Press. The Review Metaphysics

of Metaphysics

57 (December

2003):

339-358.

Copyright

?

2003

by The Review

of

SEAN J. McGRATH

340

are to the middle more carefully early Heidegger (all of his references seen else being that whatever he would have and later writings), means for understandable. it is primally for Heidegger, Being call existentia, the Thomists is not what pure contentless Heidegger positivity, analogically

the

sheer

indicates

act the

of infinite

upsurge Creator;

from

which nothingness, it is rather fore-theoretical

determined

Seinsvergessenheit historically intelligibility. Heidegger's of haecceitas. of esse but the forgetfulness is not the forgetfulness such eminent neo-Scholastics How is this massive by oversight

possible?

I believe Scotus

it is entirely due to their neglect the

study, Heidegger's ries and Theory of Meaning sumed (on the later Heidegger's

4Martin

1916 Habilitationsschrift, We Scotus.4 of Duns misleading

have

suggestion)

of the young The Catego too long as that

this

is a

des Duns und Bedeutungslehre Die Kategorien Heidegger, in 1:Fr?he vol. Gesamtausgabe, Mohr, Reprinted 1916). (T?bingen: von Her "GA 1"), ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm (hereafter, Schriften (1912-1916) rmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978). On Heidegger's "The Forgetting of Haecceitas: Scotus study see Sean J. McGrath, Heideg the Human in Between and The Di ger's 1915-1916 Habilitationsschrift,11 ed. Andrzej Wiercinski and Theological vine: Philosophical Hermeneutics, The litera Press, Elan & Son, 2002), 355-77. (Guernsey: The Hermeneutic I have found Augustinus is uneven. ture on Heidegger's Habilitationsschrift des Seins bei Jo Verst?ndnis "Zu Heideggers Karl Wucherer-Huldenfeld's und bei Thomas sowie im Thomismus hannes Duns Scotus und im Skotismus between out the connections von Aquin" helpful, for drawing especially of his in Scotistic the interest teacher, ontology Scotus, early Heidegger's in Being and Time. Carl Braig, and the critique of Scholasticism presented ed. Helmuth Vetter (Frankfurt am Main: und das Mittelalter, See Heidegger treatment of the Habilitation Kisiel's Theodore Peter Lang, 1999), 41-59. dense but brilliant. See his The Genesis is almost of impenetrably schrift of California Press, 1993), Time and Being (Berkeley: University Heidegger's in 1915-16 was es 25-38. John van Buren shows that Heidegger's position Rumor of The See his Young Heidegger: sentially "philosophical mysticism." In a 70-112. Indiana theHidden King Press, 1994), University (Bloomington: anti-He the neo-Romantic, Gudopp elaborates study, Wolf-Dieter neglected See his Der junge of the young Heidegger's thinking. gelian directions von Sein und Zeit in der und Wahrheit Realit?t Vorgeschichte Heidegger. Bl?tter Gmbh, Frequently 1983), 40-7. (Frankfurt am Main: Marxistische on and Aquinas: An Essay cited studies include, John Caputo, Heidegger 36 York: Fordham Press, University 1982), Metaphysics (New Overcoming in Heideg and Radical Subjectivity "Signification 43; Roderick M. Stewart, 12 (1979): 360-86; Richard and World Man ger's Habilitationsschrift" und Martin die Denkens. des Heidegger Fr?mmigkeit Schaeffler, Wissenschaftliche katholische Buchgesellschaft, Theologie (Darmstadt: and the Grammat Mysticism "Phenomenology, 1978), 10-29; John Caputo, Journal A Study of Heidegger's Habilitationsschrift," ica Speculative. of the British 5, no. 2 (1974): 101-17; Otto P?ggeler, Society for Phenomenology 2d ed. (Pfullingen: G?nther, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers, 1990), 11-16. Scotus

TRUTHAND LANGUAGE

341

to Being with no intrinsic connection youthful work lacking direction, ex the most and Time. On the contrary, direct and vital connection account of singularity of the intuition ists between Scotus's (haeccei of Erfurt's modes (modis tas), Thomas grammatical significando), Husserl's

and the young intuition, categorial "hermeneutical intution" of the fore-theoretical "live

within

in life

itself."5

and without

to Failing the Heidegger

notion of Heidegger's forms of meaning that commentators both this,

recognize school

cannot

but misunderstand

to the onto-theological tradition. relationship Heidegger's In the Habilitationsschrift the young Heidegger appears

himself with philosophers who hold ontological intuition

marily

(for example, and in the modern

Plato,

Plotinus,

ture, Scotus, period, Descartes, He argues that the truth of judgment, propositional or founded, to the direct secondary apprehension occur. it cannot in Being which writes Heidegger

knowledge

to align

to be pri Bonaven

Augustine,

and Husserl). truth, is derivative of being, without

Kant,

and

Time

that judg be something

is logos as apophainesthai, that "lets language or Primal is unconcealment.6 enables truth, aletheia, Judgment hinders unconcealment. Because it can allow the thing to show itself or cover can or true it over once again, be false. logos apophainesthai

ment

seen."

to "as aletheuein the 'being true' of logos means: writes, Heidegger in legein as apophainesthai take beings that are being talked about uncon to let them be seen as something out of their concealment; to cealed discover them. Similarly (alethes); 'being false,' pseudest hai,

is tantamount

something

to deceiving in the sense of covering up: putting of something else (by way of letting it be seen) and it off as something it is not."7 Aletheia is prior to the

in front

thereby passing distinction between rectly mary

truth and

apprehended. 'place' of truth.

originally the simple

true sense

falsehood.

