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Musical imagination: Perception and production, beauty and creativity Article in Psychology of Music · August 2012 DOI: 10.1177/0305735612444893

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Musical imagination: Perception and production, beauty and creativity David J. Hargreaves Psychology of Music 2012 40: 539 DOI: 10.1177/0305735612444893 The online version of this article can be found at: http://pom.sagepub.com/content/40/5/539

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POM0010.1177/0305735612444893HargreavesPsychology of Music

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Musical imagination:  Perception and production, beauty and creativity

Psychology of Music 40(5) 539­–557 © The Author(s) 2012 Reprints and permission: sagepub. co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0305735612444893 pom.sagepub.com

David J. Hargreaves Applied Music Research Centre, Roehampton University, UK

Abstract In our recently-published book Musical Imaginations (Hargreaves, Miell, & MacDonald, 2012), I suggest that the creative aspects of music listening have been neglected, and that putting these at the centre of musical creativity (which is usually seen as being manifested in the activities of composition, improvisation and performance) can lead to a more fundamental view of imagination as the cognitive basis of musical activity. I consider different approaches to the concept of musical beauty in experimental aesthetics and neuroscience, and also different views of the concept of imagination, which declined in psychology in favour of studies of creativity. I propose that we should redress this balance by orienting the study of musical activity around the musical imagination, such that the concept of musical creativity can be seen to be much more restricted in scope. I suggest that musical imagination involves different networks of association, and consider the existence of a creative general executive function for music. This leads to a revised and simplified reciprocalfeedback model of music processing, which exists at the core of both musical perception and musical production.

Keywords beauty, creativity, imagination, music, neuroscience, perception, production

Introduction Our recently-published book Musical Imaginations (Hargreaves, Miell, & MacDonald, 2012) argues for a rethinking of several big concepts in music psychology, and in particular of those associated with musical creativity. We suggest that the creative aspects of music listening have been neglected, and that putting these at the centre of musical creativity (which is usually seen as being manifested in the activities of composition, improvisation and performance) can lead to a more fundamental view of imagination as the cognitive basis of musical perception and production. Imagination is also the essence of the creative perception of music, and there is new research interest in the emotion-arousing properties of music as well as in the nature of musical beauty. Recent advances in neuroscience appear to confirm the functional similarities Corresponding author: David J. Hargreaves, Applied Music Research Centre, Roehampton University, Southlands College, Roehampton Lane, London, SW15 5SL, UK. Email: [email protected]

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between these different areas of creative activity in music, and this paper seeks to clarify and redefine some of these existing concepts. I start by looking at different views of the concept of imagination, which was considered to be of central importance in human life by such disparate figures as David Hume, Albert Einstein, and Aaron Copland, but which was declined in psychology in favour of the massive predominance of studies of creativity. I propose that we should reorient the study of musical perception and production, both of which are ‘creative’ activities, around the concept of musical imagination, and start with a consideration of Hume’s views on imagination, which were central to his whole philosophy. I next consider the definition of musical beauty, and its investigation and theorization in experimental aesthetics, and revisit the socio-cultural approach which gave rise to our proposal of a ‘reciprocal-feedback’ model of the response to music (Hargreaves, MacDonald, & Miell, 2005). My colleagues and I also previously proposed a reciprocal-feedback model of musical performance which runs parallel to the response model, and we then combined the two models so as to formulate a further model of musical communication. The revised and simplified view which I present in the final section of this paper is that musical imagination, which consists of internal cognitive representations, is at the core of both musical perception and musical production, and that this revised model deals with music processing rather than communication. If we define imagination as the cognitive basis of both musical perception and production in this way, the concept of musical creativity can be seen to be much more restricted in scope, and this is another central argument in this paper. I look at the suggestion that musical creativity involves different networks of association, and go on to consider the study of the general executive function, which has been investigated in relation to general IQ in a musical context by Schellenberg (2011). I consider its relationship with music cognition as manifested in theoretical models such as Ockelford’s (2007) proposed ‘music module’ in working memory, and in Dietrich’s (2004) (non-musical) propositions concerning the neuroscientific origins of creativity, which also exist in working memory. I consider the extent to which Dietrich’s four proposed basic types of creativity might relate to a general musical executive function and suggest, following Ockelford (2012), that this phenomenon within working memory might exhibit the characteristics of imagination or creativity. This leads to a reformulation and simplification of the original reciprocal-feedback models of response and performance, as mentioned earlier, since the new conception of a creative music executive function underlies both perception and production, such that there is no need to propose separate models of each.

1. Imagination The Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) was well known as a sceptic, as well as for his empiricism: in A Treatise of Human Nature (1739; see Wikipedia, n.d.) he strove to establish a naturalistic science of man that investigated the psychological basis of human nature. His strict empiricism was expressed in the view that knowledge can only be derived from direct perceptions of the world, which he called ‘impressions’: Since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are deriv’d from something antecedently present to the mind, it follows, that ’tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of anything specifically different from ideas and impressions. Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible; let us chace [sic] our imagination to the heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe; we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive any kind of

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existence, but those perceptions, which have appear’d in that narrow compass. This is the universe of the imagination, nor have we any idea but what is there produc’d. (pp. 67–68)

Streminger (1980), in his essay on ‘Hume’s Theory of Imagination’, suggests that Hume’s concept of imagination (fancy) ‘is of paramount significance for the understanding of his entire philosophy’, even though ‘until quite recently the “problem of imagination” has hardly even belonged to the marginal topics of modern philosophy’ (p. 91). It is based on the important distinction between what Hume called ‘realities’, which are also ideas, and ‘the universe of the imagination’: Belief or assent, which always attends the memory and senses, is nothing but the vivacity of those perceptions they present; and that this alone distinguishes them from the imagination. To believe is in this case to feel an immediate impression of the senses, or a repetition of that impression in the memory. ’Tis merely the force and liveliness of the perception, which constitutes the first act of the judgement, and lays the foundation of that reasoning, when we trace the relation of cause and effect. (p. 86)

