Sympathy in Space(s): Adam Smith on Proximity Author(s): Fonna Forman-Barzilai Source: Political Theory, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Apr., 2005), pp. 189-217 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30038412 Accessed: 05/05/2009 10:54 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=sage. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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SYMPATHY IN SPACE(S) Adam Smith on Proximity FONNA FORMAN-BARZILAI University of California, San Diego

In this essay the author explores the relation betweensympathyand proximityin Adam Smith's TheoryofMoral Sentiments.Theessay proceeds in twoparts. First, the authordemonstratesthat Smith's description of our various attachments and affections, and the inevitable conflicts among them,draws us into the rich spatial textureofsympatheticresponseand stimulatesfurther inquiryinto a variety of spaces in which sympatheticactivitytakesplace. In the second part, the author explores three such spaces-the physical, the affective, and the historical/cultural-to critique the way that some contemporary moral and political theorists have appropriated Smith'saccount of sympathyas a tool for cosmopolitanaspirations. Towhat extent can Smith's sympathymodel detach usfrom and get us beyondthepartialityand particularitygenerated by our physical, affective, and cultural entanglements? Keywords:

Adam Smith; sympathy;proximity;space; cosmopolitanism

Adam Smith's account of sympathyin TheoryofMoral Sentimentssurely ranks among the subtlest accounts we have of the nature of sympathetic activity and of its prominence in human life.' It is certainly the best known dimension of his moral thought among students and casual consumers of Smith.And yet, in a time when so manyof us arethinkingabout globalization and variouscosmopolitical conundrums,therehas been virtuallyno exploration of Smith's thoughts on sympathy and proximity.2David Hume is regularly noted for his thoughts in Enquiry Concerningthe Principles of Morals about the influence of proximity on our sympatheticresponsiveness to others; but little has been said, even among Smith scholars, about Smith's thoughts on the spatial limitations of sympathy,which are in many ways AUTHOR'SNOTE:Forperceptive commentson variousdrafts,my thanksto Sam Fleischacker, SharonKrause,Jeff Lomonaco, Patchen Markell,LloydRudolph,Lisa Wedeen,Stephen White, and mostly,as ever David Forman-Barzilai.Twoanonymousrefereeswere tremendouslyhelpful as I workedto improvethe essay. Ifeelfortunate to have had theirassistance. I would like to dedicate this essay to my brotherAdam Forman,myfirst Adam. POLITICALTHEORY,Vol. 33 No. 2, April 2005 189-217 DOI: 10.1177/0090591704272277 c 2005 Sage Publications

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more interestingand complex than Hume's. Hume observed that "sympathy ... with persons remote from us [is] much fainterthan thatwith persons near and contiguous" and that this effect on our sentiments necessitated a more impartialfoundationfor our moraljudgements, which Hume located in general standardsthataredrawnfrom "social intercourse"and "generalusefulness."3 In this essay I demonstratethat Adam Smith absorbed much of Hume's basic orientationto the relationbetween sympathy and space, and thathe too sought to discoveran enlargedmethod of judging distantothers,untaintedby the naturalpartialityof our passive feelings. This attemptwas embodied, of course, in Smith's well-known account of the "ImpartialSpectator."Much has been done on the relationbetween Hume's and Smith's general accounts of sympathy,notablytheirdivergence over Hume's association of sympathy with considerations of utility. I do not intend to rehearse all that here.4 I invoke Humefor the simple reason that Smith generally adoptedhis orientation to the effects of proximityon sentiment, that our sympathytends to fade as the object becomes furtherremoved. But we shall discover that Smith's Humean claim is rooted in a genealogical observation drawn substantially from Stoic moral psychology that physical proximity begets familiarity, which in turnmakes affection stronger,understandingmore accurate, sympathy likelier,and other-concernmore naturaland appropriate.5This trajectory in Smith'sthought(notablythe segment thatrunsproximity-familiarityaffection-sympathy)has not been widely appreciatedor discussed. Indeed, people continue to cite Hume, never Smith, on the relationbetween sympathy and distance.But I demonstratein this essay that Smith's descriptionof sympathy and its spatiallimits was not only more extensive andexplicit than was Hume's but also more subtle and textured, more complex and psychological, and ultimatelymore compelling for contemporarymoral and political theory. One primaryreason is that Smith's perceptive descriptionof our various attachmentsand affections, and the inevitable conflicts among them, draws us into the rich spatialtextureof sympathetic response and stimulates further inquiryinto a variety of spaces in which sympathetic activity takes place. This essay proceeds in two parts. In the first part,I offer an interpretation of sympathy in Adam Smith's thought that opens itself to questions about sympathy and space in a global context. In brief, I maintainthat Smithian sympathy is best understoodas a social practice through which morality is intersubjectivelyproducedin sharedphysical spaces. Challenginga frequent assumption that sympathyis an emotion for Smith, or a virtue, I emphasize the dramaticactivitiesof surveillanceand discipline, concluding thatSmith's descriptionof sympatheticactivityentails a rich moralpsychology of culture

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formation. Understanding sympathy in this very practicaland sociological way in the first half of the essay will help in the second half when we inquire into the spatialtextureof sympatheticactivity.In the second half of the essay, I productivelycomplicate the notion of proximityin Smith'sthoughtby identifying and differentiatingthree spaces in which sympathyseems to movewhich I call the physical, the affective, and the historical(or cultural). Ultimately, I want to demonstrate that a rich and complicatedunderstandingof proximity exposes the difficulties (thoughnot necessarily the impossibility) of maneuveringsympathybeyond the spaces it naturallyinhabits.Embedded within my interpretationof Smith lies a critique of the way contemporary moral and political theory have often (mis)appropriatedhis descriptive account of sympathy as a tool for cosmopolitan aspirations.Can sympathy transcendits own genealogy and be shifted about?And to what extent does Smith's "ImpartialSpectator"model succeed in correctingthis sentimental nearsightedness, in detaching us from and getting us beyond the partiality and particularitygenerated by our physical, affective, and culturalentanglements? The Moral Sentiments helps us to appreciatethe gravity and complexity of these very timely questions. I begin now with Smith's idea of sympatheticengagement,and I turnlater to the spaces in which it moves.

AS A SOCIALACTIVITY L SYMPATHY People often mistake the Moral Sentimentsas a normativetreatise about morality,but Smith rarely spoke in what we would referto today as a "normative"voice. He tended to reject traditionalmoralphilosophyfor neglecting or distortingthe psychological and sociological phenomenaof ordinarylife in its driveto promote abstract(Smith would say "abstruse")6 views of how the world should be.7 In the tradition of his teachers Frances Hutcheson and David Hume, Smith was engaged in a far more descriptive activity.8At one point he bluntly asserted "thatthe presentinquiryis not concerning a matter of right... but concerning a matterof fact."9Undoubtedly,there are moments in the text when he came ratherclose to offering a theoryof moraljustification, struggling with the erratic or unfortunatemoralconsequences of sympathy in certaincontexts.10I say more aboutthis later.But I argue that Smith in the Moral Sentimentsprimarilyattemptedto convey as earnestly as possible the phenomena he observed in the social world aroundhim. As such, he approachedthe subjectof morality with the empiricaleye of a moral psychologist, describing in rich detail the actual causal mechanisms through which sympathygeneratedmoral sentiment, given people as they are and the world

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as it is. On Smith's account, sympathy was not an innate humandisposition that discharges mindlessly and spontaneously like Grotius's appetitus societatus or Rousseau'spitie, and it was not a rationaltelos towardwhich all healthy people strive, like Stoic apatheia or Lockean naturallaw. Though Smith was keen to challenge the egoistic assumptionsof ThomasHobbes and his disciples (notably Pufendorf and Mandeville)," he did not employ the idea of sympathyas a sappy signifier of human benevolence. Sympathy for Smith was an ordinarysocial practice throughwhich people in sharedspaces produce morality together without the artifice of coercion, philosophy, religion, or formal education. I presentSmith's accountof sympathy as a dramaticactivity that unfolds in two general "stages."The first, which I like to call surveillance, is that in which a "spectator,"any ordinaryperson, observes and judges the behavior of an "agent"and throughsome means communicates this judgement. The second stage, which I call discipline, refers to the impact thatthe spectator's surveillanceandjudgementhave on the agent, the extent to which they motivate her to modify her conduct, and, ultimately, through repetition, to become a memberof a culture.12 One prefatorycommentbefore pursuing each "stage"further:It is potentially misleadingto referto the engagementsin Smith'sdescriptionas "stages" since they often fire quiterapidly,often simultaneously,andtend to live on in the mind long after they take place. Mindful not to lock the sympathy dynamic into a mechanicalsequence, I use "stage" since it conveys distinct social moments within Smith's description. I use "stage" to emphasize the intersubjectivityof Smith's account-that sympathy for him was not a moral disposition or a telos but a dynamic that stimulated agents (and the future agents of agents)to accommodatethemselves to the demandsof social life. Surveillanceand Fellow Feeling The first "stage"of sympathyis that in which a spectator-any ordinary, richly constituted,inescapablypartial individual-observes the behavior of an agent, arrivesat ajudgement, and somehow (verbally or otherwise) communicates herjudgementto the agent. In this act ofjudging, Smith noted, the spectatoris unableto experience the agent's joys and griefs in a primaryand immediate way since she is quite literally a different being, incapable of going beyond her own flesh and mind, "beyond her own person."'3The only way a spectatorcan generatefellow feeling for the agent, accordingto Smith, is imaginatively to projectherself into the agent's world and to ask herself whether, were she the agent, she would be motivatedby his circumstancesto feel and act as he does. "Wecan form no idea of the mannerin which he is

