CH A P T E R

N I N E

India: A Major Power in the Making R aj e s h Ba s ru r

Editors’ note: This chapter on India highlights the difficulties encountered by a strong, and status-consistent regional power, to move beyond the regional club and onto recognition as a global power, despite (a) its own desire to do so in principle; (b) the willingness of the only superpower to assist it in becoming one; and (c) continued and substantial growth in its own capabilities. Part of the problem appears to be the range of unresolved issues retarding stability in its own regional order; the lack of strong and clear domestic political demands for pursuing the path for global status; and continued domestic weaknesses, including substantial poverty and inequality, and inefficiencies in its political regime. India is a major power in the making. In this chapter, I assess India’s power and status at the regional and global levels. I argue that it has the capabilities of and is accorded the status of a limited hegemon at the regional (South Asian) level. The nature of this limited hegemony has changed since the 1990s, from a relatively aggressive to a relatively benign role in the region, which has brought it growing but still incomplete acceptance from within the region. This has been facilitated by its rising profile at the global level, where it is increasingly recognized as a significant player by the sole superpower, the United States—an attribution that lowers India’s costs as a power at both the regional and global levels. On the latter plane, India has exhibited a relatively limited capacity and willingness to inf luence developments via traditional modes of power politics, but has been active in reshaping the politics of military and nonmilitary regime formation and development. In terms of both capabilities and status attribution,

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it is status-consistent as a major regional power and as a global power in the making. It has limited autonomous capabilities at the global level and is not in the near term expected—either by itself or by others—to play a major role in shaping the world except in conjunction with other powers in the restricted arena of international regimes. As such, it is neither likely to generate significant tensions within the system nor to play the role of a major stabilizer should systemic tensions appear. Barring severe shocks, it is likely to grow into major power status over time. In the first part of this chapter, I attempt to come to grips with how power and status attribution are understood in international relations. Thereafter, I examine India as a regional power. Finally, I shift the frame of reference to assess India’s power at the global level. The analysis at the regional and global levels revolves around India’s military and economic capabilities, its willingness to use these capabilities, its role in shaping the regional and global orders, the extent to which other powers bestow recognition to its role as a power, and its actual efforts to shape the international order in the two settings. Its regional and global strategies are closely related, each aimed at enhancing its position in the other sphere. In an implicit acknowledgement of its limitations, it bandwagons with the United States in regional and global strategic politics and collaborates with China in global nonstrategic regime politics.

Power and Attribution Measuring power is difficult; assessing its impact harder still.1 It has been a traditional practice among scholars of international relations to estimate a state’s power by looking at its attributes relative to those of others. The standard components of military power are military hardware and spending, while the distribution of economic power is usually assessed with reference to gross domestic product, indebtedness, and other economic indicators. Classical realists, who emphasized the vital importance of power in determining the course of interstate politics, also acknowledged the importance of nonquantifiable factors such as leadership, morale, the quality of diplomacy, and political, economic, and social stability (Morgenthau 1973: 112–119). However, periodic efforts to rank states by adding some measure of qualitative characteristics have not yielded more than a loose and general expectation about a state’s power in terms of its capacity to inf luence the behavior of others.2 It is more useful to observe how states behave—as powers themselves or in response to other powers—to gauge status attribution. Throughout this chapter, I use both hard military and economic indicators as well as the strategic responses of other states to judge India’s status as a regional and as a major power.

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How does one pinpoint the attribution of status? One way is to look at membership in status groups—a state is a major power if it is accorded membership in the club of major powers. But that is not always the most useful method. Chapter 2 claims that in the global system today, the United States may be the only member of the great power “club.” Even if it acts in consultation with other aspiring powers, this does not necessarily mean it is according them equal or approximate status. Similarly, in South Asia, India’s power far exceeds that of any other state. A state can be said to be a major power if other major powers respond to it as if it is one. This by no means presumes they must put out a welcome sign. Some states may indeed do so, by seeking alliances or by inviting a potential major power into a coalition. Other states may act in a hostile or defensive way by balancing against it, distancing themselves from it, or by adopting a threatening stance. Strong power–weak power relationships generally exhibit a typical pattern within an international system (Mandelbaum 1988).3 First, strong states tend to extend their control within a system in order to maximize their security; weak states tend to resist it, though they submit if they are unable to resist. Second, strong states insist on negotiating disputes with weak states bilaterally; weak states try to involve others through alliances or through multilateral organizations. Third, strong states try to draw weak states closer in order to exercise more inf luence over them; weak states are inclined toward distancing or building barriers, notably to restrict trade and investment. The international politics of South Asia clearly reveals these patterns, though there are significant exceptions. Before moving forward, two clarifications are needed. First, about the nature of power and its role in the shaping of the international order: to the extent that there is interdependence between and among states, power has limited utility (Keohane and Nye 1978). In economic relationships, states interlocked in the global economy are unlikely to view the prospect of a system breakdown as palatable. This is true of economies that are highly developed, and is increasingly true of those classified as “emerging markets,” of which India—increasingly integrated into the global economy—is one. In military-strategic relationships, owing to the rising cost associated with it, war is said to be on the decline (Väyrynen 2005). This may be due in part to the economic interdependence of so many of the big players. But there is also a state of strategic interdependence between nuclear-armed states who cannot afford the extraordinarily high costs of nuclear conf lict. Power can be used rather more freely when the interdependence wrought by economic integration or by nuclear weapons does not exist. Since the majority of states possess neither developed economies nor nuclear weapons, there is quite a bit of room for conf lict. In this context, I will demonstrate that India is increasingly inclined to

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limit its use of power as a traditional resource in strategic politics at both the regional and global levels. Second, to the extent that power is not an easily usable commodity in international politics, states collaborate in constructing regimes in order to regulate issues critical to their survival and well-being (Krasner 1983). Here, power may be a relevant factor, but it hardly works in the same way. Power among interdependent entities has two facets. Negative power involves the ability to resist a particular set of rules and processes sought to be established; positive power involves the ability to actively shape regimes through processes of generating ideas, persuasion, and bargaining. In regime building, India exhibits greater readiness to use its capability than it does in traditional strategic relationships, but thus far it has exercised only negative power in resisting the construction of regimes it sees as inimical to its interests. Until it shows the capacity to wield traditional power in bilateral relations or positive power in the politics of regimes, it will remain, at best, a state aspiring to become a major power.

