notice and a prior hearing, removal of property contrary to one’s constitutional rights violates due process. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969), Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 423 (1915). This Petition presents the opportunity to discuss post-judgment enforcement of “Non-Final” or “Appealed Money Judgment” by writs for property, pursuant to MD Rule 2-645 and 2-641, commenced by an unlicensed debt collector. This petition addresses whether a prior noted appeal of a money judgment, which renders the judgment nonfinal, prohibits compliance with MD Rule 2-645(b)(2) and MD Rule 2-641(a)(2). This Petition also addresses whether hearings requested under MD Rules §§ 2-643(f) and 2311(f) for writs for property, are mandatory, rather than at the court’s discretion. Review is desirable, in the public’s interest, and necessary to secure uniformity of post-judgment enforcement of non-final judgments pending resolution of appeals. Additionally, this Petition impacts consumer collection decisions and could resolve important questions of law pertaining to a statutory right to appeal pursuant to MD Cts. and Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §12-301, subject matter appealed, property rights, as well as due process rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. See William Elliott v. Dyck O’Neal, Inc., 46 N.E. 448, 456 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) trans. denied. See also DyckO'Neal, Inc. v. Wilson, 332 P.3d 380 (2014). On June 9, 2016, in Higgins v. DyckO’Neal, Inc., __So.3d. __, 2016WL3191146 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016), the Florida Appellate Court ordered that Dyck O’Neal, Inc.’s improper judgment obtained absent subject matter jurisdiction be voided. 2

On February 24, 2016, in Mensah v. MCT Federal Credit Union, 446 Md. 525, 132 A.3d 332 (2016), this Court addressed the enforcement of a “final” judgment where no appeal was taken from the underlying judgment. In light of the Mensah case, enforcement of a “Non-Final” money judgment on appeal with a consolidated Bond/Stay of Enforcement Appeal, as in the present case, is jurisdictionally incorrect. In light of the holdings in Jason v. National Loan Recoveries, 227 Md. App. 516 (2016), (citing Finch v. LVNV Funding LLC, 212 Md. App. 748, cert. denied, 435 Md. 266 (2013)), and Wayne Garrity, Sr. v. Maryland State Board of Plumbing, 447 MD 359 (2016), which held that an unlicensed debt collector cannot comply with the “Amounts Due” requirement of MD Rule 2-645(b)(2) and MD Rule 2-641(a)(2) because any judgments obtained by the unlicensed debt collector are deemed “unlicensed activities” and these “void judgments,” prohibited the unlicensed debt collector’s ability to comply with the procedural requirements of MD Rule 2-641 and 2-645. This Court has been silent on all issues in the present Writ. PETITIONERS’ QUESTIONS PRESENTED I.

Did the circuit court err and abuse its discretion by exceeding its jurisdiction and granting judgments on Writs of Garnishment and Writs of Execution for Real Property to enforce a “non-final money judgment”, appealed, and consolidated with a Bond/Stay of Enforcement Appeal?

II.

Did the circuit court err and abuse its discretion by failing to hold a requested, mandatory hearing required by MD Rules §§2-643(f) and 2-311(f), in violation of

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the Due Process Rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights? III.

Did the circuit court err by accepting an unlicensed debt collector statement of “amounts due” under MD Rules §§ 2-641(a)(2) and 2-645(b)(2) that are “nonfinal” and “the subject matter” of a “money judgment appeal” and consolidated “bond/stay of enforcement appeal”? PERTINENT AUTHORITIES

The United States Constitution, Amendment XIV “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law” Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights “[N]o man ought to be..deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land.” MD Cts. and Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §12-301 “Except as provided in § 12-302 of this subtitle, a party may appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court. The right of appeal exists from a final judgment entered by a court in the exercise of original, special, limited, statutory jurisdiction, unless in a particular case the right of appeal is expressly denied by law.” Md. Rule 2-643(f) “(f) Hearing. A party desiring a hearing on a motion filed pursuant to this Rule shall so request pursuant to Rule 2-311 (f) and, if requested, a hearing shall be held promptly.” Md. Rule 2-645(b)(2)

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“(b) Issuance of writ. The judgment creditor may obtain issuance of a writ of garnishment by filing in the same action in which the judgment was entered a request that contains” ** “(2) the amount owed under the judgment” Md. Rule 2-641(a)(2) “(a) Generally. Upon the written request of a judgment creditor, the clerk of a court where the judgment was entered or is recorded shall issue a writ of execution directing the sheriff to levy upon property of the judgment debtor to satisfy a money judgment. The writ shall contain a notice advising the debtor that federal and state exemptions may be available and that there is a right to move for release of the property from the levy. The request shall be accompanied by instructions to the sheriff that shall specify” ** “(2) the judgment and the amount owed under the judgment”

MATERIAL FACTS All parties agree that as of December 18, 2014, the Petitioners’ Real Property, Church Lane, valued at $127,800.00, became subject to a judgment lien, pursuant to MD Rule §2-621(a) and MD Cts. and Jud. Proc. §11-402(b) (“December 18, 2014 Judgment Lien”). (Attachments 2, 5, and 11). Proceedings in the Circuit Court for Carroll County With prior noted Appeal No. 02269, September Term 2014, the Non-Final Money Judgment (“Money Judgment Appeal”), consolidated with Appeal No. 00388, September Term 2015, Stay of Enforcement by Alternate Bond (“Bond/Stay Appeal”) for Dyck O’Neal, Inc. v. Edwin Bell, et al., Civil Case No. 06-C-11-059558 in the Circuit Court for 5

Carroll County, unlicensed debt collector, Dyck O’Neal, Inc. (“Dyck” or “unlicensed debt collector”), pursued post-judgment enforcement of a “Non-Final Money Judgment” by Writs of Garnishment and Writs of Execution for Real Property in violation of MD Rules 2-643(f), 2-645(b)(2), and 2-641(a)(2) as well as the Petitioners’ due process and property rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights leading to the present Writ. (Attachments 1-3 and 5-9). After numerous opposed requests to stay enforcement (Attachments 5 and 7), on February 6, 2015, with a request for a hearing pursuant to MD Rules §§ 2-643(f) and 2311(f), the Petitioners filed a “Joint Motion to Quash Writs of Garnishment, Request for Release of Property from Levy, and Request for Hearing” for the garnishment of their bank account from levy, however, despite their request, no due process hearing was held. (Attachment 6). On May 28, 2015, requesting a hearing pursuant to MD Rules §§ 2643(f) and 2-311(f), the Petitioners filed a “Motion to Quash Writs of Execution for Real Property and Request for Hearing” seeking to release their real property from the writs to serve as an Alternate Bond, however, again, no due process hearing was held. (Attachment 12). All requests were denied absent a requested, mandatory hearing pursuant to MD Rules §§ 2-643(f) and 2-311(f). Despite the unlicensed debt collector’s inability to comply with MD Rules §§ 2-645(b)(2) and 2-641(a)(2) for Writs of Garnishment or Writs of Execution for Real Property for a “Non-Final” money judgment and in the absence of the due process hearing required by MD Rules §§ 2-643(f) and 2311(f), the circuit court, absent subject matter jurisdiction, failed to correct the 6

jurisdictional mistakes for both post-judgment actions pursuant to MD Rules 2-534 and 2-535. (Attachments 1, 17, and 19). Proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals On January 20, 2015, pursuant to MD Rule 8-422 and 8-423, the Petitioners filed a “Joint Motion for Stay of Enforcement Pending Resolution of Appeal and Class-Action Lawsuit, Request for Waiver of Bond and Request for Hearing” in the Court of Special Appeals. (Attachment 1). On April 30, 2015, the Petitioners filed a “Motion to Stay Enforcement of Judgment by Waiver of Bond or an Alternate Bond and Request for Hearing” in the Court of Special Appeals pursuant to MD Rules §§ 8-422, 8-423, but no hearing was held. (Attachments 13-14). On July 23, 2015 and August 12, 2015, Petitioners noted the two Post-Judgment appeals pending resolution of their prior noted Money Judgment Appeal and consolidated Bond/Stay Appeal. Petitioners’ briefed the Court of Special Appeals on January 7, 2016 and February 24, 2016. Oral arguments were held on May 10, 2016 and on May 17, 2016 an opinion was issued. (Attachment 20). On June 16, 2016, the Petitioners filed a Motion to Reconsider the May 17, 2016 opinion of the Court of Special Appeals (Attachment 21) and simultaneously, on June 16, 2016, the Court of Special Appeals issued its Mandate. (Attachment 22). REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT A. THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY EXCEEDING ITS JURISDICTION AND GRANTING JUDGMENTS ON WRITS OF GARNISHMENT AND WRITS OF EXECUTION FOR REAL PROPERTY TO ENFORCE A “NON-FINAL MONEY JUDGMENT”,