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affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation."''4 Though our brotheris upon the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They neverdid, and nevercan, carry us beyond our own person,and it is by the imaginationonly thatwe can formanyconception of what are his sensations.... By the imagination we place ourselvesin his situation,we conceive ourselves enduringall the same torments,we enteras it were intohis body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogetherunlike them.15

Only throughher attemptto get as close to the agentas possible, to "enter as it were into his body and become in some measurethe same person with him,"'6to "bringhome to [herself] every little circumstanceof distress which can the spectatorcome to understand can possibly occur to the sufferer,""17 In otherwords,imaginary closeness as he does. the acts and feels agent why But for the sympathymodel is effective for Smith, understanding. produces because the spectatoris at once both moral judgements impartial producing involved and detached. Once "changingplaces in fancy"the spectatoris said to understandthe agent and his conditions well enoughto "form some idea of his sensations,"to feel with him and achieve a sufficient"correspondence"or "concord."And yet, she is coolly removed from his distress or pleasure; her change of position is only "imaginary"and "momentary."Since she remains safe while the agent suffers, since she remainspoor while he prospers, lonely while he loves, the sentiment she generatesis necessarily "lower" in degree and it "varies in kind" from the agent's primarysentiments.'8 Ourimaginationnot having runin the same channelwith thatof thelover, we cannot enter into the eagerness of his emotions.19

Surely Smith did not make Rousseau's more radicalclaim about the man whose reason "isolates him and moves him to say in secret at the sight of a suffering man, 'Perish if you will; I am safe and sound,'"20but he did assert thateven the most refined imagination mustfall shortof primaryexperience, that a complete "unison"of sentiment between differentpeople differently situated is impossible.21(We see later that this gap widens as the spectator becomes spatially removed in various ways from the agent.) Nevertheless, this unbreachabledistance was the very thing thatenableda spectatorto be a judge, or at least betterposisufficiently "fair,""indifferent,"and "impartial" tioned than the agent is to judge whetherhis behavioris "proper."22 Now, think of propriety as a kind of "suitability."Smith rejected a tendency among philosophers in his day to reducemoraljudgement to a consid-

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eration of consequences alone, what he called the "tendencyof affections."23 For him, "propriety"meant that the spectator found the action or feeling "suitableto its object,"24appropriateto the particularcause that excited itnot merely that its consequences merited praise, though clearly they might. But how does a spectatordecide whether an action or feeling is suitable to its cause and thereforeproper?On what criteria-or to use Smith's languageon what "measure"25 does she base her judgement? A Smithian spectator does notjudge otherswith an abstractmeasure,with a "view from nowhere,"26 as if she has come upon the scene disembedded and strippeddown. Smith maintainedthatspectatorsemploy what we today might call a self-referential standpoint,which means thatwe judge the actions and opinions of others "as right, as accurate,as agreeableto truthand reality .. .for no other reason but because we find thatit agrees with our own."27In short, a Smithianspectator has no resourcebut her own lights: I judge of your sight by my sight, of your ear by my ear, of your reasonby my reason, of your resentmentby my resentment,of ~Ourlove by my love. I neitherhave,nor can have, any other way of judging about them.

And again: When we judge... of any affection... it is scarce possible thatwe shouldmake use of any other rule or cannon butthe correspondentaffection in ourselves.29

Of course, to describethe spectator's perspective as self-referentialis not to say thatspectatorsareegoists on Smith's account, and it is perfectly compatible with an observationthatthe spectator'sperspectiveis cultivatedin the spaces in which the spectatormoves, the fruits of social discipline. A spectator's perspective will obviously reflect her experiences as a social being. Smith describedit as self-referential since the spectator makesjudgements with her own faculties and without absolute algorithms to guide her. But she comes to know who she is and what she believes througha lifetime of gazing into the "mirrorof society,"participatingin sympatheticexchange. In a wellknown passage Smith speculated that a person who grew up in solitude "could no morethinkof his own character,of the proprietyor demerit of his own sentimentsandconduct,of the beauty or deformity of his own mind that of the beautyor deformityof his own face."30Society provides the mirrorof self-knowledge and engenders the criteria by which the self will come to mirrorandjudge others. I leave aside until my exploration of the spaces the question of whether this account of sympathycan yield the impartialjudgement that Smith was

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seeking, particularlyin contexts thatareunfamiliarandforeign to the spectator. Relatedly,we shall returnto Smith's discussion of the "impartialspectator,"a consciencelike faculty that he introducedto help spectators in such contexts to overcome bias, partiality,and other irregularitiesin judgement. Discipline So far we have examined Smith's thoughtson sympatheticjudgement and have briefly considered the self-referential natureof the criteria spectators use when they judge. But no account of Smithiansympathyis adequate if it neglects the disciplinary impact that the spectator'ssurveillance has on the agent, the extent to which it motivates her to modify herself, to act in a "proper"way, in a way that the spectatorcan indulge, in what Smith often referredto as a "moral"way. Sympathy serves in Smith'stheory as an act of surveillancein a closed physical space thatexertsa certainkind of disciplinary power over those being watched. When compounded over time, these disciplinaryengagements progressively constrainthe agent's understanding of herself, of others, and of the world, and serve to conditionthe moral criteria ("my ear,""my reason,""my resentment,"and so on) that she will deploy when she inevitably finds herself in the position of spectator. How is an agent disciplined on Smith's account?What motivates her to adjust her conduct, to violate her "natural,""untaught,"and "undisciplined feelings"?31In Smith's words, the very "presence"of others "composes" us because we desire to be loved and approved of.32Smith emphasized the "cool" rationality of "proper"behavior.33Agents are regularly confronted with a choice-to indulge in present, undisciplinedgratificationor to calmly pursue a duller but more matureenjoyment of love, approval,and congenial relations with peers. An agent must negotiate these ends, calculating how best to bring her emotions into "harmonyand concordwith the emotions of those who are about [her]."34Experience is surely her best guide. Since she was a small child, startledto discover thather playfellows refused to indulge the selfishness and moodiness once toleratedby her parents,the agent has learnedthe rules of obtaining love and approval.She has learnedthrough surveillance and discipline to exercise a Stoic-like self-command, to become "masterof [her]self'35and to adjusther passions (or at leastthe appearanceof them) to a "tone" or "pitch" or "degree"that spectatorscan "enter into."36 This most often means silencing herself, "lowering"herpassion, "bringingit down," since, as we have seen, spectators "though naturallysympathetic, never conceive, for what has befallen another,thatdegree of passion which naturallyanimates the person principally concerned."37

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But sometimes propriety requires an agent to "raise" her passion, to "bring it up"-a dimension of Smith's theory that seems to diverge from the theme of Stoic self-command that runs through much of the Moral Sentiments, and to adopt more of an Aristotelian mediocrity that, Smith acknowledged, "lies in a kind of middle between two opposite vices."38 Smith proceededthroughoutthe treatiseto offer a treasuretroveof perceptive illustrationsof the "proper"exercise of passion, which requiredraising and which requiredlowering-from cold parentsto brattychildren, from scholars too bookish to enjoy the diversions of youth to cowards without proper indignation, from the womanish man who cries in pain to the savage who endures pain in the name of honor. Smith's point in all of these (incidentally, rathermale) vignettes, and in dozens of others, is that the agent who adjusts his behaviordoes so coolly underthe watchful and critical eye of spectators. The anticipationof judgement inclines the agent to soften his temper, to restrainhis resentment,more Stoicly to endure physical discomfort, to elevate other-concern,to augmentproper indignation, and so on. In all of these examples, discipline takes place under surveillance and chisels the social beings we become.

IN SPACE II. SYMPATHY In a well-known passage in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, David Hume observed that proximity tends to stimulate sympathy, and that distancetends to diminish it: Sympathy,we shall allow, is much fainterthan our concern for ourselves, and sympathy with personsremotefromus, muchfainterthanthatwith personsnearandcontiguous.39

Hume's spatialconcepts in this passage-remoteness, nearness, and contiguity-all seem to have a physical implication: that we sympathize more vibrantlywithpeople who areliterally close by and less so with those who are not. And yet, they seem to signify something otheror more thansharedphysical space. Forexample, Hume noted that our relationships and associations will affect the scope of our sentiments. To cite anotherfamous passage, he observed thatan accountof a generous action reportedin an "old history or remote gazette"is "so infinitelyremoved, as to affect the senses with light nor heat"-but, that if the virtue is brought "nearer,by our acquaintance or connexion with the persons" involved, then "our hearts are immediately caught" and "oursympathy [is] enlivened."40Likewise,

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A statesmanor patriot,who serves our own country,in our own time, has always a more passionate regardpaid to him, than one whose beneficial influenceoperated on distant ages or remote nations;where the good, resultingfromhis generoushumanity,being less connected with us, seems more obscure, and affects us with less lively sympathy.

