Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork Sean Drysdale Walsh Department of Philosophy University of Minnesota Duluth, MN 55812 218-726-6829 [email protected]

DEAFT 1/15/10 Please do not cite without permission.

Introduction: The Problem with Teaching Kant’s Groundwork Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals is one of the most difficult of the most popularly taught undergraduate texts.1 Not only is it commonly taught in general philosophy survey courses and ethics courses, but selections are also taught in applied ethics, medical ethics, and environmental ethics courses. Despite being so popular in undergraduate course syllabi, I believe it is one of the most misunderstood texts. The Groundwork pedagogy in many contemporary philosophy courses is at odds with Kant’s own pedagogy in the Groundwork. The trouble with teaching Kant’s Groundwork, is that Kant’s moral theory (unlike utilitarian moral theory) is not meant to be applied to cases, even though it is taught as such a wide variety of philosophy courses. Kant's formulations of the Categorical Imperative (CI) are often taught as giving principles that students can apply to their maxims to help them determine right and wrong in a variety of situations. Upon being taught that Kant’s CI is supposed to determine right action, many undergraduate students quickly think of problems with applying Kant’s CI, especially the Formula of Universal Law (FUL). For example, some

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork students think that FUL prohibits walking on lawns, since if one universalized the maxim “Walk on the lawn,” then everyone would walk on the lawn and the lawn would be destroyed. Students often realize that they can tinker with their maxims to make them seem universalizable. For example, they consider maxims like “Lie when no one will find out” or “Make a lying promise to Sam at 4pm today” and realize that universalizing them does not lead to a contradiction or undermining the practice of promising. These students then believe that Kant’s moral theory is silly, and that it can be used to justify just about anything as long as you can be creative with maxim formation. This can give the students the impression that moral theory leads to relativism (“Moral Theory can be used to justify anything!”) or egoism (“Moral Theory can be used to justify whatever I want!”). However, I will argue that this undermines Kant main practical purpose for writing the Groundwork. Kant’s main practical purpose for writing the Groundwork was to prevent bad moral theory from corrupting our moral good sense. Relativism and egoism, from Kant’s point of view, are paradigmatically bad moral theories that corrupt good moral sense. However, the way Kant’s Groundwork is taught often leads students to such bad moral theory, thus undermining Kant’s own pedagogical purpose for the Groundwork. I will argue that we should not teach Kant’s Groundwork as being applicable to specific cases, even though this interpretation is invited by Kant’s illustration of the Categorical Imperative by his use of examples—e.g., the examples of the lying promise, suicide for self-love, not using one’s talents, not

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork helping others, the coldhearted benefactor, and the man of hopeless sorrow. It is common in philosophy classes to hear that Kant’s groundwork gives us a theory of right action.2 A theory of right action is supposed to tell us what is morally permissible, forbidden, and obligatory given the facts of the situation. A theory of right action is supposed to be a moral guide, and undergraduates are supposed to benefit from being taught about theories of right action.3 Teaching Kant as if he is offering a theory of right action gives students the false impression that Kant’s moral theory is meant to solve moral problems in specific cases. In this paper I will argue that Kant’s moral theory in the Groundwork cannot determine what is right in cases, and it was never meant to do so.4 James Rachels, in his popular undergraduate textbook The Elements of Moral Philosophy, demarcates Kant’s ethics from ancient eudaimonistic ethical theory by saying that the former can determine right action and the latter cannot. This is a commonly held view expressed by contemporary philosophers and philosophy textbooks.5 What many contemporary philosophers mean when they say Kant’s theory can tell us what is morally right is that an intelligent person with all the relevant facts should be able to use the theory to determine what is morally right.6 I will argue, however, that we should teach that Kant’s moral theory works much like ancient eudaimonistic ethical theory, in the sense articulated by Julia Annas when she says: We [contemporary philosophers] find it natural to make a number of demands on a moral theory which ancient theories do not make. It is a common modern assumption that a moral theory should help us to decide

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork what is right for us to do, and in particular, that it should help us to resolve moral dilemmas and difficult moral cases…. Ancient theories [however] assume that the moral agent internalizes and applies the moral theory to produce the correct answers to hard cases; but the answers themselves are not part of the theory…. Modern theories [however] often see it as a demand that they be able to generate answers to hard cases…7 I will argue that Kant’s moral theory is like Annas’ ancient theory, in that the agent uses good moral judgment with an internalized moral principle (for Kant, it is necessarily internalized by every rational agent), rather than the theory, to solve moral problems. I will argue that in teaching Kant’s moral theory, there are many pedagogically useful comparisons and contrasts to make with Aristotle, whose virtue ethics is often taught alongside Kant’s ethics in many courses. I will argue that Kant, like Aristotle, never intended to give us a system for determining what is right in the Groundwork. I will, however, argue that Kant himself thought that teaching the theory in the Groundwork did have practical application, but it is not the practical application that many teach today. The practical application, also suggested by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics, is that there is what Kant calls a “natural dialectic” between theory and practice, and bad theory can corrupt practice. Kant’s moral theory, especially in the Groundwork, has a much more modest goal of simply laying some basic epistemological and metaphysical groundwork for the possibility of morality. Similarly, the Critique of Pure

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork Reason has the modest goal of laying some basic epistemological and metaphysical groundwork for the possibility of experience. The Critique of Pure Reason does not tell us how to experience (but only tells us what is presupposed in experience, such as the intuitions of space and time and the categories of causation and substance). The Groundwork does not tell us how to be moral (but only tells us what is presupposed in the existence of morality, such as autonomy, respect, and the categorical imperative). Kant’s stated purpose at the beginning of the Groundwork is to tell us the basic groundwork (epistemological and metaphysical) for the possibility of a good will. Nevertheless, I will suggest that this inability to determine right action is not a bad thing for Kant’s moral theory. I will argue that Kant’s moral theory is still worth teaching as widely as it is taught today, and still has practical relevance for a wide variety of applied ethics courses. Kant has much to say about right and wrong, and gives a powerful framework in which to deliberate about right and wrong. Kant himself, I will argue, has specific, practical pedagogical purposes for the Groundwork, but they are not to give a theory of right action. Teaching the Groundwork, I will suggest, can indeed help students become better people.8 The Four Famous Examples in the Groundwork Many philosophers teach Kant’s discussion of the four famous examples in §2 of the Groundwork—the examples of the (1) lying promise, (2) suicide for self-love, (3) not using one’s talents, and (4) not helping others—as illustrations of how to apply Kant’s moral theory using the formulations of the Categorical Imperative (CI).9 For example, if applies the Formula of Universal Law and

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork universalizes the maxim “Commit suicide for the sake of self-love” or the maxim “Never help others,” there is some sort of contradiction generated. So, according to many, there seems to be an algorithm that tests maxims by universalization. I find this way of teaching the Groundwork examples as illustrations of applied ethics unfortunate but understandable. It is unfortunate because it is misleading and can lead to bad moral theory (as discussed above). It is understandable because the way Kant develops the four examples gives the superficial appearance that he is using the CI as a sort of algorithm for determining right action in cases. However, it is my thesis that Kant is simply using generic examples to illustrate the universality of the CI, and how the CI is unconnected to inclination (i.e., what we desire or want, or what gives us happiness). I will soon illustrate this by going over Kant’s pedagogy in that section of the Groundwork. Not only does Kant not use the examples to illustrate how to determine right action, but to generate the contradictions, Kant also often sneaks in extra normative premises not explicitly in simple versions of these maxims. If the CI test was suppose to determine right action given the facts, it would not require such extra normative premises (especially since those normative premises do not follow from wither the facts or the CI itself). For example, in the suicide case Kant adds the normative premise that the intrinsic purpose of self-love is selfpreservation. Thus, the contradiction Kant derives is a contradiction with the intrinsic purpose of self-love. This extra normative premise is dubious, since it is doubtful whether the intrinsic purpose of self-love really is self-preservation.

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork After all, why not say that self-love’s intrinsic purpose is to satisfy desires, which may or may not include self-preservation in many cases? In some cases, people desire to die because life is painful, and satisfying that desire might be the purpose of self-love.10 However, Kant did not write these Groundwork examples in §2 to illustrate how to apply his moral theory. Evidence that the four famous examples in §2 of the Groundwork are not meant to be applied is that Kant says, just after giving the examples and at the end of §2, that all the arguments in §2 are analytic. For Kant (as well as for Hume before him), strictly analytic truths do not apply to the real world of synthetic truths or “facts.” For Kant, judgments of moral facts (what is the right thing to do in the real world) are synthetic a priori. The four examples are merely supposed to illustrate these analytic truths, and not to tell us how to apply the CI to the real world. There is other evidence that Kant did not mean for the four examples to be examples of how to apply the CI. At that point of Kant’s argument, he has merely shown that if there is a good will, then the determining ground of (the cause underlying) a good will necessarily cannot be inclination, but must be a universal principle that is unconnected to inclination. Kant says that the means-end principle of the hypothetical imperative can be connected to the non-universal ends in one’s inclination, but the universal principle of the CI cannot. The CI itself contains no empirical content that requires it be connected to inclination or some other contingent ends. The four examples, then, are meant to illustrate how such a universal principle is not connected to inclination. The universal form of

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork the moral law necessarily excludes inclination, and this, as Kant says, is presupposed by the very possibility of morality. An Objection: Kant’s Theory is Meant to be Applied It might be objected to my thesis that, at the end of the Groundwork in §3, Kant suggests that the CI test indeed can be applied. After all, in §3, Kant attempts to show that the analytic truths in §1-2 are synthetic a priori and thus can be applied to the real world. In the next section of this paper, I will give a reply to this objection by working more thoroughly through the four parts of Kant’s Groundwork, the preface and §1-3. Kant says that §1 is largely a common sense discussion of morality to illustrate the idea of a good will. In §2, Kant explains how the Categorical Imperative is the foundation, the “determining ground,” for a good will, in part with his discussion of the four famous examples. At the end of §2, Kant says “this section, like the first, is merely analytic.”11 This means that the four examples are illustrating mere analytic truths. It is only in §3 that Kant shows that the moral laws applies to the real work of synthetic truths. Groundwork §3 argues that morality is synthetic a priori, and that it applies to each and every rational agent in the real world. Groundwork §2, by contrast, merely illustrates what is analytically true about the concept of morality. The purpose of the whole Groundwork is merely to give the foundational conceptual and metaphysical presuppositions for the very possibility of morality as synthetic a priori (which is closely analogous to the purpose of the Critique of

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork Pure Reason as giving the presuppositions for the very possibility of experience as synthetic a priori). In §3, these analytic truths of §1-2 apply to real rational agents because each rational agent presupposes his or her own freedom in acting as an agent at all. In turn, this freedom itself presupposes that the agent has libertarian, transcendental freedom, which means that the agent is a special kind of cause acting on a special kind of causal law. The special cause must not be determined by natural causes or inclination. Kant argues that the CI itself is the only thing that can serve as a causal law that stems wholly from the rational agent without being determined by natural causes or inclination. Thus, Kant argues, the CI applies to free actions of rational agents. The objector to my previous arguments above might argue that this allows the analytic truths in §1-2 to apply to the real world. Thus, the objection might go, one can indeed apply the CI test to cases in the real world, as Kant seems to do in §1-2 for so many contemporary philosophers (despite Kant saying §1-2 are analytic). My reply to this objection is that while Kant indeed applies §1-2 in some sense in §3, it is not as an application of a theory to cases. Groundwork §3 merely shows that generically, the CI applies to real rational agents in the real world. More evidence that Kant did not mean for the four examples to be applied to specific cases is that when he does take up the question of what the practical application of the theory in Groundwork is, he does not mention anything about applying the theory to cases. In fact, in the Groundwork Kant says things that resist the application of his theory to cases, as I will argue in the next section of

