2016 CHRONICLE OF A DISASTER FORETOLD: THE ARMERO TRAGEDY

Natural Risk Management Group Assignment

Hugo Cabrera April Coleta Mónica Guasca Nadia Ortega Marc Tevini Felipe Thornberry

1 17 March 2016

CHRONICLE OF A DISASTER FORETOLD THE ARMERO TRAGEDY Introduction ‘The tragic failure to evacuate the towns of Armero, Chinchina and surrounding villages despite multiple warnings of volcanic activity led to an enormous loss of life and our sympathies today lie with the survivors and those families who lost loved ones in the terrible events that ensued from the eruption’. 1 Margareta Wahlström, former head of the UNISDR On the 13th November, 1985, Colombia lived the worst natural tragedy in its history. The stratovolcano Nevado del Ruiz made eruption and the city of Armero was wiped out from the map. Casualties were estimated to reach 25.000 people, who were trapped in mud-flows up to 40 meters thick. Three quarters of the people living in the Armero were swept away or drowned in the minutes it took for the swiftly moving mud to cover the town (NOOA, n.d). The eruption of the volcano was 2 moderate from the measures of volcanologist , but it’s impact were disastrous; mainly due to cumulative human error. The disaster is known worldwide as the “Armero Tragedy” and constitutes a reference to highlight and remember the importance of risk management. The following pressure and release model is expected to cover collateral root causes, underlying factors, and unsafe conditions that have been contributed to the Armero tragedy. These identified causes have made one of the biggest disaster from what was a moderate eruption. The event has been at the source of a worldwide awareness about the necessity of a better coordination of the crisis management organism and of the officials in charge of the monitoring of the volcano. It constitute a good example of management of volcanic risks as it is representative of broader natural risk management issues. On the long-term, it requires the knowledge of the past events (previous eruptions), and the urban planning measures dedicated to prevent settlements in zisky zones. On the short-term, it requires the monitoring of the volcanic activity, the alert, and the crisis gestion. The last international event at that time was the Saint Helens mount, in the North West of the U.S, and caused around 30 deaths, in 1980. The activity of the volcano was well-forecasted by the scientists, so that the focus has been put on the reluctance from the inhabitants to evacuate when the authorities (Peltier, 2005). Nonetheless, in the case of the Nevado Volcano, the issue of the reluctance of the inhabitants comes one step-further, since the alert to evacuate has not been properly neither identified, nor diffused in the surroundings of the volcano. As it will be outlined, many conditions have prevented such information to be widely and properly broadcasted.

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The 13 November 2015 in Geneva, for the 30 Anniversary of the Nevado del Ruiz Eruption. Press release UNISDR 2015/38 2 Volcanic explosivity index of 3 in a scale from 1 to 8.

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PRESSURE AND RELEASE MODEL

1) ROOT CAUSES 1.1 Armed Conflict Colombia is a country that has been troubled by internal conflict over a long period of time. The rise of guerrilla movements can be traced back to the period of La Violencia (c. 1978–1984). This period started after the assassination of Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, a liberal leader leading to violent conflict between the conservative and liberals, as the name dictates this period was marked by extreme violence, including guerrilla warfare, assassinations, extortions and mass murders (Booth, 1974). Political instability paved way for the rise of armed groups with foreign doctrines. The conservatives and liberals came to an agreement by the end of the period and created the National Front, this accord ensured that each party would rule for four years and then switch. The period of the 60’s led to many social changes across the globe and many youths who were distraught with the violence between liberals and conservatives and deep social gaps joined various guerrilla movements, such as the ELN, FARC and M19 who were the most prominent at the time. (Kline, 1995). Another serious issue Colombia has is narco–traffic and it is intertwined with the armed conflict as it has been used as a way to finance various armed groups. These two issues have been contextualized as priority problems in the national agenda and often over shadow other serious social ones such as disaster response. This can be argued happened in Armero as the government was

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fixated in the siege of the Palace of Justice taken over by the guerilla group M19 just a week before the volcano erupted and thus did not give the attention it should to the natural disaster (El Tiempo, 2000). 1.2 Lack of governance Colombian history has been marked for a constant debate between centralization and decentralization of power. It was just until the constitution of 1991 that it was considered the need for administrative decentralization. After two hundred years, the regional and local levels of government remained limited in their capacity to take decisions. Hence, the decisions were primarily made at the highest level of central government (LaRosa & Mejia, 2012). This fact could explain to some extent why neither the mayor nor the governor took any decision at the right time to evacuate the city. As mentioned above, the national government had its attention in combating guerrilla and narco groups; combined with the limited power of local authorities to take fundamental decisions lead this leads to inaction that claimed thousands of lives. Another component implied in the lack of governance is the high level of corruption; embedded in Colombian politics since long time ago. It is then expected that the majority of the population does not trust their political system and that Colombian inhabitants do not take seriously any public announcement made by politicians. Colombia ranks 94th out of 175 countries on the Corruption Perceptions Index of 2014 and a staggering 80% of Colombians view their government as corrupt (Transparency International, 2014). It is important to clarify that although these are recent figures, the perception of people has been the same in previous years; moreover in the violent decade of the 80s. This in turn creates a serious issue when it comes to disaster risk prevention because lack of trust in government . On the other hand, an atmosphere of spread distrust among government levels and different institutions contributed as well to the lack of governance present in the country. For instance, although the first signs of the Nevado del Ruiz appeared in 1984 and there was a risk map (See Figure 1 in Annex), some authorities judged the map as too alarmist and argued this paranoia had political and economic interests behind it. 1.3 Need for economic revival The decade of the 80’s began with a slowdown in economic growth, accompanied by high fiscal deficit and strong external imbalance with a huge decrease of the amount of international currency reserves. This recession was the strongest since the one experienced in the years of the World War II. This led, therefore, to take more severe measures, which included acceleration in the rate of devaluation, a general tariff surcharge of 8% to imports and austerity policies in government spending. The whole process was accompanied by the International Monetary Fund so as to regain credibility with the international financial community. This period was also relevant for the coffee boom that experiences the country which contribute to a rapid recovery of the economic activity (Ocampo, 1987). 1.4 Low risk perception Aside of the lack of scientific knowledge communication, poor monitoring system and disregard of the disaster by the national government, another major issue that propagated the disaster was the passivity of the town people itself. There had been various signs that indicated the chance of an eruption taking place and yet people went to sleep that night at their homes and ignored all previous warnings (Arenas, 2016). As Orlando Lozada, one of the survivors pointed out “over trust killed us” (Arenas, 2016). He explained to a reporter how excessive trust was the downfall of the people of Armero, whom seemed to have decided to ignore completely the existence of the volcano and did not want to go away. This is embedded in the Colombian culture of not reacting until it is too late, which is represented in Orlando’s words, “when will we learn to prevent rather than regret?” (Arenas, 2016). It is for this reason, and the deep religious roots that Colombia has, that the Armeritas did not actively mobilize after hearing the warnings.

