Civil Service Reform: The New Human Resources Management Systems of Georgia and Florida Mauricio I. Dussauge Laguna1 “The problem is governmental paralysis, because despite its name, our present Merit System is not about merit. It offers no reward to good workers. It only provides cover for bad workers.” Governor Zell Miller

(Documento preparado como parte de un proyecto de investigación para la U.S. General Accounting Office [ahora Government Accountability Office], durante el Seminario de Gestión de Recursos Humanos en el Sector Público, The Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Universidad de Syracuse, otoño de 2002.)

During the last 20 years, many countries around the world have been transforming their public administrations (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000). Among the topics that have appeared on the international public management agenda, the theme of civil service reform has occupied a prominent place among scholars, politicians, and even civil servants. In the United States, the discussion about civil service reform has been present in both the federal and the state levels. During the last decade, the “reinventing government” movement served as a powerful doctrine for transforming the civil service structures, their managerial systems, and their organizational values. Within this general tendency of public management and civil service reforms, two U.S. state governments have taken the lead and have gone to the extreme of eliminating the very basic characteristics of their civil service systems, with the same intention of creating a more effective and accountable public sector. Trying to escape from highly centralized public personnel systems (Condrey 2002, 121), which supposedly reduced organizational efficiency, flexibility and responsiveness, Georgia and

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Agradezco los comentarios de Patricia W. Ingraham a una primera versión del ensayo.

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Florida have developed a new decentralized model in which individual agencies have almost complete autonomy for managing their human resources systems. Simultaneously, trying to escape from a rigid system, that supposedly constrained managerial discretion, and rewarded seniority instead of performance (Condrey 2002; West 2002; Florida Council of 100 2000), both states introduced “at-will” employment practices, broadened personnel related managerial faculties, and eliminated seniority rights (Walters 2002). This paper briefly describes the main changes that Georgia and Florida have introduced to their civil service systems. In order to do so, the paper contains two broad sections that address the principal characteristics of the human resources systems reforms (recruitment, job classification, pay levels, performance management, and discipline) in each state. At the end of each section, there is a general comment about the new role central state personnel agencies are supposed to play after the reform. As a complementary objective, the paper will highlight the main positive aspects of the reforms, as well as some of the difficulties these states have faced upon this day. However, the general conclusions of the paper will try to explain what topics may become important in the near future. While most of the points are somehow related with Georgia’s particular experience, they may also have a direct relevance for the case of Florida, as well as for other states that are thinking of implementing similar civil service reforms.

GEORGIA: A GENERAL OVERVIEW In order to understand human resources changes in Georgia, it is necessary to have in mind the dichotomy between classified and unclassified employees and positions. According to Governor Miller’s reform, all employees hired after July 1, 1996, as well as the positions created after that date, would be considered unclassified. Conversely, all state employees that were already working before that date would remain classified2.

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The complement of that dichotomy is the following: “[A]n employee with classified status can keep his or her status by remaining in the current position or by taking a new position that still retains classified status. If a classified employee moves to a newly created position (i.e., unclassified), he or she becomes an unclassified employee. If a new employee occupies a position that has classified status, he or she does not become a classified employee. Once a classified employee accepts an unclassified position, he or she can never regain classified status: likewise, once a position is occupied by an unclassified employee, it can never be returned to the classified service” (Gossett 2002, 99). The numbers of the classified and unclassified public servants can be found in Condrey 2002.

