DECLASSIFIED E
.
eu*o,iry{a
E.u
f}SZG'
I
_'6C;^*;rt+r{ rrmu,/r
$u,}.(ovr-or-',Jr
sKL
rr
n/i',Y '19115 BY fICOl,t
o]o,u,*qi;Bx'rso 9!r-iiqrprusB,mc-9N
- tz
'+
j:q
fE'J'[ 6. J'"-_'\
rlcq4
I
lJth June,
copy No,[!-..1.
1?+5
ITo.
gf
Pages. "tr,.&
q I
Distribution
2 tr, .D
4
U. S.
Srit ish
2g-3o opzo-e( z) (via
Lt.
Pendcrgrass)
"' it c-i (vi"'r,t. col" Hilles) ("i" iriaior se-:'nnn) :z-ll i'J.;). (z)S,I'D' EttUSJ' (2) ("1*
{ Director
2 D,D,1 J D,D.4
14-35
l+ D. D. (N. s. ) 5 l.n, (uw)
Director,
Irt. Col. Johnson)
6 D.D.(4.s.) 7-B ;.u. (c.c. h. ) ( z) 9 CoI. Leathmn
c) :'U t(,
\
ilA
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EE
z * P \ 6
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notify Lrt.. Pend.ergrassr Pffi 163, tf uaaitio*l d.istribution of this publicaticir
Please
10 Chairman 11-11+ S,i,.C, (&) 15 0dr, Bacon
,
is
advisablc.
t6 car. MacKenzle
11 cdr.
Tand.Y
1B tr,t/Car. 0eser
19 Irt.Col, Johnson 20 lt[aj., Seaman 21 Lt, Ea.chus 22 Lt; Yance
2) Capt.
lrt'
Co!"ran
FehI 25-28 Ticom Ftles (t+) 24
of 0berrcgie"qg:'l]* ,-.-This ls a translation of the preliminery intcrrogrtion section of 4 s;fi'/Iu (fngIand") Tra,crrr head. of fII F, the cryptanalytic-'uu**""f, ancl of'.the follorring members of hls staff: Kapitan zur See iluPfer Lreutnant Box
I,mtsrat Schvratse ,Dipl.Ing. Sihmaltz, -this docunent should. be taken i"rlth reserve pend'ing of c,:nte,nts of the Some und'crtaken at F}ensbulr!4.
the results of tt,* "xp*rt intcrrogntion no.,.,i.being information conccr-l1ing thc Gcrman It is to be noted-'thai most of ihe and. Naval Cyrrhcr refcrs to usage vd:ich crypta.nalytio attack on Nava1 CoAe is no,,,'i out of d.ate. Ttris interrogati.on i,ras previously d"istributed'
in
Gerrnan.
al
€'<
-
\"''*
authorirvAO
u? B&l
i,
t
35ZG'
I
_!
IBJJ{SL,TI0N 0F TIS: IRm.,ru]]{,,RT ffTEIB.OG.T'IONS 0F ORR.
ols[, ci,RRrID our i"f
I
-. ---Date J.U4R) NARA t
IB,J\]OV''I
0F
l. SItr/III
T*IL
FI"aISHIRG 0N 24/25 1\L"Y 19t+5 BT Trcot[ lsi${ -:a l,Ia
TIiri.NOI/
It rvas actually in 1918 that v're tnoke into the tsritish operational systcms, thc rr0yphersr'. lfle exploitcd. ttris practical kno-rrIed.ge at the beginnlng of the !-r.arr so that vre v'rcre in a position to rea-d. them. iit the beginning of the rrar - I bclieve on 25/8/1939 - a.11 oi.phcr systems changcd, ,i\t that tinrc orx' stecngth v'ras not such that r,'rc couLd. r,-rorlc on all the mnterial received. trTe confined oursclves to the TLDMINISTR"TIVE C0IE. This l,'as a 5-figr;rc cod"e rccyphered. on a subtractor table. In a short tinre, aftcr about 8 days, vrc"hnd progressed. so far as to bc ablc to reard it casily again. /ifter a timcl in about 0ctobcr 1939 t thc pcrsonncl v,,'.ts so numerous that vre r.rcre ablc io tqkc on Nl-Vi,L, CYPIUR. By riiicl'-Ootober 1939 a few f"mpcrtant thi-ngs cn NavaL qrphcr could. be rcad.
far d.id you get in
October?