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1.5 Deep catholic roots The vast majority of Colombian population is catholic. According to official figures, 90% of the population is Roman Catholic (CIA, 2015). The Catholic Church has played a key role in the construction of social and political order of Colombia. It has a significant influence in the society, which makes it a fundamental part in the construction of governance. During most of its 150 years of history, the Church has maintained a anti-secularist position, imposing a model of society according to "God's plan" (Gonzalez, 2008). As it will be explained in the next section, religion causes has also influenced the final death toll. 2- UNDERLYING FACTORS 2.1 Political Priorities on conflict The storming of the Palace of Justice catalyzed and prioritized the political action. The ongoing conflict between the authorities and the guerilla group has reached a dramatic level, and has to some extent put Armero in the background. More precisely, the 6 November 1985, exactly one week before the main eruption of the Nevado Del Ruiz, the Palace of Justice was taken over by a guerrilla group; the M-19. The siege has gone during two days and more than 98 persons died, including colombian soldiers, M19 members, and supreme court members (El Tiempo, 2000). Such political instability required the full presence of the army in the capital, and again, this had consequences on the way people in the remote town of Armero were helped. After the Nevado Del Ruiz eruption, the president Betancur announced: ‘We have had one national tragedy after another’. As well as the political and the military attention, the assault of the Palace of Justice has also drawn the attention of the media. In the overall panorama, investments were intended to deal with the conflict itself and much less to deal with social issues. 2.2 Institutions - Bureaucracy and weak communication channels The lack of governance has as a consequence the weakening of institutionality and the increase of bureaucracy as decisions are taken at the highest level with poor decision power from local authorities. In the case of Armero, the institutions existed but the lack of communication between them and the ubiquitous bureaucracy diminish the effectiveness of their action. For instance, UNESCO informed to the minister of foreign affairs that they were ready to provide help with specialist and instrumentation but the official letter offering help remained lost for two months and reappeared finally in the MInistry of Education (Hall, 1990). There were national, regional and a local emergency committees formed by various 3 institutions like the Defensa Civil, Ingeominas , Red Cross, National Police and Government representatives (president, ministers, mayors, governors). Nevertheless, this institutionality was ineffective at taking decisions and communicating them to the inhabitants of the Armero. 2.3 Economic pressures It is commonly said that Colombia did less worse than other latin american countries during the 80s (Perry, 1990), in relation to the debt crisis and the neoliberal period that the whole continent was facing. We may highlight in this regard, the increasing in coffee and cotton exportations which resulted in a higher importance of agriculture in the national economy composition. In this context, Armero was one most prosperous areas in the country and considered an important municipality in the Colombian Coffee Axis, in the Tolima Department. In this active area, an important amount of coffee, rice, and, especially, cotton was produced. Therefore, a preventive evacuation of the region would have generated important economic losses as well as the diminution of the value of the lands threatened (Peltier, 2005). This resources were actually extremely needed for the fight against guerrillas and narcotraffic, as it was previously explained.

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Colombian Geological Service.