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork this paper as I discuss “Common Sense Kant.” I believe teachers should teach this “Common Sense Kant” to students. “Common Sense Kant” in the Groundwork Preface and §1-2 I will reply to this objection by working through the basic structure of the argument in the Groundwork. There are three sections of the Groundwork not including the preface. First, consider the preface. The Groundwork preface says that empirical influence on our moral thinking corrupts philosophical moral theory, but Kant does not here mention moral practice.12 At the end of the preface, Kant says that the purpose of the Groundwork is to “proceed analytically from ordinary knowledge to a determination of the supreme principle and then back again from an examination of this principle and its sources to ordinary knowledge where its application is found.” After the preface, in §1, Kant explicitly says this application of the moral law is found in applying common sense, and not in applying a philosophical theory. Kant explains in §1 what a good will is according to “ordinary (nonphilosophical) knowledge of morality.”13 Here Kant explains why a good will is necessary for the possibility of morality according to common sense. At the end of §1, says he uses this ordinary, nonphilosophical knowledge to give us some basic philosophical knowledge of the good will. In §1 of the Groundwork, Kant says that common sense, and not philosophical moral theory, is the source of applying the moral law: … common human reason, with this compass in hand, knows… what is in conformity with duty or contrary to duty, if…we only…make it attentive

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork to its own [internal, autonomous] principle [and not a heteronomous, external principle of inclination]; and that there is, accordingly, no need of [theory of] science and philosophy to know what one has to do…. [W]e cannot consider without admiration how great an advantage the practical faculty of appraising has over the theoretical in common human understanding.14 [my italics] This “common sense Kant” is my focus when I teach the Groundwork. So if we use common sense and are conscientiously attentive to (and thus in dialectic with) the correct fundamental moral principle, common sense practical reasoning is the best moral compass, with theoretical, philosophical reasoning a distant second. For example, Kant says that we ought to, and thus can, substantively contribute to perpetual peace and the happiness of others.15 If we are attentive to the correct fundamental moral principle, our moral compass will eventually succeed. Over time, the attentive agent will succeed and generate a pattern of acting that belies her moral commitment. Because we ought to act from duty, we can, in practice, act from the categorical imperative. Practical reason will prevail over theory. We would not be morally responsible for our actions otherwise, since any agent is morally responsible no matter how little moral theory she knows. The way I suggest getting across this “common sense Kant” in §1 is to focus on what he takes to be his common sense examples illustrating that morality. The common sense examples are the “coldhearted benefactor” case and the “man of hopeless sorrow” case, which Kant uses to illustrate what he takes to be his common sense intuition that that satisfying inclination or desire is

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork irrelevant to moral worth. The coldhearted benefactor helps others even though he does not want to do so. The man of hopeless sorrow continues to live even though he does not want to do so. These examples show an important point for Kant as well: the point that it is possible to be motivated by something other than inclinations, desires, or wants (the building blocks of happiness). It is possible to be motivated to be a benefactor and help others without wanting to do it. It is possible to be motivated to stay alive without wanting to do it. For Kant, this is part of an argument that morality is possible, since morality is not possible if we can only act on inclination or desire. So, for Kant it is common sense that it is morally good to help others even when we do not want to, and the possibility of this motive allows for the possibility of morality itself. While Kant’s theory is practical relevant in many ways, Kant is rightly not interested in giving a theory that determines right action. Morality demands a special motive that does not come from inclination. Morality does not demand that the best moral theory be applied and determine right action as a condition for the possibility of morality. This would be a violation of the main thesis of the Critique of Pure Reason, which argues that theoretical reason (including theoretical philosophical reasoning) cannot itself know fundamental metaphysical truths. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that we can only know what is presupposed by experience for experience to exist at all. In the Groundwork, Kant argues that we can only know what is presupposed by morality for morality to exist at all.

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork Not only does morality not presuppose that we can develop a moral theory that determines right action, but also such moral theory is impossible. A theory that determines right action is impossible since it would usurp the autonomous power of pure practical reason, which alone is supposed to determine right action. Pure practical reason is only suppose to determine right action in real cases of moral action, and not in hypothetical cases of theorizing about right action (recall that “pure” here means non-empirical and a priori, and “practical” means that it is directed at action itself and not theoretical truth per se). Pure practical reason is not a form of theoretical reasoning (it is not a form of moral philosophy or moral theorizing). Moreover, pure practical reason itself it inscrutable to our theorizing capacities. Kant says that we do not know whether or not we have ever acted on the moral law, and whether pure practical reason has ever directed our action or led us to a moral conclusion. Kant believes we do not know the content of our maxims by introspection. Such introspection, Kant says, is deeply flawed. Kant believes that we can never know what maxim we actually use.16 Thus, we cannot rely on pure practical reason to guide our philosophical moral theorizing so far as to give us a complete theory of right action. We can only rely on pure practical reason to guide our moral actions. Pure practical reason may give us some limited insight into the theoretical nature of morality, but not much beyond what Kant himself says in the Groundwork. On my view, teaching “common sense Kant” gives students interesting and powerful arguments. I teach upper-level students that, for Kant, the