"Logos simply In the Greek

may sense

The unconcealed

is di being as the pri not be acclaimed more what is 'true'?indeed

logos we have been of something. perception

than

the

aisthesis, discussing?is . . . What is in the purest

5 See Martin vol. 56/57, Zur Bestimmung Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, der Philosophie "GA 56/57"), ed. Bernd Heimb?chel (hereafter, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, connec 1999), 117. The Heidegger-Scotus more tion has becoming the publication in apparent with increasingly of these early Freiburg lectures (1919-23). On Gesamtausgabe Heidegger's see Kisiel, Gene the relationship these and the Habilitationsschrift between sis of Being and Time, 21-68. 6SZ 219-26/200-8. 32-4/28-30, 153-60/144-50, 33/29. 7Ibid.,

342

SEAN J. McGRATH

and most

sense

'true'?that

such

it can

never

original a way that

is, that which

only

discovers

in

cover

up anything?is pure noein, observant of the simplest determina apprehension straightforward as such."8 tions of the being of beings as is not a defender of a na?ve doctrine of knowing Heidegger more an the of truth is than immediate experience complex "looking"; of presence.

apprehension fied notions

of

He

intuition

disassociates

and

the traditionally identi is not mute Unconcealment

immediacy. sense of intuition "The fundamental is not experience: to limited the of the ily apprehension originary sensory."9 in the of intuition emphasizes primacy cognition, Heidegger to be "equiprimordial" with Like all intuition.10 pression sense

unconcealment

experience,

truth

mediated;

is

occurs

only

and

fundamentally

within

On

language.

one

necessar While

he

holds

ex

Dasein's

ineradicably truth level,

for the logos apophainesthai is an expressed language a On of aletheia. interpretation deeper level, truth is generated by to in the word birth live We and gives language: thinking. language to experience that is not permeated have no access The by language. generates

task

hermeneutical

of

words

through which

superstructure

of

Phenomenology goes along with

does

frees

up more

life first expresses theoretical not

the way basic

traditional

is to

phenomenology

historical

experiences between

the

up

primal

itself by dismantling that

attach

dichotomy is always already expressed; or projection the construction

loosen

conceal

judgments to unexpressed words life is already expressed of thinking. and intuition

the them.

it intuitions; for us and annuls

Heidegger

the

the

intuited

expression: is not the primal conversely, expression of a subject but an intuited domain of

meaning. Heidegger's the early Husserl's Investigations

of truth is a Scotus-inspired theory of "categorial notion intuition."

Husserl

departs

from

the

reigning

of development In his 1901 Logical neo-Kantianism

of

his day by holding that the categorial and the intuitive do not neatly divide ence.11

and the received data into the subjectively generated it calls forth the category. The given is structured;

of experi Intuition

SSZ, 33/29. 9See Martin zur Ge vol. 20: Prolegomena Gesamtausgabe, Heidegger, "GA ed. Peter schichte des Zeitbegriffs 20"), (hereafter, Jaeger (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, of the Concept of 1994), 74; English: History trans. Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Time: Prolegomena, Press, 1992), 55. 10Ibid., 65/48.

TRUTH AND LANGUAGE 343 a

includes Heidegger Scotus's

nonsensuous developed of

theory

Habilitationsschrift. of understanding a

from

proceeds

or

The

dimension.

categorial

intuition

Husseri's

young it with

by fusing categorial in his in depth which he examined intellection, inner For the Franciscan the word Scholastic, the universal (verbum definition, interius), a of The simple apprehension singular thing.

individual is entirely intelligible, even if its intelligibility is never fully defined.

is an

definition

Scotus's

reads

Heidegger of the intelligibility intuition. categorial

as

doctrine

of

a precursor

singular The ground

of

the

of Husseri's

thing

known

precategorial notion

which is never individual, fully fore-theoretical thing has a formal a the individual speaks singularized,

Historically to us. This original which verbum, primal word of makes verbum the word entis, possible being, The the verbum interius. understanding, and

that Husserl

on

Scotus

we the

call might inner word

Scotus

the of

young Heidegger this point. Neither of fore of the notion

converge the ramifications recognized for the understanding of historical theoretical intelligibility to point out for Heidegger, Husseri's young assistant, nor

Husserl

of

in a universal

actually intelligible The by the concept.

comprehended or ideal structure.

discovered

the

life.

Itwas

that

if the

cannot in its singularity, is actually be history singular intelligible as ineffable. is a domain of fore-theoretical History disregarded own one that which exhibits its proper experience, understandability, eludes Time

the objectifications of categories Scotistic-Husserlian this develops

limitations

of

categorial

knowledge,

and Being judgments. a into of the critique insight a retrieval of the primordial and

intelligibility of history, and the primal historicity of intelligibility.

I Heidegger's

Logos

rius.

Corresponding cal truth of aletheia

Apophainesthai to Heidegger's

and

11Edmund Husserl, (New York: Humanities, 12 SZ, 150/161.

Verbum

Inte

the ontologi of judgment is an understated that defines is not the first word. "Intelli

the ontic

of logos. The word is also always gibility already The foundation terpretation."12

doubling

and Augustine's distinction between

truth

articulated of

language

Logical Investigations, 1970), bk. 2, sec. 45.

before

in its appropriative is not wordless (Sprache)

trans. J. N. Findlay,

2d ed.

344

SEAN J. McGRATH

intuition

but

The

"discourse" has

(Rede).13 a long history

of primally

theme

in the

lectures

expressed up to Being

understanding leading In 1920 Heidegger and Time. is the explication said, "Phenomenology of the meaningful it the of the whole, logos phenomenon, logos gives in the sense of verbum not in the sense of logicification."14 internum, In 1925 Heidegger "It is also a matter of fact that our simplest wrote, are already even more, expressed, is and It here? way. primary original see the objects and things but rather that we states

and constitutive perceptions are interpreted in a certain so much

is not first see, We

that we

talk about rather

but

do not

possible. What

say what

the

we

see, we sense

verbum

Saying

we

the matter."15 makes

seeing

the logos here, Latin term refers

of

the

to the

its fruit, the verbum the inner interius, on the analogy of the processual rela in the Trinity. The inner word proceeds

as the Son proceeds from the Father. is not a change, the reduction of potency to the formation from act to act. Applied of

but a procession, the analogy speech, from wordless

as an epoch-making hermeneutics sophical showing

philosophy,

language is mediated

but

celebrates

bum

by

that

suggests

experience

act of expression. Gadamer Hans-Georg

guage" "Greek

invoked The

about

says say.