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2.4 Centralization and confusing messages: the press issue There were just two national broadcasts at that time that were, as mentioned above, very focused on different issues such as the Justice Palace assault. The characteristics of the media at that time, and their confusion are important underlying factors that had increase the vulnerability of the population of Armero. First, it is important to consider that the press channels were very few, and very centralized in 1985. The country’s capital, Bogota, had the national leadership of the national radio networks which was the main tool to order the evacuation. Therefore, the information could not spread through individual means such as the social networks today. Second, ‘they were placated by reassuring messages from the mayor over the local radio, and from a local priest over the church public address system’. At about 9 p.m., Armero was completely without electricity service and there were no means of communicating the dangers to the town. This last issue refers to the need of other means of communication such as security alarm system. At 21:45 Civil defense officials in Murillo radioed the regional Civil director in Ibague that Ruiz had erupted. ‘He attempted to radio Armero to order an evacuation, without success’ (Scarth 1994). 2.5 Low attention to scientific data A person who had great influence in shaping public opinion was indeed the priest of the city. The messages of the priest stating that there was no danger affected the credibility of the volcanologist, who were warning that Armero had a probability of 2 out of 3 to be destroyed in case the eruption occurs. Not only the priest of Armero was denying the scientific facts but also the archbishop of the neighbour city of Manizales criticized the media for spreading “Volcanic terrorism”. The overconfidence in the priest’s statements and the idea of leaving destiny in the hands of God and the church, determined the tragic destiny of the city. The government didn’t put much attention to the scientists neither. In the opinion of one experienced observer of the political scene (Hess, 1987) "Scientists are generally viewed with less regard than any other group. From my observations, they are perceived as people who don't understand the system, who have little ability to talk with people outside their profession, and who think that being correct is always enough... [Scientists] must learn that budgets, limited time frames, regulatory impacts,and public accountability are all factors that must be considered by Congress. Scientific facts are not the only criteria in public decision-making." 3) UNSAFE CONDITIONS 3.1 Physical vulnerability Armero was located in a critical area, at the mouth of the Rio Lagunillas canyon, 74 km downstream from the summit crater (Pierson, 1990). Thus, the town was situated on the scope of the Nevado del Ruiz, on a debris fan that had already been overrun by destructive mudflows in 1595 and again in 1845, provoking devastating consequences. (Wright, et al,1992:21) During the ensuing period of 140 years of the volcano’s inactivity, people seemed to forget the previous experiences. As it was a plateau very favorable to human settlements (Peltier, 2005), people decided to rebuild and develop the town. As for building safety, typical buildings at Armero were made of adobe brick or concrete blocks with poor structural connections. Some building were not able to withstand the impact from the lahar flow and were completely destructed. On the contrary, some remained erect but were buried in the lahar. In any case, the hazard achieved such magnitude that did not discriminate almost any building (Mileti et al, 1991). 3.2 Socioeconomic vulnerability Before the disaster, Armero was a prosperous town, a fertile land that had a long history of agricultural production, like tobacco and aguardiente, the preferred alcoholic beverage of Colombia, in the late XIX Century. In the 1900s, the production in the territory included rice, coffee and maize.

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Cattle breading was one of the top qualities in the country, and the cotton boom of the sixties brought prosperity to the town and its surroundings (El Tiempo, 2015). The activation of the Nevado del Ruiz in 1985 brought some major concerns for land devaluation and opportunism due to the panic the constant alarms were causing. The Manizales Chamber of Commerce as well as the Archbishop of Manizales accused the press of spreading false information, and creating potential economic losses in the region a few weeks before the eruption (Hall, 1989). There was an overall denial, some inhabitants even claiming that they would only leave their lands if they died. The population of Armero never really believed the treat of the avalanche and were preparing for the risk of a potential flood of the Dam of the Lagunillas in the El Sirpe path instead (Arenas, 2016). 3.3 Poor political response and preparedness The last months before the disaster, a general confusion (Hall, 1989) and disbelief had spread about the threat that the Nevado del Ruiz represented (Arenas, 2016). After many months of uncertainty after the first signs of volcanic activity in December 1984, many technical teams had studied the area and had returned with inconsistent opinions regarding the volcano. Following the eruption with ash emission of September 11 1985, a Committee of Volcanological Studies from Caldas to monitor the situation. However, later that month, during a session of national Congress, the Representative of Caldas province heavily criticized the Civil Defense of Caldas for alarming the population instead of instructing them on actions to take in case of eruption. This started a political dispute with Civil Defense action in the region (Hall, 1989). Guillermo Alfonso Jaramillo, former representative of Armero, claimed that when he and fellow congressmen explained the dangerous situation of Armero to central Government officials in September 1985. However, they were dismissed as alarmist and “Horsemen of the Apocalypse” (Arenas, 2016). In October 1985, the population kept receiving mixed messages on the status of the danger, for example: on one side, the Emergency Committee that was established to monitor the volcanic activity of the Nevado del Ruiz began to alert people on what to do in case of emergency; while on the other, well-known figures such as the Archbishop of Manizales accused the press of “volcanic terrorism” for their alarming publications. The lack of direction and unity caused an overall confusion among the population. When interviewed, a few weeks before the disaster (October 8), the Mayor of Armero stated to the Consigna magazine that the Emergency Committee did not have the resources necessary to take actions in a case of catastrophe and confirmed that the inhabitants were left confused, due to the lack of credibility of the information received so far. He stated that the people had opted to finally commend themselves to God’s will instead (Hall, 1989). 3.4 Problems with communication If there is something sure in these whole event is that the lack or inefficient communication between the different actors was evident. Otherwise, the message of evacuation could have reached the community on time saving thousands of lives. Although Armero was 74 km (44.5 mi) from the crater of Nevado del Ruiz, it took the lahar only two and a half hours to reach the village, time who was not enough for a warning to reach the people in time (NOOA, n.d). As mentioned above, messages from different sources created confusion among the citizens. It was as well a lack of 4 cooperation. For instance, INGEOMINAS and CHEC scientist were working independently and didn’t share information (Hall, 1989). The discrepancies of opinions among the scientist, the local personalities and the authorities was a clear evidence that communication channels were disregarded.

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Central Hidro-electrica de Caldas.

