Online Appendix: What’s Not to Trust? Rubrics of Political Party Trustworthiness in Chile and Argentina

Ryan E. Carlin Assistant Professor of Political Science Georgia State University 38 Peachtree Center Ave., Ste. 1005 Atlanta, GA 30303 (404) 413-6190 [email protected]

Party Politics Forthcoming 2012

This appendix is divided into three sections. The first section describes the focus groups, their length, and incentives for participation. Its Tables 5 and 6 report descriptive information on the focus group participants in Santiago, Chile and Buenos Aires, Argentina, respectively. The second section provides information about the various questionnaires from which the Q-sample was drawn. Additionally, Tables 7 and 8 provide summary information on the participants who completed the Q-sorts in Santiago and Buenos Aires, respectively. Table 9 reports the full results of both Q-sort analyses. Additional information about the procedures and the samples is available upon request. Tests of association between rubrics-based party trust/distrust measures and socioeconomic status, gender, and partisanship are provided in Tables 10-11. Robustness checks of the tobit analyses (Table 4 in the manuscript), which correlated rubrics-based party trust/distrust with the GSS party trust measure, are reported for OLS (Table 12) and ordered logit (Table 13) estimations.

Focus Groups The focus groups lasted 75-90 minutes and were videotaped and transcribed. Participants were compensated with light refreshments. In some cases a nominal donation was made to the group. In Santiago, these groups included a transnational citizen movement, ATTACChile; a group of neighborhood leaders from the working-class borough, La Granja; a Christian Democrat Youth group from the working-class comuna San Joaquín; and the Gay and Lesbian Brigade of the Socialist Party. The Buenos Aires focus groups were recruited from the class-based coalition, Central de los Trabajadores (CTA); vocational school students from the working-class districts of Vicente López and General San Martín; young party members in a leadership course at Centro de Implementación de la Políticas Públicas para la Equidad y Crecimiento (CIPPEC); and members of the human rights group Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos Humanos (APDH). Table 5 and Table 6 below provide more demographic and attitudinal information about the focus groups participants.

Table 5: Summary of 42 Santiago Focus Group Participants

Table 6: Summary of 34 Buenos Aires Focus Group Participants

Q Methodology This section contains additional information on the surveys from which the Q-sample was drawn, and information pertaining to the demographics and attitudes of the Q-sorters in Santiago, Chile and Buenos Aires, Argentina. Before displaying these tables, however, the appendix reports the explained variance for the factor analyses broken down by case, factor, and eigenvalue (in parentheses). Santiago Factor 1 (Integrity and Competence) = 20% (16.5) Factor 2 (Internal Politics and Competence) = 11% (9.0) Factor 3 (Responsiveness and Integrity) = 10% (7.9) Buenos Aires Factor 1 (Integrity and Competence) = 19% (15.4) Factor 2 (Responsiveness and Integrity) = 18% (14.9) Factor 3 (Internal Politics and Competence) = 14% (11.5)

Table 12. Rubric-Based Party Trust/Distrust & GSS-Style Party Trust (OLS Regression) Coeff. Integrity & Competence

Coeff.

Santiago Coeff. Coeff.

-.653*** (.198)

Internal Politics & Competence

Coeff.

Coeff.

-.643** (.250) -1.017*** (.230)

Responsiveness & Integrity

Coeff.

Coeff.

Buenos Aires Coeff. Coeff.

-.501* (.221) -.830** (.261)

-.691* (.317)

Coeff.

Coeff.

-.535* (.247) -.581** (.226)

-.462 (.378)

-.328† (.240) -.491* (.253)

-.458* (.265)

Trust in the President

.124 (.135)

.182 (.129)

.137 (.145)

.019 (.120)

.016 (.123)

-.002 (.123)

Governing Party Identification

-.047 (.223)

-.040 (.215)

-.084 (.231)

1.516** (.488)

1.601*** (.498)

1.574*** (.493)

Education

-.215 (.737)

-.435 (.714)

-.277 (.774)

.081 (.053)

.050 (.05)

.063 (.054)

Income

.100 (.111)

.112 (.108)

.109 (.117)

.113 (.110)

.160† (.111)

.172† (.111)

Age

.001 (.008)

.007 (.008)

.003 (.008)

-.015* (.007)

-.014* (.007)

-.014* (.007)

Woman

-.224 (.205)