say what

of the "inner word" under through which in the production of a provisional definition. Fol a relationship the Scholastics formulated between

of divine persons tionships from the act of understanding In both cases, the procession

directly mental

we

of logos internum?

lowing Augustine, the act of understanding and the definition word that gives

to act, human

see what

do not

elaboration is fulfilled

standing

we

To put itmore precisely one the reverse, we see what them.

is the other

phenomenon, Scholastics'

What

the Scholastic

contribution for

it corrects

only a name?i.e., to Gadamer, Socrates

and

Plato

reduce

not

by a more doctrine

to the development "the Greek forgetting

of unity original more or less began with that it does not represent "the

does

emerge funda

of ver of philo of lan

and thought language."16 is the insight that a word true being."17 According to a tool, "a copy

the word

13 SZ, 160-6/150-6. 14Martin in die Ph?nomenologie der Religion," Heidegger, "Einleitung in Gesamtausgabe, 60: vol. ed. Matthias Jung and Thomas Regehly, des religi?sen ed. Claudius Strube (Frankfurt am Lebens, Ph?nomenologie Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1995), 63. 15GA 20:75/56.

TRUTHAND LANGUAGE constructed For

selves."18 names

and

because

judged

Socrates, there

345

in terms

of

the things them original, without the true being of things is investigated to truth in the being is no access of words. the

to demonstrate "Plato wants that no truth comments, can in ton claim be attained onton) language?in (aletheia language's ton onomaton)?and to correctness that without words (orthotes

Gadamer

ton onomaton) Gadamer heuton)"19 (aneu

hermeneutical the

indissoluble

connection discovery

being must considers

phenomenology unity of thinking

between

from itself (auta purely of Heidegger's central insight

be known the to be and

the remembering interius:

the anti-Platonic

affirmation

es

of

He draws an explicit language. of language and the theological

of the verbum

Language and thinking about things are so bound together that it is an of the system of truths as a pre-given to conceive abstraction system of corre for of the selects which subject possibilities being signifying sponding signs. A word is not a sign that one selects, nor is it a sign that one makes or gives to another; it is not an existing thing that one picks in order to make another being visi up and gives an ideality of meaning to begin with, subse is not wordless ble through it. . . . Experience an object of reflection by being named, by being sub quently becoming sumed under the universality of the word. of itself Rather, experience it. We seek the right word?i.e., the seeks and finds words that express to the thing?so that in it the thing comes to word that really belongs language.20

The word

is not

In a

certain

itself.

imposed

on

sense,

the

from the thing thing; it emerges comes to in the word. be thing

the

16See und Methode. einer Gadamer, Wahrheit Grundz?ge Hans-Georg Hermeneutik philosophischen (T?bingen: Mohr, 1972), 409-42; English: trans. Joel Weinsheimer Truth and Method, and Donald G. Marshall, 2d rev. ed. (New York: Continuum, On Gadamer's retrieval of ver 1995), 405-38. in "The Hermeneutic Retrieval of a Theological bum, see Andrzej Wiercinski, in Between theHuman and the Divine, 1-23. sight: Verbum Interius," 17 und Methode, 409/405. See Plato, Cratylus, 438d Gadamer, Wahrheit 439b: "But if this is a battle of names, some of them asserting that they are like the truth, others contending that they are, how or by what criterion are we to decide between them? For there are no other names to which appeal can be made, but obviously recourse must be had to another standard which, without of the two are right, and names, will make clear which employing this must be a standard which shows the truth of things. . . . But if that is then I suppose that things may be known without names." true, Cratylus, Translated by Benjamin Jowett in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. Edith and Huntington Hamilton Cairns Princeton University Press, (Princeton: 1961).

18 Gadamer, Wahrheit 19 Ibid., 411/407. 20 Ibid, 421/417.

und Methode,

412/408.

346

SEAN J. McGRATH a word,

that is, experience is not mute. Plato to the direct and wordless nous, prior language, of form (eidos). Socratic of language lead to analyses

"finds" Experience of intellection speaks apprehension aporia which

because

precisely

the ground

at best

of

truth

is a wordless cannot

One

intuition, be justice

define

approximates. of justice exceeds the limits of language. Thus So moves cratic dialectic from the analysis of language toward vision. and Scholastic Trinitarian the ground prepared Augustinian theology cause

language the form

for a non-Greek

a model of language. sketched philosophy Augustine as a procession of human of an inner word from under cognition to the of the Son from the Father. The procession standing analogous Son is the Word of the Father, the Word that was always with God be cause

it was

is never without the 1:1). That the Father (John Word means that the divine mind has always itself. already expressed a not The procession of the Word from the Father is in God, change the actualization of a potency, for in God there is no potency. It is a God

from

act

to act.

that the emergence of argues Augustine an of is proces speech understanding analogous sion from act to act. the verbum is pre Spoken exterius, language, a verbum ceded by an inner word, interius. treatment of verbum in De Trinitate lends itself to Augustine's

procession

from

an

inner word

multiple interpretations. ous. First, language

Some

features

of

it are

relatively unambigu of thinking; it is only an externalization of thinking dimension itself. Thinking is a dialogue also an intrinsic of no words at any itself: "For although there were the soul with spoken, is not

in his heart."21 The "speech of the heart" thinks speaks rate, he who act is a complex and intuition. mediates outward speech Thinking or intuitive or expres and in part spontaneous that is in part receptive of the heart, it does sive: "And yet, when we call thoughts speeches not

follow

knowledge, wardly things;

that they are not also when they are true.

by means but when

of we

acts

of sight, arising from the sight of For when these things are done out

then speech the body, think inwardly, the two

and

sight are one."22

are

different

In inner

dia

21 On the bk. 15, chap. 10, par. 17. Translation: Augustine, De Trinitate, in A trans. Select the Nicene Arthur West Haddan, Library of Holy Trinity, ed. Philp Schaff, vol. 3 and Post-Nicene Fathers Church, of the Christian 1956). (Grand Rapids: W. M. B. Eerdmans, 22 Ibid, bk.15, chap. 10, par. 18.