The vital distinction between realities, which arise immediately and directly from the object of perception, and ideas which emerge from the imagination, are largely made on the basis of the coherence of the former: As to those impressions, which arise from the senses, their ultimate cause is, in my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human reason, and ’twill always be impossible to decide with certainty, whether they arise immediately from the object, or are produc’d by the creative power of the mind, or are deriv’d from the author of our being. Nor is such a question in any way material to our present purpose. We may draw inferences from the coherence of our perceptions, whether they be true or false; whether they represent nature justly, or be mere illusions of the senses. (p. 84) All this, and everything else which I believe, are nothing but ideas, tho’, by their force and settlled [sic] order, arising from custom and the relation of cause and effect, they distinguish themselves from the other ideas, which are merely the offspring of the imagination. (p. 108)

Hume distinguished between three different functions (‘faculties’) of the imagination – the metaphysical faculty, the artistic faculty and the scientific faculty, and imagination was central to the explanation of the products of all three. He saw metaphysical approaches as the product of ‘blind imagination’, giving rise to ‘trivial suggestions of the fancy’ which could only rationally be investigated by that the use of the experimental method. The basic assumption that only empirical propositions are justifiable led Hume to propose that the products of the metaphysical faculty were ‘changeable, weak, and irregular’, whereas those of the scientific faculty were ‘permanent, irresistable [sic], and unchangeable’ (p. 225). It is the artistic faculty of the imagination that concerns us most here, and its essence is the capacity to produce new ideas by reorganizing or simplifying past impressions; that is, the ability to place known impressions into new relationships with one another. This has a lot in common with some of the associative theories which we will consider in section four, and Hume saw this faculty as the origin of creativity: Nothing is more admirable, than the readiness, with which the imagination suggests its ideas, and presents them at the very instant, in which they become necessary or useful. The fancy runs from one end of the universe to the other in collecting those ideas, which belong to any subject. One could think the whole intellectual world of ideas was at once subjected to our view, and that we did nothing but pick out such as were most proper for our purpose (p. 24).

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In spite of its central importance in Hume’s work, imagination seems to be of marginal interest in contemporary philosophy, although Streminger pointed out in 1980 that this may be changing. The concept also had some early currency in the psychological literature: the Rev H. L. Hargreaves (1927), for example, wrote a Monograph Supplement of the British Journal of Psychology entitled The ‘faculty’ of imagination: this adopted a psychometric approach in devising ‘tests of imagination’ which resemble current tests of divergent thinking. Hargreaves was influenced by Spearman’s (1927, 1930) two-factor theory of intelligence, in which different abilities were seen as deriving from a mixture of people’s general intelligence (‘g’) and their content-specific talents in different domains of creative activity. In spite of a revival of interest in the relationship between creativity and intelligence in the 1960s and 1970s, however, and an isolated book by Peter McKellar on Imagination and Thinking: A Psychological Analysis in 1957, which covered topics including mental imagery, sleep, wakefulness and dreaming, abnormal and pathological thinking, the conditions of creativity, cognition and the arts, and the supernatural, there was little further interest in imagination in psychology: in the rest of this paper, I shall attempt to show why it is time to redress the balance, and why the field of music psychology is a very good place to start.

2. Beauty and aesthetics Discussions of the nature of beauty often take place within the context of the arts, although there is no reason why this should necessarily be the case: beauty also exists in science, in architecture, and in the environment, for example (see, e.g., de Botton, 2007). Beauty in the arts is usually associated with positive feelings and happiness, although art also has the power to shock, disturb or offend, and painters including Goya, Caravaggio, and more recently Francis Bacon and Tracey Emin have exploited this power to dramatic effect. One of the many views that William Shakespeare expressed about beauty is that it is self-evident, needing no explanation: when you see or hear it, you recognize it immediately. He voices this view in The Rape of Lucrece: Beauty itself doth of itself persuade The eyes of men without an orator. What needeth then apologies be made, To set forth that which is so singular?

Nevertheless, the origins and explanation of beauty have been extensively studied, mainly in two quite distinct branches of the field of aesthetics. ‘Speculative’ aesthetics deals with abstract questions including the nature and meaning of art, and is to be found within the disciplines of philosophy, art history and art criticism. ‘Empirical aesthetics’, on the other hand, is the scientific study of the nature of beauty and its appreciation, and this is the approach on which I focus in this paper. Most of the research has been carried out on either visual art or music: and given that music is our main focus here, I will largely restrict myself to research in the experimental aesthetics of music. Empirical aesthetics began in 1876 when Gustav Theodor Fechner published his Vorschule der Äesthetik (Introduction to Aesthetics): this means that experimental aesthetics is one of the oldest topics in experimental psychology, which itself was in its early stages at that time. Fechner investigated people’s responses to simple shapes, colours, sounds, geometrical forms and so on, characterizing this approach as ‘aesthetics from below’: his view was that this would eventually

