Peace Operations in the Francophone World

This book critically examines peacebuilding, humanitarian intervention and peace operation practices and experiences in francophone spaces. Francophone Africa as a specific space is relatively little studied in the peace and security literature, despite the fact that almost half of all peacekeepers are deployed or were deployed in this part of Africa during the last decade. It is an arena for intervention that deserves more serious attention, if only because it provides fertile ground for exploring the key questions raised in the peacekeeping and peacebuilding literature. For instance, in 2002 a French operation (Licorne) was launched and in 2003 a UN force was deployed in Côte dÊIvoire alongside the French force there. Filling a gap in the current literature, Peace Operations in the Francophone World critically examines peacekeeping and peacebuilding practices in the francophone world, including but not limited to conflict prevention and resolution, security sector reform (SSR), francophone politics, and North South relations. The book explores whether peace and security operations in francophone spaces have exceptional characteristics when compared with those carried out in other parts of the world and assesses whether an analysis of these operations in the francophone world can make a specific and original contribution to wider international debates about peacekeeping and peacebuilding. This book will be of interest to students of peacekeeping, peacebuilding, peace and conflict studies, African politics, security studies, and IR in general. Bruno Charbonneau is Associate Professor of Political Science at Laurentian University and Director of the Observatoire sur les missions de paix et opérations humanitaires at the Université du Québec à Montréal, Canada. He has written widely on the international politics of intervention in Francophone Africa. Tony Chafer is Professor of Contemporary French Area Studies at the University of Portsmouth, UK, and Director of its Centre for European and International Studies Research. He has written widely on Franco-African relations in the colonial and post-colonial periods.

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Cass Series on Peacekeeping General Editor: Michael Pugh

This series examines all aspects of peacekeeping, from the political, operational, and legal dimensions to the developmental and humanitarian issues that must be dealt with by all those involved with peacekeeping in the world today. Beyond the Emergency Development Within UN Peace Missions Edited by Jeremy Ginifer The UN, Peace and Force Edited by Michael Pugh Mediating in Cyprus The Cypriot Communities and the United Nations Oliver P. Richmond Peacekeeping and the UN Agencies Edited by Jim Whitman Peacekeeping and Public Information Caught in the Crossfire Ingrid A. Lehmann The Evolution of US Peacekeeping Policy Under Clinton A Fairweather Friend? Michael G. MacKinnon Peacebuilding and Police Reform Edited by Tor Tanke Holm and Espen Barth Eide Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution Edited by Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham

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Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21st Century Edited by Adekeye Adebajo and Chandra Lekha Sriram Women and International Peacekeeping Edited by Louise Olsson and Torunn L. Tryggestad Recovering from Civil Conflict Reconciliation, Peace and Development Edited by Edward Newman and Albrecht Schnabel Mitigating Conflict The Role of NGOs Edited by Henry F. Carey and Oliver P. Richmond Ireland and International Peacekeeping 1960–2000 A Study of Irish Motivation Katsumi Ishizuka Peace Operations After 11 September 2001 Edited by Thierry Tardy Confronting Past Human Rights Violations Justice vs Peace in Times of Transition Chandra Lekha Sriram The National Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post–Cold War Era Edited by David S. Sorensen and Pia Christina Wood A UN ‘Legion’ Between Utopia and Reality Stephen Kinloch-Pichat United Nations Peacekeeping in the Post–Cold War Era John Terence OÊNeill and Nicholas Rees The Military and Negotiation The Role of the Soldier Diplomat Deborah Goodwin NATO and Peace Support Operations 1991–1999 Policies and Doctrines Henning-A. Frantzen

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International Sanctions Between Words and Wars in the Global System Edited by Peter Wallensteen and Carina Staibano Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations A New Model in the Making? Peter Viggo Jakobsen Kosovo Between War and Peace Nationalism, Peacebuilding and International Trusteeship Edited by Tonny Brems Knudsen and Carsten Bagge Laustsen Clinton, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Interventionism Rise and Fall of a Policy Leonie G. Murray Political Ethics and the United Nations Dag Hammarskjöld as Secretary-General Manuel Fröhlich Statebuilding and Justice Reform Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Afghanistan Matteo Tondini Rethinking the Liberal Peace External Models and Local Alternatives Edited by Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh Peace Operations and Organized Crime Enemies or Allies? Edited by James Cockayne and Adam Lupel Corruption and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Selling the Peace? Edited by Christine Cheng and Dominik Zaum South America and Peace Operations Coming of Age Edited by Kai Michael Kenkel Peace Operations in the Francophone World Global Governance Meets Post-Colonialism Edited by Bruno Charbonneau and Tony Chafer

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Peace Operations in the Francophone World Global governance meets post-colonialism Edited by Bruno Charbonneau and Tony Chafer

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First published 2014 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2014 selection and editorial material, Bruno Charbonneau and Tony Chafer; individual chapters, the contributors The right of the editors to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data [CIP data] ISBN: 978-0-415-74913-8 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-79630-7 (ebk) Typeset in Times by Apex CoVantage, LLC

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Contents

List of figures and tables List of contributors Acknowledgements Introduction: Is there a specificity to peace operations in the francophone world?

ix xi xv

1

BRUNO CHARBONNEAU AND TONY CHAFER

PART 1

Conceptual and policy issues 1

Francophone peacekeeping: Charting the emergence of a new problematique in peace operations

19

21

MARIE-JO˙LLE ZAHAR , LORI-ANNE THÉROUX-BÉNONI, AND DAVID MORIN

2

Task sharing and peace operations: The role of the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie

38

FRÉDÉRIC RAMEL

3

Making sense of a francophone perspective on peace operations: Belgium as a case of minofrancophone state

54

MICHEL LIÉGEOIS

4

Peace operations and security sector reform (SSR) in Francophone Africa

71

NIAGALÉ BAGAYOKO

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viii 5

Contents The problems of French-led peace operations in Francophone sub-Saharan Africa in the twenty-first century

91

TOBIAS KOEPF

6

France and European Union peace operations in Africa: A francophone space exception?

106

BASTIEN NIVET

PART 2

Case Studies 7

International intervention in Côte d’Ivoire: The changing specificity of a francophone space

121

123

BRUNO CHARBONNEAU

8

The French military intervention in Mali: Not exactly Françafrique but definitely postcolonial

137

ISALINE BERGAMASCHI WITH MAHAMADOU DIAWARA

9

When peacekeeping meets French realpolitik: The implementation of Resolution 1778 in Chad

153

CYRIL FIORINI

10

Improvising the liberal peace model: A postcolonial view on the Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilization en Haiti (MINUSTAH)

168

MARTA FERN˘NDEZ MORENO, CARLOS CHAGAS VIANNA BRAGA, AND MA¸RA SIMAN GOMES

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Figures and tables

Figures 1.1 Shares of languages used in OIF member states (%) 3.1 UN personnel deployed in French-speaking areas 3.2 OIF and French-speaking personnel in UN missions deployed in OIF member states 3.3 Belgian deployed personnel by types of operations 3.4 Belgian deployed personnel by areas of deployment 3.5 Linguistic role of Belgian contingents in UNIFIL: D = Dutch speaking; F = French speaking

24 58 60 62 63 64

Tables 1.1 Maximalist and minimalist definitions 2.1 International missions of the OIF

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23 42

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Contributors

The editors Tony Chafer is Professor of Contemporary French Area Studies at the University of Portsmouth and Director of its Centre for European and International Studies Research. He is a specialist on French-speaking Africa and has published widely on Franco-African relations in the late colonial and postcolonial era. He is the author of The End of Empire in French West Africa: FranceÊs Successful Decolonization? (Berg, 2002) and has recently published a number of articles on Anglo-French cooperation in Africa in International Affairs, the Journal of Modern African Studies, and African Security. His new book Francophone Africa at Fifty (coedited with Alexander Keese) was published by Manchester University Press in 2013. Bruno Charbonneau is Associate Professor of Political Science at Laurentian University, Director of the Observatoire sur les missions de paix et opérations humanitaires at the Raoul-Dandurand Chair of Strategic and Diplomatic Studies, and Adjunct Professor of Economics at the Université du Québec à Montréal, Canada. He is the author of France and the New Imperialism (Ashgate, 2008) and coeditor of Peacebuilding, Memory and Reconciliation (Routledge, 2012) and Locating Global Order (University of British Columbia Press, 2010). His work has appeared in several edited books and journals, including the Review of International Studies, International Peacekeeping, International Political Sociology, and Afrique Contemporaine. His research examines the international politics of African conflicts and peace interventionism in Francophone Africa.

The contributors Niagalé Bagayoko is Doctor of Political Science, Institut dÊÉtudes Politiques (IEP) in Paris. She works at the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF), where she is responsible for the Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Programme of the Peace, Democracy, and Human Rights Division. She was also a security and development Research Fellow at the Institute for Development

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Contributors Studies (Sussex University, United Kingdom) from 2007 and 2010 and was a lecturer at the IEP in Paris from 2003 to 2005.

Isaline Bergamaschi holds a PhD from SciencesPo and the Centre dÊEtudes et de Recherches Internationales. Since January 2012, she is an assistant professor at the Department of Political Science of the Universidad de los Andes in Bogotá, Colombia. Her research deals with the transformations of international intervention in Mali (aid, humanitarian action, the French military operation, the UN Stabilization mission) and their effects on politics. She has been doing fieldwork in Bamako since 2007. Mahamadou Diawara is a Bamako-based consultant. He holds a Diplôme d'Etudes Appliquées in political sociology and collective action (Université de Bordeaux II, France) and has been involved in several research projects dealing with political participation, development, local governance and decentralisation in West Africa. He is researcher at the laboratory Citoyennetés, and a research associate at the Groupe d'étude et de recherche en sociologie et droit appliqué (GERSDA). Cyril Fiorini is a PhD student in Political Science at Paris 8 University (France). He works on sociopolitical dynamics in sub-Saharan societies, particularly in Chad. His research concerns human rights in Chad and the integration of Chadian actors into transnational networks. A specific focus is put on the economic, diplomatic, and strategic links between Chad and France, understood through the past colonial relationship. He is also currently working as research officer in the field of environmental policy in France. Maíra Siman Gomes is a PhD candidate and a lecturer at the Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro. She holds a masterÊs degree from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva. Her thesis concerns the engagement of Brazil in MINUSTAH and is supported by the Ministry of Defence and Education. Tobias Koepf is an Associate Fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) in Paris. From 2011 to 2013, he was a Transatlantic Post-Doc Fellow for International Relations and Security (TAPIR) at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in Washington, D.C., and the Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri) in Paris. He holds an MA from the University of Munich and a PhD from the University of Koblenz-Landau. Michel Liégeois is a Professor at the Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium, where he was awarded his PhD and now teaches international relations theories and security studies. He has authored Darfur: Mission Impossible for UNAMID? (GRIP Report No. 6, 2009) and Whatever Happened to Peacekeeping? The Future of a Tradition (with Jocelyn Coulon) (Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2010), and he has coedited (with Gaëlle Pellon) Les organisations régionales européennes et la gestion des conflits: Vers une régionalisation de la sécurité? (P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2010).

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Contributors

xiii

Marta Fernández Moreno is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, which also awarded her masterÊs degree and PhD. Her dissertation articulated a postcolonial reading on peace operations deployed in Somalia. She has been teaching on international relations theory and postcolonial studies. Her current research deals with BrazilÊs engagement in peacebuilding operations from postcolonial perspectives. David Morin is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Université de Sherbrooke and Deputy Director of the Francophone Research Network on Peace Operations at the University of Montreal. He is coeditor of the 2011 edition of Guide du maintien de la paix with L.-A. Théroux-Bénoni, with whom he has also published a bulletin entitled ÂMaintien de la paix et espace FrancophoneÊ (2009). In 2011, he published, with Justin Massie, ÂFrancophonie et opérations de paix: Vers une appropriation géoculturelleÊ in Études internationales. Bastien Nivet is Associate Professor of European Affairs and International Relations and Head of the Centre dÊÉtudes et de Recherche en Management (CEREM) at the Ecole de Management Leonard de Vinci (EMLV, Paris La Défense). He is also Associate Research Fellow at the Paris-based Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques (IRIS, Paris). His research focuses mainly on the European Union and its role in world affairs, as well as broader issues regarding the political dimensions of European integration. He is the author of numerous publications on these issues. Frédéric Ramel is Professor of Political Science at Sciences Po, Paris, and researcher at Centre dÊEtudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI). His areas of research cover multilateralism, concepts of strategy, and theory and art in international relations. In 2013, he received the Alfred ThibaudetÊs award for LÊattraction mondiale (Presses de SciencesPo, 2012), and he also participated in the creation of EISA (European International Studies Association). His latest publication was coedited with Thierry Balzacq, and includes more than 60 contributors, and deals with the contextualisation, organization, and diffusion of knowledge in francophone areas: Traité de Relations internationales (Presses de SciencesPo, 2013). Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni is Senior Researcher in the Conflict Prevention and Risk Analysis division of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Dakar (Senegal), where she covers West Africa. She previously worked as a researcher on peace and security issues with the Network on Peace Operations (ROP) at the University of Montreal. She has developed various projects relating to peace operations and capacity building in French-speaking states, mainly in New York and Addis Ababa. Lori-Anne holds a PhD in anthropology from the University of Toronto in Canada (2009). Her thesis focused on media, conflict, and democratization in Côte dÊIvoire, where she has been conducting regular field research since 2003. Her most recent research projects explored the participation of French-speaking states in UN and AU peace operations and the certification of postconflict electoral processes by the UN in Côte dÊIvoire.

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xiv

Contributors

Carlos Chagas Vianna Braga is a Brazilian naval officer (Marine Corps) and a PhD candidate at the Institute of International Relations, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro. He holds a masterÊs degree in military studies from the US Marine Corps University and has served in Haiti as assistant to the first MINUSTAH (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti) force commander. He has published on defence, strategy, and peacekeeping. Marie-Joëlle Zahar is Professor of Political Science and Research Director at the Francophone Research Network on Peace Operations (ROP) at the University of Montreal. She is also the Senior Expert on Powersharing on the 2013 United Nations Standby Team of Mediation Experts. Her research focuses on conflict resolution and peacebuilding. She has published extensively on both topics, including in International Peacekeeping, Global Governance, and Critique internationale. Her most recent book (cowritten with Rex Brynen, Pete W. Moore, and Bassel F. Salloukh) is Beyond the Arab Spring: Authoritarianism and Democratization in the Arab World (Lynne Rienner, 2012).

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Acknowledgements

This volume would not have been possible without the effort and support of many people. First and foremost, we want to thank Michael Pugh, editor of RoutledgeÊs Cass Series on Peacebuilding and long-time editor of the journal International Peacekeeping, for encouraging us to pursue this project. We also thank our contributors who responded positively and swiftly to our editorial demands, suggestions, comments, and various requirements. Their professionalism, indulgence, and devotion ensured the smooth process of bringing this book together. Thank you to Andrew Humphrys, senior editor at Routledge, and to his editorial team for their patient and professional work. Finally, we want to thank our families and friends for their support and for putting up with the often crazy and unpredictable demands of our academic careers.

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Introduction Is there a specificity to peace operations in the francophone world? Bruno Charbonneau and Tony Chafer

This book seeks to critically examine peacebuilding, humanitarian interventions, peace operation practices and experiences (broadly conceived) in the francophone world, including but not limited to conflict prevention and resolution, security sector reform (SSR), francophone politics, and North South relations. There seems to be no end to the literature on peacebuilding and peace operations. Yet relatively few analyses seriously study such activities in francophone contexts. Although analyses are found in French publications, these seem only rarely to transfer to or appear in English language debates and publications. More importantly, English language publications for the most part seem to largely exclude the experiences from francophone contexts. This book seeks to partly remedy this state of affairs by exploring whether peacebuilding and peace operations in francophone spaces have exceptional characteristics when compared to those carried out in other parts of the world and by assessing whether an analysis of peace operations in the francophone world can make a specific and original contribution to wider international debates about peacebuilding and peace operations. Historically speaking, the formation of the francophone world is closely connected to the development of French colonialism and the French empire. The expansion of the French language and culture was intimately tied to the dynamics of conquest, domination and control. These dynamics have evolved since decolonization·and rapidly since the end of the Cold War, as international peace efforts in Mali and Côte dÊIvoire suggest. Any appreciation of peace operations in the francophone world and/or by French troops must consider these post-colonial dynamics in order to appreciate how they interact with the international practices and politics of peace operations. The specificity of these shared and complex historical experiences, however, quickly transforms into theoretical and methodological difficulties of great significance. As Michel Liégeois discusses in Chapter 3 of this volume, the object under study is clouded by conceptual fuzziness: what are francité, francosphère, francophonie, Francophonie, and francophone? Can we isolate these experiences from nonfrancophone ones? Can we even talk of a francophone country if it is multicultural, and if French is the language only of the elite few or of formal exchanges? Although we deploy the term francophone world to express the diversity and the continuously transforming characteristics of its spaces, the theoretical and methodological difficulties are not so easily solved. After all, to seek to add the experiences of francophone spaces to analyses of

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peace operations is to confront the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion already expressed by the terms francophone/francophonie. What is defined as, and included within, the sphere of francophone/francophonie is too often reduced to simple claims about the (higher) value of French language and culture, as ardent proponents of Francophonie often articulate.1 Whereas francophone spaces are about more than the remains of the French empire, they are, at the very least, a reflection of a world once divided among the French, British, Belgian, Portuguese, and other empires. Although the literature on francophone countries, on francophonie, on the French Empire, on France Africa relations, and on French African security and military policy is vast, literature on francophone peacekeeping is scarce. An example is the limited number of publications on Côte dÊIvoire where the UN has been involved since 2003. In the leading journal, International Peacekeeping, only two articles that analyse the peace missions in the country have been published, both in 2012.2 This might point to a need for further research, but it may also point to the significance (or irrelevance) of discrimination between francophone and nonfrancophone experiences of peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peace missions in general. This introductory chapter presents the history of the francophone world as it pertains to issues of peace and conflict in order to critically assess its specificity and to situate it in academic debates on peace operations. It argues that the historical specificity of French colonialism is the inescapable a priori context of peace missions, even if this context is rapidly evolving and interacting with nonfrancophone spaces. The specificity is nevertheless increasingly difficult to identify as new practices and conditions emerge and as the lines between different francophone spaces and between francophone and nonfrancophone spaces are increasingly fluid. The French UN military intervention in Côte dÊIvoire in April 2011 that ousted Laurent Gbagbo and the French intervention in Mali in January 2013 to stop the northern armed rebellion both point to complex and transforming francophone-specific dynamics. This volume explores the range of possibilities that emerge from such interrogations and emphasizes that adding the experiences of the francophone world to analyses of peace operations is to confront context-specific dynamics of inclusion and exclusion and to interrogate the imperial legacy of peace operations.3 This introduction shows how the processes of globalization broadly conceived increasingly challenge the notion of a francophone specificity but do not eradicate it. It then goes on to critically examine debates concerning the international politics of peace and peace interventionism. The publication of this book might suggest a self-fulfilling prophecy about the specificity and relevance of francophone experiences to larger debates about peace operations. We do not wish to overemphasize or essentialize francophone experiences. We do not claim that the analysis of francophone experiences is of any more importance than that of other experiences. Nor do we claim that such analyses can change or challenge dominant positions. Yet francophone experiences offer a fertile ground for further exploring and throwing new light on many issues surrounding peace operations

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Introduction 3 and their critiques. Our ultimate goal is not to complete a story per se or to provide a more comprehensive account of peace operations. Instead, we interrogate where and how the context-specific dynamics of francophone experiences provide a comparative perspective that can (or cannot) challenge theoretical approaches and various debates. Such a comparison helps us to examine how hegemonic peacebuilding practices move and change between locations and between different historical contexts, as well as how these dynamics point to the ways in which the organization or reorganization of power is negotiated, imposed, and/or resisted across francophone and nonfrancophone spaces.

Decolonization and the specificity of the francophone world The notion of a francophone world, with its own specific characteristics, culture, and identity, has roots in the experience of French decolonization in sub-Saharan Africa. Here, in contrast to its experience in Indochina and Algeria, France was able to negotiate a largely peaceful transfer of power to African political leaders (except in Cameroon), which enabled it to maintain a privileged sphere of influence. Upon independence, France signed a network of exclusive defence, military assistance, and technical and cultural cooperation accords with the newly independent African governments. It maintained up to 60,000 prepositioned troops at French military bases (although this number declined rapidly to some 10,000 by the 1970s). Its former colonies were the privileged recipients of French overseas development aid. The currencies of the newly independent states were in the franc zone and remained tied to the French franc. Large numbers of young French people went to Africa to work as coopérants, often as an alternative to military service. Moreover, President Charles De Gaulle regarded West and Central Africa as a key arena for the projection of French power overseas (rayonnement), and he maintained a special so-called Africa cell at the Elysée Palace, managed for years by his close collaborator and éminence grise, Jacques Foccart. France and Francophone Africa came to constitute a transnational francophone space that was bound together by a dense network of links. Underlining the specificity of this space and the special nature of the relationship, Francophone Africa was known as FranceÊs pré carré (literally, Âenclosed area of influenceÊ). The francophone world was never limited to Francophone Africa, but the Cold War afforded France an opportunity to maintain its African pré carré as an exclusive sphere of French influence.4 With the United States concerned about maintaining African countries in the Western bloc, France was able to use the Cold War context to carve out a role for itself as the guarantor of Western interests in West and Central Africa. As the only external power with the capability and the political will to intervene in the region, France undertook some 35 military interventions in Francophone Africa from political independence in 1960 to 1995 (an average of one a year), usually to sustain or restore to power governments that were friendly to France.5 Its military activism earned it the reputation of the gendarme of Africa.

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With the end of the Cold War, major changes took place in global power relations that fundamentally affected FranceÊs African pré carré. With the demise of the Soviet bloc, Africa no longer had the strategic importance that it had enjoyed during the Cold War. At the 1990 Franco-African summit, President François Mitterrand sent a warning to African leaders that they could no longer expect unconditional French support and that French aid would in the future go to those African governments promoting political reform and democratization. However, implementation of the new policy was uneven in practice. It was only after revelations of FranceÊs shameful activities in Rwanda in the early 1990s, criticism of its role following the 1994 genocide,6 and the crisis that then unfolded in former Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) that a far-reaching reappraisal of French military policy in Africa began.7 By 1997, French influence in Africa, even in its traditional pré carré, seemed to be on the wane. Unqualified French support for President Mobutu led France into diplomatic isolation and raised questions about its claim to be the privileged interlocutor for the Francophone African states.8 Renewed instability in the Central African Republic in 1996 1997, which was home to FranceÊs second largest military base on the continent, further undermined French military policy in Africa. Moreover, the United States seemed ready to exploit French discomfiture in the Great Lakes area by extending its links with African states. In 1997, it announced the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), a programme to enhance the capacity of African militaries to respond effectively to peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations on the continent. ACRIÊs emphasis was on training African troops based on a common peacekeeping doctrine and on the supply of interoperable communications equipment that would enable deployed units to work together more effectively. Against this background, it was clear that, if French strategic objectives in Africa were to be met, then a drastic overhaul of military policy was needed. After winning the 1997 legislative elections, the Socialist government of Lionel Jospin introduced reforms.9 He called for a Ânew partnershipÊ with Africa and, while acknowledging that FranceÊs military commitment to Africa should continue, he proposed thorough revision. First, he launched the RECAMP (Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities) programme. Conceived in response to the US ACRI programme, its purpose was to increase the military capacity of African countries to engage in peacekeeping operations by providing training and capacity-building support. The programme, placed under UN auspices, sought to work in close collaboration with the Organisation of African Unity and AfricaÊs subregional organizations. The programme was seen as being in keeping with FranceÊs commitment to ÂAfrican solutions for African problemsÊ and was supposed to make it possible for French troops to take a less prominent role in maintaining security and stability on the continent. Second, the Jospin government undertook a review of FranceÊs prepositioned forces. Discounting troops posted to the island of La Réunion, there were some 8,500 stationed at seven bases. The idea was to reduce troop numbers by approximately one-third by 2002 and to concentrate them on five bases. Underlining the increased mobility and capability

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Introduction 5 of the remaining forces, Jospin argued that the adverse impact on French ability to deploy its forces on the continent would be negligible. Third, Jospin wanted to shed FranceÊs reputation as the gendarme of Africa. He therefore sought to set French military commitments within explicitly multilateral frameworks by gaining approval for interventions through the UN Security Council and by working with African regional and subregional organizations.10 Finally, he set out to redefine the terms of French military cooperation. This meant replacing coopération de substitution, whereby French officers replaced African military officers in key roles, with a new approach, coopération de partenariat, whereby French officers acted as advisers working alongside African officers. From the French point of view, this had the advantage of reducing costs because the required number of French military cooperation personnel declined. It also freed up resources for the RECAMP programme, which was seen as the centrepiece of FranceÊs new approach to military cooperation. Moreover, in a further break with FranceÊs unilateral approach to military interventions in Africa, the French and British governments signed the Saint-Malo agreement at the 1998 Franco-British summit. France and the UK agreed to work together more closely on defence and security·issues that had long divided them·paving the way for a meaningful European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). They also committed to cooperate more systematically on Africa policy, opening the door to greater security cooperation.11 These changes in French military policy were motivated not only by the pressures of a rapidly changing international context but also by an urgent need to overhaul policy in order to reduce both the costs and risks of its military posture and interventions and to ensure that policy better served French interests in Africa. In arguing for the changes, explicit reference was made to the need to promote peace, democracy and prosperity in Africa. The new policy was presented as FranceÊs contribution to supporting security and development on the continent. At the same time, it was made clear that France now intended to engage with Africa beyond its traditional pré carré; all sub-Saharan African countries were for the first time included in FranceÊs Zone de Solidarité Prioritaire and eligible for inclusion in French cooperation partnerships.12 By the beginning of the new millennium, the notion of a distinctive francophone space for French military interventions had been considerably watered down. Developments in the 1990s had ended the French monopoly over military interventions in its former pré carré, and the special relationship between France and its former colonies in Africa had lost much of its lustre. France increasingly sought to intervene on the continent in concert with other external powers rather than unilaterally, and many Africans increasingly challenged French influence and presence on the continent. These trends continued during the first decade of the twenty-first century, but the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001 renewed a focus on security issues in Africa (where it was feared that Al-Qaeda and other African terrorist groups operated) and on the perceived need for multilateral cooperation. French and US concerns about Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, although shared, did not in practice lead to the two countriesÊ working

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in concert with each other, mainly due to ongoing concerns that cooperation with the United States would lead to a relative diminution of French power.13 France deployed significant troop numbers to Côte dÊIvoire in 2002 that would later support the UN forces mandated to monitor and support the ceasefire there (UN Operation in Côte dÊIvoire [UNOCI]) and that played a lead role in the four ESDP military missions launched in Africa to date: Operation Artemis, DRC, June September 2003; EUFOR, DRC, July November 2006; EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic, January 2008 March 2009; and EU NAVFOR, Operation Atalanta, December 2008 ongoing. Finally, the French RECAMP programme was transformed into an EU programme, EURORECAMP, following the December 2007 Africa EU summit in Lisbon. Based in Paris because France is the framework nation designated by the EU, EURORECAMP has a French general as director and a British officer as deputy. Like RECAMP, it aims to strengthen African peacekeeping capacity through education and training. Unlike its predecessor, however, it is guided by the principle of African ownership, and its focus is explicitly on the African Union (AU) and on AfricaÊs regional organizations, in order to enable them to contribute more effectively to regional security. A good example of this new focus was the 2008 launch of the first training cycle, Amani (ÂpeaceÊ) Africa, which aimed to assist the AU in its decision making for crisis management at the continental level and in operationalising the Africa Standby Force, a key element of the new African Peace and Security Architecture.14 The UK was the largest financial contributor to Amani Africa, while France took on the lead role in agenda setting and implementation as the framework nation for the EURORECAMP programme.15 Yet for all the claims of a rupture in French African policy, the French military protected the regime of Chadian President Idriss Déby under the cover of the EU deployment (EUFOR Tchad/RCA) in 2008, ousted (with UN troops) President Laurent Gbagbo in Côte dÊIvoire, was one of the major forces in the campaign against LibyaÊs Muammar al-Qaddafi in 2011, and launched unilaterally and without a UN mandate (albeit with wide African support) an assault on Salafist insurgents in Mali in 2013. President Nicolas Sarkozy came to power in 2007 promising to overhaul Franco-African relations, including military relations. A key part of the promised overhaul of military relations was the renegotiation of FranceÊs exclusive defence accords with African governments, which Sarkozy promised in a speech at Cape Town in 2008. Elected in May 2012, SarkozyÊs successor, President François Hollande, also promised a rupture. In October 2012, he assured that he would not put French military boots on the ground in Mali. Yet this was precisely what he did three months later. Since then, the 2013 Livre blanc on French defence and military policy, published in May after multiple delays due to the Mali military deployment, reasserted the necessity of maintaining French bases in Africa to support a strong military policy on the continent.16 Promises of less unilateral intervention have been belied by essentially unilateral interventions in Côte dÊIvoire, Mali, and Chad, notwithstanding the Âmultilateral coverÊ provided by the UN Security Council.17 Moreover, the emphasis on training African soldiers and supporting African military interventions, instead of putting French

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Introduction 7 troops on the ground, was already present in French policy statements under SarkozyÊs predecessor as president, Jacques Chirac. In addition, training African peacekeepers is a common theme within UK and US initiatives. French analysis of the African security context has remained largely constant since 2001, revolving around the notion of ungoverned spaces and diffuse threats stretching across the African Sahel.18 In this respect, French security thinking about the continent is broadly in line with the current thinking of the United States and the UK.19 In sum, the notion of a Francophone African space as an exclusive area of French intervention was transformed under the presidencies of Chirac and Sarkozy and against the background of rapid African political developments. The end of the French monopoly of interventions means France now seeks to intervene within multilateral frameworks or alongside other international organizations such as the EU, the UN, and the AU, with which it can share the costs and risks of intervention. This increase in UN, EU, and AU involvement in the francophone world has occurred against the background of a fundamental change in the network of power relations that facilitated unilateralism. These changes in the material realities underpinning the Franco-African special relationship have in turn impacted normative frameworks and mindsets within which French and Francophone African policymakers operate. Interventions are no longer justified by reference to the need to maintain or restore stability in Francophone Africa. Instead, the justification for intervention relates to the need to establish security and the rule of law as prerequisites for development and for the effective integration of a peaceful and prosperous Africa into the global economy. France has joined with other Western powers in promoting a neoliberal agenda for Africa, diluting in the process the notion of a distinctive francophone space in Africa. However, this diluting argument should not be taken too far. Although the francophone world has seen numerous and significant transformations, the 2013 French military operation in Mali should serve as a reminder that French militarism in Africa and its specific mechanisms are not things of the past and continue to influence UN deployments on the continent. Of course, francophone spaces are not limited to France-Africa relations, as the contributions to this volume demonstrate. The so-called francophone world is not the exclusive domain of France, and one should not underestimate the agency of African and other francophone actors. For instance, in parallel with Franco-African developments, the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF, also referred to as La Francophonie) has itself redefined the notions of francophonie and the francophone world. The organization has, in recent years, become less focused on the defence and promotion of the French language. As more countries have joined, a declining proportion of the populations of OIF member states have French as their mother tongue. In keeping with this change, France now increasingly sees Francophonie Ânot just as an auxiliary arm of its own cultural and language policy of rayonnement, but as a means of exerting political influence in the world at largeÊ.20 In other words, Francophonie has evolved from being an official ideology that sought to promote the rayonnement of French language and culture into an organization that is more pragmatic and more political in nature,

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focusing on political governance and sustainable development. The OIF has further changed the meaning of francophone world, and the organizationÊs involvement in peacekeeping, in conflict prevention and resolution, and in security sector reform is one part of this evolution.

Peace operations in evolving francophone contexts Michael Pugh once regretted the small number of critical analytical perspectives on peacekeeping and peace missions in general. Against the dominance of policy-driven and problem-solving approaches, he argued that Âthe received view of peacekeeping in global governance is not neutral but serves the purpose of an existing order within which problem solving adjustments can occurÊ.21 He could hardly make the same argument in 2014 about the lack of critical perspectives because they have emerged to challenge dominant perspectives and conceptualizations of peace operations. From various theoretical approaches, critics have emphasized how international peace practices and interventions are often founded upon and reproduce lingering hierarchies of race, class, and gender.22 The most virulent critiques have perhaps been informed by poststructuralist and postcolonial perspectives that theorize the ways in which colonial conditions of the past, as well as North South inequalities, linger on into present international peace intervention practices and interact with contemporary processes of global circulation, migration, state building, and identity politics.23 Yet, as Mac Ginty and Richmond argue, Â[d]espite its vibrancy, the critical school remains a minority interest, especially given the material power associated with the problem-solving perspectiveÊ.24 With a few exceptions, problemsolving oriented academics have not engaged much with the works of critical academics.25 Roland Paris is perhaps exceptional in confronting them directly. In 2010, he perceived the need to save liberal peacebuilding from the Âexaggerated backlashÊ of Âhyper-critical writingsÊ.26 Although he once acknowledged that there were ÂechoesÊ of mission civilisatrice in international peacebuilding,27 he now rejects the notion that the imperial past matters to contemporary peace missions because colonialism, he argues, ended with decolonization.28 From such a perspective, the past does not matter as much as the critics claim it does, except perhaps in the ways in which the past can produce Âlessons to be learnedÊ for elaborating better practices.29 Here, PughÊs distinction between critical perspectives and policy-driven approaches becomes useful in understanding the various ways one can approach, question, and theorize the specificity of the francophone world. The distinction reflects the different normative positions related to the politics of peace and conflict management and the normative power of certain epistemological standpoints. The problem-solving (or policy-driven) perspective distinguishes clearly between war and peace.30 With peace being conceived as the normal condition, it is attained through the management of war.31 In this mindset, technical solutions to end war and promote peace are debated and offered as policy-relevant research.

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Introduction 9 The historical and political conditions of peace/war are not called into question. Questions about whose peace and the nature of the peace that should be promoted and constructed are questions better left assumed and unanswered. Peace is taken as an unproblematic given. Peace operations can thus be construed as one of the instruments for the promotion of international peace and security. Within such an epistemological framework, the francophone specificity is another variable that might or might not be relevant to the betterment of peacekeeping practices. Does a francophone country, people, culture, or language change the needs, objectives, mechanisms, efficiency, strategies, and/or tactics of peace operations? From a technical and problem-solving perspective, most would certainly answer no. In a limited fashion, however, a positive answer can be given by emphasizing the significance of efficient and effective communication. The fact that there is quantitative data supporting the increase in UN troops deployed in francophone spaces since 2001 (see Chapter 1 of this volume) can buttress arguments and demands for more French-speaking UN soldiers and officers. Critical perspectives, on the other hand, argue that the dominant approaches ignore the consequences of power and the normative and practical effects of their epistemological positions. Peace operations are not simply technical solutions to conflict in the non-Western world but rather the historical product of complex power relations. They have evolved as an aftereffect of the emergence of the state system, the global political economy, and colonial history. As Philip Cunliffe put it, Âinternational inequalities of wealth and power are refracted through the UNÊs conflict machineryÊ.32 Critical perspectives emphasize the importance of historical and/or situated knowledge, the political and historical formation of knowledge and ideological discursive forms,33 and context-specific analyses of peace operations.34 The specificity of peace operations in the francophone world is thus found analytically at the intersection of the historical formation of certain conditions and of the contingent moment of a specific operation. The specificity is not a static context or variable that ÂcausesÊ events or behaviours (in the positivist rational sense of causality). It is not a cultural or linguistic causal argument per se but an emphasis on historical structures, formations, and practices that inform the conditions of possibility of a specific context. In the English-language literature, debates over peace operations have rarely found expression in the experiences of the francophone space of international intervention, with the possible exception of Haiti. Moreover, when comparisons are made and drawn from past colonial conditions, the British Empire is the common point of reference in the peace operations literature. We do not claim that our collaborative analysis of peace operations in the francophone world will or can settle for good any of the debates surrounding peace operations. This would be to essentialize francophone experiences, and, in any case, our contributors represent varied perspectives on the francophone specificity that are not necessarily compatible beyond the subject matter. However, as our preceding brief discussion suggests, francophone spaces offer a fertile ground for exploring further such questions and for providing comparative experiences and perspectives.35 As most of our contributors suggest, the post-colonial past inevitably influences the

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francophone spaces where international peace interventions occur because where France is involved (notably in Africa), the post-colonial is an omnipresent and overt aspect of local/international interactions and because the development of the OIF is historically tied to the remnants of the French and Belgian empires. The francophone (post-)colonial past, no matter how defined, is an inevitable characteristic in that it is the inescapable a priori context of international interventions in the francophone world, even if this context is rapidly evolving and challenged by a variety of actors and is in constant interaction with nonfrancophone dynamics and processes. This is not a deterministic argument or one that seeks to assign causal power to post-coloniality or some francophone culture. To take into account the post-colonial context in the francophone space of intervention is to acknowledge the conditions of possibility at play prior to international intervention, how these conditions change according to local/international dynamics, strategies and tactics, and how the limits to peace are set or challenged within this particular context. As the contributions to this volume suggest, international peace interventions in the francophone world are found mostly in Africa, with Haiti being an interesting exception (see Chapter 10 in this volume by Marta Moreno, Carlos Braga, and Maíra Gomes). In Francophone Africa, the particular role that France has played and the particular dynamics of Franco-African interactions should not be underestimated. The majority of Francophone African states share a specific institutional, organizational, and procedural model largely inspired by the Constitution of the French Fifth Republic of 1958. Their institutional framework encourages the concentration of power within the executive and, more precisely, within the presidency. The president has the last word in regard to matters of defence and security, marginalizing the role of the prime minister and/or of the legislative body. Although this is not unique, as an OIF-sponsored collective research effort recognized, constitutional controls in Francophone Africa to dissuade the use of force and the involvement of the army in national politics have had limited success. Long and multiple histories of military coups dÊétat (e.g., Chad, Mauritania, Guinée-Conakry, Togo, Madagascar) point to the ambivalent views of Francophone African political elites vis-à-vis their armies.36 This militarism must be understood in the context of French African practices of bilateral military cooperation that, in the past, encouraged militarism. These practices have come to symbolize a permanent state of intervention that influenced the composition of social forces, the role of the state, and the distribution of material and political resources.37 In this context, the promotion of peace and stability through SSR presents specific difficulties, both in preventive and postconflict situations. The liberal peace model that SSR promotes38 has encountered resistance and obstacles in the institutional and organizational history of French African policy and in the politics of French African bilateral military cooperation. However, while proponents of dominant approaches to peacebuilding can acknowledge the post-colonial context, they are often quick to trivialize its relevance to peace missions.39 Yet local actors (notably elites) seem clearly aware of the post-colonial specificity of the francophone space of intervention and of

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Introduction 11 the paradoxical situation that France is confronted with as a member of the UN Security Council and as the former gendarme of Africa. Thus local actors gain political potency from this paradox for avenues for action and strategic or tactical opportunities. For example, in Côte dÊIvoire, Laurent Gbagbo clearly understood the tensions involved in the politics of the international peace mission and how they could be manipulated or exploited to change Ivoirian conditions of possibility. His nationalist anticolonial rhetoric and use of powerful images of Âsecond decolonizationÊ, of liberation, and of freedom from injustice proved effective in neutralizing international meddling until the conflict reignited during the 2010 2011 postelection crisis.40 In Côte dÊIvoire, local agents defining themselves vis-à-vis international actors played a key role in setting the limits and the conditions of possibilities for the peace operation by working with, against, or in spite of the limitations imposed by the specific context of peace interventionism.41 Nevertheless, francophone spaces and experiences should not be essentialized. As the contributors show, francophone dynamics are rapidly evolving and are further integrated into and influenced by nonfrancophone networks and institutions, as can be seen in the developing relationship between the OIF and the UN. More importantly, establishing the existence of the francophone world of peace operations is an instance of exclusion. There are significant methodological challenges in defining the limits of the term francophone or Francophonie that have both political and operational consequences. One challenge is the subjective location of the editors and contributors of this volume. Are we not participants, as interested and/or francophone academics, in reproducing our subject and its associated inclusion/exclusion dynamics? The francophone space is not to be conceived as hermetic to the outside world. It is a particular space and moment of inclusion and exclusion, but one that can sometimes conflate, interact with, or distinguish itself from other global patterns and sites of inclusion and exclusion.

Structure of the book The first part of the book introduces and analyses the conceptual and policy issues. It begins with a chapter that defines, documents, and presents an overview of the increasing francophone fact of peace operations. Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni, and David Morin show the empirical basis of what they call the ÂfrancophonizationÊ of peacekeeping. Quantitative data illustrate the exponential increase in the number of UN troops deployed in francophone countries since 2001. Qualitative changes are argued to come from the development of more complex peace operations (from peacekeeping to peacebuilding), which have fundamentally changed the relationship between peacekeepers and host populations. The significance of communication in the success of peace missions is amplified in the context of increased contacts between internationals and locals. The authors argue that these developments result from three reinforcing dynamics: (1) the quantitative increase in UN deployments in francophone spaces; (2) the specific

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needs of peace missions that have become multidimensional and that involve complex interactions to reconstruct states and societies; and (3) appropriation of peace operations by francophone states and the OIF. These dynamics highlight the importance of deploying resources that are adapted to the specific situation and the need for more efficient collaboration between the UN and regional organizations. In Chapter 2, Frédéric Ramel examines the instruments and institutions of the OIF and their articulation with those of the UN. Unlike other regional organizations, the OIF does not engage in traditional task sharing and is not a ÂsubcontractorÊ that will send troops. Rather, the OIF has emerged as a third party that facilitates and supports peace operations, notably by promoting democracy and human rights and freedoms as stipulated in the Bamako Declaration of 2000, which gives the OIF the means to act in cases of threats to the legal democratic systems or of human rights violations in its member countries. Ramel argues that the evolution of the OIF has so far been associated with the proactive role of its two first secretaries-general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Abdou Diouf. Their leadership has been crucial to overcoming the reticence of member states and the financial and political limits imposed on the OIF. More importantly, Ramel emphasizes the particular characteristics of the OIF as Âa partnership model that gets over the pragmatism and even the narratives of authorization that govern several examples of inter-organizational cooperationÊ, thus emerging as a third party that offers additional diplomatic avenues and opportunities, and increased capacity in terms of interorganizational cooperation. In his chapter on Belgium as a minofrancophone state, Michel Liégeois further analyses quantitative data to chart the evolution of peacekeeping into multidimensional practices, arguing that key explanations for increasing interest in francophone peacekeeping include the growing number of francophone countries hosting UN troops on their territory, rising cooperation between the UN and regional organizations, and the institutional development of Francophonie. However, he argues that a Âblurred conceptual landscapeÊ surrounding francophone/ francophonie results from the ways in which different authors approach the topic from varied perspectives and adopt Âthe particular conceptual tool that fits that [authorÊs] chosen perspectiveÊ. Liégeois deconstructs the Âfrancophone perspectiveÊ on peace operations to question the relevance of discussing peacekeeping along cultural lines. Most importantly, his analysis points to the implicit political dimensions involved in discussing a francophone perspective or participation in peace operations. As he argues, ÂMapping the use of French across the globe means tracing the colonial expansion of France and BelgiumÊ, thus inevitably introducing tensions when and where these countries send troops to past areas of colonial domination. He supports the argument with a case study analysis of BelgiumÊs participation in UNIFIL, as a Âminofrancophone stateÊ, to emphasize Âthe thin influence of the linguistic factor on its peacekeeping policyÊ and to argue Âthe vacuity of the language-matching argumentÊ. In Chapter 4, Niagalé Bagayoko maps out and analyses how security institutions work in Francophone and Anglophone African countries and how the different actors (security providers as well as oversight actors) relate to each other. She

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Introduction 13 highlights the kind of institutional framework prevailing in the two sets of countries and the specific considerations that the African Union and United Nations have to take into account. The chapter aims to provide a better understanding of the institutional, organizational, bureaucratic, and legal security arrangements operating in Francophone and Anglophone African countries, to highlight their commonalities and differences and to provide an overview of the actors, structures, and how security systems function. Former French territories (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Côte dÊIvoire, the Central African Republic [CAR], Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo) and former British and American colonies (Botswana, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) are reviewed. Such a comparison suggests ways to improve SSR programmes implemented in Africa, taking into account the specific organizational structures and management processes prevailing respectively within Francophone and Anglophone African security systems. The next chapter, by Tobias Koepf, on the difficulties of peace operations in Francophone sub-Saharan Africa analyses the specific characteristics of what could be considered the most common occurrence when examining francophone peace operations: the involvement of France. Koepf examines the peace operations in Côte dÊIvoire, Chad, and the CAR and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. FranceÊs colonial past, its policy of military intervention, and its presence after decolonization have proven problematic. FranceÊs role and the legitimacy of its intervention (even if under a UN mandate) have come under severe criticism, notably in countries where France pursues simultaneously a bilateral policy of military cooperation and defence agreements. According to Koepf, the practices of this bilateral military cooperation undermine international peacekeeping efforts, as examples from Côte dÊIvoire and Chad/CAR suggest. In many ways, this is a practical concern with concrete effects on the ground, Koepf argues, because African actors have seen and instrumentalized the opportunities offered by this problematic French involvement. To Koepf, the case of the DRC suggests that a possible solution is the full multilateralization of French military commitment, meaning the full integration of French troops under UN command, even if there is no guarantee that this will solve the ambiguity behind deploying French troops on African soil. Once a mere observer in the field of peace operations, the European Union (EU) has emerged over the past 12 years as one of the international actors capable of undertaking peace missions, usually under a mandate or a direct demand from the United Nations. This transformation of the EU has not gone without difficulties and limits, given the specific nature of this actor, composed as it is of different institutions and different member states. In the context of French attempts at ÂEuropeanisingÊ its military operations in Africa, Bastien Nivet questions the existence of potential specificities of francophone spaces as theatres of EU peace operations. He addresses the question whether one can identify specific features, trends, and characteristics of francophone spaces with regard to the official and

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broader EU approach to peace operations. Chapter 6 compares the trends and patterns of the EU approach to peace operations since its first mission on the continent in 2003 (operation Artemis in DRC in 2003). An analysis of the conditions in which these missions are prepared and decisions about them are made and implemented, based on interviews with officials implicated in the process, enables this chapter to contribute to the study of francophone spaces, of peace operations, and of the conditions of emergence of the EU as an actor in both fields. The second section of the book offers in-depth studies of context-specific peace operations in francophones spaces. In Chapter 7, Bruno Charbonneau analyses the changing role that France played in the Ivoirian crisis since 2002 in order to assess the historical legacy of Franco-Ivoirian relations on the peace operations and the 2011 dénouement. From a predominant role during the early years (2002 2004), to a more modest and quiet role (2005 2009) that left room for African peace initiatives, France took again a leading role in 2010 2011 by ousting President Laurent Gbagbo after he lost the presidential election. Even though the 2011 regime change was authorized under United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1975, involved UN troops working with French troops, and received the support of African regional organizations, it remains undeniable that France was at the centre of developments thanks to its military power and status as a permanent member of the UNSC. The chapter shows how the specificity of this francophone space affected international and national peace efforts. Moreover, the case of Côte dÊIvoire clearly shows how this specificity has evolved rapidly due to various Ivoirian dynamics and strategies and to evolving international norms of intervention. This case study points to how the specificity of a francophone space of peace intervention is intertwined with nonfrancophone dynamics, notably the regional dynamics of international peace interventionism. In the next chapter, Isaline Bergamaschi surveys the events leading up to the French military intervention in Mali in 2013. As she shows, this was not an oldstyle unilateral military intervention, insofar as President Hollande had previously promised not to intervene militarily in the crisis but subsequently felt obliged to do so by rapidly evolving developments on the ground and following a plea from MaliÊs interim president for French help. In this respect, President Hollande was very much the Âreluctant intervenerÊ. Yet, as Bergamaschi argues, the intervention is at another level very much a product of FranceÊs ÂneocolonialÊ presence in the subregion. She shows that Operation Serval can only be understood as a postcolonial intervention that is inherently specific to the African francophone space because France alone had the capability, resources on the ground, and political will to intervene. Moreover, the legitimacy of the intervention was framed by President Hollande very much within a postcolonial framework; he paid tribute to the way Malians had come to the aid of France in its hour of need during two world wars and indicated that France was now repaying that debt. In Chapter 9, Cyril Fiorini examines the case of Chad. During the last decade, the increase in rebel activity in the Chad Sudan Central African Republic boundary area resulted in a massive transfrontier displacement of people. The humanitarian crisis and large-scale insecurity that ensued made intervention by

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Introduction 15 the international community absolutely necessary. Thus, the Security Council established the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) through its resolution 1778 adopted on 25 September 2007. This resolution included the deployment of a European force (EUFOR) whose mission was to protect civilians and refugees and to support humanitarian activities in eastern Chad and the northeast of the Central African Republic. France sent the largest single contingent deployed through EUFOR. Diplomatic, economic, and military issues in Chad are particularly influenced by the presence of French interests. The existence of a French military force permanently stationed in Chad since the Libyan invasion in 1986 constitutes a particularly relevant illustration of the important place Chad holds in the French strategic system in Africa. By focusing on contextual features, especially on the political dynamics observable since Idriss Deby ItnoÊs seizure of power in 1990 as regards human rights protection, this chapter discusses the issues raised by FranceÊs contribution to the European operation. In particular, it shows how the dominant French position in EUFOR was related to the French governmentÊs attempt to protect its own interests. In the final chapter, Marta Fernándes Moreno, Carlos Chagas Vianna Braga, and Maíra Siman Gomes analyse the UN mission in Haiti from a postcolonial perspective. Conceived as a francophone mission operating in a francophone country, their chapter presents a complex picture that problematizes the possibility of discussing francophone/francophonie in peace operations. Composed by a majority of Latin American troops, MINUSTAH was exposed to different symbolic and material pressures that ranged from the UN liberal peace model to French colonial heritage, to the previous US interferences and its current geographical proximity, to postcolonial worldviews, and to local demands. The authors argue that MINUSTAH shows how the conventional peace operation model is, at the field level of everyday experience, constantly challenged and renegotiated. The authors emphasize the need to politicize the multiple encounters between a predefined peace operation model and field experiences by exposing the inevitable negotiations and adaptations of the various actors in a post-colonial context and by highlighting the hybridity and ambivalence of all identities. Taken together, the contributions to this book show that francophone spaces and experiences are in flux. It appears that France has largely fallen into line with the liberal peace model of intervention. It is in this sense that the French SenateÊs portrayal of the French military intervention in Côte dÊIvoire, as a Âlaboratory for changeÊ for FranceÊs new military policy in Africa, can be understood.42 Yet FranceÊs colonial past and history of military interventions since 1960 have rendered the implementation of this new approach highly problematic in practice, as the 2013 military deployment in Mali demonstrates. Resistance to change is observable within France and in the various spaces of peace operations, yet President François Hollande ultimately did send French troops to reconquer northern Mali. This book problematizes these changes in a specific space where global liberal governance meets postcolonialism, although as the contributions to this volume show the lines are not as clear-cut as they might at first appear between different

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francophone spaces and between francophone and nonfrancophone spaces. At a moment when it seems increasingly difficult to identify what is distinctive about peace operations in francophone contexts, this book explores the range of issues that emerge from an interrogation of peace operations in francophone spaces and charts the difficulties that France, the OIF, and the UN face as they seek to modify and adapt their practices to new and evolving conditions.

Notes 1. Bruno Charbonneau, ÂPossibilities of Multilateralism: Canada, la Francophonie, and Global OrderÊ, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2010, pp. 79 98. 2. Bruno Charbonneau, ÂWar and Peace in Côte dÊIvoire: Violence, Agency, and the Local/International LineÊ, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2012, pp. 508 524; Katariina Simonen, ÂQui sÊexcuse sÊaccuse . . . An Analysis of French Justifications for Intervening in Côte dÊIvoireÊ, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2012, pp. 363 376. 3. Bruno Charbonneau, ÂThe Imperial Legacy of International Peacebuilding: The Case of Francophone AfricaÊ, Review of International Studies, Vol. 40, forthcoming 2014. 4. Bruno Charbonneau, ÂLes effets du prisme de lÊAtlantique sur les relations Nord-Sud: Le cas de lÊAfrique francophoneÊ [The effects of the Atlantic paradigm on North South relations: The case of Francophone Africa], in Dorval Brunelle (ed.), Repenser lÊAtlantique: commerce, immigration, sécurité [Rethinking the Atlantic: Commerce, immigration, security], Brussels: Bruylant, 2012, pp. 395 418. 5. Gordon Cumming, Aid to Africa, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2001, p. 410. 6. Daniela Kroslak, The Role of France in the Rwanda Genocide, London: Hurst, 2007. 7. Rachel Utley, ÂFranco-African Military Relations: Meeting the Challenges of Globalisation?Ê, Modern and Contemporary France, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2005, pp. 25 40. 8. Tony Chafer, ÂFranco-African Relations: No Longer so Exceptional?Ê, African Affairs, Vol. 101, No. 404, 2002, p. 349. 9. Tony Chafer, ÂChirac and „la Françafrique‰: No Longer a Family AffairÊ, Modern and Contemporary France, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2005, pp. 16 17. 10. Utley (see n. 7), pp. 29 30. 11. Tony Chafer and Gordon Cumming, ÂBeyond Fashoda: Anglo-French Security Cooperation in Africa Since Saint-Malo,Ê International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 5, 2010, pp. 1129 1147. 12. Cumming (see n. 5), p. 409. 13. Niagalé Bagayoko, ÂFranco-American Ties: Old Foes, New Friends?Ê in Tony Chafer and Gordon Cumming (eds.), From Rivalry to Partnership? New Approaches to the Challenges of Africa, Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2011, p. 134. 14. U. Engel and J. Porto, AfricaÊs New Peace and Security Architecture: Promoting Norms, Institutionalizing Solutions, Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2010. 15. Tony Chafer, ÂThe AU: A New Arena for Anglo-French Cooperation in Africa?Ê, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 49, No. 1, 2010, pp. 64 65. 16. France, Défense et Sécurité nationale Le Livre blanc, Paris: Odile Jacob/La Documentation Française, 2013. 17. On Côte dÊIvoire, see Charbonneau (see n. 2). On Chad, see Charbonneau, ÂFranceÊ, in David R. Black and Paul D. Williams (eds.), The International Politics of Mass Atrocities: The Case of Darfur, London: Routledge, 2010, pp. 213 231. On Mali, see Isaline BergamaschiÊs Chapter 8 in this volume and Charbonneau and Jonathan Sears, „Defending Neoliberal Mali: French Military Intervention and the Management of Contested Political Narratives‰, in Florian Kühn and Mandy Turner (eds.), Where Has All the Peace Gone? The Politics of International Intervention, London: Routledge, 2014.

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Introduction 17 18. See France, Défense et Sécurité nationale Le Livre blanc, Paris: Odile Jacob/La Documentation Française, 2008. 19. Bruno Charbonneau, France and the New Imperialism: Security Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2008, pp. 73 92. 20. Margaret A. Majumdar,  „Une Francophonie à lÊoffensive‰? Recent Developments in Francophonie,Ê Modern and Contemporary France, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2012, p. 18. 21. Michael Pugh, ÂPeacekeeping and Critical TheoryÊ, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2004, p. 41. 22. For instance, Sherene Razack, Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somalia Affairs, Peacekeeping, and the New Imperialism, Toronto, Can.: University of Toronto Press, 2004; Sandra Whitworth, Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004. 23. Many could be listed here. Among others, see Adekeye Adebajo (ed.), From Global Apartheid to Global Village: Africa and the United Nations, Scottsville, South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2009; Michael Pugh, Neil Cooper, and Mandy Turner (eds.), Whose Peace? Critical Perspectives on the Political Economy of Peacebuilding, New York: Palgrave, 2008; Oliver Richmond, A Post-Liberal Peace, London: Routledge, 2011. 24. Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver Richmond, ÂThe Local Turn in Peace Building: A Critical Agenda for PeaceÊ, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 5, 2013, p. 768. 25. This is not to say it precludes collaboration. Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver P. Richmond (eds.), New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding, New York: United Nations University Press, 2009. 26. Roland Paris, ÂSaving Liberal PeacebuildingÊ, Review of International Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2010, p. 339. 27. Roland Paris, ÂInternational Peacebuilding and the „Mission Civilisatrice‰Ê, Review of International Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2002, pp. 637 656. 28. Paris (see n. 27). 29. For instance, see Kimberly Zisk Marten, Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004. 30. For a critique of the assumed difference between war and peace, see David Keen, ÂWar and Peace: WhatÊs the Difference?Ê, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2000, pp. 1 22. 31. Oliver Richmond, The Transformation of Peace, New York: Palgrave, 2005. 32. Philip Cunliffe, ÂThe Politics of Global Governance in UN PeacekeepingÊ, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2009, p. 333. 33. Florian Kühn, ÂThe Peace Prefix: Ambiguities of the Word „Peace‰ Ê, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2012, pp. 396 409. 34. Marta Moreno, Carlos Braga, and Maira Gomes, ÂTrapped Between Many Worlds: A Post-Colonial Perspective on the UN Mission in HaitiÊ, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2012, pp. 377 392. 35. See Charbonneau (see n. 3). 36. Kossi Agokla, Niagalé Bagayoko, and Boubacar NÊDiaye (eds.), La réforme des systèmes de sécurité et de justice en Afrique francophone [Security and justice sector reform in Francophone Africa], Paris: OIF, Délégation à la paix, à la démocratie et aux droits de lÊHomme, 2010, pp. 21 35. 37. Robin Luckham, ÂLe militarisme français en AfriqueÊ, Politique Africaine, Vol. 6, June 1982, pp. 45 71. 38. Richmond argues that the Âliberal peace has become a model through which Western led agency, epistemology, and institutions, have attempted to unite the world under a hegemonic system that replicates liberal institutions, norms, and political, social, and economic systemsÊ (Richmond [see n. 23]. p. 1). 39. Marina Ottaway and Bethany Lacina, ÂInternational Interventions and Imperialism: Lessons from the 1990sÊ, SAIS Review, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2003, pp. 71 92.

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40. Mike McGovern, Making War in Côte dÊIvoire, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011; Giulia Piccolino, ÂDavid Against Goliath in Côte dÊIvoire? Laurent GbagboÊs War Against Global GovernanceÊ, African Affairs, Vol. 111, No. 442, 2012, pp. 1 23. 41. Charbonneau, ÂWar and Peace . . .Ê (see n. 2). 42. Charbonneau (see n. 19), p. 149.