-.122 (.203)

-.248 (.215)

.053 (.195)

.105 (.198)

.095 (.196)

-.544 (1.407)

-1.020 (1.360)

-.724 (1.476)

-.038 (.784)

-.367 (.781)

-.407 (.769)

Constant

.822*** (.083)

.830*** (.079)

.888*** (.102)

.935*** (.096)

.859*** (.085)

.964*** (.109)

n 79 79 79 58 58 58 79 79 79 61 61 61 F 10.81*** 19.63*** 4.75* 2.66* 3.27** 1.77 5.13* 6.60* 3.76† 3.28** 2.75* 2.96** Adjusted-R2 .111 .191 .045 .170 .218 .087 .050 .067 .034 .210 .169 .186 Note: Entries are OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Data gathered via Q-sorts and pre-Q-sort questionnaire. *** p ≤ .001, ** p ≤ .01, * p ≤ .05, † p ≤ .1 (one-tailed tests)

Table 13. Rubric-Based Party Trust/Distrust & GSS-Style Party Trust (Ordered Logistical Regression) Coeff. Integrity & Competence

Coeff.

Santiago Coeff. Coeff.

-1.763*** (.573)

Internal Politics & Competence

Coeff.

Coeff.

-2.104** (.791) -2.826*** (.715)

Responsiveness & Integrity

Coeff.

Coeff.

Buenos Aires Coeff. Coeff.

-1.127* (.583) -2.887*** (.881)

-1.459* (.832)

Coeff.

Coeff.

-1.694* (.826) -1.280* (.609)

-1.048 (1.063)

-2.822† (1.153) -1.089* (.647)

-1.422† (.852)

Trust in the President

.342 (.403)

.581 (.415)

.421 (.409)

.082 (.363)

.010 (.362)

.015 (.360)

Governing Party Identification

-.489 (.668)

-.564 (.706)

-.145 (.669)

4.653** (1.580)

4.364*** (1.577)

4.752*** (1.555)

Education

-.282 (2.189)

-.961 (2.214)

-.728 (2.151)

.260† (.170)

.188 (.167)

.194 (.165)

Income

.313 (.327)

.376 (.331)

.334 (.315)

.325 (.331)

.400 (.339)

.501† (.328)

Age

.002 (.024)

.026 (.026)

.009 (.024)

-.048* (.023)

-.039* (.022)

-.044* (.022)

Woman

-.616 (.611)

-.275 (.617)

-.631 (.595)

.238 (.586)

.144 (.597)

.349 (.580)

Cutpoint 1

-.579 (.250)

-.647 (.257)

-.654 (.288)

3.321 (4.142)

5.438 (4.231)

4.017 (4.033)

-.811 (.278)

-.664 (.247)

-.868 (.306)

1.629 (2.336)

2.285 (2.310)

2.705 (2.255)

Cutpoint 2

1.720 (.323)

1.851 (.342)

1.489 (.340)

6.527 (4.212)

8.778 (4.324)

6.839 (4.102)

1.334 (.311)

1.506 (.299)

1.272 (.329)

4.560 (2.431)

5.316 (2.423)

5.597 (2.370)

Cutpoint 3

3.748 (.724)

3.984 (.744)

3.455 (.724)

8.099 (4.259)

10.446 (4.403)

8.290 (4.148)

3.493 (.720)

3.689 (.719)

3.436 (.725)

7.544 (2.624)

8.465 (2.678)

8.529 (2.604)

n 80 80 80 58 58 58 79 79 79 61 61 61 LLF -81.285 -77.714 -84.746 -52.128 -49.769 -55.475 -85.417 -85.015 -85.892 20.10** 21.89** 18.58** LR Χ2 10.09** 17.23*** 3.16† 16.58* 21.30** 9.88 3.81* 4.62* 2.86† -54.966 -54.072 -55.729 Pseudo-R2 .058 .100 .018 .137 .176 .082 .022 .026 .016 .155 .168 .143 Note: Entries are ordered logistical regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Data gathered via Q-sorts and pre-Q-sort questionnaire. *** p ≤ .001, ** p ≤ .01, * p ≤ .05, † p ≤ .1 (one-tailed tests)

Online Appendix: What's Not to Trust? Rubrics of ...

from the class-based coalition, Central de los Trabajadores (CTA); vocational school students from the working-class districts of Vicente López and General San ...
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