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lead to an ‘aesthetics from above’; that is, to explanations of more general aesthetic questions. Fechner’s ‘aesthetics from below’ implicitly adopted the ‘objectivist’ view that aesthetic phenomena such as beauty lay in the properties of the art works concerned; and, although this field of study declined in the years following Fechner’s early work, its revival in the 1960s in the form of Daniel Berlyne’s ‘new experimental aesthetics’ (e.g., Berlyne, 1974) was also concerned to a large degree with the aesthetic properties of the stimuli themselves, such as their balance, proportion, symmetry and complexity. Hargreaves and North (2010) have written a comprehensive review of research on the experimental aesthetics of music which covers not only research on the properties of the music itself, but also that which takes the contrasting view that ‘beauty is in the eye of the beholder’, or, in the case of music, ‘in the ear of the listener’. We review the research literature on individual differences in responses to music, looking in particular at the effects of age, the factor which has been studied most extensively, and also at that on the effects of social class, gender, personality, and musical training. The next stage of the argument is to suggest that the perception of beauty is best explained not by either the properties of the perceived object or by the characteristics of the beholder, but rather by the interaction between them, and Reber, Schwarz and Winkielman’s (2004) expression of this viewpoint has been widely quoted. Reber et al. suggest that ‘beauty is grounded in the processing experiences of the perceiver that emerge from the interaction of stimulus properties and perceivers’ cognitive and affective processes’ (p. 365). They also use the words ‘beauty’ and ‘aesthetic pleasure’ interchangeably, although this is not always a straightforward equation, as some researchers (e.g., Schubert, 1996) suggest that people can also enjoy negative emotions in music. Since the publication of The Social Psychology of Music (Hargreaves & North, 1997), Adrian North and I have argued that the social and cultural context in which the perception of music takes place is a vital concern, and one which is now reflected in a great deal of the research literature in music psychology: our own research has investigated responses to music in various real-life listening situations including shops, banks, restaurants and bars, gymnasia and onhold phones, as well as considering broader cultural factors such as social class, and other aspects of people’s beliefs and lifestyles (see, e.g., North & Hargreaves, 2007). This view clearly suggests that any comprehensive explanation of musical beauty should go one stage further still by proposing that aesthetic perception derives from a three-way interaction between the art work, the beholder, and the situation. This might be described as a socio-cultural point of view, and its Vygotskian origins and other ramifications are explored in The Social and Applied Psychology of Music (North and Hargreaves, 2008), a book which followed up our 1997 volume. This approach was used in a quite specific, situational sense in our formulation of the ‘reciprocal-feedback’ model of the response to music (see Hargreaves et al., 2005). We describe this as a ‘reciprocal-feedback’ model because any one of the three main determinants of musical response can simultaneously influence the other two, and these influences can work either way. This model is shown in Figure 1, and a simplified version of it appears in Hargreaves, North and Tarrant (2006). The contents of the boxes containing the three main determinants include brief references to all the research that we have reviewed on different properties of the music, the listener and the listening situation, which we updated in chapter 3 of The Social and Applied Psychology of Music, and we also explained the nature of the reciprocal-feedback relationships between these three main determinants in terms of some of the broad patterns of research findings in this field.

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Situations and contexts

Reference systems, genres, idioms, styles, pieces…. Collative variables: complexity, familiarity, orderliness… Prototypicality

Social and cultural contexts

Situational appropriateness of genres and styles

of g

Performance contexts: live, recorded, non-musical

Musical ‘fit’

Everyday situations: work, leisure, consumer, education, health, media, entertainment… Presence/absence of others Other ongoing activities

Response

Physiological: arousal level • level of engagement • active/passive control of listening

Constant evolution and change in individual preferences and taste

Cognitive • attention, memory, perceptual coding, expectation • discrimination, evaluation Affective: emotional responses, like/dislike, mood

Individual use of music as a resource in different situations: goals in specific environments

Listener Individual difference variables: gender, age, nationality… Musical knowledge, training, literacy, experience Immediate and short-term preference patterns: medium/long term taste patterns Self-theories: musical identities

Figure 1.  Reciprocal-feedback model of musical response

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the model in the present context, however, is the contents of the central box labelled ‘response’. We include three main categories of response, which we label as physiological, cognitive and affective, respectively, and we detail the different behavioural factors which have been investigated in each category. Each one of these three categories is involved in our discussion of the aesthetic response to music, but the interaction between cognitive and affective factors in particular is perhaps critical in its determination. People make (cognitive) discriminations between and evaluations of different pieces and genres: but these pieces and genres also elicit different affective states (emotions and moods), and it is the combinations of these effects that underlie aesthetic preference and the perception of beauty. Elvira Brattico and her associates in Helsinki have made some promising advances not only in the definition of different aspects of aesthetic responses to music but also in investigating some of the possible underlying neural mechanisms. They propose (e.g., Brattico & Jacobsen, 2009) that its three main components are affective responses (the power to induce or modulate emotions or mood states), hedonic responses (likes or dislikes), and ‘aesthetic responses’, more narrowly defined with reference to cultural or artistic standards (e.g., beauty or other properties such as symmetry, elegance, or coherence). The new field of neuroaesthetics aims to determine the neural foundations of art appreciation, although its focus is largely on visual art rather than music.

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Although neuroscientific research has been able to identify some of the neural processes which are linked with the objective properties of music, these researchers have as yet been unable to identify specific neural correlates of listeners’ experiences of musical liking or beauty (Brattico & Jacobsen, 2009). They have nevertheless been able to demonstrate differences between the event-related potentials (ERP) of musically trained and untrained listeners when making aesthetic judgements (Müller, Höfel, Brattico, & Jacobsen, 2009), and have also shown that the ERP responses which are recorded when listeners make cognitive (correctness) judgements about tonal chord sequences are dissociated from those which are recorded for their affective (liking) judgements about the same sequences (Brattico, Jacobsen, De Baene, Glerean, & Tervaniemi, 2010). They also concur with our own view of the importance of ‘the sociocultural context as a relevant variable to study when considering music as an aesthetic domain’ (Brattico & Jacobsen, 2009, p. 308).