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork possibility of morality (a) presupposes a good will, (b) which presupposes acting from duty (and not “merely in accord with duty”), (c) which presupposes acting from the universal form of a maxim and not inclination, (d) which presupposes an agent’s maxim’s being determined by the categorical imperative. The progression of a, b, c, to d is supposed to all come from common sense, for Kant. If a teacher does not want to be quite this technical in her approach to Kant, the teacher can focus on simple common sense ideas in Kant, such as that morality requires we can do the right thing because it is right and not because we want to do it (i.e., we have an inclination to do it). If we can do the right thing because it is right, according to Kant we have a special moral motive that can trump not wanting to do it. Here Kant does not and need not argue that morality presupposes that the correct moral theory determines right action. This, after all, does not follow from this common sense, according to Kant. In contrast to teaching Kant, it is correct to teach undergraduates that utilitarians do presuppose that the correct moral theory determines what is right given the empirical facts. Utilitarians presuppose that there are facts of the matter about better and worse consequences for alternative possible actions. Utilitarian theory says that what is right is what has the best consequences among possible alternatives, so their theory better determine right action given the facts. If there just is (as a matter of fact) such a thing as an alternative whose consequences have the highest utility, then the utilitarian moral theory would indeed determine right given the facts.

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork Kant’s moral theory, however, does not presuppose that it can determine right and wrong in all cases. However, the application of Kant’s moral theory, either by considering various maxim descriptions using various formulations of the CI and various features of Kant’s theory or by considering Kantian ideal theory, can indeed help us think about right and wrong across many cases.17 I will consider the relevance of philosophical theory to moral pedagogy that Kant discusses in the Groundwork. Teaching the Application of Kant’s Groundwork However, Kant does indeed discuss the practical use of his moral theory in the Groundwork, as well as the Metaphysics of Morals, he does not use his theory to determine right and wrong in the way some contemporary applied ethicists think he does. Kant developed a theory that solves a variety of theoretical and practical problems, but his theory is not meant to solve the problems of determining right and wrong in cases. So even though Kantian theory cannot be a determinate guide to right action, this need not be a problem for Kantian moral theory.18 Kant, for example, argued that morality presupposes that, in practice, an agent with “common human understanding” typically has a “good idea” of what is right. Kant says that this moral knowledge does not come from instruction in philosophical theory. In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant says: The most common understanding can distinguish without instruction what form in a maxim makes it fit for a giving of universal law …19

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork …even the most common eye cannot fail to distinguish whether something belongs to [morality]… What is to be done in accordance with the principle of the autonomy… is seen quite easily and without hesitation by the most common understanding…20 [my italics] In the Groundwork, Kant praises the practical power of common human understanding when he says: But in practical matters, it is just when common understanding excludes all sensible incentives from practical laws that its faculty of appraising first begins to show itself to advantage…. In… determin[ing] the worth of actions… it can even have as good a hope of hitting the mark as any [theoretical] philosopher can promise himself; indeed, it is almost more sure in the matter, because a [theoretical] philosopher… can easily confuse his judgment by a mass of considerations foreign and irrelevant…21 Common understanding’s faculty of appraising (or faculty of judging) the moral worth of actions has the best ability to “hit the mark.” Common human understanding, unlike the theorizing of philosophers, tends to get the universal form of maxims right. One might object here that what common human understanding gets right is how to pick out the particular instance of the universal moral law rather than the universal moral law itself (e.g., common sense picks out a particular instance of lying rather than picking out the universal that lying is wrong). However, in this preceding quote, Kant is asking why we need to present a theoretical

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork “foundation of morals,” which Kant presents in the Groundwork, in addition to a more practically oriented “system of morals,” which Kant presents in the Doctrine of Right and doctrine of virtue in his Metaphysics of Morals.22 In this quote and the preceding quote from the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant is not saying that common human understanding is better at judging particulars as instances of universals, since he says common human understanding is better than philosophers at avoiding mistakes about universals. What common human understanding gets right is the universal form of the maxim, rather than the right particular as an instance of the universal.23 In the next paragraph in the Groundwork, Kant suggests that a theory of the foundations of morals is practically important since (1) philosophy often gets the theory wrong and (2) theory stands in a natural dialectic with our practical reasoning, whose “innocence” is “easily seduced.” Kant does not take anything back or qualify his statements about how much better common human reason is in its fortunate simplicity than philosophical theory in "hitting the mark" and getting correct our judgments about moral right. Kant’s “Natural Dialectic” between Theory and Practice Kant does say is that philosophical theory is not useless despite its inferior status, because having a false theory can seduce one into following it in practice. So getting the theory correct has practical importance, because of the natural dialectic that occurs between our practical reasoning and a theory we strongly hold as a result of speculative reasoning, but the correct theory need not tell me what the right thing to do is. Common human reason in the context of practice is

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork still much better at that. Kant says that we mainly need a theory that does not say false things like “Morality is the pursuit of happiness.” We need moral theory, which is in the natural dialectic with moral practice, to not recommend impure principles through which inclinations become the determining ground of the will. A profoundly indeterminate foundational theory that cannot tell us what action is right when conjoined with the empirical facts is nevertheless acceptable. Kant says that the good moral theory must get the nature of the moral law correct: it must be pure (a priori) and strict, not under the influence of inclination. Kant goes on to say: In this way common human reason is impelled, not by some need for of [theoretical] speculation (which never touches it as long as it is content to be mere sound reason), but on practical grounds themselves, to go out of its sphere and to take a step into the field of practical [theoretical] philosophy... 24 For Kant, we do not need a foundational theory for moral practice unless the moral theory goes wrong about the nature of the ultimate moral principle. We only then need a moral theory that is a priori; we do not even then need a moral theory that tells us what is right. With that, Kant moves to the next section, which discusses the distinctions of the Hypothetical vs. Categorical Imperative and heteronomy vs. autonomy. For Kant, the “commonest intelligence” can best discern the subtleties of maxim formation in the non-theoretical, practical context of action. I find it useful to teach that Kant’s agent with common human understanding is an