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4) HAZARD - VOLCANIC ERUPTION The eruption starts the 13th of November 1985. It is moderate intensity compared to a historical scale. However, the eruptive column reaches 30 km high, and pyroclastic flows appears. As a result, the snow cover has melted, liberating a tremendous mass of water. This starts running downhill right away , at 50/80km/h speed, removing ash and stones produced by the eruption and snatched materials. The lahar flow achieved 50 meters high 2h30, after the beginning of the eruption and Almero and the villages nearby will be buried under the lahars. 5) RESPONSE TO DISASTER 5.1 Disaster Impact and Immediate Response The nature and extent of the mudflow left the distribution of the survivors scattered all over a great area making it difficult to assess the amount of rescue and relief operations to plan for. The search and rescue operations were facilitated by the Colombian Red Cross and the Civil Defense personnel with the help of the military. Medical assistance, transport and distribution of supplies and establishment of medical and shelter facilities were given priority. International relief aid arrive after 24 hours from almost 30 countries in the forms of monetary donations, personnel, medical supplies and shelter needs. However, since the local government had no existing disaster response system at that time, rescue operations and relief efforts were hampered due to logistics problems. Most of the roads were impassable thus aircraft and helicopters had to be used for transport. Requisition, fueling and usage of these aircrafts had to be dealt with before the actual search and rescue could happened. Also, a centralized location for medical care could not be established with most of the city being damaged thus an initial confusion on where to send survivors for emergency medical care. The limited number and size of the helicopters available during the rescue operations could not respond in time to the large number of injured that needs immediate medical attention. Local medical care facilities could not accommodate all the patients thus requiring their transport to distant facilities. Coordination and facilitation of the operations improved over time as these issues were addressed (Mileti et al, 1991). Damage assessment, recovery, identification and burial of bodies were also given attention. About 23,000 people were killed by the disaster (Jovel, 1989). Many of the recovered bodies remained unclaimed and unidentified while some remained buried in the mud. After dealing with the urgent matters of the disaster, actions were taken to restore communication, transportation routes and other services such as water supply, sewer systems and fuel pipelines. Within two weeks, roads were become accessible and temporary bridges were built. People started returning to daily functions even with temporary facilities. Economic and social functions were slowly restored with the reestablishment and temporary relocation of settlements. As the recovery of the local community progressed, monitoring of the volcanic activities of Nevado del Ruiz were also viewed with urgency as concern for possible future eruptions heightened. 5.2 Long Term Impact and Response The eruption of Nevado del Ruiz volcano led to the loss of properties and livelihood for many survivors causing the economic activity to drop by 50% within the succeeding three months. There were issues on whether it is safer to relocate the people from Amaro as future eruptions could cause a similar disaster. It was acknowledged that this could only be possible with external financial aid. The recovery program in Amaro began from joint efforts of both public and private sectors. The program focused on recovery, construction and monitoring of the volcano. Major efforts were given to defining the future risk , generating useful public information, preparing for emergency situations and mitigating potential impact. Actions were taken with regards to monitoring the volcano such as employment of telemetered seismic and ground deformation networks centered at Observatorio Volcanológico de Colombia in Manizales placing them in-charge of monitoring the

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volcano for signs of eruption and notifying the president so that he can operate through the National Emergency Committee. The National Emergency Committee were comprised of INGEOMINAS, the Army, the Red Cross, the Colombian Civil Defense, the governor of Tolima, and local police and fire departments. Civil Defense was put in-charge of training people for disaster response, prevention and mitigation also in coordinating with other agencies involved in emergency response. The involvement of the local communities were organized through the public education campaign on the risks of volcanic eruption in the areas near the volcano. Information on hazards and what to do’s for an impending hazard were taught in schools. Useful information were disseminated through the distribution of flyers to locals about hazards and evacuation signals. Hazards maps were distributed to towns at risk for further planning and preparation at local government levels and evacuation route markers were placed to illustrate where to go when warning systems are activated. With the establishment of the warning systems and emergency response plan of the local government units, it was up to the public risk perception on whether such system would be effective in mitigating the impacts of an impending disaster. Evacuation drill was tested once but with poor response from the locals, and an actual implementation of the emergency system was done in January 1986 in response to an actual eruption, however, poor cooperation from the public was observed. Conclusion The eruption of the Nevado del Ruiz was relatively moderate from a volcanologist perspective, but its effects have killed a tremendous number of people. The Pinatubo eruption caused relatively few victims compared to its potency. Therefore, a positive correlation exists between the level of development of a country and its capacity to cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard (Peltier, 2005). The Nevado del Ruiz eruption is a sad demonstration of the significant worsening of a risk by a misconception of the phenomena and a deficient preparedness. Nowadays, the monitoring of the Nevado Del Ruiz has increased considerably in order to improve the management of a hypothetic risk. The underlying factors and the unsafe conditions have been addressed by current governments. Nevertheless, there is still work to do in order to tackle the root causes, which are still present in the country.

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Role: Journalist Profile : Frank Fournier is a real journalist. He became famous after having taken a photo of Omayra Sanchez, being stucked under the debris and unable to move during three days, right after the eruption of the Volcano del Ruiz in November 1985. The picture will be diffused all around the world, after the death of the young girl. Two polemics started whereupon the publication. One regarding the decision of the photographer to take the picture, and another one regarding the inaction of the Colombian government to prevent the tragedy of Armero in spite of the several warnings. Before the Disaster: Full attention of the media towards Bogota The entire country, one week before the eruption, was passing through an important phase of political instability. There had been a takeover at the Palace of Justice in Bogota by leftist M-19 guerillas. As a result 98 persons died, including military, M-19 members and Supreme court justices. Many people had been killed and this had a big impact on the way people in the remote town of Armero were helped. The army, for example, had been mobilised in the capital. The media were still very centralized at that time in the country's capital, Bogota, with national leadership of some radio networks, some newspapers and three television channels that only broadcasted the recent events (Miguel Perez, 2015) During the disaster : Chronology of a confusion The population of Armero was exposed to reassuring messages from the mayor over radio, and from a local priest over the church public address system. In the context of Armero in 1985, the messages of the church had a major credibility when at the same time, the Red Cross ordered an evacuation of the town at 7:00 p.m. However, shortly after the evacuation order the ash stopped falling and the evacuation was called off. At 20.00 : A message ordering to evacuate is transmitted on radio but few people will hear it, and among other facts, a soccer game takes place at the same moment on the T.V. At about 9 p.m., Armero was completely without electricity service and so there were no means of communicating the dangers to the town. Local authorities, over loudspeakers, advised people to wear a damp handkerchief to protect their noses and their respiratory systems and return home to safety. 21:45 Civil defense officials in Murrillo radioed the regional Civil director in Ibague to inform that Ruiz had erupted. He attempted to radio Armero to order an evacuation, without success. 10.30pm the regional Civil Defense director overheard various other radio transmission directed at Armero. These included messages from the towns of Ambalema and Murillo that an “avalanche” (the word often used in Spanish) was approaching and Armero should be evacuated (Committee on Natural Disasters et al. 1991). Post Disaster Response: the Omayra’s picture power “People were asking: 'Why didn't you help her? Why didn't you get her out?' But it was impossible’ (Franck Fournier, 2005). The difficulty to rescue people has created a tragedy above another one: ‘There was this little girl (Omayra Sanchez) and people were powerless to help her. The rescuers kept coming back to her, local farmers and some people who had some medical aid. They tried to comfort her.’ After 60 hours of agony, Omayra Sánchez died. When the picture is taken, the world is already informed of the tragedy. Omayra is one of the victim at the center of the polemic around the responsibility of the authority. Her death highlights the incapacity of the Colombian Authorities to assist the victims stucked under the ruins and is at the source of various analyze about the reactivity of the government to intervene. In a recent interview, Frank Fournier concludes: ‘I believe the photo helped raise money from around the world in aid and helped highlight the irresponsibility and lack of courage of the country's leaders ‘There are hundreds of thousands of Omayras around the world important stories about the poor and the weak and we photojournalists are there to create the bridge.’