3. Musical creativity The study of musical creativity has largely been concerned with the activities of composition, improvisation and performance. Creativity is a huge topic which has been studied for many years in disciplines including philosophy, psychology, and education, and two central questions in all of these are those of definition – how can creativity be defined? – and explanation – what are the relative strengths and weaknesses of the many theories that have been advanced to explain creativity? The second question is way beyond us here – I would simply refer the reader to Sternberg and Lubart’s (1999) review of the main theoretical approaches as they saw them in Sternberg’s (1999) Handbook of Creativity over a decade ago, and also to Kozbelt, Beghetto and Runco’s (2010) more recent account in the updated version of that Handbook (Kaufman & Sternberg, 2010). The question of definition is important here, however, as it is closely bound up with my earlier proposal that we should define imagination as the source of the internal cognitive processes involved in musical perception and production, such that the concept of musical creativity is seen as much more restricted in scope. There is an inherent difficulty in trying to define creativity because its essence is to go beyond the bounds of what is already given. Plato illustrated this point as follows: ‘How will you set about looking for that thing, the nature of which is totally unknown to you? Which among the things you do not know is the one you propose to look for? And if by chance you should stumble upon it, how will you know that it is indeed that thing, since you are in ignorance of it?’ (from Meno, cited by Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 371). This view suggests that the definition of creativity needs to be much more context-specific: rather than being seen as a generalized capacity of individuals which can be deployed by them in different situations, it should refer to producing solutions to specific problems in specific situations. When creativity is not ‘grounded’ in this way, the term becomes over-used and abused: and this is exactly what has happened in the research literature. Hudson (1966) suggested this over four decades ago: ‘In some circles “creative” does duty as a word of general approbation – meaning, approximately, “good” . . . [it] covers everything from the answers to a particular kind of psychological test, to forming a good relationship with one’s wife’ (p. 119). Dietrich (2007) not only makes a similar argument from the neuropsychological point of view – that the main focus should be on the specific cognitive mechanisms and neural substrates which are involved in particular types of creative activity, rather than on a monolithic view of creativity – but also argues, in an outspoken and polemical article, that the psychological study of creativity has been stuck in a rut for decades:

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The study of creativity is, quite unfortunately, still dominated by a number of rather dated ideas that are either so simplistic that nothing good can possibly come out of them or, given what we know about the brain, factually mistaken. As cognitive neuroscience is making more serious contact with the knowledge base of creativity, we must, from the outset, clear the ground of these pernicious fossil traces from a bygone era. (p. 22)

Dietrich identifies four central ideas which still persist in creativity research as ‘targets for demolition’, as follows: ‘creativity is divergent thinking’ (it also involves convergent thinking, and divergent thinking is in any case far too broad a construct to be of much predictive value); ‘creativity is in the right brain’ (simplistic ideas of left–right hemispheric specialization are outdated; creativity involves many different functions, and the idea of functional specialization of such a complex mental process is in any case misguided); ‘creativity occurs in a state of defocused attention’ (it also occurs in a focused state, and different forms of creativity may occur in focused and unfocused states); ‘altered states of consciousness facilitate creativity’ (many altered states of consciousness, such as those that occur in mental illness, do not give rise to creativity, and creativity often occurs in the normal waking state). Once again the basic problem in all these issues is that of overgeneralization: since actual creativity exists in so many different forms, activities and contexts, giving rise to an infinitely variable range of products, any attempt to formulate a unitary description or explanation is doomed to failure. The same seems to apply to musical creativity: as Cook (2012) points out in his concluding afterword in Musical Imaginations, the term refers to ‘an indefinite number of related concepts or behaviours’, such that it may be better instead to speak of multiple ‘creativities’, as do several other authors in the book. Far from the traditional view of creativity as a special individual gift which is conferred on rare geniuses such as Mozart, it ‘revolves round social interaction, and is embedded and embodied in the practices of everyday life’ (p. 451). This point is developed by the sociologist Simon Frith (2012) in chapter 4 of the book, who contrasts what he calls the ‘romantic’ view of the individual genius with the sociological view that creativity is a kind of ‘business behaviour’: people are creative because it is their job to be so, and they need to be productive in order to earn a living. In doing so they need to be aware of the social and cultural context of their creative work which may, for example, involve ideas such as spotting gaps in the market. This view leads Frith to the same conclusion that others have reached, albeit for a different set of reasons: ‘. . . the concept of “musical creativity” is more of a hindrance than a help in understanding music-making practice, hence my conclusion: we should cease to use the term altogether, even if it remains the sociologist’s task to explain why the concept matters so much’ (p. 71). I can conclude this section by reiterating that creativity is only one facet of a much broader phenomenon, the central core of which is imagination. We need more precise distinctions between the internal mental processes and the behavioural manifestations of ‘creativity’; between these behavioural manifestations and the social–environmental influences involved; and between creative production and creative perception.

