All-Party Parliamentary Group on North Korea

Meeting of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on North Korea Held in Committee Room 4A, The Houses of Parliament, at 17:00 on the 7th May 2014

Members present: Lord Alton of Liverpool, in the Chair Fiona Bruce MP Baroness Cox Lord Eames Lord Griffiths of Bury Port The Lord Bishop of Peterborough Stephen Pound MP Lord Rowe-Beddoe Andrew Selous MP

Minutes 1. 17:10 — The Chair explained the role of the APPG to attendees and notified members and attendees of future events of interest. 2. The Chair welcomed the new Secretariat of the APPG and offered his thanks to the European Alliance for Human Rights in North Korea for their help in organising the evening’s event. 3. Andrew Selous MP informed the group of an upcoming debate in the House of Commons on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). 4. The Chair introduced Mr. Jang Jin-sung and his translator, Ms. Shirley Lee. 1

5. 17:15 — Mr. Jang stated that the DPRK remains misunderstood by many outside observers. It was noted [by Mr. Jang] that non-North Korean frameworks of understanding, such as Communism, are inadequate in explaining the reality of political life in the DPRK. Mr. Jang commented that the DPRK regime actively fosters these misunderstandings for its own gain. 6. Mr. Jang stated that the Organisation and Guidance Department of the Korean Workers’ Party (OGD) is the most powerful organ within the DPRK regime and [Mr. Jang] then expanded on the OGD’s history and role within the DPRK’s political hierarchy. It was reported [by Mr. Jang] that political power in the DPRK is concentrated within the OGD and that any discussions concerning power within the DPRK that omit the OGD lack true comprehension. Mr. Jang explained that all political roads in the DPRK lead to the OGD. 7. Mr. Jang asserted that since the purge and execution of Jang Sung-taek in December 2013, the OGD’s domestic profile had increased. Mr. Jang questioned why the OGD was rarely discussed outside of the Korean peninsula. 8. 17:25 — Mr. Jang concluded and the Chair opened the floor to questions. 9. Question 1 — It was noted [by the questioner] that students and student societies in the United Kingdom (UK) had yet to fully engage with issues of concern in the DPRK. The questioner cited the opposing examples of Myanmar and apartheid-era South Africa. 10. Question 2 — Mr. Jang was asked if the DPRK’s ‘guilt-by-association’ policy had placed himself or his family in personal danger and what he hoped to achieve by revealing the role of the OGD. 11. Mr. Jang noted that, since his departure from the DPRK, he had had no contact with family members. Mr. Jang then stated his hope that an understanding of the OGD would contribute to more effective foreign policies towards the DPRK. 12. Question 3 — Mr. Jang was asked if it was possible for North Korean citizens to live openly as Christians in the DPRK.

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13. Mr. Jang stated that no North Korean citizen would admit loyalty to anyone outside of the ‘Cult of Kim’. 14. Question 4 — Mr. Jang was questioned on the extent of ordinary North Koreans’ knowledge of the outside world. 15. Mr. Jang noted that North Korea’s market-class, who, he explained, no longer desired the political status-quo, are increasingly aware of the outside world. It was also explained [by Mr. Jang] that the status-quo class continue to benefit from a closed North Korean society. 16. Question 5 — Mr. Jang was asked his opinion on the importance of an independent radio service for North Korean citizens. 17. Mr. Jang explained that the DPRK regime holds an information monopoly in North Korean society. Mr. Jang then posited that once the regime’s control on information had been undermined by external sources, he [Mr. Jang] believed that the regime’s control over society would decline in equal measure. 18. Question 6 — Mr. Jang was asked how external sources of information had changed North Korea and North Koreans. 19. Mr. Jang responded by noting a change in the DPRK’s political currency — from loyalty to money. Mr. Jang went on to explain that few in the DPRK political elite believe that the current regime will endure. 20. Question 7 — Mr. Jang was asked how the Republic of Korea (RoK) viewed reunification with the DPRK. 21. Mr. Jang explained that South Korean society was ill-equipped to believe in change in the DPRK or reunification. Mr. Jang asserted that that the RoK government should better engage South Korean society on this issue. 22. Question 8 — Mr. Jang was asked if the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was the DPRK’s only international supporter and, if so, why? 23. Mr. Jang stated that it was more convenient for the PRC to support the DPRK than not. He [Mr. Jang] went on to note that the DPRK viewed the PRC as a historical enemy and that the PRC was displeased with the DPRK following the execution of 3

Jang Sung-taek. Mr. Jang concluded that the PRC’s position on the DPRK was open to change. 24. Question 9 — Mr. Jang was questioned on the impact that the United Nations Commission of Inquiry (UNCOI) report had on the OGD. 25. Mr. Jang stated that the OGD would transfer historical blame to other political actors in the DPRK. Mr. Jang anticipated that placing human rights on the international political agenda, as per the UNCOI’s recommendations, would exert pressure on the DPRK regime and [Mr. Jang posited] increase the international community’s diplomatic leverage. 26. Question 10 — Mr. Jang was asked how important the DPRK’s nuclear programme was to the regime’s survival. 27. Mr. Jang noted that the DPRK’s nuclear weapons programme would not be resolved through established diplomatic channels. Mr. Jang postulated that the DPRK would continue to frame nuclear negotiations with the international community within the aforementioned diplomatic frameworks so that the issue would remain unresolved. 28. Question 11 — Mr. Jang was asked for further information on the OGD. 29. Mr. Jang stated that the OGD appoints all high ranking officials in the DPRK regime; conducts extensive surveillance; operates the DPRK’s prison camps; acts as a de-facto lawmaker; and coordinates the personnel for the leader’s bodyguard. 30. Question 12 — Mr. Jang was asked about the diplomatic relationship between the governments of the UK and the DPRK; and on the issue of the PRC’s repatriation of North Koreans to the DPRK. 31. Mr. Jang explained that he was not well versed in UK-DPRK relations, but noted that the international community should exert moral pressure on the PRC. 32. The Chair stated that the UK had a large North Korean exile community and that the DPRK Embassy in the UK had no involvement in the UK government’s handling of its North Korean community. The Chair also noted the UNCOI’s documentation of infanticide following the PRC’s repatriation of North Koreans to the DPRK.

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33. Question 13 — Mr. Jang was asked about the prevalence of methamphetamine use in North Korean society. 34. Mr. Jang explained that since 2011, drug abuse in the DPRK had become widespread and had been normalised. 35. Question 14 — Mr. Jang was asked if the PRC could play a positive role in reforming the DPRK. 36. Mr. Jang asserted that the PRC would prioritise its own national interest above other concerns. 37. Question 15 — Mr. Jang was asked about the supply chain to the North Korean black market. 38. Mr. Jang noted that supplies are smuggled into the DPRK from the PRC-DPRK border and that prices are controlled by the Chinese Yuan. 39. Question 16 — Mr. Jang was asked whether his revelation of the OGD met with the approval of the RoK government. 40. Mr. Jang explained that he no longer worked on behalf of the RoK government and that information on the OGD had been publically available for some time. 41. 18:25 — End of questions

42. The Chair thanked Mr. Jang and Ms. Shirley Lee and announced forthcoming events of interest. 43. The Chair informed Peers and Members of the House of Commons that the group’s Annual General Meeting would take place at 17:00 on the 10th June.

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