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Role: Disaster Response Personnel Before the Disaster The management of the eruption of the Volcano Nevado del Ruiz has been severely criticized and discussed over the years. A very important critic against the authorities is that this tragedy could have been prevented if the appropriate emergency mechanisms would have been set in place. In its first mission to the country, in March 1985, UNDRO recommended the Civil Defense to initiate preparatory measures due to the instability of the volcano. The first Emergency Plan was prepared in April by the Civil Defense of Caldas. It is important to highlight that a May report for UNDRO made by M. Hall, an Ecuadorian volcanologist on mission in the area, specifically informed the authorities about the high probability of mudflows. Technical committees were set up to monitor and evaluate the treat of the volcano, while new emergency plans were designed. After the September 11, 1985’s phreatic eruption, a state of emergency was established by Civil Defense authorities (Hall, 1989). The authorities of the provinces of Caldas, Tolima, Risaralda and Quindío decided to manage their emergency plans individually; however, later in September, they made a plea together to the national government for international assistance in case of a possible eruption. This was followed by a series of initiatives from Civil Defense to inform the population about awareness of the volcanic danger is schools, and the treats of lahars in case of eruption. The situation backfired by the end of September, when the Representative of Caldas Province in national assembly accused the Director of Civil Defense of frightening the population instead of informing, and also criticized the government for not providing help and acting with uncertainty. Later came disagreements between authorities and wellknown figures on the probability of the volcanic risk, that caused confusion among the population. The situation deteriorated to the point that the risk map made by INGEOMINAS that highlighted the areas or the provinces that were the most threatened was poorly distributed (including the dangerous location of Armero), only a few copies were made (Hall, 1989). Finally, the night of the eruption, a weak order of evacuation from the Red Cross of Ibagué was sent to Armero, but the communication was lost before being systematically distributed (Hall, 1989). Disaster Response The news of the avalanche that buried the towns of Armero and Chinchiná was only available the morning after the disaster. The first responders to be mobilized were personnel from the Colombian Red Cross and Civil Defence. The Government of Colombia appealed immediately for international assistance through UNDRO, mainly to supply tents, blankets, lanterns, generators, water, kitchen utensils, first aid kits and helicopter services (UNDRO Report, 1985). The destruction was overwhelming and volunteer personnel worked nonstop, with limited resources and rest in order to save the largest amount of survivors (Manrique, 2015). The operation was complicated since it had to be almost entirely airborne because of the destruction of the roads to access Armero and Chinchina. (Graham, 1985). Rescue operations were coordinated from Ibagué and Bogotá, with stabilization and triage centers in Guayabal, Marquita and Lerida. After the first avalanche that covered Armero and Chinchiná, the surrounding towns with rivers that came from the Nevado del Ruiz volcano were also under possible treat. Due to the condition of the victims and the status of the centers, the only possible treatment was a basic clean-up of wounds and the administration of antibiotics. Even this basic attention procedure was difficult due to clean water scarcity, since in some towns the avalanche had destroyed the water supply. A logistic issue arose for the relocation of the victims to safety, some were separated from their families and sent to other city centers like Cali, Medellin and Bogotá in order to receive additional medical attention (Gueri, n.d). Technical difficulties to access the area and the threat of a possible second eruption hindered the prompt delivery of rescue equipment and supplies from international cooperation. The disorder and unrestricted media coverage also affected the operation by communicating inaccurate information to donors, requesting equipment and supplies that were not necessary at the moment or simply not

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practical for the region (Strassle, 2014). One of the most dramatic cases of the post disaster scenarios is the death of young Omaira Sanchez, a young survivor that agonized for several days in the mud because there was no access to a pump that could help dig out her legs, stuck underneath the remains of her old house. (Santamaria, 2015). There was also an important shortage of rescue personnel. The survivors and neighboring volunteers were collaborating as much as possible with the rescue operation. (Treaster, 1985) Unfortunately, the lack of training from rescue teams created further confusion. There was no clear methodology for the registration of the victims and survivors, most of which were children that were never found again after the disaster (Manrique, 2015). During the first days, Red Cross teams estimated that approximately 1000 to 2000 people might still be trapped alive in the mud (Treaster, 1985). Although the operation was coordinated by the military, few soldiers were sent to rescue survivors from the mud and help the Red Cross and Civil Defense in the rescue operation. This might have been based on the initial assessment that barely anyone could have survived the avalanche (Graham, 1985). Post Disaster response: There was an international aid campaign set to help the victims from Nevado del Ruiz which received approximately 3.3 million dollars in foreign aid help. However, the lack of registry on who were the actual inhabitants of Armero made it difficult to distribute properly the aid received. There were accusations of aid personnel taking for themselves donations sent for the survivors and people from the area pretending to be in distress in order to receive benefits. The organization Resurgir, which was in charge of aiding the homeless, registered around 32,000 affected people. Approximately 40,000 persons requested benefits due to the disaster; however, the total estimated population of Armero was only 30,000 people (Gonzalez, 2015).