4. Networks of association In chapter 10 of Musical Imaginations, my colleagues and I consider the notion of imaginative listening as a creative activity which is inextricably linked with and influenced by the social and cultural environments in which it takes place (Hargreaves, Hargreaves, & North, 2012). We consider different ‘styles’ of listening, looking in particular at the distinction between the styles

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of expert listeners, such as critics and music theoreticians, and those of non-expert listeners: finer-grained discrimination in ‘expert listening’ can give rise to perceptions of musical meaning and implication which are specific enough to appear to be qualitatively different from those emerging from lower-grained discrimination. The reciprocal-feedback model of responses to music, which I described in the first section of this paper, deals with the interacting effects of three determinants of these responses – music, listening situation and listener: and in chapter 10 we take this further by suggesting that listeners create their own personal ‘networks of association’ which act as reference points for their mental representations of their musical worlds. There are three types of network, one based on each of the three main determinants of the response to music. The first type exists within musical pieces themselves at the structural level, and we consider how musical reference is involved in their creation. This idea has a great deal in common with Folkestad’s (2012) proposal of an individual’s personal inner music library, which comprises ‘all previous musical experiences of that individual, all the music ever heard, collected and stored in the mind and body of that person’ (p.198). In this view composers are seen as being in dialogue with their personal inner music libraries, as well as making contact with those of their listeners. The second type of network links pieces of music with their cultural associations – with the typical situations and contexts in which they are typically heard; these are very similar to the networks of cognitive units proposed by Martindale and Moore (1988) in their ‘preference for prototypes’ model of musical likes and dislikes. This leads on to the idea of ‘musical fit’, which has been investigated in consumer psychology as well as in music psychology. The associations between, for example, different products in a shop and particular styles of music playing in the shop can be used to predict which products customers will actually buy because the music primes certain cognitions (see North & Hargreaves, 2008). Third, individuals combine their networks of musical and cultural associations to include their corresponding associations with the people, situations and events that they have experienced in their lives: these are effectively personal networks of association, which are subject to constant change as new pieces or styles are experienced in different social-cultural situations. In chapter 8 of Musical Imaginations, Emery Schubert (2012) sets out his ‘spreading activation theory’ of creativity, which is also based on the idea of networks of associations – in this case, between small, discrete units of information called nodes, which are associated with one another by means of links. Schubert suggests that ‘creativity is then defined, in part, as the spontaneous creation of a new pathway (link) to solve a . . . problem’ (p. 124). However, the creative solution of a musical (e.g., compositional) problem involves not only the formation of new, meaningful links between nodes but also the inhibition of other links that can cause pain/ avoidance behaviours; and Schubert invokes the principle of dissociation to account for the latter phenomenon. To put this simply, creativity involves switching pleasurable musical connections on, and painful ones off. He also uses dissociation in a more general sense to refer to the everyday phenomenon of focusing to such an extent upon a favourite piece of music (‘getting lost in’ the music) that one becomes dissociated from one’s surroundings. Schubert also suggests that the activation of certain networks of nodes is inherently pleasurable, whilst dissociation serves to deactivate other painful networks – such that aesthetic pleasure derives from the complementary operation of both of these processes. It is no accident that our own three-fold division between musical, cultural and personal networks runs parallel with Hargreaves, Marshall and North’s (2003) model of the potential outcomes of music education, which we described as musical-artistic, personal, and socialcultural outcomes. This model was based on our international review of the aims of music

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education in different countries world-wide (Hargreaves & North, 2001), and also on our psychological analysis of the functions of music (Hargreaves & North, 1999). There is also a clear parallel with the three main ‘human needs’ which form the basis of Deci and Ryan’s (2002) widely-quoted self-determination theory of well-being: this holds that, when the basic psychological needs of relatedness, competence and autonomy are satisfied, people’s motivation and wellbeing are enhanced. Relatedness refers to a person’s activities taking place within a social network, and thereby being influenced by the social-cultural context: competence refers to the skills and abilities which are required for engagement in creative activities, which links directly with musical-artistic skills: and autonomy means that our creative activities are likely to be most highly motivated when they are generated by ourselves, rather than by external demands or by other people – that is, by our personal motivation.

5. Musical executive functioning: Memory and creativity Schellenberg (2011) recently published a provocative study of the relationships between executive function, IQ, and the presence or absence of music lessons. He compared the performances of musically trained and untrained 9- to 12-year-olds on a measure of IQ and on five measures of executive function and found that the musically trained group had higher IQs than their untrained counterparts, which supports the findings of several previous studies. However, he also found very little association between the membership of one or other of the two groups and executive function, even though IQ and executive function were positively correlated. Schellenberg’s conclusion was that these results provide no support for the hypothesis that the association between music training and IQ is mediated by executive function but suggest, rather, that ‘children with higher IQs are more likely than their lower-IQ counterparts to take music lessons, and to perform well on a variety of tests of cognitive ability except for those measuring executive function’ (p. 283). Aleksandar Aksentijevic and I wrote a peer commentary on this article which was published alongside the original article (Hargreaves & Aksentijevic, 2011). We raised several issues concerning the causal relationships between the variables involved, including that of the relationship between IQ and executive function. The intelligence quotient (IQ) has a very long history as well as a very bad reputation in some disciplines, perhaps as a result of the ways in which IQ tests have been used as much as of the concept of intelligence on which they are based. Executive function (sometimes also described as cognitive control, or the supervisory attentional system), on the other hand, is described by Schellenberg as ‘a loose construct that allows for ‘conscious, goal-directed problem solving’ and, when impaired, leads to ‘failures to make wise judgements, cognitive inflexibility, poor planning of future actions, and difficulty inhibiting inappropriate responses’ (Zelazo, Carlson, & Kesek, 2008, p. 553). As noted by Hannon and Trainor (2007), ‘“small but widespread effects of musical training on cognitive processing might occur because music lessons train attentional and executive functioning, which benefits almost all cognitive tasks” (p. 470)’ (quoted in Schellenberg, 2011, p. 287). Aksentijevic and I questioned the extent to which IQ and executive function are conceptually and empirically distinct, especially since, in Schellenberg’s study, one test (digit symbol-coding) was the same in the measures of both IQ and executive function. Consideration of a general executive function and its relationship to general IQ in a musical context leads naturally on to the question of whether or not there might be a musical equivalent: is there a general executive function in music? Something very much like this was proposed a few years ago by my Roehampton colleague Adam Ockelford (Ockelford, 2007), as a result of some of his well-known work with the blind musical savant Derek Paravicini. Derek’s ability to immediately reproduce, on the keyboard, large chunks of recorded music played to him is a remarkable