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APPEALED, AND CONSOLIDATED WITH A BOND/STAY OF ENFORCEMENT APPEAL? The Petitioners have the right to their prior noted Money Judgment Appeal and consolidated Bond/Stay Appeal (Attachments 2-3 and 8-9) which includes the issues of Petitioners’ prior payment in full, Dyck’s use of counterfeit documents, and Dyck’s absent collection agency license for its 3214 West Park Row Drive, Arlington, TX 76013 address, (“West Park Row”) as well as Dyck’s lack of “status as a claimant,” all causing Dyck’s “Money Judgment” to be non-final, unenforceable, and void which prohibited Dyck’s ability to comply with MD Rules §§ 2-645(b)(2) for a Writs of Garnishment (Attachment 4) or 2-641(a)(2) for Writs of Execution for Real Property (Attachments 1011). Finch, 212 Md. App. 748, cert. denied, 435 Md. 266 (2013). MD Cts. and Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §12-301. “A claim that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time.” Gardner v Board County Comm’rs, 320 Md. 63, 71 (1990). “The ‘exercise of jurisdiction’ includes compliance with procedural and statutory requirements.” Wells v. Price, 183 Md. 443, 450 (1944); Johnson v. State, 199 Md. App. 331, 345 (2011). Public policy demands that an unlicensed debt collector, who violates the Maryland Collection Agency Licensing Act or Business Regulation 7-101, et seq., be denied use of the Maryland Courts and be prohibited from further violations of the law through post judgment writs for property on a “non-final money judgment”. See Finch, 212 Md. App. 748, cert. denied, 435 Md. 266 (2013); Wayne Garrity, Sr. v. Maryland State Board of

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Plumbing, 447 MD 359 (2016). Therefore, it is only proper that the subject matter of a Money Judgment Appeal and consolidate Bond/Stay Appeal take priority. This court should grant the writ to reverse the lower court’s errors and abuses of discretion on the writs for property to enforce a “non-final money judgment”. Allowing the decision to stand would only serve to set a dangerous preference for circuit courts to exceed their jurisdiction, ignore the law, disregarding prior noted appeals of money judgments and allowing enforcement of “non-final money judgments” through writs of execution for real property and writs of garnishment. B. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT THE WRIT TO GIVE MD RULE § 2643(f) ITS FIRST APPEALLATE CONSTRUCTION AND THEREBY RESOLVE THE SERIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATEWIDE PROBLEMS JUDGMENTS LIKE THE CIRCUIT COURT’S HAVE CREATED IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AS WELL AS ARTICLE 24 OF THE MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS WHICH PROVIDES FOR A “MANDATORY” DUE PROCESS HEARING WHEN REQUESTED. MD Rule § 2-643(f) provides that: “A party desiring a hearing on a motion filed pursuant to this Rule shall so request pursuant to Rule § 2-311 (f) and, if requested, a hearing shall be held promptly.” [Emphasis Added] See also Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969); Northwestern N. Ins. v. Wetherall, 267 Md. 378, 387 (1972); Bragunier Masonry Contractors, Inc. v. The Catholic University of America, 368 Md. 608, 293 (2002). “Under the rules of statutory construction, unless the words of a statute or a rule are ambiguous, we give the words their ordinary meaning.” 9

Brown v. Daniel Realty Co., 409 Md. 565, 585 (2009); Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Mary B., 190 Md. App. 305, 1049 (2010). Because MD Rule § 2-643(f) plainly and unambiguously states that: “if requested” a hearing “shall be held promptly,” the hearing component is mandatory, if requested, not at the discretion of a circuit court. Id. “A procedural rule that may satisfy due process for attachments in general, does not necessarily satisfy procedural due process in every case.” Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969) (internal citation omitted). Where the taking of one's property is so obvious, absent notice and a prior hearing, due process has not been accomplished. Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 340-342, Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 423 (1915); Grannis v Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914); Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236 (1900); Mitchell v. WT Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 614 (1974); Anne Arundel Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. O'Brien, 49 Md. App. 362, 373374 (1981). On February 6, 2015, the Petitioners, requesting a hearing pursuant to MD Rules §§ 2-643(f) and 2-311(f), filed a “Joint Motion to Quash Writs of Garnishment, Request for Release of Property from Levy, and Request for Hearing” to release their property and/or bank account from levy, however, despite their request for a hearing, no hearing was scheduled. (Attachment 6). Again, on May 28, 2015, the Petitioners, requesting a hearing pursuant to MD Rules §§ 2-643(f) and 2-311(f), filed a “Motion to Quash Writs of Execution for Real Property and Request for Hearing” to release the Petitioners’ Real Property, intended as an Alternate Bond, from the Writs of Execution for Real Property pursuant to MD Rule § 2-641(a) which provides a “right to move for release of the 10

property from the levy,” however, although a hearing was requested, no hearing was held. (Attachment 12). The Petitioners’ requested hearings, pursuant to MD Rules §§ 2-643(f) and 2311(f), seeking release of their property from levy, their request for a hearing was not granted due to the Court’s misinterpretation that the hearing was discretionary and not mandatory as required by MD Rule 2-643(f), the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The lower court’s decision to ignore the Petitioners’ request for a hearing pursuant to MD Rule § 2643(f), in violation of the plain and unambiguous language of MD Rules §§ 2-643(f) and 2-311(f), not only violated the Petitioners’ due process rights for both the writs for property but also involves the “taking of Petitioners’ property,” bank account and real property, without due process. Contrary to the precedent established by the United States Supreme Court decision in Grannis v Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) that the “opportunity to be heard” is a “fundamental requisite of due process of law,” the failure of the circuit court to hold a due process hearing, required by MD Rule § 2-643(f), is clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion by its failure to correct the jurisdictional mistake on the writs for property pursuant to MD Rules §§ 2-534 or 2-535. See Sniadach, 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969); Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 423 (1915); Young v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., 108 Md. App. 233 (1996). The circuit court had neither the power to render a valid decree, nor the propriety of granting the relief sought by the unlicensed debt collector. DiNapoli v. Kent Island, 11

203 Md. App. 452, 467 (2012). With the Money Judgment Appeal (Attachments 2-3) and consolidated Bond/Stay Appeal (Attachments 7-8), the circuit court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction required by MD Rules §§ 2-645(b)(2) and 2-641(a)(2) to act on writs for property (Attachments 4 and 10). Sigurdsson v. Nodeen, 180 Md. App. 326, 342 (2008); Thacker v. Hale, 146 Md. App. 203, 224-26, cert. denied, 372 Md. 132 (2002). Tandra S. v. Tyrone W., 336 Md. 303, 317 (1994). Regardless, the circuit court’s refusal to comply with requirements of MD Rule 2-643(f), caused the circuit court to be removed of jurisdiction to proceed on the Writs of Execution for Real Property or the Garnishment Judgment. Because the circuit court refused to cease proceeding absent compliance with MD Rule 2-643(f), its decisions are voidable. Wells, 183 Md. at 450; Johnson, 199 Md. App. at 345. This court should grant the writ to reverse the lower court’s errors and abuses of discretion on the writs for property to enforce a “non-final money judgment”. A failure to reverse the circuit court would only serve to set a dangerous preference for circuit courts to ignore mandatory due process hearings required under MD Rule §2-643(f). C. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT THE WRIT TO GIVE MD RULES §§ 2645(b)(2) and 2-641(a)(2) THEIR FIRST APPEALLATE CONSTRUCTION AND THEREBY RESOLVE THE SERIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATEWIDE PROBLEMS JUDGMENTS LIKE THE CIRCUIT COURT’S HAVE CREATED IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AS WELL AS ARTICLE 24 OF THE MARYLAND DECLARATION OF RIGHTS CAUSING TAKINGS OF PROPERTY TO ENFORCE “NON-FINAL, APPEALED, MONEY JUDGMENTS”. 12

The Petitioners’ seek review of MD Rules §§ 2-641(a)(2) or 2-645(b)(2) being used to enforce a non-final, appealed money judgment consolidated with a bond/stay appeal. Gardner v Board County Comm’rs, 320 Md. 63, 71 (1990), Wells v. Price, 183 Md. 443, 450 (1944). MD Rule §2-645(b)(2), plainly and unambiguously requires that a request for a garnishment of property, or bank account, specify “the amount owed under the judgment.” [Emphasis Added] See Bragunier, 368 Md. 608, 293 (2002). MD Rule § 2-641(a)(2), plainly and unambiguously requires that a request for a writ of execution for real property specify “the judgment and the amount owed under the judgment.” [Emphasis Added] See Humphrey v. Herridge, 103 Md. App. 238, 244 (1995). With a non-final money judgment on appeal (Attachments 2-3) and consolidated Bond/Stay Appeal (Attachments 7-8), the circuit court lacked the subject matter jurisdiction required to proceed on writs for property (Attachments 4 and 10) by way of MD Rules §§ 2-645(b)(2) or 2-641(a)(2). Because of the “Non-Final” Money Judgment and consolidated Bond/Stay Appeal, it was and remains impossible for Dyck to allege an “amount owed under the judgment” required by MD Rules §§ 2-641(a)(2) and 2645(b)(2) for writs of garnishment or writs of execution for real property as a matter of fact and law. Since Dyck’s unfounded requests for writs were incongruent with the plain and unambiguous language of MD Rules §§ 2-641(a)(2) and 2-645(b)(2), the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction in ruling on either resulting in jurisdictional error. Clearly erroneous and having exceeded its jurisdiction due to Dyck’s misrepresentations of “amounts due” under MD Rules §§ 2-641(a)(2) and 2-645(b)(2), the circuit court abused 13

its discretion by failing to reverse its decisions on the writs for property or otherwise correct its jurisdictional mistake pursuant to MD Rules §§ 2-534 or 2-535. This Petition is desirable and in the public’s interest due to the public’s exposure to the judicial process. In January of 2016, Human Rights Watch released an 80-page report. “Rubber Stamp Justice: US Courts, Debt Buying Corporations, and the Poor,” which scrutinized how courts approach hundreds of thousands of lawsuits brought by debt buyers. The report found the suits were often marred by patterns of apparent error, legal deficiency, and alleged illegality. Many of the suits reviewed, are without evidence and were meritless, yet consumer’s bank accounts and wages were garnished without due process of law. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/us0116_web.pdf. This court should grant the writ to reverse the lower court’s errors and abuses of discretion on the writs for property to enforce a “non-final money judgment”. A failure to reverse the circuit court would only encourage circuit courts to exceed their jurisdiction by allowing enforcement of non-final money judgments in violation of MD Rules §§ 2641(a)(2) or 2-645(b)(2), thereby diminishing property rights, rights to appeals, and due process rights. CONCLUSION For reasons as set forth in this Petition rendering it desirable and in the public interest, this Honorable Court should grant this Petition for Writ of Certiorari and schedule this matter for briefs and hearing before this Court.

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ATTACHED DOCUMENTS 1. Case History 2. December 18, 2014 Judgment 3. Notice of Appeal for Appeal No. 02269, September Term 2014 4. Writ of Garnishment for Bank Account 5. Motion to Post Alternate Bond Form 6. Motion to Quash Writs of Garnishment for Bank Account 7. March 9, 2015 Orders: Garnishment Judgment and Alternate Bond 8. Order Barring Stay of Enforcement or Alternate Bond 9. Notice of Appeal for Appeal No. 00388, September Term 2015 10. Writs of Execution for Real Property 11. Sherriff Schedule, Appraisal, and Return 12. Motion to Quash Writs of Execution 13. Motion to COSA for Alternate Bond 14. Order: COSA denying Alternate Bond 15. June 17, 2015 Order: Quash for Writs of Execution for Real Property 16. July 13, 2015 Order: Alter and Amend 17. Notice of Appeal: Quash for Writs of Execution for Real Property 18. August 4, 2015 Order: Vacate Garnishment Judgment 19. Notice of Appeal: Garnishment Judgment 20. Opinion: COSA dated May 17, 2016 21. Motion to Reconsider filed June 16, 2016 22. Mandate: COSA dated June 16, 2016

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