347

TRUTH AND LANGUAGE

are one: the inner word and intuition is the thought of logue, speaking The idea is a the thing known: we see and say in the same moment. it is outwardly then is able to un word before expressed: "Whoever, a word,

not only before it is uttered in sound, but also before are considered in thought... is able now to the images of its sounds some see through likeness of that Word this glass and in this enigma . . was .' For of neces the Word. of whom it is said, 'In the beginning

derstand

sity, when we speak what born from the knowledge

is true, i.e., speak what the memory itself which

we

there is know, that retains, a word

is altogether of the same kind with that knowledge from which it is born. For the thought that is formed by the thing that we know is the word

we

which

not

nalization,

in the heart."23 Outward speak a transformation: "Accordingly,

expression the word

is an exter that

outwardly is the sign of the word that gives light inwardly; which has

the greater

claim

to be called

the possibility that thinking is itself of the inner word. With characteristic

develop

conflicting

while

conceptualization,

expressed

plays with

before

the procession he asks if "this some

ambiguity from our knowledge, is to be so it is formed because to say, already it is, to here allows and Scotus Aquinas ambiguity to accounts of the nature of thinking prior

thing of our mind, which even before called a word The

latter

a word."24

What is the thinking that is prior to idea? Augustine

formable."25

sounds

can be formed

both

claiming

to be faithful

to Augustine.

II The Verbum Augustine's of model

Thomistic Interius.

and

Scotistic

Alternative

Interpretations of to precision thirteenth-century brought an Aristotelian he interpreted it through Prior to intellection the singular is only poten

Aquinas verbum when

intellection.

tially

intelligible It tential).

23Ibid., bk. 24 Ibid., bk. 25 Ibid., bk. 26 Aquinas,

non est intelligibilis, in materia nisi in po (forma in lies dormant the darkness of matter, awaiting

15, chap. 10, par. 19. 15, chap. 11, par. 20. 15, chap. 25, par. 25. Summa theologiae I, q. 79, a. 3.

348

SEAN J. McGRATH

illumination (illuminatio)

by the agent intellect. Once illuminated it

an actually "The intelligible thing, an image or phantasm. our of mind" that the inner word is the precedes something image, the illuminated The verbum the concept, uni phantasm. interius,

becomes

concrete

versalizes

the

Gadamer

remains

Aquinas

too

entangled sources of his main

(one

that

intelligibility

in German on

opposite of the position he defends and and

are not

language

not

tellect,

agree on the

all agree the production

verbum)

itself

in the

argues

in Aquinas

but

image. that the

precisely

Thinking as ground

related

on the necessity of positing intermediate steps between

see

to

idealism

in Truth and Method.

one

originally

consequent. While all Thomists

shows

in the agent illuminated

and

of the inner word. In his magisterial phantasm ar of cognition, model Bernard study of Aquinas's Verbum, Lonergan a act for and between illumination definition: gues mediating insight. three moments

in Aquinas's notion of abstraction: sense of illumination and the abstraction, experience (1) objective to act of the potentially in reduction by the agent intelligible singular

He

distinguishes

the

which

tellect,

yields

an

image

or a phantasm;

ab

(2) apprehensive

the insight that grasps the intelligibility of the phantasm;

straction,

the abstraction of the universal in the abstraction, (3) formative definition that expresses the verbum The second interius.27 step, in to illumi of actual understanding. It is posterior sight, is the moment to conceptualization, concrete nation and prior and preconceptual. and

The

inner word

pression

is distinct

is not

the

apprehensive sence manifest tion ifest

the

intellect

an

as an ex understanding is This distinction it expresses.28

is distinct

that which

intuition

that

the

of essence

from

that precedes thinking but a preconceptual

the

in

penetra In objective ab thing by the intellect. to In the of the intellect. is agency passive thing to the es the intellect is initially abstraction passive In formative abstrac in the actually image. intelligible

of a concrete

straction

from

it demonstrates

for

significant ner word tion

that defines

individual

speaks

an inner word

to define

the universality

man

in the

image.29 are in agreement is all Thomists crucial point upon which are that singular prior to illumina only potentially intelligible things intu Therefore intellection is not primarily intellect. tion by the agent The

ition but act. The intellect is directed toward intelligibility; it cannot

TRUTHAND LANGUAGE

349

est uni intellectus of sense experience: the singularities a sensum transformation of is Intellection versalium, singularium.30 it "For human writes: though understanding, experience. Lonergan is it it in the phantasm, in the phantasm and knows has its object yet with

remain

on itself to produce an object It pivots in this state. as word inner is the which def ratio, intentio, object are not the but received est."sl Ideas by generated quid initio, quod a comes as term of and the intellect: pro product "Conceptualization

not

content

with

for itself another

cess

of

reasoning.

As

the course, continues, ence of the inner word singular

thing.

The

of dis the fluctuation long as the reasoning, Yet the refer is as yet unuttered."32 inner word is not actually

an abstract intelligible

universal phantasm

but

a concrete

precedes

the

27See Bernard vol. 2 of Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Rob the Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, of Toronto Press, ert M. Doran, vol. 2. (Toronto: University 1997), 187-8: the objec abstraction: "There are three stages to physical and mathematical is the illumina the formative. abstraction Objective tive, the apprehensive, in treating the imagined ob tion of phantasm, the imagined object; it consists as far as its specific nature goes; like to be understood ject as something it is one reality with two aspects; as effected by agent in action and passion, the imagined object, itmay be be it named may efficient; as affecting tellect, one has named instrumental. abstraction, Next, with regard to apprehensive intel to distinguish between first act and second act: first act is the possible from first lect informed and actuated by a species qua; second act proceeds the pro as esse from form and action from principle of action; accordingly, in grasping, know the second act consists is processio cession operationis; an intelligible Per se species quae in the imagined object. ing, considering to it by a sort of reflection, there is in the second act is infallible; consequent of the singular, that is, a reflective intellectual grasping direct, knowledge is the nature of the particular that the universal nature understood imagined. in an act of this consists abstraction; Thirdly there is the act of formative or an or act of whenever is but there defining, by meaning meaning defining; formative ab that very fact there is something meant or defined; accordingly, as positing a universal ratio or an intentio straction may also be described intellecta" 28Ibid.,

23-4.