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork egalitarian version of Aristotle’s phronimos (the person with good moral judgment of cases, who is a rare expert in Aristotle’s ethical theory).25 Like Aristotle, Kant believes ethics presupposes a “phronimos,” or an agent with good practical judgment about universal moral principles.26 Unlike Aristotle, however, Kant believes that all rational agent’s are phronimoi, since for Kant morality would not apply to normal rational agents if they did not know right and wrong. Kant believes that a high level of moral knowledge is required for moral responsibility, and all moral agents are morally responsible for what they do. Students find the contrast with Aristotle useful here. Aristotle is not so concerned with this idea of “moral responsibility,” but rather is concerned with “virtue and vice.” An ignorant person who does not know right and wrong can be vicious according to Aristotle, but would lack moral responsibility for Kant. For Kant, however, ought implies can. Thus, Kant believes that since we cannot act morally without knowing what the right thing to do is, we must know what the right thing to do is to be a moral agent. Kant uses the “ought implies can” idea very differently from how it is usually used today. Today, “ought imples can” principles are used to restrict what we are morally obliged to do (the “ought”) to what we pre-theoretically know we can do (the “can”). So, “ought implies can” is often used today in a modus tollens argument of the form 1. If I morally obligated to help my mother, then I can help my mother. 2. I cannot help my mother (I am locked in my room and cannot get out). 3. Therefore, I am not morally obligated to help my mother.

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork Kant, however, usually uses the “ought implies can” premise in a modus ponens argument, in that we first pre-theoretically (by common sense) know what we ought to do, and then learn that we can do it (e.g., because of common human understanding we know we are morally obligated, and thus we also know that we can act as transcendentally free).27 Kant believes that such good moral judgment (common sense) tells us what we are able to do. Such good moral judgment comes not from moral theory but from “pure practical reason,” which is an egalitarian version of Aristotle’s phronesis (practical wisdom). Aristotle believes that only a few, fully virtuous agents have phronesis, or good moral judgment.28 Kant believes that all rational agents have good moral judgment. Kant believes that because morality applies to all moral agents, all moral agents have the phronesis (good moral judgment) to know what is right and wrong in cases. Kant points out that a Kantian moral theory is not practically useless, despite not having the practical import some applied ethicists think it has. In the Groundwork, Kant asks why we need a theoretical foundation for morals when practical reason is so accurate in its “fortunate simplicity.”29 Kant answers that a good theory is practically important since a bad theory can stand in a “natural dialectic” with our practical reasoning, whose “innocence” is “easily seduced.” Practical reasoning is not corrupted, however, in a dialectic with a correct moral theory that understands that it cannot determine right action. On the other hand, a dialectic with an incorrect moral theory that recommend impure principles that

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork are “foreign and irrelevant” may encourage inclination to be the determining ground of the will.30 Kant’s view seems to be intuitively plausible, since there is some evidence that people “under the grips of a bad theory” act in bad ways.31 For example, students who are under the grips of the moral theories of egoism or relativism (e.g., due to the students’ thinking that maxims can be manipulated to justify anything on Kant’s moral theory) can live badly as a result of holding such bad moral theory. Such confused students might start ignoring basic moral obligations to be good roommates, for example. Kant is making the modest claim that using accurate moral theory and accurate philosophical distinctions (such as the duty/inclination distinction) is practically useful for moral life. Kant’s natural dialectic between theory and practice, of course, goes both ways: good moral practice will also help one do good moral theory. This dialectical nature of theory and practice is a point also stressed by Aristotle in Book X.9 of the Nicomachean Ethics. Here Aristotle says that physicians refine medical theory as they practice, and physicians improve medical practice as they learn medical theory better. Familiarity with the particulars of a universal help one understand the insights of the universals, and learning the universals helps one find deeper salience in the particulars of moral experience. Aristotle then says that something similar holds of the best politicians, who become better as politicians both from experience of particulars and also from learning the universals of political science.32

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork For Kant, the existence of morality presupposes people already know right from wrong, and philosophy can add little or nothing to this knowledge we already must have. Kant sees himself as simply articulating a moral law that we already must know in order to be moral agents. Since we are already moral agents, we must already know the moral law. We must be able to use the moral law easily use at any time to be under moral obligations, since “ought implies can” (in the modus ponens sense). In the Groundwork, Kant suggests that knowing moral right from wrong is simple; what is difficult is getting the philosophical foundations of morality right. Thus, Kant's Groundwork does not give a moral principle that tells what to do (this is better done with common human understanding). At any time, we can follow the moral law already within us, so long as foreign and irrelevant considerations do not confuse moral judgment by introducing inclinations into the dialectic of theory and practice. Pedagogical Technique: Comparing Morals to Language So, Kant's purpose for writing the Groundwork is not to tell us right and wrong, but to protect moral judgment from the influence of bad moral theory. I will now consider a useful analogy for teaching Kant’s dialectic of theory and practice in the Groundwork. The analogy is between language and morals.33 It is helpful for students of Kant’s Groundwork to compare native language use to common moral judgment, and linguistic theory to moral theory. We do not need moral theory or linguistic theory to tell us right and wrong in their respective domains. We can use language and judge moral cases with common sense. We can judge properly without a theory in both the case of language use and of