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Part 1

Conceptual and policy issues

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1

Francophone peacekeeping Charting the emergence of a new problematique in peace operations Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni, and David Morin

In January 2011, UN General Assembly Resolution A/65/L.26/Rev.1 welcomed the Ânew impetusÊ that cooperation between the UN and the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF also known as La Francophonie) had given to the participation of OIF states in peacekeeping operations, highlighting further the organizationÊs participation in the Peacebuilding CommissionÊs work on Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, and the Central African Republic (CAR). This and similar episodes attest to the intersection between the trajectory of la Francophonie and peace operations. What has prompted this recurring intersection, and what are its consequences? Drawing upon the authorsÊ experience and work with the Francophone Research Network on Peace Operations, Montreal, in developing and implementing peacekeeping capacity-building projects for French-speaking countries in bilateral and multilateral contexts, this chapter critically explores the intersection of peace operations and the francophone spaces. It suggests that the increasing importance of the so-called francophone fact in peacekeeping is the result of three reinforcing dynamics: (1) the reality of UN deployments in the past decade with more than half of the blue helmets deployed in francophone settings; (2) the consequent creation of specific needs for the Âgood functioningÊ of multidimensional peace operations; and (3) an incomplete but undeniable appropriation of peace operations by francophone states and organizations. The chapter first proposes a conceptual definition of the so-called francophone fact in the context of peacekeeping, underlining the tensions and contradictions inherent in the various uses of the adjective francophone, particularly its linguisticoperational and political usages. It then documents the multiplication of peacekeeping operations in the francophone world over the past decade and identifies ÂnewÊ ensuing needs. Finally, building on an argument by Justin Massie and David Morin, the chapter documents an increasing geocultural appropriation1 of peace operations by francophone states and by La Francophonie, underlining the manner in which this has resulted in specific initiatives and actions that have transformed francophone states and La Francophonie into fully fledged actors in this domain.

The francophonization of peacekeeping In the past decade, we have witnessed the francophonization of peacekeeping, understood as the growing importance of the francophone fact as a politically and

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logistically inescapable factor in the universe of peace operations. The intersection of francophone spaces and peacekeeping, from which we derive the concept of the francophonization of peacekeeping, is linked to three distinct but interrelated dimensions in the evolution of peacekeeping. The first is an empirical reality, documented in more detail in the next section: over the past decade, the number of military peacekeepers deployed in francophone states has increased eightfold and reached a peak of 55,000 blue helmets in 2010. The second is linked to the demand for new, specific linguistic and sociocultural abilities, a need that is further heightened by the multidimensionality of contemporary peace operations. The third is the growing interest and participation of francophone states and of la Francophonie in such operations. The francophonization of peacekeeping can be apprehended from two perspectives: a minimalist operational perspective and a maximalist political one. Operationally, francophonization refers to the necessity of deploying blue helmets who can speak the language used by local populations in theatre. From this perspective, which focuses on linguistic abilities, francophone states would be defined as those states whose citizens can use French as a working language, that is, states where French is frequently used or that have French as the (or an) official language. One immediate difficulty with such a definition is the ability to quantify the proportion of effectively French-speaking troops deployed by those states that are bi- or multilingual (Canada or Rwanda, for example) or states where French is a language of culture (Egypt or Vietnam, for example). Further, such a definition would not account for the fact that nonfrancophone countries can elect to select personnel to be deployed in a French-speaking area of operations on the basis of linguistic abilities. Politically, francophonization refers to the growing involvement of French-speaking states and of the Francophonie in peacekeeping. Much like the operational definition, this political perspective has problems of its own. Indeed, as already suggested, membership in the Francophonie includes multilingual states as well as those where French is a language of culture. It does not necessarily reflect the linguistic-operational capacity of member states and their citizens once deployed in peacekeeping missions. Another potential problem with this perspective could be the tendency to equate the growing number of Frenchspeaking states and organizations involved in peacekeeping with increasing clout in discussions about peacekeeping. As will be argued, even though the two are interrelated, they do not necessarily move in tandem. As Table 1.1 demonstrates, the decision to adopt a minimalist operational or a maximalist political definition can make a significant difference when assessing the participation of francophones in UN peace operations. However, whether one favours a linguistic-operational or a political definition to make sense of the word francophone in the context of peacekeeping, one must recognize that, from an analytical perspective, a significant margin of error is linked to this adjective. This margin is further amplified by the fragmented and scattered nature of available data of francophone participation in peacekeeping, at the UN and national levels.2 Nonetheless, as established in the next section, the francophonization of peacekeeping is a reality at least in the sense of the multiplication of peace operations in French-speaking areas of operations.

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Francophone peacekeeping 23 Table 1.1 Maximalist and minimalist definitions Maximalist political definition Number of francophone states Personnel deployed in UN missions on June 30, 2012 Percentage of personnel deployed in UN missions on June 30, 2012

53 22,186 22.67%

Minimalist operational definition 34 14,678 15%

Peace operations in francophone worlds: Quantitative changes Since 1948, 159 peace operations were deployed by about 15 international, regional, and subregional organizations around the world. Of these, 53 or about one-third, were deployed in francophone countries, whereas these countries make up only about 17.6% of UN member states.3 In 2012 2013, this number was on the increase with the newly approved ECOWAS and UN missions in Mali, as well as the International Conference on the Great Lakes RegionÊs neutral force in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In this regard, the past decade has witnessed an unprecedented development in the francophone world.4 Between 2000 and 2010, the number of blue helmets deployed in Francophonie member states grew eightfold, from 6,203 in 2001 to 55,195 in 2010. In January 2010, 55% of the 118,535 troops in 18 UN peace operations were deployed in francophone countries.5 There were eight missions in nine OIF states: the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB),6 the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the UN Operation in Côte dÊIvoire (UNOCI), the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), and the UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). Since 2010, BINUB was transformed into the UN Office in Burundi, MINURCAT closed, and MONUC was downsized and renamed MONUSCO (the UN Organisation Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo). From fewer than 10,000 per year between 1990 and 2000 (with the exception of the years 1994 1995, which saw simultaneous deployments in Rwanda, Lebanon, and Haiti), UN peacekeepers deployed in francophone countries have systematically numbered over 50,000 per year since 2008. In the last decade, almost 440,000 military, police, and UN observers deployed in francophone countries amount to 53.2% of all UN personnel in peace operations. On 30 June 2012, these included 10,163 personnel in Haiti, 10,968 in the Ivory Coast, 11,571 in Lebanon, and 19,144 in the DRC. The exponential increase in UN troops deployed in francophone settings can be traced back to three roughly concurrent deployments: UNOCI in February 2004, MINUSTAH in April 2004, and the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB, the predecessor of BINUB) in May 2004. As Figure 1.1 shows, between January and July

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AuQ1

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French Arabic Vietnamese Tai languages Polish Lingala (lingua franca) Ukrainian Other English Swahili (lingua franca) Romanian Mande languages Russian Senegalese Bantu languages Malagasy Kongo (lingua franca) Chadic languages Akan Gur Rwanda Niger-Congo languages Khmer Hungarian Hausa (lingua franca) Greek Berber Kongo Chinese German 0.00

2.00

4.00

0.00

8.00

10.00

12.00

Figure 1.1 Shares of languages used in OIF member states (%) Source: ÂArea and PopulationÊ and ÂLanguageÊ, in Encyclopedia Britannica, Book of the Year 2011, Chicago: Britannica EncyclopÕdia, 2011, pp. 750 755, 766 770.

2004, UN personnel deployed in French-speaking areas doubled from little fewer than 20,000 to 40,000. Another important factor accounting for this increase in personnel was the doubling of blue helmets deployed in the Congo from 10,866 in January 2004 to more than 20,000 in 2010. As a result, between July 2004 and January 2005, the percentage of UN troops deployed in OIF countries moved from 47.69% of the total UN troops worldwide to 61.32%. A slight bucking of the trend occurred in 2006 due to the gradual withdrawal of ONUB (which closed in December 2006) and a decrease of troops in MINUSTAH. A second steep rise in 2007 followed the decision to reinforce UNIFIL following the war between Israel and Hezbollah in summer 2006. By 2007, UN troops deployed in francophone countries reached a peak at 62.84% of total deployments. It is important to underline that some of the UNÊs most ambitious missions, in terms of both size and mandate, were deployed in francophone countries. These include MONUC/ MONUSCO (upwards of 22,000 personnel in 2009), UNIFIL (upwards of 13,000 personnel in 2007), MINUSTAH (approximately 12,500 in 2011), and ONUCI (some 11,000 personnel in 2012).

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Francophone peacekeeping 25 The next section charts the changes brought about by an increase of deployments in francophone worlds in a context of complex multidimensional peace operations.

Peace operations in francophone spaces: Qualitative changes This dramatic change in the geography of peacekeeping would have had little impact from an operational perspective had peacekeeping remained tantamount to observing front lines and monitoring ceasefires. Indeed, the fundamental transformation of the relationship between peacekeepers and host countries is the direct consequence of the emergence of multidimensional peace operations intended not only to keep the peace but also to assist in the reconstruction of the state and society. These changes have brought to the fore a dimension that held relatively little significance before: the importance of linguistic and sociocultural dimensions in contributing to the efficiency and success of peace operations.7 One could easily call into question the relevance of the debate surrounding the use of a specific language in peace missions, more specifically the use of French or the importance of a so-called francophone dimension (see Chapter 3 by Liégeois in this volume). A first objection can be raised on the grounds of the importance of interoperability for the success of peace operations. Interoperability is defined as Âthe ability of systems, units or forces to provide the services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively togetherÊ.8 This principle underlies the argument that multinationalism in UN missions makes it necessary to have a common working language and that it should be English. Historically, the preponderance of blue helmets drawn from neutral Western states (Scandinavian countries, Ireland, Canada) and from former British colonies (Pakistan, India, Ghana, Nigeria) fostered the emergence of English as the lingua franca of peacekeeping. Further, and although French-speaking personnel are on the rise since the early 1990s, on 30 June 2012, only 15% of personnel deployed in UN peace operations came from francophone countries.9 That French-speaking personnel are still a minority within peace operations can also be used to question the utility of reconsidering the use of English as the de facto language of peace operations. A second objection holds that while French is the language of elites in francophone countries, it might often not be the language of local populations, as in Haiti where the majority speaks Creole in their daily interactions or in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which is home to 242 local languages of which four have the status of national languages.10 Justified as those arguments may be, they miss an important point. Study after study has established the importance of communication in the success of peace operations. In their analysis of interoperability for joint and coalition operations, Thea Clark and Terry Moon report that language barriers are one of the main differences accounting for the ease in developing shared understandings among American, British, Canadian, Australian, and New Zealand armed forces, as opposed to the difficulty of doing so among the states of the Association of Southeast Asian

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Nations.11 The Joint Task Force CommanderÊs Handbook for Peace Operations, developed by the Joint Warfighting Center of the US Armed Forces, identifies the ability to communicate effectively with oneÊs Âown staff, involved multinational partners, other national and international players, and host nation representativesÊ as one of the keys to success.12 To the extent that, unlike first-generation peacekeeping missions, todayÊs peace operations involve such tasks as security sector reform that require deployed troops to accompany their local counterparts in training and rehabilitation, the ability to communicate in the local language carries increasing importance. But communication is important not only in dealing with local partners in the countryÊs military or bureaucracy but also in buttressing relations with local populations. As Robert Rubinstein and his colleagues have established, not only are cross-cultural encounters a daily reality of peace operations; so are cross-cultural misunderstandings.13 Similar misunderstandings and communication problems have been documented by Béatrice Pouligny.14 Culture and language are intimately related; language has indeed been shown to be the main instrument of socialization into a culture and its mores.15 Thus, to use the terms coined by Rubinstein and his colleagues, if horizontal (within mission) and vertical (with the population) interoperabilities are to be achieved, knowledge of French should no longer be simply an asset but a selection criterion for missions in francophone countries. Indeed, in June 2009, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peace Operations Alain Le Roy admitted that the lack of French-speaking resources caused the UN Âserious problemsÊ and that Âsome challenges would more easily be overcome if UN personnel mastered FrenchÊ. Over the past few years, the emergence of a francophone dimension to peacekeeping and related challenges and opportunities have increasingly been acknowledged by many peacekeeping actors, especially within the UN. Since 1995, the use of French is a recurring item on the General AssemblyÊs agenda, resulting in several resolutions recalling that both French and English are the working languages of the Secretariat. On peacekeeping, more specifically, the UN has expressed a growing need for French-speaking personnel in its peace operations. This was initially acknowledged in a letter sent by then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to his OIF counterpart Abdo Diouf in 2004. Annual reports of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) have regularly called attention to this question. Since 2008, C-34 annual reports have systematically recalled Âthat English and French are the two working languages of the SecretariatÊ. In their own words, C-34 members have heeded RubinsteinÊs calls for greater horizontal and vertical interoperability. Indeed, the Special Committee has underscored the importance of Âeffective interaction between Headquarters and the field to ensure efficient communications and the safety of all peacekeeping personnelÊ.16 It also acknowledged Âthat the interaction of United Nations military, police, and civilian personnel with the local population is necessary for the efficient and successful implementation of peacekeeping operationsÊ. To that end, the Committee considers that language skills are required and shall constitute an important element of the selection and training processes. Therefore, the Special Committee urges the

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Francophone peacekeeping 27 Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support to make further efforts towards recruiting staff and experts on mission with language skills that are relevant to the particular mission area where they are to be deployed, so that specific requirements of peacekeeping operations can be addressed. In particular, good command of the official language spoken in the country should be taken into account as an essential asset during these processes.17

Francophone actors in peacekeeping roles: Towards a geocultural appropriation? Subsequent to the increasing deployment of UN peace operations in Frenchspeaking countries, the growing need for French-speaking staff led the UN to call upon member states to put francophone resources at the organizationÊs disposal. At a Security Council meeting in 2004, then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan declared: ÂAnother shortcoming is critical to our urgent need for French-speaking staff, especially policing, to meet the mandates in francophone countries. We have created or expanded missions this year in Haiti, Ivory Coast and possibly Burundi, and this need will only intensifyÊ.18 It would seem that recurring UN and Francophonie appeals supporting the increase of francophone participation in peacekeeping operations have been heeded. Indeed, the last decade has seen a substantial increase in the global contribution of francophone countries and by a growing implication of the Francophonie in peacekeeping. According to Massie and Morin, this marks the beginnings of a Âgeocultural appropriationÊ of peacekeeping by francophone actors.19 Indeed, the OIF has attempted to mobilize its member states, for example, by creating information and experience-sharing platforms.20 It has also established a network of French-speaking peacekeeping training centres.21 At the national level, some countries have endeavoured to contribute more troops to UN peacekeeping, and bilateral partnerships have been developed to address specific obstacles to participation in peacekeeping missions. Appropriation is not a new idea per se. It has, however, gained increasing importance in the context of the regionalization of peacekeeping, which builds on the principle of subsidiarity to promote the participation of regional actors in conflict management.22 Appropriation refers to the transfer of responsibilities, of competences, and of capacities to organizations and states on security matters.23 In the francophone world, geocultural appropriation draws upon a notion of Âimagined communityÊ,24 whereby francophone countries share or converge around political, cultural, and linguistic values. This underpins arguments in favour of an increasing role of francophone actors in peacekeeping. Widely accepted, this notion has gained credence among francophone countries and has given rise to concrete initiatives at both national and international levels. Nationally, francophone troop-contributing countries are building their capacities to participate in peace operations. Internationally, La Francophonie has increased its role in peacekeeping as mentioned. However, both sets of efforts are beset with problems and obstacles, and, as a result, they have yet to translate into

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a global and coherent strategy that would allow francophone actors to speak with one voice and fulfil the role that could be theirs in the realm of peacekeeping.

Francophone countries in peace operations: Growing capacities but a limited role Some studies trace the participation of francophone states in UN peace operations to the end of the 1940s.25 But, although data on francophone participation in peacekeeping are scant, analysis of available sources suggests that, in the historical perspective and relative to English-speaking countries, francophone participation in UN peace operations is relatively recent, comparatively modest, and characterized by important disparities. In the early years of UN peacekeeping, francophone participation was limited to French-speaking Western states (Canada, France, and Belgium) that provided the UN with mostly military observers and logistical equipment and support. Newly independent African francophone countries began contributing to the general peacekeeping effort on the occasion of the UN operation in the Congo (ONUC). Between 1960 and 1964, ONUC was the first mission involving Francophone African troop-contributing countries (TCCs), notably drawn from the Mali Federation,26 Guinea, Tunisia, and Morocco. After a long hiatus, African francophone countries resumed their participation in UN peace operations in the 1990s, in the context of the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR). Using a political definition of the term francophone, the number of francophone African TCCs doubled from 6 to 12 between 1992 and 1995.27 Another surge was recorded in 2004 when, echoing a demand from then Haitian Prime Minister Gérard Latortue, the UN called on francophone countries to contribute personnel to the mission in Haiti. As of 2012, 46 francophone countries participated in peace operations worldwide. In spite of this increase and the involvement of Francophone African TCCs, the francophone contribution to UN peacekeeping remains relatively modest. On June 30, 2012, they represented a mere 13.8% of all deployed UN personnel in peace operations, and in the past two decades, that percentage has never increased beyond 25%. There are no marked differences in terms of deployment in francophone or nonfrancophone settings either.28 However, francophone contributions to UN peacekeeping fluctuated quite widely between 1990 and 2012. In 1992, they amounted to 22% of all deployed personnel, boosted by important French, Canadian, and, to a lesser extent, Tunisian contributions to the operations in BosniaHerzegovina and Cambodia. Eight years later, they reached a low of 5% at the same time as the absolute number of African Francophone TTCs increased. In June 2012 and with 13,500 deployed personnel, francophone contributions had almost regained their historic high of the mid-1990s. For their part, francophone military observers have remained at a constant 13% of all observers deployed since the early 1990s. Lastly, it is important to note that we have no details concerning francophone civilian personnel deployed under the UN banner because

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Francophone peacekeeping 29 data published since 2006 in the Annual Review of Global Peace Operations are provided only in aggregate form. Nevertheless, two to five francophone countries, including France and Canada, are identified recurrently as part of the 20 top countries contributing personnel to DPKO and to the Division of Mission Support. This relatively modest showing is partly attributable to important disparities in the nature of these contributions. The most glaring of these concerns is the number of troops deployed by francophone states located in the global South as opposed to troops hailing from the North. Until the early 1990s, most francophone contingents came from Belgium, Canada, and France. However, their contribution plummeted from 1995, on the heels of setbacks in Rwanda (UNAMIR), Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNPROFOR), and the Somalia debacle. Although other francophone states such as Morocco, Tunisia, or Senegal became regular TCCs in the 1960s, most other francophone countries took longer to start contributing and did so only modestly. Since the mid-1990s, African francophone countries took over from their Western counterparts, contributing the majority (83%) of francophone UN troops, while Northern countries are increasingly deploying contingents under non-UN banners. At the end of June 2012, the contributions of the three main French-speaking Western TCCs France, Canada, and Belgium amounted to only 1.4% of UN peacekeepers and 9.4% of peacekeepers deployed in francophone settings. In comparison, the three most important African TCCs Rwanda, Senegal, and Morocco deployed at the same time almost 60% of the total number of African Francophone troops with other African countries accounting for the remaining number. This reversal raises another important element of asymmetry among the Francophone TCCs. Much as is the case for peace operations in general, Southern states provide personnel, whereas Northern states are better endowed with financial and logistical resources. This situation raises some concerns, as expressed by former UN Undersecretary-General for Peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guéhenno, who warned that Âunder the guise of „promoting African solutions to African problems‰, African countries should not simply accept a gradual withdrawal of States from the North from UN peacekeeping and a distribution of roles in which developed countries would provide financial, logistical and technical support while countries from the South would bear the burden of risk aloneÊ.29 In spite of the growing contribution of francophone states, many challenges still lie ahead if the UN is to properly address the francophonization of peace operations. This involves changes to the manner in which the UN has functioned to date, particularly as regards the place of French as a working language at the UN. It also implies increasing the ability of francophone states to rise to the challenge of becoming an important actor in peace operations in their own right. The two are intimately connected. Regarding the UN, the main challenge is to respect the principle of equality between French and English in recruitment, training, and access to documentation. If research on the importance of language as a factor in the success of peace operations is right, then French should no longer be considered simply an asset but a criterion in the recruitment and nomination of personnel deployed

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in French-speaking theatres of operation. For their part, francophone states must also meet standards and procedures, present candidates with the requisite qualifications, and prepare such candidates for interviews and tests. The timely translation and dissemination of UN documents in French, which the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations has promised to address, will be crucial if francophone states are to meet this challenge. For their part, francophone countries, particularly those located in the South, will have to overcome financial and logistics challenges. Currently, they have difficulties meeting UN standards in training and equipment. To date, the acquisition and replacement of materiel has been made possible by bilateral partnerships between francophone African and Northern states, such as those between Benin and Belgium,30 and between Togo and France. For its part, Canada has contributed financial support for the purchase of helicopters and loaned a hundred armoured cars to the Nigerian, Rwandan, and Senegalese contingents of the African UnionÊs Mission in Sudan. However, one might argue that these are temporary solutions and that their viability is limited because of the growing reluctance of countries from the North to help their Southern counterparts by investing in heavy equipment (armoured vehicles, helicopters, and so on), even if this is meant for use in peacekeeping contexts. Another important element for new francophone TCCs is the need to develop strong national structures in charge of peacekeeping. To do so, decision makers must frame their participation in peace operations in terms of national defence and security strategies. Although most francophone missions to the UN have come to realize the importance of having a military/police adviser or a civilian in charge of these issues, the process still needs to be sped up and expanded to regional organizations such as the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). Further, cooperation and coordination among ministries are increasingly important if these new TCCs want to succeed in preparing and selecting personnel for increasingly integrated and multidimensional missions. Francophone countries must be equipped with institutional structures able to plan and manage their deployment. A last but equally important challenge is the ability of francophone peacekeeping actors to be heard in peacekeeping forums traditionally dominated by English-speaking actors. This highlights the need to develop a coherent and strategic approach that the OIF and some of its members are attempting to spearhead and to which we now turn.

La Francophonie and peace operations: A growing role but limited means The growing role of La Francophonie in peace operations could not have happened were it not for institutional changes that deeply transformed the organization from a cultural and technical agency into a political organization.31 It is this transformation that, more than anything else, enabled La Francophonie to respond

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Francophone peacekeeping 31 to the UN Secretary-GeneralÊs plea for greater francophone participation in peace operations. La FrancophonieÊs efforts in peace and security are guided by framing documents (for more on La Francophonie, see Chapter 2 by Frédéric Ramel). In 2000, the Bamako declaration provided the organization with normative guidelines for conflict prevention and resolution. It also put in place a number of instruments to operationalize those guidelines, including early warning, mediation, and regional/ international cooperation in situations of crisis or serious violations of human rights.32 At the 2004 Conference of Heads of State and Government in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, OIF leaders identified Âpeace, democracy, and human rightsÊ as the organizationÊs central objectives. However, only in 2006 at the Saint Boniface Summit did La Francophonie fully acknowledge its transformation into an institution concerned with issues of peace and security by reaffirming its decision to take on a conflict management role to Âprevent crises and conflicts from erupting in the francophone world, to limit their spread, facilitate their peaceful resolution and speed up the return to sustainable peaceÊ.33 La FrancophonieÊs peace and security ambit also widened as the Saint Boniface Summit upheld the notions of Âhuman securityÊ and Âresponsibility to protectÊ as principles at work in the francophone world.34 Empirically, these changes translated into a significant increase of La Francophonie activities in the realm of peace and security. Between 2006 and 2008, the organization set up 12 electoral observation missions and another 12 information missions and contact groups in the Comoros, Haiti, Niger, Mali, and Chad.35 From 1992 to 2010, La Francophonie organized approximately 160 electoral assistance missions, most recently in Mauritania and Guinea. The latter has also hosted two other OIF missions, one entrusted with security sector reform and the other intended to support the countryÊs transition from crisis. Since 2008, La Francophonie has carried out mediation efforts in Togo, Benin, the Ivory Coast, and Chad, as well as conflict prevention work and efforts to consolidate peace in Haiti, the Comoros, the CAR, Madagascar, Mauritania, and Niger.36 It has also invested in capacity building. In 2009, in collaboration with other organizations and states, it launched a cycle of regional forums in West and Central Africa to discuss practices and parameters relating to francophone participation in peace operations. Further, the organization provides financial support to capacity-building programmes in francophone states. These are implemented by several OIF partners, including the Peacekeeping School in Bamako (École de Maintien de la Paix), the International School for Security Forces in Cameroun (École Internationale des Forces de Sécurité, EIFORCE), and the Francophone Research Network on Peace Operations (Réseau francophone de recherche sur les opérations de paix). As a result of these institutional, doctrinal, and empirical efforts, La Francophonie has progressively established itself as a credible, committed, and legitimate actor in peace operations. Its emergence as a distinct actor rests on the premise that La FrancophonieÊs approach to matters of peace and security is both distinct and relevant. Thus, the 2010 Francophonie report on current practices in the realm of peace operations underlines the development of a francophone

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approach that, rather than immediately responding to the latest crisis, supports countries before and after crises. This consists of diplomatic moves emphasizing the creation of spaces for dialogue and negotiation among protagonists to defuse tensions and allow for crisis resolution with the full participation of all actors and in a manner respecting local dynamics.37 If this is the source of the approachÊs distinctiveness, then its added value, the OIF argues, rests on the organizationÊs knowledge of the territory and realities of each of its members, its ability to intervene both rapidly and precisely, and the complementarity of its approach to prevent and/or end violence, human rights violations, or situations of instability and political tension.38 Some observers argue that the values of La Francophonie and its ability to dialogue with protagonists allow it to articulate a specific point of view internationally.39 The assessment is shared by the organizationÊs Secretary-General Aboud Diouf, who identifies the political security realm as the sphere of action where La Francophonie can bring added ÂgeoculturalÊ value because of its willingness to engage in prevention, to summon solidarity among members, to be open to dialogue, and to build on the sociocultural traits of its members and on their common cultural heritage, as well as to reinforce multilateral synergies in order to strengthen national capabilities.40 Still, the scope of La FrancophonieÊs action in the realm of peace operations remains limited and marginal. This is due to a number of mutually reinforcing dynamics. First, one must acknowledge that while La Francophonie has emerged as an important forum for the discussion of francophone participation in peace operations, most francophone member states are TCCs in a myriad of international and regional organizations that are more or less sensitive to the issue of the francophonization of peace operations and of its operational consequences.41 Furthermore, OIF action is hindered partly because of the limited resources that states and governments allocate to this area. In the words of Hugo Sada, La FrancophonieÊs delegate for human rights, democracy, and peace, the recognition by outsiders of the organizationÊs role in peace operations is not matched by the requisite internal financial and human resources needed to achieve the stated objectives and to reinforce the scope of the organizationÊs experience.42 There are indeed those who, reflecting on the speed with which the new mandate was developed, on its scope, and on the weak resources allocated to it, doubt the efficiency, let alone the pertinence, of La FrancophonieÊs peace and security portfolio.43 Given this, the 2006 assessment of OIF Secretary-General Abdou Diouf continues to hold. Since resources determine the organizationÊs capacity to act, Âhumility and realism force us to admit that La Francophonie cannot tackle all crises and that it is first and foremost there to do what others will never do in its steadÊ.44

Conclusion This article has argued that the francophonization of peace operations is the result of three simultaneous developments in the field of peacekeeping. The first is an

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Francophone peacekeeping 33 empirical geographic reality that has emerged in the post Cold War era and that has seen the majority of UN peace operations deployed in francophone settings. The second derives from the renewed importance of communication, language, and culture in light of the multidimensional aspects of contemporary peace operations. The third is the growing interest and investment of francophone actors, both states and interstate organizations, in the field of peace and security. Together, these three developments have contributed to creating a rationale and interlocutors for then UN Secretary-General Koffi AnnanÊs call to La Francophonie to mobilize its member states and to encourage them to participate in UN peacekeeping. A critical exploration of the intersection of peace operations and francophone worlds raises important definitional, practical, and policy questions that, in turn, point to new avenues for research. Conceptually, whether one defines the francophone fact from a linguistic-operational perspective or from a political perspective, the blind spots of the various definitions create obstacles that accentuate the albeit limited availability of data on francophone participation in peace operations. Nevertheless, no matter the definition one adopts, the multiplication of peace operations in francophone settings is an inescapable fact that, in the last decade, describes the situation of more than 50% of all UN troops. This figure raises as yet unanswered questions about why the francophone space is such a fertile ground for peacekeeping missions and whether peacekeeping is a solution for crisis in the Francophonie. From a practical/operational perspective, the simultaneous concentration of peacekeeping in francophone settings and the increasingly multidimensional nature of peacekeeping have created new needs both in the field and at UN headquarters. For the UN, these changes do not only suppose access to capable and highly specialized military, police, and civilian capacities; they also underline the need for personnel able to effectively communicate and interact with the host country, at both the elite and the population levels. Aside from training, this has translated to attempts and strategies to foster or increase the participation of current, former, new, and emerging francophone TCCs. In turn, francophone countries and the OIF have deployed efforts to develop, encourage, or support the contribution of francophone personnel to UN peacekeeping operations. This phenomenon raises questions about the effectiveness and implications of the use of French and the contribution of francophones in French-speaking peace operations. Do language skills and communication abilities really matter for the success of a peace operation? If so, how? The explosion of francophone participation in peace operations in French-speaking settings provides researchers with new data to explore these questions from a comparative standpoint. This article has focused on the use of French in peacekeeping; however, the arguments developed here have consequences beyond the francophone world. TodayÊs crises are in francophone countries; tomorrow, the UN might be called upon to deploy in Portuguese-, Arabic-, or Spanish-speaking territories.45 Two lessons can be absorbed from the experience of deployment in francophone settings: (1) the importance of adapted resources and the need to recruit personnel with appropriate linguistic abilities and (2) the need to work with regional

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organizations to develop their interest in and ability to shoulder responsibilities in the field of peace operations. At a time when traditional peacekeeping countries are increasingly hesitant to commit human (but also financial) resources to peacekeeping, and while the UN is calling upon all states to share in the burden, only such a two-pronged approach will allow for a global geocultural appropriation of peace and security issues in which the South is not merely a provider of troops but a set of actors who develop their own voice in the field.

Acknowledgement The authors thank Hiba Zerrougui, research assistant at the Francophone Research Network on Peace Operations, Montreal ROP, for collecting the data.

Notes 1. Justin Massie and David Morin, ÂFrancophonie et opérations de paix: Vers une appropriation géoculturelleÊ [Francophonie and peace operations: Towards a geocultural appropriation], Études internationales, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2011, pp. 313 336. 2. Michel Liégeois, ÂMaking Sense of a Francophone Perspective on Peace Operations: The Case of Belgium as a Minofrancophone StateÊ, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2012, pp. 316 332. 3. Data compiled from information from Réseau francophone de recherche sur les opérations de paix (at: www.operationspaix.net). 4. Data concerning troop contributing countries are available on the DPKOÊs website (at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml). 5. Deployed personnel amounted to 118,535, including 99,943 police forces, military personnel, or military experts. 6. Since January 2010, this mission falls under the purview of the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA). 7. There is an abundant literature debating the efficiency and success of peace operations. Notable contributions are (in alphabetical order) Paul F. Diehl, Jennifer Reifschneider, and Paul R. Hensel, ÂUnited Nations Intervention and Recurring ConflictÊ, International Organization, Vol. 50, No. 4, 1996, pp. 683 700; Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006; Virginia P. Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping BelligerentsÊ Choices After Civil War, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008; J. Michael Greig and Paul F. Diehl, ÂThe PeacekeepingPeacemaking DilemmaÊ, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 4, 2005, pp. 621 645; Birger Heldt, ÂAre Intrastate Peacekeeping Operations Less Likely to Succeed? Some Statistical EvidenceÊ, IRI [Ilmin International Relations Institute] Review, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2001/2002, pp. 111 135; Birger Heldt, ÂUN-Led or Non-UN-Led Peacekeeping Operations?Ê, IRI Review, Vol. 9, 2004, pp. 113 138; Lise Morjé Howard, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008; Dennis C. Jett, Why Peacekeeping Fails, New York: St. MartinÊs Press, 1999; Jean Krasno, Bradd C. Hayes, and Donald C. Daniel (eds.), Leveraging for Success in United Nations Peace Operations, Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003; Nicholas Sambanis and Jonah SchulhoferWohl, ÂEvaluating Multilateral Interventions in Civil Wars: A Comparison of UN and Non-UN Peace OperationsÊ, in Dimitri Bourantonis and Kostas Ifantis (eds.), Multilateralism and Security Institutions in an Era of Globalization, London: Routledge, 2008, pp. 252 287; Barbara Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002; and Thomas G. Weiss (ed.), The United Nations and Civil Wars, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995.

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Francophone peacekeeping 35 8. Thea Clark and Terry Moon, ÂInteroperability for Joint and Coalition OperationsÊ, Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 151, November December 2001, p. 24. 9. This increase is coupled with a similar increase in the number of Portuguese, Spanish, Arabic, and Chinese locutors, and it is fundamentally related to the diversification of UN troop contributing countries following the stark increase in the number of authorized peace operations since the end of the Cold War. 10. The four national languages are Kilonga, Tshiluba, Lingala, and Swahili. French is the language of the administration. 11. Clark and Moon (see n. 8), p. 32. 12. Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Task Force CommanderÊs Handbook for Peace Operations, Ft. Monroe, VA: Joint Warfighting Center/USAF, 1997 (at: http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/ papers/pmt/exhibits/1920/PeaceOps.pdf ). 13. Robert A. Rubinstein, Diana M. Keller, and Michael E. Scherger, ÂCulture and Interoperability in Integrated MissionsÊ, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2008, pp. 540 555. See also Robert A. Rubinstein, ÂCultural Aspects of Peacekeeping: Notes on the Substance of SymbolsÊ, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3, 1993, pp. 547 555. 14. Béatrice Pouligny, Peace Operations Seen from Below: UN Missions and Local People, Boulder, CO: Kumarian, 2006. 15. See Bambi B. Schieffelin and Elinor Ochs (eds.), Language Socialization Across Cultures, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986. 16. See the following reports of the United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: UN docs. A/62/19(2008), para. 186; A/63/19(2009), para. 168; A/64/19(2010), para. 213; A/65/19(2011), para. 261. In 2009 and 2010, the Special Committee noted the efforts made by the Police Division and the Office of Military Affairs in recruiting French-speaking peacekeepers, especially police officers, to address specific requirements of peacekeeping operations (respectively, paras. 171 and 216). All UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations are at the UN General Assembly and Peacekeeping website (at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/ctte/spcmt_ rep.htm). 17. See the following reports of the United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: UN docs. A/62/19(2008), paras.186 188; A/63/19(2009), paras. 168 171; A/64/19(2010), paras. 213 216; A/65/19(2011), paras. 261 263. 18. United Nations, ÂSuccessful Peacekeepers Need a Strong Mandate and Adequate Resources, Says Secretary-General to the Security CouncilÊ, UN Press Release SG/SM/9311 SC/8096 PKO/107 (at: www.un.org/News/fr-press/docs/2004/SGSM9311.doc.htm). 19. This section draws upon the conclusions and data from Massie and Morin (see n. 1). 20. Bamako regional forum, 15 17 June 2009, and Yaoundé regional forum, 8 10 November 2009, on Francophone participation in UN peacekeeping. 21. Technical meeting, ÂFrancophone Training Capacities on PeacekeepingÊ, Paris, 30 June and 1 July 2011. 22. Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, ÂWhoÊs Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace OperationsÊ, International Security, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2005, pp. 157 195; Rosemary Durward, ÂSecurity Council Authorization for Regional Peace Operations: A Critical AnalysisÊ, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2006, pp. 350 365; Justin Morris and Hilaire McCoubrey, ÂRegional Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War EraÊ, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1999, pp. 129 151. 23. Benedikt Franke and Romain Esmenjaud, ÂWho Owns African Ownership? The Africanisation of Security and Its LimitsÊ, South African Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2008, pp. 137 158 (at p. 137). 24. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, London: Verso, 1991. 25. See Sandrine Perrot and Mountaga Diagne, ÂÉtude documentaire sur la contribution francophone aux opérations de maintien de la paix de lÊONUÊ [Documentary study of francophone contribution to UN peacekeeping], Montreal and Ottawa: Francophone

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26. 27.

28. 29. 30.

31.

32. 33. 34.

35.

36. 37. 38. 39.

40.

Marie-Joëlle Zahar et al. Research Network on Peace Operations (ROP) and Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada, 2007. The Mali Federation was a short-lived union (1959 1960) between the autonomous territories of the Sudanese Republic and Senegal. Upon SenegalÊs secession, the Sudanese Republic became the Republic of Mali. However, it is worth noting that using a more restrictive, operational definition of Francophone states, the numbers would have probably been lower since this number includes countries that are culturally Francophile or others that are multilingual. Given the available data, there is no way to ascertain whether these countries deployed French-speaking contingents in francophone settings. In 1990, 13.7% of the personnel of UN missions deployed in Francophone member states were drawn from Francophone countries, against 14.7% in June 2012. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, ÂAddress to the Bamako Forum on the Francophone Participation to Peace Keeping: Practices and ParametersÊ, June 15 17 2009, Mali, Bamako. See General Alassane Kpémbi Massouhoudou, ÂCoopération militaire Bénin-Belgique: Un exemple de partenariat dans les opérations de maintien de la paixÊ [Benin Belgium military cooperation: An example of partnership in peacekeeping operations], 2009 (at: www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENTTEXTE/4682.pdf ); Lt.-Col. Junior de Fabribeckers, ÂCoopération militaire Bénin-Belgique: Engagement commun dans les opérations de maintien de la paix en AfriqueÊ [Benin Belgium military cooperation: A common enagement in peacekeeping operations in Africa], 2009 (at: www. operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENTTEXTE/4709.pdf ). The first avatar of the OIF, the Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation (ACCT), was born in Niamey in 1970. It aimed to use the French language to promote solidarity, development, and cooperation through continuous dialogue among ÂcivilizationsÊ. The ACCT became the Intergovernmental Agency of la Francophonie in 1998 and the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie in 2005. The OIF gradually developed a political dimension most notably with the introduction, in 1986, of regular Conferences of Heads of State and Government, also known as Francophonie Summits. The political dimension was formally integrated into the institutional structure of la Francophonie at the Hanoi Summit in 1997 and a secretary-general was elected. Agence Intergouvernementale de Francophonie, ÂBamako DeclarationÊ, Bamako, 3 November 2000, p. 8 (at: http://apf.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/decla_bamako-2.pdf ). OIF, ÂConflict Prevention and Human SecurityÊ, Saint Boniface Declaration, 14 May 2006, p. 4 (at: www.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/Declaration_Saint-Boniface.pdf ). OIF, ÂÉtat des pratiques de la démocratie, des droits et des libertés dans lÊespace francophoneÊ [State of democratic practices, human rights and liberties in the francophone space], Paris: Délégation aux Droits de lÊHommes et à la Démocratie et à la paix (DHDP), 2006, p. 18. OIF (see n. 33), p. 69; UN, ÂReport of the Secretary-General on Cooperation Between the United Nations and Regional and Other OrganisationsÊ, UN doc. A/61/256, 16 Aug. 2006; UN, ÂReport of the Secretary-General on Cooperation Between the United Nations and Regional and Other OrganisationsÊ, UN doc. A/63/228-S/2008/531. OIF (see n. 33). Ibid., p. 197. Ibid., p. 201. Julia Marion, ÂLÊévolution de la coopération entre lÊONU et les organisations régionales. LÊexemple de lÊorganisation internationale de la FrancophonieÊ [The evolution of cooperation between the UN and regional organizations. The example of lÊorganisation internationale de la Francophonie], in Michel Guillou and Phan Thi Hoa Trang (eds.), La Francophonie sous lÊangle des théories des relations internationales [Francophonie from an international relations perspective], Paris: Iframond, 2008, p. 200. Abdou Diouf, ÂLa Francophonie en Afrique. Quel avenir?Ê [Francophonie in Africa. What of the Future?], Paris: OIF, 2010.

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Francophone peacekeeping 37 41. For example, 30 out of the 54 member states of the African Union are also member states or observers at the OIF. Francophone AU TCCs contribute 33% of the troops of the organization. However, given the AUÊs anticolonial history and the fact that it has historically been organized around regional rather than linguistic equilibria, the francophonization of peace operations does not hold much sway in discussions at AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. 42. Hugo Sada, ÂLes perspectives et besoins pour la médiation de la FrancophonieÊ [Perspectives on, and needs for, Francophonie mediation], Retraite sur la médiation de la Francophonie [Proceedings of Francophonie Mediation Retreat], Geneva: OIF/ DDHDP, 2007. 43. See, for example, Mamadou Badji and Jean-Marie Crouzatier, ÂSolidarité en Francophonie. Réalité ou faux-semblant?Ê [Solidarity in Francophonie. Reality or simulacra?], Cluj-Napoca: Agence Universitaire de la Francophonie, 2010. 44. Abdou Diouf, ÂRapport du Secrétaire Général de la Francophonie. De Ouagadougou à Bucarest 2004 06Ê, Paris: OIF, 2006, p. 3. 45. For an early exploration of these issues, see Rodrigo Tavares and Luis Bras Bernardino, ÂSpeaking the Language of Security: The Commonwealth, the Francophonie and the CPLP in Conflict Management in AfricaÊ, Conflict, Security & Development, Vol. 11, No. 5, 2011, pp. 607 636.

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2

Task sharing and peace operations The role of the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie Frédéric Ramel

With the end of the Cold War, the revival of the UN led to an expansion of peace operations from traditional peacekeeping to more varied missions like peacebuilding. To rationalize these changes, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali put forward intellectual and operational shifts. Both versions of his Agenda for Peace called for strengthening interactions between the UN and regional organizations in terms of preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and postconflict reconstruction.1 This trend was apparent in the discourses of all sections of the UN, its doctrine, and its practice. Since the 1990s, international organizations have substantially improved their cooperation in order to improve their peace-related efforts, as missions in Africa highlight.2 Task sharing between organizations has become a necessary practice, even though no universal pattern for this type of cooperation has emerged. This development has generated academic literature devoted to the notions of subsidiarity and complementarity in relation to international institutions. The dynamics of UN peace operations reflect two paradigms of task sharing: Âby „subcontracting‰ for military services and some diplomatic functions to regional arrangements and major states, on the one hand, and for the provision of services to international NGOs, on the other.3 Actors, methods, and objectives differ between these intergovernmental and societal paradigms. Most importantly, their underlying principles are not the same. In one case, the privatization of activities requires improvement in procedures. In the second, the issue of coherence in international order arises. In spite of the new academic interest in interorganizational relations in the area of security studies, most analyses have turned a blind eye to the role of transregional linguistic organizations, such as the British Commonwealth and the League of Arab States. Although numerous experiences have shown that this kind of international organization also contributes to peace dynamics, empirical studies and theories of international cooperation do not address their institutional design or interventions in the field. One case that offers an opportunity to examine this tendency in greater depth is the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF).4 The OIF is an international actor that promotes the French language and reflects international changes (societal influence on interstate interactions).5 Since 1991, member states have defined new prerogatives to handle crisis and conflict

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management, ranging from prevention to electoral assistance. This process is based on a deviation from a cultural path dependency that developed over decades. Léopold Sédar Senghor (Senegal), together with Habib Bourguiba (Tunisia), Hamari Diori (Niger), and Norodom Sihanouk (Cambodia), suggested the creation of an organic francophone community in the 1950s. They argued that a Âfrancophone reality is born and wanted outside FranceÊ.6 For different reasons, the first intergovernmental francophone structure adopted in 1970 (through the Treaty of Niamey) was not carried forward to implement such a project. The Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation (ACTC) relied upon solidarity among peoples who shared a common language. It had no function relating to peace operations and was solely cultural. The Versailles summit in 1986 resulted in a further reorientation to deal with political issues by establishing the heads of state conference. These dynamics progressively merged following the end of the Cold War. Official declarations extended the dimensions of cooperation to law and justice, and the agency enlarged its areas of intervention by returning to principles of pluralism and rule of law. Several African countries had to cope with violent situations due to electoral competition or genocide, especially in the Great Lakes region. As a result, the conference decided to send its first mission to support peace in April 1995 in Burundi. Because such decisions were not inscribed in the Niamey Treaty, they revealed deep changes: ÂLa Francophonie transcends the unique struggle for French language supportÊ, commented Boutros Boutros-Ghali.7 For member states, institutional reform was needed.8 The ACTC and the conference gradually turned into a genuine intergovernmental organization between 1997 (Charter of Hanoi) and 2005 (Charter of Antananarivo). With the creation of a general secretariat, the agency became the OIF, benefiting from legal status. For the first time, an international convention established links between French and francophone political values in order to participate in international relations. Beyond sharing the same language, OIF members supported a conception of political action. According to Joseph Maila, Âlanguage and values were political extensions; they are the source of political behaviour in the domestic order, they shall inform the rule of law and democracy and in the international order, they require the prevention of conflict and the search for peaceÊ.9 The first secretarygeneral of the OIF, Boutros-Ghali, insisted on the strong relationship between democracy, linguistic diversity, and peace.10 All of the final declarations of the summits on Francophonie since then have also pointed out these pillars of action. Although the organization has not forgotten linguistic promotion and cultural policies in its prerogatives, it has considerably enriched its spectrum of intervention. Two other statements provide an official framework for francophone action. The first, adopted in Bamako in November 2000, focuses on the practice of democracy, rights, and freedoms in francophone areas. The Bamako statement confirms the central role dedicated to the secretary-general, who must be informed permanently as to the state of democracy, rights, and freedoms in francophone areas. Article 5 allows the secretary-general to intervene in two cases: a rupture of democracy or mass violation of human rights. Like the Saint-Boniface

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Frédéric Ramel

statement adopted in May 2006 by the ministerial conference, this deals with conflict prevention and human security. Both statements refer officially to task sharing. More aligned cooperation with other intergovernmental organizations is requested to achieve these political objectives. For instance, in the Bamako statement, member states expressed interest in renewed partnerships with international organizations. They intended to Âintensify cooperation between the OIF and international and regional organizations, develop consultation on the democratization of international relations, and support, in this framework, initiatives to promote democracyÊ.11 The Saint-Boniface statement reinforced this perspective by proposing Âsystematic and rationalised cooperation with international and regional organizationsÊ.12 What is the relationship between these instruments and the UN devices, as well as those of the regional institutions? What type of task sharing is conceived and applied by the OIF? Could the OIF be exposed to the same dilemmas in task sharing as other regional organizations related to benefiting from powerful states?13 Based on the internal institutional transformations in the OIF and its involvement in various African cases, this article argues that the OIF emerged as an institutional third party in crisis and conflict management but that it embodies the role of a supporting organization rather than that of a subcontractor in the classic sense of task sharing. The purpose of this chapter is not to evaluate the OIFÊs actions through a rationalist perspective, nor to analyse its legitimacy. I do not aim to describe the conditions responsible for each form of cooperation with other organizations14 or to contribute to the debate on the regionalization of peace operations. The main point is to qualify the role of the OIF in interorganizational cooperation. Based on a qualitative approach, this research treats the latter as a social form: a set of interactions between actors.15

A wide spectrum of interventions as a source of task sharing With the creation of a general secretariat, the OIF gradually increased its means of action for peace. First, it extended its permanent representations at international organizations to include those other than the UN (New York and Geneva), including the European Union (EU, Brussels), African Union, and the Economic Commission for Africa (Addis Ababa). The new prerogatives of the general secretariat also led to the establishment of the delegation for peace, democracy, and human rights, which aimed to support its action. Two initial trends appeared with the inclusion of peace operations on the organizationÊs agenda: they focus on internal conflicts and crises in member states, and the OIF was given the ability to intervene in all moments of crisis or conflict. Missions undertaken by the organization since 1997 range from the prevention of conflicts to the consolidation of peace. In terms of prevention, the OIF essentially adopts structural measures in a direction intended to deepen the democratic life of member states through the consolidation of the rule of law, through free reliable and transparent elections, through the internalization of democratic culture, and through full respect for human rights.16 Operationally, the organizationÊs interventions are based on the

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establishment of different types missions: facilitation (to set up dialogue between parties without proposing a resolution), mediation (to search for solutions beyond bons offices), and varied exploratory missions (from information to the preparation of elections). The organization also adopted several measures in the declaration of Bamako to deal with ruptures of democracy with sanctions under article 5: suspension (Togo and Mauritania in 2005; Madagascar and Guinea in 2009; Madagascar, Guinéa-Bissau, and Mali in 2012) or sanctions (Mauritania between 2008 and 2009; Guinéa-Bissau in 2012). In any conflict, a third party may have a dual political function: to prevent the outbreak of war and to change the forces present by preventing the escalation of conflict. This design considers the third party as neutral and impartial. According to Georg Simmel, the third party is nonpartisan and a mediator who Âproduces concordance between two colliding parties by creating direct contact between the unconnected or quarrelling elements; functions as an arbiter who balances the contradictory claims against one another and eliminates what is incompatible in themÊ.17 Due to its consensual decision-making process and the official requests from conflict protagonists to intervene, the OIF benefits from legitimacy. Table 2.1 shows the extent and regularity of the actions undertaken, as well as their concentration in Africa. These actions illustrate that the OIF sees peace as a process and that it implements interventions along a continuum from conflict prevention to the consolidation of peace by responding to member statesÊ internal conflicts and/or crises. This method incorporates both structural and operational prevention. The different interventions present several distinct features. First, they need to be implemented following an official request by the protagonists of the conflict. Second, they mobilize other actors alongside them, such as the OIF operator, the International Association of Francophone Mayors (a structure of decentralized cooperation that promotes proximity with the local population) and the parliamentary assembly of Francophonie (an institution that provides recommendations within the francophone structure). Bringing together delegates from different member states and observers, this assembly participates in implementing and strengthening democratic institutions, as well as in organizing bon offices and electoral observation missions. Civil society actors are also involved in order to gather privileged information on political situations. Since 2003, the OIF has engaged in systematic consultations with representatives of francophone institutional networks, such as the African Association of Francophone High Courts, the Association of Constitutional Courts that partly use French language, and the international conference of common law bars. Third, the OIF has equipped itself with an early warning system to facilitate information flow and strengthen its means to respond. Concentrated on 12 states, this comprises five project managers responsible for analysis. They produce notes regarding evaluations and situations.18 Fourth, a preference for facilitation has emerged over the years, particularly through special envoys.19 It would not be possible to appoint these without the personal involvement of the secretaries-general, who can easily make requests to heads of states and to governments due to their former posts. Fifth, the OIF does not yet intervene in the

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Table 2.1 International missions of the OIF Missions of information and contact

1998 1999 Niger 2000 Equatorial Guinea, Haiti (2) 2001 2002 2003

2004

2005

2006

2007 2008 2009

2010 2011

Exploratory missions and electoral preparations

Missions of electoral observation

Guinea, Togo

Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Gabon, Guinea, Togo, Sao Tome, and Principe Benin, Central African Republic, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Niger, Nigeria Guinea Bissau, Senegal, Haiti

Albania, Benin, Chad, Comoros Gabon, Senegal Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Mali (3), Seychelles Central African Republic Central African Benin, Djibouti, Cambodia, Rwanda, Côte dÊIvoire Republic, Côte Togo dÊIvoire Democratic Republic of the Congo Central African Cameroon, Cameroon, Comoros, GuineaRepublic, Comoros, Central African Bissau, The Former Yugoslav Haiti, Republic, Côte Republic of Macedonia, Niger dÊIvoire (2), Haiti Burundi, Comoros, Chad, Togo, Albania, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Mauritania, Togo Djibouti, Côte Central African Republic (2), dÊIvoire Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Gabon, Guinea Bissau, Lebanon, Mauritius, Republic of Moldova Central African Republic Chad, Côte Benin (2), Chad, Comoros, Côte dÊIvoire, dÊIvoire, Democratic Republic Mauritania of the Congo, Haiti, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Madagascar, Mauritania (3), Seychelles Benin, Comoros, Mauritania (2), Madagascar, Togo Madagascar, Mali, Togo Senegal Benin, Comoros, Ghana, Comoros (2) Guinea-Bissau, Rwanda Comoros, Mauritania Comoros (2), Congo, Madagascar Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau (2), The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Gabon, Haiti, Rwanda, Guinea Togo Cameroon, Haiti, Niger Central African Republic

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economic sphere, despite calls, since 2003, from OIF Secretary-General Abdou Diouf for more active involvement in development beyond setting standards relating to respect for the environment. This wide spectrum of intervention does not fall into the global approach or that of the security development nexus, as understood by the EU in terms of crisis management or indeed by NATO.20 However, these interventions cannot be implemented by a single actor, least of all by the OIF, which Âdoes not expect to do alone what other organizations that benefit from greater funds already doÊ.21 Boutros-Ghali set the objective of actively involving the organization in crisis and conflict management in order to give substance to its political function. This is also the aim of his mandate as a campaigner for the French language.22 He intends to Âmake the OIF a visible, recognized international institution . . . beyond its historical dimension as an agency for cultural and technical cooperationÊ.23 For him, such an ambition can be achieved only on the basis of stronger cooperation with other international organizations, first and foremost the UN. On 14 June 1999, at a ceremony in New York for the inauguration of his official portrait alongside that of preceding secretariesgeneral, he emphasized his continued action: ÂI am committed to helping the UN through the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, which I direct also in the name of my own commitment and my faithfulness to the men and women who fight for peaceÊ.24 Boutros-GhaliÊs role was decisive in implementing cooperation between these international organizations. This stems from his character both as a practitioner, who builds on his UN experience, and also as a resolute academic. His doctoral thesis in international law, completed in 1949, was already related to the challenge of interorganizational cooperation and bore the title, ÂContribution à lÊétude des ententes régionalesÊ [Contribution to the study of regional cooperation]. This commitment to linking research and action translated into the implementation of peace operations in collaboration with regional organizations under his mandate as UN secretary-general.

A secondary role in task-sharing implementation On 20 March 1998, Boutros-Ghali invited to the international day of Francophonie delegates from 16 major regional organizations, including the Commonwealth, League of Arab States (LAS), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Community of Portuguese Language Countries, Economic Community of West African States, and Organisation of African Unity. The objective was to present the new approach of the OIF following the Charter of Hanoi. However, the goal was also to initiate cooperation between those organizations through information sharing and the sending of envoys to participate in their conferences. The OIF launched its mandate for interorganizational cooperation and for extending its horizons: henceforth, ÂLa Francophonie . . . opens itself up to the worldÊ.25 Subsequently, the OIF signed about 30 agreements with international and regional organizations with the purpose of promoting the mutual exchange of information and consultation on issues of shared interest, notably with the League of Arab States (21 April 1998), the Commonwealth (15 July 1999), the Indian Ocean

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Commission (3 December 1999 and March 2011), and the Economic Community of Central African States (26 August 2011). These agreements entailed the organization of conferences with the United Nations Board in Western Africa between May 2011 and June 2012, as well as electoral observation missions conducted in conjunction with the Commonwealth (Seychelles), the Organisation for African Unity, and subsequently the African Union (Togo, Equatorial Guinea, Niger, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal) and the League of Arab States (Benin, Djibouti). At first, this information exchange related to electoral issues, but it gradually extended to the diplomatic sphere and eventually to mediation.26 A basic principle for interorganizational cooperation that emerged was the precedence of regional organizations in diplomacy. The situations dealt with in relation to the African Union (AU) revealed the position that the OIF intended to adopt. The OIF was aiming not to substitute but to accompany diplomatic processes initiated by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and subsequently the AU. This was the case for the Comoros, where, in 1997, after strikes and riots, the island of Anjouan expressed its wish to secede from the Federal Islamic Republic of Comoros. The OAU and the LAS rallied to establish the Antananarivo agreement in order to engage in mediation. Despite requests by the new Comoros president, Col. Asali Assoumani, the OIF refused to intervene alone in the Comoros. It reiterated relentlessly that it would intervene only in terms of legal support and in accordance with the framework put in place by the regional actors. Boutros-Ghali responded to Assoumani: Â[I]t is out of the question for us to intervene. We have a clear principle in this matter: to avoid duplicating the work of other international organizations and not to increase the number of mediatorsÊ.27 The impasse in dialogue between the parties in the conflict pushed the OIFÊs secretary-general to dispatch a fact-finding mission and to contact the former president of the national conference of Comoros, André Salifou. As the first to revive discussions with the separatist authorities of Anjouan, following an embargo decreed by the OAU, he produced a report on the situation in October 2000. This gave credence to the argument that there was no possibility of reconciliation between the two sides (those championing the Antananaviro agreement and those championing a separate Fomboni accord directly bargained between the secessionist Anjouan island governed by Lt.-Cols. Abeid and Azali). Salifou proposed a new track between the Antananarivo and Fombioni texts. To follow this third track, new negotiations began in which the OIF participated. André Salifou became the organizationÊs special envoy. From November 2000, he contributed to reestablishing dialogue between the parties, but always linking with the UN and AU. A new Comorian constitution was adopted on 23 December 2001 and was monitored by a committee set up for this purpose, which included the OIF.28 Another illustration of this preference for cooperation with regional organizations occurred in April 1996 in the Central African Republic when social and economic unrest led to an eruption of political violence. After an official request by President Ange-Félix Patassé to the OIF to intervene, Boutros-Ghali participated in a conference on national reconciliation cochaired by President Omar Bongo of Gabon and the President Amadou Toumani Touré of Mali. The OIF

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was continually involved either in implementing electoral processes or by giving its support to a committee for coordination of national dialogue. However, in 2005 the OIF found itself in the forefront because other regional organizations had failed to respond. It contributed to the organization of elections the same year without the help of other intergovernmental organizations. This constituted an exception to the secondary role of the OIF. Boutros-GhaliÊs words regarding the OIFÊs position in the peace process in the Comoros can be applied generally to all interventions: Â[W]e have to leave the OAU its role as leader. The OIF can content itself with playing brilliant secondsÊ.29 This secondary role was also evident in ad hoc structures such as contact groups (Mauritania from 10 November 2008; Guinea from 17 February 2009; Madagascar from 30 April 2009) and monitoring committees (Côte dÊIvoire, Niger, and Comoros, as mentioned. However, the linchpin of interorganizational cooperation remains the OIFÊs relationship with the UN. Boutros-Ghali and Abdou Diouf, who succeeded him in 2002, both attached primacy to this relationship.30 This is the second principle of task sharing. Although regional organizations need to participate more actively in securing peace, their action Âmust be carried out simultaneously with the authorization, under the control and by delegation of the Security CouncilÊ.31 The ACTC created an institutional connection with the signing of an agreement in 1978, which was transferred to the OIF on 18 December 1998.32 These principles of cooperation were then advanced with a new agreement on 25 June 1997, which made provisions for the organizations to develop projects of shared interests, as well as for mutual representation at each otherÊs conferences. From 1998, the OIF benefited from observer status at the UN. The connections were strengthened first and foremost by the OIFÊs regular participation in high-level meetings between the UN and regional organizations. This Âemphasised the usefulness of increased sharing of information regarding the individual experiences and capacities of each organization as regards peacebuildingÊ.33 The UN was also in favour of this strengthening and had consistently been supported by General Assembly resolutions since 2001.34 Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has referred to this cooperation positively, emphasising that Âthe UN system and the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie are good, close partnersÊ.35 Traditionally, interorganizational cooperation concerning armed conflict can assume three forms through the deployment of troops in sequential, parallel, or integrated ways (which leads to the implementation of joint planning and command structures).36 In the case of the OIF, it is not strictly speaking task sharing in a strategic sense, that is, sending troops. Indeed, the OIF Âis not a direct actor in terms of peacekeeping and it is not one of its objectives to become oneÊ.37 However, the expansion of missions of multifunctional peacebuilding and the use of the UN CharterÊs chapter VIII offer windows of opportunity for the OIF. In this way, the UN cultivates task-sharing relationships with the OIF that fall within the sphere of parallel action in pursuit of the same objectives. It manifests itself principally in the areas of electoral support and conflict prevention.38 By carrying out parallel actions as a secondary organization, the OIF is not on the first line according to the definition of global security architecture. It has the

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status of a supplementary partner in the division of work. This position, which the Summit of Kinshasa in 2012 confirmed,39 deserves to be reevaluated in the contemporary debates about connections between the UN and regional organizations. In the 1960s, research remained entrenched in a comparison of the respective advantages of the two types of organizations.40 In the 1990s, a new generation of academic literature emerged. For instance, Neil MacFarlane and Thomas Weiss considered the division of labour between international organizations that raised an issue of global governance.41 Despite the superior authority of the Security Council, a handful of research underlines the greater capabilities of regional organizations compared to the UNÊs. They show Âa move away from enhanced global governance and towards unbridled regional autonomy or even hegemony in determining actions to foster peace and securityÊ because Â[t]he CharterÊs formal hierarchy is maladapted to these practical capabilitiesÊ.42 In addition, they defend a new global architecture, beyond the UN, by delegating mandates in order to emancipate regional bodies: Â[i]t is more realistic to consider the relationship between multilateralism and regionalism in more horizontal and reciprocal terms, compared to the orthodox approach where regional agencies are subordinated to the UN Security CouncilÊ.43 The OIF does not engage directly in this debate. Indeed, its major role in interorganizational cooperation aims to strengthen the capacities of both the UN and regional organizations.