Related to this, Hume noted that our intereststend to influence the scope of our sentiments. He maintained that since our real and present interests are always "in view," it is unlikely that an "imaginaryinterest"in "distantages and countries" will incite "real sentiments,"particularlyif these interests happen to draw in different directions.42 What all this suggests is that there are other ways thanphysically that a person can be "near"or "remote."Hume points us in the right direction: we need to complicate the notion of proximityto signify othersorts of space than physical space. I might be revolted by my neighbor,familiaritybreeding proverbial contempt, yet feel affectively connected with an old schoolmate or lover who lives in another country. I might sympathizewith a person thousands of miles away upon hearing a narrativethat she, like me, has a special fondness for doing tai chi or for the paintingsof MarkRothko,or that,unlike me, lives next to a radioactive waste dump. What is more, I might be sitting just across a table from someone but find myself entirelyincapable of understandingor sympathizingwith her world of meanings.I might be more familiar in a cultural sense with the religious or dietarypracticesof a person living in Yementhan with the practices of my dinnercompanion,yielding in such a case a more refined sympathetic judgement of the physically remote and a relativeinsensibility towardthe near.Grown-upssimplycould not grasp that Saint-Exupdry'sLittle Prince had drawnnot a hatbutanelephantinside a boa constrictor.43Indeed, the issue of physical proximity seems to rouse more questions than it resolves, for it seems to be neithera necessary nor a sufficient condition for sympatheticresponse.The questionof proximity seems to demand cultural and affective considerations. Adam Smith's rich moral psychology in the Moral Sentimentshelps us to appreciatethe spatial complexities of sympatheticactivity.In the balance of this essay, I consider three spaces (theremight be others)in which sympathy seems to operate on Smith's account: the physical, the affective, and the historical. I do no more in this section thanidentify and differentiatethese three spaces, pointing occasionally to overlaps, glaring tensions, and conflicts among them. Space forbids a rigorous analysis of theirrelationships.For our purposes, each of these spaces can be conceptualizedas a continua along which any act of sympathy can be situated (i.e., physically proximate or remote, affectively connected or not, historicallyfamiliaror unfamiliar). In other words, any act of sympathy can be situatedsomewhere along each of

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these threecontinua,with the result thatany act of sympathywill be a particular confluence of the three. I now examine each of these spaces in further detail. Physical Immediacy We will discover in the next three sections thatAdam Smith was less concerned in the Moral Sentimentswith examining how physical proximity and distance influence our sympathetic responses and judgements than he was with describingthe ways thataffective "connections"and sharedexperiences and interestsdo. Nevertheless, it is inaccurateto say that physical space was unimportantin Smith'smoralpsychology since his accountof the mechanics of sympathyassumesthatthe spectatoris positioned near enough to "see,"to "gaze at,"and to "look upon"the agent before him, as well as to appreciate the particularcircumstancesthat motivated the agent to feel and act as he does.4 Throughoutthe first section of the treatise, Smith spoke regularly about the ways that we "view" others, of the "very appearances"that their emotions convey to us, thatwe rejoice in "observing"fellow feeling in them, that people tend to "parade"certain parts of themselves, "conceal" others, and so on. Indeed,Smithdescribes sympathy as an activity thattakes place in physical space,upona sortof dramaticstage.45As KnudHaakonssennotes, Smithalwaystakesasa matterof coursethatmanis social,thatheis boundto betogether with his fellows. This means that he will always literally have to look upon them; he is

forcedto watchthemandsee whattheyarelike.46

The spectatorthus is an audience to her fellows, or in Smith's words, a "bystander"47who watches and is affected by the spectacle of suffering or joy before her,in all its colorful and compelling detail. And, as we have seen, the agents who performbefore her will respond to being seen, like Sartre'sman in the park whose physical space is violently penetratedthe moment he is seen by another.48 To take a couple of Smith's illustrationsof the influence of on physical space sympatheticdiscipline, small children learnby observing the responses of those physically closest to them (notably their "play-fellows") what it means, quite literally, to act appropriately.49That I feel "offense" when a spectator"seems not to be affected by my misery"or when she refuses to "wear a serious countenance" is a function of the physical proximity between me and her.50I see her insensibility, and the effects are "instantaneous."''As Luc Boltanski describes it, we "regulateour reciprocal expectations by interpretingexternal signs accessible to sight."52In short, Smith assumesa basic physicalproximity,a face-to-facetransaction,between

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spectatorand agent in his descriptionof both "stages"of sympatheticinteraction-although, as we shall see, physical proximityis neithera necessary nor a sufficient condition for sympathetic response. For the moment, the relevant insight is that physical proximity will improvethe preciseness with which the spectator-by-standercan understand the circumstancesof the agent when she "entersinto"his reality,and thatdistance will diminish it. She cannot physically experience the agent's sensations or feel his emotions, but she sees his blood andtears,hears his cries and laughter,and she finds herself drawn into the circumstancesthat gave rise to them. Physical proximity will help her to better understandwhy the agent respondedto particularcauses the way he did andto evaluatemore accurately whether the agent's response was "proper"or "suitable."For example, a spectatormight believe she sees an act of harmwhen from afar she observes an agent strike another, but a more refined understandingof the circumstances, seeing more, can reveal that the "bully"was merely fending off an attackor maybe helping his friend by crushinga mosquitoon its bite or helping to dislodge a piece of meat from his throat,and so on. Distance (physically, temporally) distorts what we can see, obscures the whole story, and leads the spectatorto evaluate the agent's behavioras "improper."Bring the scene nearerto the eye, and the spectatorwill likely adjustherjudgement to accommodate the incidents that motivated the agent's behavior-the prior attack, the mosquito biting, the choking. Nevertheless, while physical proximityassists the spectatorin acquiringa more precise and accurateunderstandingof an event, we should not assume that it is either necessary or sufficient for sympatheticresponse on Smith's account. Regardingnecessity, I might hearaboutor readin graphic detail (as Smith must have) an account of the public executionof Damiens the regicide, and without seeing the events-the "red-hotpincers,"the "boiling potion," the "tugging horses,"the prisoner's cries for his Lord'spardon-experience some dimension of sympathy for him."5Although Smith's primarydescription of sympathetic activity rested on the faculty of sight, he acknowledged thata spectatormight be moved by literature(he frequentlydrawson tragedy for his examples) or a vivid narrativeof distantjoy or suffering. The vividness of the descriptionreplicates physical proximity;imaginationcarries the distant back to us and ultimately elicits the very sentiments that physical proximity would have produced (confirmingthat proximityserved as a sort of baseline in Smith's account of how we come to sympathize): We can sympathizewith the distress which excessive hungeroccasions when we read the descriptionsof it in the journal of a siege, or of a sea voyage. We imagine ourselves in the

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situationof thesufferers,andthencereadilyconceivethegrief,thefearandconsternation,whichmustnecessarilydistractthem.54

These insights seem particularlyrelevant today, when the idea of physical proximity is complicated by information, mobility, and speed and when images and narrativesof distant suffering are transporteddigitally into the living rooms andcomputerscreens of remote spectators.55Smith would have had much to say were he reflecting today on the impact of graphicimages of starving infants or grinning soldiers torturing naked prisoners, or of vivid narrativesof ethnic cleansing. As physical proximity appears not to be necessary for sympathy, it also does not seem to be sufficient. Smith offered a fine illustrationin his Lectures on Jurisprudenceof the insufficiency of physical proximity to explain sympathy.He observedthata nobleman "who is far removed from the conditions of his servant"has a less refined ability to "feel with" him than do ordinary farmers who work side by side in the fields and eat with their servants. Despite the nobleman'sphysical proximity to a servantwho might be shaving his face in the morningor clipping his toenails, only the farmer"considers his servantas almostan equal with himself, and is thereforemore capable of feeling with him."56In this example, the nobleman's sense of superiority (we might call it "distance in status") dulls the sympathetic imagination, regardlessof his physical proximity to his servant. A sense of helplessness might producea similarnumbing effect, as when one visits an impoverished city and comes upon throngs of homeless children begging for money or when one is besieged by television images of starving infants. AffectivePartiality: On "Feeling Too Strongly" We come now to a second, somewhat overlapping, space within which Smith consideredthe possibility of sympathy: thatof affective space. Affect for Smith is the emotional outcome of "association"and "connexion"with others over time, which commonly evolve through our physical proximity and sharedexperienceswith them.57Smith's thoughtson humanaffection are decisively Stoic in origin.5'Here I am most interestedin Smith's thoughts on the Stoic idea of initiated by Hierocles and developed by Cicero.59 oikei-sis The word oikeizsis derives from the Greek root oikos, which referred in ancientdemocraticlife to the privaterealm of the household as opposed to the public realmof thepolis. Oikei-osiswas a Stoic extrapolationfrom the familiarity one develops over time with those who inhabit the oikos, with those who share one's physical space. When offered as a more general account of