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork morals. However, a bad postmodern linguistic theory about the ultimate nature of grammar, for example, can corrupt language use. Similarly, a bad, empirical moral theory about the ultimate nature of morality can corrupt moral judgment. The main practical purpose of the Groundwork is to give a good moral theory that will leave the perfectly good “moral common sense” that we already have uncorrupted. However, the use of this “language-morals” analogy should by employed with a caveat. I believe that language use can improve dramatically with the study of the structure and grammar of language. I believe, for example, that it can aid in language use if one knows how to diagram sentences, and distinguish subject from verb from predicate from predicate object from indirect object from direct object. If one knows these grammatical structures of language, one can use this knowledge to makes one’s writing more precise and clear. On the other hand, according to Kant, knowing the Groundwork only helps one be morally better if one already has been or will be corrupted by a bad moral theory that introduces empirical elements into one’s ethical reasoning. If one has not been or will not be so corrupted, one does not need Kant’s Groundwork at all for any practical purposes. Common sense will tell you what is right, since pure practical reason just is common moral sense. Applying Kant’s General Principle of Autonomy: Medical Ethics It is also of note that the generic principles discussed in Kant’s Groundwork are also practically useful. I agree with Onora O’Neill on the practical usefulness of these generic moral principles.34 O’Neill suggests that

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork Kant’s indeterminate moral principles are neither rigid and clear but false (like “Never lie”) nor vague and useless (like “Only lie to people who do not deserve the truth”). Kant’s moral theory is still worth teaching for its practical relevance for a wide variety of applied ethics courses. For example, Kant’s moral principle of autonomy transformed the mid-tolate 20th Century teaching of medical ethics in both undergraduate and graduate schools. In the first half of the 20th Century, physician ethics was focused on the judgment and expertise of the individual physician, which was often paternalistic. Doctors thought of ethical relationship between doctor and patient was like the ethical relationship between parent and child. The ethical parent, it was thought, cared for the child even though the child lacked understanding of the world, and similarly the physician cared for the patient, even though the patient lacked understanding of the complex medical issues. This paternalistic moral theory is a straightforwardly bad moral theory from Kant’s point of view. Holding such bad moral theory led to very bad moral practice, just as Kant predicts. Some of the worse cases of paternalism in medical practice in the United States ranged from lying to patients about cancer diagnoses to forced sterilization of women who were thought to be too poor and ignorant to raise a child.35 In the second half of the 20th Century in the U.S. and elsewhere, there was a significant paradigm shift from the paradigm of “paternalism” to the paradigm of “informed consent.” The moral importance of informed consent is due to the significant influence of the teaching of Kant’s moral theory.36

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork Thus, it is clear that teaching Kant’s moral philosophy, which is done most often through the teaching of the Groundwork, can have significant practical importance in the real world. But the importance Kant’s moral theory has actually had does not come from applying formulations of the categorical imperative to specific maxims. Rather, the importance of Kant’s moral theory, in the example of paternalism in medical ethics, comes from realizing that bad moral theory was corrupting moral practice. When these physicians first began thinking in terms of patient autonomy, they did not need to form maxims and universalize them to determine that their paternalistic practices were morally wrong. The physicians needed to realize that the moral theory of paternalism was false, and to internalize (in Annas’ sense) a better moral principle in which patient autonomy was of great moral importance. Conclusion Kant has much to say about right and wrong, and gives a powerful framework in which to deliberate about right and wrong. Kant himself has specific, practical pedagogical purposes for the Groundwork, but they are not to give a theory of right action. Teaching Kant’s Groundwork as if it gives us a theory of right action undermines Kant’s pedagogical purpose for writing the Groundwork, and can lead to students manipulating maxims to get the result they want. This can lead students to think that philosophy justifies quintessentially bad moral theories (from Kant’s point of view), such as egoism or relativism. However, according to Kant, reading the Groundwork will indeed help us become better people by focusing our minds on the power of common sense or

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork “common human understanding,” which eschews impure, empirical influences on moral deliberation (such as those of inclination, desire, and happiness) and is rooted in a principle of autonomy. Kant's Groundwork is largely meant to tell us how it is possible for us to already know right and wrong without any theory at all. What makes it possible that we already know what is right is that the CI is already in every rational agent’s common human understanding. Since we are morally obligated to act on the CI, then we always can accurately act on the CI can and thus overcome all contrary inclinations. Kant, I have argued, believes that moral judgments do not come from moral theory but from “pure practical reason,” which is much like a more egalitarian version of Aristotle’s phronesis (practical wisdom). For Aristotle, only a few, fully virtuous agents have phronesis, or good moral judgment. Kant, on the other hand, is more egalitarian about moral judgment, since he believes that because morality applies to all moral agents, all moral agents have the phronesis (good moral judgment) to know what is right and wrong. Kant’s moral theory is like Annas’ ancient theory, in that the agent uses good moral judgment with moral principle that is necessarily internal to every rational agent, rather than the theory, to solve moral problems. While Kant’s Groundwork is not meant to be applied to cases, as it is often taught to do, it nevertheless gives us general principles that can be practical in revolutionary ways (as it was when it transformed 20th Century medical education and practice from paternalism to patient autonomy). I have also suggested some pedagogical techniques to get across this practical importance,

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork including the (very qualified) use of the language-moral analogy. It can be stressed to the undergraduates that applying Kant’s formulations to cases is just what Kant does not want us to do, precisely because it makes moral theory look so silly (e.g., it makes Kant’s moral theory seem to justify anything if we manipulate our maxims, or prevent us from walking on lawns). The Groundwork can, as Kant insists, have the practical importance of protecting common human understanding from the impure (empirical, non a priori) influences of bad moral theory. There is a “natural dialectic,” as both Kant and Aristotle suggest, between moral practice and moral theory. Good moral theory can clarify moral practice, and good moral practice can lead us toward the best interpretation of the right theory.