India as a Regional Power As a starting point, it is useful to draw a broad picture of the distribution of power in South Asia. Table 9.1 gives us a quick glimpse of the enormous disparity between India and the remaining states of South Asia in physical size, population, and economic strength. In the last case, I use both well-known ways to measure India’s relative power: gross domestic product (GDP) and GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. Both reveal India’s predominant position: it constitutes a very high percentage of the region’s total on every count. Table 9.2, similarly, shows a huge gap between India’s military spending and forces and those of its neighbors, with India at least double that of all the rest combined in every category. Yet, Tables 9.1 and 9.2 do not provide a very accurate story. Despite its apparent dominance, India’s position in South Asia is best viewed as a limited hegemony. It has been able to inf luence developments substantially in some but not all of its neighbours. Its military power, though much greater than that of others in conventional terms, has been effectively stymied by Pakistan’s nuclear capability. Moreover, its economic inf luence has been restricted to three of them—Bhutan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. With respect to Pakistan, its strongest neighbor, ever since the 1950s India has consistently sought to enhance its power by augmenting its military hardware and, where possible, using it. In 1971, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi took advantage of an internal crisis in Pakistan to intervene militarily and facilitate the birth of Bangladesh as a separate state. Pakistan, as the weaker of two countries, has resisted Indian preponderance and sought

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Table 9.1 South Asia’s Nonmilitary Power Indicators, 2000 and 2008 Country

Surface Area (000 sq. km)

Population, (thousands, 2008)

GDP (US$m, 2008)

GDP, PPP (US$m, 2008)

144 47 3,288 0.3 147 796 66 73

160,000 687 1,139,965 310 28,582 166,037 20,156 75.2

79.0 1,359 1,217,490 1,260 12,615 168,276 40,714 84.44

213,504 3,266 3,388,473 1,709 31,791 439,036 91,921 81.26

Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka India’s % of Total

Sources: 1. For surface area: World Bank. 2000. World Development Report, 1999/2000. Washington, DC: World Bank. 2. World Bank. Data and Statistics. [Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/ Resources/POP.pdf (for population), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/ GDP.pdf (for GDP), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GDP_PPP.pdf (for GDP,PPP); all accessed January 21, 2009.]

Table 9.2

South Asia’s Military Balance, 2008

Country

Military Spending (US$m, 2007)

Armed Forces (Active)

Main Battle Tanks

26,513 4,530 998 975 167 79.90

1,281,000 617,000 157,053 150,000 69,000 56.31

4,065 2,461 232 62 — 59.60

India Pakistan Bangladesh Sri Lanka Nepal India’s Total as % of Grand Total

Submarines

16 8 — — — 66.67

Principal Naval Surface Combatants 47 6 5 — — 81.03

Combat Aircraft (including naval) 632 396 75 22 — 56.18

Note: NB: Figures for Bhutan and Maldives not available. Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2009. The Military Balance, 2009. Abingdon: Routledge.

to balance Indian power by means of alliances with the United States and China. In the 1950s, it became a member of the US alliance system by joining the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Its critical role in assisting the United States to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the 1980s brought it substantial military and economic aid. At present, it continues to obtain large-scale aid of both kinds in its role as a frontline state in the American “war on terrorism” in Afghanistan and on its own territory. Such aid has

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tended to undermine Indian preponderance, and India has responded by obtaining arms from outside as well—primarily from the Soviet Union during the Cold War period, but from very diverse sources in the present era. Pakistan has also leaned on China for political as well as military support and the two see themselves as “all-weather friends.” But China, while plying Pakistan with military hardware, has not intervened on its behalf, notably in 1971. India’s success in breaking up Pakistan caused the latter to pursue and eventually obtain nuclear weapons with substantial assistance from China.4 This has given it a measure of confidence and India has, for all its threats to punish Pakistan militarily for pushing terrorists into its territory, implicitly acknowledged Pakistan’s capacity to deter it. Yet, there is periodic evidence of a continuing small power mind-set in Pakistan as its officials regularly harp on India’s hegemonic intentions—a fear greatly aggravated by India’s growing closeness to the United States.5 On Kashmir, in typical strong power fashion, India has stuck to its position that any resolution of the dispute must be bilateral. Pakistan, also typically, has consistently sought to bring pressure to bear on India by appeals to the United Nations, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and other international bodies, but to no avail. Finally, while India has granted Pakistan most favored nation (MFN) status and urged expanded trade, Pakistan has not reciprocated on MFN and has kept its formal trade links with India marginal, as illustrated in Table 9.3. There is increasing awareness in Pakistan that the gap between the two countries is widening with respect to conventional military forces, economic power, and domestic stability. The power relationship between India and her other neighbors has been more clearly one of major power–minor power relations. From time to Table 9.3 South Asian Neighbours, Trade with India as Percent of Total Trade, 1997 Country

Bangladesh Bhutan* Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka

Exports to India as % of Total Exports

Imports from India as % of Total Imports

2.37 95.18 2.13 59.17 0.03 6.74

14.68 73.89 7.61 55.42 0.05 20.31

Trade with India as % of Total Trade 10.15 84.32 6.95 56.31 0.04 15.25

Source: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 2009. * For Bhutan: International Monetary Fund. “Bhutan.” Statistical Appendix, December 2009. [Available at http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr09335.pdf; accessed January 21, 2010.]