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ability which has been witnessed by many: the task would be well beyond most professional pianists. In the Researching Exceptional MUsical Skill (REMUS) project which Ockelford describes, one of the four tasks which the researchers devised in order to investigate how Derek learns pieces, and is able to show such prodigious levels of skill, was the ‘listen and play’ task in which he first listens to a piece in its entirety, and then attempts to reproduce it: this was repeated on 13 different occasions in all, over a period of two years. The piece in question was a jazz piece called Chromatic Blues which Ockelford specially composed so as to fulfil four criteria, namely: (1) that the style should be broadly familiar to Derek; (2) that it should possess certain specific, salient features that were unusual within the style; (3) that it should be technically undemanding; and (4) that ‘The piece should be of sufficient difficulty to be found challenging, though possible for Paravicini to learn after a number of hearings, given its length and complexity’ (p. 8). Since it did exceed Derek’s short-term memory capacity to a considerable degree, he was forced to combine his accurate renditions of those parts of the piece that he could remember with his own inventions of material that made musical sense, and was consistent with the style. Ockelford undertook a detailed musicological analysis of Derek’s changing renditions of the piece over the 13 attempts, using his own zygonic theory (Ockelford, 2006), which enabled him to investigate the degree to which the elements of one rendition bear musical similarity to those of another. The results of this detailed analysis led Ockelford to the conclusion that Derek achieved musical and stylistic coherence in his part-accurate renditions of the piece by borrowing material from other works in the same style: that he was drawing on ‘a bundle of musical fragments and attributes from various locations in the original piece, of varying lengths, types and degrees of abstraction’ (p. 13) which was held in his short-term memory. The elements which appeared in this bundle were determined by their salience in relation to the surrounding musical context: by their structure, in terms of their ease of encoding; by their resilience – that is, the degree to which they retained their identity in relation to the surrounding musical context; and by reinforcement, through repetition. Ockelford suggests that the process of ‘creative reconstruction’ might be explained as being conducted by an executive function such as that we discussed in relation to general intelligence earlier; specifically, his proposal is that the results of his study suggest the existence of a ‘musical executive’ which uses not only the auditory information presented in the recording of Chromatic Blues, but also Derek’s memories of other pieces, fragments, attributes and stylesystems. This is illustrated in Figure 2: the musical executive draws on the music bundle in short-term memory as described earlier, as well as on the contents of the long-term memory store. Ockelford describes this whole system as a ‘music module’ in working memory, following Baddeley’s (1986) original model of a central executive in working memory linked to the two slave systems of the phonological loop and the visuo-spatial sketchpad, and on Berz’s (1995) subsequent proposal of a music module which is seen as a third slave system acting alongside the other two. Of particular interest in the present context is Ockelford’s use of the adjective ‘creative’ in relation to what was going on in Derek’s short-term memory: the notion of ‘creative reconstruction’ is very much in tune with the way in which my colleagues and I describe the cognitive basis of music listening in chapter 10 of Musical Imaginations (Hargreaves, Hargreaves, & North, 2012). We suggest that ‘Listening to music is an active, creative process which exists at different levels of engagement’; that ‘all music processing involves centrally-stored personal networks of association . . . or schemata, which mediate all musical activities, and not just the act of listening itself: these include composition, improvisation, and performance’; and that ‘the active processes of revision which our minds perform are most usefully described as ‘musical imagination’ (p. 169).

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Figure 2. The possible disposition of a ‘music module’ in working memory (reproduced by permission of Adam Ockelford and Sage Publications Ltd.)

In a more recent paper, Ockelford (2012) has reinforced this particular feature of his proposed ‘music processing module’, suggesting that memory and creativity are indeed ‘different sides of the same coin in musical improvisation’. He postulates seven ways in which this process of creative reconstruction takes place in working memory which include, for example, the module’s ability to ‘select fragments or features from the available “bank” that would fit with each