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the natureof humanaffection, oikei-osisdescribeda phenomenonof fading or weakening sentimentthatcorrespondsto an increasein physicaldistance and a correspondinglack of familiarity.Thus, the Stoics mappedour affections concentrically, claiming that the circles of affection weaken as our object radiatesfurtherfrom the self. Smith embraced Stoic oikeiisis as an empiricalfact abouthuman "affection."He agreed that we tend to feel affection for those with whom we share physical space and aremost familiar,and likewise that"spatialdistance operates to intensify psychological distance,"as Jacob Vinerput it.6oThis Stoic way of understandinghuman connectedness is capturednicely in Smith's claim that"affection"was quite simply the offspringof "habitualsympathy": Whatis called affection, is in reality nothing but habitual sympathy.Ourconcern in the happinessor misery of those who are the objects of whatwe call ouraffections;our desire to promotethe one, and to preventthe other;are eitherthe actualfeeling of that habitual sympathy,or the necessary consequences of that feeling. Relationsbeing usually placed in situationswhich naturallycreate this habitualsympathy,it is expected that a suitable degree of affection should take place among them. We generallyfindthatit actually does take place; we therefore naturallyexpect that it should.61

For Smith, affection evolves throughour experiencesliving in close proximity with others over time. It does not originate in blood, a fallacy that holds And it is not an force for Smith "no-wherebut in tragedies and romances."62 abstractentity such as benevolence or compassion, which moralists traditionally attemptedto teach and to shift aboutfromobjectto object. For Smith, the relation between physical and affective proximity meant that the Stoic circles were firmly entrenchedin humanexperienceandwere thereforeresistantto philosophical or religious manipulation.As such, while he was greatly impressed with and indebted to Stoic moral psychology, Smith rejected the Stoic's "absurdand unreasonable"cosmopolitan assertion that we should aspire to collapse the natural concentric structureof human relationships throughthe properuse of reason.63He simply could not accept that our highest humanaspirationis to nourish apathytowardthe nearandto become "citizens of the world."64He refused to make the leap "fromprimaryimpulse to virtue,"to borrow A. A. Long's description of the Stoic imperative.65Smith wrote, By the perfect apathywhich [the "stoical philosophy"]prescribesto us, by endeavoring, not merely to moderate,but to eradicate all our private,partial,andselfish affections, by suffering us to feel for whatever can befall ourselves, our friends,our country ... [it] endeavorsto renderus altogether indifferentand unconcernedin the success or miscar-

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With regardto our duties, therefore, Smith concluded, All men,even those at the greatestdistance, are no doubtentitled to ourgood wishes, and our good wishes we naturallygive them. But if, notwithstanding,they should be unfortunate,to give ourselvesany anxiety upon thataccount, seems to be no partof ourduty.67

This apparentlycallous disregardfor the condition of distantstrangersmight seem odd coming from a moral philosopher so often championed as a prophet of humansympathy.But our judgement should be tempered somewhat by noting that "ought,"for Smith always implied "can,"and that he found it absurdandcynical to extend duty to actions thatwere bettersuited to saints andbeyond the capacities of ordinaryeighteenth-centurypeople, who were drivenprimarilyby their personal interests and affective attachments. Smith might have underestimatedthe humanitarianinterests and capacities of his own century,let alone those of centuriesto come, buthe firmly believed thatwe arebest positionedto assist those for whom we have affection, understanding, and direct contact68-and he insisted that humanityprofited, borough by borough, through a sort of divine ceconomy, from this natural arrangement. In sum, familiarityand affection assume a central role in Smith's account of why we tendto sympathizemore vibrantlywith some people thanothers.69 And yet Smithrecognized that familiarity and affection, which are the natural consequences of living together in close physical proximity over time, threaten to distort our perceptions and judgements, to bias the sympathy dynamic, ultimatelyto divide and factionalize humankind.As Smith put it, "feeling too strongly" tends to delude us into fantastic overevaluations of ourselves and our loved ones, of our own pains and joys, and of the importance of our place in the world relative to others.70We can find ourselves caught up in what Smith called a "paroxysm of emotion" or "distress"-a "particularsituation"of "heat"or "keenness"or "eagernessof passion" that will "discolourour view of things" and lead us to elevate our own immediate ends above all else. He observed, In the same manner,to the selfish and original passions of humannature,the loss or gain of a very small interestof our own, appears to be of vastly more importance,excites a much more passionatejoy or sorrow, a much more ardent desire or aversion, than the greatestconcernof anotherwith whom we have no particularconnexion. His interests,as long as they are surveyed from this station, can never be out into the balance with our 71 own.

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Smith famously postulated that most of us would be far more distraught by the loss of our pinky finger than by the sudden death of millions of distant strangersswallowed up in a massive earthquake. He seems to have fastened onto Locke's observationin the Second Treatise that self-love makes men "partialto themselves andtheirFriends"-that we are "biased" when we are "judges in our own case."72Hume too was instructivewhen he observed in the Enquirythat we passively tend to prefer ourselves and those "contiguous"and "intimatelyconnected"with us.73Like Locke and Hume, Smith suggested taking a cool, affectivedistance from the heat of our self-love. While Locke turnedto the umpireof civil government and Humecounseled com"to restrainthe partialityand Violence of men,"'74 mon sense and "calmjudgement,"encouragingus to "renderour sentiments more public and social" by employing "generaland unalterablestandards" drawnfrom "theintercourseof sentiments ... in society andconversation,"75 Smith introduced us to the "ImpartialSpectator,"a consciencelike faculty thatserves to temperour naturalinclinationsandto ensurethatthe heat of our passive sentiments will not give way to radically partialjudgements and actions.76This "inhabitantof the breast, the man within,the greatjudge and arbiterof our conduct"succeeds in cooling us off, "astonishingthe most presumptuous of our passions"77and protecting the weak and innocent, Smith maintained, because it forces us to imagine how we would appear to an impartialobserver,a "thirdperson who has no particularconnexion" with us, if we were to lose control and surrenderto our passive sentiments.78 And yet, once "we can entermore cooly into the sentimentsof the indifferent spectator,"we often fall victim to "self-deceit"and"delusion,"which prevent us from seeing ourselves in too humiliatinga light (todaywe might call it denial or sublimation or "sweeping it under the carpet") and ultimately deliver us into "like errorsin time to come."79 It is so disagreeableto think ill of ourselves, that we often purposelyturnaway our view from those circumstances which might renderthatjudgement unfavorable.He is a bold surgeon, they say, whose hand does not tremblewhen he performsan operationupon his own person; and he is often equally bold who does not hesitateto pull off the mysterious veil of self-delusion, which covers from his view the deformitiesof his own conduct.80

According to Smith, this phenomenon of delusion, of "feeling too strongly" and committing "like errorsin time to come" is particularlyacute when we live too solitary a life, isolated from the reality check of society.8' Smith encouraged the deluded to look outside themselves, to surroundthemselves with umpires who are unlikely to be caught up in the same web of self-inflation and delusion, which meant avoiding solitude and seeking the company of friends and, better yet, strangers. Indeed, strangerswho care little for us

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are betterspectators,more "impartial"than our friends or neighbors.82Smith extended this insight about self-preference and distortion to nations as well, which is why he was wary of isolationism in internationalaffairs where the "partialspectatoris at hand: the impartialone at a great distance."83 This discussionof the problems of affective partialitybringsout an apparent tension in Smith's thoughtabout the relationbetween physical space and affective space. On one hand, as I discussed earlier,Smith speaks regularly about the importanceof physical proximity for well-informedjudgementsthata spectatorbe nearenough to a situationto "enterinto"its "minutestincidents." And yet, we learn now that spectators must be affectively removed from a situationto evaluateit impartially.Apparently,understandingrequires proximity,and impartialityrequires a sort of cool distance. If an agentis my friend,and I care for her well-being, my partialitytoward her makesme likelierto accommodateher self-indulgence, to brushit aside. I alreadywantto understandher,I want her to succeed, I have memories of her behaving betterand of her similarly indulging me, and so on, so I forgive her lapse andjudge hergently. In Smith's words, "Weexpect less sympathyfrom a common acquaintancethan a friend ... [and] still less sympathy from an And yet, despite the affective partialitythat softens assembly of strangers."84 my judgement,I am nearerto my friend in a physical sense than a strangeris and am thereforefarlikelierto "see"and understandthe "minutestincidents," the "little circumstances""85 surrounding my friend's behavior. In other words, thoughmy judgement is partial, my understandingis rich. An impartialstranger,on the other hand, does not have the same affective pull. His distancebecomes a remedy for partiality-but of course not without adverse side effects. Distant strangers, though impartial, will have a less refined andprecise understandingof the circumstancesthey are being asked to evaluate.They will not have an intimateor complex appreciationof why an agent behavesas she does. But in extreme situations,they arean effective disciplinaryforce, Smithdecided, in shaking extremeprejudiceout of partiality. In the end, it seems thatan ideal Smithianperspectivewill be thatof a spectator who is essentially Janus-faced:near enough to access the meanings and vicissitudes of a particularsituation but distant enough not to be entangled within them-both hot and cool. This tension is not entirely resolvable, but Smith seemed to thinkthatreflective moral agents could navigate it more or less successfully.86 Historical Familiarity And yet, this tenuousbalance between physical and affective space is profoundly unsettledby a thirdspace, likely the most relevantand complicated