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time, India has shown its willingness to exert pressure on them. In 1981, Indian forces occupied the disputed New Moore/South Talpatty Island at the mouth of the Hariabhanga River, which divides Bangladesh and India. In 1987, India underlined its intervention in Sri Lanka’s Tamil–Sinhala conf lict with a show of force when combat aircraft accompanied a relief mission dropping supplies for refugees. The Sri Lankan government was compelled to allow an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to enter the country to maintain order (though that turned into a fiasco). In 1988, Indian forces intervened to help quell a brief coup in the Maldives. In 1989, India allowed difficult negotiations with Nepal over trade and transit to break down and their existing treaty to lapse, after which it restricted Nepal’s access to maritime trade. This caused a major economic and political crisis in Nepal. Again, in 2008, with Indian support, an internal crisis caused Nepal’s Maoist-led government, a government friendly toward China, to collapse. While India has behaved like a typical regional power, other regional actors have resisted its dominance. The only state that has consistently accepted Indian dominance has been Bhutan, which has never sought to balance against India or to limit trade with it (Table 9.3). All the rest have sought at some time or another to diminish India’s capacity to determine their fates. Bangladesh, the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka have sought closer relations with China and Sri Lanka with the United States. All have tried to use multilateral forums to exert some pressure on India. Bangladesh has appealed at the United Nations for the Bay of Bengal to be designated a “pocket of peace,” as has Nepal appealed for a “zone of peace”; and the Maldives Republic has approached the United Nations for a special mechanism to protect the security of small states. It is widely understood that the impetus for the formation of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985 came from a common desire among the smaller states to strengthen their bargaining position vis-àvis India. Not surprisingly, India has consistently insisted that SAARC’s agenda cannot include political disputes, and that the organization must focus on economic and social cooperation. Equally unsurprising, those of its neighbors who are not landlocked and dependent on India for access to the ocean have not engaged in much trade with it (Table 9.3). Sri Lanka is an exception, having made a conscious decision to build trade via a free trade agreement with India and trade between the two has increased significantly.6 Resistance from the smaller states has not worked. As a result, by the first decade of the twenty-first century, most have become more accepting of Indian power than in the past. Sri Lanka was the first to change its stance, shifting in the mid-1990s from economic moat-building to a preference for free trade—a conscious bandwagoning decision taken for

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pragmatic reasons: there was more to be gained than lost from a closer relationship with India.7 Ironically, India, which learned a hard lesson from the IPKF’s failure to tame the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), played a subdued role in the eventual defeat of the LTTE. Still more ironically, apparent abdication of its regional power role in Sri Lanka, which had constantly pressed it to intervene, had no visibly detrimental effect on the relationship between the two countries. President Mahinda Rajapaksa of Sri Lanka affirmed in the aftermath of his military victory of May 2009 that “nothing is more important to me than what India thinks,” and his brother, Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, termed India his country’s “closest ally.”8 Nepal has periodically resisted Indian power and unsuccessfully sought China’s help. The 1989 episode revealed the extent of its dependence on India for access to the rest of the world—a geographical reality that cannot change. Bangladesh has long kept India at arm’s length, refusing potential agreements on transit, resisting a major pact to transfer gas from Myanmar to India, and responding tardily to offers of Indian investment. But by the 2000s, this policy had clearly yielded only negative dividends in the form of failed deals and withdrawn investments.9 By about 2007, the tendency in Dhaka to view the relationship with India as a zero sum game had receded and a trend toward cooperation became visible (Choudhury 2010). The China factor has and continues to loom large in the region. The long-standing border dispute between India and China, unresolved since their 1962 war, has produced a competitive history. From the perspective of subcontinental relations, the smaller regional states have leaned—with limited success—on China to balance Indian power. On its part, China has made consistent efforts to penetrate the region by plying the weaker states with military and economic assistance. Most prominently, China has built an “all-weather” relationship with Pakistan, which has extended to providing nuclear weapons–related assistance in an effort to contain India within the region ( Jeffrey and Warrick 2009).10 Indians worry about China using Pakistan to contain India while penetrating the region in order to encircle it. To date, the smaller states within the region have not gained much leverage with India through China. Pakistan has benefited significantly from Chinese assistance but such help has failed to shift the balance of power in the region, as Pakistan remains a weak state wracked by internal strife. Post–Cold War, India has assumed a more benign role in the region. It has agreed to engage in a “composite dialogue” with Pakistan, in an attempt to try and resolve all outstanding problems. Remarkable progress was made until 2007, including both sides making major concessions on Kashmir; however, it faltered when Pakistan entered a period of prolonged political turbulence. In Nepal, India appears to have played a

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partisan role contributing to the fall of Maoist leader Prachanda’s government, but that in part is attributable to his failure to keep his weak coalition af loat. During Prachanda’s tenure as prime minister and later, India affirmed its willingness to redefine its relationship with Nepal through a series of new treaties. With no pressure to do so, India revised its treaty relationship with Bhutan in 2007. The original treaty of 1949 had been one that effectively formalized Indian dominance over the tiny Himalayan state; the new treaty explicitly acknowledged India’s respect for Bhutan’s sovereignty. India’s more benevolent approach toward the region has been guided by three motivations. First, Indian leadership understood that regional acceptance would be more conducive to India’s global ambitions: the use of force can be politically costly, as the IPKF episode had shown, as well as inconceivable in a nuclear environment vis-à-vis Pakistan. The “Indira Doctrine,” which envisioned South Asia as India’s exclusive preserve, had exaggerated both the threats faced by India and its capacity to maintain a stable order in the region. Now, the United States was proving to be not a threat but a useful resource for cost sharing in stabilizing South Asia. For instance, the US presence in the region was valuable in exerting pressure on Pakistan and pressing it to stop backing terrorist activity in India.11 Similarly, US pressure compelled Bangladesh to pay more attention to India’s warnings about the growth of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorist activity in its territory. In Nepal, as Maoist violence threatened to overthrow the state, the United States forced the Maoists to soften their stance and come to the negotiating table (International Crisis Group 2006: 22). In short, India’s rising global profile and its warming relationship with the United States helped India generate regional order without having to bear a high cost. While the United States may have adopted a policy of “containment” toward India during the Cold War (Nayar and Paul 2003; Rudolph and Rudolph 2006), American acknowledgment of India’s self-assumed role as a “regional security manager” was implicitly forthcoming well before the Cold War’s end (Bouton 1987: 160). Indian interventions in the region throughout the 1980s evoked no response from US policy makers, in part because the region was not viewed as critical with the exception of Afghanistan on the periphery but where India’s role was marginal. In the public eye, India was viewed with some admiration as a “regional superpower” and—prematurely—as an emerging “great power on the world stage” (Copley 1988).12 Today, the India-US relationship is far stronger, involving rising trade and investment, considerable cooperation in defence, and consultation on regional political issues. The US strategy of cultivating India as a global partner has greatly enhanced India’s regional position. Still, India remains a limited regional hegemon, its capacities