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The crucial difference between classified and unclassified employees is that the latter are “considered ‘at-will’ employees, unable to attain a property interest or tenure rights” (Condrey 2002, 116). This is one of the key elements of the reform, and its implications –present along the diverse elements of the state’s human resources system– will be described below. The second key element of Georgia’s civil service reform has been the process of decentralization of personnel authorities. In the case of selection policies, for instance, after 1996 each state agency has had the opportunity to recruit, screen, and hire candidates by using its own resources, conditions, and deadlines. Even if the Georgia Merit System (GMS, the state’s central personnel office) serves as a point of contact for those looking for a public job, each agency now has the faculty to decide whether or not its job openings will be posted with GMS (Gossett 2002, 104). Therefore, agencies are no longer obliged to guide their own selection activities by any central mandate, a change that seems to have effectively produced faster and more efficient hiring processes3. The existence of these new agency capacities, however, has not implied that agencies certainly develop their own recruitment, screening, and hiring (Walters 2002, 24). In fact, some of them continue to contract the advice and help of the GMS during their recruitment processes as a more effective way for hiring adequate personnel. In terms of job classification, before 1996 Georgia had a centralized system in which the GMS had the authority to establish position classes. While GMS still has the legal responsibility for regulating positions that can be found across state agencies, now the agencies are “free to identify any of their positions as unique and assume responsibility for classifying the positions themselves” (Gossett 2002, 102). Therefore, when an agency thinks it is necessary to create a new position, it does not have to ask for authorization from the GSM; the agency simply has to design the new job description and assign a new job title. Also linked to the new position classification authorities, the reform decentralized the right of establishing new pay levels for these newly created positions to the agencies. According to some authors, these authorities have certainly increased agencies’ ability to face environmental changes (Lasseter 2002, 127). However, at the same time the transformations have brought other changes that may not be considered very positive: the new faculties assigned

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It should be mentioned, however, that the decrease in hiring times is also related to the more intensive use of new information technologies (Lasseter 2002, 130).

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to the agencies have increased the inconsistencies in pay levels between similar jobs (Lasseter 2002, 127)4; the number of state job titles has augmented by about one-third (Walters 2002, 25); and the competition among agencies for getting the best employees has increased (Lasseter 2002, 127)5. The merit system reforms also changed the structure of the promotions system. Even if classified employees are still governed, as they were before the reform, by seniority-related considerations, all the unclassified employees are under a new decentralized system in which their manager can promote them (to another position or pay level), without regard to the number of years they have been in a determined job. As a natural consequence, the reforms have eliminated predictable pay increases for all unclassified employees (Walters 2002, 23). At the same time, the reforms established that those classified employees who want to be promoted to higher but unclassified positions, have to face the loss of their civil service prerogatives (Gossett 2002, 105)6. A different situation has happened in the area of performance management, since the changes in this area were not included in the merit system reforms, but were developed in parallel as a particular project called GeorgiaGain (Facer 1998, 61-62).

GeorgiaGain was the name given to the project to develop and implement a pay for performance system in Georgia. […] The administration wanted to step away from the perceived automatic nature of ‘annual merit increases’ and focus these raises on those employees whose performance warranted recognition and reward (Elmore and Cornish 2000, 9).

The idea of the new system supposed a huge transformation from the former performance appraisal system, since it introduced the concept of economic rewards for productive employees. 4

“The downside is inconsistency in the pay levels of similar jobs in different operating agencies. This may be due to any number of reasons from inadequate job analysis and salary benchmarking by agency staff members to the simple desire to be in advantaged position to attract candidates from their sister agencies. Regardless of the reason, as time has passed since reform, we have seen significant discrepancies in pay equity develop across agency lines” (Lasseter 2002, 127) 5 According to Walters “if an agency wants to pay more to attract a higher-quality candidate to some lowlevel clerical position, it can simply create a new job title and pay scale” (Walters 2002, 24). 6 It should also be mentioned that, in the majority of the agencies, promotions are no longer based in the use of standardized tests, but in the assessments of skills, knowledge and abilities, in combination with references and interviews (Walters 2002, 25).