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Role: Victims Before Disaster: Armero was a prosperous town, where a lot of agricultural activity took place. IN 1913 rice was farmed with the use of technology and 24 years later there were 1500 hectares of cereal and 117750 hectares of coffee grains were processed for internal consumption and exportation (Anon 2015). The national federation of coffee makers had seven massive warehouses beside the railroad. Same process happened with corn that was brought from Magdalena Medio farms in wagons to be threshed in mills (Anon 2015). Cattle raising flourished and in 1940 the best dairy farms in the country were established (Anon 2015). In 1960 cotton production became so predominantly strong that it was given the nickname of “The White City” (Anon 2015). Armero had strong commerce. The town had daily monetary flows of 400 million pesos , in fact the day before the eruption this went up to 500 million pesos (about 159 thousand US Dollars) in checking accounts and 270 million pesos in savings (Anon 2015). Armero also produced and provided tobacco to the municipality of Ambalema who then exported it to European markets in a time period where there was an abundance of this product. The town also had a lot of athletes and had the only coliseum with weights at the time (Garrido 2015). It had a lot of good basketball players and it was where Olympic-medalist Helmut Bellingrodt went to train (Garrido 2015). During the disaster: As mentioned in the paper apart from improper communication to the population there was also terrible coordination during the response soon after the eruption but what made things worse was the social issues around the disaster such as trafficking of children and theft. Children who were separated from their parents were claimed by strangers as their own or were offered help to take them somewhere else on a false safety promise (Palomino 2013). Sometimes even in the hospital doctors offered to look after them as their parents were being taken care off for injuries and then when they came back the child was gone (Gurisatti 2015). In addition to this, people took advantage of the victims and stole whatever jewellery or artefacts with monetary value they had on them, sometimes this was even done by people from the rescue teams and police as exposed in the documentary “El Valle sin Sombras” (Martínez 2015). Furthermore in the hospitals nurses gave victims old and worn out clothes while they kept the new clothes that were donated internationally (González 2015). Post Disaster: Studies have been conducted to see the psychological impact the disaster had on victims. One study in which 102 adult victims were analyzed showed that 91% of the victims who were emotionally distressed met the DSM-III (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder third revision (1974) (Lima 1991). The most common diagnoses: post traumatic stress disorder and major depression. Another study conducted a similar research but at two different points in time, one year and five years after the disaster and found that emotional distress decreased from 65% in 1986 to 31% in 1990 showing that Over time symptoms of emotional distress decrease among disaster victims (Lima 1993).

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Role: International Aid - UNDRO representative November 14, 1985, an international appeal for emergency relief was launch by the United Nations Disaster Relief Organization (UNDRO) as per formal request of the Colombian government. A cash grant of $30,000 were immediately made available from UNDRO in answer to this request. UNDRO dispatched its staff to assess the emergency needs and the local coordination for international relief effort. It was determined that temporary shelter needs, power source, water purification equipment, medical kits and helicopters were among the urgent needs. On the following day, November 15, the government organized an emergency committee tackling the major operations for relief, technical, communication/transportation and reconstruction. The UN representatives collaborate with the government in identifying priorities based on the assessment of the 50,000 people affected by the disaster. Several effort from the international community arrived on the same day including medical supplies and approximately $25,000 from the World Health Organization (WHO), $30,000 from UNDP Special Programme Resources, 700,000 water purifying tablets from UNDP/UNICEF/WHO and 12 helicopters from United States to assist in rescue operation. Logistics problems were encountered during the first few hours of operation as there was no existing plan for emergency response available. Coordination for relief aid with UNDP offices from neighboring countries like Venezuela, Ecuador, Panama and Brazil was also done. On the same day, a UNDRO volcanologist arrived with three telemetric seismographs, several electronic tilt meters and chromatographs in response to the monitoring of the volcano. The need to assess if another eruption could happen was crucial in line with all the operations being executed in the risk zones. France urged the Colombian government to assess the possibility of future eruption by November 16. Food security was assessed by the World Food Programme (WFP) and food stock were authorized for distribution immediately to the affected areas. More international aid arrived by the succeeding days including cash grants from foreign governments (Canada, Germany, USA), aircraft, medical supplies and emergency facilities like mobile hospital, water treatment equipments (Dominican Republic, Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, Ecuador, Venezuela, Netherlands, Japan, New Zealand, Brazil, France). Non-governmental organizations and private sectors also contributed to the relief aids being sent to Colombia. There was an issue with regards to the quality of goods sent as many of the medicines were reaching expiration and clothes were not good in condition (Gueri). The local emergency committee expressed that there was no need to send foreign medical personnel as the local health sector addressed medical attention at facilities outside the disaster zone. UN agencies held a meeting to make plans for the rehabilitation/reconstruction of the area. In line with the monitoring of volcanic activities, the US government sent a disaster specialist and USGS volcanologist for a 3-week mission. The UNDRO volcanologist reported that the volcano was there was no sign of possible eruption at that time. The first seismic telemetry station was installed with the assistance of an UNDRO officer the instrument being provided by the Hawaiian Volcano Observatory. The monitoring equipment were installed in adequate locations with the help of 8 experts from USGS while other equipment for earthquake, ground deformation and gas compositions were installed with the help of Canadian and Spanish experts (UNDRO, 1985). In conclusion to the role of the international community, it did not lack in response to the 1985 Nevado del Ruiz disaster despite the occurrence of a recent disaster in Mexico City (Osterlund, 1985). The international aid coming from the different country and organizations ranged from financial, transportation, medical, food, water and shelter needs. In addition to this, there was also an action from foreign aids for future hazard and risk assessment of the volcano. It was up to the local government to device an adequate early warning and emergency response system to mitigate the impacts of future hazards from the Nevado del Ruiz volcano.