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restricted in both military and economic terms. Then again, the hallmark of a major power is not so much its ability to control its environment—the United States has failed repeatedly without losing its status—but its place in the calculus of its interlocutors. In this sense, India has long been the preponderant power in South Asia. What is changing slowly is that its position is today derived less from others’ fear than from their acceptance. Not a small part of this is due to its considerable success in sustaining its democratic political system.13 A hegemon is not just a power that pushes smaller powers around; if benign, it can also provide certain public goods and maintain systemic stability (Keohane 1980; Snidal 1985). It is widely recognized that the United States has, among other things, underwritten a liberal world economy and acted as the lender of last resort. India’s capacity to play a similar role may appear to be nonexistent. Yet the Indian economy has absorbed a large amount of labor from two neighboring countries, Nepal and Bangladesh, in the former case by formal agreement. Nepalese citizens are permitted to enter India freely and to work without employment permits; India also employs Nepal’s citizens in its armed forces. From Bangladesh, the f low is largely illegal, the consequence of poverty-ridden people seeking a livelihood wherever they can. In this case, while there is no formal agreement, it is significant that India has not really tried to stem the f low. Though this is but a small quantum of public goods that India provides, it is nonetheless remarkable since India itself is a poverty-stricken society. Future efforts to create regional economic order, a positive use of its power, will depend on its capacity to take some weight off its neighbors’ shoulders in other ways, for instance by making trade-related concessions to them that override purely cost–benefit calculations.

India as a Global Power India has been widely viewed as an “emerging” power, but one which is held back by numerous difficulties, notably its large and poor population, innumerable domestic conf licts, and the many imperfections of its democracy (Basrur 2009; Cohen 2001).14 Some have argued that it has potential, but has a considerable way to go: it can resist strong pressures to alter its strategic behavior, but it is not yet able to exercise significant inf luence on others (Mistry 2004; Nayar and Paul 2003; Perkovich 2003/2004). Indian power in the global system needs to be understood in a nuanced way. Power itself cannot be treated only as an instrument that is used—in military or economic terms—directly to achieve political goals. In an increasingly interdependent world, the direct application of power is often not a viable strategic option. Where there is interdependence, rules and

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institutions are central and bargaining is critical to outcomes. In assessing India’s position as a power, then, it is important to consider both aspects— its capacity to utilize power directly; and its capacity to shape the rules and institutions through which states interact in important ways. Where the direct utilization of power for political ends is concerned, India has very limited capabilities. Its strategy has focused on institutional power within a multilateral framework, generally attempting to do not much more than obtain a seat at the table in every conceivable institution relevant to it. Much of its energies have gone into circumventing and then penetrating one regime that it views as an obstacle to its strategic choices—the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In another case, the global trading regime, it has similarly resisted the imposition of rules it considers detrimental to its interests, but is now attempting to undertake a more positive role in giving shape to the regime as it evolves. Historically, Indian leaders, conscious of their country’s rich culture and long civilizational history, have tended to take for granted its status as a major global power. Before independence, Jawaharlal Nehru, who became its first prime minister, simply assumed it would do so (1946: 547). Nehru strode the world stage in pursuit of a grand design to sidestep the Cold War and build an egalitarian postcolonial order committed to wiping out colonial rule, apartheid, and nuclear weapons. This was the core of a national self-image of global leadership fed by an abundance of optimism and confidence arising from a successful independence movement built on a foundation of the principle of nonviolence. But that confidence was shattered in 1962, when Indian forces were dealt a severe blow by China during a short border war. In one stroke, India’s strategic horizon was reduced to that of a struggling power with no more than a regional shadow. Even that was under challenge from Pakistan, a state far smaller yet still willing to go to war with India over Kashmir. India’s inability to meet the challenge adequately—it had been unable to win a decisive victory in 1947–48 and again in 1965—left it with a tattered image and little inf luence except among some of its very small neighbors. Under Indira Gandhi, India retreated into its regional shell and began to focus on building its hard power and inf luence. Following some of the same strategies toward the world as its neighbors did toward it, India sought inf luence through multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (including UN peacekeeping), the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), and the Group of 77 developing countries (G77). When it felt threatened by external powers in what appeared to be an emerging US- China-Pakistan nexus in 1971, it built an alliance-like relationship with the Soviet Union for arms and for political support on Kashmir. It also demanded the Indian Ocean be declared a zone of peace, opposed any external military presence in the region (including the Soviet move into Afghanistan), and followed

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an economic policy that kept out most foreign investment and attempted to go it alone through import substitution. It did not go very far with this strategy. In 1990, it was still a relatively weak power, its global position marked by a defensive struggle against regimes (nonproliferation, trade) that threatened its autonomy, while economic stagnation and a lack of technological dynamism seemed endemic. Two events transformed its approach. First, the end of the Cold War rendered its political worldview obsolete. The overarching East-West dimension of world politics had collapsed, taking its most reliable friend, the Soviet Union, with it. Second, and perhaps even more profoundly, the North-South dimension of its strategy disintegrated at the same time. Caught in a serious balance of payments crisis, India had no choice but to go to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a loan, which made “structural adjustment” a necessity, compelling it to abandon the neo-Marxian centre-periphery thinking that had been its well-embedded orthodoxy since the 1950s. Both shocks made possible a rapid reversal of fundamental political and economic strategy and both pointed India in the direction of a closer relationship with the sole remaining superpower, the United States. The path was by no means easy. India’s relatively slow adaptation to a more liberal domestic regime raised doubts about its capacity to turn itself around. On the political plane, India-US relations entered a rocky phase as the United States sought to tighten the nonproliferation regime, making India a major target of its goal to first stop and then roll back the threat of more and more states going nuclear. By the early 2000s, India’s position had improved. Its nuclear die had been cast through a series of tests in 1998. The Indian economy began to pick up pace. In the meantime, two global trends—the rise of transnational terrorism and the emergence of China as a potential challenger to American dominance—brought a convergence of views between India and the United States that outweighed their earlier frictions. A decade after the end of the Cold War, India was beginning to be seen more as a global player than a regional one. India’s search for recognition stems from a consciousness that it is its due, and is taken for granted across the spectrum of Indian political opinion. Yet, despite the tendency of the media to overplay this on an almost daily basis, Indian political leaders rarely use India’s “greatness” for domestic political support. There is, however, a thread running through India’s foreign relations that shows a consistent interest and sensitivity to the status issue. Its chief characteristics are an acute consciousness of a history of foreign rule (and hence rejection of foreign domination through alliances) and efforts to assume leadership of the third world via the nonaligned movement. However, there is little domestic political pressure, ideological or otherwise, to assume a world role. For the most part, domestic politics has been just that, except in resistance to outside inf luence. Indeed,