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other . . . within the evolving style system’, to ‘synthesize the selected elements, integrating them “horizontally” (melodically) and . . . “vertically” (harmonically) within the unfolding matrix of pitch and perceived time’, and to ‘track and direct the musical narrative simultaneously at different architectonic and hierarchical levels to ensure both short and longer-term coherence’. In the third section I mentioned Dietrich’s (2007) critique of the last few decades of research on creativity, and his view that ‘cognitive neuroscience is making more serious contact with the knowledge base of creativity’ (p. 22). Three years earlier he published a paper in which he made some concrete proposals about some of the neural mechanisms that may underlie creativity (Dietrich, 2004), proposing four different types of creative insight, each mediated by a distinctive neural circuit. Although these do not apply specifically to music, they are nevertheless of clear relevance to our interests here. Dietrich conceptualizes information processing as being hierarchically structured, such that the most sophisticated mental operations (including creative functioning) are localized in the prefrontal cortex, which deals with processing at the highest levels of the functional hierarchy. One hierarchy of neural systems exists which extracts emotional information from the environment, allowing the individual to assess the biological significance of a given event, and a second hierarchy exists which performs the feature analysis which forms the basis of cognitive processing. These two functional systems appear to exist within different anatomical brain structures, and although these structures are connected at various levels, the reintegration of emotional and cognitive information processing only occurs at the higher levels of the functional hierarchy: this takes place in the prefrontal cortex, which is concerned with executive functioning. The prefrontal cortex is functionally divided into two units – the ventromedial (VMPFC) and the dorsolateral (DLPFC). The research literature suggests that the VMPFC is primarily responsible for social functioning, dealing with the personal consequences of one’s behaviour in society, and the emotions with which these are associated, whereas the DLPFC is associated with attention and working memory. In particular, the working memory buffer of the DLPFC appears to be concerned with cognitive flexibility, abstract thinking, and strategic planning: Dietrich suggests that this may therefore be the central structure involved in creative thinking. Damasio (2001) had previously suggested that a working memory buffer is a critical prerequisite for creative thinking because of its involvement in the ability to sustain attention to one source of information whilst simultaneously processing another. Dietrich concludes that ‘creativity requires cognitive abilities, such as working memory, sustained attention, cognitive flexibility, and judgement of propriety, that are typically ascribed to the prefrontal cortex’ (p. 1014). Dietrich proposes that the PFC has three main functions in creativity, namely: (1) gaining consciousness of novel thoughts, which become insights when represented in working memory; (2) recruiting higher cognitive functions in developing the insight, including central executive processing such as the direction of attention, retrieving relevant memories, and considering the appropriateness of the insight to the problem; and (3) implementing the expression of the insight, which involves recruiting task-specific skills, techniques and knowledge. Dietrich further proposes that creative insights can occur in one of two processing modes – spontaneous and deliberate – and that either of these can direct operations in one or both of two structures – emotional or cognitive – giving rise to four basic types of creativity in all. Examples of creative insights which employ the deliberate mode of processing for cognitive structures are those which involve high levels of knowledge and expertise, and the methodical, systematic linking of different pieces of information so as to create an overall pattern such as might occur in scientific breakthroughs like Crick and Watson’s decoding of the structure of DNA. Creativity

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which employs the deliberate mode of processing for emotional structures is also seen by Dietrich as methodical and systematic, and this is applied to affective memories, such as insights achieved during psychotherapy. The third type, insights in which a spontaneous processing mode is applied to cognitive systems, are those in which sudden illumination or ‘Eureka’ experiences are reported, such as in Newton’s insights into the nature of gravity when watching an apple falling from a tree, or indeed Archimedes’ original Eureka experience when he displaced the water in his own bathtub. Finally, when the spontaneous processing mode is used on emotional structures, the creative insights involve intense emotional experiences, such as in the creation of Picasso’s Guernica, or of Stravinsky’s The Rite of Spring. I have ranged over several different interrelated topics and issues in this section, and it is useful at this point to summarize the arguments and try to evaluate the status of the notion of musical executive functioning, and consider how it relates to working memory and creativity. Schellenberg (2011) proposes that the general executive function (EF) plays little part in the association between taking music lessons and gaining high IQ scores, suggesting that this simply occurs because children with high IQs are more likely to take music lessons than those with lower scores. Apart from the question of the relationship between IQ and EF, which I raised earlier, there is also the troublesome question of the possible influence of musical aptitude: is this a variable that should have been controlled for in Schellenberg’s study? If our focus is now upon the relationships between general IQ, general EF, and musical aptitude, the obvious next step is to consider the possible existence of a musical EF – and this is precisely what Ockelford (2007) has done. He proposes a music module in working memory with a musical EF at its core, which also draws on general EF as well as on the short-term and also long-term musical memory stores. Ockelford does not deal directly with the issue of musical aptitude, but we can assume that the functioning of the music module is likely to be far more advanced and active in people with high levels of aptitude. Ockelford (2012) also concurs with my own view, expressed elsewhere in this paper, that musical processing in working memory is essentially creative in its operation, and I suggest that there may be some kind of neural basis for this – which leads directly on to the consideration of Dietrich’s proposal of four distinct types of creativity, each of which is rooted in a distinct system of neural processing. The consideration of a possible neural basis for the musical EF, if indeed it does exist, is beyond us at this stage, but the evidence for it is growing. Aleksandar Aksentijevic and I suggested that: There is a great deal of evidence that certain aspects of music are indeed cognitively unique. For instance, unlike language, music is uniquely a ‘spatio-temporal’ domain of activity, which engages both hemispheres, which are differentially attuned to processing structural and temporal information. This perhaps explains the close relationship between musical training and general intelligence. The non-semantic nature of musical information demands the involvement of both hemispheres, such that music could act as a regulator of the general cognitive function, maintaining a dynamic equilibrium between the hemispheric biases towards linguistic and visuo-spatial abilities. (Hargreaves & Aksentijevic, 2011, p. 307)

Returning to my original theme, I can now propose somewhat more specifically that ‘musical imagination’ is a term that might be used to apply to the activities of the musical EF; that is, to the cognitive processing underlying music perception and production, which is essentially creative in character. This leads to a reconsideration of the original ‘reciprocal-feedback’ models of musical response, performance and communication which were originally proposed by Hargreaves et al. (2005), and I will conclude the paper with this.