A major role in capacity building The OIF makes a substantial contribution to supporting peace operations. In turn, it is supported by measures aimed at strengthening the capacities of member states at the operational and institutional levels. At the operational level, the UN comes up against two obstacles. The first lies in the increasing number of peacekeeping operations and the need to increase contingents. The second is due to the number of missions of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) located on French-speaking territories. Six of the 15 peacekeeping operations run by the department have taken place in francophone countries: MINURSO (Western Sahara), MINUSTAH (Haiti), MONUSCO (Democratic Republic of the Congo), UNFICYP (Cyprus), UNIFIL (Lebanon), and UNOCI (Côte dÊIvoire).44 However, the organizationÊs French-speaking resources fall short of its needs.45 In most cases, the personnel deployed in francophone contexts are not fluent in the language due to the linguistic tropism caused by English, as emphasized by the former Undersecretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guéhenno.46 Due to the needs of the intervention in Haiti, on 17 May 2004, Kofi Annan launched an appeal to francophone states and the OIF. In response, the UNÊs Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (the C34) advocated greater balance in the use of languages in operations and welcomed the OIF as an observer to the Committee. This marked the start of a strengthened partnership that led to the adoption of an ambitious programme by the OIF, aiming to increase contributions by francophone countries to peacekeeping operations and to improve the use of French in operations occurring in francophone countries. This was officially stated at the ministerial

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conference of Francophonie on conflict prevention and human security in Antananarivo in November 2005 and has been regularly called upon since.47 This policy is translated into action through speeches and training. The OIF tries to encourage its member states to increase their cooperation with the UN in order to Âmanage the interface between francophone countries that could potentially contribute troops and the UNÊ.48 It also encourages training and the promotion of know-how in peace operations. On military aspects, in 2009, the OIF organized two regional forums, in Bamako and Yaoundé, relating to francophone participation in collaboration with the UN and the francophone peace operations network. Since then, it has encouraged the development of a network and of complementary development among francophone training centres. It has developed relationships with the UNÊs training system and made francophone programmes comply with UN norms and standards. It also supports the establishment of bilateral partnerships in relation to training and the acquisition of equipment. Indeed, several bilateral francophone experiences demonstrate the organizationÊs potential to offer support. Since February 2006, Belgium and Benin have cooperated in northern Katanga (the former by sending heavy equipment, the latter by deploying troops and light equipment). As emphasized by Babacar Gaye, military advisor of the DPKO, Âthe OIF could stimulate and back a similar formula among its member statesÊ.49 These actions, which aim to consolidating training and therefore the human capacity of peace operations, seem to have had positive results. In 2009, 35% of countries contributing to peacekeeping operations were francophone. This proportion is increasing: as of 31 August 2011, 32 of the 119 countries contributing to uniformed personnel to peacekeeping operations were OIF members.50 This figure increases to 46 by adding observer-status members (38.6%). In October 2012, 34.83% of contributors were OIF members. In terms of personnel deployed, the Guide du maintien de la paix 2012 shows an increase over the past decade from 3,132 in 2002 (7.47%) to 14,678 in 2012 (15%).51 The OIF also plays a major role in strengthening the institutional capacity of member states. It works to support the successful functioning of institutions: drafting texts, applying laws that determine the action of these institutions, training, and allocating funding or information technology equipment. This has been one of its comparative advantages since the 1990s, in relation to both electoral support and state-building in postconflict situations. This investment in the judicial domain helps to support elections,52 in addition to training judges and strengthening constitutional courts, akin to the now more global efforts in relation to Security Sector Reform (SSR). These efforts were officially recognized in point 18 of the Quebec declaration in 2009. In the spirit of Bamako and Saint-Boniface, the OIF intervenes not with force but rather through legal and democratic supervision. At the same time as ensuring the restoration of security in a sustainable and effective way, these reforms aim to increase the transparency of the management of budgets allocated to SSR, as well as to ensure respect for human rights and parliamentary control over actors involved in SSR. Such reforms constitute a defence against abuses of power and coups dÊétat.

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The SSR models applied by external intervening actors have been inspired essentially by Anglo-American traditions. However, Francophone African states present characteristics that set them apart from other states, notably in organizational terms (francophone policing is based on a dual system consisting of police and gendarmes) and in judicial terms (a Romano-Germanic tradition and local customs). In collaboration with the DPKOÊs office of rule of law and with various intervening civil actors, the OIF has supported the SSR process in the Central African Republic (CAR), including campaigns to raise awareness among journalists of the problems and to support to improve training capabilities at the CAR national school for police; in Guinea, such as sending an expert to assist in the audit of civil police reforms; and in Guinea-Bissau, where a mission assessed SSR needs.53 This increase in operational and institutional capacity benefits from a rich arrangement of skills. The OIF regularly organizes seminars with the purpose of highlighting its research. Experts from civil society and grassroots organizations participate in meetings in order to improve local understanding of conflicts. These actors meet the needs of OIF. Although the role of high-level personalities and their charisma are essential in a peace process, they are not sufficient in themselves. The support of expert knowledge on the ground is indispensable to mediation. For instance, Nelson Mandela failed to assess the situation properly when he arrived in Burundi as a mediator in 2000 and had to cope with much resistance because he interpreted the conflict as analogous to South AfricaÊs.54 However, these secondary roles also present more opaque aspects.

The dark sides of task sharing The first obstacle to task sharing is in the operational sphere of mediation. Although the OIF would like to intervene as a secondary organization and not increase the number of mediators, it cannot avoid the logic of competition and even rivalry between external intervening actors. The case of Togo is revealing. The presidential election in1998, following which President Gnassingbé Eyadéma declared himself the winner, led to a serious political crisis with the Togolese opposition. Boutros-Ghali decided to initiate mediation by sending Moustapha Niasse and then Idé Oumarou, former secretary-general of the OAU, as another facilitator when Niasse was made Senegal Prime Minister.55 Other mediators were also appointed by the EU, Germany, and France. It quickly became impossible for these four mediators to work in consultation with one another. The OIF mediators did not manage to assert their assessment of the situation when faced with former ambassadors and forthright personalities who failed to go into the case deeply or who acted without mutual consultation. This aberration led Boutros-Ghali to operate alone for a while, at the risk of exposing himself to sharp criticism from partners.56 The situation in Guinea-Bissau also illustrates such polarities between international organizations. After the election of Nino Vieira as president in 1998, political violence led to calls for a coup by Gen. Ansumane Mané. In view of the countryÊs history, Boutros-Ghali approached the Community of Portuguese

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Language Countries and went to Portugal in autumn 1998. However, he did not manage to lift their partnersÊ suspicions of indirect action by Senegal and also France in support of the instigators of the coup, despite an agreement between the protagonists signed on 3 November 1998.57 These experiences confirm the notion that Â[o]verlap stimulates cooperation, but it also instigates rivalry for mandates, tasks and resources among organizations competing for relative relevanceÊ.58 A second obstacle occurs at the level of decision making. The adoption of decisions by consensus is an undeniable guarantee of legitimacy for the organization, but it proves difficult to secure. Above all, though, it is the appropriation of the political function by OIF member states, particularly the most powerful ones, that presents weaknesses. The more elite member states, with vast diplomatic resources at their disposal, are still timorous when it comes to supporting OIF action. They do not demonstrate any real desire to advance the role of the organization in promoting peace.59 They perceive the OIF through its earlier functions as a historic institution rather than through its new approaches in a new international context. And yet their commitment and their convergence of views are decisive.60 While the OIFÊs expansion encourages new actor involvement in the Âinstitutional gameÊ, it does not reduce the role of its main contributors. In other words, the policies taken up at the francophone level are not solid enough for sustaining multilateral action under its auspices. The last obstacle concerns the granting of the necessary financial aid. Whether this is for diplomatic purposes or for capacity building, the OIFÊs involvement in task sharing requires the allocation of finances to support action. The resources have increased for years to cover crisis prevention and crisis and conflict resolution61. However, it is still not enough to meet the organizationÊs stated ambitions. This could generate a deepening discrepancy between requests made to the OIF and its resources available to respond to them. This is a similar dilemma to that of the EU, as described by Christopher Hill.62

Conclusion This research leads to two main ideas. First, it reasserts the importance of the role of the individual in the functioning of international institutions. Boutros-Ghali and Abdou Diouf appropriated the instruments provided by the charter (of Hanoi and the amended version of Antananarivo) in order to involve the OIF in peace operations. Their involvement illustrates that the fulfilment of promises by international institutions depends first and foremost on the men and women Âat the head of these institutionsÊ.63 This dynamic, initiated by the secretaries-general, can conflict with a reticence among member states on financial, material, and even political grounds. It has been no less prominent since 1997. A second conclusion relates to the OIFÊs characteristics in terms of interorganizational cooperation. According to the former French minister for cooperation and French language, Pierre-André Wiltser, it fills a role as a Âcatalyst for other international organizations with greater fundingÊ.64 Indeed, it performs the role of a gobetween for the protagonists of conflicts and international organizations. But the

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idea of the catalyst is probably excessive. The OIF embodies neither a top-down institution (a kind of appendix to the UN, as some might describe it) nor a subcontractor that benefits from the full delegation of duties, both diplomatic and strategic, in the event of internal conflict within one of its member states. The majority of its actions are more like that of a link in a chain, contributing to strengthening the capacities of other actors. The nature of its involvement in task sharing lies in diversified support in order to improve the operational and institutional resources of its member states in relation to peace. It is a partnership model that gets over the pragmatism and even the narratives of authorization that govern several examples of interorganizational cooperation, notably that between the UN and the EU in Africa.65 This special feature enables it to avoid the grievances of Âpolitics of dominationÊ hidden behind Âpolitics of devolutionÊ.66 This distinguishes the OIF from other regional organizations but above all from other transregional linguistic organizations. The OIF emerges as a third party offering additional diplomacy and capacity building in terms of interorganizational cooperation. Do these characteristics contribute to the dissemination of a particular conception of peace? Do they encourage a specifically francophone know-how based on shared values? These questions echo various research programmes that make culture a favourable factor in the development of new forms of peace operations.67 They make the OIF a common subject of research in the field of international relations, particularly in the area of international intervention.

Notes 1. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, UN doc. A/47/277, S/24111, 17 June 1992, p. 17. 2. Malte Brosig, ÂThe Multi-Actor Game of Peacekeeping in AfricaÊ, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 17, No. 3, June 2010, pp. 327 342. 3. Edwin M. Smith and Thomas G. Weiss, ÂBeyond UN Subcontracting: Task-Sharing with Regional Security Arrangements and Service-Providing NGOsÊ, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1997, p. 611. 4. In 2012, the OIF brought together 57 states and governments and 20 observers. 5. Brian Weistein, ÂFrancophonie: A Language-Based Movement in World PoliticsÊ, International Organization, Vol. 30, No. 3, 1976, pp. 485 507. 6. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ÂLa naissance dÊune nouvelle institution internationale: lÊOrganization Internationale de la FrancophonieÊ, Humanisme et entreprise, No. 243, 2000, p. 13. 7. Boutros-Ghali (see n. 1), p. 22. 8. Christine Desouches, ÂMédiation et francophonie: principes, démarche, pratiqueÊ, in Jean-P. Vettovaglia (ed.), Médiation et facilitation dans lÊespace francophone. Théorie et pratique, Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2010, pp. 281 290. 9. Joseph Maïla, ÂY-a-t-il une spécificité de la médiation en francophonie?Ê, in Vettovaglia (see n. 8), p. 342. 10. ÂI often repeat, the day where all States will speak the same language, and will be set to think in the same way, then we risk to establish a totalitarian regime in the worldÊ. (Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ÂLa francophonie: un espace de coopérations politiques et économiquesÊ, Revue Française de Géoéconomie, Summer, 1999, p. 88.) 11. OIF, ÂDéclaration de BamakoÊ, 3 November 2000 (at: http://apf.francophonie.org/ IMG/pdf/decla_bamako.pdf ).

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12. OIF, ÂDéclaration de Saint-BonifaceÊ, 14 May 2006 (at: www.francophonie.org/IMG/ pdf/Declaration_Saint-Boniface.pdf ). 13. E.g., Nigeria in ECOWAS. See Clement E. Adibe, ÂThe Liberian Conflict and the ECOWAS-UN PartnershipÊ, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1997, pp. 484 485. 14. Such as the capacities of regional actors and their access to adequate resources or the degree of acceptability and the legitimacy of these regional actors. (Brosig [see n. 2], pp. 328 30.) 15. For another methodological perspective, see Rafael Biermann, ÂInter-Organizationalism in Theory and PracticeÊ, Studia Diplomatica, Vol. LXII, No. 3, 2009, p. 11. 16. Before the adoption of the Charter of Hanoi, missions had already been engaged in electoral observation (consolidated by a series of guidelines): Benin (April 1995); Niger (February 1996); Mali (1997). But reaction to emergency situations was systematized after 1997. 17. Georg Simmel, Sociology, trans. Kurt H. Wolff, Glencoe: IL, Free Press, 1950, pp. 146 147. 18. OIF, Francophonie. Agir pour prévenir [Francophonie: Act to Prevent], Rapport du panel dÊexperts de haut niveau sur la problématique du passage de lÊalerte précoce à la réaction rapide, September 2010. 19. Thomas Greminger and Carol Mottet, ÂLe point de vue de la Suisse sur la médiation et la facilitation francophones en AfriqueÊ, in Vettovaglia (see n. 8), p. 335. 20. The comprehensive approach as a holistic use of tools also deals with interorganizational cooperation. See Claudia Major and Chritian Mölling, ÂMore Than Wishful Thinking? The EU, UN, NATO and the Comprehensive Approach to Military Crisis ManagementÊ, Studia Diplomatica, Vol. LXII, No. 3, 2009, pp. 21 28. 21. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, En attendant la prochaine lune. . . . Carnets: 1997 2002, Paris: Fayard, 2004, p. 90. 22. Boutros-Ghali (see n. 21), p. 24. 23. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Emanciper la francophonie, Paris: LÊHarmattan, 2002, p. 8. 24. Boutros-Ghali (see n. 21), p. 264. 25. Boutros-Ghali (see n. 21), p. 126. 26. The OIF signed a memorandum on facilitation with the AU in 2005. 27. Boutros-Ghali (see n. 23), p. 267. 28. The situation gradually deteriorated from 2007. André Salifou, ÂLÊexpérience de médiation de lÊOIF aux ComoresÊ [The OIFÊs experience of mediation in the Comoros], in Vettovaglia (see n. 8), p. 558. 29. Boutros-Ghali (see n. 21), p. 449. 30. Abdou Diouf, Passion francophone, Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2010, p. 252. 31. Boutros-Ghali (see n. 10), p. 108. 32. See General Assembly resolution, UN doc. A/RES/33/18. 33. Kofi Annan, ÂCooperation Between the UN and the International Organization of la FrancophonieÊ, Report of the Secretary General, 20 September 2001, UN doc. A/56/390, p. 2. 34. General Assembly, ÂCooperation Between the UN and the International Organization of la FrancophonieÊ, January 2002, UN doc. A/RES/56/45; General Assembly, ÂCooperation Between the UN and the International Organization of la FrancophonieÊ, May 2011, UN doc. A/RES/65/263. 35. Secretary General, SM/13146, 24 September 201. (at: www.un.org/News/Press/ docs/2010/sgsm13146.doc.htm). 36. Sarjoh A. Bah and Bruce D. Jones, ÂPeace Operations Partnerships: Lessons and Issues from Coordination to Hybrid ArrangementsÊ, Center on International Cooperation, New York University, May 2008. p. 2. See also Brosig (see n. 2), pp. 327 342. 37. Diouf (see n. 30), p. 252. 38. Kofi Annan, Cooperation Between the UN and the Organization internationale de la Francophonie, Report of the Secretary-General, UN doc. A/56/390, 20 September 2001, p. 9.

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39. At the Summit, heads of state called for regional organisations or United Nations intervention given the situations in Mali, Guinéa-Bissau, and Nagorno-Karabakh, OIF, ÂDeclaration de Kinshasa,Ê 14 October 2012 (at: www.francophoniekin shasa2012.cd/images/sommet_xiv_resol_crises_2012.pdf ). 40. Francis Wilcox, ÂRegionalism and the UNÊ, International Organization, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1965, pp. 788 811. 41. S. Neil MacFarlane and Thomas G. Weiss, ÂThe UN, Regional Organizations and Human Security: Building Theory in Central AmericaÊ, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1994, p. 277. 42. MacFarlane and Weis (see n. 41), p. 603. 43. Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum, ÂThe UN and Regional Organizations in Global Security: Competing or Complementary Logics?Ê, Global Governance, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2006, pp. 227 232. 44. Not to mention other UN actions through offices located in Burundi, Central African Republic, or Guinea. 45. David Morin and Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni, ÂMaintien de la paix et espace francophoneÊ [Peacekeeping and the francophone space], Bulletin du maintien de la paix, No. 96, November 2009. 46. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, ÂSynthèseÊ, Forum regional de Bamako, 17 June 2009 (at: www.operationspaix.net/IMG/pdf/guehenno_conclusion_17_juin_rev1.pdf ). 47. See Final Declaration of Quebec Summit, 2008 (at: www.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/ decl-quebec-2008.pdf ). 48. OIF, ÂContribution de lÊOIF aux opérations de maintien de la paixÊ [OIF contributions to peacekeeping], p. 10 (at: www.operationspaix.net/IMG/pdf/Contribution_de_l_ OIF_maintien_de_la_paix.pdf ). 49. Babacar Gaye, ÂVers une integration renforcée de la Francophonie aux efforts de la Communauté internationaleÊ [Towards reinforced integration of Francophonie in efforts by the international community], Revue internationale et stratégique, Vol. 3, No. 71, 2008, p. 115. 50. A contributor is a state that provide troops, police, and miltary observers. 51. These statistics integrate two main contributors to Commonwealth and IOF: Egypt and Ghana. On quantitative and qualitative limits of these contributions, see Chapter 1 by Zahar, Morin, and Theroux-Bénoni in this volume. 52. In August 2011, IOF set up the Network of Francophone Electoral Skills with the General Delegation of Elections of Quebec. It helps to the consolidation of electoral procedures and administrations. 53. On SSR, see Kossi Agokla, Niagalé Bagayoko, and Boubacar NÊDiaye (eds.), La réforme des systèmes de sécurité et de justice en Afrique francophone [Reform of security and judicial systems in francophone Africa], Paris: OIF, 2010. 54. Pierre Buyoya, ÂLe processus de paix au BurundiÊ, in Vettovaglia (see n. 8), pp. 488 489. 55. He was replaced by Lansan Kouyaté after his death in 2002. 56. On Togo, see Boutros-Ghali (see n. 21), pp. 190, 483, 608, 634. 57. Boutros-Ghali wrote: ÂI have the feeling to have ploughed the seaÊ [I feel like IÊve ploughed the sea]. (Boutros-Ghali [see n. 21], p. 199.) 58. Rafael Biermann, ÂInter-organizationalism in theory and practiceÊ, Studia diplomatica, Vol. LXII, No. 3, 2009, p. 8. 59. For an evaluation of the situation, see Hugo Sada, ÂLes perspectives et besoins pour la médiation de la FrancophonieÊ [Perspectives and needs of Francophone mediation], in OIF, Retraite sur la médiation de la francophonie, 2007, p. 5 (at : http://democra tie.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/Retraite_mediation_francophonie.pdf ). On the OIF as a conflict prevention actor, see Camille Sicourmat, ÂDe la prévention des conflits aux opérations de paixÊ [On conflict prevention in peace operations], Cahier du CEREM, May 2009 (at: www.irsem.defense.gouv.fr).

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53

60. On divergences between Canada and France as a structural constraint in francophone cooperation, see Jean-Philippe Thérien, ÂCooperation and Conflict in the FrancophonieÊ, International Journal, Vol. 48, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 492 526. 61. Jean-Pierre Vettovaglia, ÂInventory and Tracks for the Strengthening of the Instruments (Process and Resources) Available to the Mediators of the Francophonie,Ê in OIF (see n. 59), p. 16. 62. Christopher Hill, ÂThe Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing EuropeÊs International RoleÊ, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, September 1993, pp. 305 328. 63. Robert Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, ÂThe Promise of Institutionalist TheoryÊ, International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1995, pp. 39 51. 64. OIF (see n. 59), p. 13. 65. For pragmatism, see Claudia Morsut, ÂEffective Multilateralism? EU UN Cooperation in the DRC, 2003 2006Ê, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2009, pp. 261 272. For a more critical approach, see Bruno Charbonneau, ÂWhat Is So Special About the European Union? EU UN Cooperation in Crisis ManagementÊ, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2009, pp. 546 561. 66. Michael N. Barnett, ÂThe Limits of Peacekeeping, Spheres of Influence, and the Future of the UNÊ, in Joseph S. Lepgold and Thomas G. Weiss (eds.), Collective Conflict Management and Changing World Politics, Albany: SUNY Press, 1998. 67. Tom Woodhouse, ÂPeacekeeping, Peace Culture and Conflict ResolutionÊ, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2010, pp. 486 498.

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3

Making sense of a francophone perspective on peace operations Belgium as a case of minofrancophone state Michel Liégeois

After clarifying the conceptual fuzziness that prevails in the literature on Francophonie,1 this chapter coins the concept of the minofrancophone state and discusses quantitative data on Francophone participation in peace operations, thereby proposing a probabilistic estimation of the effective French-speaking share in deployed contingents. The expected operational benefits of sending French-speaking peacekeepers to French-speaking areas are then critically examined. The chapter argues that Organisation international de la Francophonie (OIF) membership is not a reliable marker of French language proficiency for troopcontributing countries to peace operations. It further dismisses the assumption that sending peacekeeping personnel from francophone countries automatically improves the efficiency of peace missions deployed in francophone areas. Finally, Belgium, as a small minofrancophone state, is analysed as a case study that highlights the limited influence of linguistic factors on its peacekeeping policy. The chapter further demonstrates the weakness of the language-matching argument, with empirical findings from the Belgian participation in the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

Francophonie and peace operations There is a stunning contrast between the large literature on Francophonie in general and on the scarcity of writings about francophone peacekeeping specifically.2 The current interest in peace operations and in the use of the French language is certainly not fortuitous. Four dynamics have contributed to raising the topic in research agendas. The first is the evolution of UN peacekeeping activity over the last two decades. The end of the Cold War triggered an exponential expansion of UN peacekeeping operations, leading to 15 operations featuring 121,774 personnel, with a US$7 billion annual budget, as of 2012.3 As senior UN officials have stated, ÂUN peacekeeping is clearly overstretchedÊ.4 In such a context, states that are able to contribute more troops to UN peacekeeping, which is undoubtedly the case in most Western countries, are singled out by analysts5 and by UN officials for their lack of commitment. For the same reason, more effective burden sharing between the UN and regional organizations is seen as a way to ease the UNÊs overstretch. Even though the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) is

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Francophone perspective on peace operations 55 not stricto sensu a regional arrangement as foreseen by Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, UN bodies and officials have repeatedly praised OIFÊs widening commitments in crisis management and peace-related activities.6 Peacekeeping operations have not only increased in size but have also become multidimensional. When patrolling and establishing checkpoints formed the core business of the blue helmets (in traditional peacekeeping operations), language was not a significant issue since communication with the local population was of secondary importance. In second-generation peace operations, the blue helmets remain key actors of peace operations but can no longer fulfil their mandates without the support of an expanding civilian component. A sixth of UN operations personnel, approximately 20,000, were civilians in 2012. In close cooperation with peacekeepers, they deal with a wide range of issues from rule of law to mine action and from protection of civilians to reintegration of ex-combatants. To perform such tasks, military personnel and civilians have to engage in intensive communication with local authorities, communities, and populations, thereby making language a key issue in modern multidimensional peace operations.7 The second dynamic contributing to the emergence of the French language issue is the growing number of francophone countries welcoming peacekeepers on their territory. As of 2012, five UN operations were taking place in a francophone area.8 They include 63,551 personnel, or 52% of the overall UN human resources deployed in all peacekeeping operations. Such an increase in francophone contexts has led to calls for more French-speaking personnel. Addressing the Security Council in 2004, the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned member states of the Âurgent need of French speaking personnel, especially police, to tackle assignments in Francophone countriesÊ.9 Five years later, Undersecretary-General Alain Le Roy in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) pointed out that 75% of the deployed personnel in francophone areas did not speak French, causing Âa serious problemÊ that was Âraised by several force commanders in their end of assignment reportsÊ.10 The third dynamic at work is the growing commitment of regional organizations in peace-related activities. Since the mid-1990s, the EU, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and NATO have become increasingly active in various types of actions ranging from robust military peacekeeping to election monitoring and rule-of-law assistance. At the onset, the actions of these three organizations were confined to the Balkans, each of them occupying a niche of proficiency but attempting coordination among one other and the UN.11 It was only in the early 2000s that they began operating outside the European zone. NATO launched the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in December 2001, and the EU deployed Operation Artemis in the Ituri province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in June 2003. The EU conducted two additional military operations in Africa: EUFOR-DRC in support of the electoral process in 2006 and EUFOR-Chad from 2007 to 2009. Africa has also been the theatre of endogenous dynamics. Although subregional bodies such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) previously undertook interventions in Liberia and in Sierra Leone during the 1990s,12 the creation of the

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African Union (AU), in 2002 included ambitious plans regarding the maintenance of international peace and security on the continent with an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The AU subsequently deployed troops in Burundi, Darfur, and Somalia.13 Considering that France played a key role in every EU military operation in Africa14 and that almost half of the AU members are francophone states,15 the issue of regionalization became progressively interconnected with the issue of French language use. The scarce existing literature on Francophonie and peacekeeping usually underlines this particular aspect.16 The fourth dynamic contributing to the emergence of the francophone issue is the institutional evolution of Francophonie.17 Institutionalization was conceived and gestated in the postcolonial nexus of France and African states. Due to Charles de GaulleÊs reservations about the project, it was not implemented until 1970 at the Niamey meeting,18 when 21 governments created an Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation. From then on, Francophonie developed along three parallel tracks: technical, associative, and political. The political track takes the form of periodic meetings between heads of states and governments, the first in Paris in February 1986, the next in Québec the following year, and then Sommets de la Francophonie every two years.19 Participants gradually adopted a twofold agenda, the first dedicated to a review of the international situation and the second to cooperative actions.20 The summit outcome focused not only on linguistic issues but also on prominent international problems, ranging from human rights in South Africa (Québec, 1987) to humanitarian emergencies (Cotonou, 1995). The three components were gathered under the OIF umbrella in 1996 with the adoption of an amended Charte de la Francophonie at the Hanoi Summit. This event also witnessed the appointment of a high-profile secretary-general, the former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, thereby enhancing the OIFÊs profile internationally. This institutional building occurred in parallel with the gradual expansion of the Francophone capacity to engage in peace and security initiatives. The early 1990s saw the first initiatives of the Francophonie in this direction, electoral assistance and monitoring teams being sent to Romania, Seychelles, Djibouti, and Senegal.21 At the same time, the summit conclusions increasingly included peace-related items, an evolution that resulted in the official incorporation of the heading ÂPeace, Democracy and Human RightsÊ among the main missions of the OIF at the 2004 Sommet in Ouagadougou.22 Two years later, the Saint-Boniface conference issued a statement that demonstrated the enhanced commitment of OIF members to peace-related activities, such as early warning, conflict prevention, mediation, and peacebuilding, and to the sensitive issue of the Âresponsibility to protectÊ concept.23 The 2006 Québec Summit continued this trend, issuing Âconcrete commitments in order to implement in a much more vigorous way the device of the Bamako and Saint Boniface StatementsÊ.24 The four interconnected dynamics explain why questions about francophone perspectives on peace operations have emerged. Notwithstanding this book recording the growing centrality of the topic, the precise question at stake remains to be clarified. A conceptual fuzziness characterizes the literature dealing with

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Francophone perspective on peace operations 57 francophonie and peace operations. Distinctions are made between several concepts that try to capture the multidimensional character of the object under review. This blurred conceptual landscape results from authors writing about the same object from a different angle, employing a particular conceptual tool that fits their perspective. The old-fashioned francité25 translates as an idealistic and rather normative view, where language becomes a vector of intellectual excellence and universal values, such as tolerance. The rarely used francosphère26 is undoubtedly connected with a realist perspective, in which language commonality and related institutions are seen as leverages for power politics or geopolitical speculation. These realist approaches pave the way for critiques whereby Francophonie becomes a war machine built by French imperialism.27 The gradual politicization of the OIF through Âsummit diplomacyÊ28 certainly gives substance to realist interpretations, but the growing consistency of the OIFÊs institutionalization logically fosters liberal institutionalism in the analysis of Francophonie that, to date, still constitutes the biggest share of published materials.29 The particular approach adopted here deals with francophonie rather than Francophonie because the following arguments critically examine the validity of the operational assertion that stresses the added value of deploying French-speaking peacekeepers in francophone areas.

The case for French-speaking blue helmets Advocacy and prescriptive statements are ubiquitous in discourses on the use of language in the framework of peace operations. They may be found in OIF documents,30 in statements by UN senior officials,31 and in observations (without serious discussion) by scholars.32 The point favouring language matching between peacekeepers and local population suffers from two serious weaknesses: the lack of appropriate supporting data and the confusion between Francophonie and francophonie, which gives rise to a constant shift from one to the other. When speaking about political influence through the enhanced weight of the Francophonie in UN peacekeeping activities, focus should be on OIF member statesÊ contributions. Such a study is simple to conduct. In the long term, it reveals a growing participation of OIF member states in UN peacekeeping. Therefore, the only methodological question is whether to include the 19 observer states. Such an approach might make sense in a realist perspective or for the purpose of promoting the OIF. However, it has nothing to do with effective language matching. The reason is quite obvious but has been neglected to date: having more blue helmets provided by OIF members does not automatically lead to more French-speaking peacekeepers deployed among French-speaking populations. Several problems have to be examined in this respect: the effective use of the French language in in the OIF member states, the multilingual character of many OIF member states, and the consequences involved when considering whether these countries are to send or host peacekeepers. With its continuing growth, Francophonie has probably gained in terms of political weight but at the cost of its francophone homogeneity. As Figure 3.1

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60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000

19

9 19 0 9 19 1 9 19 2 9 19 3 94 19 9 19 5 9 19 6 97 19 9 19 8 9 20 9 00 20 0 20 1 02 20 0 20 3 0 20 4 05 20 0 20 6 0 20 7 0 20 8 0 20 9 1 20 0 11 20 12

0

Figure 3.1 UN personnel deployed in French-speaking areas

shows, French is still the most common language in the OIF, but its share represents only 12% of the overall population of the organizationÊs members and observers. A vast majority of OIF member states are actually not francophone; only a minority of their population actually speaks French. to promote clarity, these states should be labelled minofrancophone.33 As a result, when addressing the language issue in peacekeeping operations, the term francophone may lead to considerable misunderstandings. If language matching between peacekeepers and locals is the objective, the OIF label gives a poor guarantee of French proficiency because the theoretical probability of meeting a French-speaking peacekeeper in an OIF member state contingent is only 12%. The same argument may be used regarding the host country. The motto Âmore francophone peacekeepers in francophone countriesÊ is simplistic because it overlooks the fact that the effective use of the French language by the population of an OIF host country may be much lower than expected. This is especially true because OIF host countries of peace operations acquired their francophone character through the colonial endeavours of European French-speaking countries (Belgium and France), whose rule came to an end more than half a century ago with various consequences for the prevalence of the French language. The use of French in the framework of peace operations must therefore be reviewed in light of the proportion of the population speaking it, both in the contributing countries and in the host countries. Such data, however, are not available. When surveys are conducted, they do not always use the same criteria, and questions emerge. Should only the native language be considered or a learned second language as well? What is the level of proficiency required to be registered as ÂspeakingÊ the language?34 Taking into account the degree to which French is used in the population of a given OIF member state is an advance on approaches postulating that all peacekeepers from an OIF member state are French speaking. It is nevertheless not fully satisfactory because the actual situation may be more complex. In bilingual countries, military units are usually homogeneous up to a

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Francophone perspective on peace operations 59 certain level (at least to the company level and most of the time to higher levels, such as the regiment or brigade), and only high-ranking officers are required to be bilingual. As a consequence, a given contingent sent to take part in a peace operation will be from one linguistic background. For example, the French-speaking share of the overall Belgian population is roughly 40%, but the units that were sent to take part in the reinforced United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) were alternately 100% francophone or 100% Flemish speaking, depending on the rotation schedule. A detailed account of the linguistic role of the personnel provided to UN peace operations by OIF members would certainly enlighten the debate about the operational benefit of enhanced OIF participation in UN peacekeeping. Because it requires detailed and time-consuming data collection country by country, however, such a methodology is beyond the scope of this chapter. As an alternative, statistics have been obtained by crossing UN data on contributing countries to peacekeeping operations with updated language statistics available in Encyclopaedia Britannica, Book of the Year 2011.35 For each mission analysed, it was possible to gather the following figures: troop contributing countries (i); number of contributing countries (n); total number of contributed personnel (C); number of contributed personnel for each contributing country (Ci); population of each contributing country (Pi). The total population of the contributing countries ( P = Σ ni 1 Pi) was then compared to the population of i country speaking French (Σ ni 1 Pi , j), which makes it possible to compute the theoretical share of Frenchspeaking personnel in a given operation: n

Ci Pi i =1 C Pi , j

Prob(C j ) = ∑

This methodology has been applied to the UN peacekeeping operations deployed in OIF member states: UNIFIL in Lebanon, MONUSCO in the RDC, UNOCI in the Ivory Coast, and MINUSTAH in Haiti. The results are shown in Figure 3.2. Given these observations on the actual share of French-speaking population within the OIF perimeter, and on the prevalence of minofrancophone states in the organization, these figures should not come as a surprise. Still, the results show a stunning contrast between the Francophone (OIF origin criteria) and the francophone (effective French-speaking quality) shares of personnel. For each of the selected operations, the proportion of French-speaking personnel is much lower than the OIF one, with differences ranging from 7.5% for MINUSTAH to 33.1% for UNOCI. More relevantly, the probability of meeting a French-speaking blue helmet in any of these four areas of deployment is actually five times lower than might be expected from taking OIF contingents into account.36 As mentioned, language data have to be handled with extreme caution, and these results should at least lead scholars to avoid using francophone and Francophone as substitute concepts. OIF membership is not a valid language marker in the context of peacerelated activities.

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40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 UNIFIL

UNOCI

MONUSCO

MINUSTAH

Theoretical share of French-speaking personnel (%) Personnel from OIF member-states (%)

Figure 3.2 OIF and French-speaking personnel in UN missions deployed in OIF member states Source: DPKO, ÂUN MissionÊs Contributions by CountryÊ, 31 August 2011 (at: www.un.org/en/peace keeping/contributors/2011/aug11_5.pdf ); ÂArea and PopulationÊ and ÂLanguageÊ, in Encyclopedia Britannica, Book of the Year 2011, Chicago: Britannica EncyclopÕdia, 2011, pp. 750 755, 766 770.

Beyond these quantitative considerations, one should also address more critically the idea of sending French-speaking peacekeepers to francophone countries. The benefit of easier communication with the local authorities and communities that derives from language commonality is not as obvious as it may seem. In the case of the DRC, for instance, French is the official language for all administrative and judicial acts. It is also the language used in the education system and by the majority of Catholic churches. French is therefore widespread in the DRC as a vernacular language. However, as a result of the long lasting conflict in the Eastern Congo, the literacy rate dropped dramatically because Âduring wartime and prolonged conflict the school buildings and infrastructure are damaged or destroyed, qualified teachers are displaced and the lack of security prevents parents from sending their children, particularly their daughters, to schoolÊ.37 A growing proportion of the population was therefore prevented from learning French and relied solely on Swahili. In addition, the massive cross-border movement of populations, the formation of a trade nexus with Uganda and Rwanda, and the long lasting presence of international personnel from UN agencies and NGOs contributed to an increasing use of English as a business language. Consequently, the added value of sending French-speaking peacekeepers to such a context remains to be demonstrated.

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Francophone perspective on peace operations 61 Language commonality may also carry political dimensions. The most obvious derives from the historical context of French language expansion. The geographical footprint of francophonie is not the result of a random chain of events, nor is it the consequence of the attractive power of French culture. Mapping the use of French across means tracing the colonial expansion of France and Belgium (see the Introduction to this volume by Charbonneau and Chafer). Therefore, the plea for sending francophone peacekeepers to francophone countries may entail the return of the former colonial military to their old areas of domination, which may appear problematic (see Chapter 5 by Koepf in this volume). For example, the French-led EUFOR-Chad/CAR was sullied with partiality because the peacekeeping deployment was regarded by some local and international actors as a cover for reinforcing French support for the Chadian government.38 Worse, in other cases, troops from former colonial powers were targeted with bloody consequences in Lebanon, Rwanda, and the Ivory Coast.39 To avoid these conflicts, alternative forces might be provided by southern francophone countries, but such a solution raises new problems. The first is capacity shortfall. As is well documented, the limited ability of southern states especially in Africa to perform peace operations without external support still prevents the AU motto, ÂAfrican solution for African problemsÊ, from being operationalized.40 Despite valuable efforts made by the AU and the African subregional bodies with the support of external countries,41 it is unlikely to have sufficient French-speaking African personnel adequately equipped and trained, ready for major peace operations in Francophone African countries in the near future. The second potential problem is also due to the legacy of French and Belgian colonialism. In the African context, language commonality is frequently the result of close vicinity to a hardly impartial potential troop contributor. Competing interests, border disputes, cross-border ethnicity, and many other issues, may hinder a neighbouring state, though it shares the same language, from being an appropriate troop provider for a peace operation.42

Language issues in Belgian peace operations policy As a minofrancophone state and founding member of Francophonie, the Belgian situation may be compared to CanadaÊs.43 They rank third (12%) and second (31%)44, respectively, as financial contributors to the OIF, though far behind France (45%). Since education and culture are decentralized competences in the Belgian legal system, 100% of the Belgian financial contribution to OIF is paid by the French-speaking entity renamed in 2011 Fédération Wallonie-Bruxelles (FWB), even though the political representation at the OIF summits is still held by the federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Prime Minister. As noticed by Justin Massie and David Morin in the Québec case,45 the growing importance of the OIFÊs geopolitical role tends to change the balance in favour of the federal state at the expanse of the FWB, even though the latter supports the whole financial burden of BelgiumÊs membership.

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BelgiumÊs active membership in OIF must be understood as part of the multilateral approach of Belgian foreign policy since the end of World War II. Seeing itself as a Âsmall country with not so small powerÊ,46 Belgium demonstrated a systematic commitment for enhanced multilateralism in international relations to wield soft power and exercise influence on the international stage.47 In spite of the constant reduction of its military budget and human resources,48 Belgium has strived to demonstrate international solidarity and reliability by taking part in numerous multilateral military operations.49 As Figure 3.3 shows, four types of operation were performed abroad by the Belgian-armed forces since 1989: evacuation of nationals, humanitarian assistance, UN peacekeeping, and non-UN peacekeeping. There is a notable parallel between Belgian practices with those of the other Western countries. Together with France, the UK, Spain, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and many others, Belgium took part in the expansion phase of UN peacekeeping in the 1990s. As far as Belgium was concerned, the activity was driven by solidarity with European partners, as well as by incentives resulting from its presence on the UN Security Council in 1991 1992. Substantial Belgian contingents were sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia, and Rwanda, where they experienced similar difficulties as their Western counterparts. Consequently, Belgium adopted new guidelines, for the most part inspired by the parliamentary inquiry committee in charge of investigating the events in Rwanda.50 Figure 3.3 clearly depicts how Belgium consequently left UN peacekeeping in the late 1990s to relocate its military commitments under the EU and NATO flags. This period came to an end only in 2006,

4,000 3,500

UN PK

NON UN PK

HUMA

EVAC

Deployed personnel

3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500

19 8 19 9 9 19 0 9 19 1 9 19 2 9 19 3 9 19 4 9 19 5 9 19 6 9 19 7 9 19 8 9 20 9 0 20 0 0 20 1 0 20 2 0 20 3 0 20 4 0 20 5 0 20 6 0 20 7 0 20 8 0 20 9 1 20 0 01

0

Figure 3.3 Belgian deployed personnel by types of operations Source: Belgian Ministry of Defence.

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Francophone perspective on peace operations 63 when Belgium joined other European countries to participate in reinforcing the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Figure 3.4 shows the geographical consequences of this policy evolution. Among the various guidelines established in the aftermath of the Rwandan tragedy, one specifically mentioned that ÂBelgium should no longer send armed troops to countries with which it had a colonial bondÊ.51 The African continent, which used to be the main area for overseas Belgian military interventions, became a forbidden zone. This did not mean, however, that Belgium lost interest in Africa. Brussels maintained its special, though choppy relationship with the DRC, remained diplomatically committed in the Great Lakes Region, and took part in all EU operations in Africa, though it avoided sending combat units to the DRC. Belgium also contributed to the development of African peacekeeping capacities, in the form of bilateral partnerships, with equipment and training provision in the case of Benin. In other cases, such as in the DRC, Belgium mixed bilateral training assistance with participation in multilateral disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) programmes. Even though Belgium often became involved in various seminars and meetings, together with France and Canada, in French-speaking parts of Africa,52 one can hardly highlight a specific francophone approach in the Belgian strategy. Beyond the obvious facilitating role of a shared language, nothing in the formulation of the Belgian foreign and military policy in Africa denotes any linguistic hubris compared to that sometimes demonstrated by France.

4,500 4,000

ASIA

AFRICA

EUROPE

OTHERS

Deployed personnel

3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500

19 8 19 9 9 19 0 9 19 1 9 19 2 9 19 3 9 19 4 9 19 5 9 19 6 9 19 7 9 19 8 9 20 9 0 20 0 0 20 1 0 20 2 0 20 3 0 20 4 0 20 5 0 20 6 0 20 7 0 20 8 0 20 9 1 20 0 01

0

Figure 3.4 Belgian deployed personnel by areas of deployment Source: Belgian Ministry of Defence.

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In 2006, Belgian soldiers were dispatched under the UN flag to Lebanon, an OIF member state. This presents an opportunity to investigate empirically the added value of sending francophone peacekeepers to francophone areas. As a preliminary question, it should be asked whether Belgium sent troops to Lebanon because it is a francophone state. Evidence of such a motivation is hard to find. The Belgian rationale was rather that a UNIFIL reinforcement by a core group of EU member states provided a unique opportunity to reintegrate into UN peacekeeping under fairly good operational conditions and at an opportune time because it was just months before Belgium entered the UN Security Council for the 2007 2008 membership.53 For historical reasons, France was the driving force behind the European commitment, and it was expected that a French officer would become the post-2007 war UNIFIL force commander, with French troops as the biggest contingent. However, France subsequently downsized its participation and agreed to alternate the force command with Italy. The memories of the bloody episode in 1983 when the French HQ was bombed certainly played a role in these decisions, confirming the caveat about deploying peacekeepers from former colonial powers.54 To address the operational argument concerning the added value of sending francophone peacekeepers to francophone countries, the actual French-speaking character of the Belgian contingent has to be examined, as well as that of the French-speaking character of the local population. Because Belgium organizes its army armed forces in homogeneous linguistic units for operational reasons, each unit was therefore Flemish speaking or French speaking, and the relieving rotation was designed on a four-month duty basis, as represented by Figure 3.5. From September 2006 to June 2012, the Belgian military presence in Lebanon was actually French speaking for 28 months and Flemish speaking for 40 months. The proportion at 41% equals the proportion of the Belgian francophone population, which may add credit to the probabilistic methodology. What can be said about the actual use of the French language in the area of deployment? In Lebanon the official language is Arabic, though French enjoys a kind of semiofficial status, as article 11 of the constitution stipulates that a law determines the cases in which the French language may be used. Estimations of the proportion of the Lebanese population that may be considered French speaking vary from 38 to 22%.55 However, the use of French is unequally distributed. It

Jun 12

D Feb 12

F Oct 11

Jun 11

Feb 11

D Oct 10

Jun 10

F Feb 10

D Oct 09

Jun 09

Feb 09

F Oct 08

Jun 08

Feb 08

D Oct 07

F Jun 07

Feb 07

Sep 06

D

Figure 3.5 Linguistic role of Belgian contingents in UNIFIL: D = Dutch speaking; F = French speaking Source: Belgian Ministry of Defence.

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Francophone perspective on peace operations 65 is still the first language of an older elite generation. It is also spoken as a second language by children as they learn and practice it at school, but their proficiency tends to decrease once they leave school. In the absence of any linguistic census, the proportion of the French-speaking population in South Lebanon, the UNIFIL area of deployment, is impossible to estimate. However, research missions in the region, as well as various testimonies from Belgian officers, tend to indicate a low level of use. To build its relationship with the local population, the Belgian contingent opened medical facilities, conducted a demining campaign, and undertook urgent reconstruction works with the purpose of Âwinning hearts and mindsÊ in the village of Tebnin, next to the Belgian Camp Scorpio. At the entrance to their field hospital, the Belgian medics placed a one meter-wide panel with the Belgian flag in the background and wrote in large white letters: ÂBelgian field hospital welcomes youÊ. English was considered more likely to be understood by the recipients. Another observation relates to the local communication team (LCT). Among various actions aimed at releasing timely information to locals about the activities performed by the Belgian contingent, the LCT regularly distributed leaflets with messages such as, ÂWe try our best to become integrated and to respect your culture. We are working for UNIFIL but we are also at your serviceÊ, written in Arabic.56

Conclusion These considerations inadvertently contribute more to deconstruction than to construction of a francophone perspective on peace operations. The figures on francophone participation in peace operations have been reconsidered in the light of a probabilistic estimation of the effective French-speaking share of the deployed contingent. Although the deflation of existing figures is severe, this first finding nevertheless remains a matter of accuracy. More disturbing are the findings indicating that the deployment of more Francophone troops to Francophone countries will not necessarily result in French-speaking peacekeepers amidst French-speaking locals. Language matching will therefore not happen as planned and will not produce the expected operational benefits. In addition, language matching may even entail severe disadvantages and potential problems for peacekeeping purposes because language commonality often results from former colonial bonds. Despite ritual statements at the OIF summits and informative gatherings of francophone UN ambassadors in New York, elements of a francophone approach to peace operations are hardly discernible. As shown by the Belgian case, the decision to participate in a peace operation cannot be explained either by OIF membership or by the linguistic factor. It rather looks like the result of momentarily converging path-dependencies. For Belgium, sending troops to Lebanon simply appeared to be a smart and secure way to resume UN peacekeeping after more than a decade of absence, just before entering the Security Council for a new term.

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Making sense of a francophone perspective on peace operations is still a work in progress. As a first priority, the conceptual fuzziness generated by the various meanings of the word francophone must be clarified. As a community of French speakers, as an international organization, or as a tentative geocultural entity, the underlying realities that it designates are significantly different and should not be casually linked. In-depth investigations on language and peace issues are also influenced by the availability of accurate data about the effective use of the French language, both among the troops and in the host countries. In the meantime, the use of theoretical probabilities based on available data on spoken languages may offer an acceptable methodology, which takes into account the prevalence of minofrancophone states within the OIF. Such an approach should, of course, be supplemented with case studies to throw light on the peculiarities of each specific situation.

Acknowledgements The author expresses his deep gratitude to the anonymous reviewers who helped to improve the original version. Professor Françoise Massart-Piérard of the Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) deserves a special mention for having shared her deep knowledge of the nitty-gritty of the institutional and political evolution of the Francophonie. This research also benefited from the support of Damien Deltenre, a research trainee in UCL, who gathered, updated, and sorted the quantitative data used for this study. The syntactic approximations of the first draft were pitilessly chased by Dr. Charles Devellennes (University of Kent). The author is, of course, responsible for the final outcome.

Notes 1. The francophone writings generally adopt the use of francophonie (lower case) to name the aggregate of French-speaking people and Francophonie (capitalized) to designate the institutional forms (today the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie). (Françoise Massart-Piérard, ÂLa construction sinueuse dÊune identité complexeÊ [The sinuous build-up of a complex identity], Cahiers de lÊInstitut de linguistique de Louvain, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2006, p. 81.) We adopt this spelling convention together with the corresponding adjectives francophone/Francophone throughout the chapter. 2. Only two articles addressing francophone peacekeeping as the main topic were located: David Morin and Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni, ÂMaintien de la paix et espace francophoneÊ [Peacekeeping and the francophone space], Bulletin du maintien de la paix, No. 96, 2009, pp. 1 4; Justin Massie and David Morin, ÂFrancophonie et opérations de paix: vers une appropriation géoculturelleÊ [Francophonie and peace operations : Towards a geocultural ownership], Etudes internationales, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2011, pp. 313 336. 3. United Nations Department of Peaceking Operations (UNDPKO) (at: www.un.org/en/ peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet.html). 4. Alain Le Roy, ÂA Decisive Year: Revitalizing the Peacekeeping PartnershipÊ, statement by the Undersecretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations to the UN Security Council, 23 January 2009.

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Francophone perspective on peace operations 67 5. See, among others, Richard Gowan, ÂThe New Horizon Initiative United Nations Peacekeeping for the 21st CenturyÊ, Signal, New York: Center for International Cooperation, Winter 2011, p. 5. 6. See, among others, ÂResolution Adopted by the General Assembly 61/7. Cooperation Between the UN and the International Organisation of la FrancophonieÊ, Sixty-First session, Agenda item 108 ( j), UN doc. A/RES/61/7, 27 November 2006; ÂResolution Adopted by the General Assembly 63/236 Cooperation Between the United Nations and the International Organisation of la FrancophonieÊ, Sixty-third session, Agenda item 114 (k), UN doc. A/RES/63/236, 17 March 2009. 7. Béatrice Pouligny, Peace Operations Seen from Below: UN Missions and Local People, London: Hurst, 2006. 8. UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), UN Operation in Côte dÊIvoire (UNOCI), UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), and UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). 9. Kofi Annan, ÂSecurity Council, Fifty-Ninth year, 4970th meetingÊ, 17 May 2004, UN doc. S/PV.4970, p. 5. 10. Alain Le Roy, ÂRemarques de clôture du Secrétaire-Général adjoint des Nations Unies pour les Opérations de maintien de la paixÊ [Closing remarks of the UN Undersecretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations], Séminaire régional de Bamako, La participation francophone aux Opérations de maintien de la paix: Pratiques et paramètres [Regional Seminar of Bamako, Francophone participation in peace operations: Practice and parameters], 17 June 2009. 11. Sarjoh Bah and Bruce D. Jones, Peace Operations Partnerships: Lessons and Issues from Coordination to Hybrid Arrangements, Center on International Cooperation, New York University, 2008. 12. Economic Community of West African States Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). 13. African Mission in Burundi (AMIB, 2003 2004), African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS, 2004 2007), African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM, from 2007 on). 14. Thierry Tardy, ÂLÊUnion européenne, nouvel acteur, du maintien de la paix: Le cas dÊArtemis en République démocratique du CongoÊ [The European Union, new actor for peacekeeping: The case of Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo], in Jocelyn Coulon (ed.), Guide du maintien de la paix 2005, Outremont, France: Athéna, 2004, pp. 35 56; Raphaël Pouyé, ÂEUFOR Tchad/RCA: Une opération européenne de protection des civils à lÊépreuve du politiqueÊ [EUFOR Chad/RCA: An EU operation for the protection of civilians tested against politics], in Jocelyn Coulon (ed.), Guide du maintien de la paix 2010, Outremont, France: Athéna, 2009, pp. 25 37; Catherine Gegout, ÂThe West, Realism and Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1996 2006)Ê, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2009, pp. 231 244. 15. Out of 56 AU member states, 26 are OIF members. Algeria chose not to join OIF. but despite its policy of arabisation, the French language remains prevalent. 16. Morin and Théroux-Bénoni (see n. 2), p. 2; Massie and Morin (see n. 2), pp. 319 320. 17. Françoise Massart-Piérard, ÂLa construction sinueuse dÊune identité complexeÊ [The sinuous buildup of a complex identity], Cahiers de lÊInstitut de linguistique de Louvain, Vol. 32, No. 4, 2006, p. 81. 18. Françoise Massart-Piérard, ÂLa Francophonie internationaleÊ [The International Francophonie], Courrier hebdomadaire du Centre de recherche et dÊinformation sociopolitiques, No. 1655, 1999, p. 10. 19. Although the vocable Sommet de la Francophonie is now commonly used, the official denomination of these meetings is Conférence des chefs dÊÉtat et de gouvernement des pays ayant le français en partage [Conference of the Heads of States and Governments having the French language in common]. 20. Massart-Piérard (see n. 18), p. 15.

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21. Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, Délégation a la paix, à la démocratie et aux droits de lÊhomme, ÂTableau des missions dÊinformation et dÊobservation des élections dépêchées par lÊorganisation internationale de la francophonie (1992 2010)Ê [Factsheet on information and elections monitoring missions sent by the OIF] (at: http://democratie.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/tableau_de_missions.pdf ). 22. Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, Xe Conférence des chefs dÊEtat et de gouvernement des pays ayant le français en partage, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, 26 27 November 2004, ÂDéclaration de OuagadougouÊ [Ouagadougou Statement], 27 November 2004, p. 6. 23. Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, ÂPrévention des conflits et Sécurité humaine: Déclaration de Saint-Boniface adoptée le 14 mai 2006Ê [Conflicts prevention and human security: Saint-Boniface Statement adopted on 14 May 2006] (at: www. operationspaix.net/IMG/pdf/Declaration_Saint-Boniface_2006.pdf ). 24. Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, XIIe Conférence des chefs dÊÉtat et de gouvernement des pays ayant le français en partage, Québec, 17 19 October 2008, ÂDéclaration de QuébecÊ [Québec Statement], p. 2 (our translation). 25. The term was coined by Léopold Sédar Senghor to name the values of language and culture connected with the French civilization. See also Massart-Piérard (see n. 18), p. 6; Joseph Boly, ÂVisages de la francitéÊ [Faces of the francité], Bruxelles: Fondation Charles Plisinier, 1999, p. 12, cited in Massart-Piérard, p. 6. 26. Derived from anglosphère, it means a francophone institutionalization instrumentalized for the benefit of its most powerful members, namely France and Canada. Massie and Morin (see n. 2), p. 316; David G. Haglund and Justin Massie, ÂLÊabandon de lÊabandon: The Emergence of a Transatlantic „Francosphère‰ in Québec and CanadaÊs Strategic CultureÊ, Québec Studies, Vol. 49, March 2010, pp. 59 85; Aymeric Chauprade, ÂLÊespace économique francophone: Pour une francophonie intégraleÊ [The francophone economic space: For an integral francophonie], Paris: Ellipses, 1996. 27. Massart-Piérard (see n. 18), p. 87. 28. Massart-Piérard (see n. 18). 29. See, among others, Xavier Deniau, ÂLa FrancophonieÊ [The Francophonie], Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1998; Michel Guillou, ÂLa Francophonie: Nouvel enjeu mondialÊ, Paris: Hatier, 1993; Françoise Massart-Piérard, ÂLa Francophonie, un nouvel intervenant sur la scène internationaleÊ, Revue internationale de politique comparée, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2007, pp. 69 93. 30. Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (see n. 23), p. 2. 31. Annan (see n. 9) and Le Roy (see n. 10). 32. Morin and Théroux-Bénoni (see n. 2), p. 2; Massie and Morin (see n. 2), pp. 321 322. 33. Among the OIF member states, only two have a majority that speak French as a first language; the remainder should therefore be considered minority francophone states, or minofrancophone. Canada and Belgium, the second and third financial contributors and most influential countries after France, are minofrancophone, with 21% and 40% of the respective populations being French speaking. 34. The need for a Âminimal proficiency thresholdÊ was underlined by Alexander Wolff in ÂDossier réalisé par mfi médias France intercontinents, lÊagence multimédia de radio france internationale en partenariat avec lÊOrganisation internationale de la Francophonie à lÊoccasion de la Journée internationale de la FrancophonieÊ [File realized by mfi France intercontinents, the multimedia agency of Radio-France internationale in Partnership with OIF for the International Day of the Francophonie], 20 March 2009, p. 35 (at: www.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/Fcs_enjeu_21esiecle.pdf ). 35. DPKO, ÂUN MissionÊs Contributions by CountryÊ, 31 August 2011 (at: www.un.org/ en/peacekeeping/contributors/2011/aug11_5.pdf ); ÂArea and PopulationÊ and ÂLanguageÊ, in Encyclopedia Britannica, Book of the Year 2011, Chicago: EncyclopÕdia Britannica, 2011, pp. 750 755, 766 770. OIF statistics were avoided because the organization has an obvious political interest in overstating the pervasiveness of French.