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Indian history, barring the expansion of ancient southern kingdoms into Southeast Asia, shows little Indian interest in extraregional empire building. Such inf luence as Indian society has had to the North and the East has been largely of a social and religious nature. There is a common perception that Indian (read “Hindu”) civilization is all-absorbing—an outlook that is inward rather than outward looking. An overriding (and exaggerated) self-perception is that India is a peaceful, nonviolent society capable of negotiating differences. This self-image, when accepted outside, is a useful form of “soft power” for India, although India has yet to consciously promote it (in contrast to the explicit promotion of this form of soft power by both Brazil and France). How accurate is the image of an emerging power? India, compared with other major powers, ranks in the top five on military capabilities other than its expenditures (Table 9.4). Yet, compared to major global powers, it has a long way to go. India is nowhere near the United States except in the numerical strength of its military personnel, which only emphasizes the relatively “labor-intensive” character of its military. The

Table 9.4

Military Indicators, India and Major Powers Compared, 2009

Country

Military Active Armed Main Battle Submarines Principal Combat Aircraft Expenditure Forces (000) Tanks Naval Surface (including (US$m) Combatants naval)

1. United 552,568 States 2. United 63,258 Kingdom 3. France 60,662 4. China 46,174 5. Germany 42,108 6. Japan 41,039 7. Saudi 35,446 Arabia 8. Russia 32,215 9. South 26,588 Korea 10. India 26,513

1,539,587

8,023

57

107

4,201

160,280

386

8

27

360

352,771 2,185,000 244,324 230,300 221,500

637 7,660 2,035 880 910

6 59 12 16 –

32 78 18 52 11

351 1,943 298 350 276

1,027,000 687,000

23,000 2,330

106 12

102 47

2,248 499 632

1,281,200

4,065

16

47

India’s Rank

10

3

4

4

5

4

India as % of USA

4.80

83.22

50.67

28.07

43.93

15.04

India as % of China

57.42

58.64

53.07

27.12

60.26

32.53

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies. 2009. The Military Balance, 2009. Abingdon: Routledge.

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Table 9.5 Selected Economic Indicators Comparing India with Major Powers, 2009 Country 1. USA 2. China 3. Japan 4. India 5. Germany 6. Russia 7. United Kingdom 8. France 9. Brazil 10. Italy India’s Rank India, % of USA India, % of China

Population (thousands) 307,007 1,331,460 127,560 1,155,348 81,880 141,850 61,838 62,616 193,734 60,221 2

GDP, PPP (US$m) 14,119,000 9,091,142 4,139,682 3,778,159 2,969,575 2,689,846 2,256,830 2,172,097 2,017,180 1,921,576 4 26.75 41.56

Per capita GDP, PPP (US$) 45,640 6,890 33,470 3,250 36,780 18,350 37,230 33,930 10,200 31,360 10 7.12 47.17

Source: World Bank. Data and Statistics. [Available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/ Resources/POP.pdf (for population), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/ GDP_PPP.pdf (for GDP,PPP), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/ GNIPC. pdf (for Gross National Income (GNI) PPP); all accessed January 27, 2011.]

comparison with China, also a labor-intensive military, shows India far behind in every category. Table 9.5 presents a comparative picture of leading economic indicators. Here, I rely on GDP PPP for comparisons of aggregate economic power. I also show per capita GDP PPP to modify the implications of the aggregate figures. The level of per capita GDP inf luences the level of defence spending a state can afford as well as its capacity to reward or resist others. Despite India’s fourth rank in GDP PPP terms, its economy at present is a long way behind that of the United States. In comparison with China, it is still small: China’s aggregate as well as per capita figures are twice those of India. India faces severe constraints on its growth path: poverty, inequality, illiteracy, corruption, and poor welfare standards (Narlikar 2007). These are bound to restrain its military capabilities. However, the Indian economy is expected to expand rapidly over the medium term. In January 2007, Goldman Sachs projected a pace of growth that would enable India to overtake Japan in terms of GDP by about 2030 and the United States about a decade later (Poddar and Yi 2007: 5). Others echoed the judgment (Ablett et al. 2007: 13–14, 55–56). One recent projection expects India’s growth to be even quicker, anticipating that it will catch up with Japan in 2012 (Hawksworth 2010). Thus, while India’s present position is not very strong, it is likely to experience a significant rise in relative terms,

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making it the world’s third largest economy in the very near future. This has a bearing on its military expenditure, which can retain a relatively low per capita spending level while rapidly expanding in aggregate terms. And of course, barring a completely skewed development that leaves the average citizen behind—unlikely given its democratic apparatus—such a strong growth rate means the pressures of backwardness should begin to recede steadily, thereby enhancing its relative position as an economic power. Then its value as an attractive strategic partner for other states will increase, along with its weight and bargaining power in international regimes. In the military realm, India is in the process of building a modern armed force. Allocations for new acquisitions have nearly trebled for 2005–2010 as compared to 1999–2004.15 Between 1999 and 2009, it spent $50 billion on new equipment and well over $30 billion is to be allocated for more purchases over the next four to five years.16 Significantly, new and forthcoming purchases include a high proportion of equipment for long-range operations: an aircraft carrier; 6 C-130J transport aircraft; 12 submarines; and IL-78 air refuelling aircraft that can allow an Indian aircraft to f ly nonstop to Alaska. These new capabilities are clearly designed to extend the strategic reach of the Indian armed forces to an unprecedented level. India has also established a military “base” in Ayni, Tajikistan, where it has placed an unspecified force (believed to be military helicopters).17 India has plans to build a blue water navy, allowing it strategic space across the Indian Ocean and beyond, and particular interest in protecting shipping in the Gulf and the Straits of Malacca. Conceivably, it could play a significant role in the not too distant future as the guardian of the Indian Ocean’s island states or become a joint security provider for the Gulf.18 It has widened its reach in the Indian Ocean by establishing a listening station in Madagascar.19 Indian ships regularly patrol the seas off the Gulf to counter the rising menace of piracy. Indian leaders are selfconsciously aware of their country’s widening strategic radius. As Rahul Gandhi has noted: “What is important . . . is that we stop worrying about how the world will impact us . . . and we step out and worry about how we will impact the world.”20 This can be interpreted either as willingness to exert Indian power or as a word of caution to others. So far, the latter appears to be the case. While India’s military horizons have stretched well beyond South Asia, Indians are well aware that what they call their “extended neighborhood” (the arc from the Middle East to Southeast Asia) is one where other major players are already present, hampering India’s capacity to undertake autonomous activity. The United States is everywhere, Russia and China are strongly placed in Central Asia, and China and Japan likewise in Southeast