Quc_stion:
How
Tranovr:
Thcre r,,rere various,cyphers involved, for exarnplc Nava1 Cyphcr, In gener:,l irc had progressccl lrtth the S&.LL Neival Cod.e ctc. and the Qtr'FIC]lifS Tj'BtES so far that lre cou}d" rcail Ti'FLXg SItrPS pcrhaps sor:otlrn':s 5C(. 3C - 4Ar,,
Qltgstioq:
li,Iith
Tranow:
i,t tho"t tilne connection I
ho:,v
many people?
had perhaps 40 men for Naval Cyphcr., In this must point out thr,t vre d"id" n'o'c tr7ork on a"11 arcr-s, on34r those areas. that interested us, ergr North Soa and .i"tl:'ntic to South i,tk.ntic. -tfc taclclcd. thc INDIC..TORS, vrhich r,'rc brokc to a great extcnt - irO - JO/,, rn thc North Sea a"nd" r-tlantic are&s. In addition therc v,rcre thc TfORLD V'IIDX EDITIONS so thnt r;rc vrcre in a position to brcak in fbom one e.ree table to another' Until early 191+0 vre continued to vrorl< out Naglcyphcr, so thr"t it can nca1-Iy bc said. that-at thi-s timc the pcak in Ni,l/;l, CYItniR rres r,ve
reachcd".
In connoctlon ri'rith the NoR,li:J o'pcration there wers practically nothing of inportance thnt tre could not rcnd. l-trc also read. currently the p3-ans in },{arch and during thc Norsray operations
i,c
reacl evcrything almost currently.
Luestion:
Did you still
Iss{:
The organisation wes cxpand.ed
Q
have only 40
mcn?
to a consid"crr"ble extent.
Duri::g t hc Nonny business?
ues ti.o.p:
the personnel r,-ras a-lmost cloublcd.. T'ie likevrisc dirl intcnsivc r,vork on the jiIMn[ISTF,"ffiUE COD3, primarily to f ind" out thc d"isposltion of thc heavy units for rr'rhich thc i;clnininstrative Qod.el vrith its pcrsonncl a-ncL tcchnical transnctions, "rras of
franow:
"
considerable importance'
to that tine your subnrafj:res r.lso used. ll,1[.Il CYPH]R, particularly in the North Sear Thcse iliessage $ r;'lhich oomc up d"aily morc or lcss as routine, \-?crc rcnd. conrplctely' fhis situation ccntinued. mtil 2O/B/19W. /it this time r11 sys t cms becarp' {-f ig ur c, incl ucling the ;IX\'IINISTR,;TIVI CODE vrhich ,*ftcr about 6 uer:ks -t/e rr'Ierc alrcaCy UaA nttfrcrto becn 5ifigure. able to read. someflrings easily again; in N/;U;'L CIPHER r's lre}} as in NlfiL:L -}.a,* CQDI by tie end. oi Scptcrnber. In $ct;rtcr (hitherto
Up
lr^rr Ir^A
rrql t rI €nr l'l 1 .lz'r.:re,\ th,.r ireve -u',fefff snlit'
fm.
-
r v\.J
i_)rrcrrng t hc adCresscs. n ccrtnin *o*1 Thi; nrt urrl}y cruatcd ditri"*tv'ro" uu, ioi"tiiiJ to be of grcat iirportnncc,rhe[ ,r"s not such rs ,:l_ furthur strcngthcned'' ft r,"." oncc thc organisatton Lncl bcr,n Lnry u,,
:.'' Q
uestion:
Ttrat rvas
in Octobcr
tcmporary phenonnexion.
1940?