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Francophone perspective on peace operations 69 36. The theoretical average proportion of French-speaking peacekeepers among the OIF contingents deployed in the four operations is considered to be 21.5%. 37. Ulrike Hanemann, ÂLiteracy in Conflict SituationsÊ, Hamburg: UNESCO Institute for Education, March 2005, p. 7. 38. Hylke Dijkstra, ÂThe Military Operation of the EU in Chad and the Central African Republic: Good Policy, Bad PoliticsÊ, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2010, pp. 395 407; Bruno Charbonneau, ÂFranceÊ, in David Black and Paul Williams (eds.), The International Politics of Mass Atrocities: The Case of Darfur, London: Routledge, 2010, pp. 213 231. 39. On 23 October 1983, 58 French soldiers were killed in the bombing of their headquarters in Beirut. On 6 April 1994, 10 Belgian blue helmets were assassinated in Kigali by elements of the Rwandese Army Force. On 6 November 2004, a government-ordered air strike killed nine French soldiers part of Opération Licorne deployed in support of ONUCI. (See Bruno Charbonneau, ÂWar and Peace in Côte dÊIvoire: Violence, Agency, and the Local/International LineÊ, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2012, pp. 508 524.) 40. See among many others, Roy May and Gerry Cleaver, ÂAfrican Peacekeeping: Still Dependent?Ê, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1997, pp. 1 21; Michel Liégeois, ÂOpérations de paix: la question de la régionalisationÊ [Peace operations: The question of regionalization], in Jocelyn Coulon (ed.), Guide du maintien de la paix 2005, Outremont, France: Athéna, 2004, pp. 17 33. 41. Olaf Bachmann, ÂThe African Standby Force: External Support to an ÂAfrican Solution to African ProblemsÊ?Ê, IDS Research Report 67, Institute for Development Studies, April 2011. 42. For example, the Democratic Republic of the Congo did not provide any personnel to the UN operation in the DRC because of cross-border ethnicity issues. 43. For internal political reasons, official statistics dealing directly with language use have not been collected in Belgium since 1961. However, various techniques of extrapolation give a 41% share as a fairly accurate evaluation. See, for example, Jacques Leclerc, ÂLÊÉtat belge: Données démolinguistiquesÊ [The Belgian state: Demo-linguistic data] (at: www.tlfq.ulaval.ca/axl/europe/belgiqueetat_demo.htm). 44. This is the contribution of the Federal Government of Canada. Québec contributes a separate 3% share. 45. Massie and Morin (see n. 2), p. 317. 46. Michel Liégeois and Galia Glume, ÂA Small Power Under the Blue Helmet: The Evolution of Belgian Peacekeeping PolicyÊ, Studia Diplomatica, Vol. 61, No. 3, 2008, p. 111. 47. With five mandates to date, Belgium is the most frequently elected small country as a nonpermanent member of the Security Council. Michel Liégeois, ÂThe Role of Small Powers in the UN Security Council: The Case of BelgiumÊ, in Jan Wouters, Edith Drieskens, and Sven Biscop (eds.), Belgium in the UN Security Council: Reflections on the 2007 2008 Membership, Oxford: Intersentia, 2009, pp. 51 61. 48. The Belgian defence budget for 2010 was US$5.4 billion, or 1.2% of GDP, down from 2.5% in 1989. 49. The Ministry of Defence reports that, since the end of the Cold War, Belgium has carried out more than 120 military operations of all types, sending a cumulative total of about 30,000 soldiers abroad. 50. ÂNote de politique générale du Gouvernement sur la participation belge aux opérations de maintien de la paixÊ [General Policy Note of the Government on Belgian Participation to Peace Operations], Sénat et Chambre de Belgique, Session de 1997 1998, 1394/1 97/98; Sénat de Belgique, Session de 1997 1998, Commission dÊenquête parlementaire concernant les événements du Rwanda, ÂRapport fait au nom de la commission dÊenquête par MM.Mahoux et VerhofstadtÊ [Report on Behalf of the Investigation Committee], 6 December 1997. 51. ÂNote de politique généraleÊ (see n. 50), pp. 6 7 (authorÊs translation).

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52. Massie and Morin (see n. 2), p. 12. 53. For a detailed account of the Belgian decision-making process regarding UNIFIL, see Liégeois and Glume (see n. 46), pp. 121 130. 54. Liégeois and Glume (see n. 46), pp. 128 129. 55. According to OIF estimation, 38%; 22% according to Encyclopedia Britannica (see n. 35). 56. Liégeois and Glume (see n. 46), p. 132.

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4

Peace operations and security sector reform (SSR) in Francophone Africa Niagalé Bagayoko

For a decade or so, security sector reform (SSR) processes have become an essential part of multidimensional peacekeeping operations, particularly during their consolidation phase. SSR reflects the qualitative changes that have occurred in recent years with the development of more complex and integrated peace operations. Most of the multilateral organizations deploying peace operations have adopted their own SSR documents. The Security Council, in its presidential statement (S/PRST/2011/19), has noted that an increasing number of peacekeeping and special political missions are mandated to support SSR processes, including those in Africa that are specifically mentioned. The key importance of SSR has also been recognized by the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34),1 which has taken note since 2010 of the increasing demands placed on the Security Sector Reform Unit, created within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), with respect to supporting United Nations missions in the field. The UN Secretary-General has released two reports on SSR. The second one, ÂSecuring States and Societies: Strengthening the United Nations Comprehensive Support to Security Sector ReformÊ,2 published on 13 August 2013, reviews progress made in the provision of United Nations support to SSR since the release of the first report on SSR in 20083 and examines ways forward to further enhance the United NationsÊ comprehensive approach to SSR.4 The report considers these issues in three areas of United Nations engagement: (1) UN support to national SSR efforts; (2) UN policy development and normative frameworks on SSR; and (3) partnerships and regional SSR efforts. The recommendations highlight ways in which the UN, member states, and partners can further support SSR by encouraging inclusive and sustainable national ownership, promoting security service delivery, building capacities for reform that better link componentspecific reforms to sector-wide initiatives, expanding and deepening partnerships, encouraging dialogue and knowledge sharing, and further enhancing interagency coherence and coordination. All major peace operations presently deployed in Francophone Africa by the United Nations namely the ONUCI (Operation des Nations unies en Côte dÊIvoire), the MONUSCO (Mission de lÊOrganisation des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo), and MINUSMA (Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation du Mali) have an important SSR section, playing a major role in

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the peace consolidation process. Most of the United Nations offices set up by the Department of Political Affairs in Francophone countries for instance, the BNUB (Bureau des Nations unies au Burundi), the BINUCA (Bureau integré des Nations unies en République centrafricaine or in regions including Francophone countries such as the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) and the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) have divisions specifically responsible for promoting security sector reform. The African Union (AU)5 and some African regional organizations (including ECOWAS) have also adopted their own SSR documents. The Mission international de soutien à la Centrafrique (MISCA) to be deployed in the Central African Republic under the aegis of the African Union and replace the MICOPAX6 deployed by the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) will also have an SSR section, security reform being seen as crucial to guarantee a return to peace in the foreseeable future. In this context, it is worth mentioning that all the SSR documents adopted by multilateral organizations have been greatly inspired by the SSR Guidelines adopted by the OECD in 2005, which are considered universal norms and standards in the realm of SSR. The OECD DAC Handbook on SSR: Supporting Security and Justice provides guidance to operationalize the 2005 DAC Guidelines on Security System Reform and Governance,7 which are promoting an integrated approach to security reform in fragile, conflict-prone, or conflict-affected states. The OECD approach includes not only the armed forces, police and gendarmerie, intelligence services, and justice and penal systems but also the civil authorities responsible for oversight and democratic control. It also provides new guidance on assessment, monitoring, review, and evaluation of SSR programmes and highlights how to ensure greater coherence across the different actors and departments engaged in SSR. These general principles underpinning SSR are no doubt relevant to Francophone Africa as well. However, identifying better ways to promote efficient SSR programmes throughout Francophone Africa requires a deep understanding of those countriesÊ bureaucratic patterns that belong to a specific linguistic area and are inherited from colonial rule. In recent years, Anglophone countries have arguably been more open to changes in the direction of increased accountability8 (Ministries of Defence relatively independent from the armed forces; parliamentary oversight; accountability to audit bodies, ombudsmen, human rights commissions) than their Francophone equivalents.9 Partly this may reflect variations in their respective democratic transition processes. But another factor has been the active promotion of SSR itself in countries like Sierra Leone and Ghana, together with some cross-fertilization among Anglophone countries, as well as the demonstration effects of the South African model. In contrast, Francophone African countries are usually presented as not having experienced any significant transformation in security governance.10 The seizure of power by the military or with their complicity in several states (Côte dÊIvoire, Mali, Mauritania, Guinea, and Madagascar) is seen as dramatic evidence of the total lack of improvement in security governance. However, the situation is more complex because a

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73

significant number of countries, including nondemocratic ones, have embarked on tiptoe on a process of reform.11 In some cases, these reform processes have been undertaken and framed without the SSR label. But they are in fact resulting in more professional and more accountable security forces, which is the overarching purpose of the SSR approach.12 Senegal is a relevant example from this perspective. Yet in Francophone countries emerging from crises, the SSR approach based on OECD guidelines and standards has been the norm and has not always proven to be totally efficient. Today, the major international actors involved in SSR acknowledge that the peculiarities of French-speaking African environments have not been sufficiently taken into account in the original conceptualization of SSR or in the implementation of policies on the ground. The time is ripe to recognize that institutional variations matter and have to be understood and built into SSR programmes conducted in the context of peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations: for SSR programmes to be efficient in Francophone Africa, there is a need to recognize that, beyond sharing a common language, the majority of Francophone African states share a specific model from an institutional, organizational and procedural standpoint.13 A thorough knowledge of these features is necessary to ensure the success of SSR in Francophone Africa, both in postconflict and conflict prevention strategies developed in the context of peace operations. This chapter thus aims to provide a better understanding of the institutional, organizational, bureaucratic, and legal security arrangements operating in Francophone African countries in order to highlight their patterns and to provide an overview of the actors, structures, and how security systems function. The issue at stake is to highlight the kind of mechanisms and frameworks prevailing in francophone countries and the specific considerations to be taken into account in the context of peace operations conducted in francophone environments. The final purpose of this chapter is neither to provide a performance rating of francophone security apparatus nor to define performance benchmarks against which such security apparatuses should be systematically assessed. Rather, it states that taking into consideration the specific organizational structures and management processes prevailing within Francophone African security systems is a sine qua non condition to ensure the success of peacekeeping and peace consolidation missions in Francophone Africa.

Historical heritage: Colonial and post-colonial influences on francophone security systems In all Francophone African states, the security system is a direct legacy of the structures put in place under colonial rule and maintained from the 1960s onwards by independent governments.14 The Francophone African defence apparatus originates from French colonial troops (troupes coloniales). From 1822 to 1900, both French and indigenous troops were initially designated as Marines (troupes de marine) and administered by the Navy Ministry, even if they were mostly made up of infantry and also included artillery units.15 The French colonial troops were divided into the French long service volunteers (French troops from France

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serving in the colonies) and the indigenous troops put under the supervision of French officers and designated as tirailleurs (riflemen). French colonial regiments recruited soldiers in all African territories under French rule and used them in anywhere without taking into account their geographical origin. In the colonies of French West and French Equatorial Africa, the maintenance of law and order was a responsibility shared by all colonial troops. There were two noticeable exceptions, however, with two specialized bodies that were part of the colonial troops but specifically entrusted with police and law enforcement missions: first, the colonial gendarmes and, second, in the colonial territory that would become Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, camel troops (troupes meharistes), created in 1894 by the Governor of Senegal under the name of Garde cercle and then Garde goume. It is worth noting that, following the adoption of the Deferre Law in 1956, the function of policing and law enforcement had been entrusted to indigenous forces placed under the supervision of local authorities rather than under French supervision. It was then decided that the colonial territories would have their own municipal and local police forces, the French government-general being entrusted only with supervising the armed forces and ensuring the territorial defence of the territories. The objective was to unburden metropolitan France of all the operations of Âmaintenance of law and orderÊ, especially against trade unions and demonstrations by educated youth. From the 1960s independences, France has been more deeply engaged in Africa than in any other Western country.16 Any analysis of the security apparatus in Francophone Africa must bear in mind that the relationships with France are critical to the understanding of the state of the security sector in a number of Francophone African countries. From the time of independence, a special relationship17 has prevailed between the new states and their former colonial powers. France kept close strategic ties with its former colonies and was tied to a number of them with a system of diplomatic, economic, cultural, and defence agreements. The essential characteristics of the Franco-African security relationship includes defence agreements (guaranteeing the continual presence of French troops in a number of Francophone states Senegal, Djibouti, Gabon, Cote dÊIvoire18 or mutual defence clauses), military advisors, and close military and police cooperation (including the training of officers and the sale of weapons and related equipment). From the 1960s, a significant number of Francophone states have been protected from external and in some cases internal aggression, with France serving as the guarantor of their sovereignty. Consequently, they have not developed a strong military apparatus.19 In addition, the French so-called coopérants technical advisors (in the defence as well as in the police and justice sectors), permanently deployed in Francophone African countries for a two- to three-year period have been deeply involved in assisting the newly independent authorities in establishing a national security apparatus.20 When security reform is part of the mandate of peace operations, a lot should be learnt from the experiences of French security cooperation both its successes and failures in building up and reforming African security apparatuses.

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Institutional patterns: The central role of the president and the marginalization of parliaments All Francophone countries have centralized presidential systems in which security bureaucracies report directly or indirectly to the president: the prominence of the executive branch has downsized the role of the parliaments, a feature that is formally recognized by the constitutions. In Francophone Africa, the legacy of colonialism and then the adoption of constitutions inspired by the French Fifth Republic Constitution21 if not carbon-copied from it have resulted in the concentration of power in the executive branch. A constant feature of most francophone constitutions is that the president of the republic presides over all security apparatuses, whilst the government mostly through the ministries of defence, interior/internal security, and justice is responsible for implementing security policies. The president also has the power to appoint civilian and military positions (for instance, the chief of general staff of the armed forces, as well as other heads of the civilian and military administration). The president can also hold exceptional powers, including the power to declare a state of emergency, though this can be only after consultation with his Council of Ministers. Furthermore, it is important to note that most Francophone African constitutions (except those of Cameroon, Togo, Guinea, Niger, Senegal) have also integrated provisions inspired by the American Constitution: they appoint the president as the Âsupreme commander in chief of the armed forcesÊ, the adjective supreme being directly taken from the American Constitution.22 Nevertheless, in Francophone Africa, parliamentary oversight of security services is provided for in most constitutions. Since the 1990s, the francophone constitutions have established a system of separation and collaboration between the executive and the legislative branches. Most of them state that the parliament is in charge of declaring war and of ratifying peace agreements. Moreover, as in France, the constitutions of Francophone African states apart from in Togo (where there is no definition of the legislative sphere of responsibilities) recognize that Âthe fundamental principles of the general organization of the national defenceÊ are the result of legal provisions, which means that their defence policies are passed into law by the legislature, though only after being reviewed by the appropriate committee. Furthermore, parliament may call on the security forces to defend national territory or to approve or amend any act relating to new alliances. Most of the time, it has to approve any engagement of its armed forces abroad. In countries such as Benin and Niger, the parliament is entitled to adopt bills that ratify any international alliance, including military assistance agreements. Generally, the national assembly has the power to monitor the actions of the government through consideration of the budget (including a facility to approve the funds to be allocated among various security structures, to revise them downwards or upwards, or to redirect budget allocations towards other areas) and to put questions to the government or parliamentary standing committees (on national defence, security, justice, and civil protection). Like all other standing committees, these committees have

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a duty to monitor the actions of the government; they may hold audiences with ministers and call before them anyone who needs to be consulted. The committees receive draft bills from the government, but in some countries such as Benin, they may also propose laws on security issues. These committees are, however, mainly in charge of carrying out surveys and drafting amendments. They are not investigative bodies, nor are they units that provide direct control of the activities of the security sector, even if they are allowed to call on external expertise. However, in a number of Francophone African countries, the constitutional provisions related to parliamentary oversight have very often been ignored in practice.23 One of the aims of SSR-related programmes promoted in the context of peace operations is to provide extensive support to the elaboration of security legislation as well improving capacity-building assistance to enhance parliamentary oversight.24

Decision-making structures An important feature of security systems in Francophone Africa is the absence or the lack of collegial organs meant to be fully associated with the decision-making process. Furthermore, the management and supervision of defence ministries has been insufficiently civilianized. In most of Francophone Africa, beyond the Council of Ministers (under the authority of the prime minister), which is in theory the first level of coordination, there are no integrated processes combining external defence, internal security, policing, and the like within a single policy frame and coordinated at the national level that can be seen as comparable to the National Security Council (NSC).25 In most countries, however, the constitution sets up high councils on national defence, which are in fact rather similar, including as regards their lack of real influence, to the defence councils that can be found in Anglophone Africa. The high councils on national defence, once again modelled on their French counterparts, are chaired by the president and bring together all ministers involved in security and defence matters. Even if supposedly meant to think about strategic orientations of defence and security policy, these structures are focused only on defence and military policy. They have only an advisory role and are in no way a decision-making body: most of the time, they are a hollow and empty shell. However, a number of countries have recently set up collegial and coordinating decision-making structures, as shown by the creation of national security councils in Côte dÊIvoire and Niger. Most Francophone countries do not have any coordination structure to deal with internal security matters. An interesting exception is Burkina Faso, where a coordinating unit for internal security forces was implemented in 2001 (police, gendarmerie, and fire brigade). Clear distinctions between civil and military functions are far from widespread in francophone ministries of defence: on the contrary, ministries of defence are administered only by the military. The minister of defence/armed forces is generally in charge of the implementation of military defence policy under the authority of the president. He is responsible for organizing the armed forces and for ensuring that they are operational by providing them with the required resources,

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equipment, and infrastructure. He also has responsibility for military cooperation with foreign countries. However, in a number of countries, the presidents violate the provisions of the constitutions and cumulate their function with that of minister of defence. Furthermore, in a significant number of francophone countries, ministers of defence as well as ministers of the interior have been appointed from the military.26 One of the objectives of SSR programmes usually promoted in the context of peace operations is the setting up of collegial decision-making structures, as well as the introduction of a clear distinction between civilian and military functions: the ministry is seen as a crucial mechanism for the civil control and executive supervision of the armed forces. According to such programmes, the operational command of the forces should work together with a civilian bureaucracy from the respective ministries. At the head of the ministry, a civilian minister should be appointed by the president. The ministry of defence, which is responsible for the development and implementation of national defence policy, should be made up of a defence secretariat (defence bureaucracy) and a defence headquarters, headed by the secretary/minister of defence and the chief of defence staff, respectively. The secretary should be the chief accounting officer for the ministry and advises the minister of defence on policy matters. The chief of defence staff should be responsible for the operational command of the armed forces and advise the minister on operational matters related to national defence. Types of defence forces A number of defence forces that do exist in Francophone Africa (presidential guards on the one hand and national guards on the other) have no real counterpart elsewhere on the continent. Furthermore, Francophone defence forces are often officially endowed with development missions, contrary to Anglophone armed forces. Presidential guards are common practice in Francophone African countries. Officially, the mission of the presidential guard is to protect the head of state when he travels abroad or within the country and the presidential residences. The presidential guards are usually drawn from the ranks of the military (officers and noncommissioned officers) and the gendarmerie. However, the presidential guards called the republican guard in some Francophone African countries (cf. the French republican guard) are often configured as praetorian bodies. These forces are usually appointed on the basis of their loyalty towards the president and recruited according to ethnic criteria. The presidential guard is the core security body in nondemocratic francophone countries. Even if they are formally integrated into the armed forcesÊ chain of command, these presidential guards are not accountable to the chief of staff or to the ministry of defence: they are accountable to virtually no one but the president. Presidential guards can also be found in less authoritarian states. Even if their missions are less challenging, they enjoy special status. The presidential guards are one of the major manifestations of the system of competing security agencies and parallel chains of command that characterize

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the military in Francophone Africa. The presidential/republican guards are generally better equipped than the other armed forces, and they also enjoy virtual immunity for the crimes and abuses they commit. However, in some countries, the presidential guards have been reformed (in Niger, for instance). A clear challenge for SSR-related programmes conducted in the context of peace operations is clearly to reform such presidential bodies. On the other hand, in some Francophone countries of the Sahelian region (Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad), the national guard carries out important duties that are both military and civilian in essence. It contributes to maintaining order and public safety, as well as to the general policing of territorial communities. It is entrusted with providing security to political and administrative institutions and is also involved in the prison services. What is specific about the national guard is that it has the ability to grow into a formidable fighting force, capable of serving alongside the army. The national guard is managed by the minister of defence but in operations is put under the authority of the minister of the interior. Generally, a chief of general staff leads, coordinates, and controls the activities and duties of the division commanders and of the heads of units (who command the territorial units in the provinces). The national guard is present throughout the national territory and works essentially to the benefit of the administration and the population. It is a highly decentralized force, and its organization reflects the administrative division of the country. National guards are particularly worth considering by SSR programmes launched in the context of peace operations because they were reformed during the 1990s in order to integrate members of former rebel movements from the Sahelian region.27 Reforming the Malian National Guard into which a significant number of Tuaregs have been integrated will be a key challenge in the SSR process in Mali. Finally, most Francophone countries have traditionally envisioned a role for their armies in both economic development and in education. In a number of countries, the constitutions state that the armed forces may participate in the economic, social, and cultural development of the country.28 Even if these missions are not explicitly mentioned in the constitutions themselves, missions that involve the military in development or humanitarian projects are often considered as a possible (and legitimate) role for the armed forces. Because of its resources, the military is often seen as the only competent organization to perform a wide range of developmental tasks in more remote areas. The use of the armed forces is also seen as a way of creating a coming together of interests between the population and the military. The armies of Mali, Senegal, and Benin have been particularly active in this area (training the public in basic hygiene and sanitation, implementing inoculation and vaccination campaigns, building or repairing schools and/or roads, and providing air transport facilities to remote areas). In Anglophone countries, only specific units of the armed forces, namely the engineering corps (and in some cases the health service), are involved in development missions. Such an original approach to missions assigned to military forces could be of interest for a number of SSR programmes developed in the context of peace operations.

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Police forces It is worth noting that, in most Francophone African countries, the operational capabilities of the police forces have been deliberately undermined by the political rulers. In most African countries, police forces have been treated as inferior to the military both in status and resources. Such an under-resourcing has resulted in the inability of the police to grapple with public insecurity arising from high crime rates and serious internal security threats.29 The consequent loss of public confidence in the police has led to the delegitimization of the police and recourse to the military (resulting in a blurring of internal and external security functions) and/or to privatized sources of security and protection, such as corporate security companies and vigilantes. Consequently, reforming and enhancing the operational capabilities of the police forces are top priorities in Francophone Africa. Police reform is seen as particularly crucial to any SSR programme promoted in the context of peace operations: in 1993, a civilian police unit has been set up inside the DPKO. In 2000, the United Nations Panel on Peace Operations issued the Brahimi Report on improving United Nations peacekeeping operations and called for, among other things, a Âdoctrinal shiftÊ in the use of police and other rule of law elements to support a greater focus on reform and restructuring activities. The panel recommended that police work together with their justice and other rule of-law colleagues in a coordinated and integrated manner. Since then, reforming police forces has been a major trend of United Nations SSR programmes. However, as specifically regards Francophone Africa, it is paramount to address police reform taking into account the very particular organizational frameworks that characterize policing. Indeed, one of the defining features of Francophone security systems is the reliance in large part on the kind of security forces that are responsible for the maintenance of internal order. In most Francophone African countries that used to be under French colonial rule, the policing system is modelled on the French system. Two different services are nationally involved in the protection of internal order: the police forces on the one hand and the gendarmerie forces on the other. The relevance of the latter has been questioned over the last few years. In addition, in some countries, municipal police forces operate alongside these two forces and are under the mayorÊs supervision.30

Organizational, territorial, and functional divisions between police forces at the national level To understand how policing functions in Francophone African countries, it is necessary to make a three-fold distinction: organizational, territorial and functional31. The first division between the police forces and the gendarmerie forces is organic/ organizational in essence. The national police, headed by the General Directorate of the National Police (Direction générale de la police nationale, DGPN), come under the responsibility of the minister in charge of security (in some cases also known as the minister of the interior). Most of the time, the General Directorate of National Police is divided into the following departments: the department of public

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security, in charge of maintaining public order and policing common offences (assaults, rape, theft, fraud, mugging, etc.); the criminal investigation department ( judiciary police), which investigates and prosecutes major and organized crime; the territorial surveillance department, which issues permission to enter or exit the national territory (counterpart of the so-called police des frontières in France); and the intelligence department, responsible for administrative inquiries and individual surveillance. Each department is divided into several more general departments, regional departments, provincial departments, and country desks and services. In the various regions, departments are placed under the administrative authority of the regional governor and the technical authority of the director general. This dual layer of hierarchical and technical authority enables regional governors to carry out their roles as both regional civil services and chiefs of security in their areas of expertise. On the other hand, the gendarmerie can be defined as a civilian police force with military status. The national gendarmerie is part of the military forces and comes under the jurisdiction of a general directorate of the ministry of defence, which is responsible for the budget, recruitment, education, training, equipment, administration, and logistics of the gendarmerie forces. However, in operational matters, the gendarmerie has to respond to the agency that requires and asks for its services, namely, the ministry of the interior on the one hand and the ministry of justice on the other. The gendarmerie is made up of two subdivisions, the so-called Great Commands (grands commandements): the territorial gendarmerie (gendarmerie territoriale), and the mobile gendarmerie (gendarmerie mobile). The territorial gendarmerie is the cornerstone of the gendarmerie and is responsible for national territory surveillance, gathering intelligence and the execution of judiciary, military, and administrative police missions. The mobile gendarmerie is the second Great Command of the gendarmerie and is specifically responsible for law enforcement across the national territory and for the protection of the authorities. It has absolutely no judiciary police missions, and its members are therefore not judiciary police officers. The second division relates to the territorial sharing of responsibilities between the national police and the gendarmerie forces. Police units usually carry out their duties in urban areas and cities, whereas the gendarmerie intervenes in rural areas and at borders (sometimes along with forest security and customs units).32 Third, there is a legal/functional division between the functions of the administrative and judiciary police, although this distinction is not always apparent because police personnel can act in both functions. Indeed, these two functions are exercised by both the national police and the gendarmerie. Members of the two police organizations have therefore the status of both administrative and judiciary police. The administrative police are characterized as serving essentially preventive purposes, responsible for the protection of persons and property and for law enforcement. Both the National Police and the National Gendarmerie are in charge of responsibilities such as maintaining order, controlling and preventing crime, enforcing public peace, looking after public health, and regulating traffic. Particularly with regard to maintaining law and order, special units of the national police [generally, the Compagnie Républicaine de sécurité (CRS)]

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and the gendarmerie mobile [including in most sensitive situations the so-called Groupement dÊintervention de la gendarmerie nationale (GIGN)] are mobilized. It is also important to note that in regard to law and order enforcement, there is a hierarchy between the different forces: the national police are the first class of force who can maintain public order. The gendarmerie becomes involved as the second-category force. Under exceptional circumstances (for instance, in a state of emergency), the armed forces may be called in as a third category force to back up the police and gendarmerie forces with law enforcement missions. As regards the judiciary police, it could be described as repressive; it is responsible for the detection of crime, the investigation of crime, and the arrest of suspects. The judiciary police units of the gendarmerie and the national police are specifically trained to be responsible for discovering crimes, for gathering evidence, and for seeking out offenders. In both organizations the judiciary police are answerable to the minister of justice. When they act as judiciary police, the police and the gendarmerie forces come under the authority of the courts, particularly the juge dÊinstruction (examining magistrate) and the procureur (prosecutor). Furthermore, it is important that, in addition to their judiciary and law enforcement duties, gendarmerie forces also have a military defence function (military police, gathering intelligence, protecting sensitive sites) and perform several more directly combat-related tasks in the event of war. Finally, both the national police forces and the gendarmerie forces are increasingly taking part in international peacekeeping missions. The gendarmerie forces are sometimes seen as something of an anachronism or anomaly because they represent the continuation of a military presence in domestic security and therefore legitimize the involvement of the armed forces in internal security matters.33 The existence of the gendarmerie has been accused of violating the basic distinction between the police and the military in a liberal democratic state. Due to their militarized status, the gendarmeries are sometimes associated with tendencies towards authoritarianism and repression. One of the core problems that is common to a number of Francophone African countries is the insufficient separation and blurred responsibilities between the police and the military forces. Militarized police forces such as the gendarmerie are consequently seen as making this tendency worse. Moreover, the differences between the police and the gendarmerie lie in their jurisdiction: cities as the police forcesÊ jurisdiction versus countryside as the gendarmerie forcesÊ jurisdiction. Yet in many Francophone African countries, this distinction is no longer respected. Nevertheless, despite such criticisms, the gendarmerie is often considered an elite corps: that is why its recruitment may be more stringent than for other services, such as the army or the national police forces. The gendarmes generally enjoy a better reputation than the other security forces: they appear as a disciplined corps that respects the hierarchy. The gendarmerie has generally experienced fewer mutinies than other security forces. More often than not, they have not been involved in any forcible takeovers of power. However, in some undemocratic or dictatorial regimes (Guinea), the gendarmeries have been viewed as a central unit that protects the regime and have sometimes been used as a tool of repression against opposition movements. In other countries, they are seen as a rival to the army.

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A number of francophone countries have abolished their gendarmerie forces, such as Belgium in Europe or Burundi and DRC in Africa. There is currently a debate in France in which a number of voices have been pleading for the abolition of the gendarmerie in the context of budgetary restrictions, making the dual police system unaffordable. Conversely, Switzerland decided to create a gendarmerietype force in early 2000. In contrast, it seems that the intermediary, gendarmerie type of security force is growing in significance. According to them, the emergence of a growing number of transnational risks and threats that increasingly challenge the traditional distinction between internal and external security has argued for the rise of agencies located between levels of internal and external security. The distinction between external security on the one hand meaning mainly military threats coming from the aggressive behaviour of other states and, on the other, internal security, meaning criminal activities or other activities likely to disturb internal order within the boundaries of a state has been increasingly blurred. This implies that both crime and war have tended to meet and that, consequently, the roles of the military and the police forces have increasingly coincided. In a number of aspects, such as with formal affiliation, internal structures, and armoury, the gendarmeries occupy an intermediary position between internal and external security forces. The gendarmerie forces are organized along military lines and are thus more centralized and hierarchical than the civilian police forces; they are also equipped with heavier equipment than common police forces (armoured cars, light infantry weapons). Finally, as mentioned, gendarmeries have a double affiliation with the ministry of defence and the ministry of the interior, and they carry out their judiciary police missions under the supervision of the ministry of justice. Due to the fact that they combine both the characteristics of police and military forces, gendarmeries are seen by some observers as particularly appropriate institutions to deal with the challenges that emerge in Africa.34 They are seen as a relevant force that can easily be mobilized to deal with border control or to respond to various transnational challenges (e.g., fighting arms and drug trafficking), and they are increasingly mobilized for border enforcement, sometimes along with the armed forces. They are also seen as having a role to play in peace operations, especially in attempts at postwar reconstruction. African crises are often characterized by the gravity of the offences and crimes that have been committed, mostly against civilians, by troublemakers. Due to their double affiliation, gendarmerie forces can be deployed both under civilian command (for law enforcement as well as for judiciary missions) and military command (their military skills enabling them to engage in fighting missions in case of the deterioration of situations from postconflict to war). It has also been suggested that gendarmerie forces could act as judiciary auxiliaries to the International Criminal Court.

The municipal police In some Francophone African countries, such as Burkina Faso and CAR, municipal police forces operate alongside national police forces based in towns. However,

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in many countries, municipal police forces exist only in theory due to the scarcity of resources in African cities. Where they do exist, the municipal police are generally controlled by the ministry of territorial administration. Supervising municipal police services is one of the responsibilities of town councils. The municipal police therefore come under the authority of a mayor and operate under a municipal police commander. The municipal police are a police of proximity (Âpolice de proximitéÊ). Their duties are to ensure the safety and smooth running of public activities on streets, public highways, and other public facilities notably cleaning, lighting, the removal of congestion, the demolition or repair of unsafe buildings; to control infringements of public order (fights, crowds, noise, and night gatherings); to maintain order during large gatherings; to inspect the accuracy of measures of foodstuffs sold by weight or by measure and the healthiness of food on sale; to ensure the protection of persons and of public and private goods; and to guarantee the preservation of public places like waterways, forests, hunting, and fishing services. The municipal police have an obligation to report all occurrences falling under the jurisdiction of the National Police that could have been missed and to give assistance in any place to prevent breaches of the peace and morality and to ensure the cleanliness of the city.

Administrative and territorial organization in Francophone African states With regard to the security apparatus, the administrative and territorial organization of a state does matter. Indeed, some security institutions (for instance, the municipal police, where they actually exist, or the military regions, which are generally based at the territorial division of a country) are supposed to work closely with decentralized entities (e.g., mayors). A growing number of SSR programmes, conducted in the context of peace operations, envision the creation of decentralized authorities that will be given more responsibilities within a security area. Most Francophone states have inherited the French system of a highly centralized state. Before the 1990s wave of decentralization, the territorial division of Francophone countries was composed of departments, districts (arrondissements), administrative posts, and communes, which were originally merely administrative bodies. These structures were therefore only devolved, since they were administered by representatives appointed by the state. Nowadays, most of the Francophone African states formally recognize both administrative zones and local authorities. Inspired by the French decentralization process (launched in the 1980s), most Francophone African constitutions now recognize the right of local authorities to administer themselves freely. Territorial administration is contained within the constitution, and local authorities are created by law. Consequently, a number of laws that deal with the decentralization process were, at the beginning of the 1990s (often between 1993 and 1995), adopted in most Francophone African states: these have created local authorities in the provinces. These kinds of provisions generally result from an obligation to abide by the programmes of structural and institutional adjustment and an urge to implement regional development

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policies and administrative reforms, as well as to trying to bring the state closer to those it administers and to favour local democracy. According to existing laws, most of the regions, departments, and communes have their own fields of competence and their own financial resources. As in France, communes are meant to be administered by mayors appointed by municipal councils and elected via direct elections. Territorial bodies are supposedly free to run their own affairs under the supervision of a state representative. The state is present locally through a system of administrative authorities: prefects, subprefects, and, in some cases, administrative posts. In most countries, the region is an administrative subdivision both of the state and of a local authority. However, in a number of countries, these provisions are far from effective: in urban and rural communes and in the provinces, communal elections, while planned by the constitution or by the law, have never actually been held. At each administrative level, the authorities are appointed by the central authorities, including when they are supposed to be elected. Operationalising constitutional and legal provisions at the local level should be a major trend of SSR programmes that take place within the framework of peace operations in order to decentralize the management of security in Francophone African states.

Budgeting processes in Francophone African countries The similarities between the French system and the systems of Francophone African countries are very strong with regard to their cash plans and their descriptions of the process and internal control of expenditure.35 Francophone African countries are similar to France in their legal and institutional ways of budgeting, for instance, in the control of government by parliament through the voting of a budget law and supplementary budget reviews and a statutory deadline for the formulation and execution of budgets. Moreover, Francophone countries are similar to France with regard to their expenditure processes and procedures.36 However, although Francophone African countries have historically borrowed largely from the French budgeting system, they have in practice departed from the original model. There are many differences between France and Francophone African countries in auditing, in external control, in accounting, and in reporting. Although budgetary control institutions exist on paper, in practice they work very poorly. The parliamentÊs budgetary role is very weak, and its budgetary prerogatives (votes on initial, supplementary, and review budget laws, as well as control of the executive branches) are, in fact, largely symbolic. Most of the time, it is very difficult to clearly appraise the amount of the security budget because this is divided between several governmental bodies and policy areas. The Francophone African countries are very different from France with regard to the ordonnateur and the degree of consolidation of the budget. Most Francophone African states generally have a centralized structure with an ordonnnateur unique, who often is part of the ministry of finance, whereas in France all ministers are ordonnateurs

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for the spending done by their ministries. The monopoly that is held by the ministry of finance is a defining feature of systems in Francophone Africa. Furthermore, there is another distinctive feature with regard to the defence sector: in many countries, the ministry of defence does not have any control over the defence budget.37 It is the president, rather than the ministry of defence, who can give payment orders (even for minor expenses such as fuel and ammunition), managing the budget completely under secretive rules. Consequently, exceptional spending procedures are often overused. Besides, in Francophone Africa, it is only the central governmentÊs operations that are mostly recorded, and budget consolidation is therefore very weak. In a number of Francophone countries, consolidated treasury balances are not frequent, and budget construction is mostly manual. In the bestcase scenario, executed budgets are published with very long delays (often more than five years after their closing date). Long delays are also observed in the voting of budget review laws. The information flow between the budget directorate and the treasury is irregular, and, as a consequence of a badly monitored execution budget, the treasuryÊs data are often incomplete or incorrect. In practice, normal budget processes are often bypassed, and recourse is made to exceptional spending procedures: these are particularly widespread in the defence sector where spending rules are often circumvented, whereas extrabudgetary spending and political interference are more frequent. The real levels of payment are difficult to assess due to the length of administrative spending processes and the lack of efficient control. The reliability of fiscal data is also often questionable. Finally, audit and external controls are the weakest links of the Francophone budgetary systems. In many African countries, the supreme audit institutions are either quite recent or they do not exist, despite constitutional provisions that specify such offices. Public audit offices in some countries have been created but are not operational. Where they do exist, public audit offices are ill-equipped and understaffed and do not have skilled members of staff. Most importantly, government auditors are not independent from the executive branch. Government accounts are rarely checked by the supreme audit institution. Promoting transparency, accountability, and oversight of security sector expenses and budgeting processes is an important part of SSR processes conducted in the context of peace operations. Taking into account these major trends will be key to ensuring the success of reform processes in Francophone Africa.

State-of-the-art of research on SSR Carrying out documentary research into institutional security development in Francophone Africa is a real challenge: little information and few materials either as primary or secondary sources are available in the public domain. It is important to acknowledge the fact that difficulties in conducting research in most of Africa, and particularly in Francophone Africa, constitute in some cases a wilful obstacle to the production of knowledge for analysis and sound policy formulation. This is in itself a major obstacle to the improvement of security provision

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and stability, which are key objectives of SSR processes promoted in the context of peace operations. Only a few states have compiled the statutory rules of their civil service, and texts relating to the special statute that characterize most of the defence and security forces in Francophone African states are unavailable. As a consequence, priority must be given to European or North American research or documentation centres when carrying out documentary research into the security sector of an African Francophone country. In addition, there are no organized SSR-focused research capabilities of any importance that can be identified in Francophone Africa.38 Individual academics rather than research centres, networks or think tanks are working on SSR topics in an isolated way. However, itÊs important to note that these people, if not numerous, do generally have a very deep knowledge of the African Francophone security systems. Most of the time, these belong to research centres that are specialized in international relations, strategic studies, or geopolitics. Many Francophone practitioners have also developed very specialized skills in the field of security sector reform. If connected to a strong network, these academics and practitioners could bring invaluable contributions to SSR in Francophone Africa. Supporting the emergence of pan-African SSR expertise by encouraging the integration of Francophone African research and assessment capacities into the framework of the existing centres and strong networks that have been working on SSR-related issues for around 20 years in Anglophone African countries would be a real asset.

Conclusion As stated in Bruno Charbonneau and Tony ChaferÊs Introduction to this volume, specificity is the inescapable a priori context of peace missions: such a statement is particularly relevant to the SSR realm. Security systems in Francophone Africa reflect the institutional and organizational legacy of French colonial rule. Such systems are also inherited from the post-independence period and demonstrate that peace operations in ex-French colonies, as elsewhere, must take into consideration post-colonial dynamics. Taking into account and developing a better knowledge of Francophone security systems provides a comparative perspective that can challenge the sometimes too normative approaches of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, as well as theoretical approaches to SSR. Such a comparative perspective enables us better to understand the ways in which international SSR norms and standards interact with particular institutional and cultural areas. From a methodological point of view, it is rather easy to isolate Francophone security systems from non-Francophone ones, as shown by examples from Anglophone Africa provided tentatively in this chapter: in fact, SSR is one of the fields of peace operations where the very notion of Francophone specificity is least challenged. Shedding light on the peculiarities of Francophone security system offers a fertile ground for exploring new ways to approach security reform, which would be more context and history sensitive, as well as more grounded in cultural and institutional trends.

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Unfortunately, all these specificities are more often than not underestimated if not simply ignored in SSR processes undertaken in the context of peace operations, which sometimes tend to be excessively governed by too standardized prescriptions and a one-size-fits-all approach. Interestingly, FranceÊs approach to SSR itself refers mostly to international SSR norms and standards codified by the OECD and now endorsed by most of the multilateral organizations deploying peace operations: from this perspective, it can be argued, as stated in the Introduction to this volume, that the notion of a distinctive francophone space is increasingly being diluted within a liberal agenda. However, if the objective of contemporary peace operations is to promote efficient, accountable, and professional security systems in Francophone Africa, greater attention will have to be paid in the forthcoming years to the institutional, organizational, and procedural peculiarities of security systems.

Notes 1. In its reports for 2011 and 2012, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations stressed the importance of ensuring effective integration of security sector component levels of United Nations support both in the field and at headquarters (A/65/19, para. 124, and A/66/19, para. 136). The Special Committee also recognized the important role that the United Nations can play in the provision of assistance in a number of areas, including national security sector strategies, security sector legislation, security sector reviews, national security sector development plans, national dialogue on security sector reform, and national management and oversight capacities, as well as to national coordination bodies for security sector reform (see A/65/19, para. 126, and A/66/19, para. 138). 2. Report of the Secretary-General, A/67/970 S/2013/480, ÂSecuring States and Societies: Strengthening the United Nations Comprehensive Support to Security Sector ReformÊ, 13 August 2013. 3. Report of the Secretary-General, A/62/659 S/2008/39, ÂSecuring Peace and Development: The Role of the United Nations in Supporting Security Sector ReformÊ, 1 January 2008. 4. A comprehensive consultation process was undertaken between January and July 2013 to ensure that the 14 entities of the UN Interagency SSR Task Force, UNHQ, field missions, and member states were offered the opportunity to comment on the reportÊs content. The interagency Security Sector Reform Task Force is co-chaired by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 5. The AU Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform (SSR), adopted during the 20th Ordinary Session of the Assembly in January 2013, was developed in fulfillment of a January 2008 Assembly decision and was in line with the postconflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) policy adopted by the Executive Council in June 2006 (at: www.peaceau.org/en/topic/au-policy-framework-on-security-sector-reformssr#sthash.zf4zo5ko.dpuf ). 6. The MICOPAX also had an SSR mandate. 7. OECD, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series. Security System Reform and Governance, Paris: OECD Publishing, 2005, ISBN 92-64-00786-5; OECD, OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform. Supporting Security and Justice, Paris: OECD Publishing, 2007. 8. Initially, institutional arrangements in most Anglophone countries reflected the distinctively British legacy of parliamentary government, common law, sharp separation in

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9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

Niagalé Bagayoko principle between external defence and internal policing, and hence between military and police, and so on. However, most Anglophone countries have shifted toward presidential governance, not least in relation to the security sector, hence tending to converge with French-speaking countries. Currently, nearly all the constitutions in former British colonies (with the exception of Ethiopia, Lesotho, and Swaziland) provide for the presidential system of government, as opposed to the Westminster parliamentary system inherited at independence. Furthermore, in Anglophone Africa, security governance influences stem from models other than the United KingdomÊs institutional tradition either from widespread links with other Commonwealth countries or from the United States. Yet despite such an institutional model, significant progress has been made in those countries in terms of security governance, as mentioned is this chapter. Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham (eds.),Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies, London/New York: Zed Books, 2003. Boubacar NÊDiaye, ÂSecurity Âa la francaiseÊ: Francophone AfricaÊs Security Sector Non-TransformationÊ, draft paper, 2007. Bryden Alan and NÊDiaye Boubacar, Gouvernance du secteur de la sécurité en Afrique de lÊOuest francophone: bilan et perspectives, Geneva: Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2011. Agokla Kossi, Bagayoko Niagalé, and NÊDiaye Boubacar, La réforme des systèmes de sécurité et de justice en Afrique francophone, Paris: Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, 2010. Niagalé Bagayoko, Security Systems in Francophone Africa, IDS Research report, April 2010. D. G. Lavroff, ÂLes influences de la période coloniale sur lÊavènement de régimes militaires en Afrique noireÊ, Journal of African Law, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1976, pp. 100 106. The French colonial troops are different from the Armee coloniale, which included North African regiments such as the Zouave, the Saphis, the Goumiers, and the Foreign Legion. However, some African troops (Goumiers guard in Mali, Saphis in Senegal) were part of both structures. Dominique Bangoura, ÂLes armées africaines face au défi démocratique,Ê Géopolitique africaine, No. 5, 2002, pp. 177 193. Shaun Gregory, ÂThe French Military in Africa: Past and PresentÊ, African Affairs, Vol. 99, No. 396, 2000, pp. 435 448. French troops who had been permanently stationed in Central Africa Republic left the country in 1997. Eric Bonnemaison, ÂRefaire de la sécurité en Afrique un Bien publicÊ, in Dossier spécial Sécurité et Conflits, Afrique contemporaine, No. 200, 2001, pp. 3 49. Observatoire permanent de la coopération française, Rapport 2002, Paris: Khartala, 2002. André Cabanis and Michel L. Martin, Les Constitutions dÊAfrique francophone: Evolutions récentes, Paris: Khartala, 1998. André Cabanis and Michel L. Martin, ÂArmée et pouvoir dans les nouvelles Constitutions dÊAfrique francophone,Ê Revue juridique et politique, indépendance et coopération, Vol. 52e, No. 3, 1998, pp. 276 287. Hans Born, Philipp Fluri, and Anders Johnsson, Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector, Geneva: Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2003. Adedeji Ebo and NÊDiaye Boubacar, Le contrôle parlementaire des secteurs de la sécurité en Afrique de lÊOuest, Geneva: Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2008. This is a major difference from Anglophone African states where appointments and decisions are supposedly made on the advice of collegial organs that are established to advise the president on policy matters relating to security and that consequently have an important role in the policy decision-making process. The Cabinet is the highest

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26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

31. 32. 33.

89

decision-making organ of government, including national security policy issues. Moreover, in the last ten years, structures and policy review processes, such as defence reviews and/or national security reviews and white papers, have been introduced, and interagency decision-making structures have been set up. At the top of all national security organs is the National Security Council (NSC), which coordinates all security policy and advises the president on national security matters. The NSC, which is under the direct control of the presidency, is managed by a national security adviser (as in Nigeria) or a national security coordinator (as in Ghana and Sierra Leone). The meeting of the NSC is presided over by the president and is made up of the ministers of foreign affairs, defence, interior, and finance, and other ministers appointed by the president. Other members of the NSC are the chief of defence staff (sometimes known as force commander), the inspector-general of police, and the directors of the various intelligence agencies, the influence of whom varies from case to case. Two other important national organs that can be found in a number of anglophone countries are the Defence Council and the Police Council. Known as the Armed Forces Council in some countries (for example, in Ghana and the Gambia), the Defence Council is principally responsible for advising the president on defence policy and acts as a mechanism for executive control and supervision of the defence forces. It is usually chaired by the president and includes the ministers of foreign defence, foreign affairs, and interior; and the chief of defence staff as well as the service chiefs. The president may also appoint other members. The Defence Council is only advisory, and, in practice, presidents make defence-related decisions without recourse to it, particularly in countries with weaker democratic credentials. The Police Council is principally responsible for advising the president on internal public security and safety policy. The Police Council has as its chairperson in some countries a vice president (as in Ghana) and, in others, the president (Nigeria), while other members include the minister of the interior, the inspector-general of police (also known as police commissioner in some countries), and the attorney-general. Some regional prefects, directors of state companies, and directors of customs services are also appointed from the military In Mali, the camel units, mostly made up of former Tuareg rebels, had been developed and deployed in the northern regions of the country: they had been trained by the French military cooperation services. Cabanis and Martin (see n. 21 and 22). Dilip K. Das and Michael Palmiotto, World Police Encyclopedia, New York/London, Routledge, 2006. It is also important to mention that the so-called Âcommunity policingÊ approach promoted by most international SSR programmes can be considered similar to the Âpolice de proximitéÊ philosophy developed in France and in many Francophone African countries. Although the latter, largely modelled on the British approach, can be seen as a bottom-up approach with communities initiating and practicing a great deal of informal, unofficial policing negotiated with the state, the latter is more of a top-down approach to security, with the police taking the lead in mobilizing community self-rule in policing matters. George Thomas Kurian, World Encyclopedia of Police Forces and Correctional Systems (2nd ed.), Detroit, MI: Gale, 2006. Alain Faupin, ÂProviding Security. The Division of Labour, Armed Force, Gendarmerie and PoliceÊ, Working Paper 156, Geneva: DCAF, February 2005. Philippe Franceschi, ÂLa régionalisation du maintien de la paix en Afrique: Une évolution des rapports entre les gendarmeries africaines,Ê Revue de la Gendarmerie nationale, No. 220, Septembre 2006; Philippe Franceschi, ÂPlaidoyer pour la création de forces de gendarmeries africainesÊ, Défense Nationale et sécurité collective, No. 10, 2007, pp. 179 186.

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34. Derek Lutterbeck, ÂBetween Police and Military: The New Security Agenda and the Rise of Gendarmeries,Ê Cooperation and Conflict, Journal of Nordic International Studies Association, Vol. 39, No. 1, 2004. 35. Moussa Yaya, ÂPublic Expenditure Management in Francophone Africa: A CrossCountry AnalysisÊ, IMF Working Paper WP/04/42, International Monetary Fund, 2004 (at: www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/Rwanda/SecInfo.html). 36. Nouhoum Sangaré, ÂMali,Ê in Eboe Hutchful and Wuyi Omitoogun (eds.), Budgeting for the Military Sector in Africa: The Processes and Mechanisms of Control, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2006; Nouhoum Sangaré, ÂLe contrôle budgétaire du secteur de sécurité : Le cas du Mali,Ê in Kossi Agokla, Niagalé Bagayoko, and Boubacar NÊDiaye (eds.), La réforme des systèmes de sécurité et de justice en Afrique francophone, Bosquet, France: lÊOrganisation internationale de la Francophonie, 2010, pp. 215 227. 37. Amor Tounakti, ÂLes principes du contrôle budgétaire des dépenses de défense et de sécurité dans le monde francophone,Ê in Kossi Agokla, Niagalé Bagayoko, and Boubacar NÊDiaye (eds.), La réforme des systèmes de sécurité et de justice en Afrique francophone, Bosquet, France: lÊOrganisation internationale de la Francophonie, 2010, pp. 203 214. 38. An important amount of knowledge has been accumulated on the security sector in Anglophone Africa, thanks to the expertise and research activities carried out by a lively network of research centres such as ASSN (African Security Sector Network), ASDR (African Security and Dialogue Research), CDD (Center for Democracy and Development), the CLEEN Foundation, SADSEM (Southern African Defence and Security Management Network), and Center for Practice Research Datalink (CPRD) based in Eastern, Western, and Southern Africa.

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5

The problems of French-led peace operations in Francophone sub-Saharan Africa in the twenty-first century Tobias Koepf

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, Francophone sub-Saharan Africa has become a central focus of international peacekeeping efforts. Of the nine UN peacekeeping operations in Africa in the years 2000 to 2010, four were deployed to the French-speaking part of the continent.1 Three of them were complemented by so-called bridging operations, carried out by the EU.2 France has been the driving force behind most of the peacekeeping operations in Francophone sub-Saharan Africa.3 It was particularly active with regard to EU military interventions, all of which were initiated in Paris and to which France contributed a considerable number of troops. France did not participate with a significant number of troops in UN operations, but, as will be shown, it used its position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council to lobby for the establishment of the operations behind the scenes. Thus, without the French will to engage, Francophone sub-Saharan Africa would not be as high on the international peacekeeping agenda as it is today. Certainly, other actors have also been lobbying for intervention, such as Belgium in the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), but France has been by far the most important and most active proponent of international action in this part of the African continent. Yet French-led peacekeeping in Francophone sub-Saharan Africa has not been without controversy. FranceÊs past as a colonial power in the region spurred doubts about the legitimacy of the operations and made it difficult for France to play the role of an impartial third party. By examining peacekeeping efforts in Côte dÊIvoire, Chad, and the Central African Republic (CAR), as well as in the DRC,4 I argue that this was not the only shortcoming of the operations. Particularly in Côte dÊIvoire and Chad/CAR, the fact that France pursued bilateral military policies towards all three countries seriously undermined international peacekeeping efforts and gave African actors the opportunity to instrumentalize the policies and use them against each other.5 In the DRC, especially in the case of Operation EUFOR RD Congo (2006), peacekeeping fared comparatively better. This relative success was due to the fact that there was no additional French military presence and that Germany took the lead. Only a full multilateralization of French military engagements, as well as a stronger commitment to peace operations in the region by other external actors (from the Western world or, ideally, from within Africa), can make peacekeeping in Francophone sub-Saharan Africa more credible and thus more effective.

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92 Tobias Koepf

Côte d’Ivoire (since 2002) This section closely scrutinizes the French peacekeeping role in Côte dÊIvoire, which has been going on for over a decade. It presents developments that led to the escalation of a political crisis in 2002 and peacekeeping efforts undertaken by France, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the UN, before critically analysing French policy. Genesis of the operation Côte dÊIvoire entered a period of conflict after a coup by soldiers led by General Robert Gueï in 1999. Following the 2000 presidential election, Laurent GbagboÊs accession to power did not bring about stability either.6 Tensions escalated into violent conflict in September 2002, when a rebel group from the North attacked Abidjan, the economic capital of the country, as well as several other cities. The motivations of the rebels who were joined in November 2002 by several other groups from the west of the country were numerous, but the most important reason was their frustration with GbagboÊs attempt to strengthen his position by cracking down on the political opposition. This was reinforced by his revival of the ethnonationalist concept of ivoirité, which aimed at depriving a great number of ethnic groups of Ivorian citizenship and thus denying them the right to vote.7 France initially deployed its permanent forces, stationed in the country since its independence in 1960, to protect the approximately 20,000 French nationals living in Côte dÊIvoire. When violence continued, France launched the large-scale Operation Licorne to create a Âconfidence zoneÊ between the northern and the southern parts of the country and to monitor a ceasefire agreement brokered by ECOWAS in October 2002. For a while, the Chirac government hoped to hand over responsibility to an ECOWAS peacekeeping force, but the African force proved unable to deploy as quickly as required, and French forces continued managing the zone. In January 2003, the French government organized peace talks in Linas-Marcoussis near Paris where, on 23 January 2003, a peace agreement laid the groundwork for a power-sharing arrangement between the Ivorian government and the rebels, now assembled under the label of Forces nouvelles (FN).8 From 2003 on, France lobbied the UN Security Council to deploy a peacekeeping force to monitor the fragile peace in Côte dÊIvoire and the disarmament of the belligerents. The offer, however, was blocked behind the scenes by the United States. The US administration claimed that it did not want to pay for a UN operation, the United States being by far the largest financer of UN peacekeeping. However, it was no secret that the move was motivated by the transatlantic rift over the intervention in Iraq, to which France was fundamentally opposed.9 Nevertheless, as the Iraq dispute ebbed and the crisis in Côte dÊIvoire remained unsettled, France, in early 2004, managed to convince the United States of the need to deploy a UN operation to stabilize the country and to avoid potential spillovers of conflict into neighbouring countries. This paved the way for the creation of UNOCI by UN Security Council Resolution 1528 in February 2004.10

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Problems of French-led peace operations 93 Assessing the French role Under Ivorian President Félix Houphouët-Boigny (1960 1993), France had close relations with Côte dÊIvoire, which it considered its showcase (vitrine) in West Africa. France maintained a permanent military base in the country but never had cause to intervene because the political situation stayed fairly stable for almost 40 years. When conflict broke out in 1999, the French military evacuated the ousted President Henri Konan Bédié but made no effort to reinstall him to power.11 However, in 2002 France decided to act but opted neither for intervention against the rebellion, which would have been possible under the provisions of the existing bilateral defence agreement, nor for easing the rebel quest for power. Instead, the Licorne force took on the role of an interposition force to stop the fighting between the conflict parties.12 From the beginning, however, the neutral French role was doomed to failure. Laurent Gbagbo did not accept France as a conflict broker, which he accused of de facto legitimization of the armed rebellion. He thus systematically undermined French mediation efforts, which became most obvious during the LinasMarcoussis negotiations. Gbagbo neither attended the talks nor accepted the resulting agreement.13 In the following months, he mobilized support to protest against the ÂFrench occupationÊ of the country.14 This made even those among French decision makers who were either supporting Gbagbo (mostly leading figures inside the French military)15 or at least held a nonpartisan position, such as foreign minister Dominique de Villepin, VillepinÊs Africa adviser Nathalie Delapalme, and French Ambassador to Côte dÊIvoire Gildas Le Lidec,16 to turn against him and disconnect France ever further from the impartial role it claimed. When UNOCI was finally deployed in April 2004, an opportunity existed for creating a truly multilateral peacekeeping presence. France contributed about 200 out of approximately 6,000 troops to UNOCI, but it neither recalled nor integrated Operation Licorne into the UN force. The task of monitoring the Ivorian ceasefire and the disarmament of the belligerents was officially transferred to UNOCI; in theory, the French force remained only to protect French nationals and support the UN in carrying out its tasks.17 Nonetheless, in practice, France continued to play a decisive role in assuring respect for the confidence zone between the conflict parties, created in October 2002.18 The pivotal French role was at least partly responsible for the escalation of the crisis in November 2004, which dragged France deep into the conflict and put a definite end to its credibility as an impartial peacekeeper. On 6 November 2004, GbagboÊs anti-French sentiments culminated in a bomb attack by Ivorian fighter jets on a French army camp in Bouaké, killing nine French soldiers. France retaliated by destroying the entire Ivorian air force. This in turn led to massive antiFrench protests in the streets of Abidjan and the evacuation of about a third of the 15,000 French nationals who had remained in the country.19 During the protests, the French army clashed heavily with the protesters and killed between 20 and 57 civilians (depending on sources),20 thereby provoking fierce criticism in France and internationally.21

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94 Tobias Koepf Following the November 2004 events, France assumed a lower diplomatic profile and the African Union (AU), represented by South African President Thabo Mbeki, took over the role of mediator. Mbeki brokered two further peace agreements in April and July 2005, but the peace process ended in deadlock again. It was only under mediation of Blaise Compaoré, president of Burkina Faso, that a promising power-sharing deal was made in Ouagadougou in March 2007.22 Still, France maintained its Licorne presence and continued to support UNOCI. French policymakers made clear that they wanted the operation to stay in the country until presidential elections were held.23 Having been rescheduled several times, they finally took place in late 2010. Gbagbo lost to his main contender, Alassane Ouattara, in the second round but refused to accept defeat. Ouattara had the support of the UN Security Council, which recognized his victory in the elections.24 But Gbagbo maintained a de facto grip on power, at least in large parts of the South and in Abidjan, which led to another deadlock of the Ivorian crisis. In April 2011, France again took on a more active role and for the third time since 2002, flexed its military muscle. Together with UNOCI troops, it launched an offensive on the presidential palace (where Gbagbo was hiding) with the aim of helping forces loyal to Ouattara to topple Gbagbo. The intervention, officially conducted under Security Council resolution 1975 (30 March 2011), allowed OuattaraÊs forces to enter the palace and arrest Gbagbo, his wife, and some of his supporters. Officially, Licorne troops stayed in the background. According to the UN secretary-generalÊs report on the events in April 2011, they merely provided ÂsupportÊ to UNOCI,25 but in practice they played a much more important role in allowing OuattaraÊs forces to reach the presidential palace. French policymakers and military officials have repeatedly denied allegations that French soldiers were directly participating in the arrest of Gbagbo, and indeed there is no clear proof that this was the case.26 Still, the French army was decisive in paving the way for the Ouattara forces. It carried out military operations against the remaining supporters of Gbagbo and secured the district where the palace is located.27 The events in 2004 and 2011 illustrate that under the given conditions it was impossible for France to play the role of an impartial peacekeeper. To the contrary, France evolved into a de facto party of conflict, culminating in a military intervention that brought Ouattara to power. Of course, the question remains open as to whether the integration of Licorne troops into UNOCI would have avoided this course of events. In any case, it would have granted external peacekeeping in Côte dÊIvoire more legitimacy and would have raised the bar for military retaliation (2004) and intervention (2011).