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space in which sympatheticjudgement moves in Smith'sthought:that of history, or culture. By designating this last space "historical,"I am referring to the constructed,historical natureof the criteria spectatorsdeploy when they judge-or, to use Smith's language, the "standardsand measures" against which they discern "propriety"in other people.87We saw in the previous two sections that Smith's spectatorwas able, with varyingdegrees of success, to transcend the barriersof both physical and affective space. In both cases, sympathy was naturallybiased toward the near but was ultimately enlarged in various ways. In the case of physical space, for example, we saw that a vivid narrativeor image could serve to bring the distantnearand thus arouse our sympathy.In the case of affective space, we saw thatSmith's turntoward the impartial spectator helped us to transcendour affective biases. I argue here that this enlargement that helped disentangle the spectator from her physical and affective constraintsis substantiallymorecomplex and difficult to realize in the case of historical space and that Smith's theory ultimately lacks the resources necessary for doing so. In the first part of this essay, I sought to demonstratethat for Smith, our criteria are disciplined over time through our experiences participating in sympatheticexchange, primarilywith those aroundus. Giventhis, does it not seem thatthe criteriawe deploy in moraljudgementwill be more appropriate when we evaluate others who share our historicalspace, andless appropriate with those who are not-that we might be woefully imprecisewhen judging a personjust before our eyes or on our television screens,clearly as our eyes might receive the "facts"?In the case of physical andaffectivespaces, we saw that Smith invoked the impartialspectatorto assist us in enlarging our perspective and refining our judgements, but I argue that this transitorysort of enlargementthat Smith worked out (with much success, I believe) is not the sort of enlargementthat is requiredto facilitate impartialjudgement beyond one's historical space. Smith acknowledged clearly that a spectatorwill tendto sympathizemore "precisely"with membersof his family than with his neighborsand with his neighbors than with his fellow citizens: He is morehabituatedto sympathize with them. He knowsbetterhoweverythingis likely to affect them,andhis sympathywith them is moreprecise and determinate,thanit can be with the greaterpartof other people. It approachesnearer,in short,to what he feels for himself.88

Because we share a history, and have cultivated sharedsources of meaning throughhabitualintercourseover time, I am likelierthana strangeris to make "precise and determinate"judgements about my family,friends, coworkers,

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and fellow citizens (in this concentric order). I already understand their worlds of meaningand "how everything is likely to affect" them.89Note that historicalfamiliarityworks independentlyof affect.The subjectsof affective and historicalproximitywill often overlap (I usually understandbetter those whom I carefor), but they need not. Opposites sometimes attract,and sometimes people feel contempt for their own precisely because they understand them so well. That Smithinvokes the faculty of "imagination"as the vehicle by which spectators"enterinto"the motivationsof others does not entail thatimagination is boundless,or even thatall people (such as the well-groomed nobleman vis-a-vis his servant)wish to exercise their imaginations. For Smith, moral imagination seems to be bounded by familiarity; in other words, we are biased in historical space (as we are in both physical and affective space) towardtheproximate.This seems to entail thatwhen the moralimaginationis thrustbeyond the sphere of the spectator's experience and understanding,it can misfireandyield judgements thatare at best "imprecise"and "indeterminate"(to invertSmith's languagein the passage cited previously) and at worst based on narrowcriteriafoisted onto a reified other. Still, some have suggested that Smith's spectator model affords a sufficiently detached and impartial perspective for the objective judgement of others, distant or close, beloved or not, culturally familiar or not. Martha Nussbaum, for instance, draws parallels between Smith's spectator model and John Rawls's device of the original position.90She observed that the spectator's position in Smith's theory "is designed to model the rational moral point of view by ensuring that he will have those, and only those, thoughts, sentiments,and fantasies that are partof a rationaloutlook on the world."9 No doubt Smith would have balked at Rawls's proposition of a stripped-downspectator,but he might have granted an observation that his own spectatormodel, in the words of F. L. von Holthoon, "putreason on the throneagainas the arbiterof moral sentiments,"or, as Knud Haakonssenput it, showed that"moralideals can detach themselves from social morality."92 Similarly,CharlesGriswold argued that Smith's theory succeeds in producing objective moraljudgements because sympathy is "spectator-centered" ratherthan"agent-centered"andbecause this "asymmetricalrelationof actor and spectatorbecomes lexical insofar as judgements of value and truthare concerned."93 But we need to ask Smith (and those convinced of the transcultural significance of his theory) how, on Smith's account, spectators do this, how they detachthemselves from theirown experiences as agents disciplined in a world of values-how, within the terms of Smith's thick description of the disciplinaryprocess through which spectators in historical space

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come to be propermembersand gatekeepersof social morality,they can now transcendhistorical space when they imaginativelyenterinto the conditions and motivations of others with potentially very differenthistories.94 This brings us again to Smith's idea of the "impartialspectator,"a faculty he invoked at various points throughoutthe Moral Sentimentsto overcome the nearsightedness of our passive sentiments. Most claims about Smith's transculturalsignificance focus on the impartialspectator,for obvious reasons. Smith maintainedthat this ideal "thirdperson"(whom he sometimes called "reason,""principle,""conscience,"or "the man within") helps us to become impartialjudges, to rise above the naturalconsequences of having privateinterests,of living in families andcommunitiesandthus feeling affection and concern for some people more than others. As such, the impartial spectatorseems to be the perfect cosmopolitan device for getting us beyond ourselves. But I argue that different sorts of impartialityare requiredfor different sorts of judgement, and that the sort of impartialityachieved by Smith's impartialspectator might be effective for correctingfor physical and affective shortsightednessbut is not the sortrequiredto renderunbiasedcross-culturaljudgements.95His spectatormodel surely generatesa transitorysort of coolness-for example, restraining someone who in the heat of passion is tempted to act aggressively toward a stranger.On its own terms, Smith's model is efficient in mediating our self-regardingand other-regardingtendencies, disciplining propriety,and ensuring relatively stable and sociable communities. But renderinga cross-culturaljudgementthatdoes not simply reduce the other to oneself requires something much different:that a spectator be able not merely to transcendhis affective attachmentsto self and specific others but, more fundamentally,to question and sometimes subvertthe very measureby which he has become accustomedto judginghimself and the world. In otherwords, while Smith is primarilyconcernedwith social coordination, the problem of historical self-consciousness andtranscendenceis an epistemic one and in many respects beyond the scope of his theory.96 As such, to say that sympathetic judgement is "an ongoing process of adjustment,a continual search for equilibrium,"as Griswold, Haakonssen, Hope, and others have (correctly I believe), is neverthelessinsufficient for explaining how we might transcendhistorical space.97On Smith's account it seems that making better judgements involves becoming better and better interpretersof our own cultural signals and becoming more disciplined, in "command"of ourselves, proper,sociable, and polite. Haakonssenis helpful when he observes thatthe "process"of refining ourjudgements"is a continual weeding out of behaviour which is incompatiblewith social life."98But

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how does this process help me increasingly understandsomeone who has learned (throughthe same process as I have, for the sympathy dynamic is a universal process) what it means in her cultural vernacular to be "in command"of herself, proper,sociable, polite, and so on? In fact, it seems that as my sympatheticjudgement progresses, enhancing my proprietyand sociability througha developed capacity for self-command, I may become more deeply entrenchedin my historical context, progressively less capable of understandingmyself and others. At variouspoints, no doubt, Smith argued that the maturespectator will have learnedto differentiatewhat is inherentlypraiseworthyfrom that which is conventional,merely praised, and therefore less worthy,99which seems to provide the spectatorwith some measure of distance from her own history and with a capacity for cultivating a more impartial,less insular view of the world. But Smith'sforay into "is"and "ought"neverexplains how the spectator does this or wherethis new knowledge aboutthe world might come from. Smith all butbypassed the question by stating simply that the moral rules we createfor ourselvesare"endowedby Nature"andto be "regardedas the commands and laws of the Deity."'" This unsatisfying assertion-which seems to have suspendedthe thick empiricism thatproduced Smith's account sympathy-has led some observers to conclude that Smith's impartialspectator is merely an artifactof humanexperience. Like sympathy,conscience is cultivated in physical space, subject to the ebb and flow of human intercourse, and ultimately little more than the voice of conventional morality. In fact, Smithian conscience seems to be an internalization of sympathetic discipline, what Sheldon Wolin might have called a "socialized conscience,"'0'a social censorconstructedin the mind over time thathas strong affinities with the Freudiansuperego.102An agent internalizes her experiences with actual spectators,so thatat a certainpoint in time, she can turnher eyes inwardand away from their gaze when evaluating herself and her world. Given the likely complicity of the impartialspectatorin reinforcing conventionalorientations,how do we "enterinto" contexts and worlds of meaning that areunfamiliarto us without speculating about the other and forcing their practicesinto our own frames of reference, demanding that they conform to "my sight,""my ear,""my reason,"and so on?'03To cultivate crosscultural understandingand a modicum of impartiality,anthropologists and sociologists have traditionallysent us into the field. They have told us to go to unfamiliarplaces, come to know who inhabitsthem by observing them, talking with them,being among them. But it seems even physical proximity cannot easily overcome historical and cultural barriersto understanding.One recalls the old Hasidic tale attributedto the Baal Shem Tov that tells of a man standingbeforea window throughwhich he sees a group of Hasidim dancing