Etr,
Tranor,ri ycs, I belicvc it .r,ras Octobcr 1st. Puestion: Ho,y long d.id it take you -to gct in.;o it again? Tr,..ncr,,r. ft r;rs mcrc or the ear\y mtde some.r,rhat 1i":^:irf,*Hin$, mor, aiffi"ult fo, u".- stagcs thnt the r,iork Q
ucs
tion:
Tranorir: y9g, i,rc rr-*cro rcc.iuir?g
194o T h'rd **rhnps 150to rccovci__,:1".o,d. position, r_t *"r.-"*pioycd--in this
thc
cnd. of.
orgr.nisation" rhcn in Janur.ry iiu-".'"i;d;#fi*_?.1 lras introd,rcd. This, :..;";h""il"ginning,rliDro:?.R Groups causecl us considcrable troublc, since rr"_not oJtJlri"rr_rar"tir"r_you N,iuit Cy?litR and" g6DE, rr*a changcd ":uld" ii ;;.; gooci four ur*"L" before -iltj" could read then ."oa j-ng ,*; il";rmparisonwe ?g?ir,, trqt he previoo" po"iii;;;; v,rit h ;;";i,iry of vrh*t wc lu,ii. read hi_thcrto. Then on l/g/+l the Il,DIclroRS ,n"1?,:!o.rrged cgain and. &_figme i" ;iiXffi " i' r' cvernn mrs-r.. Br,r "*s ::, .. ^ _u . q ues t ion was t he r:nin n otirr^ t gr,, u#";:""iffi ;-ort*,.ol!"o[i establish' bearjrrg. cer{ain'f*,,,f*;* "p-i:ff in mind *i",,o" could- group t.,gcther as beIongi"s. to lh"_urri t"y, Ci*"Irr*nge eased the situation f,or o" In,"t *-rrJi"-*o", abre :? thc to reLrrl 4c * 5q,again, Ln compe.rison vrith up to 0ctober. "fr"ri"i"riod Wg rqaci then easily..rp to the *nd.of^p:cqrbcr 1gi!:_^_-0n, l/tz/t981 ,,re rr"J-" ,,pirr"h,, I think, m;ri-l c'In fron, ronnuor" TI* anx "? cyphc"l:g.T;bI""* (*"trrr";tilr,rittcI), only thc cu,;ls.c1ld. -g.gt '?t (aook)' si."out r-or f or oursclvcs, .urscI.r,^^ .,r of irnportr"nce,, "i" n*a lrorkcd';;i"i our rt ---vrLs not
it"
it:;i}tr3 ff*:iitr:
.
fn--January 1942 therc_rt:_* in aLl cr:ilcs, Nirvirl cyl*ER and N*vJ,L_6m""""'Ii'r' "lr,rpt"te changr: clays -v,re had got so far,ith N/"lAiL CODE as to be aUlc to"rer,tisorirc of it. v,rith N,v;;t cyplmR. rTi.th fl."-ioti*r r.rc hact- It ryas otherl.rise _ Jan,aa"ry lglrT orrr,rarc.s rorori utn"o'|.ri."f*ng"a your "o**,difriculty frequentiv. Th-c volLm" Key Tables very very much rcss, but in ;i r;;ri".. i1 N.yr,L cyi,run hac. beconie rcad sor.rc cf it. "pii*-"i:irri" ir-;;;;"1i"#"*" r,re still
Qggstiog: jlJj$..xll!.; fra'nol'r: Q
r.rcstion:
Tranoi,r:
if
vou
r,-,rcre
dcpcnded on rrhcre
i.lri"^r"
trilho c1cci.,.cd.
in d.ifricuhies
you_
had recor..irsc to
our p:-rticu..r-rr o,rc*.tional intcrcsts
irhieh pcrsonjiel shcuici i,/ork on y-hich
areas?
ml^ ^ ! r-rrrcr.u vv&S
--L
f-tJ/ COnCCfn, Of CI:C f was given orrLers by Control as to r",trich"arl";_-:;;"; the Qporational
-'ucstio*:
Did. you
Q
rcceivc thcsc instructions ilircctly fr.oitr th; .Ii.qh
W!Ts,?cyuvN>tr; II -W*aZ&l,i-qrnv oardrssY.Ilsa
Colrr.nnd?