Chad and the Central African Republic (2008–2009) This section focuses on external military involvement in Chad and the Central African Republic between 2008 and 2009. Again, France took a leading role, this time acting in concert with the UN and the EU. As in the Côte dÊIvoire case, in

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Problems of French-led peace operations 95 Chad and the CAR it was clearly difficult for France to be a credible leader of a peace operation in its sub-Saharan backyard (pré carré). Genesis of the operation External military action in Chad and the CAR was considered because the Darfur conflict that had been ravaging the Sudanese province since 2003 had spilled over into the two neighbouring countries. By the end of 2006, about 232,000 refugees had fled from Darfur to Chad and another 14,000 to the CAR.28 The IDP and refugee camps, set up in Eastern Chad by the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), regularly came under attack by Sudanese and Chadian rebel groups, who also used the instability to recruit fighters from the camps.29 By August 2006, France was proposing the deployment of a Âmultidimensional presenceÊ, including political, humanitarian, military, and police components, to protect the IDP and refugee camps in Chad and the CAR.30 The proposition was only reluctantly taken up by other UN Security Council members and, most importantly, rejected by the Chadian government.31 After the election of President Nicolas Sarkozy and the formation of a new French government in May 2007, the idea was taken up again, following an initiative by the new foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner. He presented a plan for an EU-led military operation to protect the camps and their humanitarian aid provisions.32 The shape of the operation, as well as the other components of the multidimensional presence, was laid out in UN Security Council Resolution 1778 and decided upon on 25 September 2007. EUFOR Chad/CAR, as the new operation was called, was complemented by the purely civilian UN mission MINURCAT that included 300 police officers and 50 military liaison officers. Its task was the formation of a Chadian police unit so as to provide security inside the camps.33 France took the logistical lead of EUFOR Chad/CAR and provided the field command. The operational commander was the Irish Gen. Patrick Nash, based at the Mont-Valérien military HQ on the outskirts of Paris, which became the operational headquarters.34 Discussions over troop contributions continued for six months and delayed the start of the operation until March 2008. In the end, France sent 2,100 soldiers out of a total of 3,700 troops, with Ireland, Sweden, Poland, Austria, Romania, and Belgium providing smaller contingents.35 Assessing the French role Before initiating an EU operation, France had intervened in both countries on behalf of the regimes in power through its permanent military presence in the two countries (operations Epervier in Chad and Boali in the CAR). In Chad, France supported President Idriss Déby against a rebel attack in April 2006, with weapons, logistical support, and secret service information, and French fighter jets fired Âwarning shotsÊ at the rebels. In the CAR, Paris intervened even more directly. In March 2007, it deployed 50 paratroopers to the northeastern city of Birao to allow central African troops to recapture it from rebels.36 This made

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96 Tobias Koepf sceptics speculate about the ÂrealÊ intentions France was pursuing through the EUFOR operation.37 The scepticism surfaced when France tried to gain EU support for the operation. Germany and the UK in particular feared being instrumentalized and signalled very early that they were reluctant to participate in a military adventure in a French sphere of influence.38 In the end, both states supported the operation politically but did not send any troops. Smaller EU members were also reluctant to become engaged, which is why it took over four months (October 2007 until January 2008) and five troop-contributing conferences to assemble the 3,700 soldiers for the operation. It was not until January 2008, when Austria agreed to participate and France promised to provide more troops than originally planned, that the operation was ready for deployment.39 Certainly, the initiative to launch EUFOR Chad/CAR was not only motivated by readiness to support Déby and Bozizé. It was mainly a small group around Kouchner and his then special adviser for crises and conflicts, Eric Chevallier, who convinced Sarkozy to make an impression at the beginning of his presidency by doing something about the Darfur conflict. Both men had backgrounds in the humanitarian field and were not known to be close to the presidents of Chad and the CAR.40 Still, remaining proponents of the idea of a pivotal French role in Francophone sub-Saharan Africa (mainly in the military and the Elysée palace) saw this as an opportunity to bolster two close French allies in the region. This is also why they opposed the idea of including Epervier troops in the EU operation, which was briefly discussed but abandoned in the end.41 It remains unclear whether Kouchner and Sarkozy really saw the ambiguity inherent in pursuing a dual policy. It is clear though that Chadians have been well aware of the ambiguities in French policy and have tried to make it work in their favour. This became especially apparent in two phases of the operation. First, when the mandate of the operation was drafted, Déby tried to use the ambiguity by initially refusing to consent to the operation. However, during his negotiations with the French government, he came to the conclusion that EUFOR Chad/ CAR might serve as an additional bulwark against rebel attacks from Eastern Chad. He knew that France was neither eager to abandon EUFOR Chad/CAR, which Sarkozy and Kouchner saw as a foreign policy prestige project, nor willing to withdraw support through the Epervier contingent and the bilateral military cooperation agreement.42 The main Âneutrality testÊ came during the second phase when, a few days after the official launch of the operation in early February 2008,43 Chadian rebels attacked the capital, NÊDjaména. On the one hand, there was no proof of French soldiers being directly implicated in the Chadian armyÊs efforts to throw back the rebels. Epervier forces concentrated on evacuating foreign citizens from NÊDjaména.44 Reports about exchanges of fire between French soldiers and the rebels exist, but the firing was only of a defensive nature.45 On the other hand, French military officials confirmed that they provided the Chadian army with weapons from Libya, logistical support, and secret service information.46 Thanks to French support, the Chadian army managed to repel the rebels, provoking critics of EUFOR Chad/CAR to again question the operationÊs

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Problems of French-led peace operations 97 legitimacy.47 Some EU states that had agreed to contribute were highly irritated by the French reaction to the rebel attack.48 In the end, France kept its European partners on board, and EUFOR Chad/CAR was finally launched in March 2008. It remains debatable, though, whether other European governments continued to support the deployment because the French government convinced them of the legitimacy of its actions or whether they were agreeing to limit possible damage that abandoning of EUFOR Chad/CAR would have meant for the project of a European defence. Superficially, EUFOR successfully managed to stay politically neutral during the operation, but it never lost its ambiguous character. Even though it was not intended to support the Chadian regime, it had a deterring effect on the rebels.49

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (2003 and 2006) In 2003 and 2006 France initiated military operations in the DRC, both conducted by the EU and designed as so-called bridging operations to allow the UNÊs MONUC to counter a crisis escalation in the Eastern province of Ituri (2003) and to assure stability during the 2006 elections. This section shows that, although both operations were far from perfect, they fared relatively better than those in Côte dÊIvoire and in Chad/the CAR. Genesis of the operation(s) After Laurent-Désiré Kabila took power in the DRC from longstanding dictator Mobutu Sese Seko following a coup in 1997, a civil war broke out that involved eight African states and several violent nonstate actors, prompting observers to call it the ÂFirst African World WarÊ.50 International peacekeeping efforts in the DRC started in November 1999 when UN Security Council Resolution 1279 established MONUC.51 In the beginning, France remained in the background, concentrating its support to the UN at a diplomatic level and sending only a handful of liaison officers and military observers for the operation. FranceÊs role came to the forefront when violent conflict escalated between ethnic groups in the Eastern province of Ituri at the beginning of 2003.52 MONUC tried to stabilize the situation there but failed to stop the killing of civilians.53 In May 2003, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan reacted by proposing the augmentation of UN force levels, to be facilitated by the deployment of an interim force. The forceÊs main task was to provide for security in the provincial capital, Bunia, until MONUC reinforcements arrived.54 An official narrative is that the initiative to set up the force stemmed from UN headquarters in New York, but it was no secret that France had heavily lobbied behind the scenes for the deployment of the force.55 France also lobbied the EU to deploy the force, finally launched on 12 June 2003 and dubbed Operation Artemis, under the umbrella of the then European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).56 In parallel with its efforts at the UN, France tried to convince other EU members that the Ituri intervention was

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98 Tobias Koepf a perfect opportunity to test the EUÊs defence policy that had just been declared operational in early 2003. The decision to choose the EU option was also spurred by the split between EU states over the intervention in Iraq. By mounting an operation other than support for NATO, France wanted the EU to prove that it could act autonomously. It gained support from other European capitals, and while France provided about 1,000 of the operationÊs 1,400 soldiers, Sweden, Belgium, the UK, and Greece also sent troops to Ituri.57 Between late 2003 and 2005, the situation in the DRC was tense but relatively stable compared to the tumultuous period between 1998 and 2003. Following the signing of several peace agreements in 2002, a transition process was launched in June 2003 that was intended to culminate in presidential and parliamentary elections in 2005. However, the elections had to be postponed and, after a successfully held constitutional referendum in December 2005, they were finally scheduled for April 2006. Kofi Annan did not succeed in gaining the support of the UN Security Council for yet another reinforcement of MONUC58 but brought up the option of an additional stabilization force and specifically asked the EU to supply it. Again, France played a central role. President Jacques Chirac maintained good relations with the UN Undersecretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guéhenno, whose candidacy for the job he had strongly supported in 2000. It was therefore no surprise to many observers that Guéhenno was the first person to propose an EU operation.59 This time, however, France signalled early on that it did not want to lead the operation and planned to contribute only a third of the military force. Instead, it tried to convince Germany to take on the role of Âframework nationÊ. Germany, having had little experience in leading peace operations and none on the African continent was initially very reluctant but accepted leadership of the operation to protect Franco-German relations and establish the EU as a security actor. In June 2006, Operation EUFOR RD Congo was officially launched.60 France still ended up as the largest troop contributor, providing 1,090 of the operationÊs 2,400 soldiers and the force commander. But a German general took the role of operational commander based at an HQ in Potsdam, and 780 German troops formed the second largest contingent.61 Assessing the French role Although Belgium, not France, was the colonial power in the DRC, France strengthened its ties to the most populous francophone country in Africa after decolonization in 1960. In 1974, France included the country in its pré carré by signing a military cooperation agreement. Bilateral relations were significantly expanded, especially in the second half of the 1970s.62 In 1978, France intervened in favour of President Mobutu Sese Seko to counter a rebel attack in the resourcerich Shaba province,63 and France remained his close ally after the Cold War. When Laurent-Désiré Kabila launched an attack on Kinshasa in May 1997, Paris granted Mobutu logistical and secret service support. It did not, however, intervene militarily and, in the end, was unable to avoid KabilaÊs seizure of power.64

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Problems of French-led peace operations 99 While France remained rather distant from Kabila, bilateral relations improved steadily after the son, Joseph, succeeded in 2001.65 Thus, when France proposed a European deployment for Ituri in 2003 to provide stability for elections in 2006, it was accused of launching the operation to assure KabilaÊs grip on power and thereby bolster its economic interests in the resource-rich country.66 Despite this criticism, France and the EU largely managed to uphold their political neutrality during both operations. Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo profited from international support and were widely considered to be both impartial and successful in fulfilling their mandates.67 To be sure, both operations suffered significant shortcomings, especially regarding the limitation of the mandate in terms of time, geographical scope, and troop numbers. The operations managed to calm situations for a short period but did not contribute to a long-term stabilization. In Ituri, the operationÊs impact was limited to Bunia and proved unable to stabilize the situation elsewhere in the province.68 Furthermore, Operation Artemis did not provide for disarming the conflict parties, and violence flared again soon after EU soldiers left.69 In the case of EUFOR RD Congo 2006, it remains open as to whether the small number of EU troops based in Kinshasa would have been sufficient to counter any escalation of violence. Flying in troops stationed in Gabon would have taken considerable time. Furthermore, recalling the troops at the end of November 2006 was risky. The results of the second round of the elections were announced just a few days earlier, and the schedule for military retreat would not have allowed the EU to react to an outbreak of violence.70 In general, however, the record of the operations was rather positive. In Ituri, Artemis troops managed to stabilize the situation, at least for a transitional period. It allowed aid organizations to help the population, gave refugees the possibility to return to their homes, and set the groundwork for the reinforcement of the MONUC operation.71 EUFOR RD Congo 2006 contributed to the establishment of peaceful elections and successfully served as a bridging operation to increase the size of MONUC.72 During the only incident that threatened the election process, EUFOR proved able to play a neutral role. When Joseph KabilaÊs presidential guards attacked the residence of his main opponent, Jean-Pierre Bemba, in August 2006, EUFOR soldiers, together with MONUC units, quickly calmed the situation.73 Identifying the reasons for the relative success of the DRC operations is puzzling. In the case of Operation Artemis, it was assumed that the operation was so unambitious that it would have been almost impossible to miss the goals set out in the mandate.74 In the case of EUFOR RD Congo, on the other hand, one expert assumed that it was probably Âdue as much as anything else to good fortuneÊ75 that the situation remained calm during the election process. Still, the fact that the operations were considered to be neutral by the disputants was important in this regard. In contrast to peace operations in Côte dÊIvoire and in Chad/CAR, France (and the other EU states involved) pursued only one military policy towards the DRC, which was clearly beneficial to the operationÊs impartiality. During EUFOR RD Congo, the appointment of Germany as framework nation and GermanyÊs

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100 Tobias Koepf significant troop contribution provided the operation with additional credibility. Certainly, the caveats Germany built into the operationÊs mandate were partly responsible for the shortcomings of the operation.76 However, this should not mask the fact that the German lead helped to foster acceptance of EUFOR RD Congo among the conflict parties.

Conclusions The article has shown that it is difficult for France to play the role of an impartial peacekeeper in Francophone sub-Saharan Africa. The maintenance of a bilateral military policy, advocated by decision makers pursuing a traditional approach favouring one conflict party over the other, seriously undermined French-led peacekeeping. This became obvious in Chad and the CAR when the EUFOR Chad/CAR mandate was shaped and in early February 2008 when Epervier forces supported the Chadian government against a rebel attack. It was also evident in Côte dÊIvoire after the attack on a French army camp in Bouaké in November 2004 and again in April 2011 when France supported OuattaraÊs troops in toppling Gbagbo. In all cases, African actors managed to instrumentalize the ambiguity of French policy for their purposes and thus deal a blow to the credibility of international peacekeeping efforts. But what are the alternatives? In the long term, there is no alternative to African regional and/or subregional organizations themselves taking on the responsibility for peacekeeping on the continent. African ownership should not be seen as a magic bullet, however. It may create problems of political legitimacy because many African states are deeply hostile to each other. Nevertheless, it is less problematic than intervention by Western actors, whether they have a colonial past or not. Unfortunately, as was demonstrated by the failed attempt to hand the task of securing the confidence zone in Côte dÊIvoire over to an ECOWAS interposition force, there is still a long way to go until ÂAfrican solutions to African problemsÊ can be effectively implemented. Thus, in certain cases, the involvement of external actors might be the only way to end or avoid the outbreak of deadly conflict. If, in this case, France wants to be involved as a credible peacekeeper, two points are important. First, France has to consider the full multilateralization of its military engagement. For the cases under scrutiny here, this would have meant the integration of operations Epervier and Boali into EUFOR Chad/CAR and of operation Licorne into UNOCI under a shared command as well as a shared mandate. This is tough for a country that maintains its independence in security and defence issues. And, of course, one does not know whether a full multilateralization would have solved the problems. It would, nonetheless, have provided the operations with greater legitimacy and diminished the room for manoeuvre of the French forces and thus also their inclination towards going it alone. Second, even if France contributes a great (or even the greatest) number of troops to a peace operation in French-speaking Africa, it should let others take the lead. The relative success of peace operations in the DRC, and especially of EUFOR RD Congo, shows that if both conditions (full multilateralization and a

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Problems of French-led peace operations 101 non-French lead) are met, peacekeeping is more likely to have a positive effect. The main problem in this context is, of course, that countries partnering with France that would be able to take the lead are not inclined to intervene in Francophone sub-Saharan Africa. Some have very few interests in the African continent in general (Germany), others consider other subregions to be more important (the UK77 and Italy), whereas still others are generally sceptical of peacekeeping (the United States). Nevertheless, rethinking FranceÊs controversial bilateral policy in Africa would make French peacekeeping less prone to a Âhidden agenda syndromeÊ78 and send a clear signal to FranceÊs partners that French interests are not at the heart of its financial and personnel investments in the region.

Notes 1. UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo [MONUC since 1999, renamed UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) in 2010]; UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB, 2004 2006); UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT, 2007 2010); and UN Operation in Côte dÊIvoire (UNOCI, since 2004). 2. Operations Artemis (2003) and EUFOR RD Congo (2006) in the DRC, as well as operation EUFOR Chad/CAR (2008 2009). 3. Tony Chafer and Gordon Cumming, ÂBeyond Fashoda: Anglo-French Security Cooperation in Africa Since Saint-MaloÊ, International Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 5, 2010, p. 1146. 4. The case of Burundi will not be discussed here because France did not play a pivotal role in it. 5. These policies are based on a number of bilateral defence and/or military cooperation agreements. In the 1960s and 1970s, France signed such agreements with several African states. Today, defence agreements exist between France and Cameroon, the CAR, the Comores, Côte dÊIvoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Senegal, and Togo. Following a programmatic speech on French African policy by President Nicolas Sarkozy in February 2008, it was decided that the agreements would be revised and fully published (which was not the case before). (Nicolas Sarkozy, ÂSpeech to the Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, Cape TownÊ, 28 February 2008 [at: www. ambafrance-rsa.org/IMG/doc/Sarkozy_discours_parl-ang.doc].) The most visible characteristic of French bilateral policy is the maintenance of a permanent military presence in several African countries. It takes the form of military bases or permanent military operations. Currently, two French military bases exist on the African continent (Djibouti and Gabon). The French ÂWhite Paper on Defence and National SecurityÊ, published in 2008, called for the maintenance of only one military base Âon each of AfricaÊs Atlantic and Indian Ocean seaboardsÊ (French version at: www. ambafrance-ca.org/IMG/pdf/Livre_blanc_Press_kit_english_version.pdf Ministère de la défense), p. 6 [English version at: www.ambafrance-ca.org/IMG/pdf/Livre_ blanc_Press_kit_english_version.pdf]). Accordingly, the military bases in Côte dÊIvoire (June 2009) and in Senegal (July 2011) were formally closed down. In addition, France has permanent operations stationed in Chad (Operation Epervier) and in the CAR (Operation Boali). 6. Thomas Hofnung, La crise en Côte dÊIvoire: Dix clés pour comprendre [The crisis in Côte dÊIvoire: Ten keys for understanding], Paris: Editions La Découverte, 2005, pp. 43 52. 7. For an extensive account of the rebellionÊs background and motivations, see International Crisis Group (ICG), ÂCôte dÊIvoire: The War Is Not Yet OverÊ, Africa Report 72, Freetown/Brussels, 28 November 2003, pp. 5ff.

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102 Tobias Koepf 8. Andreas Mehler, ÂNot Always in the PeopleÊs Interest: Power-Sharing Arrangements in African Peace AgreementsÊ, Working Paper 83/2008, Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2008, pp. 23 24. 9. Thomas Hofnung, ÂEn finir avec la „Françafrique‰ Ê [Ending ÂFrançafriqueÊ], Politique internationale, Vol. 112, 2006, pp. 384 385. 10. UN Security Council Resolution 1528 (2004), UN doc. S/RES/1528, 27 Feb. 2004. 11. Hugo Sada, ÂSéisme politique en Côte dÊIvoireÊ [Political earthquake in Côte dÊIvoire], Défense nationale, Vol. 56, No. 2, 2000, pp. 179 181. 12. However, note that France took on the role of a peacekeeper not by design but rather by default. Some in France, especially in the military, wanted to stick to the provisions of the defence agreement and repel the rebellion. Others, mainly in the Elysée, were more hostile to Gbagbo and certainly would not have bemoaned his departure. In the end, it was notably Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin who lobbied for the middle position of deploying an interposition force. (Laurent DÊErsu, ÂLa crise ivoirienne, une intrigue franco-françaiseÊ [The Ivorian Crisis, a Franco-French intrigue], Politique africaine, Vol. 105, 2007, pp. 88 91.) 13. Mehler (see n. 8), p. 24. 14. Amnesty International, Côte dÊIvoire: Affrontements entre forces de maintien de la paix et civils: leçons à tirer [Côte dÊIvoire: Confrontations between peacekeeping forces and civilians: Lessons learned], London: Amnesty International, 19 September 2006, pp. 6ff. 15. DÊErsu (see n. 12), p. 89. 16. Ibid., p. 94. 17. UN Security Council (see n. 10). 18. France significantly reduced the Licorne force, from 5,000 at the end of 2004 to 900 in June 2009. (Ministère de la défense, ÂCôte dÊIvoire: chronologie et repères historiquesÊ [Côte dÊIvoire: Chronology and historical markers] (at: www.defense.gouv.fr/opera tions/cote-d-ivoire/dossier/cote-d-ivoire-chronologie-et-reperes-historiques).) During the same period, UNOCI was further propped up, attaining a troop strength of about 8,000 at the end of 2010. [UN Security Council, ÂTwenty-Sixth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte dÊIvoireÊ, UN doc. S/2010/600, 23 Nov. 2010.] But due to their superior equipment and local experience, the French forces remain an essential backbone for the UN operation to be able to carry out its tasks. 19. Amnesty International (see n. 14). 20. Ibid., p. 5. 21. Ibid., p. 2. 22. Mehler (see n. 8), pp. 26 27. 23. See, for example, Michel Barnier, Dominique de VillepinÊs successor as French foreign minister, in an interview with France Inter, 16 February 2005 (at: www.diplomatie. gouv.fr/actu/bulletin.asp?liste=20050218.html). 24. UN Security Council, ÂTwenty-Seventh Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte dÊIvoireÊ, UN doc. S/2011/211, 30 Mar. 2011, §16ff. 25. UN Security Council, ÂTwenty-Eighth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte dÊIvoireÊ, UN doc. S/2011/387, 24 June 2011, §8. 26. ÂQuel rôle a joué la France dans lÊarrestation de Gbagbo?Ê [What role did France play in GbagboÊs arrest ?], LÊExpress.fr, 12 April 2011 (at: www.lexpress.fr/actual ite/monde/quel-role-a-joue-la-france-dans-l-arrestation-de-gbagbo_981908.html). An extensive account of events in early April 2011 was given by a French diplomat at a workshop on Côte dÊIvoire at the Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri), Paris, 27 November 2011. 27. Ibid. 28. UN Security Council, ÂReport of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic Pursuant to Paragraphs 9 (d) and 13 of Security Council Resolution 1706 (2006)Ê, UN doc. S/2006/1019, 22 Dec. 2006, §§27/39.

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Problems of French-led peace operations 103 29. Ibid., §10. 30. UN Security Council, Resolution 1706 (2006), UN doc. S/RES/1706, 31 Aug. 2006. 31. UN Security Council, ÂReport of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African RepublicÊ, UN doc. S/2007/488, 10 Aug. 2007, §6. 32. Jean-Pierre Tuquoi and Laurent Zecchini, ÂLe „couloir humanitaire‰ vers le Darfour se révèle difficile à réaliserÊ [The humanitarian corridor to Darfur proves hard to implement], Le Monde, 2 June 2007. 33. UN Security Council, Resolution 1778 (2007), UN doc. S/RES/1778, 25 Sept. 2007, §§3 8. 34. Council of the European Union, ÂCouncil Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP of 15 October 2007 on the European Union Military Operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African RepublicÊ, Official Journal of the European Union, L 279, 23 October 2007, pp. 21 24. 35. Hans-Georg Ehrhart, ÂEU-Krisenmanagement in Afrika: Die Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCAÊ [EU crisis management in Africa: Operation EUFOR Chad/CAR], Integration, Vol. 2, 2008, p. 153. 36. Bruno Charbonneau, ÂDreams of Empire: France, Europe, and the New Interventionism in AfricaÊ, Modern & Contemporary France, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2008, pp. 291 293. 37. Ibid; Patrick Berg, ÂEUFOR Tchad/RCA: The EU Serving French InterestsÊ, in Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin (eds.), ÂThe EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence?Ê Research Paper 2009/RP 14, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin, 2009, pp. 57 69. 38. Björn H. Seibert, ÂOperation EUFOR Tchad/RCA and the European UnionÊs Common Security and Defense PolicyÊ, Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, October 2010, p. 10. 39. Philippe Bernard and Philippe Ricard,Ù ÂParis augmente sa participation en hommes et en matériels pour sauver lÊEuforÊ [Paris increases its personnel and equipment to rescue EUFOR], Le Monde, 12 January 2008. 40. Seibert (see n. 38), p. 10. 41. Roland Marchal, ÂUndersanding [sic] French Policy toward Chad and Sudan? A Difficult TaskÊ, Sudan Tribune, 7 June 2009 (at: www.sudantribune.com/UndersandingFrench-policy-toward,31423). 42. Serge Malle, the then UNHCR resident representative, is cited in a cable by the US Embassy in Chad saying that Âit was the preexistence of Epervier that had made swallowing the [EUFOR, T.K.] pill acceptable to DebyÊ. (US Embassy NÊDjaména, ÂChad: Kouchner Plan AcceptedÊ, 18 June 2007 [at: www.cablegatesearch.net/cable. php?id=07NDJAMENA504)].) 43. Council of the European Union, ÂCouncil Decision 2008/101/CFSP of 28 January 2008 on the Launching of the European Union Military Operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic (Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA)Ê, Official Journal of the European Union, L34, 8 February 2008, p. 39. 44. Seibert (see n. 38), p. 18. 45. Ibid. 46. ÂTchad: La France reconnaît avoir acheminé des munitions libyennesÊ [Chad: France acknowledges forwarding of Libyan ammunitions], Agence France Presse, 14 February 2008. 47. Jean-François Bayart, ÂObscénité franco-tchadienneÊ [French Chad obscenity], Le Monde, 12 February 2008; Denis M. Tull, ÂThe Chad Crisis and Operation EUFOR Chad/CARÊ, Comments 2008/2, SWP, Berlin, February 2008. 48. Thierry Oberlé, ÂLa France et lÊEufor prises dans la tempête tchadienneÊ [France and EUFOR drenched by the Chad storm], Le Figaro, 9 February 2008. 49. Berg (see n. 37), p. 65. 50. Catherine Gegout, ÂThe West, Realism and Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1996 2006)Ê, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2009, p. 234. 51. UN Security Council, Resolution 1279 (1999), UN doc. S/RES/1279, 30 Nov. 1999.

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104 Tobias Koepf 52. See, for a summary of the Ituri conflict ICG, ÂCongo Crisis: Military Intervention in IturiÊ, ICG Africa Report 64, Nairobi/New York/Brussels, 13 June 2003, pp. 2 6. 53. UN Security Council, ÂSecond Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the CongoÊ, UN doc. S/2003/566, 27 May 2003, §10. 54. UN Security Council, Resolution 1484 (2003), UN doc. S/RES/1484, 30 May 2003. 55. Ståle Ulriksen, Catriona Gourlay, and Catriona Mace, ÂOperation „Artemis‰: The Shape of Things to Come?Ê, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 11, No. 3, 2004, p. 511. 56. Council of the European Union, ÂCouncil Decision 2003/432/CFSP of 12 June 2003 on the Launching of the European Union Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of CongoÊ, Official Journal of the European Union, L147, 14 June 2003, p. 42. 57. Chafer and Cumming (see n. 3), p. 1145; Ulriksen, Gourlay, and Mace (see n. 55), pp. 511 520. 58. Denis M. Tull, ÂHerkulesaufgabe Kongo: Die MONUC zeigt die Grenzen komplexer Friedenssicherung aufÊ [Herculean Task Congo: MONUC shows the limits of complex peacekeeping], Vereinte Nationen, Vol. 54, No. 3, 2006, pp. 92 93. 59. Peter Schmidt, Â „Freiwillige vor!‰ Bundeswehreinsatz im Kongo zur Dialektik einer Führungsrolle wider WillenÊ [ÂVolunteers step forward!Ê The Bundeswehr mission in Congo The dialectics of an unwilling leadership role], Internationale Politik, Vol. 61, No. 11, 2006, p. 70. 60. Council of the European Union, ÂCouncil Decision 2006/412/CFSP of 12 June 2006 on the Launching of the European Union Military Operation in Support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the Election Process (Operation EUFOR RD Congo)Ê, Official Journal of the European Union, L163, 15.6.2006, p. 16. 61. Claudia Major, ÂEU-UN Cooperation in Military Crisis Management: The Experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006Ê, Occasional Paper 72, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, September 2008, p. 18. For a detailed account of the decision-making process in the forefront of Operation EUFOR RD Congo, see Helmut Fritsch, ÂEUFOR RD Congo: A Misunderstood Operation?Ê, Martello Paper 33, Centre for International Relations, Kingston, Ontario, 2008. 62. Mel McNulty, ÂFranceÊs Role in Rwanda and External Military Intervention: A Double DiscreditingÊ, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1997, pp. 28 30. 63. Romain Yakemtchouk, ÂLes deux guerres du Shaba: Les relations entre la Belgique, la France et le ZaïreÊ [The two Wars of Shaba: Relations between Belgium, France, and Zaïre], Studia diplomatica, Vol. 41, No. 4 6, 1988, pp. 375 742. 64. Tony Chafer, ÂFranco-African Relations: No Longer So Exceptional?Ê, African Affairs, Vol. 101, No. 404, 2002, p. 349. 65. Gegout (see n. 50), pp. 234 235. 66. Raf Custers, ÂArrières-pensées européennesÊ [European hidden agenda], Le monde diplomatique, July 2006, pp. 12 13. 67. Ulriksen, Gourlay, and Mace (see n. 55), pp. 517 519. 68. Ibid., pp. 519 520. 69. Ibid., p. 520. 70. Denis M. Tull, ÂEUFOR RD Congo: A Success, but Not a ModelÊ, in Asseburg and Kempin (see n. 37), pp. 53 54. These insufficiencies led observers to conclude that the DRC operations were nothing more than an attempt by the EU to position itself as a military actor without really considering what was happening in the field. Gegout (see n. 50); Gorm Rye Olsen; ÂThe EU and Military Conflict Management in Africa: For the Good of Africa or Europe?Ê, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2009, pp. 245 260. 71. Ulriksen, Gourlay, and Mace (see n. 55), pp. 517 519. 72. Tull (see n. 70), pp. 51ff. 73. ICG, ÂSecuring CongoÊs Elections: Lessons from the Kinshasa ShowdownÊ, Africa Briefing 42, Nairobi/Brussels, 2 October 2006.

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Problems of French-led peace operations 105 74. Damien Helly, ÂOperation Artemis (RD Congo)Ê, in Giovanno Grevi, Damien Helly, and Daniel Keohane (eds.), ESDP: The First Ten Years, Paris: EU Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009, pp. 181 185. 75. Tull (see n. 70), p. 53. 76. Denis M. Tull, ÂDie Führung und Beteiligung der Bundeswehr an EUFOR RD CongoÊ [Bundeswehr leadership and participation in EUFOR DR Congo], in Stefan Mair (ed.), Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr: Leitfragen, Entscheidungsspielräume und Lehren, SWP-Studie 27/2007, Berlin: SWP, September 2007, pp. 72 73. 77. Chafer and Cumming (see n. 3), p. 1146. 78. Alvaro Vasconcelos, ÂShould Europe Have a Policy on Africa?Ê, in Winrich Kühne, Guido Lenzi, and Alvaro Vasconcelos (eds.), ÂWEUÊs Role in Crisis Management and Conflict Resolution in Sub-Saharan AfricaÊ, Chaillot Paper 22, Institute for Security Studies of the WEU, Paris, December 1995.

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6

France and European Union peace operations in Africa A francophone space exception? Bastien Nivet

Interviewed at the time when the EU was launching its European security and defence policy (ESDP) and somehow still wondering what it could be used for, a Swedish diplomat was asked about the expectations and hopes of his country regarding the potential scope of future EU peace missions and answered, ÂWhat we do not want is to be embarked in French adventures in AfricaÊ1. One year later, Sweden was one of the main participants of the French-initiated and French-led Artemis mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the first ever EU peace operation in Africa. This example illustrates both the reluctance and mistrust of EU member states towards interventions in francophone Africa that might be perceived as neocolonialism, as well as the ability of the EU and its member states to surmount their initial resistance by undertaking peace operations that would have been unthinkable only a few years before. This paradox reflects a larger one that saw, within less than a decade, an apparent Âgrey zoneÊ of EU foreign, security, and defence policy Africa become one of its most dynamic fields of action. Accounts for this development insist on the link between development and security, the Europeanization of member statesÊ African policies, or the experimental nature of the EUÊs CFSP and ESDP, all pointing towards a rather nonplanned, ad hoc development2. Once a mere observer in the field of peace operations, the EU has emerged over the past 12 years as one of the international actors capable of undertaking peace missions, usually under a mandate or a direct demand from the United Nations. This transformation of the EU has not gone without difficulties and limits, given the specific nature of this actor, composed as it is of different institutions and different member states. Within the broad ambition of this volume on francophone spaces and peace operations, this chapter attempts to question the specificities of francophone spaces as theatres of EU peace operations. Can one identify specific features, trends, and characteristics of francophone spaces with regard to the official and broader EU approach to peace operations? Answers to this question are found by comparing, mainly in Africa, the trends and patterns of EU approach to peace operations since its first mission on the continent in 2003 (Operation Artemis in DRC). Studying the conditions of elaboration, decision, and implementation of these missions might also enable this chapter to contribute to the study of francophone spaces, of peace operations, and of the conditions of emergence of the EU as an actor in both fields.

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France and EU peace operations in Africa 107 The literature on the EU approach to peace and security in Africa is vast,3 and so is the literature on francophonie and French foreign, security, and defence policies in Africa.4 Partly due to the regionalization of security and defence in Africa, there exists also a well developed literature on the different patterns and lessons on the role of regional organizations in peacekeeping in Africa.5 This regional distinction both encourages and challenges the hypothesis/interest of studying the specificity of francophone spaces with regard to EU peace operations in Africa. It encourages it by showing that very different contexts and patterns of interventions may coexist in sub-Saharan Africa, making possible and necessary the study of African diversity and local/regional specificities regarding peace operations. It challenges it because the regional mapping of Africa, reflected by the different regional economic communities (RECs), does not match the linguistic or cultural map implied by the notion of francophone spaces:6 there exist nonfrancophone countries in West Africa (such as Ghana and Nigeria), a region otherwise traditionally receiving much attention from France, and there exist francophone countries in southern Africa (such as Madagascar), a region of otherwise little French presence and influence. This initial reminder raises the question of the specificity of francophone spaces with regard to EU peace operations in Africa. From that point of view, the ambition of this contribution is neither to search deliberately for francophone specificities or lessons nor to refute them in the name of preexisting, dominant analyses but rather to use francophone spaces as a specific renewing tool to study EU peace operations in Africa7 and the Europeanization of French policies in Africa8. The first section of this contribution raises the question of the significance or irrelevance of a discrimination between francophone and nonfrancophone spaces in Africa. The second section analyses the developments and trends of EU peace operations in francophone Africa since the early 2000s and explains both its relative initial dynamism and recent slowdown. The third section analyses whether the previous dynamics point towards a timid Europeanization of French foreign and security policy in Africa or whether the ESDP has been occasionally captured so as to cover French African policy with an EU hat.

Francophone Africa as a field of EU intervention Of the 13 EU peace operations in Africa to date, seven have taken place in Francophone spaces, mainly in the DRC (five). These vary in nature and scope. While Artemis, EUFOR RDC, and EUFOR Chad/RCA were military operations of rather great importance, EUPOL RDC, EUSEC RDC, EUPOL Kinshasa, and EUCAP Sahel Niger are more Âsoft securityÊ operations. Francophone Africa has therefore been the theatre of implementation of the varied types of operations (except peace enforcement) that the EU pretends to be able to deploy. In so doing, it represents both characteristics of ÂnormalÊ fields of EU engagement and specific characteristics that distinguish it from other parts of Africa.

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Francophone specificities? There exist specific trends and features of francophone spaces regarding EU peace missions in Africa. The first, most visible one has to do with the nature of missions deployed. Only in Francophone Africa has the EU deployed fully fledged military operations with a mandate of stabilization implying a possible use of force, and always with or because of French involvement. This was the case of Operation Artemis in the DRC and of Operation EUFOR Chad/RCA. This has to do with the necessity for the EU to intervene in these demanding types of missions, in which one member state acts as what the Europeans call a framework nation (nation-cadre) and provides a majority of the troops and the command and control capacity so as to make possible a European operation without the use of NATO planning and command capacities and assets. In both DRC and Chad/ CAR cases, France acted as a framework nation, enabling an EU operation otherwise impossible for capacity and operational reasons, not to talk about political ones.9 The incomplete nature of the EU as a strategic actor not least its lack of a permanent command and control structure10 and its uncertain political continuity and unity means that it can deploy ambitious peacekeeping missions only if and when a member state with strong political will and strategic planning capacities is willing to exercise a leadership role. Since within the EU, only the UK and France have both such strategic planning capacities and projection capacities and arguably viable projection forces more broadly this implies that crisis-mobilizing only one of these two member states makes them potentially ÂEuropeanizableÊ. This may create a tacit differentiation of regional or local context in sub-Saharan Africa because countries belonging to francophone spaces may seem Âby natureÊ more porous to outside intervention. It seems impossible, for instance, to envisage a strong EU peacekeeping operation in southern Africa, for both political and operational reasons. There are French, European, and African explanations for this. The local context, marked by the presence of a strong regional power and a rather anti-intrusion approach to international intervention and interference in regional affairs, is one of them. The fact that France, for political, historical, and operational reasons, cannot act in the region as a driver for EU intervention is another one. As for the EU, its role and perception in the region in terms of security provider and partner remain limited. This source of specificity reminds us that EU and UN involvement in francophone spaces remain, at least partly, the result of FranceÊs interest, pressure, or commitment for action and intervention. These interests and pressures dictate not only the idea or possibility of intervention but also the nature and forms of interventionism. Normalized francophone spaces? There exist specific features and trends in peace operations in Africa that transcend, however, the distinctiveness of francophone spaces. The differences in trends of peace operations among regions identified by the African RECs are

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France and EU peace operations in Africa 109 one of them. In the case of West Africa, defined as the region that is covered by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and that includes both francophone and nonfrancophone countries, there exists a certain tradition of regional intervention in the neighboursÊ conflicts and of porosity to outside intervention.11 In the case of southern Africa, defined as the region covered by the Southern African Development Community (SADC), there exists a much more ÂsovereignÊ approach to security policy and peace operations, where the intrusion of regional and, even more so, nonregional actors in domestic or local conflicts is badly perceived and almost inconceivable. The emerging African peace architecture with the AU being the main overarching framework/organization acting as leader and main interlocutor with external actors such as the UN and the EU, and the different regional organizations being the building blocks, the bricks responsible for providing peacekeeping capacities transcends the definition of francophone and nonfrancophone spaces and gives birth to an alternative geopolitical mapping of peacekeeping in Africa. Differences in relations to external interventions and peace operations are further criteria that transcend the differentiation between francophone and nonfrancophone spaces. Previous works concerning the relation of African countries towards peace operations and outside interventions provide useful perspective. Laurie Nathan, for instance, put forward the power of Africanist and anti-imperialist paradigms as explanations of the emergence of differences between Africa and western/northern countries about Darfur,12 while Giulia Piccolino and John Karlsrud put forward the dynamics of greater resistance and withering consent that affect international peace operations, against the background of African renewed assertions13. These evolutions largely transcend the francophone/nonfrancophone spaces divide by renewing the more common North South one. It must also be noted that while UN and EU involvements in francophone spaces remain under French influence, they are also increasingly influenced by newcomers on the world and African stages. As some have already pointed out, Âthe influence of countries that have a more cautious position than Western powers over issues of international intervention and state sovereignty is growingÊ.14 Within the broader picture of EU peace operations in Africa, francophone spaces present, in the end, both specificities and normalized characteristics in comparison with nonfrancophone spaces. Retracing the conditions, patterns, and history of the emergence of the EU as an actor of peace operations in Africa helps understand both specificities and normalities.

EU peace operations in Francophone Africa Although many considered that the historically diversified relations of EU member states made difficult any assertion of the EU as a diplomatic actor and for stronger reasons a military one sub-Saharan Africa became, over the last decade, one of the privileged fields of deployment and projection of the EU as an international actor. It is in the field of security and defence that this phenomenon is most

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spectacular, with two main yet not exclusive dimensions: the deployment of 13 military, civil, or civilomilitary missions of the EU and the support for the transformation of African regional and subregional organizations as actors of security and defence governance and intervention on their own continent. Retracing these dynamics helps understand how the EU became an actor in francophone spaces previously considered, in Paris and elsewhere, as a French privileged sphere of influence. It may also be useful for the understanding of the specificities and normalities of francophone spaces within the broader picture of EU peace operations in Africa. Explaining the EUÊs involvement in Francophone Africa The unforeseen development of EU peace operations in Africa in the early 2000s has been the result of a complex set of historical, political, and conjectural opportunities.15 As far as European institutions were concerned, they were already engaged in a relative politicization and securitization of their approaches and policies towards Africa. The longstanding cooperation and development policy managed by the European Commission began touching upon security issues following the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement in 2000. As far as individual member states were concerned, both those that had a tradition of intervention in Africa and those that did not, they saw a relative interest in envisaging EU operations in Africa after the European security and defence policy (ESDP) was set up.16 For the first set of countries, France and the UK in particular, a timid Europeanization of their African policy and of external intervention in Africa was perceived both as a way to Europeanize the cost of security in Africa, as a new multilateral evolution of their African policy, and as a way to cover their own ambitions and policies with EU legitimacy. For the others, it was a way to show willingness to take part in EU operations outside the European continent and to respond to UN demands. African and global evolutions also created opportunities for an EU engagement through peace operations in Africa. The uncertain commitment of international actors such as the UN and the United States to peace operations in Africa created a strategic vacuum illustrated by occasional calls from UN secretaries-general for greater international engagement and commitment of actors in favour of African peace and security. African actors were also looking for alternative modes of peace operations, including a multilateralization and regionalization of them following the first experiences of ECOWAS in the 1990s. The EU could provide both dynamics. As a budding strategic actor eager to prove its usefulness, it was more than willing to fill any strategic space left vacant by the United States. As a regional structure itself in transformation and construction, it could arguably provide African actors with advice, support, and experiences in their will and need to renew peace operations in Africa. Operation Artemis, conducted by the EU from June to September 2003, the first ever EU peace operation in Francophone Africa and in Africa more broadly, is a perfect illustration of these opportunistic and nonplanned conditions and patterns

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France and EU peace operations in Africa 111 of the EUÊs sudden involvement in peace operations in Africa. The European decision to launch it relied on many grounds, sometimes very far from immediate local needs and realities. Following strong European divisions on the question of Iraq in 2002 2003, member states of the EU were looking for a way to reinvigorate the EUÊs CFSP and ESDP.17 In this context, the crisis in Ituri appeared as an opportunity to do so. For ÂinterventionistÊ individual member states such as France, an EU intervention in Ituri was clearly perceived as a way both to reunify the European family and to Âregain innocence after TurquoiseÊ.18 For other EU member states, the UN demand for support and the will to recover from the diplomatic crisis on the Iraqi question were decisive. Beyond the rationale of its launch, Operation Artemis was also specific at the time in terms of organizational and institutional arrangement because it was the first ever EU operation outside Europe, the first EU operation without using NATOÊs means, and a mission very experimental in nature, using European institutions, methods, and concepts that were still in the making.19 DRC and more broadly Africa represented at that time a complex set of opportunities for EU involvement and for French authorities to get the EU involved. This view was comforted by actors involved in EU decision making. As one French officer recalls, ÂWhen the instruments of the CFSP and ESDP were born, we naturally asked ourselves where can we act? We were limited by several factors, such as the capacities and the theatre of actions. NATO was already present in Europe [Balkans] where the EU was there in support. Africa appeared as a possibilityÊ.20 This experimental approach, within which France had a decisive role in bringing in other EU member states, partly accounts for the EUÊs relative activism in peace operations in Africa in the years 2003 2008 and for the previously mentioned characteristics of francophone spaces. 2003 2008: Africa as a laboratory of the EUÊs ESDP Following Operation Artemis, 12 other peace operations were launched in Africa, seven in francophone spaces, between 2003 and 2012. Two phases of EU involvement might be distinguished here: one of dynamic action and experimentation, from the launch of Artemis in 2003 to that of EUFOR Chad/RCA in 2008, and then a phase of relative slowdown ever since. Between 2003 and 2008, sub-Saharan Africa was the most dynamic field of intervention and innovation for the EUÊs ESDP. A far as francophone spaces were concerned, DRC concentrated much of the effort, with five military, civilomilitary, or civil missions being launched and/or completed between 2003 and 2008.21 These covered a wide spectrum of mission types, turning DRC into a kind of laboratory for ESDP structures in Brussels and abroad. During this same period, other missions were launched in nonfrancophone spaces such as GuineaBissau,22 Sudan,23 and along the Somalian coast.24 The first two missions were more focused on supporting local actors, EUSSR Guinea-Bissau being an attempt to support security sector reform and Sudan/Darfur being a mission of support to the African Union (AU) led AMIS II operation. Operation EUNAVFOR/Atalante

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is a specific maritime operation of monitoring, protection, and combating piracy along the coast of the Horn of Africa. EUFOR Chad/CAR, launched in early 2008 after very tense European debates and negotiations, somehow marked an end to this dynamic, exploratory period of European peace operations in Francophone Africa and in Africa more broadly. The difficulties in reaching an agreement at EU level on this operation marked the end of this initial European impetus in Africa in 2008. Discussions and negotiations on the idea of a mission itself, as well as later negotiations on the mandate, ambitions, and legal and operational framework of the mission, were particularly intense among EU member states.25 The European debates lasted numerous months,26 ending in the decision to launch Operation EUFOR Chad-RCA by the decision 2008/101/CFSP of the Council of the EU. In the end, the mission, which rested on a UN mandate to protect civilians, facilitated the delivery of humanitarian aid and protected UN personnel and facilities27 and made room for the EU to act under Chapter VII for a one-year mission before a handover to the UN in 2009. The particular difficulty to reach the zone of deployment, the risk of potential use of force, and the size and operational requirements partly explain European doubts on the operational rationality of the mission. Others point to the specific role of FranceÊs policy and strategy in the region, as having made the operation specific and uncertain in the eyes of other European countries.28 The operation may be regarded as pointing to the specific difficulties of the EU as peace operations provider. The rules regarding outside operations of the EU imply that the setting up of these missions rests on ÂvoluntaryÊ contributions of member states, which are not always prepared to take part in new missions, especially since military contributors are also financial contributors. Besides, the definition of the mandate and the objectives of these missions must be endorsed collectively by member states that sometimes have different assessments of crises and of the need for a peace operation. This double constraint explains the difficult launch of certain operations of the EU, like that in the Chad in the Central African Republic.29 Beyond these structural constraints, conjuncture factors, such as domestic political debates or budgetary constraints, may also present obstacles. In any case, EUFOR Chad/RCA is the last major land-based EU mission to date and therefore represents a turning point in EU peace operations in Francophone Africa and in Africa more broadly. A normalization of the EU Africa relation? Since 2008, no major land operation has been launched by the EU. As far as francophone spaces are concerned, only one very limited new mission has been launched, Operation EUCAP Sahel Niger, a civilian mission aimed at helping the Nigerien security forces to fight against terrorism and organized crime. Outside francophone spaces, similar missions of support of local capacities were launched in Somalia (EUTM Somalia),30 in South Sudan (EUAVSEC South Sudan),31 and in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor).32

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France and EU peace operations in Africa 113 The recent launch of these missions does not really represent a renewal of the early European activism in peace operations in Africa, given their limited scope and ambition. A relative slowdown characterizes the EUÊs engagement in peace operations in Africa since 2008, which is clearly acknowledged by the main actors and observers concerned. This slower launching rhythm of new missions and of the qualitative/military ambitions of operations launched is neither condemnable nor necessarily bad news in itself, and it could have been the simple reflection of a lesser need for European or, more broadly, any external intervention in Francophone Africa. However, evolutions of context in the DRC and the Sahel region indicate contradictory security assessments. The rationale for lesser European activism in peace operations in Africa over the past five years is in reality to be found in the greater reluctance among European member states towards peace operations in Africa and in a greater concentration on support operations or actions of advising and cooperation rather than direct military engagement. Rightly or wrongly, these are more acceptable among European capitals because they allegedly present less political and human risk and, arguably, lower costs. As far as military peacekeeping missions are concerned, the domestic barriers inside member states and diplomatic reluctances among them, which had been overcame in order to launch Artemis, which had later delayed the launch of Operation EUFOR Chad/ RCA, now seem to have regained more importance, not least in countries such as Germany. From that point of view, Operation EUFOR Chad/RCA may once again have represented a political turning point in EU peace operations in Africa. Budgetary pressures in the context of the economic and monetary crisis in Europe since 2008, of course, add to the reduction of European ambitions in Africa. To some, ÂEU Member States use Africa policy as a way of creating a united Europe on the cheap, precisely because the stakes in their relations with Africa are so very lowÊ.33 This would explain why, in a context of budgetary crisis and of lesser international engagements, even the interest for ÂEurope on the cheapÊ began to fade away . . . In the case of France, the rationale and conditions for engagement in an EU policy on peace operations in Africa may have been different and needs to be discussed so as to understand the evolution of the EUÊs commitment to peace operations in Francophone Africa and in Africa more broadly.

Europeanization of French African policy or French adventures draped in an EU flag? The study of the France-EU-Africa triangle in the field of security and peace operations has already been the object of much attention. It provides, indeed, useful insight and may shed a new light on postcolonial studies, multilateralism, the Europeanization of foreign and security policy of EU member states, and the role of non-African actors in African conflicts, peace operations, and security governance. Using the francophone spaces insight, a few more comments may be made here.

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The Prince of Salina, the hero of the famous novel The Leopard by Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa, in desperately trying to save his status and family amid intense social and political tumult and renovation, argues that Âeverything must change in order to stay the sameÊ. This necessity to change the forms of things so as to preserve them somehow sums up the evolution and Europeanization of French interventions in Francophone Africa. To some extent, the evolution of French interventionism in Africa points towards a certain degree of Europeanization, understood here as the capacity of a member state to converge towards common European actions, attitudes, and perceptions on a specific issue or policy.34 The opening of the RECAMP program to EU member states, the deployment of EU missions in francophone countries, the increased number of EU CFSP declarations on African security since the late 1990s, and the relative support of French authorities of the regionalization of African security governance35 are all signs that Paris is at least open to some form of European discussion, cooperation, and coordination on African issues.36 This was partly a palliative for French national weaknesses and uncertainties. As a French diplomat detached to the Council of the EU summed up about West Africa a few years ago: ÂFrance would really be willing to Europeanize the region. Not only for economic and financial reasons, but also because we do not know any more what to do. France would like . . . the EU to bring help in this regardÊ.37 Another sign of budding Europeanization lies in the increased cooperation and discussion among specific EU member states, not least the UK and France. Even a mission like Artemis in the DRC, an EU-hatted, French-led operation, was made possible diplomatically thanks to pressures from the UK and the United States on Rwanda. Other symbolic manifestations of this trend can be found in the joint visit of foreign ministers to Africa in 1999 or in the Saint-Malo declaration, which both symbolically launched the ESDP and the Franco-British move towards more cooperation on African security. However, critics might argue that this is not Europeanization but mere bilateral coordination between two countries that are both former colonial powers in Africa and the main instigators of ESDP.38 In any case, the rationale for this opening is manifold. To some, ÂFrance was seeking to reduce its presence and its engagements. Their progressive transfer to the EU allegedly allowed to defend FranceÊs interests and values without having to assume their economic and political costÊ.39 From a financial point of view, the Europeanization of French African policy and interventions is therefore to be understood first and foremost within a broader need of rationalization of the countryÊs foreign presence and commitment in the post Cold War world, which does not concern only Africa. From a political point of view, this move towards greater Europeanization is also to be understood within a post-Rwanda40 and postKosovo41 context, marked by greater needs for international legitimacy and multilateralism. An increased international legitimacy implies acting not only under the mandate of an international institution such as the UN but also in coalition with other members of the UN or the EU, so as to share responsibility with others and avoid being accused of unilateralism and having to assume all the risks

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France and EU peace operations in Africa 115 inherent in some interventions. What is striking from this point of view is the fact that French officials acknowledge rather easily that the ÂAfricanisation of ESDPÊ or the ÂEuropeanization of French commitments on African securityÊ are obvious levers for reshaping and rephrasing FranceÊs African policy in view of relegitimizing and rationalizing it. As some argue, ÂESDP in Africa remains, essentially, a French affairÊ.42 It is in this context that some consider that Operation EUFOR Chad/RCA has showed the limits of this approach and that France is privileging a military vision of peace in Africa and neglecting its more civil or civilomilitary dimensions.43 These limits of the Europeanization of French African policy are also visible in the fact that there remain crises and contexts of very limited if existing at all EU involvement, such as the Ivoirian crisis in 2010 2011. In the Ivoirian context, the role of the EU was limited to producing CFSP declarations encouraging local actors (Ivoirians and West Africans) to find a solution to the crisis and imposing sanctions on Laurent GbagboÊs ending regime44 The direct diplomatic and military management of the crisis, up until the fall of Laurent Gbagbo on 11 April 2011, was managed by Paris outside the EU framework. This example reminds us that the Europeanization of member statesÊ foreign, security, and defence policies remain very partial. It does not mean that all aspects of FranceÊs African policy are Europeanized at all times but rather only in some cases and on some occasions. Francophone Africa will therefore probably keep navigating into two different types of approaches by France: a traditional national one, marked by unilateral diplomatic discussions and military commitments, and a renewed European one, turned more towards a regionalization of approaches and to civilomilitary modes of intervention. One strong element of explanation for this lies in the fact that only two European member states have the capacity and potential political will to settle peace in Africa with the use of force if needed: the UK and France. This means that French governments, unlike most of their EU counterparts, have the possibility to Âact EUÊ in these matters if they can or must but also to go it alone if necessary. France does not have the monopoly on this attitude of partial Europeanization. The very nature of the EUÊs CFSP and ESDP, which are common policies that complement national policies but are not unique policies that replace them, allows and explains this. It explains why these policies are sometimes used by member states so as to Europeanize their ambitions and interests on a specific issue or at a specific time, while at other times the very same member states may do everything possible to keep the EU out of the picture if they consider that a mix of other European states or European institutions would be detrimental to their national interest or policies. This frequently raises debates among Europeans as to whether France is keen on Europeanizing the cost and risks of its African policy rather than its political leadership and potential benefits. The evolution of EU peace operations in Francophone Africa illustrates both a Europeanization of French peace operations and a relative nationalization or national appropriation of European instruments and structures of peace operations by individual member states.

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Conclusion Studying EU peace operations in Francophone Africa provides insights on the study of both the specificities and normalities of francophone spaces as theatres of peace operations, on the study of the EU as a provider of peace operations, and on the study of FranceÊs evolving African policy. As far as the first angle is concerned, our specific look confirms that francophone spaces are both carriers of specific trends and signs of normalization. EU peace operations in these areas follow the same constraints and rules as in other regions. Yet some of them are also specific because they could objectively not have taken place in nonfrancophone spaces or in places where France would not have been willing to intervene and to exercise a role of leadership within the EU. As far as the second angle is concerned, our study confirms that the role of individual member states may on some occasion be decisive for the EU not only to decide on an intervention but also to be able to implement it. It also confirms previously established assessments regarding the rationale for EU peace operations45 and their sometimes experimental nature. As far as the third angle is concerned, our contribution confirms that the relative normalization of FranceÊs African policy and interventions in Africa is not just rhetorical: increased multilateralism, the search for greater international legitimacy, and the enhancement of European coordination and ambitions in Africa are indeed visible. The completeness of this normalization must not be overestimated, and there remain postcolonial signs and symptoms in FranceÊs attitude towards peace operations in Francophone Africa (see Chapter 7 by Charbonneau in this volume). The rationale of this relative normalization should not be misunderstood: it is self-interested choices of economic, political, and diplomatic rationalization rather than a mere conversion to new principles of foreign intervention, although one does not necessarily preclude the other.

