Implementation with Near-Complete Information Kim-Sau Chung; Jeffrey C. Ely Econometrica, Vol. 71, No. 3. (May, 2003), pp. 857-871. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28200305%2971%3A3%3C857%3AIWNI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-O Econometrica is currently published by The Econometric Society.

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Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange Szilvia Pápai Econometrica, Vol. 68, No. 6. (Nov., 2000), pp. 1403-1433. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28200011%2968%3A6%3C1403%3ASABHE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B

References Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms Matthew O. Jackson The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 59, No. 4. (Oct., 1992), pp. 757-775. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28199210%2959%3A4%3C757%3AIIUSAL%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P

A Characterization of Game-Theoretic Solutions which Lead to Impossibility Theorems Matthew O. Jackson; Sanjay Srivastava The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 63, No. 1. (Jan., 1996), pp. 23-38. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28199601%2963%3A1%3C23%3AACOGSW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P

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The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information Atsushi Kajii; Stephen Morris Econometrica, Vol. 65, No. 6. (Nov., 1997), pp. 1283-1309. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199711%2965%3A6%3C1283%3ATROETI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8

Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies Thomas R. Palfrey; Sanjay Srivastava Econometrica, Vol. 59, No. 2. (Mar., 1991), pp. 479-501. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28199103%2959%3A2%3C479%3ANIUUS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-5

Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange Szilvia Pápai Econometrica, Vol. 68, No. 6. (Nov., 2000), pp. 1403-1433. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28200011%2968%3A6%3C1403%3ASABHE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B

NOTE: The reference numbering from the original has been maintained in this citation list.