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Nonetheless, according to some authors GeorgiaGain faced multiple troubles and did not respond completely to its original objectives (Facer 1998; Kellough and Nigro 2002). Among these problems, perhaps the two most important have been the lack of sufficient funds for effectively compensating outstanding employees (Walters 2002, 25; Kuykendall and Facer 2002, 138); and “the widespread perception that the performance appraisal process was not fairly administered” (Kellough and Nigro 2002, 163). As a consequence, GeorgiaGain has been replaced recently by PerformancePlus (Gossett 2002, 103), which is the new “performance management

and

performance

compensation

program”

(www.gms.state.ga.us/agencyservices/FAQ.asp?faq=ALL, 10/28/2002). Finally, the civil service reforms of 1996 also modified in a radical sense the main elements of the disciplinary system. According to Lasseter, “prior to the reform, any formal disciplinary action of a classified employee had to be clearly documented and could be appealed to an administrative law judge” (Lasseter 2002, 127). After the reform, however, all those unclassified employees that have been hired under the doctrine of “at-will” employment face a completely different legal status:

While such employees would receive the same basic benefit packages as classified employees, they would have no seniority rights (they couldn’t “bump” anyone anywhere) and no formal rights to appeal disciplinary actions, whether those actions came in the form of letters of reprimand, less-than flattering annual job performance reviews, pay cuts, or even dismissal. Post-July-1996 hires could be transferred, demoted, promoted, or riffed at the complete discretion of management (Walters 2002, 23).

As can be imagined, this area of reform has been the most controversial of all (Kuykendall and Facer 2002). Whereas some of the consequences of the “at-will employment” idea still need to be fully developed, currently there are two changes that have clearly appeared in agencies’ disciplinary activities. On the one hand, the transformation of the disciplinary system has apparently accomplished its objective of making it easier to fire poor performers. In the case of Georgia’s Department of Human Resources, for instance, the number of employees dismissed has constantly increased after the reform (Lasseter 2002, 128). On the other hand, it seems that the reforms have also generated some tensions among managers, since they have had

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to use simultaneously two different sets of disciplinary standards and systems (Lasseter 2002, 127). Also in the context of this new disciplinary system, the role of the GMS and other external authorities has become irrelevant for unclassified employees, for whom the last appeal instance is the agency’s director. This fact may partially explain why the number of unclassified employees trying to appeal disciplinary decisions has been very low7. From all the reforms described above, it is clear that the role of the state’s central personnel office, the GMS, has had to change in a radical way. At present, the GMS is supposed to administer a central job bank; provide some general benefits related services for the state employees8; and implement “a statewide pay plan, and establishing pay grades and qualifications for jobs found in all units” (West 2002, 81). However, currently the principal activities of the GMS seem to be generally oriented to offer “a wide range of human resource related services to aid State of Georgia agencies in acquiring and maintaining the workforce necessary to meet the State’s business needs”, an idea further detailed in the GMS’ objectives description9. The new decentralized environment has implied that the GMS currently works mainly as a consultant, that can be contracted by the individual agencies for determined tasks (Walters 2002, 24), than as a central authority responsible of auditing agencies’ personnel practices (Gossett 2002, 108). Furthermore, according to Gossett this focus of the GMS in becoming a “fee for service” agency, may have comprised its auditing activities: “to keep itself in business, the Merit System may be reluctant to be overly critical of agency performance for fear of hurting its chances when it bids to provide services to that same agency at a future date” (Gossett 2002, 109)10.

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According to Walters, “agency directors report that very few unclassified employees who are fired even try to appeal, simply because the state now has a reputation as having few protections for public sector employees” (Walters 2002, 26) 8 “The Merit System continues to administer the state’s 401 (k) plan and some other benefits like dental coverage, but health care and pensions are administered by outside agencies” (Walters 2002, 23). 9 “Providing human resource services that enable agencies to hire, develop, and retain high-quality employees; assisting agencies in developing effective and efficient human resource policies and practices; assisting agencies in identifying and utilizing effective and efficient human resource product services; providing human resource development and training strategies that will support the workforce development objectives of State organizations; and providing employee benefits which are perceived as valuable in an efficient and effective matter” (www.gms.state.ga.us/agencyservices/index.asp, 10/28/2002). 10 The agencies can also contract private consultants (Condrey 2002, 118).