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Asia. But India’s prudence has been evident even where it has been invited to play a larger role in maintaining order in neighboring regions. In 2003, the United States encouraged India to send peacekeeping troops to Iraq. Although there was some domestic support for the move, India refused.21 The IPKF’s experience in Sri Lanka clearly lingered in policy makers’ minds. Similarly, India has confined its role in Afghanistan to civilian construction and military training.22 Actions such as the sinking of a pirate vessel off Northeast Africa are exceptional. Normally, India’s preference is to act within a multilateral framework, such as the United Nations. Even though it is hemmed in by other major and regional powers and not particularly active in maintaining order beyond its neighborhood, states outside its region have recognized its potential as a major global power. Singapore’s foremost political figure, Lee Kuan Yew, predicted that India, along with China, will “reshape the world order before the end of the 21st century.”23 India’s free trade agreement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was more keenly sought by the richer ASEAN than by India, which delayed the signing (2009) for six years on account of domestic pressures. At the Asian-regional level, India has become associated with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia-Europe meeting (ASEM), and joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as an observer. At the global level, recognition of India’s rising status has given it a place in several major institutional arrangements, notably the expanded avatar of the Group of 8 countries (G8), which it joined in 2009, the group of 20 major economies (G20) brought together for financial stabilization, the Group of 15 developing nations (G15) leading the unwieldy G77, and forums involved in regular consultations such as BRIC (Brazil-Russia-India- China), IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa), and BASIC (Brazil-South Africa-India- China). Recognition of India’s rising status has come from diverse quarters. British foreign secretary David Miliband spoke in 2008 of a “global power shift” with the rise of China and India.24 China upgraded the status of its ambassador to New Delhi in January 2010 to the status of a vice-minister.25 The most striking development is the important place accorded to India by the sole superpower, the United States. The relationship between the two countries underwent a transformation in the post–Cold War era. US officials proclaimed American commitment to “help India become a major world power in the 21st century.”26 In recognition of India’s key place in their strategic calculations, American policy makers successfully undertook the herculean task of convincing staunch critics at home and abroad that India should be allowed to bypass the nuclear nonproliferation regime’s restrictions on civilian commerce with it.27 This marked a turning point both in the emerging strategic partnership between the two countries and in the global recognition of India as an emerging major power.

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During the Cold War era, India’s deportment toward the United States had been a mirror image of its own neighbors’ behavior toward it. It had kept aloof from the United States and the global US- dominated economy; it periodically bowed to US power (as in seeking its help after the 1962 war and in accepting large-scale food aid in the mid-1960s); it tried to play a balancing game between the United States and the Soviet Union; it resisted the entry of American power into the subcontinent; and it tried to offset its weakness by playing an active role in multilateral organizations such as NAM and the UN. Today, it confidently seeks a close relationship with both the United States and the global economy and welcomes American military presence in South Asia. Neither NAM nor the UN is central to its drive for great power status, though it does seek status and institutional power by seeking a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Yet its reluctance to become embroiled in military actions (other than UN peacekeeping) beyond its borders shows it has no illusions about its still limited status as a major power. The India- China relationship is more complex (Basrur 2010). In addition to lingering border disputes, naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean (Mohan 2009), and mutual processes of rapid military modernization, both societies harbor considerable nationalist sentiment, further promoting the competitive side of their relationship. However, they have also demonstrated a remarkable capacity to set aside many differences and accelerate trade very rapidly. China is now India’s largest trading partner. They have cooperated in major multilateral negotiations on trade (the Doha Round) and the environment (the Copenhagen summit on climate change). It is often said that India worries far more about China than China does about India. Two points may be made here. First, Chinese policy makers have visibly resisted India’s rise. They have tried to box India into South Asia by backing Pakistan, opposing India’s quest for a permanent seat in the Security Council, and resisting the alteration of the nonproliferation regime’s rules to accommodate India. Second, China may have more to worry about as India’s rapidly warming relationship with the United States has produced the growing perception of an emerging US- China-India strategic triangle (Blank 2007). With China, in effect, taking the heat of American resistance to global power transition, India has been able to embark on its own transition to great power status (still in an early phase) with relative ease. India’s “rise” has been and is still a complex process. In material terms, it has certainly embarked on a higher rate of growth, but its military and economic capabilities lie well behind those of the United States and China (Tables 9.4 and 9.5). By itself, India has been unable to inf luence the course of events in any single major global event or process. Yet, it has been able to exploit US- China rivalry. Its growing market and

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its prestige as a democracy enhances its stature in spite of its relatively limited capabilities. Nowhere is this more evident than in the bending of nonproliferation rules with considerable American help. That India has been able to attain widespread recognition as an “emerging power” despite its relative weakness is a ref lection of its skilful leveraging of these advantages. If India has been assertive, it has been toward multilateral regimes. Three cases stand out. In each, India has successfully challenged the combined efforts by other powerful states to impose rules unpalatable to it. First, India has resisted the efforts of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime to impose a change in its nuclear weapons policy. In the Cold War era, India rejected the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and stayed away from the emerging regime. While it did conduct a single nuclear test in 1974, it did not become a nuclear weapons power, preferring to keep the option open, and eventually becoming a covert nuclear-armed state in about 1989. Following the end of the Cold War, it came under pressure to cap and roll back its clandestine weapons programme, particularly with the formalization of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). India walked out of the negotiations and began preparations for fresh testing, which were eventually conducted in 1998 (Saksena 2006). It came close to being treated as a pariah, but its place in the post–Cold war order was stronger than before and the political calculus of the Bush administration helped it overcome the constraints imposed by the nonproliferation regime. There is little doubt that after 1998 there was no turning back and, because it could no longer be persuaded to toe the line of the regime, it was accommodated. The change ref lected both the weight of India’s rising power and the fact that the United States went to considerable lengths in assisting India to alter the rules of the regime. However, India has neither played a significant role in shaping the regime thereafter, nor in the global drive for disarmament, a cause which it has long held dear. Another formidable challenge India met with partial success was at the Doha Round of trade talks. The talks, aimed broadly at expanding the scope of international trade regulation, broke down in July 2008 with developed and developing countries at odds over critical issues such as the level at which the former’s agricultural subsidies could be permitted, or the level at which prices could trigger protective tariffs on food and other key crops.28 The United States exerted enormous pressure for a deal, but resistance from India and China led to the eventual collapse of the negotiations.29 India played a major role in the denouement, allying first with Brazil and later with China to stave off pressure. India’s minister for commerce and industry, Kamal Nath, who played a decisive part as one of the four lead negotiators, was described in the press as the “pivotal figure” in the negotiations.30 The episode ref lected India’s rising clout, although its inf luence was limited to