,s
DECLASSIFIED F euno,io/a-D I 3S?G' I
.
_'K;@
?
No, by the
trancnr-:
HeaC'
r:f the
Dcpartrnent
{-tt-
(l'lteitgngschef)'
the NAVi'I' CYFIIIR for AngloriJ'S' trrffic ?han in October 19ir-1 ,,las introd.uced.. fhe traf:lic in 'i;his Naval. cypher ';rras at first lrrcre Fing your old' system, sIightr, but we discovered ttrat )rou -vnas in force up to Janwry 191+1. indicator,.,ihicir t#;Ih )-figr:re You mean
Qgqst*oFr Tranolv:
'it
l'ias reintrod.ucecL?
aftcr iL short tinc that thls codc turnec,. or-rr special attentir:n to ire l,tra.s used f or convox-escorLs receiverl" rre it and" in spito or tu" slight amount of rnaterial had" progressed- so far in I'ebru'-,ryr4[arch 1942,that I bc]ieve.the in thc North /'tlantic traffic of evcry oonvoy sailingr-rl.heth,:r .;rhorever thc Cod"e v'ras usccl, pr"cific ana Souikr,ttla.niic, or the eould be rcad. In many caiJes the.convoy schei*rr1es could llIso be rulil in goorl tinc. othcr 1 In Junc 1)42 t;;.c srmc inclicrting systcm as f or theiiile ccntinuecl gave us no trouble. i Cira".'i*s- in'rto.l.uced, ftris an i to f uita up thc Sod.e, ri,Ie bioke the }
Qg"gli.on:
yes.
sinoe we establisheil
got yor"r pi:rsonnel?
Yrlhere cl"id" you
a' short c"urse Tranovt: Service pcrsonnel r,vith forcign languagcs had" -a::::' il.rtr.vrn up for lrcrc of tr...inihg. The necessary instructions this. The acrsonncl all c:rrne fron the NavX' Qtrnetlcn:, Horr long diii 'che cout'se k st?
Tranour: -Questio4: Tr,alrow:
r',bout 6 -":eeks.
they diij" not conre from en;. particular .So ri,le
sourrce?
took 'pereorurel fron activ'e servicc.
Q-Eestion: Did. you
aJ-r,,rays
gct thcrr, er wes thsre cliff iculty?
Tranol,r: There i,verc ahv:rys administrative iiiffi-culties. It vras not aluvr.ys easy'Lr: prcve to a lalrmrrn thc necessity for employing ab,out 100 pcople in one pxrticular sphcre. One only f ou:d. tu'rclcrstrmding for ihis with ottets o\iln Dcpartr,rental ii iirris not cj,r$y to f inii sympathy in the adrninistration Chief, but -ffcrc trcedecl on active service too. Some of thosc as thc uien vrho lrad" to be withrlra-r'.rr fron th* front 'lilere speci-a1i.sts. ,r.ilvent o:1 the nc,.' nnd, bri"fly trninccl ;crsonncl we again nrade progrcss with the rlecyphcring of NtiV;'L 00DE anrl" Ni.Vi-L Sf?imR {J.$.e,. e i,e. cf thc Convoy-Cyphcr, so that lre \ircrc
lliih thc
frecluently LbIc to
jrtlantic (in
i^ri:ich
::eo.d all ttrat.intcrcsted us in ttrc r,nicstcrn iipprcachcs and- Halifax
thc
North
thc [Convoy Sniling?' tclcgrar-is from Ncvr York r,,icrc uscful to us) so quickly that r,'re c,f tcn hrc'i :;ur roui'ine ti:lcgrams r *.6,.snr^+i.rn
4fl
amd"
hr,rrnq
{ n ndrrrrrrtn-
F F--
DECLASSIFIED
euno^tyLD
ftu
i 35ZG'
NARA Date
"6 '+.---'
to the beginning of June 1943 .,i'te rrere vireIl in the picture., Difficulties that came up fr:om time to time ,rere part3.y ov()rcome. ltIe could read" the Convoy-Tables for I,,LjRSIGS system, lvhich we also took up in thc Spring of 1942c
Up
Ihis l\LERCilJ[T Ni.VJ,L, C0DE vras a 5-figr:re code rurd a 4-lctter. cod.e. Convoy-signals for stragglers lrere given in the l-figr.rre cod.e and this eocie adcled to the othcr, go back a bit. During our d-ifficulties in 1942, the time vrhcn the indicators rrere recypherecl., we had the
I must
INTffiDIP/,-RT$,ffi\ITI.I., CiyPHItR, trpon r,vhich lre began rvork about the middle af 1940 rnil irhict] :rc ,/erc son:ctimes ablc to rcac1 up to '100'',,. Sincc "bhis r,iLs aLso uscd" r,,rithin thc Nrvy by hearry: units in ihc Freetov,nr area, it gave us an fus'ight into the
moverrcnts
of
sonc
of
Lhe heavy
movements. T?ris r,uas a 1ink. in forcc up to thc cnd of 19)+2,
units
and.