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Whether this statement is true or not, it is important to remark that the GMS has almost abandoned its original role as a strong central regulatory personnel office, and according to some authors is trying to assume a new partner role (Lasseter 2002, 129)11.

FLORIDA: A GENERAL OVERVIEW In the case of Florida State, the reforms are both similar and different when compared to Georgia’s merit system reforms (West 2002, 86). They are similar in the sense that the ideas and practices of “at-will” employment have been introduced again inside state bureaucracies. The reforms are also similar because they try to increase the ability (flexibility) of managers and individual agencies to hire good candidates and dismiss poor performers, in order to increase government’s efficiency, effectiveness, and public image. However, Florida’s reforms are also different for at least three reasons. First, “at-will” employment in this state has been limited to about 16,000 state employees that now integrate the Selected Exempt Service (SES). Second, the reforms in Florida that have eliminated seniority protections during downsizing projects (“bumping” rights) for both the SES personnel and career civil service personnel. Third, the new human resources systems of Florida show particular features that differ from those present in Georgia, as it is described below. In terms of recruitment and screening activities, for example, Florida already had a decentralized selection system, which based hiring on “knowledge, skills, and abilities” as well as references and interviews, instead of traditional testing practices (Walters 2002, 30). Service First only increased agencies’ hiring autonomy in order to produce a more efficient, flexible, and faster system. According to the Department of Management Services –DMS, which is responsible for coordinating state personnel management– “selection will now only require the completion of one document, and will reduce the current average of 60 days to hire an individual to only a few days or a couple of weeks” (Department of Management Services 2002a)12.

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A side effect has been that individual agencies now face an increased mutual interdependency for exchanging information about their new practices in those faculties decentralized after the reform (Condrey 2002, 119). 12 “Now, the only documentation mandated is a written rationale demonstrating that the recommended person is qualified and satisfies job requirements; minimum qualifications are no longer required. This eliminates the voluminous paperwork previously compiled on all eligible individuals; application material is needed only for the final candidate” (Bowman et al. 2002, 17).

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The Service First Initiative also includes three changes, two of which were not present in the case of Georgia. First, the DMS has begun to contract out some “transactional processes”, such as the advertisement of vacancies (Department of Management Services 2002c; Walters 2002, 32). Second, while the DMS still coordinates a central job bank posting, the agencies are now completely free to announce their jobs by the mechanisms they consider most appropriate. And third, in “order to ensure the highest quality workforce in Florida state government” the governor proposed “extending the probationary period for permanent Career Service status from 6 months to one year” (Department of Management Services 2002d). In the case of pay levels and job classifications, the transformations brought by Service First have also been different from those made in Georgia, even if the objective of increasing managerial and organizational flexibilities has been the same. With an extensive broadbanding strategy that has covered almost all state personnel13, Service First reduced over 3,300 job classes into 145 occupational levels (Department of Management Services 2002e, vi). Managers are now free to promote their employees inside each band, while discrete pay steps linked to seniority have been eliminated (Walters 2002, 33). According to the DMS, the objectives of the new broad-banded system are to “significantly reduce the need to reclassify employees, reduce the levels of supervisory positions, provide flexibility to managers to move employees through, and to provide for salary increase additives and lump-sum bonuses” (Department of Management Services 2002f). Since the change is very recent, it is hard to evaluate it. However, some authors think that “broadbanding tends to increase payroll costs, diminish promotion opportunities, and expose agencies to Equal Pay Act violations unless policies exist detailing the method of pay progression within the band” (Bowman et al. 2002, 18). In terms of the promotion system, the Service First reform has also increased, as in the case of Georgia, the autonomy and flexibilities that organizations and managers have. Currently, individual agencies are allowed to promote good performers without having to respect employees’ seniority rights and a fixed chain of pay steps; managers now can choose to promote an employee among the pay levels of a determined broadband. Promotions are no longer based 13

“The proposed broadband system will be used by all executive branch state agencies, including the Executive Office of the Governor, and shall encompass the Career Service, Selected Exempt Service, and Senior Management Service classes. Personnel not included in the broadbanding initiative are employees of the State University System, Legislative and Judicial branches, elected officials, Lottery employees, and those in other miscellaneous pay plans” (Department of Management Services, 2001, p. viii).