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preventing unpalatable change. It remains to be seen whether it can bring more positive inf luence to bear on an actual agreement. Finally, India was active in shaping a limited climate change agreement at the December 2009 Copenhagen Summit. The summit was hampered by disagreements between the United States and developing countries over distribution of the costs of cutting down on greenhouse gas emissions and by American unwillingness to accept the call for quantitative targets for emission control agreed on in an earlier agreement thrashed out in Kyoto.31 Following the personal intervention of US president Barrack Obama, a watered down and essentially nonbinding deal was finally signed as India and other developing countries accepted that a weak agreement was better than none. Although the center of attention was the face-off between the United States and China, the world’s two largest greenhouse gas emitters, India did play a major role in the negotiation of the final accord along with representatives from the United States, China, Brazil, and South Africa.32 Notably, the European Union blamed India as well as China for the disappointing end to the summit.33

Conclusion The picture that emerges from the analysis above is as follows: In its immediate geographical sphere, India is in many ways a regional major power, with a restricted direct capacity to inf luence outcomes desirable to it (such limitations also apply to much stronger powers). What it does, or fails to do, is important to all its neighbors, whereas what they do affects it relatively less. This is true even of Pakistan: it is readily evident that India occupies most of Pakistan’s foreign policy horizon, while the reverse is far from the case. India also gains from American involvement in the region, primarily in restraining those Pakistani policies that are inimical to Indian interests and security. India’s rising global profile and its closeness to the United States help lower resistance to its preeminence in South Asia. Its own shift to a more benign stance is also a contributory factor. There is increasing recognition of its status from the other states in the region, including from Pakistan, which sees India as steadily drawing away and upward from it. Thus, notwithstanding its local problems, India is a status-consistent regional power. Strong in the region and its capabilities continuing to grow, India should be able to move more decisively away from local preoccupations to focus on the world stage. Limiting its ability to do so is its ongoing relationship with Pakistan. That relationship may remain problematic and constraining as long as the Pakistani military benefits from ongoing hostility with India, and as long as domestic uncertainties and turmoil leaves unclear the future of the Pakistani state. To the extent that

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the military remains vital to Pakistan’s “hybrid democracy,” and political turbulence continues under the onslaught of Islamic extremism, India will continue to be preoccupied with regional stability (Tremblay and Schofield 2005). Yet, it is simply too big—and growing larger—to be confined to its neighborhood. On the world stage, India’s profile is growing fairly rapidly, but it still has a long way to go. For all its impressive growth and aggregate GDP figures, and for all the expectations it has raised about its future as a major power, it remains a country with enormous problems of poverty, inequality, and corruption (Drèze and Sen 2002). Can a state become a great power, or receive the status of one when a substantial portion of its population is hungry? Indian leaders are conscious of this, and this keeps military spending down to about 2 percent of GDP. As India’s democracy becomes increasingly decentralized, the pressure to do something about improving distribution of wealth becomes stronger. Given the combination of democratization and economic liberalization, it is unlikely that India’s growth will remain highly skewed over time. But, given the enormity of its problems of poverty and inequality, the transformative process is likely to remain steady rather than rapid. For this reason, India is likely to remain a potential rather than an actual great power for some time to come. Beyond its immediate periphery, India does not now have much capacity to shape the international order in adjacent regions where there are states recognized as major powers. However, India does not have autonomous interests of great magnitude, and its warming relationship with the United States and its old camaraderie with Russia should stand it in good stead. At the global level, its capabilities are limited and its ambitions equally limited as we can see from its unwillingness to become militarily involved in Iraq and, beyond a point, in Afghanistan. It has charted a more active and inf luential course in the politics of regimes, in each case to protect its vital interests. Here again, it has not played an autonomous role (except with respect to distancing itself from the nonproliferation regime), but has allied with other powerful states to shape outcomes, although this shaping has not been substantial. India has had some ability to decide what should not be done; little inf luence on what is. Hence, it would be fair to say that, at the global level, India is a state with currently limited capacities and limited status attribution, but considerable potential in the long term to lay claim to the status of a major power. In the meantime, as a player that is not deeply dissatisfied with international arrangements, as a power that has been able to make steady progress in attaining enhanced status, and as a state that tends to act in concert with others rather than go it alone, it is likely to have a stabilizing rather than a disturbing inf luence on the international system.