Notes 1. Interview with a member of the Swedish ministry of foreign Affairs, Stockholm, October 2002. 2. See, for instance, Niagalé Bagayoko and Marie V. Gibert, ÂThe Linkage Between Security, Governance and Development from an Institutional Perspective: The European Union in AfricaÊ, Journal of Development Studies. Vol. 45, No. 5, 2009, pp. 789 814; Nyagale Bagayoko-Pénone, ÂLes politiques européennes de prévention et de gestion des conflits en Afrique subsaharienneÊ, Champs de mars No. 16 (2005), pp. 93 114; Bastien Nivet, ÂDu laboratoire au miroir. Quand lÊAfrique subsaharienne construit lÊEurope straté giqueÊ, Politique Africaine, No. 127, Paris: Karthala, 2012, pp. 135 154. 3. See, for instance, Niagalé Bagayoko and Marie V. Gibert (see n. 2); Malte Brosig, ÂThe Emerging Peace and Security Regime in Africa: The Role of the EUÊ, European Foreign Affairs Review. Vol. 16, 2011, pp. 107 122; Bruno Charbonneau, ÂWhat Is So Special About the European Union? EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management in AfricaÊ, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2009, pp. 546 561; Mary Farrell, ÂA Triumph of Realism over Idealism? Cooperation Between the European Union and AfricaÊ, European Integration, Vol. 27, No. 3, 2005, pp. 263 283; Bastien Nivet, ÂSecurity by Proxy? The EU and (Sub-)Regional Organisations: The Case of ECOWASÊ, Occasional Paper No. 63, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 2006.

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France and EU peace operations in Africa 117 4. See, for instance, Philippe Marchesin, ÂLa politique Africaine de la France en transitionÊ, Politique Africaine No. 71, n.d., pp. 91 106; Tony Chafer, ÂFranco-African Relations, No Longer So Exceptional ?Ê, African Affairs, Vol. 101, No. 104, 2002, p. 349; Rachel Utley, ÂFranco-African Military Relations: Meeting the Challenges of Globalisation?Ê, Modern and Contemporary France, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2005, pp. 25 40; Bruno Charbonneau, ÂDreams of Empire: France, Europe, and the New Interventionism in AfricaÊ, Modern and Contemporary France Vol. 16, No. 3, 2008, pp. 279 295. 5. As far as the African context is concerned, one may refer to the initial works of Liisa Laakso, Regional Integration for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in Africa, Helsinki: University of Helsinki, 2002; for a broader study including African cases, Rodrigo Tavares, Regional Security: The Capacity of International Organizations, London: Routledge, 2010. 6. The definition of what constitutes a Francophone country/space would deserve long developments, which cannot be done here. Membership in the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF), the use of French as the main or official language, and spheres of specific French influence, for instance, produce different mappings of francophone spaces. See, in this volume, Chapter 1 by Zahar, Theroux-Bénoni, and Morin, Chapter 2 by Ramel, and Chapter 3 by Liégeois. 7. For a broader analysis on peace operations in francophone spaces and on the exceptionality or not of francophone space for the study of peace operations, see Bruno Charbonneau and Tony Chafer (eds.), ÂPeace Operations and Francophone SpacesÊ, International Peacekeeping, Vol.19, No. 3, 2012, pp. 274 286. 8. In this chapter, France is studied essentially within the broader EU context, not as a unilateral actor. For more detailed and specific accounts of FranceÊs role, see, in this volume, Chapter 2 by Frédéric Ramel, Chapter 7 by Bruno Charbonneau, Chapter 8 by Isaline Bergamaschi, and Chapter 9 by Cyril Fiorini. 9. Just to mention the example of EUFOR Chad/RCA, France contributed up to 1,900 soldiers out of 3,700, as well as a large part of the logistical capacities. Twenty-two other EU member states and three non-EU countries also took part in the mission. 10. Unlike NATO, the EU does not have a permanent Operational Headquarters (OHQ). This means that it must rely either on NATOÊs capacity or on a member stateÊs OHQ to deploy missions. 11. The region reveals the existence of two dimensions of outside intervention: (1) a regional one, illustrated by the role of ECOMOG, more recent ECOWAS mediation efforts and interventions, and statesÊ interference in neighbouring crises and conflicts, and (2) nonregional intervention by the UN or by formal colonial powers such as France and the UK. 12. Laurie Nathan, ÂInterests, Ideas and Ideology: AfricaÊs South Policy One DarfurÊ, African Affairs, Vol. 110, No. 438, January, 2011, pp. 55 74. 13. Giulia Piccolino and John Karlsrud, ÂWithering Consent, but Mutual Dependency: Peace Operations and African AssertivenessÊ, Conflict, Security and Development, Vol. 11, No. 4, October, 2011 pp. 447 471. 14. Piccolino and Karlsrud (see n. 13), p. 452. 15. For accounts of this development, see, for instance, Nyagale Bagayoko-Pénone, ÂLes politiques européennes de prévention et de gestion des conflits en Afrique subsaharienneÊ, Champs de mars, No. 16 (2005), pp. 93 114; Nyagalé Bagayoko-Pénone and Marie Gibert (see n. 2); Bruno Charbonneau, ÂDreams of Empire: France, Europe and the New Interventionism in AfricaÊ, Modern and Contemporary France, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2008, pp. 279 295; Catherine Gegout ÂCauses and Consequences of the EUÊs Military Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): A Realist ExplanationÊ, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, Autumn 2005, pp. 427 443. 16. For an empirical account of this process, among many others, see, for instance, Giovanni Grévi, Damien Helly, and Daniel Keohane (eds.), ESDP, the First Ten Years (1999 2009), Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009.

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17. See, for instance, Gegout (see n. 15). 18. Interview with a French officer in office in Brussels at the time of Operation Artemis in Paris, 26 March 2012. 19. Nivet (see n. 2) and Gegout (see n. 15). 20. Interview with a French officer in Paris, 26 March 2012. 21. Namely, Operations Artemis RD Congo, EUSEC RD Congo, EUPOL Kinshasa, EUPOL RDCongo, and EUFOR RDCongo. 22. Operation EUSSR Guinea-Bissau, launched under Council joint action 2008/112/ CFSP of 12 February 2008 on the European Union mission in support of security sector reform in the Republic of Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR GUINEA-BISSAU). 23. Operation EU Support to AMIS II, launched under Council joint action 2005/557/ CFSP of 18 July 2005 on the European Union civilian-military supporting action to the African Union mission in the Darfur region of Sudan. 24. Operation EUNAVFOR Atalante, launched following joint action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008 on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention, and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast. 25. For an account of the operationÊs operational requirements and challenges, see Bjorn H. Seibert, ÂAfrican Adventures? Assessing the European UnionÊs Military Intervention in Chad and the Central African RepublicÊ, MIT Security Studies Program Working Paper, November 2007; as well as, from the same author, ÂEUFOR Tchad/RCA. A Cautionary NoteÊ, ISIS Europe, European Security Review No. 37, March 2008. For an account of the broader implications and significations of this mission for the EUÊs role in Africa, see Fré dé ric Mé rand and Mireille Rakotonirina, ÂLa force europé enne au Tchad et en Centrafrique: Le baptême du feuÊ, Politique africaine, No. 114, pp. 105 125. 26. These focused, among others, on the operational and diplomatic condition, on rationality of a possible intervention, on the nature of Dé byÊs and BozizeÊs regimes, on the imbrications between the potential mission and French force in Chad and on the reluctance of member states to contribute to a potential mission under all these conditions. 27. UN Security Council, Resolution 1778 (2007) S/RES/1778 of 25 September 2007. 28. See, for instance, Bruno Charbonneau, ÂFranceÊ, in David Black and Paul Williams (eds.), The Politics of Mass Atrocities: The Case of Darfur, London: Routledge, 2010, pp. 212 231; Bruno Charbonneau (see n. 3). 29. See, for example, Seibert (see n. 25); or Antoine Rayroux, ÂAdaptation, Projection, Convergence? The Europeanization of the Defense and the Intervention of the Military Intervention EUFOR Chad/RCAÊ, Politique europé enne, No. 34, 2011, pp. 201 230, see also Charbonneau, ÂFranceÊ (see n. 28). 30. An EU military mission aimed at contributing to the training of Somali security forces (Council Decision 2010/96/CFSP, 15 February 2010). 31. A mission aimed at contributing to the air safety and border control of Djouba International Airport in South Sudan (Council Decision 2012/312/CFSP, 18 June 2012). 32. A mission aimed at supporting the Nigerien security actors in fighting terrorism and organized crime (Council Decision 2012/CFSP/392, 16 July 2012). 33. Jean-François Bayart, ÂCommentary: Towards a New Start for Africa and EuropeÊ, African Affairs, Vol. 103, No. 412, p. 453. 34. The literature on Europeanization and on Europeanization in the field of foreign policy is particularly huge and somehow confusing for the non-Europeanists. For an early, introductory work, see, for instance, Micheal Smith, The Europeanization of European Political Cooperation, Berkeley, CA: Centre for European Studies, 1996. 35. Through the support of the AU and RECs, for instance. 36. For an insight on FranceÊs (and the UKÊs) evolutions on these issues, see, for instance, Tony Chafer, ÂThe UK, France and ECOWAS: Towards Convergence?Ê Paper presented at the workshop on African Security: A Case for Convergence? Wits Rural Facility, South Africa, June 2012. Article to be published in African Security Review, December 2013.

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France and EU peace operations in Africa 119 37. Interview with a member of the Council of the EU in Brussels, November 2005. 38. Catherine Gegout, ÂEU Conflict Management in Africa: The Limits of an International ActorÊ, Ethnopolitics, No. 8, 2009, pp. 3 4. 39. Interview with a French officer in Paris, 26 March 2012. 40. Although debated later and to a lesser extent than in Belgium, the conditions and forms of the French intervention in Rwanda has provided occasions of reappraisal of the French interventions and peace operations in Africa. For a recent example, see the debates in the French quarterly Commentaire (debates rebounding in several issues during 2012). 41. The intervention in Kosovo in 1999 through NATO has also been the occasion of reflections and debates on the conditions of intervention in peace operations, not least regarding the conditions of legal and legitimate intervention. For a European overview of the debates at that time, see Barbara Delcourt and Olivier Corten (eds.), Droit, lé gitimation, dé mocratie: LÊEurope et la guerre du Kosovo, Brussels: E⌂ ditions Bruylant, 2001. 42. Mé rand and Rakotonirina (see n. 25), p. 107. 43. See, for instance, Charbonneau (see n. 3 and 28). Debates have regularly occurred among EU member states on the balance between civilian crisis management and military crisis management and on the meaning of ÂcivilomilitaryÊ operations and concepts. While the French have frequently accused some of their partners of using the notion of civilomilitary intervention as way to downsize the EUÊs military ambitions, their partners frequently accuse France of overplaying the military dimension of security and peacekeeping, not least in Africa. 44. These concerned mainly restrictive measures such as visa bans aimed at specific persons or the freezing of assets. See, for instance, Decision 2010/656/CFSP of 29 October 2010 or Council Regulation No. 330/2011 and 560/2005. 45. Gegout (see n. 15); Nivet (see n. 2).

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Part 2

Case Studies

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7

International intervention in Côte d’Ivoire The changing specificity of a francophone space Bruno Charbonneau

The French military interventions in Côte dÊIvoire (2002 2011), Libya (2011), and Mali (2013) strongly support one of the claims made in this book about the specific processes, practices, and dynamics to peace operations in francophone spaces: mainly, that the French state can intervene and interfere militarily in African political affairs, with or without UN legal authorization, largely because of the context-specific dynamics of its relationships with Francophone African states. Between 2011 and 2013, France deployed its military forces to enforce a regime change in Côte dÊIvoire, to impose another in Libya,1 and to support an interim Malian government faced with a radical Islamist rebellion.2 Each military intervention was different in its context, dynamics, and consequences, but together they bury the idea that French militarism in Africa was an affair of the past.3 It is obvious now that French militarism in Africa persists, but it should be equally obvious that the ways in which such interventionism occurs have been transformed. In a 2006 French Senate report on African conflict management, the members of the committee explicitly identified Côte dÊIvoire as an ÂexperimentÊ in finding new ways to deploy, legitimize, and share the costs of French military intervention in Africa. It maintained the French willingness to intervene but emphasized the need for establishing new conditions for it.4 Yet despite the Âmodernization of the instrumentsÊ of French African policy, in 2011 the French Senate emphasized 30 years of continuity since 1990: ÂFor 30 years . . . FranceÊs diplomatic and defense policy in Africa has evolved without major rupture but with the great global upheavals and by adapting to themÊ.5 There is a sense of familiarity and continuity about the policy because it uses old capabilities that are situated in a different logic.6 This chapter shows that French military involvement in the Ivorian conflict was crucial in determining and experimenting with new modes of international intervention and thus in how the conflict evolved. It analyses the role that France played in the Ivorian crisis, but it is not a straightforward analysis of French policy- and decision making. Nor does it construe the Âfrancophone specificityÊ as a causal variable that explains events. Instead, it situates the analysis at the intersection of three groups of intertwined practices and processes: (1) historical Franco-Ivorian dynamics, (2) the specific Ivorian dynamics of the conflict, and (3) the international politics of peace intervention. Each group refers to particular

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locations, practices, and processes, but the conditions of possibility for each group are determined interdependently. The difficult but necessary analytical articulation is made between the particularity of the Ivorian case of this Âfrancophone space of interventionÊ and the universal claims and aims of the international intervention context (represented by the UN involvement). The Franco-Ivorian specificity of this particular francophone space is intrinsic to the conflict and its international management, but its effects become particularly clear when and where the French military uses force. From a predominant role during the early years (2002 2004) to a more modest one (2005 2010) that left room for African and international peace initiatives, the French state took again the key role in 2011. In April, French military forces enforced the results of the 2010 UN-supervised election, thus ousting President Laurent Gbagbo. Although the 2011 regime change was arguably authorized under the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1975,7 involved UN troops working with French troops, and received the support of African regional organizations, this international denouement is impossible to imagine without an understanding of the specificity of this francophone space that authorizes such French militarism in Africa. It remains undeniable that the French state was at the centre of the Ivorian conflict and of the 2011 resolution, both as a military power and permanent member of the UNSC,8 thus pointing to the significance of the francophone specificity to the international politics of African conflict management. To reiterate, I do not claim causal power for the francophone specificity. The francophone space of peace operations is contingent, ambiguous, negotiated, continuously changing, and porous to nonfrancophone influences, processes, and dynamics. Yet it is a complex historical space where specific practices, relations, structures, and resources were construed, negotiated, imposed, and continue to be maintained. The analytical strategy is one that emphasizes the struggles over the new organizing logic of old capabilities for military intervention. This enables an analysis that takes seriously the contingency of the Franco-Ivorian francophone space. Put another way, I locate the changing specificity of the Franco-Ivorian francophone space in the transforming organizing logic of the old capabilities of French African relations, notably their integration with dominant international peace intervention practices.

France–Côte d’Ivoire relations Since its independence in 1960, Côte dÊIvoire has been not only an economic and political regional power but a strong symbol of France Africa relations. The relationship between President Félix Houphouët-Boigny (who stayed in power until his death in 1993) and French political elites was close, to the point that it was Houphouët-Boigny who is said to have coined the expression France Afrique to express the unique characteristics of the links between the countries (critics later transformed the term into Françafrique as a synonym of neocolonialism).

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International intervention in Côte dÊIvoire 125 Much could be said of links between the two countries that were never restricted to the friendship between elites. As Chauveau and Dozon demonstrated, the Ivorian state and political economy were built upon the colonial administration and governance practices. In fact, they argued, President Houphouët-Boigny developed the stateÊs capacity in order to reinforce and legitimize the larger trends of its plantation economy and its place within global markets.9 According to Samir Amin, what was created was a Âstate capitalismÊ model with all the characteristics of a dependent society.10 And, indeed, the Âeconomic support network provided by France was nothing short of amazingÊ.11 In the 1980s, the structural adjustment programs strained the model. Processes of pauperization and exclusion accelerated to affect an increasing percentage of the population.12 After the death of Houphouët-Boigny, historical sociopolitical and socioeconomic alliances were disrupted. After 1993, long-standing systems of meaning were being increasingly challenged, notably by polarizing and xenophobic alternatives promoted by political elites like President Henri Konan Bédié. The struggle over state power was exacerbated by conditions of austerity and the shrinking of policy options, ultimately leading to the 1999 coup dÊétat. In 2000, Âthe Franco-Ivorian neocolonial fantasy of Côte dÊIvoire had been in decline for two decades [and] had become less and less beneficial to either Ivorians or the FrenchÊ.13 Nevertheless, the complex and rapidly evolving context of French Ivorian relations is inextricably linked to the French and UN peace operations in Côte dÊIvoire. The complex links between Ivorian and French societies and governments should not lead to the analytical marginalization of Ivorian agency as is too often the case in discussions of French neocolonialism in Africa, as if the French are all-knowing and all-powerful. But neither should the links be underestimated. On the one hand, the actors know each other very well. On the other, this knowledge and associated relationships are dynamic, multiple, subject to manipulation, and often the basis of self-understanding about oneÊs image, place, or importance.14 They enable, and are supported by, various practices, structures, and resources, including the permanent presence of French military troops. As the rest of this chapter shows, integrating into the analysis this context of mutual knowledge and (often) shared resources goes a long way to understanding the aims and strategies of the actors. Strategies and tactics are intimately linked to the politics of the Franco-Ivorian space; a space that was being rapidly transformed as it was penetrated by other international actors, processes, and dynamics.

Setting the limits of the Ivorian peace On Christmas Eve 1999, a group of soldiers led by General Robert Guéï ousted President Henri Konan Bédié. The latter found refuge at the French embassy, thinking that President Jacques Chirac would personally see to his protection and support his path back to power. However, apart from Michel Dupuch who was French ambassador to Côte dÊIvoire from 1979 to 1993 and ChiracÊs African

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affairs deputy from 1995 to 2002, nobody at the Elysée was warm to the idea of an intervention. After tumultuous episodes in Rwanda (1990 1994), in the RDC where the French supported Mobutu until 1997, and in the Central African Republic during the 1996 1997 rebellion, French African policy had lost much of its credibility. Furthermore, Chirac had to contend with socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin who had initiated in 1997 reforms to ÂnormalizeÊ France Africa relations. This period of cohabitation (between the presidential right and socialist prime minister) imposed strict limits upon the field of action of French African policy, not least because Jospin questioned the old ways. Bédié received only personal protection, being flown to Paris after French General Germanos obtained permission to do so from General Guéï, his old Saint-Cyr military school comrade.15 The French state officially condemned the coup dÊétat but asked only for the restoration of Âorder and securityÊ (not legal authorities) and for elections to be held quickly. For Paris, the putsch was embarrassing, but many French officials found solace in the fact that BédiéÊs xenophobic and ethnocentric rhetoric and tactics were over. Guéï was a known quantity, or so it was thought. As the October 2000 elections approached, France was well aware that Guéï and Gbagbo were plotting to exclude all other candidates, notably Alassane Ouattara, but was mostly concerned with a return to order and stability, not procedural democratic issues. In France, the divide was clear: the political left supported Gbagbo and the right Guéï. So when the former won, under Âcalamitous conditionsÊ according to Gbagbo himself, the Jospin government defended the election results, despite the fact that the United Nations, the United States, South Africa, and the Organisation of African Unity called for new elections. As with so many countries going through a serious crisis, elections presented no miracle solution in Côte dÊIvoire and perhaps even exacerbated the problems.16 Among other things, to exclude the political competition, Bédié, Guéï, and Gbagbo had each deployed in turn the concept of ivoirité a notion allegedly necessary to identify ÂtrueÊ Ivorians. As president, Gbagbo continued with such ethnocentric tactics to consolidate his power, thus further polarizing Ivorian society. His good standing with the French left also allowed him to navigate the cohabitation to his advantage, slowly but surely redefining Franco-Ivorian relations. But when, on 19 September 2002, Ibrahim Coulibaly and his men (initial estimates varied between 300 and 800 men in 2002) launched their attack from the north, Chirac had just won a second term that ended cohabitation. The president could intervene more freely. French troops were rapidly deployed on 22 September to stop the fighting (Operation Licorne), but the ambiguity of French military and political objectives and the contradictions emerging from a still changing French African policy led to a stalemate that would last ten years. This stalemate was the result of decisions, actions, and an interpretation of events favourable to the rebellion. Militarily, the rebels were unable to take Abidjan because governmental security forces remained loyal to the president and pushed the rebels back. As they were retreating toward Bouaké, the French military could have pushed them back further north, securing the city, but were ordered to let them stay in Bouaké.17 Chirac refused GbagboÊs call to activate the

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International intervention in Côte dÊIvoire 127 defence accords of 1961, officially arguing that this was an Ivorian affair and not an external aggression. Reflecting concerns with accusations of neocolonialism, the ambiguity of French military actions meant that the rebels accused France of defending Gbagbo, while GbagboÊs government and supporters accused it of protecting and legitimizing the rebellion. The ambiguity was perhaps not deliberate and might have reflected a confused decision-making process, but its consequences enabled the primary necessary condition for subsequent French diplomatic efforts to impose its solution: you need two to tango. To situate French diplomacy as the needed peacemaker in the Ivorian conflict, the military rebellion first had to become a legitimate political actor. President Chirac, Minister of Defence Michèle Alliot-Marie, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Dominique de Villepin emphasized publicly that the rebels were in control of the north of the country and possessed military capabilities that bestowed upon them de facto political relevance.18 Indeed, after visiting the rebels in Bouaké, de Villepin argued that it was imperative Âto propose to those [the rebels] with the bulk of military power, sufficiently attractive responsibilities to get them to accept disarmamentÊ.19 Coupled with this recognition of the rebellion, the narrative of the north-south confrontation as the explanation for the conflict was given official support, thus suggesting its own solution. As Jeremy Allouche and Patrick Zadi Zadi wrote, the dominant Âpolitical analyses have displayed a stereotyped understanding of the dynamics of the conflict as a north-south issue, basically a religious conflict between the Christian South and the Muslim North.Ê20 The January 2003 LinasMarcoussis Accords authorized this stereotype by overstating the initial political coherence and military power and assets of the rebellion by giving them a status and by obscuring or diminishing the importance of the deeper causes of the conflict, like the crucial issue of land tenure in the west of the country. The start of attacks on 28 November 2002 in the west, under the so-called zone of trust line, established by the French military, that divided the north and the south clearly demonstrated the complexity of the Ivorian conflict. The simplistic North South narrative was already being undermined by events in 2002 but has remained the dominant interpretative framework. Although the French intervention ultimately failed to impose peace on Ivorian actors in 2002 2004, it succeeded in establishing the dominant narrative and thus the basic parameters of all future peace negotiations and mechanisms. For French diplomacy, from the beginning it was a fact that the rebels controlled the north.21 (They eventually did, with time, as they undermined and replaced the Ivorian state in the Northern provinces, but it was not the case in 2002, perhaps not even in January 2003.) This assumption was necessary for France to establish itself as the (alleged) impartial peacemaker between a rebel-controlled space in the north and a government-controlled space in the south.22 This French involvement and framing of the conflict had two crucial effects. On the one hand, by legitimizing the rebels who would achieve power in 2011, it fundamentally changed the conditions of possibility of Ivorian politics. Whatever GbagboÊs government shortcomings, French actions in 2002 2003 prompted

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a redistribution of power within Ivorian society based upon a new geographical north south imagination that imposed new spatial practices because of the zone of trust monitored by French and UN forces. Some, like Guillaume Soro, acquired great political (and economic) capital because of the rebellion that was transformed into a political organization called MPCI (Mouvement patriotique de Côte dÊIvoire). On the other hand, as the rest of this chapter demonstrates, this French positioning had continuous effects upon Ivorian agency; that is, Ivorian actors planned with, against, or despite French involvement, assuming (rightly) that France was not and could not, despite strong claims to the contrary, act impartially. Put another way, the struggle for power between Ivorian elites was not limited to national borders. Gbagbo and Ouattara, in particular, always had an eye on, and a strategy that accounted for, French and international involvement in their conflict.

Ivorian frames and challenges This French involvement in the Ivorian conflict is essential to understand the subsequent peace efforts (or conflict dynamics). The 2003 French-led negotiations at Linas-Marcoussis confirmed the rebels as a legitimate political group. They called for disarmament, a restructuring of the national security forces that integrated the rebels forces, and a government of national reconciliation that significantly reduced the powers of the president to the benefit of a new prime minister. It was not surprising, then, that there was little support for this agreement within the Republican security forces and GbagboÊs government. For Gbagbo and his supporters, Linas-Marcoussis was a moment when the ambiguity of the French position ended and when France became the symbol and key actor of international meddling in Côte dÊIvoire. To consolidate his power and to counteract international peace intervention, after Linas-Marcoussis, Gbagbo deployed strategies based upon an anticolonial and anti-imperial nationalist discourse that portrayed the Ivorian crisis as a Âwar of second independenceÊ.23 But this should not be understood as GbagboÊs rejection of France. He understood that France was not a homogeneous actor, that he had French allies, that he could benefit from the divisions within France on what needed to be done in Côte dÊIvoire, and that connections with French elites could mean access to UN, EU, or other international networks. Even though Chirac and General Henri Poncet (who was the commander of the Licorne forces in 2004 2005) were openly hostile to him, Gbagbo had support from the left (notably, from Guy Labertit) and had made friends and done business with French multinational groups (like Groupe Bolloré and Bouygues). His discursive tactics were aimed at destabilizing the French spatial practices that construed Ivorian space as a conflictual and divided space that required and authorized a French-led peace intervention. As the situation deteriorated in mid-2004, Gbagbo planned a military campaign to retake the north. On November 4, Operation Dignité was launched. On November 6, the bombing of a camp near Bouaké killed nine French soldiers and one American citizen. It is still being debated whether this was a deliberate

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International intervention in Côte dÊIvoire 129 attempt to provoke the French or an error. Nevertheless, only a few hours after the bombing of the camp, Chirac answered by ordering the total destruction of the Ivorian air force. GbagboÊs government hit back by claiming publicly that France had declared war on Côte dÊIvoire. People of all political allegiances took to the streets, notably in Abidjan. Mass anti-French protests marched toward the airport, the French military base, and Hotel Ivoire. General Poncet was known for his aggressive style and supported a military option. French tanks got ÂlostÊ and ended up in front of the presidential residence, raising fears of a French coup. Tensions rose to a high on November 9 when, at Hotel Ivoire, French soldiers opened fire on protesters.24 In short, from 6 to 9 November, Côte dÊIvoire was the terrain of an Ivorian-French miniwar that discredited French claims to impartiality. The French failure to impose or find a resolution was the necessary condition in 2003 2004 for the internationalization of the crisis,25 notably for African-led diplomatic efforts that largely failed but that nevertheless confirmed and reinforced the basic parameters of Linas-Marcoussis. Under the aegis of then South African President Thabo Mbeki (who was sympathetic to GbagboÊs anticolonial stance), the April 2005 Pretoria Accords called for UN-supervised elections in October. UN Security Council Resolution 1603 (2005) supported the Accords and created the position of UN High Representative whose responsibilities were to verify all stages of the electoral process. In 2010, Gbagbo most likely regretted signing the agreement because UN-supervised elections ultimately served to oust him, but in 2005 he was playing for time. Indeed, after the elections were postponed in 2005 and 2006, French diplomacy insisted with UN Security Council Resolution 1721 (2006) that strengthened the powers of Prime Minister Banny. Gbagbo countered with a peace plan on 19 December 2006 that called for direct talks with the rebels. The talks led to the 2007 Ouagadougou Accords, which were facilitated by Burkinabe President Compaoré and supported at the Security Council by South Africa. The Accords abolished the zone of trust that divided the country in two and made Guillaume Soro Prime Minister. In effect, this peace accord seemingly disabled, partly at least, the international spatial politics of a north south confrontation by uniting opposing forces in a reconciliation government. But as much as it curbed French and international meddling, it also shifted the burden of responsibility for war and peace to Gbagbo and Soro. They had agreed to run together a divided country, thus making it difficult to further blame intrusive international intervention for Ivorian ills or, certainly, for failures to reconcile the country.26 In 2007, to many analysts, the Ivorian conflict had already settled into a Âneither war nor peaceÊ state of affairs. There had been no major acts of violence since 2005 (a condition that held until the 2010 postelection violence), suggesting that the official parties to the conflict (GbagboÊs government and SoroÊs Forces nouvelles) were not as polarized as believed or that they benefited from this state of affairs. As Mike McGovern argued, the Ivorian conflict was not Âa world of either criminal accumulation or principal legitimate defenceÊ because ÂIvorian elites and intercalaries have many incentives to maintain a situation of neither war nor peace, in which instances of relatively low-level violence are a built-in

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part of the social and political equation, necessitating the state of emergency that acts as cover for various forms of profiteeringÊ.27 In other words, from GbagboÊs resistance to international intervention emerged new forms of governance in Côte dÊIvoire. But this neither war nor peace situation was possible only within the structural limits imposed by the spatial politics of French-led peace interventionism. The zone of trust that split the country in two until 2007, the failure of Linas-Marcoussis to bring peace, and the 2004 Ivorian-French miniwar, notably, gave authority to GbagboÊs anticolonial rhetoric and tactics. His anticolonial statements acquired a currency insofar as they enabled his forces to act within and despite the imposed limits of international intervention and allowed other patterns of governance to emerge. The new patterns were favourable not only for Gbagbo and his close supporters, but also for the Forces nouvelles who controlled the war economy of the north where they dismantled or took control of state institutions. Other than ordinary citizens, nobody in Côte dÊIvoire gained from a resolution to the conflict.

Regime change The French UN 11 April 2011 regime change highlights when, where, and how the francophone specificity of a peace operation can reappear. The UN supervised the 2010 election and confirmed the results according to the Pretoria Accords of 2005 that Gbagbo had signed willingly. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon responded fiercely to GbagboÊs challenge by demanding that he step down and by asserting that Â[f]acing this direct and unacceptable challenge to the legitimacy of the United Nations, the world community cannot stand byÊ.28 The UN mandate to monitor and validate the 2010 election initially scheduled for October 2005 was more than a solution to bring peace. It symbolized a system of meaning constitutive of a world order that reaffirmed the nation-state as the legitimate political form and established the limits of Ivorian sovereignty. Democracy and elections served as the disciplinary measures of the international order.29 So, while French, UN, and African diplomacy failed to bring about a peaceful resolution to the Ivorian conflict, it succeeded in imposing the limit conditions for Ivorian peacetime politics. GbagboÊs refusal to leave office after losing the 2010 elections was the first necessary condition for allowing the French UN regime change. Challenging the election results, he was playing for time again, Âhoping that African European or inter-African schisms would provide him with some sort of mitigated legitimacyÊ.30 His strategic error was to underestimate both the power of the politics of democracy under conditions of international peace interventionism and of the significance of UN involvement, to which he had agreed at Pretoria, as well as OuattaraÊs ability to draw from this power and to manoeuvre within its space. By agreeing to UN-supervised elections, he had accepted that the Ivorian political space and its associated governmental forms were susceptible to international contention. In 2007, he and Soro cooperated to disable the conditions making

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International intervention in Côte dÊIvoire 131 possible such international interference, but they also allowed a new competitor, Alassane Ouattara, whose knowledge of international politics was superior.31 Gbagbo did not completely understand the trap that elections represented and underestimated the disciplinary measures and tools supporting international authority and order. Ouattara, on the other hand, had an intimate knowledge of international politics and its possibilities. This meant not that regime change was inevitable, only that it set up the stage for the upcoming postelection struggle. Contrary to Thomas Bassett and Scott StrausÊs claim that there were Âstrong and consistent positions of the AU and ECOWAS toward the Côte dÊIvoire crisisÊ,32 there were intense debates within these institutions. The Âworld communityÊ reacted relatively strongly to GbagboÊs refusal to leave office, but African elites were divided over how to interpret the situation: was it a legitimate case that called for enforcing election results, or was it another French- or Western-led ploy to impose an interested resolution? Was Gbagbo a genuine, justifiable, or defendable case of resistance to a dominant form of governmentality? Certainly, Thabo Mbeki supported the interpretation of the crisis as a French-led neocolonial intervention, thus influencing South African President Jacob Zuma to question the election results and UN impartiality in January 2011. President Santos of Angola and Ghanaian President Atta Mills firmly opposed a forceful resolution, and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni urged restraint.33 The debates over what to do next were polarized between proponents and opponents to an international military intervention. But these debates hid the conditions of possibility that supported this polarized and polarizing discursive frame. As Cynthia Weber argued, the issue of Âinternational interventionÊ is commonly construed as a simple matter of judgment about the transgression of state sovereignty.34 This system of intelligibility enables spatial practices that allow discursive strategies of international saviours coming to protect powerless civilians and discursive strategies of international aggressors intervening to dominate.35 The result is the reification of the Âlocal/internationalÊ distinction and associated power relations, thus consolidating the power arrangements that the persistence of such debates help to sustain.36 This common distinction enables moral judgment over the legitimacy of the regime change to the detriment of its methodical analysis. Indeed, the second necessary condition for regime change was the French military presence that gave credibility to the threat of an international military solution. Under such conditions, regime change became possible because Ouattara deployed strategies based upon, and that drew power from, his sophisticated understanding of the dominant spatial and discursive practices in France and international organizations. On the one hand, after years of experience working for international organizations and knowing well and personally French President Nicolas Sarkozy, he rapidly marshalled international support. With the UN, AU, ECOWAS, EU, and Organisation internationale de la Francophonie having recognized OuattaraÊs electoral victory, Gbagbo was quickly being isolated internationally. This allowed Ouattara to later acquire the means for legitimate violence by creating the Forces républicaines

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de la Côte dÊIvoire (FRCI) out of the rebel forces (as formalized by decree on 17 March 2011), a means that he did not have before because Gbagbo maintained control over governmental (and thus technically still legitimate) security forces. Yet this was not an easy affair. The strong support Ouattara received from Sarkozy was to a degree counterproductive because some African leaders, as already seen, were sensitive to GbagboÊs anticolonial rhetoric. In fact, the French and Sarkozy had little to gain but much to lose in Côte dÊIvoire. As tensions rose and the violence increased in the first months of 2011, so did the stakes of international intervention. With the mounting violence increasingly targeting civilians in Abidjan in particular,37 GbagboÊs international support waned. In the context of the French British intervention in Libya,38 where some argued that the ÂSecurity CouncilÊs responses to the crises in Côte dÊIvoire and Libya need to be seen in the context of its increasing willingness to authorize coalitions and „blue-helmet‰ peacekeeping operations to use all necessary means for human protection purposesÊ,39 OuattaraÊs strategy was to criminalize Gbagbo in the eyes of the UN community. Understanding that increasing tensions and violence would likely work against Gbagbo, he worked closely with and used for his purposes the UN force in Côte dÊIvoire.40 On 10 March, the AU reaffirmed its recognition of Ouattara as the legitimate president, making untenable the positions of GbagboÊs remaining allies.41 Later in March, both South Africa and Angola dropped Gbagbo.42 This late African consensus opened the door for further international intervention. On the one hand, Sarkozy had not wanted to intervene without UN approval and African support cooperation with Nigeria as the leader of ECOWAS being a top priority.43 On the other hand, Russian and Chinese resistance to intervention in the UN Security Council abated as African organizations and governments showed agreement. The turning point was SoroÊs decision to ally his forces with Ouattara. He hesitated until the very end, but he calculated that with Ouattara he would be protected from the international community.44 The Ouattara Soro alliance transformed an ex-rebel army (FN) into a republican one (FRCI). As Moussa Fofana argued, as early as January 2011, the FN discussed a military solution and, after a meeting in January of ECOWAS member army chiefs, Ouattara might have made deals with Nigeria, Senegal, and Burkina Faso to provide rebels with weapons. Fofana argued that a peaceful resolution could have excluded Soro and the FN from the benefits of a new political order after years of being one of the main beneficiaries of the neither war nor peace situation. The alliance solved the problem of external military intervention, creating the condition for an Ivorian solution to the crisis and giving Ouattara the military forces he needed to confront Gbagbo.45 The FRCI launched an offensive on 28 March, encountering little resistance until it reached Abidjan, except by not-so-local militias and mercenaries at Duékoué in the west of the country.46 Two days later, France and Nigeria sponsored UNSC Resolution 1975 (2011) authorizing UNOCI and Licorne forces Âto use all necessary means to carry out its mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment, including to prevent the use of heavy weapons against the civilian populationÊ.47

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International intervention in Côte dÊIvoire 133 The dominant interpretation of the text engaged the Âimpartial forcesÊ on the side of the electoral winner and an ex-rebel army.48 On 11 April, the French military destroyed GbagboÊs last defences at the presidential palace, where he was captured. Because he challenged the rules of democracy and good governance under conditions of international peace interventionism, he became an exception that authorized regime change. Election results were imposed. Order was restored, but it was a particular, imposed kind of political order.

Conclusion It would be difficult to understand the Ivorian conflict and its 2011 denouement without an appreciation of the francophone specificity of the international peace operation. The old practices and logics of French-Ivorian (post-) colonial relationships might have changed, but the old capabilities remain. French diplomatic, political, and military influence has found new organizing logics (chiefly, they now require UN or multilateral legitimacy) that shape, often significantly, the conditions of possibility of francophone spaces of peace operation. It seems unlikely that the UN alone would have acted this aggressively in April 2011 if it did not have French military and diplomatic support. This so-called francophone specificity argument does not need to be deterministic or cultural/linguistic. Rather, it emphasizes the importance of historical knowledge and historically informed analysis for peace operations. In this chapter, the specificity of peace operations in francophone spaces was shown to be both the historical formation of certain conditions and a contingent moment, instead of a static context or variable that ÂcausesÊ events or behaviours (in the positivist, rational sense of causality). In Côte dÊIvoire, the various relationships with France predated the international peace intervention and thus partly conditioned the possibility for peace (and war). Military, political, and socioeconomic connections were radically transformed after decolonization, from an imperial ÂmixedÊ army to national armies that ÂcooperatedÊ based on ÂinternationalÊ agreements, and from mercantilist capitalism to neoliberal capitalist relations. These connections were the historical basis that authorized and framed the limits of French involvement and Ivorian strategies. The international politics of peace operations imposed itself upon these connections and conditions, disrupting or reaffirming the specificity of French-Ivorian structures and relations. Nevertheless, Ivorians found various ways to work with, against, or in spite of such internationally imposed limits. In short, the dominant politics of international peace operations (that conceives peace as necessitating the management of war49) should not conceal the inherent struggles of such internationalized peace spaces. The analytical strategy deployed in this chapter sought to demonstrate that the specificity of peace operations in the francophone space called ÂCôte dÊIvoireÊ is not a cultural or linguistic causal argument. It is to call attention to historical structures and practices that come out of a specific context: that of the coconstitutive historical construction of French-Ivorian relations. Another implicit objective is to show that revealing the particular hegemonic content of French

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peace interventionism in Francophone Africa is no longer enough. Critical analysis must also acknowledge the considerable energies involved in struggles for power in states where international peacemakers are deployed.50 The argument suggested that old capabilities can find new organizing logics but that the latter are the product of political struggles. It also suggested that the balance of power is not favourable to those, like Gbagbo, who would oppose or resist hegemonic discursive and spatial practices. Indeed, as much as the specificity of francophone spaces has changed, it is far from clear what these transformations mean for the reorganization of power internationally, for the politics and practices of intervention in Francophone Africa, and for the social, economic, cultural, and political evolution of Côte dÊIvoire.51

Notes 1. See Jean-Christophe Notin, La vérité sur notre guerre en Libye, Paris: Fayard, 2012. 2. See Chapter 8 by Isaline Bergamaschi in this volume; Bruno Charbonneau and Jonathan Sears, ÂDefending Neoliberal Mali: French Military Intervention and the Management of Contested Political NarrativesÊ, in Florian Kühn and Mandy Turner (eds.), Where Has All the Peace Gone? The Politics of International Intervention, London: Routledge, 2014. 3. On French security and defence policy in Africa, see Bruno Charbonneau, France and the New Imperialism: Security Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2008; Raphaël Granvaud, Que fait lÊarmée française en Afrique? Marseille: Agone, 2009. 4. France-Sénat, Rapport dÊinformation sur la gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne, Paris: Commission des Affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées, No. 450, 2006. 5. France-Sénat. 2011. Rapport dÊinformation fait au nom de la commission des affaires étrangères, de la défense et des forces armées (1) sur la politique africaine de la France, Paris: Sénat, No. 324, 28 February, p. 5. 6. I draw on Saskia SassenÊs conceptualization of change in Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (updated ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006. I expand on this argument in Bruno Charbonneau, ÂThe Imperial Legacy of International Peacebuilding: The Case of Francophone AfricaÊ, Review of International Studies, Vol. 40, forthcoming, 2014. 7. I write ÂarguablyÊ because Resolution 1975 did not call for regime change per se but authorized Âall necessary meansÊ to protect civilians. 8. See Bruno Charbonneau, ÂWar and Peace in Côte dÊIvoire: Violence, Agency, and the Local/International LineÊ, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2012, pp. 508 524. 9. Jean-Pierre Chauveau and Jean-Pierre Dozon, ÂEthnies et État en Côte dÊIvoireÊ, Revue française de science politique, Vol. 38, No. 5, 1988, p. 745. 10. Samir Amin, Le développement du capitalisme en Côte dÊIvoire (2nd ed.), Paris: Minuit, 1973. 11. Peter Schwab, Designing West Africa: Prelude to 21st-Century Calamity, New York: Palgrave, 2004, p. 54. 12. Bonnie Campbell, ÂPolitical Dimensions of the Adjustment Experience of Côte dÊIvoireÊ, in Eleanor MacDonald (ed.), Critical Political Studies, Montreal: McGillQueenÊs University Press, 2002. 13. Mike McGovern, Making War in Côte dÊIvoire, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011, p. 131.

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International intervention in Côte dÊIvoire 135 14. In fact, based upon my field research in both countries, Ivorian political actors might know the French better than the French know Ivorians, generally speaking. Ivorian political actors have more often than not a sophisticated understanding of French politics and institutions and thus a firm knowledge of the limits and possibilities of French intervention in their country. 15. Jean-Pierre Bat, Le syndrome Foccart: La politique française en Afrique, de 1959 à nos jours, Paris: Gallimard, 2012, p. 639. 16. To understand the Ivorian conflict, two books, written from distinct perspectives, offer a good introduction: Christian Bouquet, Géopolitique de la Côte dÊIvoire, Paris: Armand Colin, 2005, and McGovern (see n. 13). 17. Interview with the author, retired French military high-ranking officer in Abidjan, 30 November 2012. 18. Stephen Smith, ÂLa politique dÊengagement de la France à lÊépreuve de la Côte dÊIvoireÊ [FranceÊs policy of engagement tested in Côte dÊIvoire], Politique africaine, Vol. 89, March 2003, pp. 119 120. 19. Assemblée nationale, France, ÂCommission de la Défense nationale et des Forces armées, Compte renduÊ [National Defence and Armed Forces Committee Report], No. 26, 21 January 2003. 20. Jeremy Allouche and Patrick Anderson Zadi Zadi, ÂThe Dynamics of Restraint in Côte dÊIvoireÊ, IDS Bulletin, Vol. 44, No. 1 (2013), p. 3. 21. Smith (see n. 18). 22. Bruno Charbonneau, ÂDreams of Empire: France, Europe, and the New Interventionism in AfricaÊ, Modern & Contemporary France, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2008, pp. 279 295. 23. Giulia Piccolino, ÂDavid Against Goliath in Côte dÊIvoire? Laurent GbagboÊs War Against Global GovernanceÊ, African Affairs, Vol. 111, No. 442, 2012, pp. 1 23. 24. Human Rights Watch wrote a report on these three days of war and concluded that, most likely, French soldiers reacted poorly to the crowd and fired out of fear. Amnesty International, Côte dÊIvoire. Clashes Between Peacekeeping Forces and Civilians: Lessons for the Future, 2006 (at: www.amnesty.org]. 25. It is interesting to note that the UN became concerned with the Ivorian crisis relatively late. The first official document coming out of the UN Security Council was Resolution 1464 on 4 February 2003. 26. International Crisis Group, Côte dÊIvoire: faut-il croire à lÊaccord de Ouagadougou? [Côte dÊIvoire: Should we believe in the Ouagadougou Accord?], Dakar/Brussels: Rapport Afrique, No.127, 2007. 27. McGovern, (see n. 13), pp. 116 and 197. 28. ÂUN Chief Warns of ÂReal RiskÊ of Ivory Coast Civil WarÊ, BBC News, 22 December 2010 (at: www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12056444). 29. See Rita Abrahamsen, Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa, London: Zed Books, 2000. 30. Mike McGovern, ÂThe Ivorian EndgameÊ, Foreign Affairs, 14 April 2011 (at: www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/67728/mike-mcgovern/the-ivorian-endgame?page=show). 31. Before 2007, Ouattara was legally prohibited from running in the presidential election. The Ouagadougou Accords included a clause that allowed him to run. 32. Thomas Bassett and Scott Straus, ÂDefending Democracy in Côte dÊIvoireÊ, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 4, 2011, pp. 130 140. 33. See Charbonneau (see n. 8); Vincent Darracq, ÂJeux de puissance en Afrique: Le Nigeria et lÊAfrique du Sud face à la crise ivoirienneÊ, Politique Étrangère, Vol. 2, Summer 2011, pp. 361 374. 34. Cynthia Weber, ÂReconsidering Statehood: Examining the Sovereignty/Intervention BoundaryÊ, Review of International Studies, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1992, pp. 207 212. 35. Charbonneau (see n. 3). 36. Charbonneau (see n. 6).

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37. See UN Security Council, Twenty-Seventh Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte dÊIvoire, UN doc. S/2011/211, 30 Mar. 2011. 38. Ouattara was surely aware of this timing and most likely used it to his advantage. On the same day that he created the FRCI on 17 March, the UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) authorized the use of force in Libya. 39. Alex Bellamy and Paul Williams, ÂThe New Politics of Protection? Côte dÊIvoire, Libya and the Responsibility to ProtectÊ, International Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 4, 2011, pp. 828 829. 40. Lettre du Continent, 7 July 2011. 41. Peace and Security Council of the African Union, ÂCommuniquéÊ, 265th Meeting, Addis Ababa, 10 March 2011. 42. ÂCôte dÊIvoire: Laurent Gbagbo lâché par lÊAngola?Ê [Côte dÊIvoire: Laurent Gbagbo abandoned by Angola?], Jeune Afrique, 23 March 2011. 43. Interviews by the author, Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes in Paris, April May 2011. 44. Leslie Varenne, Abobo la guerre: Côte dÊIvoire, terrain de jeu de la France et de lÊONU, Paris: Éditions Mille et une nuits, 2012, p. 85. 45. Moussa Fofana, ÂDes Forces Nouvelles aux Forces républicaines de Côte dÊIvoireÊ [From New Forces to Republican Forces in Côte dÊIvoire], Politique africaine, Vol. 122, June 2011, pp. 161 178. 46. See Christophe Boisbouvier, ÂCôte dÊIvoire: Les secrets dÊune offensive éclairÊ [Côte dÊIvoire: Secrets of a blitzkrieg], Jeune Afrique, 8 April 2011. 47. UN Security Council, Resolution 1975, UN doc. S/Res/1975, 30 Mar. 2011. Except for the emphasis on Âheavy weapons against the civilian populationÊ, Resolution 1975 was simply reiterating the Chapter VII mandate. 48. Brazil, China, India, and Russia had a more restrictive interpretation, emphasizing the neutrality of peacekeepers. See Bellamy and Williams, (see n. 39), pp. 835 837. 49. See Oliver Richmond, The Transformation of Peace, New York: Palgrave, 2005. 50. Charbonneau (see n. 6). 51. It would be important to analyze how regime change imposed limits to the postconflict peace and peacebuilding efforts. I could not do so here, for lack of space, but I do in ÂCôte dÊIvoire: Les possibilités et limites dÊune réconciliationÊ, Afrique Contemporaine, Vol. 245, No. 1, 2013, pp. 109 129.

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8

The French military intervention in Mali Not exactly Françafrique but definitely postcolonial1 Isaline Bergamaschi with Mahamadou Diawara

On 21 March 2012, a modest group of disaffected soldiers, led by Captain Sanogo, improvised a coup and toppled President Amadou Toumani Touré (known as ATT). The coup was a backlash against the governmentÊs ÂweakÊ management of the crisis in the north of the country and Âcivilian mismanagementÊ. In addition, the country was effectively broken into two. Armed groups led by the Tuareg National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA), allied with Islamist elements such as Ansar Eddine, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), had already defeated the army on several occasions since late 2011. In the aftermath of the coup, the NMLA took advantage of the opportunity to expand its control of Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu. They declared the independence of Azawad on 6 April before being defeated and sidelined by their former Islamist allies in most conquered sites. In Bamako, power was transferred to an interim civilian government, but the political situation remained unstable over the following months. On 11 January 2013, after new clashes between the army and insurgent groups, French President François Hollande announced the launching of the military Operation Serval. It was led by about 4,000 French troops supported by 2,000 Chadians and implemented in coordination with the Malian army. It was spectacularly quick in chasing the Islamists from cities and later from the mountains of Adrar. An African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) was set up with about 5,000 troops originating mostly from Niger, Nigeria, Togo, and Senegal. Ibrahim Boubakar Keïta (commonly known as IBK in Mali) was elected president in August. On 19 September 2013, President Hollande declared that French forces would Âstay as long as the threat existsÊ2 but announced a decrease in the number of troops to 1,000 by January 2014.3 This chapter raises the following questions. What is specific about this military operation? In particular, how can we explain the fact that, unlike previous French interventions in Africa (most recently in Côte dÊIvoire, Chad, or Libya), Serval has very seldom been accused of neocolonialism internationally and, in addition, has been rather popular in Mali? The argument presented here is twofold. On the one hand, it argues that this intervention cannot be approached only through the lens of Françafrique. On the other hand, however, it claims that Serval can and

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must be understood as a postcolonial intervention inherently specific to the African francophone space. The chapter is divided into four sections. Section one shows from a historical point of view that Mali has never been a model country within the French pré carré (i.e., privileged sphere of influence). Section two assesses the immediate drivers of intervention and French interests in the country and argues that the intervention finds its roots in the postcolonial context of France-Mali relations. The third section claims that Serval was a unilateral operation whose international legality is doubtful. The last section describes how its justification and legitimacy were framed within a specifically postcolonial framework. The chapter draws on the authorÊs doctoral research on international aid in Mali. After the 2012 coup, about 50 semidirected interviews with Malian civil servants, United Nations (UN) staff, former development project managers in Northern Mali, technical assistants, donor agency representatives, and practitioners close to Serval4 were undertaken by phone, via Skype, or in person during two fieldwork trips to Bamako (four weeks in total) in June and September 2013. Last but not least, the chapter builds on a qualitative opinion survey with 17 inhabitants of Bamako carried out by Malian political scientist Mahamadou Diawara in April 2013 as part of a collaborative research project with the author.5

Beyond Françafrique: Mali–France relationships over the longue durée Mali has never been a paragon of Françafrique. Ivoirian President HouphouëtBoigny allegedly coined the expression France-Afrique in order to emphasize the special relationship between France and Francophone African states after independence. Later, NGOs and activists (such as the Paris-based association Survie) used the expression Françafrique to denounce a nebula of economic, political, and military actors, in France and in Africa, who organized in networks and lobbies and who were often argued to be hostile to democracy, to evoke familiarity tending towards private interests, and to turn to criminal activities at times.6 The term implies the neocolonial characteristics of France Africa relations. Contrary to other former colonies such as Gabon, Togo, or Côte dÊIvoire, Malian politics have not been marked by permanent fusion with and co-optation by French elites or by the prevalence of mafia-like networks. The important analytical and reflexive work undertaken by a team of Malian and French researchers7 has established that MaliÊs relationships with France have been uninterrupted but tense over the past decades. Because it was landlocked and deprived of significant natural resources, the French Sudan was never considered the jewel of the French empire, and it has not been a major beneficiary of the colonial division of labour.8 Interests and investments were concentrated in cotton farming (which served to fuel the development of the French textile industry) and in an irrigation project at the Office du Niger. Later, the French Sudan played a key role in the anticolonial struggle, in the form

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French military intervention in Mali 139 of large protests organized by labour movements such as the strike of railway workers on the Dakar-Niger train line in 1947 and the consolidation of the Sudanese Union African Democratic Rally, a regional mass political party influenced by communist ideas.9 On 22 September 1960, Mali unilaterally declared its independence and its Âfreedom from all engagementsÊ with France, thus displaying the most radical posture towards Paris aside from GuineaÊs Sekou Touré.10 In August, the early and rapid collapse of the Mali Federation, a pan-African union with present-day Senegal, was seen as a humiliating experience. France was deemed responsible for the so-called balkanization of the francophone space, and Mali was seen as the main ÂloserÊ in this process.11 MaliÊs first president, Modibo Keïta, was a teacher who, contrary to Houphouët-Boigny or Senghor (Senegal), had not been trained in Paris but exclusively in Dakar. His policies were inspired by pan-Africanism, national pride and Âextreme nationalismÊ, the countryÊs great imperial past, and an idealized vision of international relations.12 Unlike most French-speaking countries, Mali did not join the various monetary, economic, political, and military arrangements established by Paris. The Malian franc was created in 1962, and French military bases were evacuated. Street names were systematically ÂdecolonizedÊ and colonial statues destroyed. The Malian government sought to develop closer ties with the Soviet Union. President Keïta started a Âdiplomatic slalomÊ between the two blocs aimed at improving MaliÊs international positioning.13 In reaction, France built on its alliances with MaliÊs neighbours to sabotage rural socialism and impede the emergence of a Soviet-like economy.14 MaliÊs ambitious and assertive strategy collapsed quickly Keïta was toppled by a coup in 1968 but it deeply marked the modalities and imaginaries of MaliÊs insertion into the world.15 Although demonizing France provided an important source of support for the new regime, relations were never interrupted.16 Paris supported MaliÊs entry into the UN. Presidents Charles de Gaulle and Modibo Keïta met in France in September 1960. During the visit of Minister Malraux in May 1961, Malian authorities stated that they were in favour of reforming rather than completely breaking off, relations.17 With the military junta in 1968, France made a comeback into Malian politics.18 More importantly, early economic difficulties forced Malian leaders to ask for French help. In June 1963, an advance account was created at the French treasury,19 In 1964, the Malian government asked the Banque de France to guarantee the Malian franc under the condition that French monetary authorities would not influence the emission of the national currency. The withdrawal of three billion Malian francs from the market, carried out with French support, provided ÂoxygenÊ for the economy.20 With the devaluation (50%) of the Malian franc in 1967, the treasury was placed under the protection and control of France.21 In the face of increasing deficits, Mali had to sign monetary cooperation agreements in 1967 and accept conditionalities related to the implementation of structural reforms such as the suppression of the collective land system in exchange for increased aid. President Giscard made the

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first French official visit to Mali in 1977.22 Mali joined the CFA franc zone in 1984 after tense negotiations, and France became MaliÊs first trading partner.23 At the same time, however, the junta in power preserved close relations with the USSR and the PeopleÊs Republic of China, reinforced its collaboration with Dakar, and developed ties with oil-producing countries, thus maintaining some diversity in MaliÊs foreign policy.24 After the mid-1980s, the influence of international financial institutions grew as a consequence of debt restructuring and structural adjustment.25 The government of Mali signed its first agreements with the International Monetary Fund in 1987. President Mitterrand condemned Moussa TraoréÊs increasingly repressive military regime at the Franco-African summit held in La Baule in 1990.26 Cooperation with France deepened with MaliÊs democratic transition in the early 1990s. France provided development assistance, military cooperation through the programme for the Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities (RECAMP: Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix), and institutional support to the state and decentralization.27 France also praised and promoted the Malian ÂmodelÊ of democracy and stability.28 MaliÊs relations with the former metropolis became even more normalized under the effect of economic globalization, FranceÊs partial disengagement, the relative Europeanization of its African policy as well as the increasing insertion of Malian diplomacy into the regional framework of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).29 Trade arrangements and preferences aimed at preserving AfricaÊs special status and reducing asymmetries between Europe and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (known as the Lomé and Cotonou Agreements) were removed from the new framework of Economic Partnership Agreements, which gives priority to market rules.30 In the past two decades, French authorities have increasingly complied with the World BankÊs and the International Monetary FundÊs neoliberal recommendations, especially in the strategic cotton sector.31 Over time, however, Ârelations have survived every crisisÊ.32 Despite ideological shifts and regime change in Mali, France has ranked second among MaliÊs aid donors, preceded only by the USSR in the 1960s and by the European Union in the 2000s.33 Mali and France have kept strong ties through technical assistance, private sector investments, cultural and decentralized cooperation, and the presence of the Malian diaspora in France (an estimated 120,000 people), notably in the city of Montreuil, near Paris. In the past years, communication at the highest level has deteriorated. President SarkozyÊs controversial speech in Dakar in 2007, which stated that Africans Âhad not yet entered into HistoryÊ, created turmoil and indignation amongst the Malian intelligentsia. In reaction, Adame Ba Konaré, a Malian historian and writer, edited a history book to improve the presidentÊs knowledge about AfricaÊs history.34 In addition, Nicolas Sarkozy insisted that Mali sign restrictive immigration agreements, a demand that President Touré rejected on the grounds that it was too sensitive politically. Indeed, many inhabitants of the western city of Kayes depend on migrant remittances. Visa denials and restrictions for Malians have poisoned Malian-French diplomatic relations since 2008.

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French military intervention in Mali 141 MaliÊs early search for autonomy avoided the most obvious workings of Françafrique. As Stephen Smith argued: First, there hasnÊt been a big man with deep pockets in Bamako since 1991 . . . Second, the vast majority of the six thousand foreign passport holders who have remained in Mali despite the coup dÊétat are dual nationals, FrancoMalians for the most part. Third, what natural resources exist mainly cotton and gold are not in French hands.35 Mali has had a military cooperation accord with France since 1985 but, contrary to most former colonies, never hosted a French military base and has not entered defence agreements.36 The first troops to set foot in Mali on January 10 11 came from French military bases in Chad.