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on formal testing, but in the evaluation of knowledge, skills, and abilities that the manager does (Walters 2002, p.33). Service First also includes the development of a new performance management system, which intends to modify “the emphasis on state employee compensation from pay-for-attendance to pay-for-performance”. According to the DMS, “state employees are to be recognized for their contributions in terms of job performance and implemented ideas for reducing state expenses through the receipt of bonuses” (Department of Management Services 2002e, vi), which are supposed to be distributed according to the proposals submitted by each agency (Department of Management Services 2002a). It is clear that the consequences of these reforms will only be clear when some time has passed. However, the experiences of Georgia, as well as those of other public service systems (Kellough and Lu, 1993), suggest that it may be necessary to keep a skeptical view of potential successes achieved by this area of the Service First Initiative. Finally, Florida’s reform legislation profoundly transformed the disciplinary system. As in the case of Georgia’s unclassified employees, the 16,000 public servants that now integrate the SES are considered “at-will employees”, which means that they have no property rights over their positions. According to Bowman, West, and Gertz, in the case of

SES employees, no cause is required for separation, suspension or other personnel action; no avenue for redress exists for these individuals unless they can show violation of civil rights laws (for which the state is immune from many such suits) or other employment laws (e.g., whistleblower statutes) (Bowman et al. 2002, 15).

Furthermore, the new legislation has expanded the “definition of ‘cause’ for employee suspension or dismissal to include poor performance” (Department of Management Services 2002a). However, the legal framework changes in the discipline and dismissal areas have not been limited to those only related to “at-will employees”. First, the value of seniority has been eliminated for all employees (except police, nurses, and firefighters), and now even career public servants can be laid off or redeployed without having the bumping rights they used to have over

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younger employees (Department of Management Services 2002a; Bowman et al. 2002, 16)14. Second, Service First reforms have modified the scope and nature of the Public Employee Relations Commission’s authorities, and have transferred the Commission to the DMS (Department of Management Services 2002a; Bowman et al. 2002, 15). Third, in case of “layoff” or transfer measures, career civil servants can no longer appeal to the Commission, since the individual “agency head has a final say on all grievances not related to dismissal, suspension, demotion or reduced pay” (Bowman et al. 2002, 15). Florida’s transformations in the area of discipline and dismissals, then, are quite different than those accomplished in Georgia. Again, it is hard to know what the consequences of these changes are going to be. However, the history of civil service reform, and the nature of state public service unions suggest that the individual agencies, the Commission, and the DMS could face in the future more resistance and legal activism from the part of employees, than in the case of Georgia. Finally, compared with the case of GMS in Georgia, Florida’s DMS seems to have a more central role in regard to civil service reforms, since this agency has the direct responsibility for implementing the Service First Initiative (Department of Management Services 2001, vi). At the same time, DMS seems to have kept the central control on pay broad-bands, whereas GMS has just kept its authorities over classified personnel. In terms of similarities, both central personnel offices have delegated their selection and promotion faculties to the individual agencies; both have remained as central actors in the design and implementation of performance management systems; and both have adopted a simultaneous role as agency consultants and agency auditors.

