Oligopoly Strategy Class Activity DIRECTIONS Assemble into groups of four. Each person is the CEO of one of the major cereal producers in the U.S.: Kellogg’s, General Mills, Post, and Quaker Oats. Each CEO will individually decide how many boxes of cereal his/her firm will produce each day. You may either produce 3 million or 4 million. The quantity demanded at various prices is listed to the right. You will make this output decision 10 times, corresponding to 10 rounds. Any CEO who can collect at least $150 million in revenue will receive a prize.
Quantity Demanded (millions of boxes)
$5.00
12
$4.50
13
$4.00
14
$3.50
15
$3.00
16
RULES
RECORD DATA After each round record your data in this table. Start by adding together all of the output produced. Use this “Total Output” number to determine the price of each box of cereal (listed in the table above). Then, multiply “Your Individual Output” by this price to get “Your Revenue.”
Round
Price (per box of cereal)
Total Output
Price
1)
No verbal communication about price or output. would violate antitrust laws.
2)
Only one Output Card can be chosen each round, and it cannot be changed once it has been shown.
3)
Count together: “1 - 2 - 3” and then (on 4) display your Output Card.
4)
Make sure all CEOs are ready before beginning to count.
CONCLUSION Once you have completed all 10 rounds, answer the following questions about your experience. 1) What is the maximum total revenue possible each round for the industry as a whole?
2) What is the minimum total revenue possible each round for the industry as a whole?
3) Was there an incentive for each CEO to limit output to 3 million boxes each round? Explain.
4) Was there an incentive for each CEO to cheat and produce 4 million boxes each round? Explain.
5) If you were a monopolist instead of an oligopolist in this market, how many boxes would you produce each round? Explain.
6) Did the other CEOs in your group generally act cooperatively, or did they mostly cheat? Explain.
7) Why do you think oligopolists behave in this way?
8) Oligopolies are generally regarded to be very unpredictable. Why do you think this is the case?
Retrying... Download. Connect more apps... Try one of the apps below to open or edit this item. Oligopoly Strategy.pdf. Oligopoly Strategy.pdf. Open. Extract.
Feb 27, 1998 - employment level or other forms of pay like workers' participation schemes. .... a Call to strike concerns only one establishment b Monthly ...... bosch, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics, Catholic University.
We show that the set of the Cournot-Walras equilibrium allo- cations coincides with the set of the Markov perfect equilibrium allocations of the two-stage game outlined above. This theorem strengthens the result obtained by Busetto and Codognato (200
Retrying... Download. Connect more apps... Try one of the apps below to open or edit this item. 4 - Oligopoly and MC (Key1).pdf. 4 - Oligopoly and MC (Key1).pdf.
Sep 1, 2009 - 2007 International I.O. Conference, and the 2008 FTC/Northwestern ... compare the ex ante predicted prices of mergers to direct ex post estimates of .... 3The FTC's web site provides an example of a second request on its web ...
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OLIGOPOLY EXPERIMENTS IN THE CURRENT. MILLENNIUM. Jan Potters and Sigrid Suetens. Tilburg University, CentER, TILEC. Abstract. We present a general overview of papers that employ laboratory experiments to study oligopoly markets. We focus on papers t
Nov 8, 2011 - ... of Economics, 001 Fisher Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544. Email: [email protected]. ..... of the other firms will also have an interior solution.
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Financial support from CNR Research Contribu- tion 98.01351.CT10 is gratefully acknowledged. â¡Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry ...