POLI333A: Session 24 - Presidents and National Security Gyung-Ho Jeong Department of Political Science The University of British Columbia
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Gyung-Ho Jeong. Not to be copied, used, or revised without explicit written permission from the copyright owner.
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Gyung-Ho Jeong
Gyung-Ho Jeong
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Reminder - Essay Submission
Don’t forget to submit your electronic copy using Turnitin.com Submission of a late paper Drop off a hard copy at my office or mailbox by 4:30PM (Don’t submit it to staff members in the Political Science main office). Note if you submit your hard copy after 4:30PM, it will be counted as submitting on the next day. Also, you need to submit an electronic copy at Turnitin.com by midnight.
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Remaining Schedule
This Thursday: Review Session - Bring your questions to class (More SVM exercises are posted on the course website). My office hours: April 9th (Mon) 10:00AM-Noon. Final Exam: April 10th (Tues) 8:30AM-9:50AM at CHBE 101.
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TA Office Hours - To Check Your Grade
I will post your grade break-down on Canvas once I have the final result of the exam. I will email you after I post your grades. TA Office Hours: April 17th (Tues) and 18th (Wed) 11-2PM at Buchanan C403 During the TA office hours, you can check your final grade. If necessary, you can request re-grading of your essay and exam.
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Today’s Topics
Presidents and National Security The Constitution and National Security Presidential Control over National Security Policy Origins of the Modern National Security System
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National Security Policy in the Constitution
The constitution gives Congress the power to declare war to raise and support armies and navies and many others
On the other hand, the constitution simply states that the President is commander in chief. But in reality, the President has dominated national security policy.
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Congress and National Security Policy
Congress has less interests and less capacities. Voters do not hold their representatives accountable for national security. Few interest groups are active in national security policy. Congress is a deliberative body; slow in responding to emergencies and crises. Congress receives information from the president (Information on security policy tends to be classified.).
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Presidents and National Security Policy
Presidents have incentives to dominate national security policy. The public holds the president accountable for national security matters. The public looks for a leader during crises.
Presidents have institutional capacity. As commander in chief, the president can respond to emergencies and crises immediately. The president has informational advantages. - CIA, NSA, and DoD report to the president on a daily basis.
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The Two Presidencies Thesis The US has two presidencies (Aaron Wildavsky 1966). One for domestic matters. And the other for foreign matters. Presidents exercise more influence over foreign policies than on domestic policies.
Presidents tend to focus on domestic issues early in their presidency, but over time they focus more on foreign policy. They focus on domestic issues at the beginning, because they are elected on domestic issues. However, domestic issues are dominated by interest groups and thus Congress. Foreign issues become more and more attractive (more opportunities to make their legacy). e.g. Wilson, FDR, Truman, LBJ, Nixon, Carter, Reagan, Bush I, Bush II, and Obama
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The President Alone?
In the absence of Congress and interest groups, who else matters? Bureaucracies are strong players in national security matters. Department of State Department of Defense Central Intelligence Agency Department of Homeland Security (Since Bush II) National Security Advisor
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President, Bureaucracies, and National Security
There are two issues in dealing with bureaucracies. 1. Bureaucracies have information and expertise. But Presidents usually don’t.
2. Bureaucracies might have interests of their own. Presidents come and go, but agencies don’t. Bureaucracies want to preserve and strengthen their agencies (turf war).
Therefore, the dilemma is that the president, who tend to care about national interests, should rely on bureaucracies, who tend to care more about agencies’ interests. c
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Presidential Solutions 1. Presidents control national security policymaking through the national security advisor (within the White House). National Security Council (NSC) was created in 1947 to coordinate different national security agencies: State dept and Defense dept. But over the years, Presidents have relied heavily on the national security advisor and the staff of the NSC to get information and to implement national security policies. National security advisors act as the president’s personal representative, negotiator, and spokesperson. e.g. Henry A. Kissinger - Nixon; Colin L. Powell - Reagan; Condoleezza Rice - Bush II
2. Presidents let bureaucracies to compete each other. Under Bush II - CIA vs. DOD vs. State c
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Watch Bush’s War
The documentary shows the inside politics of the Bush Administration right after the September 11th Attacks. Quiz: Answer the questions in the handout while watching the documentary.
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History of National Security Policy
Have Presidents been able to wage war without congressional support ever since the beginning of the US? No! Only after 1947.
Before 1947, the US maintained a small standing army in peacetime. For every major war, a military force had to be created from scratch. The mobilization of a military force required congressional approval.
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History of National Security Policy
Why no large and permanent standing military? Isolationist policy since James Monroe (1823). Efforts by European nations to colonize land or interfere with states in North or South America would be viewed as acts of aggression requiring U.S. intervention. In return, the US would neither interfere with existing European colonies nor meddle in the internal concerns of European countries.
Opposition of the South (and Congress)
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Pressures for Changes in the Late 1940s
WWII experience It took 2 years to fully mobilize and train militaries. the lack of coordination between the Army and the Navy.
The fear of the Communist expansion and the policy of Containment International commitment to the UN and the NATO All these factors pressured the development of centralized and large, permanent professional military.
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The Origin of Modern National Security Bureaucracies
The National Security Act of 1947 It created the NSC. It created the CIA. It unified the Army (the Department of War) and the Navy (the Department of Navy) into the DOD. Importantly, this created large and permanent standing military.
Ever since, “Deployment is destiny.”(Polsky)
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