CONCLUSIONS There are several aspects that can be concluded from the brief descriptions of Georgia and Florida civil service reforms. The first is that both reforms are, paradoxically, similar and different. On the one hand, both states have introduced a more decentralized personnel system, and have clearly pushed in favor of “at-will employment” and against seniority rights. 14

Walters says that “organized labor in Florida is arguing strenuously that abuses have already begun. Unions cite the termination of senior employees, a strategy labor says is being used rather coldheartedly to cut highsalaried staff. Such a strategy, charges labor, is not only a slap in the face to longtime and loyal employees, it is penny-wise and pound-foolish from the standpoint of losing valuable institutional memory” (Walters 2002, 34).

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On the other hand, the comparison of each state’s human resources systems, the scope of personnel covered by the new rules, and the role performed by the central personnel agencies show that each state has followed a different path in its search for increased effectiveness. Another set of conclusions can be obtained essentially from the experience of Georgia state reforms, since Florida’s Service First is still in the process of design and initial implementation. First, in spite of the fears expressed by different actors (Bowman 2002), it seems that widespread patronage has not developed after the introduction of “at-will” reforms (West 2002; Olson 1997)15. The active “watchdog role” that the media plays, the presence of several state and federal level legislations, and the highly technical characteristics of several public service jobs are apparently good barriers to prevent “cronyism” (Olson 1997; Walters 1997). Second, it appears that agency level and managerial flexibilities for recruiting, hiring, promoting, and firing have been well received by personnel directors16. According to some authors (Lasseter 2002; Walters 2002) there is a general perception that merit system reforms have built an environment in which human resources management is more flexible and therefore easier. Third, the new decentralized faculties seem to have effectively reduced the paperwork, time limits, and costs of recruitment, job classification, and dismissal. In this way, it seems that agencies are now able to fill critical jobs in shorter times, and that managers face less difficulties to fire poor performers. However, beyond these conclusions (which in general look very positive), there are many other relevant points that may require a closer consideration for fully evaluating these reforms. This is especially the case if the reforms are going to be considered as a reference for transforming other state civil service systems.

1. The reforms have implied a strong tradeoff between the rights of the public servants and the efficiency of the human resources management systems. While the Governors that pushed for the reforms (and some other actors) think that this has been adequate, there are 15

Condrey reports that in one agency in Georgia there have been some cases of patronage (Condrey 2002, 121). However he does not describe a generalized presence of “cronyism”. 16 “So when the Act 1816 passed, among the happiest people in the state were those who headed up agency personnel offices; they were finally being cut free from a system they regarded as the central bane of their existence” (Walters 2002, 23).

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still some doubts about whether the reforms have or have not gone too far (Kuykendall and Facer 2002). Therefore, further analysis may be necessary to assess if it is not necessary to develop a second civil service reform in order to adjust some of the legal transformations already taken.

2. There has also been a certain trade off between the former level of centralization and the new decentralized human resources management systems. As it was mentioned above, it appears that the new decentralized authorities have been well received by agencies’ managers. However, at the same time it seems that this new framework has developed (at least in the case of Georgia) some disparities among agencies. Therefore, it is not clear yet if the “amount” of decentralization has been adequate, or if there should have been (or if there need to be) a higher amount of central coordination to ensure both the efficiency and equity of the reforms17.

3. While the reforms have not reintroduced widespread practices of patronage, as many actors thought it was going to be the case, perhaps some of the most important consequences of the reform could appear in the long term due to the loss of institutional memory, and public service ethics. Constant changes among the personnel may affect the experience accumulated among public servants with long careers in a particular agency. On the other hand, thinking about public sector positions as just another job in the curriculum vitae may reduce individuals’ commitment to a particular public agency and to the public service in general (Bowman et al. 2001, 23).

4. The total cost of human resources administration still has to be fully evaluated, since it may paradoxically have increased. While a highly centralized civil service system generated a lack of flexibility, and diminished the efficiency in the recruitment processes, it may also had represented economies of scale since a central agency was the only that had to face the costs of both training human resources management specialists and preparing personnel administration materials. Now, with every particular agency having

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A further problem may be the reluctance of agencies to go partially back in the reforms and allow again the intervention of the state personnel office in authorities that have been decentralized (Lasseter 2002, 127).