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Role: politicians The decade of the 80s was a period marked by violence and several tragedies in Colombian history. The national government was focused on fighting against guerrillas groups and drug-dealing cartels. The president in 1985 was Belisario Betancur and the Major of Armero was Ramón Rodriguez, who unfortunately died in the disaster. Before the disaster It has been said that the Volcano Nevado del Ruiz was “screaming” one year before the tragedy that it was going to erupt. Scientists have shown with studies that the city was in imminent risk and authorities at all levels were informed of the potential risks and the probabilities of eruption. For instance, at some point the Ministry of Mines requested advice to the Disaster Relief Office of the UN (UNDRO). The results were quite obvious: settlements should not be built on the passage of lahars. But in Colombia there were four departmental capitals and at least 20 large municipalities in that situation (Vega, 2010). Economic interests were also involved in these regions for the production of rice, cotton and coffee, essential products for the national economy. Moreover, economic actors in Armero were claiming that the “alarmist” messages were reducing the value of the land. From a political point of view, evacuating was an unpopular measure, being this one of the reasons why authorities did not authorize an evacuation until the very last minute. Moreover, another event influenced the actions taken for Armero: the occupation of Colombia’s Supreme Court building by M-19 guerrillas, and the subsequent violent military retake that cost the lives of at least a 100 people, including half the court. On November 6 (a week before the eruption of the Nevado del Ruiz (Gillin, 2014). The influence of this event was direct and indirect. For example, when the national government asked for help to the government of the United States to make further monitoring on the volcano’s activity, the experts, who were about to travel to Colombia, heard about the episode of the Justice Palace, and cancelled their travel plans (El Tiempo, 2016) Nevertheless, some politicians did try to prevent the tragedy. Ramón Antonio Ramirez, major of Armero in 1985, tried to persuade regional and national governments to do something to tackle with the hazard. The topic was even treated in the congress, where the studies carried out by scientist were shown (El Tiempo, 2015). Nevertheless, the warnings were considered as alarmist messages. Another representative of Armero politics, Guillermo Jaramillo, affirms that “the national government did not pay attention to us. Conversely, we were called ‘the apocalypse's horsemen’” (El Tiempo, 2016). In Bogota, the representative Humberto Arango stated in a meeting with the government ministers “I do not want to be a prophet of misfortunes, but all the things that are going on will lead us to a catastrophe. Do not say later that we did not warn the Colombian state to fulfill its duties on time” (Vega, 2010). The government was simply not willing to bear the economic or political cost of early evacuation or false alarm. During the disaster The night of the 13th of November, after a three-hour meeting, experts of the Red Cross suggested to the authorities of the department to give the evacuation order. Nevertheless, it has been said that the governor of the department, Garcia Alzate, refused to take a phone call from the Mayor because he was playing billiards (Vega, 2010). Alarms were not working the day of the eruption. There were problems of communication between the mayoralty and the government of the department. The order to evacuate was just given when the eruption was detected but it was a clear failure with a massive communication to the community.

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Post Disaster The Armero Tragedy, along with what has happened in the Supreme Court, led to changes in the political approach to risk management in Colombia. In 1986, Belisario Betancur, which administration received harsh criticism for these events, was followed by the new elected president Virgilio Barco. It has been said that one of the first things that Barco stated to the people of his government was that he did not want a “Ruiz” in his administration. He did not want to repeat mistakes like those of his predecessor (Zeiderman, 2010). Today, the volcano is monitored every day with cutting-edge technology and multidisciplinary experts. When a change in the normal activity of the volcano is detected, instant response devices are implemented, warning systems are activated and relief agencies immediately informed (Zeiderman, 2010). According to the new government instructions, in 1986 a new institution was created: the National Office for Emergency Management (ONAE for its acronym in Spanish), with the support of the United Nations’ Development Program. In 1987, Bogota Council approved the creation of a Fund for the Prevention and Emergency Response. Prevention and risk were further institutionalized in 1988 when the Colombian government created the National System for Prevention and Attention to Disasters, with the aim of integrating risks management plans of the public and private sectors at national scale. In march 1988, the volcano threatened again with another possible eruption and this time the authorities ordered immediately the evacuation. In a 2009 report, the World Bank recognizes the work and advances of the country on this matter stating, " Colombia is widely considered a leader in instituting a policy and legal framework that enables a comprehensive, multi-sectorial approach to disaster risk management.” (World Bank, 2007) Further Comments The Armero Tragedy was clear evidence that national policies were in its vast majority focused on post-disaster responses, leaving aside preventive measures. The responsibility of the government and the State was not just about a rapid response to a disaster, but requires planning, institutional coordination and communication, financial and human resources and the commitment of the authorities to protect inhabitants from hazards. There is not need to wait until a major tragedy occurs to have the courage to take decisions. In the case of Armero, breakdowns of communication were a definitive cause of the final result but the biggest failure was the lack of decision and to wait until the last possible minute. The catastrophe has to be claimed to human error, mainly from the government part.