thus into
convoy
tr{TEBXTE?iR1},I[B{T.:L CFF}ilffi. vras
Fron mid. (94] onv'rards lre no lonpler read, ITJ:.1I/,L CYPllT.. d"idr hoviever, break keys, 0n'Llre othcr hancl wc continued" to clecypher'and" rend, the Ni'll,L ffiDI up to Deceurbar 1)\J. 0r: l/lz/t943 t|ne srm{crL suB?F:'"croR systcn was introd.uced" f or NAV;"L C0DX, c.nd. for N|.V;,I CYPI{ilR on 1/l/l9/+, i,tre i,icrc for a short time able to beacl t his systcm in N,r,l[',L C0DE, but af tcr the Book itself cheLngcd. :,re brol;e tnto thc recyphcring systcn but did not nana"ge to rcail it. From this timc on r-,re rced the 'rlle thcn continuofl IvIERSI$S CODE vrith its convoy-tablcs currcntly. to r.rork on less irnportant (klcincre) systcms - FITXET CODE, tr*u coastal systeirrs, L0X0, C0F0X, ctc. - and" Iater, aftcr'thc invasicn thc Combinod British - U. S.:i, /"S$,ULT CODX, TIe partly rcacl then. 0n the othcr hi,nd l*e readr the ninor systcr:s cur::entIy to thc end,. Thl'"t is the best survey I can give from rneuloryr
ii,re
,
Position at thc bcginning of
'1944:
Mr.1I"L CYPIflR and. N,.V,,L C0DE, 3T.,n:'jT
CODE
no longcr
rcnd".
rc.icl
M}ASIGS COFOX
mx0
Iffmii
. tho
last
il
TOXO
two no longer read
currently,
since t he volrxre
of nuterial
had clecreased"'
There is one point luith regard. to stafftroubles, Conditi-ons r?erc ch.:nijed. from 1942 ovri.ng to the fact that r,re introd"r.ced" the Hollerith systcn, Before this rre had. worked.
ty
hand".
gggi!.rpq: Dicl you rvork with thc Hollerith
Companfl
gfapotrr No, the Navy hail its or,rn nachines and tocJ< i:vcr trained- personnel from the Hollcrith 0orapany. fhr: specialists vrcrc service personnel and. wo took thern from active service for this puf,poser
DECLASSIFIED RurhoriwLc
t3SZe
j,&(io* *-Trarp,rj. Q
uestior.c
Tranovrr: Q
ues
tion:
.Esegr Q_u?
s
tloJr:
TUlnow;
.- . ' .-'ri=.rIilTf$.--__!,@
I
I-lu
,-
I
-/1
+tr+FJ ircro scrrrLce pcrsonncl only fron the irTavy? t.
IYo, a-l-so from thc .i,rtJy. and" G,,,.F.
Feoplc, in fnct,
l-,4:o had. r,yorkeC-
in
j_t?
Iesr.,re iook then frorn all sections of the arnccl forccs. Dicl you not hnve :rny ,rpinchesil af tcr ,,pri1 1y"4? I'To,, no
l,ile pinched. an iiss.i,u],T c0DlI cncer.