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork Notes 1

The popularity of teaching Kant’s theory of autonomy to undergraduates is expressed in a recent

volume of Teaching Philosophy. See Kevin S. Decker’s “Teaching Autonomy and Emergence through Pop Culture: Kant, Dewey, and Captain Picard,” Teaching Philosophy, vol. 32, no. 4, pages 331 - 343, 2009. 2

I originally read Kant’s Groundwork in my freshman Introduction to Philosophy course, and read

it a second time in my junior year Ethics course. I recall thinking that the Groundwork was supposed to contain a special system for determining right and wrong. I wanted to have that power to know what the right thing to do is. 3

The main thesis of my paper dovetails with a recent criticism in Teaching Philosophy which

argues that ethics education by philosophers today makes the mistake of suggesting that philosophical theorizing will help one become morally better. See J. Carl Ficarrotta’s “How to Teach a Bad Ethics Course,” Teaching Philosophy vol. 32, no. 1, pages 53 - 68, 2009. In this paper, however, I will argue that Kant says that his theory in the Groundwork can benefit us in moral practice by showing us the irrelevance of empirical facts, inclinations, and our own happiness to the pursuit of morality. 4

Frankena suggests that Kant’s deontological theory can tell us what is morally right when he says

“Given… [Kant’s] deontic principles, plus the necessary clarity of thought and factual knowledge, we can know what we morally ought to do or not do.” Frankena (2002) p. 352-353. Frankena says that deontic principles such as a Kant’s Categorical Imperative (plus the necessary clarity of thought and factual knowledge) can determine right. However, I disagree with Frankena. Kant’s moral theory cannot determine right and wrong in a wide variety of cases, even given all the empirical facts. Kant never meant it to do so. Of course, if by “the necessary clarity of thought” Frankena means something like phronesis, then Aristotelian ethical theory can determine what we ought to do as well (I will discuss this in Chapter 4). However, Frankena explicitly says that he is excluding Aristotelian ethics and its phronesis from the clarity of thought that can determine right. In this section of his paper, Frankena is contrasting deontic principles with those of Aristotelian

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork

theory, saying the former can determine right but the latter cannot. I will argue, however, that both kant and Aristotle agree that an uncodifiable phronesis is essential to moral judgment of cases at the level of both universals and particulars. 5

These examples are prima facie evidence for the popularity of the view of right action in

teaching Kant’s ethics in undergraduate philosophy texts and courses. See Rachels’ The Elements of Moral Philosophy Chapter 13 section 1, entitled “The Ethics of Virtue and the Ethics of Right Action.” Also see Robert Johnson’s 2003 “Virtue and Right,” which is in another popular Introduction to Ethics reader called Conduct and Character: Readings in Moral Theory. (Mark Timmons. ed., Wadsworth, 2005). Also see Mark Timmons book Moral Theory: An Introduction, which gives a similar account of applying Kant’s moral theory. 6

See Timmons, Mark. Moral Theory, An Introduction. (New York: Rowman and Littlefield.

2003), 14, and Frankena, William. “A Critique of Virtue-Based Ethics.” In Louis Pojman, ed., Ethical Theory: Classic and Contemporary Readings. 4th ed. (Belmont: Wadsworth 2002). Korsgaard, Christine, Creating the Kingdom of Ends. (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), and Johnson, Robert. “Virtue and Right.” Ethics 113.4 (2003), 810-834. 7

Annas, Julia. The Morality of Happiness. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 6-7.

8

Contrast Kant’s thesis on the practical importance of his theory with J. Carl Ficarrotta’s “How to

Teach a Bad Ethics Course,” Teaching Philosophy vol. 32, no. 1, pages 53 - 68, 2009. Ficarrotta claims, with Aristotle, that teaching facts to undergraduates does not itself develop moral character. Kant believes, to the contrary, that learning certain facts themselves transforms character. The most important of such facts, according to Kant, is the fact that acting on inclination is irrelevant to morality. Thus, merely learning in theory that the eudaemonists are wrong, and happiness is irrelevant to morality, has important practical consequences for one’s character development, according to Kant. 9

See Frankena’s quote above for an example of this view. In my opinion, one of the most

sophisticated ways of applying Kant in this inappropriate way is done in Christine Korsgaard’s article “The Right to Lie: Kant on dealing with Evil” in Korsgaard (1996). There are many

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork

problems with Korsgaard’s account of applying Kant’s universalization test as practical contradiction. As Alexander R. Pruss notes in his article “Lying, Deception and Kant,” …as Korsgaard explicitly notes, forbid lying to murderers who make no secret of their intentions. Yet, surely, the person whose intuitions say that lying is acceptable to save a life will insist that if one has Jews hidden in one’s house, then it is acceptable to lie to the Gestapo when they ask whether there are any Jews in the house, even though the Gestapo knows that everybody knows their murderous intentions. 10

Consider another example of an “extra premise.” In order to generate the contradiction in the

“not helping others” maxim, Kant adds the empirical premise that we finite humans need and want help to achieve our ends. Thus, if we universalize not helping others, then we ourselves are not going to be able to achieve the ends to which we are committed and also require the help of others. Of course, it is perfectly possible, as in the ancient myths about Cyclopes, that there is a species of rational agents who need no help from others. So, it is not so obvious that Kant thought universalizing maxims per se could generate contradictions for all rational beings, since some rational beings may not need help to achieve their ends. After all, a Cyclops might be perfectly consistent in willing a universalized maxims about not helping, since he or she is not rationally committed to ever being helped. Kant often brings in additional premises about human ends (the end of self-love, or the end of beings who contingently need help). 11

Kant’s Groundwork 4:445. All quotes from the Groundwork are from the Grounding for the

Metaphysics of Morals, tr. James Wesley Ellington, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981. All citations are use the German “Academy Edition” page numbers, which are found in the margins of most every translation of the Groundwork. 12

Groundwork 4:380. All quotes from the Groundwork are from the Grounding for the

Metaphysics of Morals, tr. James Wesley Ellington, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981. All citations are use the German “Academy Edition” page numbers, which are found in the margins of most every translation of the Groundwork. 13

Groundwork 4:392.

14

Groundwork 4:404.

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork

15

See the doctrine of virtue in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals.

16

Groundwork 4:406.

17

For example, Tom Hill presented a paper at the 2006 Central APA that discussed how Kant’s

theory can justify torture of the innocent in some very limited, extreme cases. 18

Kant did not believe that there was much of a problem of knowing what the moral thing to do is.

Kant was more worried about the empirical impurity of some moral theories. He was concerned with articulating the supreme principle of morality, and showing how the restraints of morality are consistent with freedom. He was not so concerned, as contemporary moral philosophers are, with knowing what the right thing to do is. Kant had not, as we have, lost confidence in the common human ability to find out what is right and wrong. 19

Critique of Practical Reason 5:28.

20

Critique of Practical Reason 5:36-7.

21

Groundwork 4:404. For Kant, we do not need a foundational theory for moral practice unless

the moral theory goes wrong about the nature of the ultimate moral principle. With that, Kant moves to the next section, which discusses the distinctions of the Hypothetical vs. Categorical Imperative and heteronomy vs. autonomy. 22

See Groundwork 4:443 where Kant contrasts a “system” with a “foundation” of morals

23

This interpretation of common human understanding is also suggested by Jens Timmermann in

his Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary, Cambridge University Press, 2007. 24

Groundwork 4:404

25

The phronimos has good moral judgment in both adjudicating among principles (e.g., has good

subjective practical judgment) and applying them to particular actions (e.g., has good empirical judgment). Kant believes that morality’s applying to all rational beings presupposes that all rational beings have such a reliable form of moral judgment. The moral law a priori applies to all rational agents, and because “ought implies can,” rational agents must necessarily know (generally but fallibly) how to apply the moral law.

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork

26

For Aristotle, the phronimos, or agent with complete practical wisdom, is the ultimate moral

standard at which we all ought to aim. Our ethical life is a life of moral development toward the phronimos’ completeness of virtue. Kant’s ultimate moral standard, however, is the categorical imperative. Aristotle’s standard is only achieved slowly over time, whereas Kant’s standard can be achieved at any time. For Kant, all rational agents with common human understanding are phronimoi, whereas for Aristotle only a few are. So the nature of the phronesis and the role it plays in their respective ethical accounts are quite different. 27

See Robert Stern’s “Does 'Ought' Imply 'Can'? And Did Kant Think It Does?” Utilitas 16

(2004): 42–61. 28

Robert Johnson argues against Aristotle’s perfectionism on who has good moral judgment, and

believes that Kant’s more egalitarian view is an advantage for Kant. Johnson’s article on this issue is reprinted in a general anthology that is taught in university courses on ethics. See Johnson, Robert. (2003). “Virtue and Right.” Ethics 113.4, pp. 810-834, which is also reprinted in the anthology Conduct and Character: Readings in Moral Theory. Mark Timmons. ed., Wadsworth, 2005. 29

See Groundwork 4:404. Also see 4:443 where he contrasts a “system” with a “foundation” of

morals. 30

See also Kant’s Groundwork 4:404, where Kant talks about how a bad moral theory can confuse

practical judgment. 31

Ayn Rand and Pol Pot come to mind for “being under the grips of a theory.” Ayn Rand, for

example, was under the grips of a strange form of ethical egoism and thus engaged openly in adulterous affairs due to her being convinced by the truth of her theory (not to mention other strange behaviors). This lead to Rand losing her some of her closest friends. For a discussion of Rand acting on her theory to disastrous results, see Barbara Branden’s The Passion of Ayn Rand. Being “under the grips of a theory” has lead to strange behaviors in many intellectuals (and nonintellectuals). Pol Pot, for example, is said to have been under the grips of a bad Rousseauian theory (learned at university in Paris, France) of the goodness of the “noble savage” who is untouched by technology. This led Pol Pot, it is said, to genocide against people immersed in

Moral Theory, Pedagogy, and Kant’s Groundwork

modernity and technology. For a discussion of Pol Pot, see Jonathan Glover’s Humanity: A Moral History of the 20th Century. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2000. 32

See Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 1080b7-1181b13.

33

This analogy of language to morals is suggested on page xv by Jens Timmermann in his Kant's

Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary, Cambridge University Press, 2007. In this section of the paper, however, I will disagree to some extent with Timmermann’s use of this analogy, since I believe there is a glaring disanalogy that he does not consider. 34

O’Neill says: The most common and general criticisms are that, because it concentrates on principles or rules, Kantian ethics is doomed to be either empty and formalistic or rigidly uniform in its prescriptions (the complaints cannot both be true). The charge of empty formalism is based on the correct observation that principles underdetermine action; it is usually countered with the equally correct observation that quite indeterminate principles (such as ‘Stay within the budget’ or ‘All religions are to be tolerated’) may set significant constraints on action, so are not empty. The charge of rigidly uniform prescriptivity is based on the thought that rules prescribe, so must regiment. It is usually countered by the reminder that since rules can be indeterminate, they need not regiment: universal principles need not be uniformly prescriptive. An ethical theory that applies to principles can be more than empty and less than rigid.

O'Neill, Onora. “Kantian Ethics.” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. E. Craig, ed. (London: Routledge, 1998). 35

For a discussion of such cases of paternalism, see Heta Häyry’s The Limits of Medical

Paternalism, London: Routledge, 1991. 36

See Beauchamp, Tom L. and James F. Childress. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 2nd edition.

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1983). Rosalind Hursthouse also makes this suggestion in an unpublished piece given at the 2005 University of Cincinnati conference “Virtue Ethics vs. Kantian Ethics” in her paper “What Does the Aristotelian Phronimos Know?”