Tug-of-War games and PDEs Julio D. Rossi IMDEA Matmaticas (Madrid) and U. Buenos Aires (Argentina) [email protected] www.dm.uba.ar/ jrossi Joint work with J. Garcia Azorero - F. Charro and with J. J. Manfredi

Bucharest, 2008 logo

Part 1: ∆∞ Consider the p−laplacian:  ∆p u = div |∇u|p−2 ∇u = P = |∇u|p−2 ∆u + (p − 2)|∇u|p−4 uxi uxj uxi ,xj = i,j ( ) P 1 = (p − 2)|∇u|p−4 p−2 |∇u|2 ∆u + uxi uxj uxi ,xj i,j

If we pass formally to the limit in the equation ∆p u = 0, we get the ∞-Laplacian, defined as X ∆∞ u = uxi uxj uxi ,xj = Du · D 2 u · (Du)t . i,j →

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Remarks

This operator is non linear, not in divergence form , elliptic and degenerate. Aronsson u(x, y) = x 4/3 − y 4/3 is infinity-harmonic in R2 .

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Absolutely Minimizing Lipschitz Extensions (AMLE) Lipschitz extensions Given a domain Ω and a Lipschitz function F defined on ∂Ω, find a Lipschitz extension u, with the same Lipschitz constant as F : Lip∂Ω {F } = LipΩ {u} Many solutions (McShane-Withney extensions, 1934) u+ (x) = infy∈∂Ω {F (y) + LF |x − y|} u− (x) = supy∈∂Ω {F (y) − LF |x − y|} Aronsson: AMLE Find a best Lipschitz extension u in every subdomain D ⊂ Ω.

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Existence Absolutely Minimal Lipschitz extensions are viscosity solutions to  ∆∞ u = 0 u|∂Ω = F . Uniqueness Jensen (1993), Barles and Busca (2001), Crandall, Aronsson and Juutinen (2004).

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Tug-of-War games Rules Two-person, zero-sum game: two players are in contest and the total earnings of one are the losses of the other. Player I, plays trying to maximize his expected outcome. Player II is trying to minimize Player I’s outcome. Ω ⊂ Rn , bounded domain ; ΓD ⊂ ∂Ω and ΓN ≡ ∂Ω \ ΓD . F : ΓD → R be a Lipschitz continuous final payoff function. Starting point x0 ∈ Ω \ ΓD . A coin is tossed and the winner chooses a new position x1 ∈ B (x0 ) ∩ Ω. At each turn, the coin is tossed again, and the winner chooses a new game state xk ∈ B (xk−1 ) ∩ Ω. Game ends when xτ ∈ ΓD , and Player I earns F (xτ ) (Player II earns −F (xτ ))

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Remark Sequence {x0 , x1 , · · · , xN } has some probability, which depends on The starting point x0 . The strategies of players, SI and SII . Expected result Taking into account the probability defined by the initial value and the strategies: ESx0I ,SII (F (xN )) ”Perfect” players Player I chooses at each step the strategy which maximizes the result. Player II chooses at each step the strategy which minimizes the result.

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Extremal cases uI (x) = sup inf ESxI ,SII (F (xN )) SI

SII

uII (x) = inf sup ESxI ,SII (F (xN )) SII

SI

Definition The game has a value ⇔ uI = uII . Theorem Under very general hypotheses, the game has a value. Reference Peres-Schram-Sheffield-Wilson (2008).

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Extremal cases uI (x) = sup inf ESxI ,SII (F (xN )) SI

SII

uII (x) = inf sup ESxI ,SII (F (xN )) SII

SI

Definition The game has a value ⇔ uI = uII . Theorem Under very general hypotheses, the game has a value. Reference Peres-Schram-Sheffield-Wilson (2008).

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Extremal cases uI (x) = sup inf ESxI ,SII (F (xN )) SI

SII

uII (x) = inf sup ESxI ,SII (F (xN )) SII

SI

Definition The game has a value ⇔ uI = uII . Theorem Under very general hypotheses, the game has a value. Reference Peres-Schram-Sheffield-Wilson (2008).

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Dynamic Programming Principle

Denote u the value of the game, and let xM , xm such that: u(xM ) = max u(y). |x−y |≤

u(xm ) = min u(y ). |x−y|≤

Main Property (Dynamic Programming Principle) u(x) =

1 1 {max u + min u} = {u(xM ) + u(xm )} 2 B (x) 2 B (x)

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Idea ∇u(x) |∇u(x)| ∇u(x) xm ≈ x −  |∇u(x)| u(x + ~v ) + u(x − ~v ) − 2u(x) ≡ discretization of the 2 second derivative in the direction of ~v

xM ≈ x + 

Therefore Dynamic programming principle ≈ discretization of the second derivative in the direction of the gradient.