1on5;r
j-:: forcc,
r
but 9 d"ays la.ter it
uas
can you'to]-l- us sonethi-ng about tne beglnning of 19L5p hol,r the Detartrnent was ptrt out of action fy tfre iarious ivithaic*,ratsf were bonJ:ed out in Bcrli;: at ttrc enct of 194J anc, novcd" then to Ebers;,ra1de" Beforc that we 'r,verc 1o,J.ged. in itre orriccs on the
trTe
"'*
?irpitzufer in Berlin,
ltol1eL:ith machines i;o thc rc.
ti;Ie turci trun*F*r.;a;';";;-;i-;;" Ebers-iuiald.c r,nc1 r,,e took orrr lrrterial
"if
?sgs.!,lqs:
Diil it
prenry_:-
No, some cl c,cr::ucnts i;rcrc 1ost, but -rrc tnd storcd. somc reserlrcs in the /'rckrarrcsr so that the intcrruption of the 1-rr-rrk 1.7*= as grcat :Ls it;.right hr,vc becn, Naturally lrc vc:rc out ofrro* actiori fc.. about a r,,rcel< after the r,ove, ett.
(luqg[io.g:
'trorc ycu thon f uLIy r;perrtivc aftcr. tlr.rt?
qr&pry':
Yes r,ve
c:\usc you
m,1uly
carrieil on qs
inturruptions?
bcfr:r.e.,
in Tirpitzufor.l
.Questioq:
niCr, 'or.r.-lc:,re i;h.e ba.sie il.ocunients behind"
Tranor'r:
No. in t'rc n.rchj-\,cs in r bor.rb-proof ccll.rr on thc
Q
r+egtionl
Tranr:t4
liI'nc
rc t s i;lri. t?
0n the Kuserclami*, ne.rr the vrircl-:,.ir-l riiast Brctschnciclerstrasse
5/7, near the l,ilitzlebci: strtion Q
ues-tig.!3:
.Trancl:,rt
],icsscc1.u:r:"...
-vtrhat
clso
and
silk incluutri"s
}{ousel
in the e::uhiraes? i,11 thc work? No, not the entirc ril:,terirI, or,ly those d.oow*qrts r,,rhiclr seemec.,important to us ancl'co l,ih.icti vc coulcl refer both for the later training of ,o:rsonnel m:l in ihe even.b of changes. (r+e rert) all signers routines and. all forms of cypher r* th"y io,l b"".r' cl.icL
you lcrLve
v'rorked. ou.t"
Question:
Did. you lel.vc
,Tranolr:
No, oniy thc inportant
-Q uestion:
Did you leavc ;:crsonal papcrs too?
.Tra.noJ,t:
1'[c
the tc:;ts of our
si-gnaIs?
oncs,
no lonrrcr hav.e thcrii for thc cntire pcrsonncl: it too frcguently. r^lo have no records oi indivicluals*
changcd.
In nberswalilc ve lrorked, in this form up ta 1/2/1gt+5" Thcn camc the rccluction of tl':,e r0lclr', ii:c tr.arrsfer from there to r^"uricir Lnd- 1;hcreby a cernsj-cieral:Ie d"ccreasc in thc pcrsonnel.. Thcre werc *ilI about 275 peoplc in thc Rcseo.roh Section, but tir.rt .,zr.s al]- t'frcrc l,',r.s.
z\t)
Fjar
;i
.ll
ARA
did you Leaye bchiniL in Ebcrslrclde in thc
r^ray
of
mnchines
,
Trancn''r: Half of thc liollcrith
machinos vere latci' brought oycr tc Ruclolstad't via Raf,hon61,', th.ab is to say trreyl,r5ni to r,pold.r, ancl f rom
'
:-pc.Icjr. t c, Ii ud.ol.ctaci t.
Qtlcsli?n: flapovr:
you :rcntioncd
tr*E thc Hollerith r.nchines? one hrl-f in.,urich ancl thc othcr half in Rudolstad.tp e.[. a1I of those betr,rcen rncl
{polir-r. Euc,rolstri.t, no card._ind.cxcs, only the :rachincs. .