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Role: The scientific and technical community Before the volcano eruption in 1985, there had been some studies addressing the importance of a better monitoring system in the region. Diverse scientific bodies from different countries visited the place and made reports, highlighting the previous devastating events in 1595 and 1845. Nonetheless, researches made upon the volcano activity were marginal since it had not presented any sign of activity for more than 140 years. The volcanologist Minard L. Hall (1989) carried out a very detailed description of the way that politicians and scientific communities behaved right after the volcano’s awakening process started. After the first signs reported by The Refugio in December 1984, different institutions such as INGEOMINAS and CHEC, local and foreign universities, international volcanologists, and international agencies took part in a complex, and not always very well coordinated, monitoring process which resulted in many alerts given to the authorities at different levels, especially after the eruption of September. Due to a wide range of factors, specially political and economic issues, the government did not pay attention to the scientists’ advices which led to one of the biggest avoidable human tragedies in history. As it has been already mentioned, many scientific stakeholders at all scales (local, national and international) got engaged in the Ruiz events during 1985. As for Colombian institutions, all activities were undertaken mainly by INGEOMINAS (National Institute of Geology and Mines) and CHEC (a national electric company) at the national level. In the same way, local civil committees were organized such as the Civil Committee of Manizales. INGEOMINAS made various inspections in the area and ended up with many reports. During the first months, the institutional position was to minimize the risks by saying the activities observed were normal for an active volcano so as not to generate social panic. However, the volcanic activity increased significantly. For this reason, INGEOMINAS started to ask for international help (UN agencies) as well as technical assistance (US Geological Survey) and take more serious measurements. When the volcano erupted in September, the institution organized meetings with all actors involved. In October, when the Ruiz’s activity was more obvious, they prepared a map showing the possible consequences of an eruption. This map showed clearly that one of the most important dangers was the ice melting that would provoke a lahar and, therefore, affect Armero directly. This map was taken as a ‘preliminary’ one and has no a proper diffusion. Only ten copies were made (Hall, 1989). They were supposed to deliver the final version four days after the meeting but it did not happen until the disastrous event, when they published the map with almost no changes. Other agencies such as CHEC were actually the first ones to have contact with the area when it started to wake up. Even though significant reports were produced, the coordination between CHEC and INGEOMINAS was not proper, leading to miscommunications and a lack of information shared. Local communities in Caldas and Manizales also organized themselves in local scientific and civil committees to monitor the volcano and prepare eventual plans. At first sight, the biggest risk taken into consideration was seismic. With the evolution of the events, eruption risk gained leadership and were these local groups which carried out a permanent monitoring with the support of local universities (Manizales University, FIDUCAL Institute, etc.). On the other hand, a lot of international support was received. Some UN agencies such as UNDRO and UNESCO engaged with the activities that were being undertaken. UNDRO inspected the area in March and reached an important conclusion: the volcano’s activity was abnormal and ‘and that such precursory events often precede big eruptions’ (Hall, 1989:103). They also recommended underpinning the monitoring actions and technical issues as well as preparing proper plans, such as evacuation, in order to protect people in danger. International scientist and volcanologist from all over the world arrived to cooperate as well. Different delegations visited the area and gave some recommendations in different periods of the year. An equatorial volcanologist, M. Hall (1989) made a research on the volcano in May and reached almost the same conclusion as UNDRO. He spoke with

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different authorities but a proper reaction was not noticed. He said that the ‘Government should not disregard what the scientists are saying, should obtain the seismographs necessary for studying the seismicity and should initiate a volcano awareness program’ (Hall, 1989: 105). But Colombian scientists lacked the expertise, government support, and equipment necessary to effectively monitor the volcano and relay information to public authorities. An important issue to point out is technical capacity. The equipment used to take the first measurements was not appropriate and they stopped working in early 1985. For this reason, INGEOMINAS asked for international assistance in the US and the UN. Thus, Colombia received 3 geophones from the USGS, which were not working properly, and two seismographs from the Swiss government, without proper instructions on how to use them. Some months before the eruptions, the devices were taken away so as to analyze their records, but it took more than two months so the data was not accurate anymore when it was ready. It is possible to state that even though the scientific community strongly warned the authorities upon a possible eruption, they could have done better. The Nevado del Ruiz was not unknown, so maps could have been better distributed and widely communicated. Communication among different scientific stakeholders could also have been more coordinated. During the disaster: just some scientists were monitoring the volcano at the time of the eruption, since many of them had gone back home due to a reduction of the Ruiz activity. When the volcano erupted, it took two hours and a half to reach Armero but the people had not received a proper alert in time (NOAA, 2008) After the disaster, the new political approach also reached the scientific and technical community. In 1987 INGEOMINAS took possession of all seismograph of the country and created new volcanology observatories in Manizales, Pasto and Popayán, unifying the monitoring systems as for seismic, volcanic and all geological risks. From 1991 INGEOMINAS started a transformation process that ended up in the new Colombian Geological Service (SGC), covering a wider range of activities. Nowadays, the SGC possesses one of the best monitoring capacity thanks to a strong political decision and international help (mainly World Bank) (SGC, 2011).

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Annexe: Figure 1: Hazard-zone maps and volcanic Risk circulated 1 month prior to the November 13, 1985. Source: Wright T.L. and Pierson T.C. (1992) ‘Living with volcanoes’ in the U.S Geological Survey’s Volcano Hazards Program p. 21.

Figure 2: Time-series diagram of seismic and eruptive activity versus onset of various monitoring activities at Nevado del Ruiz Volcano, Colombia. Arrow indicates the 13 November 1985 eruption. Thickness of time bar indicates relative intensity of effort.

Source: Norman g. Banks, Cesar Carvajal, Hector Hora and Eysteinn Tryggvasonc, (1989) ‘Deformation monitoring at Nevado del Ruiz, Colombia - October 1985 - March 1988’. In Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research, 41 (1990) 269-295 Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., Amsterdam--Printed in The Netherlands

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