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Idea ∇u(x) |∇u(x)| ∇u(x) xm ≈ x −  |∇u(x)| u(x + ~v ) + u(x − ~v ) − 2u(x) ≡ discretization of the 2 second derivative in the direction of ~v

xM ≈ x + 

Therefore Dynamic programming principle ≈ discretization of the second derivative in the direction of the gradient.

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Again the infinity-Laplacian Remark Second derivative in the direction of the gradient ≡ ∞-Laplacian. Theorem by Peres-Schramm-Sheffield-Wilson. Existence and uniqueness of the limit of the values of -Tug-of-war games ⇒ Alternative proof of existence and uniqueness for the problem  ∆∞ u = 0 u|∂Ω = F logo

Again the infinity-Laplacian Remark Second derivative in the direction of the gradient ≡ ∞-Laplacian. Theorem by Peres-Schramm-Sheffield-Wilson. Existence and uniqueness of the limit of the values of -Tug-of-war games ⇒ Alternative proof of existence and uniqueness for the problem  ∆∞ u = 0 u|∂Ω = F logo

Remark The existence and uniqueness result for the limit of the values of -Tug-of-war games holds true even if the final payoff function F is defined only on a subset of the boundary ΓD ⊂ ∂Ω Theorem (Garcia Azorero-Charro-R.) The limit is a viscosity solution to the mixed boundary value problem:   ∆∞ u = 0 u=F on ΓD  ∂u on ∂Ω \ ΓD . ∂ν = 0 Consequence Uniqueness of viscosity solutions for the mixed boundary value problem.

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Remark The existence and uniqueness result for the limit of the values of -Tug-of-war games holds true even if the final payoff function F is defined only on a subset of the boundary ΓD ⊂ ∂Ω Theorem (Garcia Azorero-Charro-R.) The limit is a viscosity solution to the mixed boundary value problem:   ∆∞ u = 0 u=F on ΓD  ∂u on ∂Ω \ ΓD . ∂ν = 0 Consequence Uniqueness of viscosity solutions for the mixed boundary value problem.

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Remark The existence and uniqueness result for the limit of the values of -Tug-of-war games holds true even if the final payoff function F is defined only on a subset of the boundary ΓD ⊂ ∂Ω Theorem (Garcia Azorero-Charro-R.) The limit is a viscosity solution to the mixed boundary value problem:   ∆∞ u = 0 u=F on ΓD  ∂u on ∂Ω \ ΓD . ∂ν = 0 Consequence Uniqueness of viscosity solutions for the mixed boundary value problem.

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The p−Laplacian

It is a very well known fact that one can find in any elementary textbook of PDEs that u is harmonic, that is ∆u = 0, if and only if it verifies the mean value property Z 1 u(x) = u. |Bε (x)| Bε (x)

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We have the following asymptotic mean value property characterization for p−harmonic functions, in the viscosity sense, α u(x) = 2

(

) max u + min u

Bε (x)

Bε (x)

( +β

1 |Bε (x)|

)

Z u

+ o(ε2 ),

Bε (x)

as ε → 0, if and only if div(|∇u|p−2 ∇u)(x) = 0. Here α and β are given by α + β = 1 and α/β = CN (p − 2), R 1 with CN = 2|B(0,1)| B(0,1) zN2 dz. → logo

In terms of games Rules F : ∂Ω → R be a Lipschitz continuous final payoff function. Starting point x0 ∈ Ω. An unfair coin is tossed (with probabilities α and β). If there is a head then a fair coin is tossed and the winner (player I or II) chooses a new position x1 ∈ B (x0 ). If we have a tail then a point in x1 ∈ B (x0 ) is selected at random (uniform probability). At each turn, the game is played again. Game ends when xτ ∈ ∂Ω + B(0, ε), and Player I earns F (xτ ) (Player II earns −F (xτ )) logo

Some References

Infinity Laplacian, limits of p−Laplacians Aronsson, Crandall, Evans, Jensen, Juutinen, Ishii, Loreti, Manfredi, Savin. Viscosity solutions Barles, Busca, Crandall-Ishi-Lions (User’s guide). Mass transport Evans, Evans-Gangbo, Mc Cann, Caffarelli, Otto. Game Theory Peres-Schramm-Sheffield-Wilson. THANKS !!!!. logo

Tug-of-War games and PDEs

F : ΓD → R be a Lipschitz continuous final payoff function. Starting point x0 ... Dynamic programming principle ≈ discretization of the second derivative in the ...

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