Shuya Li University of Zurich 8006 Zurich, Switzerland +41-786615884 [email protected] EDUCATION University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland, M.A., Economics, 2013 - Present Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, China, B.S., Finance, 2013 Special program: the Experimental Honor Class Award: Best Bachelor Thesis of the Year GPA: 3.63/4.00 (87.22/100.00) RESEARCH INTEREST Experimental Economics, Behavioral Economics, Corporate Finance, PE/VC INTERNSHIP Analyst, Morgan Creek Capital Management, Shanghai, China, 06/2012 - 12/2012 CFO Assistant, Sandvik Mining & Construction, Shanghai, China, 09/2011 - 02/2012 PROJECT Punishment, delegation, and public goods under imperfect information with Ivo Schurtenberger Supervisor: Tony Williams Abstract: To identify naturalistic mechanisms that restore efficacy of punishment in public goods games with imperfect information, we suggest that the possibility to reduce noise is one of the candidates. We test experimentally the role of the possibility of noise reduction on contribution and efficiency in public goods game with sanctioning mechanisms. We are particularly interested in different performances of centralized and decentralized institutions in such an environment. We predict that noise reduction could restore the effectiveness of punishment thus boosting contribution level, especially with centralized institution in which no free-riding on second-order public goods is present. In this sense, the prevalence of centralized institutions in modern society is justified by their advantages in adopting noise reduction and exerting punishment under imperfect information over their decentralized counterparts. Bachelor Thesis: Grandstanding of PE Firms and IPO Underpricing in China Supervisor: Zhen Wang Abstract: This paper tests the relationship between grandstanding incentives of private equity firms and IPO underpricing. Evidence from a sample of PE-backed IPOs in Chinas A-share market from January 1st, 2005 to December 31st, 2012 indicates companies backed by younger PE firms or those with little fundraising experience will be more underpriced at the time of IPO; private equity firms age and fundraising experience are used as proxies for grandstanding incentives in the model. This empirical result is consistent with grandstanding hypothesis raised by Gompers (1996) as PE firms with greater incentives to grandstand push their portfolio companies to public market earlier to realize their investments and build reputation, thus incurring cost in the form of larger underpricing. LANGUAGE English (Fluent: GMAT 740, TOEFL 115, IELTS 8) Chinese (Native) SOFTWARE Stata, R, LATEX, Eviews, OxMetrics, Microsoft Office, Photoshop CERTIFICATE CFA Level II Candidate