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Notes 1. I tend to use “power” and “capabilities” interchangeably, whereas the editors prefer the precision of the latter, as is evident from chapter 1. 2. For interesting efforts on these lines, see Cline (1980), which incorporates such elements as “will” and “strategy” in ranking states; and Hagerty (2009), which includes “economic freedom,” “political stability,” and “competence” (in governance). 3. In the present context, I apply these patterns to both the regional and international systems. 4. Smith, R. Jeffrey and Joby Warrick. “A Nuclear Power’s Act of Proliferation,” Washington Post, November 13, 2009. [Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/ article/2009/11/12/AR2009111211060.html; accessed November 13, 2009.] 5. See, for example, “Indo-US Nuclear Deal Risks Arms Race: NCA,” Daily Times, August 3, 2007 [Available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\08\03\ story_3- 8-2007_pg1_6] (all newspaper references were accessed on the same day unless otherwise stated); Muhammad Anis, “Indo-US Nuclear Deal Altered Balance,” News International, January 16, 2010. [Available at http://thenews.jang.com.pk/top_story_detail. asp?Id=26701.] 6. Sri Lanka’s trade with India has grown significantly. Between 1997 and 2008, its exports to India as a proportion of its total exports have increased from 0.95 to 6.74 percent and its imports from India as a proportion of its total imports from 11.14 to 20.31 percent. The 1997 figures are from International Monetary Fund (1988) and the 2008 figures from Table 9.3. 7. Author’s interview with Milinda Moragoda, former minister for economic reform, Colombo, September 15, 2004. The India- Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement was signed in 1998. 8. Cited in “I Fought India’s War: Interview,” Week, May 31, 2009. [Available at http://week. manoramaonline.com/cgi- bin/MMOnline.dll/portal/ep/theWeekContent.do?sectionNa me=Current+Events&contentId=5538317&programId=1073754900&pageTypeId=107375 4893&contentType=EDITORIAL&BV_ID=@@@; accessed June 5, 2009]; and “India’s Help Eased World Pressure in LTTE War: Lanka,” Indian Express, November 17, 2009. [Available at http://www.indianexpress.com/news/indias-help- eased-world-pressure-inltte-war-lanka/542522/.] 9. When the Tata group called off its proposed $3 billion investment, the country not only lost its biggest single foreign investment ever, but also sent a strong negative signal for other potential investors. Anupama Airy, “Tata’s Withdrawal from Bangla to Impact Other Foreign Players,” Financial Express, August 13, 2008. [Available at http://www. f inancialexpress.com/news/tatas-withdrawal- from- bangla- to- impact- other- foreignplayers/348023/.] 10. Also “China’s Nuclear Assistance and Exports to Pakistan,” James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, November 14, 2003. [Available at http://www.nti.org/db/china/npakpos.htm ; accessed March 8, 2010 via Nuclear Threat (NTI)] 11. The first major effort to apply such pressure occurred in 2001–2002, when Indian and Pakistani troops faced off in the wake of an attack on the Indian Parliament by Pakistanlinked terrorists. Since then, the United States has leaned on Pakistan repeatedly, though with limited success (Basrur, 2005); “Will Not Hesitate to Strike Inside Pakistan: Obama,” The Hindu, December 15, 2009. [Available at http://www.thehindu.com/2009/12/15/ stories/2009121555661200.htm.] 12. Also, Ross H. Munro, “Superpower Rising,” Time, April 3, 1989, pp. 6–13. 13. There is a significant element of admiration for India in Pakistan today on this count. See, e.g., Tasneem Noorani, “Primacy of Law in India,” Dawn, February 16, 2007. [Available at http://www.dawn.com/2007/02/16/op.htm#1]; “Imran Looks to India for Pakistan’s Future,” Daily Times, January 30, 2008. [Available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/ default.asp?page=2008\01\30\story_30-1-2008_pg7_27.]

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14. Also Sumit Ganguly,. “Can India Be Great?” Diplomat, December 31, 2009. [Available at http://www.the- diplomat.com/001f1281_r.aspx?artid=358; accessed January 3, 2010.] 15. “Armed Forces Modernization on Track: Defence Ministry,” The Hindu, January 1, 2010. [Available at http://www.hindu.com/2010/01/01/stories/2010010153331800.htm.] 16. Rajat Pandit, “$50-bn Deals since Kargil,” Times of India, January 1, 2010. [Available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/50- bn- defence- deals- since-Kargil/articleshow/ 5400429.cms.] 17. It must be noted, though, that India shares the facility with the host country and Russia. 18. Anand Giridharadas, “Land of Gandhi Asserts Itself as Global Military Power,” New York Times, September 22, 2008. [Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/22/world/ asia/22india.html?ref=world.] 19. Bruce Loudon, “India Sets up Spy Base,” Australian, July 19, 2007. [Available at http:// www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,22096826-25837,00.html.] 20. Ibid. 21. Amit Baruah, “No Troops for Iraq without Explicit U.N. Mandate: India,” The Hindu, July 15, 2003. [Available at http://www.thehindu.com/thehindu/2003/07/15/ stories/2003071505870100.htm; accessed January 24, 2010.] 22. Atul Aneja, “India Wary of Military Role in Afghanistan,” The Hindu, January 14, 2010. [Available at http://www.thehindu.com/2010/01/14/stories/2010011455661700.htm.] 23. “Speech by Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, Minister Mentor, at the S. Rajaratnam Lecture 09 April 2009 5:30 pm at Shangri-La Hotel,” Singapore Government Media Release, April 9, 2009. [Available at http://www.news.gov.sg/public/sgpc/en/media_releases/agencies/pmo/ speech/S-20090409-1.html; accessed January 24, 2010.] 24. “Rise of India Leading to Global Power Shift,” Zee News, March 6, 2008. [Available at http://www.zeenews.com/articles.asp?aid=428492&sid=NAT; accessed March 10, 2008.] 25. Ananth Krishnan and Sandeep Dikshit, “China Elevates Rank of Envoy in New Delhi,” The Hindu, January 26, 2010. [Available at http://www.thehindu.com/2010/01/26/ stories/2010012660741000.htm .] 26. “Background Briefing by Administration Officials on U.S.- South Asia Relations,” United States Department of State, March 25, 2005. [Available at http://www.fas.org/terrorism/ at/docs/2005/StatePressConfer25mar05.htm; accessed on January 24, 2010.] 27. The process, consuming considerable political capital on the part of the Bush administration, took over three years from July 2005 to October 2008 to conclude. For a quick outline, see “Chronology of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal,” Times of India, October 9, 2008. [Available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Chronology_of_the_Indo-US_nuclear_ deal/articleshow/3575350.cms.] 28. John W. Miller, “Global Talks Fail as New Giants Flex Muscle,” Wall Street Journal, July 30, 2008, p. A1. 29. Ibid. 30. John W. Miller, “Indian Minister Frustrates West at Trade Talks,” Wall Street Journal, July 25, 2008, p. A6. 31. Andrew C. Revkin and Tom Zeller, Jr, “U.S. Negotiator Dismisses Reparations for Climate,” New York Times, December 10, 2009. [Available at http://www.nytimes. com/2009/12/10/science/earth/10climate.html?th&emc=th.] 32. John M. Broder, “Many Goals Remain Unmet in 5 Nations’ Climate Deal,” New York Times, December 19, 2009. [Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/19/science/ earth/19climate.html?_r=1&th&emc=th; accessed December 21. 2009]; Andrew C. Revkin and John M. Broder, “A Grudging Accord in Climate Talks,” New York Times, December 20, 2009. [Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/20/science/earth/20accord. html?ref=world.] 33. Chetan Chauhan, “EU Blames India, China for Fiasco,” Hindustan Times, December 24, 2009. [Available at http://www.hindustantimes.com/special-news-report/india-news/ EU-blames-India- China-for-fiasco/Article1- 489911.aspx.]

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