Assessing the drivers of intervention and French interests in Mali It would be difficult to argue that France rushed to Mali in 2013 in order to secure immediate economic benefits. French firms are already present in the sectors of public construction (Bouygues), in the transportation of commodities (Bolloré Africa Logistics), in the transfer of information and communication technologies (Orange) and the financial sector (BNP-Paribas).37 The new potential economic gain that could result from Serval is related to oil in the north of the country. The presence of oil resources has been suspected for a long time but never clearly and formally established. In August 2013, authorities decided to grant exploration permits to multinational firms in the basin of Taoudeni.38 But prospects for extraction remain uncertain and are not expected to materialize in the short term. Profit and market opportunities for Western businesses could emerge for example, in the form of road construction if the large-scale, long promised plan for the development of the North were to be launched. In the French geopolitical analysis of the region, the most significant strategic interest is situated not in Mali but hundreds of kilometres away from its borders. Areva, FranceÊs giant nuclear power company, extracts 30% of its uranium from neighbouring Niger. While Nigerien authorities have announced that they will renegotiate the ÂunbalancedÊ contracts with Areva in search of better terms,39 ensuring the security of activities and personnel has been increasingly difficult in the past years, as illustrated by the kidnapping of four staff in 2010. Together with these strictly economic considerations, the beliefs and worldviews shared in French circles also seem to have played a role. The intervention was partly justified in the context of the war on terror.40 This is not necessarily an indication that French political leaders and diplomats had deeply appropriated this pillar of US foreign policy under the presidency of George W. Bush after the 11 September 2001 attacks. However, it is true that French policymakers increasingly felt that considerable security challenges were looming in the Sahel.

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In Paris, dominant interpretations about the events that occurred in Mali in early January 2013 were very alarming and played a determining role in the launching of Serval. On 21 December 2012, the UN adopted Resolution 2085, which allowed the deployment of an African force in Mali. But Romano Prodi, the UN secretarygeneralÊs envoy for the Sahelian crisis, warned that African troops would not be prepared logistically until September 2013. Ansar Eddine felt empowered and subsequently attacked army bases in Konna on 9 January 2013, thus crossing the line between the zones under their control and the southern zones controlled by the government established in April 2012. From there, they threatened to attack the strategic military airport of Sevaré where they vowed to perform their Friday prayer just two days later and the city of Mopti. Bamako was shaken by large-scale marches and demands for the organization of the continuously postponed concertations nationales (national consultations). Meanwhile, French intelligence services claimed to have detected intense communication between Konna and Bamako. They believed that terrorists had infiltrated the capital and were negotiating a potential alliance with Sanogo and/or other sociopolitical actors close to the Coalition of Patriotic Organisations of Mali (COPAM, the pro-putsch coalition formed in March) or Bamako-based Salafist imams like Dicko, the head of the High Islamic Council, who had volunteered to lead discussions with Islamist armed groups in 2012. French policymakers felt that ÂBlack flags were at the doors of BamakoÊ and that Islamist groups and the military were willing to set up a new Republic of Mali where drug trafficking and religious extremism could flourish. As argued by Marchal, this vision of things may not be based on an accurate assessment of Islamist intentions or of the potential resistance by ordinary citizens.41 Nevertheless, it surely fuelled the widespread belief that something needed to be done at all costs to prevent the Sahel from becoming a safe haven for terrorists, given its location just three hours away from Spain and five hours from Paris. Contrary to many of his predecessors, Hollande does not belong to an African network and has kept the traditional „Big men‰ of Françafrique at a distance. In this context, some of his friends amongst high-ranking military staffers like General Benoît Puga or the Ministry of Defense Le Drian have weighted on the presidentÊs decisions.42 For Roland Marchal, the demands and pressure of African presidents in early 2013, including the interim authorities in Bamako, ECOWAS members, and the president of Niger, also prompted France to intervene quickly.43 The intervention served other interests and beliefs concerning FranceÊs international status. Indeed, intervening in Mali was perceived as providing an opportunity for France to Âhonour its international obligationsÊ. Since the country no longer plays a major global role in terms of population and economics, leaders and diplomats consider that acting for stability in Africa remains a key tool to defend the French seat at the UN Security Council, which they feel is being threatened by the calls for reform and proactive diplomacies of emerging countries like Brazil. Serval also allowed France to demonstrate its will to contribute its share in, and to take responsibility for, dealing with global terrorism in its sphere of influence. During a speech delivered to Serval troops in Bamako in September 2013,

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French military intervention in Mali 143 Hollande stated that it is thanks to its army that France enjoyed Âsovereignty, independence . . ., credibilityÊ, influence and rayonnement (reach).44 Finally, French authorities arguably seized the moment to send a message domestically to its armed forces, namely that, despite the armyÊs professionalization and recent cuts in the budget of the Ministry of Defense, ÂFrance still has an armyÊ and, in particular, the vocation and practical means to intervene on the African continent.45 North Africa and the Sahel were identified as a Âkey geographic priorityÊ in FranceÊs 2013 White Paper on Defence and National Security.

Operation Serval: A bilateral operation behind a multilateral façade Journalists have argued that military intervention plans in the Sahel had been in preparation by the French military years prior to the Serval operation.46 France had tried to promote the case for a multilateral intervention since 2010 but repeatedly failed to provide the evidence needed to convince their European and American counterparts.47 In 2012, the French tried to multilateralize the management of the Malian crisis in Brussels and New York. Diplomats lobbied to keep the issue high on the agenda and overcome initial US scepticism, and they took the lead in discussions that led to the adoption of UN Resolution 2085. Hollande declared in an interview on 12 November 2012 that ÂFrance will in no case intervene in Mali by itselfÊ on the grounds that France Âtrusts, and respects AfricansÊ, who must make decisions concerning their own development and security. Minister of Foreign Affairs Laurent Fabius added that France would Ânot be on the frontlineÊ or Âsend troops on the groundÊ. Africans would make Âdecisions and take actionÊ while France would act as a facilitator and, Âtogether with other countriesÊ, provide support.48 Yet, ultimately, FranceÊs decision to intervene was unilateral. From a legal perspective, the French justified their intervention in virtue of Article 51 of the UN Charter, that is, the principle of legitimate defence which, according to international law, has so far been applied to member states only in cases of Âarmed attack by another StateÊ.49 Secondly, after the arrival of troops in Sévaré, French officials worked hard to make the case for an interpretation of UN Resolution 2085 that conceived of the action as conducted Âstrictly within the framework of the United Nations Security Council resolutionsÊ.50 This is ambiguous because, on 21 December 2012, the UN had unanimously authorized, under Chapter VII of the Charter, the deployment of Âan African-led missionÊ whose task was to Âsupport efforts by national authorities to recover the northÊ (emphasis by the author). Thirdly, French authorities emphasized the legality of the intervention based on consent between the parties involved, backed by a written request by Mali Interim President Diacounda Traoré. This point seems particularly crucial because Resolution 2085 made the deployment of the African force conditional on the Âfull respect of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of MaliÊ. A caveat to this French

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claim could be made, however, because President Traoré was the head of an interim and not a democratically elected government when he asked for FranceÊs help.51 Hadzi-Vidanovic of the European Court of Human Rights added that Âonce the internal disturbances evolve into an internal armed conflict in which an organised rebel armed group controls a significant portion of a stateÊs territory . . ., foreign states cannot intervene by the invitation of any side of such conflictÊ.52 In short, France tried to build on three Âseparate, mutually reinforcing legal groundsÊ, which are fundamentally flawed.53 The French intervention was approved post hoc by ECOWAS, the African Union, most African heads of state, and the UN Security Council. Among the broader international community, the operationÊs legality was not questioned and the intervention very little criticized. However, the lack of concrete (human, material, financial) backing provided by European countries immediately after the launch of Serval illustrated the absence of consensus within the European Union concerning security issues in the Sahel and/or some implicit disapproval of the French move. The genesis of Serval is a good illustration of the French doctrine and practices towards the African francophone space. Since the 1990s, France has promised to normalize its relations with its former colonies. In this context, UN mandates or multilateral support are sought in order to avoid accusations of neocolonialism.54 Paris has also emphasized that Africans should assume a leadership role and take responsibility for security matters, a doctrine encapsulated in the phrases ÂAfrican solutions to African problemsÊ or the Âafricanization of conflict managementÊ. However, it is also clear that if a partner country in the pré carré asks for support to cope with an emergency situation, and if multilateral organizations are not deemed to be responsive, supportive, or efficient enough, Paris considers it has a right to intervene on a unilateral basis.

A postcolonial intervention specific to the Francophone space Feelings of national pride and nationalism, nurtured by the countryÊs imperial past and emancipatory foreign policy at the time of independence, are common in Mali. In addition, the junta had rejected the idea of an external intervention throughout 2012. Their prosovereignty arguments and promotion of noninterference resonated with the population. On 29 March, protesters on the tarmac prevented the plane of an ECOWAS delegation from landing at Bamako airport. In December, interim Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarrah was deposed by SanogoÊs men after he had invited all the actors willing to contribute to restoring MaliÊs territorial integrity to get involved (in September) and discussed possibilities of an international intervention with ECOWAS and Chad President Idriss Déby. Sanogo accepted the principle of an African-led intervention only under strict conditions. The number and role of ECOWAS troops would be limited. They would provide logistical support as well as military training and assistance, especially through air forces. Soldiers would not be posted to protect interim authorities in Bamako. In other words, the Malian army would stay in control of all operations.55

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French military intervention in Mali 145 However, only weeks later, popular support for the French intervention was high in Mali. Opinion polls over the period are scarce and limited in scope, but available data and field observations show that the majority of Malians truly welcomed the French troops. Ninety-seven per cent of those consulted in the poll conducted by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in February 2013 approved of the French intervention.56 An online survey published by Al Jazeera showed comparable results.57 The very few criticisms expressed publicly stemmed from personalities closed to the COPAM. For instance, writer and activist Aminata Traoré linked Serval to her previous denunciations of Western imperialism, FranceÊs neocolonialism58 and neoliberal globalization. Between mid-January and mid-February 2013, the international media were saturated by images of Malian people waving French flags and welcoming soldiers. This led Niger President Mahamadou Issoufou to assert that, Âin the eyes of AfricansÊ, Serval was Âthe most popular of all military interventions everÊ.59 How can we account for this shift in public opinion and for the interventionÊs popularity? On the one hand, it is crucial to recall that the intervention followed a multidimensional crisis in the country. In early January 2013, the majority felt that the countryÊs integrity and existence were at stake and that the latest developments could lead to Âthe end of MaliÊ. Specifically, armed groups were willing and able to take control of Mopti, Segou, and then Bamako and establish Islamic rule over the country. For many citizens, the Konna attacks were a shock even greater than the previous occupation of the north because they felt that the threat was real, including for the inhabitants of the South.60 Authorities believed and argued that if the rebels breached the de facto border between zones under government control and ÂoccupiedÊ zones, they would then face few obstacles should they decide to head towards Bamako because it takes three days to go from Mopti to Bamako on the Niger river. The army had shown several times its inability to resist, and once again it was retreating from combat. The very existence of the Malian Republic and its laïcité (the strict separation between religion and politics) were perceived to be at risk. In early January 2013, rumours that another coup this time against interim President Diacounda Traoré was under preparation were rampant. Throughout 2012, ordinary citizens had felt betrayed by their political leaders, in particular ATT, who enjoyed very little support when he was toppled by the coup in March and, more broadly, by the political class since democratic transition. Party leaders were suspected of protecting their selfish interests in the midst of crisis.61 Different segments of the population (tourist guides, civil servants, house renters, and housekeepers, owners, and employees of restaurants and hotels) were directly affected and exhausted morally and financially by almost one year of crisis, uncertainty, and the economic slowdown that followed the suspension of most international aid, tourism activities, and public construction. Independently of their opinion about the coup and subsequent events, many had felt humiliated by their countryÊs breakdown. After the armyÊs repeated defeats against insurgent attacks, they did not trust domestic abilities to protect them and their country and hence resigned themselves to accept external interference. Mr Keïta, a taxi driver

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in Bamako, explained in June 2013 that when oneÊs mother fails, it is normal for the child to Âask their grandmother for assistanceÊ. Ordinary citizens and rulers displayed a sort of pragmatic nationalism aimed at tolerating a temporary breach of national sovereignty. Interim authorities framed the French military intervention as inevitable, the only option and the least bad scenario. They justified it on behalf of national sovereignty, unity, and Âterritorial integrityÊ. On the other hand, in a highly ambiguous and paradoxical way, the fact that the French led the operation facilitated its acceptance by Malian interim authorities and citizens. Indeed, the colonial past and postcolonial relationships between France and Mali were used as symbolic resources by the French to justify their intervention and for ordinary Malians to think of Serval in the best and most acceptable way possible. During a speech delivered in BamakoÊs Independence Square on 2 February 2013, the French president said: ÂI remember that when France was attacked, when she was looking for assistance and allies, when she was threatened, when her territorial unity was at stake, who came to support her then? Africa did, Mali did, thanks to Mali. Today we are paying our debt to MaliÊ.62 During the investiture ceremony of MaliÊs new president in September 2013, both Hollande and IBK mentioned that IBKÊs grandfather had died near Verdun in 1916, fighting under the French flag during World War I. Presenting the intervention as a repayment of FranceÊs historical debt towards Mali was instrumental in framing it within a more acceptable framework of gift and countergift between states and peoples. Moreover, the colonial past played a role in shaping popular perceptions about Operation Serval. Some of the persons interviewed by Diawara in Bamako in April 2013 considered that France had the moral and political obligation to accept and honour President TraoréÊs request for intervention. For instance, a mason stated that ÂFrance must help us because France colonised us. France must help us because we are not an Anglophone country, we are a francophone countryÊ. An electrician added that ÂFrance ought to intervene because . . . we are a French colonyÊ (emphasis added). Some interviewees recognized that the United States had the capacity to intervene too but that Âwe are under the tutelage of FranceÊ or that ÂFrance is our friend and sisterÊ. One accountant insisted that ÂFrance has always been MaliÊs main development partnerÊ and that the military operation should be viewed in terms of the continuity of this historical partnership.63 For some of them, the French intervention was a recognition of MaliÊs and AfricaÊs support for France during World War II. An electrician added that Âwithout Mali, France was nothing thenÊ.64 Interviewees finally believed that France intervened on behalf of its own interests, that is, human rights and the elimination of jihadist fighters, the rescue of French hostages held in the Sahel, the prospect of setting up a military base in Tessalit, uranium in Niger, and oil. But most of them did not blame France for pursuing its interests. Were it not for Serval, Mali would surely have lost control over its northern regions.65 In his February 2013 speech, François Hollande finally claimed to put an end to Françafrique while promising reconciliation between the two countries. For

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French military intervention in Mali 147 many Malians, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy was partly responsible for MaliÊs 2012 crisis.66 They reproached him for the military intervention that toppled colonel Gadhafi in Libya (under UN Resolution 1973) in 2011 and his lack of consideration for the side effects of such an operation for Mali. The ousting of Gadhafi is believed to have empowered northern insurgent groups in the Sahel; many well equipped and well trained Malian mercenaries joined armed groups (Tuareg and Islamist) upon their return. This, in turn, has provoked a new wave of violence. Hollande was truly popular in Bamako in September 2013. Many perceived that he had closed the Sarkozy era and were confident that ÂFrance is on MaliÊs side nowÊ.67 Interestingly, the first harsh criticisms formulated in Mali against the French intervention, which emerged in April May 2013, were also deeply entrenched in a postcolonial framework. After the liberation of most northern cities, the Malian army regained control over the village of Anefis from the NMLA on 5 September 2013. But the French allegedly stopped their progression towards Kidal the city that is most isolated from the rest of the country, where all Tuareg rebellions originated, and where rebel movements arguably enjoy greater support and popularity. During the following weeks, Kidal came to symbolize the last site where the authority and sovereignty of the Malian state could not be exerted, crystalizing all national frustrations. The numerous French flags deployed in Bamako in January were taken down at this time.68 Until then, the NMLA had asked that Malian soldiers not to enter the city before a political solution with Bamako could be found. The NMLA furthermore feared that soldiers might seek revenge against them and commit abuses against civilian Tuareg populations. The French negotiated directly with Tuareg leaders the conditions under which 150 Malian troops would enter in Kidal (early July), but the delay created a great deal of suspicion throughout the country. The French counterargued that UN resolution 2085 (under which they justified Serval) did not include provisions for solving a domestic problem or crushing the Tuareg rebellion. They furthermore claimed that the long-standing northern issue could not be addressed through violent and military responses but rather called for a sustainable, political solution and that their contingent was concerned about the civilian population. It is furthermore probable that they could not assume the political costs associated with human rights violations or illegal killings that would be listed by international NGOs. On the Malian side, the criticisms against Serval built on suspicions whose deep and old roots are found in the colonial moment. Historian Pierre Boilley has shown that the perception that French authorities support Tuareg rebellions dates back to the immediate postindependence period. Between 1957 and 1962, the French had promoted the creation of a Common Organisation of the Saharan Regions [Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes (OCRS)], which would unite the South of Algeria, Mauritania, and the northern parts of presentday Mali, Niger, and Chad for administrative purposes. This project aimed at preserving French control over the area. It also partially suited the will of the Tuareg, who considered that their interests were different from those of Black Malians69 and who were reluctant to be governed by the latter.70

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The first independent government accused the French military of developing complicities with Tuareg leaders during the first wave of rebellion in the country in the early 1960s. This idea became more widespread during the drought and famine of the 1970s and 1980s, when French nongovernmental organizations and artists raised funds to send humanitarian assistance to the north. Concomitantly, they accused the Bamako-based government of embezzling aid funds at the expense of northern populations.71 Following the most recent waves of violence, some civil servants and citizens in Bamako believed that the French remained fascinated by the Tuaregs and that the NMLA had an influential lobby capable of promoting their vision of the conflict in Paris and manipulating external actors to their advantage.

Conclusion This chapter has shown that the genesis, dynamics, and effects of the French intervention in Mali cannot be analysed only through the lens of Françafrique. It also argued that French interests in Mali may not be primarily economic and that other cognitive and political factors acted as powerful drivers for intervention in early 2013. Last but not least, the chapter claimed that Serval must be understood within a postcolonial logic and framework because it was unilateral and drew on the colonial and postcolonial relations between France and Mali. Serval served to compensate for FranceÊs perceived original responsibility in the aggravation of conflict and temporarily strengthened the ties between the two countries and peoples. The political interactions between the actors involved (heads of state, soldiers, ordinary citizens) and the effects of this military intervention cannot be reduced to accusations of neocolonialism or an expression of French domination over weak or manipulated Malians. The mise-en-scène and symbolic renegotiations of Malian French relationships produced by Serval may have lasting implications for both countries. However, this apparent rapprochement is, like Malian French relations since independence, inherently ambivalent and volatile, as illustrated by the harsh criticisms formulated against the possibilities of an external intervention in the spring of 2013. The humiliation felt by Malians has been very strong, and as the operation continues, anti-French feelings could arise. France pushed for presidential elections to be organized as early as July 2013. Its objective was to reinforce power and leadership in Bamako, support the legitimacy of the government, give voice and weight to the south of Mali, as well as to prove that its intervention had indeed restored democracy after the coup dÊétat. In addition, the organization of free and fair elections was a prerequisite of most embassies and cooperation agencies to unblock international aid, thus creating a financial incentive for political leaders and civil servants.72 As doubts about the possibility of organizing the elections in good conditions were rising, Hollande insisted in May 2013 that this calendar was not negotiable. French pressure triggered some criticisms in Mali due to all the political and logistical obstacles related to this strict timing. However, criticisms faded as the election

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French military intervention in Mali 149 was deemed to have been overall satisfactory by international observers and took place without major security incidents despite many organizational weaknesses. The first round reached record participation rates (over 48%) in a country where participation has been typically low since democratization. The victory of IBK was clear-cut: he got an estimated 77% of the vote in the second round. His main opponent, Soumaïla Cissé, recognizing his defeat, congratulated and visited IBK on 12 August, that is, before the release of official results by MaliÊs Constitutional Court. MaliÊs new President Ibrahim Boubakar Keïta and François Hollande became close friends after Hollande became first secretary of the French socialist party (1997) and IBK was appointed vice president of the Socialist International (1999). These personal and ideological ties ensure a high degree of proximity between the French government and MaliÊs new rulers. During IBKÊs investiture ceremony in September, some inhabitants of Bamako hoped that French and Malian authorities could find common ground and shared interests and that they would not ÂbetrayÊ them as previous politicians did. They also hoped that the cost of intervention would not be too high for Mali, and they were determined to hold IBK, who campaigned on the slogan ÂMali firstÊ and on the values of national honour and pride, accountable for his electoral promises. The drawbacks and potential perverse effects of the French intervention in Mali are becoming apparent.73 Northern Mali remains plagued by limited but enduring insecurity and tensions. On 26 September, the NMLA announced that the movement had left the committee for the monitoring of the Ouagadougou accords. Civilians suffer frequent pillage and criminal attacks, especially on markets days. AQIM claimed responsibility for a suicide bomb attack in Timbuktu on 28 September. On 7 October, MOJWA militants carried out four attacks in Gao. The movementÊs spokesperson declared that the attacks had targeted ÂmiscreantsÊ and Âenemies of IslamÊ.74 The war on terror narrative espoused by the French may turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy. So far, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) launched on 1 July has found it difficult to hand over Serval and scale up forces so as to guarantee security in the vast north of the country.

Notes 1. The author thanks Bruno Charbonneau, Tony Chafer, Sara Dezalay, Grégory Chauzal, and Amandine Gnanguenon for their comments and suggestions, as well as the Universidad de los Andes for funding two fieldwork missions in 2013. The author bears sole responsibility for any remaining errors. 2. François Hollande, ÂDiscours lors de la rencontre avec les personnels français des forces présentes au MaliÊ, Présidence de la République [Paris], 19 September 2013 (at: www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-lors-de-la-rencontre-avec-les-personnelsfrancais-des-forces-presentes-au-mali/). 3. François Hollande, ÂConférence de presse conjointe du Président de la République au MaliÊ, Présidence de la République [Paris], 20 September 2013 (at: www.elysee. fr/conferences-de-presse/article/conference-de-presse-conjointe-du-president-de-larepublique-au-mali/).

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4. ServalÊs military staff refused to meet the author in Bamako in September 2013, arguing that they were Ânot allowed to comment upon ongoing operationsÊ. Insights were provided by civilian and military professionals close to Serval who explicitly asked not be quoted. 5. Mahamadou Diawara, ÂLÊintervention française au Mali: Une étude des représentations et perceptions des habitants de BamakoÊ, unpublished, April 2013, 15. 6. See François Xavier-Verschave, La Françafrique: Le plus long scandale de la République, Paris: Stock, 1999. 7. Groupement dÊintérêt scientifique pour lÊEtude de la Mondialisation et du Développement (GEMDEV)/Université du Mali, Mali France: Regards sur une histoire partagée, Bamako/Paris: Donniya/Karthala, 2005. 8. Ibrahima Baba Sidibé, ÂLes relations franco-maliennes à la recherche dÊun nouveau souffleÊ, in GEMDEV/Université du Mali (see n. 7), p. 344. 9. Sidibé (see n. 8), p. 345. 10. Ibid., p. 341. 11. Ibid., p. 347. 12. Ibid., p. 342. 13. Ibid., p. 341 343. 14. Ibid., p. 351. 15. Ibid., pp. 342 344. 16. Ibid., p. 347. 17. Géronimi et al., ÂLe franc malien: Fausses ruptures ou vraies continuités dans les relations franco-maliennes ?Ê in GEMDEV/Université du Mali (see n. 7), p. 437. 18. Sidibé (see n. 8), p. 351. 19. Ibid., p. 352. 20. Géronimi et al. (see n. 17), p. 448. 21. Sidibé (see n. 8), p. 352. 22. Ibid., p. 354. 23. Géronimi et al. (see n. 17), p. 453. 24. Sidibé (see n. 8), p. 354. 25. Géronimi et al. (see n. 17), p. 456. 26. Sidibé (see n. 8), p. 356. 27. Ibid., pp. 344 and 357. 28. Ibid., p. 360. 29. Ibid., p. 344. 30. Claire Mainguy, ÂAccords de partenariat économique en Afrique de lÊOuest: Quels enjeux pour le Mali?Ê, in GEMDEV/Université du Mali (see n. 7), p. 506. 31. Philippe Hugon, ÂLes réformes de la filière coton au Mali et les relations francomaliennesÊ, in GEMDEV/Université du Mali (see n. 7), pp. 483 504. 32. Géronimi et al. (see n. 17), p. 445. 33. Ibid., p. 456. 34. Adame Ba Konaré (ed.), Petit précis de remise à niveau sur lÊhistoire africaine à lÊusage du président Sarkozy, Paris: La Découverte, 2008. 35. Stephen William Smith, ÂIn Search of MonstersÊ, London Review of Books [London], Vol. 35, No. 3, 7 February 2013, pp. 3 5 (at: www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n03/stephen-w-smith/ in-search-of-monsters). A caveat to the last assessment by Smith regarding resources must be made because French Dagris is still an important stakeholder in the West African cotton sector. 36. Bruno Charbonneau, France and the New Imperialism: Security Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2008, pp. 60 62. 37. Association Survie, La France en guerre au Mali, Paris: Tribord, 2013. 38. Jemal Oumar, ÂDes accords énergétiques au Mali pourraient renforcer la région du SahelÊ, Magharebia [Nouakchott], 19 August 2013 (at: http://magharebia.com/fr/ articles/awi/features/2013/08/19/feature-03).

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French military intervention in Mali 151 39. ÂLe Niger veut renégocier ses contrats avec ArevaÊ, Libération [Paris], 6 October 2013 (at: www.liberation.fr/economie/2013/10/06/le-niger-veut-renegocier-ses-contratsavec-areva_937410). 40. Bruno Charbonneau and Jonathan Sears, „Defending a Neoliberal Model in Mali: French Military Intervention and the Management of Contested Political Narratives‰, in Florian Kühn and Mandy Turner (eds.), Where Has All the Peace Gone? The Politics of International Intervention, London: Routledge, 2014. 41. During a conference called ÂInterventions au Mali et enjeux régionauxÊ, held at Centre dÊEtudes et de Recherches Internationales, Paris, 11 February 2013 (at: www.science spo.fr/ceri/fr/content/interventions-au-mali-et-enjeux-regionaux). 42. Cyril Bensimon and David Revault dÊAllonnes, ÂFaute de réseau africain, Hollande met lÊarmée en première ligneÊ, Le Monde géopolitique [Paris], 17 October 2013, p. 3. 43. Roland Marchal, ÂBriefing: Military (Mis)adventures in MaliÊ, African Affairs [London], Vol. 112, No. 448, 2013, p. 4. 44. François Hollande (see n. 3). 45. Unless indicated otherwise, the analysis and quotes presented in the last five paragraphs draw on interviews by the author with practitioners close to Serval. 46. Isabelle Lasserne and Thierry Oberlé, Notre Guerre secrète au Mali: Les nouvelles menaces contre la France, Paris: Fayard, 2013. 47. Marchal (see n. 43), p. 3 48. Ursula Soares, ÂOpération militaire au Mali: La France nÊinterviendra pas „ellemême‰ Ê, Radio France Internationale [Paris], 14 November 2013 (at: www.rfi.fr/ afrique/20121113-operation-militaire-mali-france-interviendra-pas-elle-meme-unionafricaine-addis-abeba-conseil-securite). 49. Theodore Christakis and Karine Bannelier, ÂFrench Military Intervention in Mali: ItÊs Legal but . . . Why? Part 1: The Argument of Collective Self-DefenseÊ, European Journal of International Law EJIL: Talk!, 24 January 2013 (at: www.ejiltalk.org/ french-military-intervention-in-mali-its-legal-but-why-part-i/#more-7483). 50. Laurent Fabius, ÂBulletin dÊactualités du 14 janvier 2013 : Mali Conférence de presse du ministre des affaires étrangères, M. Laurent FabiusÊ, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et Européennes [Paris], 12 January 2013 (at: http://basedoc.diplomatie. gouv.fr/exl-doc/FranceDiplomatie/PDF/bafr2013-01-14.pdf ). 51. Delphine Roucaute, ÂMali : lÊopération „Serval‰ est-elle légale?Ê, Le Monde [Paris], 14 January 2013 (at: www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2013/01/14/mali-l-operationserval-est-elle-legale_1816877_3212.html). 52. Vidan Hadzi-Vidanovic, ÂFrance Intervenes in Mali Invoking Both SC Resolution 2085 and the Invitation of the Malian Government Redundancy or Legal Necessity?Ê, European Journal of International Law EJIL: Talk!, 23 January 2013 (at: www.ejiltalk.org/france-intervenes-in-mali-invoking-both-sc-resolution-2085and-the-invitation-of-the-malian-government-redundancy-or-legal-necessity/). 53. Hadzi-Vidanovic (see n. 52). 54. Charbonneau (see n. 36). 55. Mathieu Olivier, ÂNord-Mali: Une intervention, mais sous quelle forme?Ê, Jeune Afrique, 16 September 2012 (at: www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20120913160944/). 56. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Mali-Mètre Enquête dÊopinion: Que pensent les Maliens?Ê Bamako: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, May 2013. 57. Al-Jazeera, ÂInteractive: Mali SpeaksÊ, 21 January 2013 (at: www.aljazeera.com/ indepth/interactive/2013/01/201312113451635182.html). 58. In 2011, she was a vocal supporter of President Gbagbo and opponent to the French involvement in Côte dÊIvoire. 59. Vincent Hugeux, ÂMahamadou Issoufou: „LÊAfrique paie une absence de vision‰ Ê, LÊExpress [Paris], 23 April 2013 (at: www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/afrique/maha madou-issoufou-l-afrique-paie-une-absence-de-vision_1250880.html#hRicHtUeWIb BPeIG.99).

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60. This assertion is made on the basis of informal discussions and interviews with ordinary citizens, researchers, and middle- as well as high-ranking civil servants in Bamako carried out by the author by phone, on Skype, or in person in January September 2013. 61. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (see n. 56). 62. François Hollande, ÂDiscours de Monsieur Dioncunda Traoré, Président du Mali, et du Président de la République françaiseÊ, Présidence de la République [Paris], 2 February 2013 (at: www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/discours-de-m-dioncounda-traore-presi dent-de-la-republique-du-mali-et-du-president-de-la-republique-francaise/). 63. Diawara (see n. 5), p. 9. 64. Ibid., p. 10. 65. Ibid., p. 12 13. 66. This assertion was made by pro-coup Malians of the diaspora during marches held in Paris in April May 2013. Observations by the author. 67. Bamako-based doctor interviewed by Diawara (see n. 5), p. 11. 68. Testimonies by inhabitants of Bamako collected by the author in Bamako, June 2013. 69. Pierre Boilley, ÂUn complot français au Sahara? Politiques françaises et représentations maliennesÊ, in GEMDEV/Université du Mali (see n. 7), p. 167. 70. Gregory Mann, ÂThe Racial Politics of Tuareg NationalismÊ, Africa Is a Country, 7 April 2012 (at: http://africasacountry.com/2012/04/07/sweet-home-azawad/). 71. Pierre Boilley (see n. 69), pp. 173 176. 72. Interviews by the author with bilateral and multilateral cooperation agencies, foreign diplomats, and Malian civil servants in Bamako, June 2013. 73. See Charbonneau and Sears (see n. 40). 74. ÂLe Mujao revendique des attaques dans le Nord du MaliÊ, Libération [Paris], 8 October 2013 (at: www.liberation.fr/monde/2013/10/08/des-islamistes-dynamitent-un-pont-aunord-du-mali_937870).

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9

When peacekeeping meets French realpolitik The implementation of Resolution 1778 in Chad Cyril Fiorini

The February 2008 international intervention in Chad unfolded within the context of France and ChadÊs long-standing historical relationship, which, in many ways, delineates the limits and possibilities of peace operations in the region. Historically, the successive governments of FranceÊs Fifth Republic engaged directly with African political actors, whether they were in power or aspiring to it. They worked in both official and unofficial capacities, with the aim of promoting FranceÊs strategic, political, and economic interest.1 Since decolonization, every French president has adhered to a framework set up by General de Gaulle and his adviser Jacques Foccart, which Tony Chafer has called the ÂAfrican Paris complexÊ,2 known in France as the ÂicebergÊ3 or ÂnébuleuseÊ4 (nebula) of Françafrique. Bilateral relationships between the French government and the newly independent African states in the so-called French pré carré (privileged sphere of influence) are still effective in Chad today. Their essential role in ChadÊs current social and political situation is undeniable, particularly in Eastern Chad. In September 2007, in response to a security and humanitarian situation that had been worsening in the region since 2003, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1778 calling for the deployment of a multidimensional presence in Chad and the Central African Republic. In this chapter, we will focus on the deployment of that presence in Chad. The international intervention was twopronged: first, the Security Council urged member states to implement a civilian mission called MINURCAT I,5 whose mandate was to defend human rights and provide training to a new Chadian police force specifically tasked with maintaining public order in refugee camps, sites for internally displaced persons, and in the neighbouring areas. Second, in accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the resolution authorized the European Union to deploy a peacekeeping operation in Eastern Chad called EUFOR, which sought to protect endangered civilians and support humanitarian workers in the border area between Chad and Sudanese Darfur. Significantly, France played a lead role in the development, deployment, and implementation of this multidimensional force. This chapter focuses on FranceÊs position of leadership in the international intervention in Eastern Chad and on the stakes underlying such a prominent role, particularly in light of the French governmentÊs bilateral policy with Chad. A salient example of this French involvement is the Eléments Français au Tchad (EFT), which is the

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fluctuating presence of approximately 1,000 French soldiers on Chadian territory since Operation Epervier was launched in 1986. This chapter also seeks to contextualize EUFOR and MINURCAT I within the broader context of ChadÊs internal and multifaceted social violence, which can be understood as a whole only if it is connected to the long-term, historical relationship-building process between French and Chadian political elites. This approach will help to shed light not only on the complexity of the worsening security and humanitarian situation that ultimately required international intervention but also on the difficulties involved in carrying out the multidimensional presence project and its ultimate ÂfailureÊ. First, we shall examine the ties that persisted between France and its former colony, even after Chadian independence, amidst the slow and fragile process of state building in Chad. Various aspects of ChadÊs internal social changes will be examined in order to explain the complex context of the 2008 international intervention. Second, I will analyze the features that characterized FranceÊs dominant position in the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1778 and the ways in which this lead role limited the effectiveness of the mission. The last section will highlight how French Chadian policy may have interfered with the deployment and objectives of the multidimensional force.

Chad since its independence From François Tombalbaye, the first president of independent Chad, to Idriss Déby Itno, the current president of the Chadian Republic, France has managed to maintain strong relationships with ChadÊs political authorities. The ties between Chadian and French political elites are evident in the direct military support that France provided to its former colonyÊs authorities in 1969, 1978, 1983, 1986, 2006, and 2008,6 Regarding the first four French military interventions, Libya played an ongoing and important role in the destabilization of Chadian regimes. First, during the 1960s and 1970s notably in the Northern Chadian region of BET (Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti) Libya backed the main Chadian rebellion movement, the National Liberation Front of Chad (FROLINAT). It then intervened more openly by militarily annexing the northern part of Chad known as the Aozou Strip. French operations Manta (1983) and Epervier (1986) were undertaken to provide technical and logistical support to Hissène HabréÊs regime, which sought to push the Libyan army back beyond Chadian borders. Nevertheless, French support of Chadian authorities has not been unwavering. Indeed, France played a decisive role in Idriss Déby ItnoÊs successful coup dÊétat in 1990 against Hissène Habré. Before becoming a dissident, Déby was HabréÊs defense and security adviser. Once again, Libya played a destabilizing role by providing refuge for Déby when he broke with the Habré regime. No doubt French authorities supported Déby out of frustration with Hissène Habré7 and his regimeÊs violence8 an increasing source of embarrassment for the French government.

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When peacekeeping meets French realpolitik 155 France supported the Mouvement Patriotique du Salut (MPS) rebellion led by Déby and launched from Darfur in November 1990. Meanwhile, it publically considered the conflict an internal affair and adopted a neutral position, despite the agreement of military cooperation. The French Minister of Cooperation Jacques Pelletier commented, ÂWe did not help Idriss Déby, we let him actÊ.9 Furthermore, France is thought to have informally expressed its support for the rebellion through the direct involvement of the Directorate-General for External Security (DGSE the French secret service) in the rebellionÊs success.10 It is thought to have played the same role in its support of Hissène Habré when he was still considered a French ally.11 According to the Chadian Member of Parliament Ngarlejy Yorongar, one must also consider the financial and material support that the rebellion received from Elf, a French oil company, if one is to understand the important nature of FranceÊs role in DébyÊs forceful accession to power.12 Despite successive governments, France has maintained its support for Déby in the form of both civilian and military cooperation. For instance, the new Chadian authorities in the early 1990s allegedly benefited from advisers from the DGSE Déby and his first Prime Minister Kassiré Coumakoye in particular.13 The French government has provided significant resources to strengthen ChadÊs capacity building, paving the way for the development of democratic institutions and thereby beginning to fulfill the goals outlined at the La Baule summit in June 1990. For example, the French embassy in Chad was particularly involved in financing the Sovereign National Conference in 1993,14 and some French coopérants (civilian service members) were sent by the French government to assist in developing a draft constitution.15 Moreover, France strongly encouraged DébyÊs efforts to restructure his army after his takeover, providing important financial assistance and supervising the operation.16 The French government worked hard to create favorable conditions to ensure a successful process of democratization in Chad. Indeed, several members of French Parliament participated in overseeing the 1996 constitutional referendum. Shortly thereafter, France signed a budgetary aid convention in support of the electoral process, and played an important role in organizing a critical meeting between Déby and armed rebel movements on the eve of the 1996 presidential elections.17 France, heavily involved in the organization of the 1996 electoral process, covered up to 95% of the costs and sent many observers, officials, members of Parliament, and other elected officials to Chad. It also obtained logistical support from the Epervier contingent to ensure that the results from all polling stations were recovered. The Independent National Electoral Commission is also thought to have benefited from the special help of a French expert in electoral matters, the legal adviser to the secretary-general of the French political party Le Rassemblement pour la République.18 The close and long established relationship between French and Chadian elites is a significant feature of the security situation in Chad and therefore must not be overlooked in such an analysis of the conditions in which the multidimensional force was deployed in Eastern Chad in February 2008.

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Towards Resolution 1778 In 2003, an armed conflict between rebel groups and Sudanese government forces broke out in the Darfur region of Sudan bordering Eastern Chad. Instability in the region the result of a multidimensional crisis that had been growing since the 1980s, in which the Chadian regime and its violence played an important role19 led to a massive exodus of more than 230,000 refugees into Eastern Chad, plus an additional 44,000 refugees from the Central African Republic. The crisisled migrations, together with the endogenous violence, also resulted in massive internal displacement within Eastern ChadÊs territory, rising to almost 200,000 internally displaced persons.20 Against a backdrop of strong ethnic antagonisms and scarce natural resources, the demographic shift put pressure on the Wadi Fira, Ouaddai, and Ennedi regions, where the refugee camps exacerbated existing tensions. Furthermore, Sudanese Janjaweed militias crossed the border to launch attacks in Eastern Chad, aggravating the security situation in the region. According to Roland Marchal, Âwar in Darfur also reveals an archeology of conflictÊ, with local, national, and transnational layers, in which the dynamics of ChadÊs sociopolitical landscape play a large part.21 Beyond the influx into Darfur of Chadian shepherds fleeing the cattle raids in their home country, the presence of Chadian armed groups in Darfur is a multidecadal social reality and a sign of the porosity of the border. Hissène Habré and Idriss Déby Itno both seized power by launching their attacks from Darfur. But the same strategy also backfired when attempted coup dÊétats launched from Darfur were led against Déby in November 2006, February 2008, and May 2009. The archeology of conflict in Darfur is made of tensions internal to Sudan. Nevertheless, in addition to manipulating ethnic groups on both sides of the border, Déby also tried to use Sudanese internal tensions in order to destabilize the Khartoum regime, which supported Chadian armed groups based in Darfur. Agreements between Sudan and Chad to normalize relations failed, and both states entered into a proxy war, making Eastern Chad the site where these conflicts played out. Consequently, though tensions may have eased between the Chadian and Sudanese presidents with the January 2010 NÊDjaména agreement, the increasing multidimensional violence in the region since 2003 has made the very precarious situation lived by the indigenous populations and refugees in Eastern Chad ever more dangerous.22 The accumulation of endogenous and exogenous factors exacerbated tensions, and the mounting insecurity in Eastern Chad led the United Nations to deploy a multidimensional force in the region in 2008.

The French mark on Resolution 1778 France was the driving force throughout the development and implementation of EUFOR, an operation mandated by the United Nations Security Council within the framework of Resolution 1778 authorizing the European Union to deploy a multilateral force in Eastern Chad. The operation was authorized under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, which legitimizes the use of force when

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When peacekeeping meets French realpolitik 157 necessary. FranceÊs role as initiator in all operations developed by the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in Africa,23 as well as the reluctance of many European partners with regard to EU intervention and the fears expressed by the European Commission about the potential instrumentalization of ESDP by France, led some to assert that ÂESDP in Africa mostly remains a French caseÊ.24 The EUFOR deployment appears to have confirmed this sentiment. Owing to FranceÊs aforementioned historical relationship with Chad, and, thus its questionable motivations for intervention, the operationÊs command was shared between Ireland and France.25 However, this did not manage to convince other European partners of the operationÊs neutrality. Among the major partners, the United Kingdom and Germany voted in favor of EUFOR deployment in Chad but refused to provide either financial or human resources for the operation.26 Bruno Charbonneau has clearly demonstrated how France, through French Minister of Foreign Affairs Bernard Kouchner, succeeded in putting the Darfur crisis on the EU agenda because Germany chaired the European presidency at the time. This was a critical step in FranceÊs efforts to prevent the Darfur crisis from spreading and destabilizing the region, notably its Chadian ally. Moreover, as Charbonneau argued, the discursive focus on the humanitarian dimension of this international intervention allowed France and the United States in a context of rapprochement between the Sarkozy and Bush administrations to pursue their own interests in the region.27 Noting the failure of the UN mission to Darfur (UNMID), France played a major role in leading Déby to accept the deployment of European force into Eastern Chad as a way of mitigating the Darfur crisis, even though the Chadian president was opposed to a military operation under the aegis of the United Nations.28 Although all European partners approved the operation, France had to exert pressure on fellow European leaders to ensure the full deployment of operational capabilities. Determined, France had to make an additional effort in terms of human, material, and financial resources.29 France thus contributed approximately 55% of the contingent, sending 2,100 French soldiers into the region. Furthermore, it should be noted that, in addition to the French command on the ground and the designation of France as the sole logistic framework nation, the EU Military Committee, the highest military structure within the European Council, was chaired by the French General Henri Bentégeat during the development, adoption, and implementation of the EUFOR deployment. In addition to its dominant position in EUFORÊs deployment, France held the presidency of the European Council from July 1 to December 30 2008, during which time it was also able to exert influence over the Political and Security Committee.30 At the time, the Head of the European Union delegation to Chad was French Ambassador Gilles Desesquelles, reinforcing the impression that France held leadership positions throughout European political structures. EUFORÊs neutrality raises numerous political issues because France dominated both the chain of command and the operationÊs logistical organization. Such issues reached their climax when France involved its armed forces, the EFT, alongside the Chadian national army in a conflict that pitted them against an armed rebel

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group in early February 2008. France worked hard to convince its European partners of its complete neutrality to keep them from balking at the mission. Nevertheless, the daily support that the EFT provided EUFOR in terms of transportation and intelligence gathering, along with their prior support of Déby, was a constant reminder of FranceÊs involvement in Chadian internal affairs. The temporary accommodation of the EUFOR contingent on EFT military bases Camp Capitaine Michel Croci in Abéché and Camp Kosseï at NÊdjamenaÊs airport31 and later the proximity on the ground between EFT and EUFOR camps made it difficult to distinguish between the two forces, especially since hundreds of EFTs were temporarily integrated into the EUFOR force. It should also be noted that FranceÊs omnipresence within the EU operation was combined with the position of French diplomats at the head of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, such as the Undersecretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations,32 a fact that undoubtedly facilitated coordination between the Department and the Council of the European Union in their work related to the Security CouncilÊs resolutions and the EUFOR mandate. With respect to Chad, FranceÊs influence at the UN seems clear. It can be seen in the statement made by the president of the Security Council on February 4 2008 condemning recent rebel attacks and legitimizing French intervention. And it is apparent in Resolution 1861, which was adopted by the Security Council, at FranceÊs urging, on January 14 2009 and which extended the presence of the multidimensional force in Eastern Chad for another year by transferring the EUFOR mandate to MINURCAT II. A December 2006 report by the secretary-general of the United Nations discouraged the French plan calling for an international intervention in Chad: Unless all the parties concerned were to agree to a ceasefire and engage in an intra- and inter-State dialogue aimed at a political solution, a United Nations force would be operating in the midst of continuing hostilities and would have no clear exit strategy. The conditions for an effective United Nations peacekeeping operation do not, therefore, seem to be in place as at the time of writing of the present report.33 Even though there were no signs of appeasement between Déby and the armed opposition, France managed to convince the Security Council of the United Nations to adopt Resolution 1778, the terms of which it were defined in agreement with the Chadian authorities.34 Patrick Berg showed how Âthe UN revised the mission concept on the basis of the agreement reached by Déby and KouchnerÊ.35 According to Berg, Déby did not want the international force to prevent the Chadian military from fighting against Chadian rebels at the border or to interfere with his support of Sudanese rebels. However, providing certain conditions were met, he was in favor of a European military operation led by his French partner.36 One condition was that EUFOR and MINURCAT I should operate as little as possible within the border territories with Sudan.37

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When peacekeeping meets French realpolitik 159 In the same 2007 report, the secretary general of the United Nations advocated for political stabilization in Eastern Chad as a primary objective of international intervention, to be achieved through the facilitation of meaningful dialogue between relevant parties in the conflict in Eastern Chad.38 However, Déby was opposed to international community interference in Chadian internal affairs.39 As Charbonneau argued, France emphasized the worsening humanitarian situation in Eastern Chad and the spillover of the Darfur crisis as a means to redirect public attention from Chadian political affairs.40 By covering up such internal dynamics, FranceÊs discursive construction of the crisis in Eastern Chad successfully concealed the Âpolitical componentÊ of Resolution 1778 that the secretary general had considered so essential. To facilitate EUFORÊs deployment, France accepted DébyÊs other conditions: (1) a transfer of the mandate of the civilian police force mandated under MINURCAT I for the protection of refugee camps to the Chadian government,41 and (2) refugee camps were to be off limits for EUFOR personnel and accessible only to Chadian police.42 These two conditions greatly limited EUFORÊs impact on local insecurity. Déby also negotiated to keep EUFORÊs infrastructure and equipment at the missionÊs end. He then rented the same infrastructure and equipment to the United Nations when it decided to prolong EUFOR and MINURCAT IÊs mission, as outlined in Resolution 1861.43 Chadian authorities were thus able to thwart the United NationsÊ hopes for a prolonged international presence on Chadian soil. Although Resolution 1778 did not specify the number of soldiers to be deployed by EUFOR, the secretary-general of the United Nations outlined two scenarios in his February 2007 report: he envisioned the need for either 11,000 soldiers or a minimum of 6,000 soldiers with more logistical and air support.44 Yet France had difficulty recruiting the 3,700 European soldiers for the EU mission and also struggled to gather the necessary military means. As already explained, the historical relationship between France and Chad and French military policy in Chad affected the disposition of FranceÊs European partners. The funds allocated to the European operation were very limited. As Alexander Mattelaer wrote, Âthe strategic centre of gravity of EUFOR for drawing strength for achieving these objectives was its credibility . . . also based on the notion of impartialityÊ.45 Although French interests were not the only ones invested in the draft of Resolution 1778, French influence was, in many respects, decisive in shaping the international communityÊs position on the crisis in Eastern Chad. Furthermore, the historical relationship between France and Chad shaped the scope of the international mission and limited its objectives so much so that one might call into question the international communityÊs ability to respond to the specific humanitarian crisis on the ground. Indeed, it has been clearly established that the international intervention did not reflect an adequate response to the root causes of the Chadian security and humanitarian plight.46 An analysis of French Chadian policy will allow us to clarify the reasons why this operation can be considered a failure.

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Resolution 1778 through the prism of French Chadian policy Initially developed under Charles de Gaulle after his return to power in 1958, French African policy has since undergone significant changes, particularly in the decision-making process. This can be seen in the respective closures of the French Ministry of Cooperation in 1998 and the ElyséeÊs African cell in 2007. Yet some of the core elements persist and can be observed in the methods of implementation.47 Additionally, the relationship between African and French elites is far from static, making the analysis of French African policy complicated at best. In the early 1980s, Jean-François Bayart was already asking whether a monolithic analysis of a single Franco-African relationship was appropriate.48 Indeed, the relationship has always been made up of a plurality of decision centers49 that are sometimes conflictual, making it all the more ÂschizophrenicÊ.50 This schizophrenia becomes even more apparent if we consider internal administrative conflicts.51 Consider, for example, the former French minister Roland Dumas, who claimed to have played an important role in Âparallel diplomacyÊ when François Mitterrand and Mouammar Kaddafi tried to resolve the Chad Libya conflict in the early 1980s.52 But such claims contradict historical research, like Robert Buijtenhuijs who clearly demonstrated how it was the multifaceted characteristic of French policy that influenced ChadÊs democratic transition.53 Nevertheless, Chad is an important pillar of the French pré carré. If one is to understand the issues at stake in FranceÊs leadership role in EUFOR, it must be examined through the prism of FranceÊs unfailing support of DébyÊs authoritarian regime.54 In addition to FranceÊs strong involvement in helping Déby build Chadian Âdemocratic institutionsÊ, it has also deployed considerable resources to help him maintain power. French diplomacy was particularly quick to congratulate Déby for winning successive elections, even though they were fraught with irregularities and boycotted by his main opponents in 2006 and 2011.55 Even elections supervised by the French Cooperation were compromised. From a military standpoint, France offered undeniable support to Déby when his regime was threatened by rebel groups. The EFT and the French Special Operations CommandÊs involvement with the Chadian army in November 2006 and February 2008 is well-known.56 On 3 February 2008, France convened an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council to condemn the Chadian rebels.57 It thus benefited from the legitimizing authority of the UN amidst fears that threats to the Chadian regime might require French military intervention.58 FranceÊs official objectives to intervene and claims to impartiality in Eastern Chad are no longer considered credible. France has acquired a considerable amount of knowledge of, and access into, Chadian sociopolitical structures thanks to its long-standing relationship with Chadian elites. In theory, such knowledge and access should prove useful in developing a more efficient operation. Yet even EUFOR (French) General Jean-Philippe Ganascia reflected in May 2008 on the difficulties of the operation from the first moment of its implementation: We organized a military force against a threat that was not clearly defined on the ground . . . Effectively, more gendarmerie [police] actions are necessary.

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When peacekeeping meets French realpolitik 161 The Chadian armed opposition is not a threat to EUFOR . . . To place the responsibility of this mission on a strictly military force is inappropriate.59 Furthermore, though EUFOR did not appear to significantly improve the situation in Eastern Chad, it did affect the perceptions of Chadian actors involved in the internal armed conflict. Indeed, the deployment of 3,700 European soldiers in Eastern Chad in addition to the fact that EUFOR was considered a Chapter VII operation was interpreted by both the government and the armed opposition as a viable way to secure the current political system.60 According to the NGO International Crisis Group, Âthanks to EUFOR, France actively contributed to the reinforcement of DébyÊs position . . . Paris was able to get the European Union to share the costs of this operation and indirectly endorse its political goalsÊ.61

French Chadian policy and continued violence in the East In addition to the human rights mission, the Security Council entrusted MINURCAT I with the task of supervising the training of a newly constituted unit of the Chadian police called Détachement intégré de sécurité (DIS), which would ensure the security of civilians in camps for refugees and internally displaced persons, of humanitarian workers, and in the Eastern neighboring cities. In contrast to EUFOR, France has not played a leading role in the management of this mission, however its Chadian policy has nevertheless interfered with the new unitÊs expected results. One of the key features linking the current violence observed in Chad and the unwavering relationship between Chadian and French politicoeconomic elites is the transfer of arms from France to Chad. In addition to the substantial quantity of weapons that Chadian authorities acquire illegally,62 France is one of the largest arms suppliers to the stateÊs armed forces. Between 2005 and 2009, France was officially the second provider of weapons and military equipment to Chad after Ukraine.63 Both in terms of trade relations and within the context of military agreements,64 France has increased the number of arms it moves into Chad, especially since 2006. This situation is all the more problematic because the financial resources allowing Déby to acquire this military equipment come in large part from oil. Indeed, in 2003, Chad became an oil-producing country. Several observers linked this important change to the significant increase in military expenditures by the Chadian state,65 which were multiplied by eight between 2004 and 2008.66 Some of the oil revenues were initially raised for state capacity building in so-called priority social areas, as stipulated in the 001/PR/99 law of 11 January 1999. Historically, the Chadian state is largely responsible for the endemic violence in the country. Certainly since 1990, when Déby came to power, Chadian armed forces have often been charged with extortion, rape, theft, and the murder of civilians, human rights defenders, and political opponents. The Human Rights Section of MINURCAT I confirmed the prevalence of abuses committed by regular armed forces in Eastern Chad.67 France has provided logistical and technical

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training and support to the Chadian security forces since 1990. It has provided military officers,68 notably to advise both the president and the National Nomadic Guard.69 Moreover, the fourth article of the 1976 military cooperation agreement stipulates that French military officers working with the Chadian armed forces are to be incorporated into the Chadian regular army and thus wear the Chadian uniform. In 2007, the Report of the Secretary General on Children and Armed Conflict in Chad stated that Âthe cohesion of the Chadian National Army chain of command and the level of discipline of troops is questionable and it casts into doubt the degree to which policy-level commitments and directives are translated into action by individual field commanders and their orders followedÊ.70 Those weaknesses within Chadian security forces have engendered fears concerning the level of skills and rigor developed by DIS members, given that they were recruited by the Chadian authorities themselves.71 In this context, it was astonishing that France, as the EUFOR framework nation, did not rule on the current recruitment of child soldiers by armed forces on both sides of the conflict, especially since the UN had signaled the phenomenon in early 200772 and since an end to the use of child soldiers was a prerequisite for deploying the force.73 The logistical training and support that France provides to Chadian security forces can easily be misappropriated74 in order to carry out abuses. When the MINURCAT I mission and the EU operation were drawing to a close in May 2009 and preparations were being made for the transition to MINURCAT II (which was deployed before December 2010), Amnesty International and the International Crisis Group noted the persistent high level of insecurity, both inside and outside the refugee camps, and expressed concern over the DISÊs ability to carry out its primary function.75 Several DIS police officers were found guilty of acts of violence.76 A major objective of the multidimensional presence was to provide a safe return of refugees and displaced persons. As of late 2013, there was still no sign that such an objective can be met, and the high level of insecurity in Eastern Chad continued to persist. France is not solely responsible for the failure in achieving the objectives of the EUFOR and MINURCAT I missions. Nevertheless, it is clear that the pursuit of its own Chadian policy both alongside and through international intervention seriously limited the possibility of improving the security and the humanitarian situation in Eastern Chad.

Conclusion The continued violence in Chad cannot be reduced to FranceÊs support from successive regimes. However, the historical relationship between the politicoeconomic elites of both countries has significantly affected the humanitarian and security situation in Chad, particularly in the East. Clearly, French Chadian policy, in addition to being a major obstacle to peacebuilding and peacekeeping in Eastern Chad, undermined and delegitimized the international communityÊs efforts. The extent of the French involvement in the European intervention confirms Marie-Claude SmoutsÊ idea that ÂFranceÊs participation in the peacekeeping

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When peacekeeping meets French realpolitik 163 operations does not follow an abstract logic of collective security. It serves material and immaterial objectives of national interest: security imperatives, its selfimage, the international audienceÊ.77 Even though France might be said to have ÂnormalizedÊ its African policy over the years, its Chadian policy has changed little. Yet Chad recently became one of the African countries in which France seeks to ÂmultilateralizeÊ its presence.78 Although this phenomenon has perhaps led to a normalization of Franco-African relationships in other countries, it appears to have taken a divergent path in Chad. In a fundamental contradiction with the initial objective of the international intervention and with the continued insecurity in Eastern Chad, the outcome of EUFOR and MINURCAT I allowed France to continue to pursue its own Chadian policy by internationally legitimizing means. It seems unlikely that peacebuilding and peacekeeping in Chad will work if Chadian and French elites continue misusing and fueling internal and regional conflicts.

Acknowledgements I am grateful to Bruno Charbonneau and Tony Chafer for their valuable comments, suggestions, and editorial work. I would also like to thank Marianne Lehmann and Marie-Hélène Archimbaud for their proofreading and especially Alexis Pernsteiner and Joe Costanzo for their help in correcting my English.

Notes 1. On Chad, see ÂPolitique africaineÊ, Le Tchad, Special issue, No. 16, December 1984. 2. Tony Chafer, ÂFranco-African Relations: No Longer So Exceptional?Ê, African Affairs, No. 101, 2002, p. 346. 3. François-Xavier Verschave and Philippe Hauser, Au mépris des peuples. Le néocolonialisme franco-africain, Paris: La Fabrique Editions, 2004, p. 9. 4. François-Xavier Verschave, La Françafrique. Le plus long scandale de la République, Paris: Stock, 1999, p. 175. 5. In March 2009, MINURCAT began implementing a second distinctive phase in response to Security Council Resolution 1861 (adopted on 14 January 2009). For greater clarity, we have chosen to call the earlier phase the ÂUN mission established pursuant to Resolution 1778, MINURCAT IÊ. 6. Bilateral military policy pursued by France in Chad is exercised within the framework of a bilateral military agreement on technical assistance, which was signed by both countries on 19 March 1964, as well as by a bilateral military cooperation agreement signed on 6 March and 19 June 1976. The 1976 Agreement can be found online (at: www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/traites/affichetraite.do?accord=TRA19760067). 7. Robert Buijtenhuijs, ÂHissène Habré: Seigneur de la guerre jusquÊau boutÊ, Politique africaine, No. 41, 1991, pp. 135 137. Hissène Habré opposed the democratization movement in Africa proposed by François Mitterrand, president of the French Republic, during the sixteenth Africa France summit hosted by La Baule (France) in June 1990. François MitterrandÊs address can be found online (at: http://discours.vie-pub lique.fr/notices/907015400.html). 8. Amnesty International, Chad: The Habré Legacy, 2001 (at: www.amnesty.org/en/ library/info/AFR20/004/2001). 9. Jacques Le Cornec, Les mille et un Tchad, Paris: LÊHarmattan, 2002, p. 489.