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in circles, sweaty and red-faced, extremities and talit flailing fast, furious, and in every direction, and he assumes he has come upon a den of madmen. That I have difficulties understandingthe sense of liberationthat some Muslim women reportliving life with theirfaces covered has much to do with the particularWestern understandingof freedom that I have been disciplined to value. When we encounter the unfamiliar, especially when it rubs hard against deeply entrenched beliefs, "something will have to stay behind the lens."" Engaging in a dialogue with my shrouded sister I might acquire a new respect for her resolve and the worldview that sustainsit. But physical proximity might actually serve to reinforce my biases and presuppositions, substantiatingmy sense of the sheer discomfortand humiliationof wearing a hijab, confirming what I already knew about the woman who does. I submit that Smith's theory of moraljudgement fails to supply what is necessary for enlarging the perspectiveof a spectatorentangledwithin in historical space. And it does not help that he offered a remarkablyinsular He was suspicious about account of education in the Moral Sentiments.10os or schools to children universityeducation supplementing foreign sending with foreign travel, since these practicestended to "hurtmost essentially the domestic morals."'106 Surely,a cosmopolitaneducationmighthelp a spectator contextualize a curious spectacle before him and anchorhis judgement more firmly (in Smith's words) on "the whole case of his companion with all its minutestincidents.'"107 But, again, Smith was primarilyconcernedwith social coordination and stability and with maintaining"domesticmorals";in this light, he believed thatthe best educationis the one we receivefrom the physiOnly when you "educatethem in your own house" cally nearand familiar.108 and "let their dwelling be at home,"Smith warns, will you have childrenwho are "dutiful,kind and affectionate."It is thereforenot insignificantor surprising that Smith threw aroundclassic Enlightenmentbinariessuch as "barbarian" and "civilized" rather freely,109and it is not merely anachronistic: the coalition of parochialism and rigid binaries was hardly unique to the eighteenth century.

III. RESISTINGCONVENTIONALISM Justafterthe first edition of the Moral Sentimentsappearedin 1759, Smith received a letter in which his old friend Sir GilbertElliot critiquedhis sympathy model for seeming to promote a troubling conventionalism. How, he wondered, might our judgements transcendconventionalopinion?"oSmith apparentlytook Sir Gilbert's challenge to heart, for a careful reading of the Moral Sentimentsreveals thathe spent the next thirtyyears,from the second

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edition of the Moral Sentimentsthrough the last in 1790, tinkeringwith his theory to find a way to give moral judgement some critical distance from popularopinion. In addressingthe problem, Smith put his finger on questions that would remaincentralin moral and political philosophy until the presentday: What grounds moraljudgement? Is morality more than a cultural artifact?Can it transcendthe particularworld of meanings from which it emerges? SurelySmith was not interested(neitherwas Sir Gilbert)in universalizing moraljudgement, the way we might conceive of such an activity today. He also did not care much aboutrefining his understandingof foreigners. Smith wanted to stabilize moraljudgement because he was revolted by the vulgar displays of wealth and powerthatwere paradingthemselves as virtuein eighteenth-centuryEuropeanlife. In this, Smith sharedsomething importantwith Jean-JacquesRousseau. Michael Ignatieff offers a compelling argumentthat Rousseauand Smith had revived a Stoic argumentthat moralcorruptionwas a productof belief and convention and, in so doing, had advanced the first "specifically modern theory of false consciousness.""' Like Rousseau, Smith arguedthat social experience accustoms the mind to accepting as true those symbols of value thatconvention happens to offer up-what Rousseau referredto as "pointsd'honneur"or "objets ... de estime."'12In the first edition of the Moral Sentiments,Smith warned modern men to avoid "emulating" those who "makeparade"of their "riches"-those who "in those delusive colors in which the imaginationis apt to paint them" seem to personify "almostthe exact idea of a perfect and happy state.""3He warned, Never enterthe place from whence so few have been able to return;nevercome within the circle of ambition;noreverbringyourself into comparisonwith those mastersof the earth who have alreadyengrossed the attention of half mankind before you.114

By the lastedition of the Moral Sentimentsin 1790, Smith's tone had intensified. Now he addressedthe manifold dangers associated with a "mob"in hot pursuitof "fashion"set by "the rich and great"-those "fashionableprofligates" whose "gaudy and glittering"behavior forced itself "uponthe notice of every wanderingeye.""5"Eventheir vices and follies are fashionable;and the greater part of men are proud to imitate and resemble them.""16 Ultimately, Smith discovered that a morality grounded in ordinaryexperience tends to slip into a precariousmoralfree-for-alldictated by the whimsy of the rich and powerful, whom Smith tellingly referred to as the "mastersof the earth.""'The great disciplinariansof the earth. In the years between 1759 and 1790, Smith attemptedin various ways to stabilizemoraljudgement, to identify standardsthatwould transcendfashion

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and variation, timeless criteria that would enable spectators to know right from wrong-inviting those who are skepticalabout such binariesto dismiss him out-of-hand as a paragonof Enlightenmentarrogance!But I suggest we sublimate Smith's reasons for the moment to appreciatewhat he had stumbled on. Smith had discovered that sympathy tends to produce inherently particularisticmoralities that will vary from one forum of ordinaryexperience to another."' To an eighteenth-centurymind, one more than slightly obsessed with order, anxious about uncertainty and instability,19 such a discovery was bound to be deeply disturbing. There is no space in a short essay to elaborateSmith's many attemptsto stabilize moral judgement.'20Some of the more substantialones are as follows: his furtherconceptualizationand refinementof his impartialspectator theory,amplificationof Stoic themes of self-commandandmoralmaturity,121 a ratheranxious discussion about fortifying judgement with "moralrules" that reflect the "Infinite Wisdom and Infinite Power!"of God's will,122an argumentthat "particularusages" in different times and places can "warp" humansentiments but cannot "entirelypervertthem,"'23a theory of commera theoryof juscialism thatproduces good effects withoutgood intentions,124 tice conceived negatively as the avoidance of human pain,125and so on. I do not think Smith felt he ever really succeeded. In his "Advertisement" to the final edition of the Moral Sentiments,he apologized for defaultingon a thirty-year-oldpromise made in the closing paragraphof the first edition: to offer a normative"theoryof jurisprudence"thatwould elaborate"thenatural rules of justice independentof all positive institution,"to elucidate "thegeneral principles which ought to run throughand be the foundationof the laws of all nations."'26Whether he might have succeeded is anyone's guess, but thatis really beside the point. I have attemptedin my discussion of historical space to demonstrate that Smith's contributionto contemporarymoral and political theory rests in the way he struggled with the problem of impartial judgement in light of what his moral psychology revealed to him about the historicity of our moral criteria.

CONCLUSION Evaluatingwhetherand how Smithiansympathymightsuit a twenty-firstcenturycosmopolitan agenda ultimatelyrequiresa deeperanalysis of the tensions and compatibilities among physical space, affect, and culture than I have provided in a "limited space" such as this. But even in this preliminary task of identification and differentiation, I hope to have affirmed that the spaces productivelycomplicate the idea of proximityin Smith'sthought,car-

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rying him decisively into very timely debates in contemporary moral and political theory.

NOTES 1. AdamSmith, The TheoryofMoral Sentiments(1759), ed. D. D. Raphaeland A. L. Macfie (Indianapolis,IN: Liberty Press, 1982). Hereafter,TMS. 2.One notableexception is Luc Boltanski, Distant Suffering:Morality, Media and Politics, trans. GrahamBurchell (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1999). However, Smith is somewhat incidental to Boltanski's larger project, and his thoughts on distance are not fully investigated. 3.David Hume,An EnquiryConcerningthe Principles ofMorals, in Moral and Political Philosophy, ed. J. B Schneewind (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1983), 48-50. 4. For a classic statement,see D. D. Raphaeland A. L. Macfie's "Introduction"to TMS,pp. 10-15. Useful accountscan be found in KnudHaakonssen,TheScience ofa Legislator: TheNatural Jurisprudenceof David Hume andAdam Smith (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1981); Vincent Hope, Virtueby Consensus: The Moral Philosophy of Hutcheson, Hume and AdamSmith(Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1989); Glenn R. Morrow,"The Significance of the Doctrine of Sympathy in Hume and Adam Smith,"Philosophical Review 32, no. 1 (1923): 60-78; David Raynor,"Hume'sAbstractof Adam Smith's Theoryof Moral Sentiments,"Journal of the History of Philosophy22 (1984): 52-79; and F L. von Holthoon, "AdamSmith andDavid Hume: With Sympathy,"Utilitas 5, no. 1 (1993): 36-48. We might summarize the relation as follows: thatwhile Smithadoptedand integratedHume's descriptionof sympathy in A Treatiseof Human Nature as the "communication"of sentiments along with Hume's subsequent shift in the Enquiry,in which sympathywas associated more conventionally with benevolence, Smith ultimately rejected Hume's claim in the Enquiry that sympathy was grounded in utility. At TMS IV.2.5 (p. 188), Smith considered Hume "the same ingenious and agreeable authorwho first explained why utility pleases, has been so struckwith this view of things, as to resolve our whole approbationof virtue into a perceptionof this species of beauty which results from the appearance of utility.. . . But I still affirmthat it is not the view of this utility or hurtfulnesswhich is either the first principle or source of our approbationor disapprobation." 5. Fordiscussion, see my "AdamSmith as Globalization Theorist,"Critical Review 14, no. 4 (2002): 391-419, at 393-401. 6. See, for example, TMS111.3.21(p. 145). 7. A themepursuedby CharlesL. Griswold Jr.in Adam Smith and the Virtuesof Enlightenment (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1999). 8. A good introductionto Smith's empiricism is found in D. D. Raphael, "The Impartial Spectator,"in Essays on AdamSmith,ed. AndrewS. Skinnerand Thomas Wilson (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1975), 83-99, at 96-99. 9. TMSII.i.5.10 (p. 77). 10. For an excellent discussion of the descriptive and normative dimensions of Smith's morality,see James R. Otteson,AdamSmith'sMarketplaceof Life (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 2002), 199-257. 11. TMSI.i.l.1 (p. 9); VII.ii.4 (pp. 306-14); VII.iii.1 (pp. 315-17). 12. Drawing on Michel Foucault's account of a modem turn in Western societies toward bloodless methods for achieving social orderin Discipline and Punish: The Birthof the Prison, trans.Alan Sheridan(New York:Vintage, 1977-1995). I have appropriatedFoucault'stwo well-