29 I, q. 84, a. 7. theologiae Compare Aquinas, Summa 30See De Anima 2.5.417b22: "What actual sensation appre Aristotle, is universals, is individuals, while what knowledge and hends apprehends "On the Soul," trans. J. A. the soul." (Translation: these are in a sense within ed. Richard McKeon [New York: Ran Smith, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, dom House, 1941], 566.) 31 Lonergan, Verbum, 48. 32 Ibid., 51.

350

SEAN J. McGRATH and

concept

makes

it possible.33

For

the

Aquinas

and

active

intellect

for without

only secondarily receptive, of sense data, understanding could not occur. an himself Scotus did not accept Aristotelian, counting the universality between of the known disjunction

primordially initial illumination While Aristotelian

is the

the and

In effect he holds the singularity of the experienced. that the singular is actually of sense "The prior to intellection. experience intelligible as as con in is far the itself is itself, thing thing intelligible singular to some to ours, for exam but if it is not intelligible cerned, intellect, ple, this itself."34

is not The

to unintelligibility is primordially intellect due

on

the part

of the singular thing a in defective intuiting

receptive, of the singular On the thing. intelligibility it abstracts the universal. This of this intuition preconceptual ground was a deliberate of Aquinas's of intellection. refutation model For way

the

concrete

actual

is the identity of intellect and intelligibility (intel

Aquinas, knowledge lectus tion cedes

in actu between

et intellectum intellect

the former.36

Why

sunt

idem35).

Scotus

assumes

in act; intelligibility insist on this? The did Scotus

in act

and

the

a distinc latter

gap between

pre a

33 153. See Aquinas, Summa I, q. 85, a. 3, theologiae Lonergan, Verbum, in the sensitive part. One, in regard of im ad 3: "There are two operations pression only, and thus the operation of the senses takes place by the senses inasmuch as the The other is formation, by the sensible. being impressed or an even of some of the absent forms for itself image thing, imagination are found in the intellect. For in thing never seen. Both of these operations intellect as informed by the the first place there is the passion of the passive intellect thus informed forms a defi intelligible species; and then the passive the by a word. Wherefore expressed nition, or a division, or a composition, the and a proposition conveys concept conveyed by a word is its definition; the intel Words do not therefore signify intellect's division or composition. the intellect forms for itself for but that which themselves, ligible species the purpose external things." (Translation: Summa Theologica, of judging of the English Dominican Province trans. Fathers [New York: Benzinger 174. See Lonergan, Verbum, Brothers, 1948]. Italics mine.) 34 II, d. 3, q. 3, n. 16. Scotus, Opus oxoniense 35Summa I, q. 55, theologiae I, q. 14, a. 2c. Compare Summa theologiae a. 1, ad 2; I, q. 55, a. 2, ad 1; I, q. 87, a. 1, ad 3. 36 Sco IX, d. 3, q. 6, ns. 10-12. For a Thomist, Scotus, Opus oxoniense the view that the intellect is pri amounts to "conceptualism," tus's position not with the concrete intelligibility grasped marily conversant with essences, 39 n. 126: "The Scotist re in insight. See Lonergan, Verbum, 38-9, especially reduced the act of understanding jection of insight into phantasm necessarily to seeing a nexus between concepts; hence, while for Aquinas understanding is is rational, for Scotus understanding which conceptualization precedes a mechan matter of is which metaphysical preceded by conceptualization ics."

TRUTHAND LANGUAGE

351

singular thing that was held to be at first only potentially and a universal

essence

intellect.

If the

agent

struck

intelligible

to be bridged by the were not actually in

in its singularity How could it be universalized? individual

how could telligible, an unintelligible "illuminate" to abstract universals from of

as too wide

Scotus

the

Scotus

the agent intellect "It is writes, impossible

singular? the singular without previous knowledge case the intellect would abstract without

for in this singular; from what itwas abstracting."37 knowing not It is edge? "insight" but Lonergan's intuition" apprehensiolsimplex (simplex knows ciple that the higher power that we Scotus argues intuitively Abstraction conceptualization.38

is this previous knowl calls Scotus "simple something On the prin intelligentia). what the lower power apprehends,

grasp is not

What

actual

to

prior

intelligibilities

it presup original knowledge; of experience intelligibility.39 Scotus's with Aquinas is rooted in fundamentally diver dispute nature views of the of intellect. With Scotus holds that gent Avicenna, a the proper of the intellect is not of being, mate modification object a more

poses

rial being, as infinite moment agent sence

basic

as

it is for Aquinas, essence.40 Thinking

that

but being

engages being announces itself as

the

thing is still required

intellect

as it is first manifest

causes"

the verbum on an

the

of

and

the concept, equally The thing does

interius.

intellect, autonomous

as

in certain

production

he understood

from (essentia) understandable.41

to effect a modal transposition in the singular to the universalized Scotus of a collaboration speaks

in the definition. expressed in intellection: the intellect sality cient

as such, which

forms of

the

the object necessary not simply of Platonism. intellect.