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6. Musical imagination and a revision of the reciprocal-feedback model The original reciprocal-feedback models were first presented in the opening chapter of our edited book Musical Communication (Miell, MacDonald, & Hargreaves, 2005), which was reviewed by Lamont (2006) in Musicae Scientiae. Lamont took us to task on a number of different issues: perhaps the most serious, concerning the book as a whole, was that she felt that we had included too many different theoretical approaches to and formal diagrammatic models of the process of musical communication, and had failed to provide any overall perspective on all of these. Although this point is well taken, I suspect that any attempt to impose an overall scheme on these disparate approaches would have been doomed to inevitable failure, principally because the use of the term ‘musical communication’ covers so many different phenomena (rather like ‘musical creativity’; see third section). As Lamont points out, these include not only communication within music (e.g., between performers), but also the communication of information by means of music. She further suggests that this distinction runs parallel to our own earlier distinction between ‘identities in music’ and ‘music in identities’ (in MacDonald, Hargreaves, & Miell, 2002), and that perhaps we should have organized this book, like our earlier one, around this distinction. Lamont also criticizes our reciprocal-feedback model from two main points of view: first, that our proposal that communication can be conceptualized as the ‘spark’ that occurs when a performance event gives rise to a response: this is only one of a number of different approaches to musical communication. The second objection lies in our conceptualization of the listening situation as one of the three main sources of variation that make up the model: that we conceive of ‘situations and contexts’ as a (set of) variables. She contrasts this with those approaches which conceive of culture as a medium rather than as a variable, and considers that the latter approach is more successful in explaining the true essence and complexity of musical communication. She takes this argument further elsewhere (Lamont, 2011) in characterizing our approach as ‘static’, and rejecting it in favour of what she calls ‘a diachronic process, with the cyclical interactions between listener and music continuing across the life span’ (p. 59), and presents her own formal diagrammatic model of the latter. On reflection, the first criticism is justified: as our book makes clear, there are indeed many different approaches to the explanation of musical communication, and the link between performance events and listener responses is only one of them. But the second criticism entirely misses the point of the notion of the reciprocal-feedback relationships between the three main sets of variables, and between each one of them and the set of response or performance variables involved in our two initial models: that the reciprocity of these relationships, and the feedback that occurs between them (as represented by the arrowheads at each end of each link in the model) mean that the mutual influences of each one on all of the others are in a constant state of transition, evolving over time such that the model is never ‘static’. Far from being ‘in a vacuum’, as Lamont alleges, the music, the listener and the context are in a constant state of mutual interaction such that, for example, that between the music and the listener represents the ‘constant evolution and change in individual preferences and taste’, to quote the labelling of that particular feedback loop in the original model. The separate three-way reciprocal-feedback models of response and performance can deal perfectly well with Lamont’s second criticism, as well as with all the features of her own diachronic model: their basic format does not need to change.

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What does need to be revised, however, is the combination of these two constituent models into our previous model of communication. The arguments that I have developed in this paper lead to an obvious synthesis of the response and performance models to form a single model with musical imagination; that is, the creative musical EF at its core. If we redefine this as a model of musical processing, rather than of communication, most of the suggestions made throughout this paper can be incorporated. The specific factors represented in the ‘music’ and ‘situations and contexts’ boxes of the model need no change: ‘listener’ and ‘performer’ need to be combined, with the inclusion of ‘composer’ and ‘improviser’: and if imagination now forms the central core of the model, and is seen to incorporate both perception and production, the model can be recast as shown in Figure 3. In this revised model we can see that the main contents of the previous ‘response’ and ‘performance’ factors are combined in the central box, and that each is determined by the cognitive processes involved in imagination. The reciprocal-feedback aspects of the model remain, such that it is diachronic rather than static: and what also becomes apparent is that ‘creativity’, in the sense of musical production, is only part of creative musical processing as a whole. It is also possible to see how several of the main concepts that have been discussed in this paper can be

Situations and contexts

Music

PRODUCTION performance: interpretation, expression composition, improvisation IMAGINATION internal mental representations schemas and cultural frames; scripts neural basis PERCEPTION physiological, cognitive, affective responses aesthetic preferences

Listener/composer/ improviser/performer

Figure 3.  Revised reciprocal-feedback model of music processing

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loosely mapped on to this. For example, the reciprocal-feedback loop linking the music with the listener was described in the original response model as representing the ‘constant evolution and change in individual preferences and taste’: this is directly relevant to the questions of the perception of beauty and the determinants of individual musical likes and dislikes, both of which are of central concern here. Similarly, the reciprocal-feedback loop linking ‘production’ in the new version of the model and the music is where musical creativity, more strictly defined, can now be seen; and the reciprocal-feedback loop linking imagination and ‘situations and contexts’ represents the domain of socio-cultural approaches to creativity which were discussed in the second sections, and which are dealt with in depth in the third part of Musical Imaginations. I will finish with the views of three eminent thinkers who would undoubtedly have approved of the emphasis on imagination. The first is John Dewey, the American philosopher, psychologist, and educator, who said that ‘Every great advance in science has issued from a new audacity of imagination’ (Dewey, 1929, p. 294). The second is Albert Einstein, the originator of several such advances who, in trying to explain his working methods in an interview published in the Philadelphia Saturday Evening Post in October 1929, said that ‘I’m enough of an artist to draw freely on my imagination, which I think is more important than knowledge. Knowledge is limited. Imagination encircles the world’. The third is the American composer Aaron Copland who wrote that ‘The more I live the life of music, the more I am convinced that it is the freely imaginative mind that is at the core of all vital music making and music listening . . . Imagination in the listener – in the gifted listener – is what concerns us here’ (Copland, 1952, p. 17). Acknowledgements I should like to thank Linda Hargreaves, Jon Hargreaves, Adrian North, Adam Ockelford, and Emery Schubert for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

Funding This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-forprofit sectors.

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Biography David Hargreaves is Professor of Education and Froebel Research Fellow at Roehampton University. He has been Editor of Psychology of Music, Chair of the Research Commission of the International Society for Music Education (ISME), and is a Fellow of the British Psychological Society. His books in psychology, education, the arts, and music have been translated into 15 languages. He has appeared on BBC TV and radio as a jazz pianist and composer, and is organist on his local village church circuit, but really ought to do more jazz playing than he currently has time for.

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