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known descriptionsof modemrn life-"surveillance" and"discipline"-because they help to convey the power relations that govern sympathetic activity and the moralculture that it produces. Surely,the Foucauldianor Benthamitearchitectis absentin Smith'saccount(indeed, we all seem to be unwitting architects in Smith's description) but the psychological methods for ensuring conformityareremarkablysimilar.What gave sympathyethicalpoint forSmith was its power to discipline modem individuals, to socialize them into the group and perpetuatecultural norms without traditionalforms of coercion. Smith used the worddiscipline overand again to describe the socializing work thatsympathyperformedin moraleducation:TMSIII.3.20 (p. 145); 111.3.22 (p. 145);11I.3.24(p. 146); 111.3.45(p. 156); 111.5.1(p. 163). He also often referredto our "undisciplined passions" and our "natural"and "untaughtfeelings": TMS I.iii.3.1 (p. 34); 111.3.28(p. 148); VI.iii.18 (p. 245). 13. TMSI.i.1.2 (p. 9). 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 18. TMSI.i.4.7 (pp. 21-22). 19. TMSI.ii.2.1 (p. 31). 20.Jean-JacquesRousseau, Discours sur l'origine et lesfondements de indgalitdparmi les hommes,in Jean-JacquesRousseau: (Euvrescompletes,ed. BernardGagnebinand Marcel Raymond, vol. III (Paris:Gallimard, Bibliotheque de la Pldiade, 1959-1966), 109-223. 21. TMSI.i.4.7 (p. 22). 22. TMSI.i. 1.2-3 (pp. 9-10). 23. TMSI.i.3.5-8 (p. 18) (emphasis mine). 24. TMSI.i.3.1 (p. 16). 25. TMSI.i.3.10 (p. 19). 26. ThomasNagel, The ViewfromNowhere (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 1986), 67-71. 27. TMSI.i.4.4 (p. 20), (emphasis mine). 28. TMSI.i.3.10 (p. 19), (emphasis mine). 29. TMSI.i.3.9 (p. 18). 30. TMSIII.1.3 (p. 110). 31. TMSI.ii.3.1 (p. 34); 111.3.28(p. 148); VI.iii.18 (p. 245). 32. TMSI.i.4.7-10 (pp. 22-23). 33. Smith's frequent use of the term "coolness" might have been borrowed from Bishop Joseph Butler. See his discussion in Sermons, xi, 20-21, of "coolness" and "reasonable selflove," which Smith's references throughoutthe Moral Sentimentsindicate he had read; TMS I.iii. 1.1 (p. 43); 111.5.5(pp. 164-65). Joseph Butler,Fifteen SermonsPreached at the Rolls Chapel, vol. I of The Worksof Bishop Butler, 2 vols., ed. J. H. Bernard(1726; London: Macmillan, 1900). 34. TMSI.i.4.7 (p. 22). 35. TMS111.3.22(p. 145). 36. TMSI.i.4.7 (p. 22); I.ii.intro.1 (p. 27); VI.iii.14 (pp. 242-43). 37. TMSI.i.4.7 (p. 21). 38. TMSVII.ii. 1.12 (pp. 270-71). 39. Hume, Enquiry,49. 40. Ibid., 50. 41. Ibid., 48 (emphasis mine). 42. Ibid., 41.

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43. Antoine de Saint-Exup6ry,The Little Prince (New York: HarcourtBrace Jovanovich, 1943-1971). 44. TMSI.i. 1-2 (pp. 9-16), throughout. 45. On the "drama"and "theatricality"of Smithian sympathy,see David Marshall, "Adam Smith andthe Theatricalityof MoralSentiments,"Critical Inquiry 10 (June 1984): 592-613, esp. p. 612, n. 14; and The Figure of Theatre: Shaftesbury,Defoe, Adam Smith, and George Eliot (New York:Columbia UniversityPress, 1986). 46. Haakonssen,Science of a Legislator,52. 47. TMSI.i.1.3 (p. 10). 48. Jean-PaulSartre,Being and Nothingness, trans.Hazel E. Barnes (New York:Philosophical Library,1956), 254-59. 49. TMS111.3.22(p. 145). 50. TMSI.i.2.4 (p. 15). 51. For example, at TMSI.i.4.9 (p. 23). 52. Boltanski,Distant Suffering,39. 53. I amreferringof courseto Foucault'smemorableoverturein Discipline andPunish, 3-6. 54. TMSI.ii.1.1 (p. 28). Note also "Ourjoy for the deliverance of those heroes of tragedyor romance who interestus, is as sincere as our grief for their distress";TMSI.i. 1.4 (p. 10). 55. Luc Boltanskihas offered a very thoughtfuldiscussion of Smithiansympathyand media representationsof "distantsuffering" in Distant Suffering. See my review essay, "And Thus Spoke the Spectator:Adam Smithfor Humanitarians,"Adam SmithReviewI (September2004): 167-74. 56. Lectureson Jurisprudence(1762-1766), vol. V of The Glasgow Editionof the Worksand CorrespondenceofAdam Smith,ed. R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael, and P.G. Stein (Oxford:Oxford University Press;repr.Indianapolis,IN: Liberty Press, 1982), A iii.109, (emphasis mine). 57. AlthoughSmith acknowledgesthat we can feel affection, regardlessof such connection, for a person who has demonstratedexceptional "personalqualities,"for someone exceptionally needy, or for someone from whom we have experienced "pastservices"; TMSVI.ii. 1.15-20 (pp. 223-26). 58. For generaldiscussion of the Stoic influence on Smith, see the editors'"Introduction"to Smith, MoralSentiments,1-52, at 5-10; NorbertWaszek, "TwoConcepts of Morality:A Distinction of Adam Smith's Ethics and Its Stoic Origin," Journal of the History of Ideas (October 1984): 591-604; Vivienne Brown, Adam Smith's Discourse: Canonicity, Commerceand Conscience (London:Routledge, 1994);Griswold,Adam Smith,217-27, 317-24; most recently,Gloria Vivenza, Adam Smithand the Classics: The Classical Heritage in Adam Smith's Thought (Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress, 2002), chap. 2, and pp. 191-212; and LeonidasMontes, Adam Smithin Context:A CriticalReassessmentofsome Central Componentsofhis Thought(London: Palgrave Macmillan,2004). 59. See Hierocles'sfragmenton concentriccircles in A. A. Long andD. N. Sedley, TheHellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols. (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1987), 57.G (I., pp. 34950; II., pp. 347-48). For Cicero, see OfDuties, ed. M. T. Griffin and E. M. Atkins (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1991), Bk. I. 46-59 (pp. 20-25). For furtherdiscussion of Smith's appropriationof the Stoic circles, see my "Adam Smith," 393-401. 60. JacobViner,TheRole of Providencein the Social Order:An Essay in IntellectualHistory (Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversityPress, 1972), 80-81. 61. TMSI.ii. 1.7 (p. 220), (emphasis mine). For discussion of the "familiarityprinciple" in Smith (in Wealthof Nations and TMS),see Otteson, Marketplace, 183-89. 62. TMSVI.ii.1.11 (p. 222). 63. TMS111.3.9(p. 140).