are both

the first The from

es

essence of cau

"partial

effi

to the production of essence the impress Nor In

is the verbum

its precategorial

37 Scotus, De anima XXII, cap. iii. 38See Scotus, Opus oxoniense IV, d. 45, q. 3, n. 17. 39 see Allan Wolter, Duns Scotus, Ibid., I, d. 3, q. 4. For a translation Philosophical Writings (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964). 40This account of Scotus aligns him in a certain respect with Platonism, the general tendency of the Franciscan school. Although Scotus is not a Pla as primarily intuitive falls midway between tonist, his account of intellection a Platonic doctrine of knowledge as confrontation with essence and an Aris as abstraction totelian doctrine of knowledge of essence. Compare Etienne and Some Institute of Medi Gilson, Being Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical aeval Studies, 86-9. 1952), 41 "Et secundum istam prioritatem est quod quid est, et per se naturalem a Metaphysico, et per se ut sic, consideratur et exprimi objectum intellectus, tur per defmitionem"; n. oxoniense d. 7. q. Scotus, Opus II, 3, 1,

352

SEAN J. McGRATH in the

manifestation

singular thing, It is a natura communis

particular. vidualized

common the

nature,

and

universality, tus's theory

of

expresses

universal

nor

an indi specified by haecceitas, essence common in the the Recognizing

abstracts

intuitive

is neither

it from

the

the concept, holds cognition

it the mode of thing, gives the verbum Sco interius.42 that

the

individual

is essen

than

in it accidentally individuated, actually intelligible in the of the mediation as, Aquinas, only through agent a "sense species," exhibits The individual specified by the of individuality (haecceitas).43

rather

tially

nature.

intellect

essence

not

self, intellect.

formality

abstraction has a negative connotation for Scotus: Consequently, and to it is derivative, Our imperfect inability incomplete, knowledge. of the singular is not due to any unintelli grasp fully the intelligibility

gibility in the thing itself but to the imperfection of our fallen intellect. "If you

He writes,

say that our

intellect

does

not understand

lar thing, I reply that this is an imperfection

the singu

(which obtains)

in its

is not a The transposition of essence into universals essence. a of Abstraction but modification perfection brings out cer that are hidden in the individual of the essence tain dimensions thing, with other for example, its commonality things of the same species. present

Yet ten. ual mas

state."44

other

it distorts Scotus

assumes

of the essence:

that at the root

of every

haecceitas definition

is forgot is an individ

Tho prior to abstraction. of speculative grammar, fourteenth-century enterprise is in this as of Heidegger's Habilitationsschrift, grounded

that

thing of Erfurt's

the subject

dimensions

is always

already

intelligible

In the Habilitationsschrift sumption. reverses ulative abstraction, grammar

Heidegger

examines

how

spec

definitions

(the deconstructing in the modality modus back to em of universality, significandi) of under natures (the thing in the modality pirically given common thing

42 "Thus for Duns Scotus abstraction is not properly speaking a demate of the object, or an act by which the form is set free from the indi rialization the object takes up vidual notes rooted inmatter; rather it is an act by which or the ideal order, a new way of being, is raised to the order of intelligibility, Efrem Bettoni, Duns Scotus: The Ba and acquires the note of universality"; trans. Bernardine Bonansea sic Principles (Washington, of His Philosophy, of America Press, 1961), 100. D.C.: Catholic University 43On Scotus's notion of see Allan B. Wolter, The Philosophi haecceitas, ed. McCord Adams Duns John cal Theology Marilyn Scotus, (Ithaca: Cor of of Scotus's On the development nell University Press, 1990), 48-53, 68-97. see ibid., 98-122. notion of intuitive cognition of singularity, 44See II, d. 3, q. 9, n. 9. Scotus, Opus oxoniense

TRUTHAND LANGUAGE standability, ble singular

to the being of the primally intelligendi), intelligi in the of modus modality thing being, essendi).45 sense within a Thomistic act does not make

modus

(the deconstructive

This

353

in a Scotistic

of

is possible grammar Speculative cognition. the prejudgmental act of understanding because of the inner word, the act that precedes the procession of a pretheoretical into phantasm but intuition mode

model

context

hearkening Three

to the word

of the thing itself.46 account features of Scotus's

important for Heidegger's prove significant cal: (1) Intellection is grounded

of

for Scotus, is not insight of

a

essence,

intellection

will

of the fore-theoreti phenomenology a in primal passivity of the intellect,

an

to the forms of meaning receptivity living in life itself.47 a limiting of the essence, is objectification, and to that (2) Abstraction a The of distortion. the definition product abstraction, degree (ver a diminished names bum interius) of essence, the intuitively modality openness

and

grasped

common

nature

that shows

itself

in the thing.

The

the intelligibility of the thing eludes theoretical knowing. that precedes

perience actual intelligibility.48

the first act of the

intellect

fullness

of

(3) The ex

is an experience

of

Ill Heidegger's

Scotistic

Reading

The

of HusserVs

Intuition. Categorial to show an in intended

young Heidegger's Habilitationsschrift trinsic connection between Scotism and Husserlian

45Thomas trans. Geoffrey 19.

of Erfurt, Grammatica L. Bursill-Hall (London:

phenomenology.

speculativa, Latin-English edition, Longman, 1972), 143. See GA 1:314

46See Armand Maurer's of Scotistic abstraction in his Me interpretation rev. ed. (Toronto: Pontifical dieval Philosophy, Institute of Mediaeval Stud in reality and are ies, 1982), 237: "Because [for Scotus] natures are common as such by the senses, all the agent intellect has to do is to make represented them completely universal by abstracting them from sense data. In order to do this, the agent intellect does not have to act upon images in the sense pow ers and prepare them for the abstraction as St. Thomas of universal, taught. It can read as in an open book the intelligible message presented by the senses and directly form its universal concept from it." (italics mine) 47 Compare GA 56/57:117. 48 the second point by holding that Lonergan's Aquinas accommodates The concrete intelli preconceptual insight is prior to formative abstraction. the abstract concept. gibility grasped by insight exceeds

354

SEAN J. McGRATH

was motivated early Husserl by an antisubjectivist structure. of intelligible Husserl argues givenness

The

of an essence

structure

not

is intuited sense

the grasp of prestructured serl writes, "There must

data

that

constructed.