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to be responsible for its own human resources management activities, agencies may be facing new administrative, transaction and opportunity costs that were not considered at the moment of implementing the reform, and that have not been fully evaluated18. Besides, some particular agencies may not have the administrative capacities and expertise to deal with the new responsibilities (Walters 1997).

5. The new decentralized competencies in the area of compensation and pay levels have increased agencies’ flexibility and competitiveness in the market job. However, they may also be generating unequal situations in which a similar type of work is not being remunerated with a similar pay level (Walters 2002, 39)19. Therefore, the new flexibilities in agencies’ compensation practices may be resulting in unfair compensation for the agencies’ workers (classified or even unclassified) that do the same job for a lower pay; and for the workers on other agencies that also do the same job and also get a lower pay. Moreover, the situation may also be unfair for those state agencies that face more limited budgetary resources and cannot compete in terms of payment against more powerful state agencies20.

6. It is clear that the current reforms related with broad-banding practices provide important flexibilities to state agencies. However, at the same time it still needs to be evaluated if the broadbands do not generate also annual budgetary uncertainties, since those flexibilities make less predictable the amount of money needed by each agency in order to cover salaries and pay increases along each year.

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“[A]gency personnel staff did express the general sentiment that life was in some ways harder: With expanded discretion had come increased responsibility for running a professional personnel management shop, which included having to stay abreast of both legal and legislative activity around personnel” (Walters 2002, 39). 19 “Although not a particularly visible or publicly discussed problem, the issue of salary equity across agencies is highly significant and disruptive in terms of employee turnover and sound pay practices for the state as a whole” (Lasseter 2002, 127). 20 “[T]he Merit System is supposed to be auditing agencies to ensure that this privilege is not abused and that there is ‘like pay’ for ‘like work’, statewide. As of this writing [October 2002], the Merit System has yet to conduct a single audit” (Walters 2002, 25). Moreover, according to Mike Sorrells, lack of oversight of compensation and pay has led to a system of compensation anarchy” (referred by Walters 2002, 27)

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7. The flexibility for easily promoting top performers may serve as an effective mechanism for rewarding exceptional employees. However, it still has to be fully assessed whether these fast promotions may not also limit the experience top performers can earn along different organizational levels, experience that can be useful (and even necessary) for the higher positions of an organization.

8. The existence of “at-will” employment may constitute a powerful incentive for managers in order to avoid the use of progressive discipline practices21. For some managers, the new faculties may be more comfortable since they no longer need to worry about designing an improvement plan for poor performers, or about “coaching” them along the period established for their performance improvement. “At-will” employment may also allow that some negative critical incidents become enough proof for firing public servants with a good or even excellent record. In both cases, the institutional change may erode an organizational culture in which trust, dialogue, and innovation-risk-taking are important values, and may diminish the importance of performance appraisal as a mechanism of dialogue.

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“Although we do actively foster a philosophy of progressive discipline and helping the employee to improve his or her performance, we must also admit that we have a two-tiered approach to discipline. For classified employees, we generally follow a standard progressive discipline method, beginning with an oral or written reprimand, then moving to suspension without pay or salary reduction, and finally dismissal. With unclassified employees, however, we will typically go straight from a written reprimand to a dismissal if immediate improvement does not occur” (Lasseter 2002, 128-129).

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Behn, Robert D. 1996. Ending civil service as we know it. Governing November: 86. Bowman, James. 2002. At-Will Employment in Florida Government, WorkingUSA Fall: 90-102. Bowman, James S., Jonathan P. West, and Sally C. Gertz. 2002. “Florida’s ‘Service First’: Radical Reform in the Sunshine State”, Paper for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston. Condrey, Stephen. 2002. Reinventing State Civil Service Systems. The Georgia Experience, Review of Public Personnel Administration Summer: 114-124. Department of Management Services. 2002a. Summary of Service First as Passed by the 2001 Florida

Legislature,

www.myflorida.com/myflorida/servicefirst/legislature.html,

10/28/2002. -----.