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64. TMSI11.3.11(p. 140). 65. A. A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974-1986), 184-89. 66. TMSVII.ii.1.46 (pp. 292-93). 67. TMS111.3.9(p. 140). 68. See TMSVII.ii. 1.44 (p. 292): "By naturethe events which immediately affect that little departmentin which we ourselves have some managementand direction, which immediately affect ourselves, our friends, our country, are the events which interestus the most, and which chiefly excite our desires and aversions, our hopes and fears, ourjoys and sorrows." 69. As Viner described it, "The sentiments weaken progressivelyas one moves from one's immediatefamily to one's intimate friends, to one's neighborsin a small community, to fellowcitizens in a great city, to members in general of one's own country,to foreigners, to mankind taken in the large, to the inhabitants,if any, of distantplanets";Providence, 80-81. 70. TMS111.3.38(pp. 153-54). 71. TMS111.3.2-3(pp. 134-35) (emphasis mine). 72. John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government,in Two Treatisesof Government,ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1960-1992), 265-428, at s13 (pp. 27576). 73. Hume, Enquiry,49. 74. Locke, Second Treatise, 275-76. 75. Hume, Enquiry,49. 76. TMS111.3(pp. 134-56). Samuel Fleischackeremphasizesthe differencein Smith between unreflexiveperceptionand a more responsible "determiningjudgement"in A ThirdConcept of Liberty:Judgementand Freedomin Kant andAdam Smith(Princeton,NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1999). 77. TMS111.3.4(p. 137). 78. TMS111.3.3(p. 135). 79. TMS111.4.4(p. 158). For discussion, see HarveyMitchell, "TheMysterious Veil of SelfDelusion in Adam Smith's Theoryof Moral Sentiments,"Eighteenth-CenturyStudies 20 (1987): 405-21. 80. Ibid. 81. TMS111.3.38(pp. 153-54). 82. Ibid. (emphasis mine). 83. TMS111.3.41(p. 154). For furtherdiscussion of Smith's thoughtson impartialityin international relations, see my "AdamSmith,"406-11. 84. TMSI.i.4.10 (p. 23). 85. TMSI.i.4.6, 10 (pp. 21, 23). 86. My thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 87. TMSI.i.3 (pp. 16-19). 88. TMSVI.ii.1.2 (p. 219) (emphasis mine). 89. Ibid. 90. Poetic Justice: TheLiteraryImaginationand PublicLife (Boston:Beacon, 1995), 134, n. 23. But surely there is a crucial difference. Impartialjudgementfor Smith entailed not a "standing back,"a "veiling"of self but the imaginative insertionof a fully developed self into the circumstances of another.Rawls noted the crucial "contrast":for Smith, he wrote, spectators"possess all the requisite information"and "relevantknowledge"of their "naturalassets or social situation,"while in the original position, partiesare"subjectto a veil of ignorance";John Rawls, Theory of Justice (Cambridge:Belknap Press, 1971), 183-87. See also T. D. Campbell, Adam Smith's Science ofMorals (London: Allen & Unwin, 1971), 127-41;Raphael,"ImpartialSpecta-

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tor,"96-97; and KnudHaakonssen,"KantianThemes in Smith,"in NaturalLaw and Moral Philosophy: FromGrotiusto the ScottishEnlightenment(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1996), 151-52. 91. Nussbaum,Poetic Justice, 73. 92. Von Holthoon, "AdamSmith and David Hume,"47; and Haakonssen,The Science of a Legislator, 56. 93. Griswold,AdamSmith,92, 96-99. 94. For furtherdiscussion, see my book review of Griswold's AdamSmithand the Virtuesof Enlightenmentin Political Theory28, no. 1 (2000): 122-30. 95. Note, I am not denying the general theoretical possibility of unbiased cross-cultural judgements. As a political theoristcommitted to liberal-democraticprinciples,I resist assertions about the absoluteimpenetrabilityof otherness and am ultimatelycommittedto the enterpriseof articulatingand defending such a perspective. But I am less convinced than others that Adam Smith's theory of conscience is the most plausible or compelling way to do this. I argue that Smith's idea of negativejustice does more work in this regard. See Knud Haakonssen's brief comments aboutnegativejustice anduniversalityin his "Introduction"to Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), vii-xxiv, at viii-x. 96. Fleischackerrecognized that Smith was concerned more with moral action than with moral epistemology in "Philosophyin Moral Practice: Kant and Adam Smith,"Kant-Studien82 (1991): 249-69, at 255-56. 97. Griswold,AdamSmith, 102; Haakonssen, Science of a Legislator;58-59; and Hope, Virtue by Consensus, 87. 98. Haakonssen,Science of a Legislator,58. 99. TMSIII.2.7 (p. 117); 2.32 (pp. 130-31). 100. TMS111.2.7(p. 117); and 111.5.6(p. 165), respectively. 101. Sheldon Wolin, "Liberalismand Conformity: The Socialized Conscience," in Politics and Vision: Continuityand Innovation in WesternPolitical Thought (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960), 343-51, at 344. 102. For discussion, see Campbell, Science of Morals, 149, 165; Raphael, "The Impartial Spectator,"83-99, at 97-98, and Adam Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 41-44; and Samuel Fleischacker,"Philosophyin Moral Practice,"259. 103. A reference again to Smith's description of the "measure"spectatorsuse when they determine the proprietyof others;TMSI.i.3. 10 (p. 19). 104. The phraseI borrowfrom Nagel, Viewfrom Nowhere, 86. 105. TMSVI.ii. 1.10 (p. 222). 106. Ibid. 107. TMSI.i.4.6 (p. 21). 108. TMSVI.ii. 1.10 (p. 222). 109. Surely some of Smith's distinctions ring true, as when he discusses variouspractices in honor societies thatwould have struckhis Europeanreaders(as they do this reader)as cruel and inhumane. See, for example, TMS V.2.8-11 (pp. 204-209) and Lectures on Jurisprudence(B) 346-47 (pp. 548-49). 110. On the circumstancessurroundingElliot's 1759 letter to Smith, see D. D. Raphael and A. L. Macfie's editorial "Introduction"to Moral Sentiments, 16-17; and Raphael, "Impartial Spectator,"90-93. Biographicalinformationabout Sir Gilbert Elliot of Minto and his relations with Smith can be foundin IanSimpsonRoss, The Life ofAdam Smith(Oxford:ClarendonPress, 1995), 113, 153, 157, 183. Forinsightfuldiscussion, see also Vincent Hope, "Smith'sDemigod,"

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in Philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment,ed. VincentHope (Edinburgh:EdinburghUniversity Press, 1984), 157-67, at 167. 111. See Michael Ignatieff, "Smith, Rousseau and the Republicof Needs," in Scotland and Europe, 1200-1850, ed. T. C. Smout (Edinburgh:John Donald, 1986), 187-206, at 201-202. See also chapter4 of his related book, The Needs of Strangers(London:Chatto & Windus, 1984; repr.,London: HogarthPress, 1990), 105-31. M. D'Alembertsur son Article Geneve 112. For example, in Michel Launay, ed., Lettrea& (Paris: Garnier-Flammarion,1967), 141-56; and Du Contrat Social; ou, principes de droit politique, in (EuvrescomplktesIII, pp. 347-470, at IV.vii(p. 458). This way of thinkingpervaded such political workslaterin Rousseau's as Considdrationssur le gouvernementde Pologne et sur sa rdformationprojettee and Projet de constitutionpour la Corse. 113. TMSI.iii.2.1-2 (pp. 50-52). 114. TMSI.iii.2.7 (p. 57). 115. See TMS I.iii.3 (pp. 61-66), titled, "Of the Corruptionof OurMoral Sentiments..." which Smith added to his text in 1790. For a useful interpretationof this addition, see D. D. Raphael, "Hume and Adam Smith on Justice and Utility,"in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, new series-vol. LXXIII (London: Methuen, 1972-73), 87-103, at 101, and "AdamSmith 1790: The Man Recalled; The Philosopher Revived,"in AdamSmithReviewed,ed. Peter Jones and AndrewSkinner(Edinburgh:EdinburghUniversityPress, 1992), 93-118. For other interpretations, see Laurence Dickey, "Historicizing the 'Adam Smith Problem': Conceptual, Historiographical,and Textual Issues," Journal of ModernHistory 58 (September 1986): 579609; and John Dwyer, "Theory and Discourse: The 6th Edition of The Theory of Moral Sentiments,"in VirtuousDiscourse: Sensibility and Communityin Late Eighteenth-CenturyScotland (Edinburgh:John Donald, 1987), 168-85. 116. TMSI.iii.3.7 (p. 64). 117. TMSI.iii.2.7 (p. 57). 118. For furtherdiscussion, see my book review of Griswold,pp. 124-30. 119. See Joseph Cropsey, Polity and Economy:An Interpretationof the Principles ofAdam Smith (The Hague, the Netherlands: MartinusNijhoff, 1957). 120. I provide such an account in my forthcoming book Adam Smith and the Circles of Sympathy. 121. Notably,TMSIII.3.21-44 (pp. 145-56); VI.iii (pp.237-62); andVII ii. 1.21 (pp. 24-47). 122. TMS111.4-5(pp. 156-70). 123. TMSV.2 (pp. 200-11). 124. See particularlyTMSVII.ii.2-6 (pp. 227-30). In "AdamSmith,"I argue that Smith saw commercial intercourseamong self-interested nationsas a way to emulatesympathy on a global scale. 125. TMSII.ii (pp. 78-91). JudithShklarrecognizedthis in passingin Faces oflnjustice (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990), 117-18. See also Haakonssen,Science of a Legislator, 83-87; idem., "Introduction,"viii-x; and my forthcomingessay, "Smithon 'Connexion', Culture and Judgment"in New Voices Explore Adam Smith, ed. Leonidas Montes and Eric Schliesser (London: Routledge). 126. TMS(p. 3). The initial promise was made at TMSVII.vi.37 (p. 341).

Fonna Forman-Barzilai is assistant professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego. She is currentlycompletinga bookmanuscripttitled Adam Smith and the Circles of Sympathy.