insight into the the categorial is not

Intuition

but

the grasp of meaning. act that renders [intuitive]

at least be an

Hus iden

sensu to the categorial elements of meaning that merely ous perception no to the material We renders have element."49 sense see or of "raw We do not hear data." experience "color," tical

services

"sounds," we and so forth. standable

see

"blue-sky," "green grass," have intuitive experience

We

The

things.

given

egorially To

expressible. show this Husserl

sponds 'this white

in perception

the

asks

paper' and, is implied ter, a judgment,

is white'?"50

in the former,

that the judgment is a modification the

I do not

latter.

first

something the predicates

about

it, attach "white paper."

thinking I see Rather a way

that

means

to say

that

themselves

confirm they with

it can be

relate

categorially in perception, itself forms

these

"white"

is formally "Ifwe by categories. structured meanings we

can but

expressions, that the lat Or

indeterminate

Experience

interpreted

to the object

a description?

cat

corre

"What

Is it simply

of the description?

see

and

intelligible

question, intriguing between the two

to the difference 'this paper

hear "music," "traffic," of structured and under

as actually

itself

gives

we

is it rather

Husserl holds and

then,

and

after to

it. "paper" in such structured are asked find itmeans

reply: structure. in its categorial is not merely referred to, as

what

it

fulfillment, only that The

object in the case

categorial our but it is set before functions symbolically, purely meaning are never structures in in these forms."51 eyes directly just Categorial are always in isolation from that which tuited they structure?they some cate Hence Husserl describes with intuited only cogiven thing.

where

intuition

gorial

as "a founded

act."52

on Scotus, saw in cate the young Heidegger of Scotus's "The intuition the resurgence apprehensio. simplex gorial the demon "is of categorial writes, discovery intuition," Heidegger Fresh

stration,

from his work

first,

49Edmund

that

there

is a simple

apprehension

[schlichtes

Erf as

Husserl: 2, in The Essential Husserl, Logical Investigations trans. ed. Donn Welton, in Transcendental Basic Writings Phenomenology, Indiana University J. N. Findlay (Bloomington: Press, 1999), 128. 50 Ibid., 123. 51 Ibid., 128. 52See ibid., 131.

TRUTHAND LANGUAGE

355

intuition abolishes the subject-cen sen] of the categorial." Categorial of modern the "old mythology of an tered epistemology philosophy, own matter the world's intellect which and with its glues rigs together forms."53

The

intellect

is not

originally

but passive:

active,

of acts but objects which man 'forms' are not constructs The categorial in these acts. They are not something made by the sub ifest themselves added to the real objects, such that the real ject and even less something by this forming. Rather, they actually present entity is itself modified a acts constitute the entity more truly in its 'being-in-itself.' Categorial new objectivity. and does This is always to be understood intentionally not mean that they let the things spring up just anywhere. 'Constitut sense mean in not the of does and it producing making ing' fabricating; means This objectivity, letting the entity be seen in its objectivity. acts or in perceptions which presents itself in the categorial pervaded a not is result of the under acts, activity of intellectual by categorial It is not a result of an activity upon an standing upon the external world. or throng of affections, which are or already given mix of sensations dered to form a picture of the world.54 intution the false dichotomy between intu exposes Categorial ition and expression assumed who argue by critics of phenomenology ex stream onto that it "stills the of life" by attaching words wordless "Our comportments, lived experiences and through sense, expe expressed through even if they are not uttered are ex in words, nonetheless they a an in definite articulation that I have of by understanding

perience.55 Heidegger taken in the broadest riences; pressed them as

writes,

are

I simply live them without structure Fore-theoretical is primal in intersubjective

embedded

them

regarding language,

thematically."56

the

historical

living expressions Hence Heidegger determinate of way

experience. as only one distinguishes categorial knowledge an object, other equally valid ways. having alongside I experienced is white," "white judge that "this paper "white which I have written paper upon accurately,

I could

Before paper,"

or, more

something, lying I am sitting, writing." where The afternoon, a a a structure isolates from web of categorial judgment relations, or in which the structure first has meaning. The precategorial world, on my

desk

fore-theoretical of having

on an autumn

world

up as a realm

of multiple

possible

ways

an object.

53GA 20:96/71. 54 Ibid., 96-7/70-1. 55This was Paul Time,

opens

47-50. 66GA 20:65/48.

Natorp's

objection.

See Kisiel,

Genesis

of Being

and

356

SEAN J. McGRATH

deference Although for many years, critique that Husseri's doubt

on

the

he

Scotus

notion entire

that

the

knowledge expression

to the concrete view

fully grasped that something cal knowing. thing, relate

that

caused

as early as 1919, of categorial intuition, of reflective enterprise

argues are only

Scotus's

the master

for

concepts limited domain

one

the

properly

interpreted,

fail to give full deal everyday.

of being; they which we

in itself yet never thing is intelligible confirmed conviction cognition Heidegger's

of the thing

is always

Theoretical

forgetting

singularity

saw cast

singular

in abstract

the

Heidegger

with

intelligibility

his

With phenomenology.57 definitions of theoretical

and

or theoreti left out of categorial is a partial and limited view of a

knowledge was It the genius interpretation. this Scotistic/Husserlian delimitation of

to withhold

the young

an

problem concrete

him

prior

of the young Heidegger to to the of the categorial

of history. The to universalization

is the arena

historical by the

intellect.