2002b.

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Initiative,

www.myflorida.com/myflorida/servicefirst/service_first_int.html, 10/28/2002, -----.

2002c.

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Frequently

Asked

Questions,

www.myflorida.com/dms/hrm/hrout/QA.html, 10/28/2002. -----.

2002d.

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Initiative,

www.myflorida.com/myflorida/servicefirst/service_first_int.html, 10/28/2002. -----. 2002e. State of Florida Annual Workforce Report. -----.

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www.myflorida.com/myflorida/servicefirst/index.html, 10/28/2002. Elmore, Steven, and Grady Cornish. 2000. Measuring Goal Attainment for GeorgiaGain and Merit System Reform, October, www.gms.state.ga.us. Facer, Rex L. 1998. Reinventing Public Administration: Reform in the Georgia Civil Service. Public Administration Quarterly Spring: 58-73. Florida TaxWatch. 2001. Modernizing Florida’s Civil Service: A Necessary Beginning for a Meaningful Change. Gossett, Charles. 2002. Civil Service Reform. The Case of Georgia. Review of Public Personnel Administration Summer. 94-113. Kellough, J. Edward and Haoran Lu. 1993. The paradox of merit pay. Review of Public Personnel Administration Spring: 45-63.

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Kellough, J. Edward and Lloyd Nigro. 2002. Pay for Performance in Georgia State Government. Review of Public Personnel Administration Summer: 146-166. Knop, Brian. 2002. Civil Service Reform. www.afscme.org. Kuykendall, Christine I., and Rex L. Facer. 2002. Public Employment in Georgia State Agencies. Review of Public Personnel Administration Summer: 133-145. Lasseter, Reuben W. 2002. Georgia’s Merit System Reform 1996-2001. Review of Public Personnel Administration Summer: 125-132. Olson, Walter. 1997. Fixing the Civil Service Mess. City Journal 7: no. 4. Pollitt, Christopher, and Geert Bouckaert. 2000. Public Management Reform. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The Florida Council of 100. 2000. Modernizing Florida’s Civil Service System: Moving From Protection to Performance. Tampa. Walters, Jonathan. 1997. Who needs civil service? Governing 10: 17-21. -----. 2002. Life after Civil Service Reform: The Texas, Georgia, and Florida Experiences. IBM Endowment for The Business of Government. West, Jonathan P. 2002. Georgia in the Mind of Radical Reformers. Review of Public Personnel Administration Summer: 79-93.

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APPENDIX A GENERAL ASPECTS OF THE REFORMS FEATURES Date of new legislation Reforms

• • •

Personnel covered • by “at will” provisions

GEORGIA July / October 1996

FLORIDA •

May 2001

Introduction of at-will employment • Job reclassification and pay for • performance (GeorgiaGain was introduced in October, and • substituted by PerformancePlus in 20)

Introduction of at-will employment Broadbanding of job titles and pay levels Elimination of seniority rights for all employees (except police, firefighters, and nurses)

All state personnel hired after law approval (considered unclassified)

•

All personnel transferred to the Selected Exempt Service (About 16,000 Supervisors, Managers, Directors, Administrators, and Confidential employees) State Congress Some Newspapers Florida Council of 100 Florida TaxWatch Moderate (some unions and newspapers) Design of the reform / oversight of implementation Republican

Support for the reform

• • •

State Congress Newspapers Agencies’ personnel directors

Opposition to the reform Role of the central personnel office Political party of the Governor that introduced the reforms

•

Almost inexistent

• • • • •

•

Consultant / Auditor

•

•

Democrat

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© Mauricio I. Dussauge Laguna

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