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10. Robert Buijtenhuijs, La conférence nationale souveraine du Tchad. Un essai dÊhistoire immédiate, Paris: Karthala, 1993, pp. 38 40; Thomas Sotinel, ÂParis sÊirrite de plus en plus de lÊautocratisme du président tchadienÊ, Le Monde, 13 September 1995; Vincent Hugeux, ÂTchad Déby, lÊallié insoumisÊ, LÊexpress, 14 February 2008. 11. Amnesty International (see n. 8), p. 38. 12. Ngarlejy Yorongar, Tchad : Le procès dÊIdriss Déby. Témoignage à charge, Paris: LÊHarmattan, 2003, p. 86. 13. Agir Ici-Survie, ÂDossiers noirs de la politique africaine de la France, No. 3: France, Tchad, Soudan, au gré des clansÊ, in Agir Ici-Survie, Dossiers noirs de la politique africaine de la France No.1 5, Paris: LÊHarmattan, 1996, p. 187. 14. Ibid., p. 187; Buijtenhuijs (see n. 10), p. 92. 15. Le Cornec (see n. 9), p. 474. 16. Buijtenhuijs (see n. 10), p. 29. 17. Agir Ici et Survie, Tchad, Niger: Escroquerie à la démocratie, Paris: LÊHarmattan, 1996, p. 25. 18. Ibid., pp. 41 and 53. 19. Roland Marchal, ÂLe conflit au Darfour, point aveugle des négociations Nord-Sud au SoudanÊ, Politique africaine, No. 95, 2004, p. 128. 20. UNHCR, Global Report 2007 (at: www.unhcr.org/gr07/index.html). 21. Roland Marchal (see n. 19), p. 131. 22. Human Rights Watch, ÂThey Came Here to Kill UsÊ. Militia Attacks and Ethnic Targeting of Civilians in Eastern Chad, Vol. 19, January 2007 (at: www.hrw.org/sites/default/ files/reports/chad0107webwcover.pdf ). 23. France was the source behind the extension of the area of ESPDÊs intervention to a large part of the African continent. 24. Frédéric Mérand and Haingo Mireille Rakotonirina, ÂLa force européenne au Tchad et en Centrafrique: le baptême du feuÊ, Politique africaine, No. 114, 2009, p. 107. 25. The Irish Gen. Patrick Nash assumed command of the operation from the Operational Headquarters at Mont Valérien in France. while the French General Jean-Philippe Ganascia commanded the European force from the Force Headquarters on the ground in NÊDjaména and Abéché. 26. Tobias Koepf, ÂThe Problems of French-Led Peace Operations in Francophone SubSaharan AfricaÊ, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 19, No. 3, June 2012, p. 338; Antoine Raynoux, ÂAdaptation, Projection, Convergence? LÊeuropéanisation de la défense et lÊintervention militaire EUFOR Tchad/RCAÊ, Politique européenne, No. 34, 2011, p. 212. 27. Bruno Charbonneau, ÂFranceÊ, in David R. Black and Paul D. Williams (eds.), The International Politics of Mass Atrocities. The Case of Darfur, London/New York: Routledge, pp. 213 231. 28. Hylke Dijkstra, ÂThe Military Operation of the EU in Chad and the Central African Republic: Good Policy, Bad PoliticsÊ, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2010, pp. 395 407. 29. In addition to €18.5 million as part of the overall European contribution, France had to allocate €130 million to EUFOR from its own budget in 2008, excluding the costs of using human and material resources from Operation Epervier. See Sénat (France), Rapport dÊinformation sur les opérations extérieures sous le contrôle du Parlement, No. 178, 23 January 2009, p. 14. The Protocol of 11 March 2008 between the French and Chadian governments on the granting of budgetary aid in support of the implementation of the Coordination nationale dÊAppui à la Force internationale à lÊEst du Tchad (CONAFIT) may illustrate the existence of many additional costs. The Protocol is online (at: www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/pays-zones-geo/tchad/). 30. A permanent structure within the EU Council, the Political and Security Committee issues recommendations about the launching of operations. French Ambassador Christine Roger assumed the presidency of the Political and Security Committee during the French presidency of the Council of the European Union.

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When peacekeeping meets French realpolitik 165 31. Vincent Hugeux, ÂLÊEUFOR a des faiblessesÊ, LÊExpress, 2 October 2008 (at: www. lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/afrique/l-eufor-a-des-faiblesses_580785.html); ÂReprise du déploiement de la force européenne EUFORÊ, RFI, 12 February 2008 (at: www.rfi.fr/ actufr/articles/098/article_62716.asp). 32. From October 2000 to date, the department was successively headed by four French diplomats. When EUFOR was launched, Jean-Marie Guéhenno assumed the position before being replaced as head of department by Alain Le Roy, when France held the EU presidency. 33. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic pursuant to paragraphs 9 (d) and 13 of Security Council resolution 1706 (2006), UN doc. S/2006/1019, 22 December 2006, §84. 34. Â[F]ollowing discussions with Mr. Kouchner the President [Déby] had agreed, in principle, to the deployment of an international military presence in Eastern Chad composed of French and other European Union forcesÊ. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic, UN doc. S/2007/488, 10 August 2007, §25. 35. Patrick Berg, ÂEUFOR Tchad/RCA: The EU Serving French InterestsÊ, in Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin (eds.), The EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence?, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2009, p. 60. 36. Ibid. 37. Also see Bjoern H. Seibert, ÂEUFOR Tchad/RCA A Cautionary NoteÊ, European Security Review, No. 37, March 2008. 38. UN Security Council (see n. 34). 39. Dijkstra (see n. 28). 40. Charbonneau (see n. 27), pp. 224 225. 41. Berg (see n. 35), p. 60. 42. Bjoern H. Seibert, African Adventure? Assessing the EUÊs Military Intervention in Chad and the Central African Republic, Working Paper, Massachussetts Institute of Technology Security Studies Program, November 2007, p. 17. 43. Dijkstra (see n. 28). 44. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Chad and the Central African Republic, UN doc. S/2007/97, 23 February 2007, §§67 and 68. 45. Alexander Mattelaer, The Strategic Planning of UE Military Operations: The Case of EUFOR Tchad/RCA, Working Paper No.5, Institute for European Studies, 2008, p. 19 (at: http://aei.pitt.edu/33107/1/mattelaer._alexander.pdf ). 46. Johanne Favre, ÂLe rêve de Largeau, pacifier et développer lÊEst du TchadÊ, Afrique contemporaine, No. 232, 2009, p. 116. 47. For instance, Margaret A. Majumdar, and Tony Chafer, ÂBack to the Future? FrancoAfrican Relations in the Shadow of FranceÊs Colonial PastÊ, in Tony Chafer and Emmanuel Godin (eds.), The End of the French Exception? Decline and Revival of the ÂFrench ModelÊ, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. 203 220; Jean-François Bayart, ÂQuelle politique africaine pour la France?Ê, Politique africaine, No. 121, March 2011, pp. 147 159; Philippe Bernard, ÂLa politique africaine de Nicolas Sarkozy tarde à rompre avec une certaine opacitéÊ, Le Monde, 26 March 2009. 48. Jean-François Bayart, La politique africaine de François Mitterrand, Paris: Karthala, 1984, pp. 11 18. 49. The African cell of the Elysée; the Prime MinisterÊs Office; the Department of Africa and the Indian Ocean; the Department of International Cooperation and Development of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the French Development Agency; the French Ministry of Economy and Finance; the French Ministry of Defense and its intelligence services; the French état major; and the actors involved in the opaque political-military-economic networks. 50. Jean-François Bayart, ÂRéflexions sur la politique africaine de la FranceÊ, Politique africaine, No. 58, June 1995, p. 48.

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51. Laurent dÊErsu, ÂLa crise ivoirienne, une intrigue franco-françaiseÊ, Politique africaine, No. 105, pp. 85 104. 52. Interview with Roland Dumas, former French minister in ÂTchad: Histoire secrète dÊune négociationÊ, La Lettre de lÊInstitut François Mitterrand, No. 12, June 2005 (at: www.mitterrand.org/Tchad-histoire-secrete-d-une.html). 53. Robert Buijtenhuijs, Transition et élections au Tchad 1993 1997. Restauration autoritaire et recomposition politique, Paris-Leiden: Karthala-Afrika Studiecentrum, 1998, pp. 54 56. 54. On the nature of the Chadian regime, see Amnesty International, Tchad, le cauchemar continue, 1993 (at: www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR20/004/1993/en); Buijtenhuijs (see n. 53); François-Xavier Verschave, Noir silence. Qui arrêtera la Françafrique?, Paris: Les Arènes, 2000, pp. 151 174. 55. Yorongar (see n. 12); Agir Ici et Survie (see n. 17); Stephen Smith, ÂLÊélection présidentielle au Tchad est entachée de multiples fraudesÊ, Le Monde, 24 May 2001. 56. Hearing of Bernard Kouchner, former French minister of Foreign and European Affairs, at the Assemblée nationale, 6 February 2008 (at : www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/crcafe/07-08/c0708038.asp#P11_187); Hearing of Hervé Morin, former French minister of defense, at the Assemblée nationale, 7 July 2010 (at: www.assemblee-nationale. fr/13/cr-cafe/09-10/c0910088.asp#P6_47). See also Jean-François Bayart, ÂObscénité franco-tchadienneÊ, Le Monde, 13 February 2008. 57. Hearing of Bruno Foucher, former French ambassador in Chad, at the Assemblée nationale, 23 March 2010 (at: www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/cr-cafe/09-10/ c0910046.asp#P6_47). 58. Charbonneau (see n. 27), pp. 222 227. 59. Laurent Zecchini, ÂLa force est au Tchad, mais où est lÊennemi ?Ê, Le Monde, 24 May 2008. 60. Some Chadian rebel movements accused EUFOR of protecting Idriss Déby ItnoÊs regime, and the Chadian president strongly criticized the European force for not getting involved during the rebel attack launched in June 2008. 61. International Crisis Group, Tchad: Powder Keg in the East, Africa Report No. 149, 15 April 2009, p. 20 (at: www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/chad/ Chad%20Powder%20Keg%20in%20the%20East.pdf ). 62. CCFD-Terre Solidaire, Le développement piégé. Les transferts dÊarmes et le développement au Tchad (2005 2010), January 2012, pp. 30 31 (at: http://ccfd-terresolid aire.org/e_upload/pdf/rapport_tchad_ccfd-ts.pdf ). 63. Ibid., pp. 26 27. 64. For instance, the 2009 annual report to Parliament on French arms exports published by the French Defense Ministry (at: www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/articles/rapportd-exportations-d-armement-2009). 65. Babette Stern, ÂLe Tchad a acheté des armes avec lÊargent du pétroleÊ, Le Monde, 22 November 2000. 66. CCFD-Terre Solidaire (see n. 62), p. 25. 67. OHCHR, Situation des droits de lÊhomme à lÊEst du Tchad: progrès, défis et pistes dÊavenir, Avril 2008 Novembre 2010, December 2010, §16, p. 7 (at: www.ohchr.org/ Documents/Countries/TD/Rapport10122010.pdf ). 68. Verschave (see n. 54), p. 166. 69. Hearing of Bruno Foucher (see n. 57). 70. UN Security Council, Report of Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict in Chad, UN doc. S/2007/400, 3 July 2007, §24. 71. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, UN doc. S/2008/760, 4 December 2008, §22. 72. UN Security Council (see n. 84), §24; UN Security Council, Report of SecretaryGeneral on Children and Armed Conflict in Chad, UN doc. S/2008/532, 7 August 2008, §§12, 13, 14. 73. Ibid., §12.

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When peacekeeping meets French realpolitik 167 74. Marielle Debos, ÂLiving by the Gun in Chad: Armed Violence as a Practical OccupationÊ, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 43, No. 3, 2011, pp. 409 428. 75. Amnesty International, ÂNo Place for Us HereÊ: Violence Against Refugee Women in Eastern Chad, September 2009 (at: www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/ AFR20/008/2009); International Crisis Group, Tchad: Powder Keg in the East, Africa Report No. 149, 15 April 2009, p. 20 (at: www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/ central-africa/chad/Chad%20Powder%20Keg%20in%20the%20East.pdf ). 76. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, UN doc. S/2009/359, 14 July 2009, §33. 77. Marie-Claude Smouts, ÂLes aspects politiques des opérations de maintien de la paixÊ, in Brigitte Stern (ed.), La vision française des opérations de maintien de la paix, Tokyo/Paris: United Nations University-Montchrestien, 1997, p. 24. 78. Majumdar and Chafer (see n. 47).

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10 Improvising the liberal peace model A postcolonial view on the Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilization en Haiti (MINUSTAH)1 Marta Fernández Moreno, Carlos Chagas Vianna Braga, and Maíra Siman Gomes Combining an academic approach and a practitionerÊs perspective, this chapter aims to politicize the multiple encounters between a predefined peace operation model and everyday field realities. Based on a Postcolonial2 perspective, it is argued that the conventional peace operation model is, at the field level, constantly challenged, renegotiated, and hence improvised. By looking specifically at the Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilization en Haiti (MINUSTAH),3 this piece calls attention to the inevitable adaptations that the liberal peace model suffers when translated by postcolonial peacekeepers at the field level. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section discusses how a postcolonial theoretical perspective allows questioning the liberal peace model reproduced through UN peace missions. After an exploration, in the second section, of the material and symbolic influences of French colonialism in Haiti, the third section suggests that these influences, reproduced through La Francophonie, for instance, are part of the complex social terrain in which MINUSTAH operates. Finally, the last section of the chapter looks at the Latin American presence in MINUSTAH in order to reflect on how mandates, practices, and values of international peace missions are always adapted, disrupted, and improvised.

Improvising the (liberal peace) model of UN peace operations First of all, with regard to national ownership of the process, the building of national institutions, the establishment of the rule of law and the development of practices of democratic governance are essential elements of any stable and peaceful political life. These things cannot be improvised.4 Institution building, the establishment of the rule of law, and democratic governance are understood as key and non-negotiable ingredients of the so-called liberal consensus.5 According to Oliver Richmond contemporary peace operations are informed by a preconceived model of peace necessarily constructed from a

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liberal democratic basis.6 Also recognizing the normative elements subjacent to peace operations, Roland Paris argues that Âwithout exceptions, all peace building missions in the post Cold War period have tried to „transplant‰ liberal democratic institutions and values to the peripheral host nationsÊ.7 Thus, for Paris, new peace operations Âmay be viewed as a modern version of the old mission civilisatrice or the belief that European colonial powers had a duty to improve the people in their overseas possessions now translated into contemporary parlance as „capacity building‰ and „good governance‰ Ê.8 Although making explicit that peace operations export liberal-democratic norms from the centre to the periphery of the international system, Paris does not question the very liberal peace model being exported. In fact, as he recently affirmed, liberal norms and values are the only alternative presently available to lead war-torn societies to a peaceful environment.9 Contrary to ParisÊs view, critical authors have interrogated this model by pointing to its political character10 and stressing the violence behind the conventional wisdom that presents the liberal peace model as a necessary and unquestionable point of arrival. Moreover, and in line with the Postcolonial perspective, Beate Jahn and Nehal Bhuta argue that peace operations are guided by old modernization theory.11 According to such a theory, all societies and cultures are to undergo a natural and universal process of development, composed of sequential steps, the pace of which can be accelerated by means of assistance and even imposition from those located on more ÂadvancedÊ steps.12 For Postcolonialism, modernization theory naturalizes the characteristics of Western political institutions (centralized state, democracy, and free market), which must be emulated by states if they are to progress.13 This chapter also diverges from Paris by arguing that the Âliberal consensusÊ is always disrupted when ÂtransmittedÊ to the ÂperipheryÊ. In the context of UN peace operations, this disruption occurs because both the recipients of the model and the various actors comprising peace missions are not a tabula rasa on which the liberal peace discourse may be unambiguously read and reproduced.14 In line with this idea, one may claim that local and international agents exist not in a cultural vacuum but in a preoccupied space rich in values and experiences from which these very agents interpret the liberal peace agenda in multiple and unpredictable ways. This process of interpretation always leads to the rearticulation of the message of the Âinternational communityÊ echoed, for instance, in the speech of Permanent Representative of France to the UN Gerard Araud, opening this section. Although host societies have contingent and complex genealogies, their diversity is seldom taken into account by liberal peace discourses that see them through homogeneous categories such as Âthe localÊ. Moreover, those discourses are frequently structured through binary oppositions such as ÂmodernÊ versus Âtraditional/ non-modern/primitiveÊ, ÂliberalÊ versus Ânon-liberalÊ or ÂpeacefulÊ versus ÂviolentÊ.15 From a Postcolonial perspective, these binary oppositions are not self-evident or neutral. On the contrary, they are contingent constructions through which the Âmodern, liberal and peaceful WestÊ constitutes its authority over its opposite counterparts.16 In this sense, liberal peace practices can be seen as reproducing these boundaries

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between ÂSelf/West/GlobalÊ and ÂOther/Non-West/LocalÊ and as understanding those identities as something objective, natural, and unchangeable. By stigmatizing the ÂOtherÊ as ÂfailedÊ, ÂviolentÊ, and ÂirrationalÊ vis-à-vis the ÂsuccessfulÊ, ÂpacificÊ, and ÂrationalÊ West, such logocentric17 discourse compels one to regard these two camps as internally coherent and radically distinct from each other. Questioning this logic, Postcolonialism aims to destabilize such boundaries, by pointing to the several overlaps and ambiguities between these two poles. Looking specifically at the composition of UN peacekeeping forces, one can argue that the presence of peacekeepers from former colonial societies illuminates clearly the ambiguities that, according to Postcolonial thinkers, pervade all identities. The analysis of the social practices performed by the Âpost-colonial human componentÊ of peace missions has the potential to reveal the arbitrary character of the imaginary boundaries supposed to demarcate exclusive identities. If, on the one hand, postcolonial states integrating peace operations are inevitably located in a site of authority over host societies (such as the Haitian), on the other hand, they may be more willing to recognize, implicitly and/or explicitly, their internal ÂOthersÊ.18 By mobilizing their own colonial past, they emphasize their familiarity with the experiences of the host (postcolonial) country, blurring the distinction between ÂSelfÊ and ÂOtherÊ. In this regard, postcolonial countries may be understood as operating in a ÂlooseÊ space of ambiguity,19 which challenges the logocentrism that informs the liberal peace model of peace operations. This movement opens avenues for the negotiation and adaptation of the liberal peace tenets which, according to Western countries such as France, Âcannot be improvisedÊ.

Haiti and its (neo)colonial encounters ÂSe blan ki desideÊ, an old saying in Haitian creole, means ÂDecisions are always made by foreignersÊ (or, more accurately, ÂWhite man decidesÊ) and clearly reflects the common feeling among Haitians that they are not responsible for their destinies.20 Furthermore, it shows that Haitians such as the East in Edward SaidÊs Orientalism did not have the power to represent themselves in their own words.21 ÂMore powerfulÊ Western actors would do it on their behalf, throughout the various colonial encounters that have permeated the history of Haiti. The most pervasive encounter is certainly the French colonial one, which led to new cultural formations in Haitian society, heavily influenced by modern Enlightenment values of their French masters. Informed by supposedly universal principles of the French Revolution of 1789, Haitians proclaimed their independence from France in 1804, after undertaking a successful even if inconceivable from a European standpoint slave revolution: ÂAlthough the fact that many of its protagonists were slaves, and illiterate, has tended to obscure this fact, it was very much an Enlightenment revolutionÊ.22 Haitian revolutionary leaders regarded their early nationhood as modern and socially progressive despite HaitiÊs remaining represented by Western actors as a premodern, isolated, and culturally introverted nation.23

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Conceived by colonial discourse as not properly human, Haitians were seen as not ready to understand or even to mimic the ÂtrueÊ (French) revolution. This representation created the conditions of possibility for multiple violent practices against the black slave bodies of Haitians. These practices were at the basis of the exploratory economic system that gave France a splendorous status and the control of one of the most prosperous areas in the world,24 popularly known as the Pearl of the Caribbean. However, the racist discourse made it impossible for Europeans to conceive the ÂsubhumanÊ slaves of the Caribbean as being prepared to have the unalienable rights that, according to the French RevolutionÊs ideals, should be enjoyed by all human beings. Haiti exposed the limitations of the French Revolution, whose ideals were not considered valid for the colonial world. As Susan Buck-Morss notes, the slave rebellion threatened the very perpetuation of the institutional framework of the mercantile economy that sustained the human French bourgeoisie.25 According to Bruno Charbonneau, the French Republic has always been seen as distinct from the French Empire,26 constructing a representation of two different and separate Frances. By tracing a fixed frontier between these two ranges of national memories, it was possible to conceal the inconsistencies of the Republic and preserve the coherence of the universalist project informing the French Revolution.27 Revolutionary Haitians leaders put into question this imaginary border when, inspired by French values, they tried to bring the colonial world into modernity. The Haitian Revolution (1791 1804) thus exposed the limits and ambiguities of French universalism what Aimé Césaire called the Âfalse universalismÊ of the French Revolution.28 The Haitian Revolution was dissonant with the Âregime of truthÊ29 of the time, which (re)produced the superiority of the colonizer vis-à-vis the colonized and made it unimaginable that the colonized could occupy the same discursive space of the colonizer; or, in Buck-MorssÊs terms, it was unconceivable to have former slaves singing the Marseillaise.30 This movement, it is argued, questions the very foundations of modernity, since it destabilized the boundary separating ÂinsideÊ and ÂoutsideÊ, ÂSelfÊ and ÂOtherÊ challenging the very constitutive relationship between modernity and its ÂOthersÊ.31 To the extent that Haitian revolutionaries defied Western imaginary, they were silenced in traditional European narratives. Haitians were considered the Âbastard sons of the French RevolutionÊ.32 In this sense, it is not surprising that the Haitian revolution, as distinct from the American, found no resonance in Europe.33 Independence condemned Haiti to decades of isolation. Nevertheless, in spite of the singular independence achieved by Haitian slaves in the nineteenth century, the Haitian elite34 kept alive the French colonial heritage, reproducing its former metropolitan habits and alienating the Haitian masses descended from African slaves. While the elite tried to reproduce the beauty and luxury of the French aristocracy, it also got involved in an intense struggle for power, with different groups exploiting others as slaves. Ironically, they came to apply the same methods of the colonial period, using even greater violence.35 The persistent violence, coupled with the recurring political instability, was read by the United States as a proof of the incapacity of Haitians to govern

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themselves, creating the conditions for a military intervention that, according to Jason MacLeod, was informed by a paternalistic discourse.36 Justified on the basis of the Monroe Doctrine, US intervention from 1915 to 1934 aimed to restore order, control the country´s finances, and contain the political turmoil. The official rhetoric portrayed the American enterprise as a noble and self-sacrificing mission.37 Different from the French colonial discourse, Americans understood that Haitians could gradually be brought inside modernity, starting from a material modernization process which would give them access to a modern infrastructure (roads, hospitals, and public buildings) followed by a spiritual civilizing uplift that would permit Haitians to become, in an undetermined future, citizens inside a liberal and democratic framework.38 This movement reinforced the perspective that Haitians were not yet capable of absorbing modern values because they were still in a less advanced stage of intellectual maturity. Promoted by the United States, Haiti´s modernization would have to be further undertaken through intermediation by the local elite. The pattern of violence and alienation of local voices persisted during the US occupation. According to Sidney Mintz, as the United States identified those in the Haitian society who spoke its language, literally or figuratively, and reinforced the pattern of exclusion to which most Haitians were relegated for years.39 During the occupation, US interaction with Haiti was informed by the same logocentric discourse of French colonialism that also structured and reproduced discriminatory dynamics between the local elite and the great majority of the Haitian population. For Sankaran Krishna, the national elites of postcolonial states recurrently use modernization narratives to legitimize their political supremacy and supposed cultural superiority over the rest of the population.40 In this case, one may think of the process as the Âinternalization of colonizationÊ that created two separate Haitis. The pervasiveness of both French and US influences further contributes to the hybridity of Haitian identity, which is neither Âmodern/globalÊ (French or North American) nor Âpre-modern/localÊ (Indigene/African), but a Âthird spaceÊ.41 This Âthird spaceÊ is defined not by a mere combination of two or more entities (modernity and nonmodernity or global and local), partly reflecting their attributes, but as something qualitatively different.42 In this perspective, the multiple legacies of international presence in Haiti that constitute this third space are ingredients of the material and symbolic terrain that has to be considered and negotiated by any contemporary multinational peace operation deployed in the country.

Fraternité and backstage diplomacy In March 2004, French President Jacques Chirac, in a phone call to Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, formally expressed his desire to have Brazil in command of a UN military force in Haiti, to be created three months later, as had been already discussed with the UN Secretary General.43 This invitation was also supported by the United States and the EU, as well as by Latin American countries such as Peru, Argentina, and Chile.44 On the one side, the invite can be interpreted as sign of an attempt by France and the United States to maintain their

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influence over Haiti, while not being seen as the UN missionÊs forefront driver. On the other side, France and United StatesÊ backstage diplomacy reflects a widespread perception that postcolonial countries, such as those from Latin America, are capable of implementing a pattern of interventionism perceived as less hostile by the international and local communities. This view also coincides with the perception that some so-called emerging powers, such as Brazil and South Africa, can effectively play a bridge-building role between the West and former colonies and therefore act as a more legitimate Âtransmission beltÊ45 of the Âinternational communityÊ liberal peace project. To place postcolonial emerging powers in a bridge-building role means that some countries are seen as occupying a space of intermediation, of Âin-betweenessÊ, that may serve to soften hierarchies and authority structures of neocolonial mechanisms. One may argue that this perceived condition of ÂliminalityÊ46 where self and other coexist was emphasized by Brazil in the process of MINUSTAH´s authorization.47 In fact, BrazilÊs willingness to engage in Haiti was articulated through the concept of nonindifference, opening space for military engagement in Haiti.48 The nonindifference principle also contributed to construct the Brazil as naturally prepared to have a leadership role in MINUSTAH. Brazil shares some identity background with Haiti and is perceived as a country that has been capable of successfully dealing with the same kind of issues that have historically confronted Haitian society. Through this discourse of ÂsimilarityÊ and ÂsolidarityÊ, Haiti is articulated as a similar other vis-à-vis the Brazilian self.49 Beyond backing BrazilÊs leadership, there was another element in France´s attempt to circumvent its Âlegitimacy deficitÊ concerning another intervention in Haiti: La Francophonie. The Organisation Internacionale de la Francophonie (OIF), known informally as Francophonie, officially supported Security Council Resolution 1542, authorizing MINUSTAH´s deployment. ÂBorn from the desire of former French colonized territoriesÊ,50 the OIF is frequently seen as an institutionalized social space of equal sovereign nations sharing common values and principles. The nonmetropolitan origins of the OIF which has Haiti among its founding members may corroborate the claim that Francophonie goes beyond colonialism.51 In fact, according to Gabrielle Parker, although Francophonie Âis intimately linked with colonization the coining of the word in 1880 coincides with the height of nineteenth-century colonialism the development of the notion coincides with the process of decolonization . . .Ê.52 To the French Foreign Office, Âtoday Francophonie is free from such a colonial connotationÊ.53 In this perspective, which assumes that former French colonies have moved from a subaltern status to a conquered position of postcolonial agency, OIF support of MINUSTAH contributes to counterbalance potential accusations of (neo)colonialism against France. Nevertheless, some may defend that Âit is not unreasonable to question whether Francophonie is genuinely postcolonial or yet another avatar of colonialismÊ.54 Even those with a more altruistic view on Francophonie´s stance recognize that OIF remains a political institution on which ÂFrance continues to rely in order to get votes and support in international foraÊ.55 Although La Francophonie is part

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of a broader shift that has substituted a pattern of imperial bonds by a ÂcommonwealthÊ approach, it may, in a certain sense, also contribute to the perpetuation of hierarchical relationships between France and its former colonies. In this regard, one may notice that the fraternity discourse and the values of peace, democracy, and human rights56 that lie at the heart of La Francophonie coincide with the liberal peace values reproduced by peace operations.

The (re)invention of MINUSTAH’s practices: The participation of Latin American countries From a postcolonial perspective, a message is never reproduced with authenticity; the content of a message is always disrupted and displaced.57 Looking specifically at MINUSTAH´s practices, one may see this impossibility of having a faithful copy of a predetermined (peace operation) model. The great involvement of postcolonial peacekeepers in Haiti helps in our understanding of how the original mandate is, at the field level, constantly challenged and renegotiated. Instead of conceiving Haitian society as an empty space to be filled by a (UN) model, Latin American contingents of MINUSTAH have shown an alternative engagement with difference. By recognizing their internal (postcolonial) Others, Latin American components are able to establish a more empathetic relation with the host society and simultaneously to speak from an ambiguous site, eventually challenging the civilisational imaginary reproduced by the liberal peace model. MINUSTAH brought along a heavy Latin American participation (more than 60% of the troops in 2010), including its leadership.58 Latin American countries came with their own views and values regarding how MINUSTAH´s mandate should be implemented. Brazilian military and political authorities, for instance, have faced many dilemmas in establishing acceptable terms for grounding Brazilian action in Haiti and have therefore dealt with constant negotiations in relation to its desired posture and preconceived models. MINUSTAH was established to support the Transitional Government of Haiti (TGOH) and the Haitian National Police (HNP), recognized as the only legal armed group in the country. A mandate that recognizes only TGOH and HNP, without recognizing any other party, can hardly be considered completely impartial. In terms of consent, it is correct to affirm that TGOH agreed to MINUSTAHÊs presence in Haiti, as presented in the Status of Forces Agreement signed by the Haitian prime minister. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of this act was somewhat questionable: although the president was nominated in accordance with the Haitian Constitution, the prime minister who at that time was responsible for running the government was selected by a Conseil des Sages (Council of the Wise) and imported from the Haitian diaspora. This process was considered illegitimate by part of the population because, according to Haitian legislation, the prime minister should have been chosen by the president and approved by the parliament. These problems regarding impartiality and consent (important pillars of UN peacekeeping) and the existence of heavily armed groups conducting illegal activities and harassing the population resulted in the UN military componentÊs often having to resort to the use of force beyond self-defence in order to accomplish its tasks.

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The position negotiated by Latin American troops in this ambiguous environment permitted a temporary management of the inherent tensions between the written mandate and field-level necessities. Although in the early years, these troops were reluctant to use force, they actively protected political demonstrators, often against the will of the TGOH and occasionally even confronting the HNP. One of the most emblematic events occurred in February 2005, when MINUSTAH troops were escorting a large peaceful political demonstration. A group of Haitian National Police officers bypassed a MINUSTAH checkpoint and began shooting at the demonstrators, killing one of them and injuring some others. MINUSTAH SRSG stated publicly that its task of protecting the civilians was to take priority over the task of supporting the HNP and that if such an incident happened again, he would order the troops to fire on the HNP. Such improvised behaviour led to the populationÊs perception that MINUSTAH was more impartial than the terms originally articulated in the mandate. After a few robust operations, the need for the use of force decreased to minimum levels. Presidential elections led to a more legitimate government, and the three pillars of peacekeeping impartiality, consent, and minimum use of force were finally balanced. UN peacekeeping has evolved towards a more robust approach regarding the use of force.59 This has not been a consensual move in the organization and among troop contributing countries. In the first years of MINUSTAH deployment, major tensions regarding the expansion of the use of force emerged between Northern and Latin American countries. Due to their special interest in the mission, the United States, Canada, and France managed to have some influence on its configuration and mode of action. Supporting a political approach in which negotiations would be combined with use of force or at least a threat of use of force, those countries actively and intensely pressured for more aggressive and robust military actions.60 This pressure was ostensive and exerted in many ways: diplomatic démarches, constant visits and conversations, among others.61 MINUSTAH troops nonetheless did not share this vision and were reluctant to implement Northern demands. To most Latin American countries, an operation under Chapter VIIÊs coercive provisions was a new experience. Besides, there was also strong pressure from human rights organizations condemning any use of force (even threatening to bring charges against the force commander in the International Criminal Court). This issue of the use of force exposed Latin American countries, especially Brazilian military commanders, to multiple political tensions, building up a space for negotiation and eventually for the achievement of some kind of compromise. Force was finally used but not at the levels of frequency and intensity intended by the Northern countries. In these circumstances, MINUSTAH troops conceived some innovative ways to establish a permanent presence in critical and violent neighbourhoods of Portau-Prince. With limited use of force, troops were able to enter areas such as Belair and Cité Soleil and establish a permanent military presence in the form of so-called strong points. Unknown to most of the members of the mission bureaucracy, this technique, adapted by Brazilian troops, allowed a substantial increase in security levels in those areas, while over the long term resorting to minimum force.62 Results were considered successful from distinct perspectives. From a

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Haitian perspective, the levels of consent regarding the presence of the troops got even higher, and from a US perspective, US Permanent Representative to the UN Susan Rice highlighted the retaking of Cité Soleil as an important example of UN peacekeeping successes.63 Another example of inventiveness in the multiple encounters between a predefined peace operation model and field realities may be found in the adaptation, suggested by Brazil, to the election procedures during the 2006 Haitian poll. These elections were held with a significant participation of the population and were considered, in this specific point, a successful process by MINUSTAH officials. Vote counting, however, took a long time, and the population begun getting impatient. When the result was released and the successful candidate, René Préval, had not reached the necessary number of votes to avoid a second round, the situation on the streets deteriorated, resulting in barricades, fires, and indiscriminate violence. There was a feeling among the population that a fraud had been perpetrated to avoid Préval becoming president. At this point, Brazilian Ambassador Paulo Cordeiro proposed to the Core Group64 the adoption of what is known as the Belgian formula, in which blank voting papers are distributed proportionately among the candidates, with Préval thereby reaching the votes necessary to avoid a second round.65 After some initial resistance from the more conservative states of the Core Group, such as France and the United States, this ad hoc solution was adopted, and the crisis blew over, with Préval taking charge as president. This manoeuvre took advantage of a legal breach, managing to avoid a stalemate, the aggravation of the crisis, and the possibility of greater violence. We are not making a value judgement, but paradoxically one may argue that it is precisely a flexible reinterpretation of an electoral law that reaffirmed the stateÊs legal existence.66 The discourse guiding the participation of Latin American countries in MINUSTAH put considerable emphasis on the tripod of security, reconciliation, and development. The Brazilian government frequently expressed the view that Latin American engagement in Haiti aimed beyond stabilization to promote political dialogue and to support the economic, social, and institutional reconstruction of the country.67 When negotiating MINUSTAH´s authorization in the UN Security Council, Brazilian representatives were able not only to emphasize this tripod but also to add Âcombating povertyÊ as one of the missionÊs efforts.68 According to Paulo Esteves, ÂBrazilÊs manoeuvre was, then, to understand development beyond the liberal frame, trying to incorporate practices and emulate specific policies designed to combat poverty and hungerÊ.69 MINUSTAHÊs mandate, however, did not properly contemplate a specific pillar for development. Development tasks were not to be taken primarily by MINUSTAH but rather by willing donor countries and organizations. From a Latin American perspective, this situation represented a major challenge because development was considered paramount in order to achieve success in the implementation of the mandate. The shared commitment of Latin American states to development promotion in Haiti was reflected in the creation of an institutional mechanism 2  9 in the form of meetings between the deputy ministers of defence and of foreign relations from the nine Latin American countries engaged in MINUSTAH

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and Haitian authorities. According to Rut Diamint, this mechanism permitted Latin American states to coordinate common positions in the UN Security Council regarding the situation in Haiti.70 Consultation and coordination among Latin American states created a specific space for dialogue in which Latin American states could operate and negotiate both with other countries comprising the UN mission and with the Haitian government. Latin American states were able to establish political grounds for a new set of interactions and arrangements out of the institutional limits of MINUSTAH. By identifying the lack of developmental initiatives as one of the main weaknesses of MINUSTAH´s mandate, countries such as Brazil, Chile, and Argentina established different programmes and partnerships with third-party actors. Some of those projects involved Northern countries, some involved Southern countries (and specific national agencies and federal universities), and others involved NGOs. Combating poverty and hunger in Haiti, an issue not directly included in MINUSTAH´s mandate, created a shared space of conversation between Northern and Southern worlds. Tripartite agreements, such as the one celebrated among Brazil, Canada, and Argentina regarding food and agricultural security issues,71 constitute examples of innovative ways in which Latin American countries have contributed to the multinational intervention in this former French colony.72 Agreements such as the one signed in 2009 between France and Brazil concerning the creation of a milk bank in Haiti, shows how postcolonial states may produce groundbreaking relations between former colonial powers and former colonies.73 Moreover, the presence of postcolonial states in Haiti has also created grounds for advancing South South cooperation through institutionalized coordinating mechanisms, such as through IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa), which successfully worked together with the UN to promote jobs and reduce poverty.74 In those projects, conflict stabilization is interpreted through comprehensive lens: security does not mean only the reduction of violence but necessarily involves reducing the general needs of the population and alleviating social and economic vulnerabilities that are thought to generate the enabling conditions for criminal and political violence.75 As emphasized by Brazilian Ambassador Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations, Âthe stabilization gains facilitated by MINUSTAH will not be sustainable in the absence of improvements in the situation of the poorer and the most vulnerable, which constitute the large majority of the Haitian populationÊ.76 These brief examples help to explain how Latin American states and other postcolonial countries/arrangements in the UN mission operate in an ambiguous social and discursive context, allowing for daily life negotiations and the emergence of mixed patterns of action.

Conclusion This chapter has suggested that a Postcolonial analysis of contemporary peace operations allows the problematization of the reproduction of the liberal peace model embedded in UN missions mandates. On the one side, this model is seen as

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grounded in a logocentric discourse, which understands the ÂOtherÊ as the Âdark mirror imageÊ of a successful, democratic, and liberal Western ÂSelfÊ.77 On the other side, by acting as Âtransmission beltsÊ of the liberal peace model, UN peace operations may be perceived as responsible for promoting the modernization of Âless advancedÊ societies or, in other words, for the universalization of enlightenment (liberal) values. Nevertheless, this chapter exposes the pitfalls of this universalist perspective and shows with illustrations from MINUSTAH´s Latin American experiences that any attempt to impose a preconceived model is permanently questioned, dislocated, and negotiated when this very model meets not only local recipients but also, as emphasized here, when it is translated into practice by peace operations contingents. This chapter does not intend to romanticize the postcolonial agency, here represented by Latin American contingents, vis-à-vis neocolonial agents.78 It goes against the essentialist idea regarding a Latin American way of peacekeeping, presupposing a better, natural, and stable identity from which patterns of behaviour could be drawn. Instead, it is assumed that hybridism and ambivalence pervade all identities. The recognition of this condition provides new analytical lenses through which one can see the multiple improvizations and negotiations inherent in the encounters between the liberal peace operation model and its multinational agents. Regarding the relations between the francophone world and UN peacekeeping operations, the technical and political support given by the OIF to MINUSTAH apparently helps in reinforcing traditional perspectives that UN missions do not reproduce colonial and imperial dynamics. Nevertheless, La Francophonie, as a social interacting space of cooperating nations, shares and promotes the liberal peace tenets and its logocentric rationale. Composed of a majority of Latin American troops, MINUSTAH has been exposed to symbolic and material pressures that range from the UN liberal peace model, French colonial heritage, and previous US interference to postcolonial worldviews and local demands. Although most of the ideas presented touched upon French legacies in Haiti, one should acknowledge the multiplicity of systemic and historical pressures that permeate any kind of intervention in former colonies. In the case of Haiti, there is no way to deny the overarching role played by the United States in its traditional Caribbean backyard. Beyond this geopolitical issue, North American influence is certainly exacerbated due to the size of the Haitian diaspora on its soil. One may hope that postcolonial lenses could add more complexity to the study of UN missions deployed in contexts where colonial difference is still so deeply rooted in everyday life. Many scholars have already been investigating a Âlocalliberal hybrid form of peaceÊ resulting from the interaction between top-down and bottom-up peace,79 looking at the reinterpretation of the liberal peace model made by host societies. Nevertheless, very few studies have explored how peacekeepers themselves also act in hybridizing the liberal peace mandate. The theoretical insights developed in this chapter to understand the translating role played by peacekeepers adds another dimension of analysis, until now

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undertheorized. In this regard, it should be recognized that the argument proposed here is not exclusive to Latin American peacekeepers. Other case studies may further illuminate how leading postcolonial contingents may also adapt the terms of a predefined mandate. In sum, this chapter helps in problematizing how the liberal peace model is resisted, transformed, and hybridized in multiple and nonpredictable ways not only by the local(s) but also by intermediate actors.80

Acknowledgements The chapter is the result of a joint effort by three authors with different theoretical and practical backgrounds. Thus, as well as the (postcolonial) argument proposed in this analysis, the chapter emerged from multiple negotiations of both academic positions and worldviews. The views expressed are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect any institutional position.

Notes 1. This chapter derives directly from the article ÂTrapped between Many Worlds: A PostColonial Perspective on the UN Mission in HaitiÊ, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2012. The article was revised and adapted to include a stronger focus on francophone aspects and on the question of the improvization of peace operation mandates. 2. The hyphenated term postcolonial will be used to denote a particular historical period or epoch. When used as a single word and with a capital letter, Postcolonialism refers to Âdisparate forms of representations, reading practices, attitudes and valuesÊ (John McLeod, Beginning Postcolonialism, Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2000, p. 5) Postcolonialism does not refer to something tangible Âbut rather is related to something which one does: it can describe a way of thinking, a mode of perception, a line of enquiryÊ (McLeod, p. 5). 3. The Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haiti (MINUSTAH) was conceived, in 2004, to serve as a model of contemporary and multidimensional peace operations. It comprises a mix of distinct elements military, police, and civilian aiming to work in close partnership with UN agencies. MINUSTAH´s innovative aspects also reside in its postcolonial influence, mainly expressed by its predominant Latin American military component, including its leadership. 4. Gerard Araud, Permanent Representative of France to the UN, speech in the UN Security Council on Institution Building, 21 January 2011 (at: www.franceonu.org/spip. php?article5353) (emphasis ours). 5. Oliver Richmond, ÂThe Globalization of Responses to Conflict and the Peacebuilding ConsensusÊ, Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of Nordic International Studies Association, Vol. 39, No. 2, 2004, pp. 129 150. 6. Ibid. 7. Roland Paris, ÂEchoes of the „Mission Civilisatrice‰: Peacekeeping in the Post Cold War EraÊ, in Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond (eds.), The United Nations and Human Security, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2001, p. 100. 8. Paris, ÂSaving Liberal PeacebuildingÊ, Review of International Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2010, pp. 337 365. 9. Ibid., p. 357 10. See a response to Paris that challenges his key claims, including the idea that Âthere is no alternative to liberal peacebuildingÊ. Neil Cooper, Mandy Turner, and Michael Pugh, ÂThe End of History and the Last Liberal Peacebuilder: A Reply to Roland

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11.

12. 13.

14. 15. 16. 17.

18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

24. 25.

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ParisÊ, Review of International Studies, Vol. 37, No. 4, 2011, pp. 1995 2007. For a postcolonial perspective on peace operations, see Bruno Charbonneau, ÂThe Colonial Legacy of Peace(building): France, Europe, AfricaÊ, Paper at the ISAÊs 50th Annual Convention, Exploring the Past, Anticipating the Future, New York, February 2009 (at: www.allacademic.com/meta/p311200_index.html); Phillip Darby, ÂRolling Back the Frontiers of Empire: Practising the PostcolonialÊ, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 16, No. 5, 2009, pp. 699 716; Kristoffer Lidén, ÂPeace, Self-Governance and International Engagement: A Postcolonial Ethic of Liberal PeacebuildingÊ, Paper at ISAÊs 50th Annual Convention (at: www.allacademic.com/meta/p312060_index.html). Nehal Bhuta, ÂAgainst State-BuildingÊ, Constellations, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2008, pp. 517 542; Beate Jahn, ÂThe Tragedy of Liberal Diplomacy: Democratization, Intervention, StatebuildingÊ (Parts I and 2), Journal of Intervention and Peacebuilding, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2007, pp. 87 106 and Vol. 1, No. 2, 2007, pp. 211 229. Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of Difference, Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2004. Sankaran Krishna, Globalization & Postcolonialism. Hegemony and Resistance in the Twenty-First Century, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009; Inayatullah and Blaney (see n. 12). On the postcolonial criticism of modernization theory, see Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney, ÂNeo-Modernization? IR and the Inner Life of Modernization TheoryÊ, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2002, pp. 103 137. Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture, Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 1994. Lidén (see n. 10). See Jacques Derrida, Posições [Positions], Belo Horizonte, Brazil: Autêntica Editora, 2001; Edward Said, Orientalismo: O Oriente como Invenção do Ocidente [Orientalism: How the West invented the Orient], São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1990. Jacques Derrida calls logocentrism the modern predisposition for the production of binary oppositions for example, colonizer/colonized or civilized/barbarian. Such dichotomies are frequently followed by moral judgements of good and bad. By the logocentric procedure, one of the two categories is privileged over the other, connoting a presence or a purity that the other lacks. Although these oppositions are taken as truth, Derrida says that they are in no way natural or self-evident but instead hierarchical constructions. (Jacques Derrida, A Escritura e a Diferença [Writing and difference], São Paulo: Editora Perspectiva, 1967; Richard Devetak, ÂPostmodernismÊ, in Scott Burchill, Richard Devetak, Andrew Linklater, Matthew Paterson, Christian ReusSmit, and Jacqui True, Theories of International Relations (2nd ed.), Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave/Macmillan, 1995, p. 187.) Tzvetan Todorov, The Conquest of America. The Question of the Other, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999 (originally published 1984). Rohan Kalyan, ÂThe Ambiguity of the Law in Everyday LifeÊ, Virtual Politics, 5 March 2009 (at: www.virtualpolitics-india.blogspot.com/2009/03/ambiguity-of-law-in-every day-life.html). Christophe Wargny, L´Haiti nÊexiste pas! 1804 2004: Deux cents ans de solitude [Haiti does not exist!: Two hundred years of isolation], Paris: Autrement, 2004, p. 174. Krishna (see n. 13), pp. 72 73. Laurent Dubois, ÂIn Search of the Haitian RevolutionÊ, in Charles Fordsick and David Murphy (eds.), Francophone Postcolonial Studies. A Critical Introduction, London: Arnold, 2003, p. 29. Martin Munro and Robbie Shilliam, ÂAlternative Sources of Cosmopolitanism: Nationalism, Universalism and Créolité in Francophone Caribbean ThoughtÊ, in R. Shilliam (ed.), International Relations and Non-Western Thought: Imperialism, Colonialism and Investigations of Global Modernity, London: Routledge, 2011, pp. 159 177. Sidney W. Mintz, ÂCan Haiti Change?Ê, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 1, 1995, pp. 73 86. Susan Buck-Morss, ÂHegel and HaitiÊ, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2000, p. 837.

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26. Bruno Charbonneau, ÂDreams of Empire: France, Europe, and the New Interventionism in AfricaÊ, Modern & Contemporary France, Vol. 16, No. 3, 2008, p. 280. 27. Ibid., p. 281. 28. Aimé Césaire, apud Martin Munro and Robbie Shilliam (see n. 23), p. 164. 29. Michel Foucault, Em Defesa da Sociedade [Society must be defended], São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2005, pp. 325 351. 30. Buck-Morss (see n. 25), p. 865. 31. For a bold articulation of how relations of alterity or multiple exclusions offer the basis of modern subjectivity, see R. B. J. Walker, ÂThe Double Outside of Modern InternationalÊ, Ephemera, Vol. 6, No. 1, 2006, pp. 56 89. 32. Wargny (see n. 20), p. 190. 33. Buck-Morss (see n. 25). 34. St. Domingue had a singular elite comprising so-called gens de couleur, or mulattos, the majority of whom descended from conjugal relations between French farmers grand blancs and their slave women. The mulattos were intermediaries in terms of class, status, and power between the grand blancs and the great majority of African slaves. Resulting even from miscegenation between Europeans and Africans, mulattos considered themselves closer to white Europeans and therefore Âmore civilizedÊ and ÂadvancedÊ than African blacks. (Mintz (see n. 24); Alex Dupuy, ÂLegacies of the Haitian Revolution: The Duvalier Regime and Color Politics in Haiti: 1957 1971Ê, Conference on Black Liberation and the Spirit of 57, Binghamton University, State University of New York, November 2007. 35. Pierre Luc-Joseph, Haiti: Les Origines du Chaos [Haiti: Origins of chaos], Port-auPrince: Imprimerie Henri Deschamps, 1997. 36. Jason D. MacLeod, ÂFrom De-to-Post-to-Neo-Colonization: A Brief History of HaitiÊs OccupationsÊ, JDM, 10 November 2011 (at: www.jasondmacleod.com/?page_id=175). 37. Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915 1934, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1995, p. 13. 38. Ibid. 39. Mintz (see n. 24). 40. Krishna (see n. 13). 41. Bhabha (see n. 14) 42. Krishna (see n. 13). 43. Message transmitted to the public by the official Brazilian spokesman, André Singer, 5 March 2004 (at: www.gazetadigital.com.br/conteudo/show/secao/10/materia/30135). 44. Estado de São Paulo, ÂBrasil vai comandar Força de Paz da ONU no HaitiÊ [Brazil to command the peace mission in Haiti], 8 April 2004 (at: www.estadao.com.br/arquivo/ mundo/2004/not20040408p26625.htm). 45. Roland Paris, ÂInternational Peacebuilding and the Mission CivilisatriceÊ, Review of International Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2002, pp. 637 656. 46. According to Bahar Rumelili, liminality signifies the interrelationship between two identities the condition of oneÊs identity being constructed as partly self/partly other with regard to another identity. (Bahar Rumelili, ÂLiminality and Perpetuation of Conflicts: Turkish Greek Relations in the Context of Community-Building by the EUÊ. European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2003, p. 222.) 47. It is important to underscore that liminality, as emphasized by Rumelili, is not an objective condition that is inherent in a groupÊs history, culture, or identity but rather a contextual position that is socially and discursively produced. (Ibid., p. 22.) 48. The idea of nonindifference originally elaborated in the framework of the African Union was articulated by the ex-Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs Celso Amorim. 49. Maira Siman Gomes, Â „Pacification‰ and the (Re)production of the National State: Re-inscribing BrazilÊs Engagement in the United Nations Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)Ê, Paper presented at the ISAÊs 54th Annual Convention, The Politics of International Diffusion: Regional and Global Dimensions, San Francisco, April 2013.

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50. Le Monde, 2 December 1995, Xavier Deniau, as cited in Olivier Milhaud, ÂPostFrancophonie?, EspacesTemps.net, 7 August 2006 (at: http://espacestemps.net/docu ment2077.html). 51. Gabrielle Parker, for instance, believes that francophonie, as a community of people, Âgoes beyond colonialismÊ. (Gabrielle Parker, ÂFrancophonie and „Universalité‰: Evolution of Two Notions ConjoinedÊ, in Charles Fordsick and David Murphy (eds,), Francophone Postcolonial Studies. A Critical Introduction, London: Arnold, 2003, p. 101.) For a criticism of this view, refer to Milhaud (see n. 50). 52. As an institutionalized social space, La Francophonie became an affaire dÊÉtat in 1969, with the first conference of États francophones in Niamey, Niger [Gabrielle Parker (see n. 51)]. In the 1980s, the francophone community became more formalized, earning a UN observer status. 53. Ministère des Affaires étrangères et européennes (MAEE) [Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs] apud Milhaud (see n. 50). 54. Parker (see n. 51). 55. Parker (see n. 51) p. 97. 56. According to the Quebec City Declaration (17 19 October 2008), Âpeace, democracy and human rightsÊ are considered fundamental values promoted by La Francophonie. See the official website (at: www.francophonie.org/Organigramme-de-la-Fran cophonie.html). According to Deniau (apud Milhaud), the notion of Francophonie encompasses four dimensions: (1) institutional, (2) linguistic, (3) geographical, and (4) ÂmysticalÊ. Francophonie may refer therefore to an organization, to a community that promotes the French language and French values, to a space of French-speaking countries, and to a specific sense of belonging. (Deniau apud Milhaud [see n. 50].) 57. Bhabha (see n. 14). 58. See the MINUSTAH official website (at: www.minustah.org). 59. United Nations, ÂA New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN PeacekeepingÊ, New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support, 2009, p. 21 (at: www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon .pdf ). 60. Carlos Chagas Vianna Braga, ÂMINUSTAH and the Security Environment in Haiti: Brazil and South America Cooperation in the FieldÊ, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 17, No. 5, 2010, pp. 711 722. 61. Roberto Abdenur, Brazilian ambassador to the United States 2004 2006, mentions the pressure exerted at his level in an article published in the newspaper Folha de São Paulo, 24 May 2008. 62. This position is interesting because it reinforces the way Brazil, by making use of its postcolonial condition and in order to legitimate an alternative way of intervention, tries to differentiate itself from (French) colonial and (US) imperial imaginary, avoiding a more intense and permissive use of force and emphasizing its familiarity with Haitian problems. Nevertheless, BrazilÊs position reinforces its leadership vis-à-vis Latin American and Caribbean counterparts, inevitably reproducing hierarchical relationships and at the same time demanding special attention in order to avoid being associated with previous colonial practices. 63. Susan Rice, ÂWritten Testimony Submitted by Ambassador Susan E. Rice, US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on „Confronting New Challenges Facing United Nations Peacekeeping Operations‰ Ê, US Mission to the UN, 29 July 2009 (at: www.usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2009/ july/126844.htm). 64. The Core Group was established by the Security Council Resolution 1542 of 2004 to facilitate the implementation of MINUSTAHÊs mandate, promote interaction with the Haitian authorities as partners, and enhance the effectiveness of the international response in Haiti. The Group, chaired by the special representative of the secretarygeneral for Haiti and his/her deputies, comprises representatives of the Organization of American States (OAS), the Caribbean Community and Common Market

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65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70.

71.

72.

73.

74.

75.

76.

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(CARICOM), international financial institutions, and other interested stakeholders (at: www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sc8083.doc.htm). Macleans (Ontario), 6 March 2006, emphasized the Brazilian electoral initiative (at: www.macleans.ca). Kalyan (see n. 19). Celso Amorim, ÂSpeech at the Economic Forum, Jedá, Saudi ArabiaÊ, Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil, Vol. 32, No. 96, 2005, p. 80. Paulo Esteves, ÂÂIkke-likegyldighetÊ Brasiliansk KutenrikspolitikkÊ [Nonindifference and Brazilian engagement with multidimensional PKOs], Internasjonal Politikk, Vol. 2, 2011, pp. 282 292. Ibid. Rut Diamint. ÂEl 2  9: œUna incipiente comunidad de Seguridad en América Latina?Ê [The 2  9: An incipient security community in Latin America?], Policy Paper 18, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Berlin, 2007 (at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/la-seguri dad/50501.pdf ). Drawing on experience from Argentina, a tripartite project (Pro Huerta Trilateral Cooperation Project) focuses on educating people about cholera, training them in farming practices, and providing vegetable seeds. Based on Canadian technical expertise, the project is run in close collaboration with the Haiti Ministry of Agriculture. Presently, the diets of more than 90,000 people have greatly improved through Pro-Huerta HaitiÊs work, which has expanded through an agreement amongst Argentina, Canada, and Haiti (at: www.new-ag.info/en/developments/devItem.php?a=1823). When comparing the content and form of US cooperation agreements in Haiti during the 1990s with more recent accords, one may say that, although US assistance was guided mainly by more abstract and long-term necessities (informed, for instance, by Inter-American Development Bank [IDB] information), such as the construction of democracy, control of population augmentation, and economic growth, tripartite agreements tend to concentrate on more obvious and urgent local demands. See Paulo Gustavo Pelegrino Correa, ÂMINUSTAH e Diplomacia Solidária: criação de um novo paradigma nas operações de paz?Ê [MINUSTAH and diplomatic solidarity: Creation of a new paradigm for peace operations?], unpublished masterÊs dissertation, Universidade Federal de São Carlos, 2009. At a meeting on 18 September 2009, French Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Bernard Kouchner and Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim discussed strengthening cooperation amongst France, Brazil, and Haiti. In a meeting with Haitian President René Préval, Kouchner and Amorim launched a project for the creation of a breast milk bank, successfully tested in Brazil. It aims to collect breast milk to help mothers who cannot breastfeed. Haiti will provide the premises and the necessary staff. Brazil will provide expertise, and France will finance equipment purchases. (Ambassade de France à Port-au-Prince [Embassy of France in Port-au-Prince] [at: www.ambafranceht.org/Deplacement-de-Bernard-Kouchner-et].) The solid waste recycling project, from 2006 to 2008, represents an important example of a project run by the United Nations Development Programme office in Haiti with the support of IBAS. This initiative, which received international recognition and awards, contributed to the empowerment of the population and to the reduction of violence. According to Special Envoy of the UN to Haiti Bill Clinton, it was the best project he visited in Haiti. [Brazil, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brazilian Agency for Cooperation. Brazil Haiti: South South Cooperation Projects (at: www.abc.gov.br).] Robert Muggah, Ivan Campbell, Eduarda Hamann, Gustavo Diniz, and and Marina Motta, ÂPromoting Peace in the Post-1215 Framework. The Role of Rising PowersÊ, Igarapé Institute and Saferworld, February 2013 (at: http://pt.igarape.org.br/ promoting-peace-in-the-post-2015-framework-the-role-of-rising-powers/). Ambassador Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations. Statement on ÂThe Question Concerning HaitiÊ, 3 October 2012 (at: www.un.int/ brazil/speech/12d-mlrv-CSNU-The-Question-Concerning-Haiti.html).

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77. Rosa E. Brooks, ÂFailed States, or the State as Failure?Ê, University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 72, No. 4, 2005, pp. 1159 1196. 78. Kate Manzo, ÂCritical Humanism: Postcolonialism and Postmodern EthicsÊ, in David Campbell and Michael Shapiro (eds.), Moral Spaces. Rethinking Ethics and World Politics, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999. 79. See Oliver Richmond, ÂResistance and the Post-Liberal PeaceÊ, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 665 692; Roger Mac Ginty ÂHybrid Peace: The Interaction Between Top Down and Bottom Up PeaceÊ, Security Dialogue Vol. 41, No. 4, 2010, pp. 391 412. 80. Even recognizing, in line with Postcolonial thought, that the global resides in the local and vice-versa and that the intermediary is both global and local, the imaginary of levels helps to understood the approach developed in this chapter. This approach introduces an intermediate level of understanding that adds complexity to most theoretical perspectives articulated in the peace operations literature.

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