of

To deny

actual intelligibility to the singular is to deny the intelligibility proper to history. In some versions of Aquinas, core of every being must be abstracted

the universal from

can be known: before the being to Heidegger, from thing history.58 According fability of the singular, r?pugn?t singularitas

cal

shell

the doctrine intellectioni,

of the prejudice that the historical needs to be mediated categories

essence

at the

its singularizing histori intellection liberates the of the

inef

is the root

by ahistorical

if it is to be understood.59

57See of the "fore-theoretical indi investigation Heidegger's something" cated but also concealed the of transcen Husseri's by objectifying language in the 1919 lecture, dental idealism "Die Idee der Philosophie und das in GA 56/57:82. For a cogent summary of this Weltanschauungsproblem," of Being and Time, 21-59. course, see Kisiel, Genesis breakthrough 58 of universalization, formative Lonergan would argue that the moment occurs to the act of understanding, is subsequent in ap which abstraction, concrete is it is abstraction. before abstract. prehensive Understanding understood is not universal but individual. Nonethe Thus, the intelligibility the singularity of the individual in this account less, from a Scotistic position, is not intelligible; the individual is regarded as intelligible only insofar as it in a universal essence. stantiates For a Thomist singularity per se eludes intel lection. about that reply that there is nothing Lonergan would intelligible which eludes intellection: it is an empirical residue. That is the whole point: for Scotus, this "residue" is a primordial mode of intelligibility. 59 is unintel Aquinas interprets history as a theater of singularity, which a in to the itself. that science of sacred is objection Replying history ligible cannot have the singular as its object, Aquinas scientia because impossible does not dispute the premise but argues that sacra doctrina does not have the singular events of sacred history as such for its theme, but the universal See Aquinas, Summa of these events. I, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2. meanings theologiae

TRUTHAND LANGUAGE

as a Scholastic effort to recover the Heidegger of the historical mantralike repeti against re him Scotus and Husserl gave conceptual

struck

Haecceitas

357

understandability primal tions of old formulas.

as a fore-theoretical of history In his 1915 qual and expression. intelligibility "The of Time in the Historical lecture, Concept Sciences," ifying oneness called the and once haecceitas "understandable Heidegger sources

for rethinking of primal manifestation

ness"

of historical

indicates not

be

existence contained sub

tinetur tion.62

But

native

to it.

the experience

life.60

Individuation

at a particular by the universal then

universale), this does not mean It means,

is a function time.61 (totia

of time; haecceitas can individual

If the whole entitas eludes

non

singularis theoretical

con

history predica that history has no understandability that the theoretical is not coextensive

rather, the understandable; the latter exceeds and delimits the former. the notions of haecceitas and intuition, Fusing categorial Heidegger turned Husseri's reflective into the "hermeneutics of phenomenology

with

facticity."63 What

it mean to say that the world is always already to of One line would pressed prior theory? interpretation suggest as old as Plato, it is an endorsement of a position that knowledge as such, a basic duality it presupposes of knower confrontation; known.

does

Heidegger the notion

says

On

the

is and

one

hand, he by the sub

to the world is brought he the notion of "world" as a total questions hand, of historical Existenz. His point is ity of facts existing independent we experi not argued at the level of metaphysics but phenomenology: ence the understandable a horizon mediated within of by the history

questions ject. On

that

something the word

different.

ex that

the other

60 "Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichtswissenschaft," GA 1:427. Heidegger, 61GA 1:253. See subtilissimae super libros Meta Scotus, Quaestiones lib. 4, q. 10, n. 76: "Accipitur individuum substantia et simul to physicorum, tum stricte, prout includit existentiam et tempus ut hie homo existens et hie lapis

existens."

62GA 1:351. Scotus, Opus oxoniense II, d. 3, q. 11, n. 9. 63A Thomist could go some way toward preserving Heidegger's herme neutics of facticity while rejecting his implicit Scotism by identifying Heideg with our experience in of actually ger's "fore-theoretical understandability" are some in While these the respect images telligible (phantasms). product of intellect, the effect of illuminatio, fore-theoretical they are nonetheless and concrete, and historical. that is, preconceptual One might even go so far as to argue that phantasms are in fact primal expressions in as much as illu occurs within a horizon of shared and situated meaning. mination The im ages that make up my world are not originally mine but given to me by my time.

358

SEAN J. McGRATH as a product

does not appear Language shows itself as "worded."

interpretation. the world ness;

Heidegger

of conscious with

dispenses

the talk of a "subject" grasping intelligibilities that exist outside the in domain of speakers. tersubjective a sea into of historically morphing nor controls. ther invented Being come

worlds

Does

worlds).65 ginning

to be.64

of the

As

this help 1947 "Letter

Dasein finds itself Rather, semantic which structure, us

the expressions

thrown it nei in which

gives the young put it, es weitet Heidegger (it us to decipher at the be the cryptic passage on Humanism"?

of man. the relation of Being to the essence It the relation. Thinking brings this relation to Be handed over to it from Being. Such offering in thinking Being comes to language. Language In its home man dwells. Those who think and are the guardians words of this home. Their of Beings the manifestation insofar as they accomplishes guardianship to language and maintain it in language through bring the manifestation their speech.66

Thinking accomplishes does not make or cause ing solely as something in the fact that consists is the house of Being. those who create with

two philosophical Scotus and Husserl, masters, Heideg must be liberated that the "logos of the phenomenon" ger learned to itself the production of meaning; from thinking that arrogates it to speak to show must be permitted itself. Under itself, or better, From

standing acting,

his

for Heidegger is not an act; rather, be When (Gelassenheit). letting

they (aletheia), ing of language,"

"speak"

64

Heidegger

writes

to us. in 1950.

to language."67 responds Scotus might have understood.

in that he

speaks which Duns

their names

it is largely a matter of not show themselves things "Mortals

live

in the speak Man speaks.

"Language A cryptic saying,

but

Mount

College

St. Mary's

one

are not limited to words but include nonverbal signifi "Expressions" that is, symbols. 65GA 56/57:73. 66Martin trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, J. "Letter on Humanism," Heidegger, Basic Writings, Glenn Gray, and David Farrell Krell, inMartin Heidegger. ed. David Farrell Krell, rev. ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 217. 67Martin trans. Thought, Heidegger, "Language," in Poetry, Language, York: 210. The German is & Albert Hofstadter Row, Harper 1971), (New if not more much more graceful, See Martin Heidegger, comprehensible. zur Sprache in Unterwegs "Die Sprache," 1975), 32-3: (Pfullingen: Neske, er der Sprache Der Mensch insofern "Die Sprache spricht, spricht. es,

entspricht."