,r"r"-"oif""I"a.
rjle
had"
capt'Kupfc{:rt v'qs rqy ir:tcntion to havc only 250 peopre in iiiilhernshaven i'iittr.the-Depar';nent. It soon iurned-oui thrt I could. not stay in r,-iilhclnishaven r,,iif.h t-!e hr-1ge leparthcnt u*"*"*o.y fo, , Supreme Conrniurd of, the_Navyr so I moved to ,.,urich, The staff . lrcre in:-po1da for a short time, l.s thcy hacl first to scttlc d.or,-ur: thcar courcl not start worrc. i(hcn r was trnnsferrud to :'urrich I h..d. r.icrc roorn and r,ras able; tc hav.e the ut".ri-"o""i t" 'riurich, so no rrork at aIl ";ras d.onc in Rucl.olstad-t. wtren I got the opportunity to asscmble thc nep*rtment I d.icL so. Quelst-ion: so
nruch
for Rudo1stac,.i,
Trapoly: /,t thc bcginning of .i,pri1
us everything fron :.,urich.
Qqcstion:
Dict
r-nd. nor.,r
.rrc iiiovecl"
the othcr hr.-rf rc,rin ;t
Tranow:
ycs.
Question:
So you hcre?
for thc qork in /,urich. to
Ncwrlrcnstcr, b,king with
riuc'rorstar:t?
lcfl: ihc rmchincs in 1{ermruenstcr
Trc-novr; Ycs, not qrdtc h.,rlf
an,J
the p-rsonnel
came
of, ,lhr, p,;1,senncl- camc hcr"cr
.Questi-oB: Dicl. the othcr harf st*y in
Ne
ur*uenster?
Tranow: Yes, cncl the3r rrcrc discl:.,rrgcd thurc. cltrestion: You r,rerc in Xbcrsr,rtlde up to 1st F.:brrnry, and C.ic.l not havc mr"nh wirrk af icr t hn.t clatc? ?ran,owj vrle still d.id" 61cCc1 rir:rk onthe LlJIisIGs cod"c ancl rced. tr*h^ minor systens currcntly.
'
F I'
;Cl^*ffi Question:
Tl')--
p,nL zS/l/+5.
Well, now tlrat we have e:ra.mined. the subject from a more or less historj.cal angle perhaps we can begin t, look at it geographically, in order to ]earn in vrrtrat forrn and in what uray the signals or intelligenoe rer"rched. ycu, and in what forro and
ln what way they were passed. on.
TRANOII
lfe had" ((at our disposal)) a ]arge proportion of ttre outstations, th€ ilIPHS ( (main naval Vf stations) ). I beliove you a.re in the picture as regards organisation. The naterial v,rac intercepted by these stations, and., in sO far as it was d.ecypherabloe that is to say, in so far as rve had. broken into the system in question, the Ttr/T message. would be passed. at once hy T/P.
gu_estj.qq:
Did the nrateriaL come d.irect from each station?
Ansvrer:
The material r{as so extensive that, aE our T/P lines rvere not rurrnerous, we could. not alIow oach flT message to be passed. as a whoIe. The general practice yras to have tho firsttwenty or thirty groups sent; we vrould then ascertain whether we were in a position to d.ecyptrer the remai-nder of the rressage too, and, when that v,las the case, we would instruct tile (dA) station to send. it
.B$L9I: Oberreg. Rat
i-nrred.iately.
0*e
stion:
Answer:
this No. It
Yfas
due
to lack of teleprinters?
not considered desirable to s,,rel-I the TA unnecessarily. In general, it .r,vas sufficient to have the first fwenty or thirty groups of the messages. tr7e kept ourselves to what vras essential, and. limited. the Tf traffic accor&lngly. was
organi-sation
Question:
time uras allov,red. betrreen the interccption signaLs by the out-stations and their reception at
How much
station?
of the this
Ansv{er:
We confined. ourselves to what vl"ae feasible, thus, as I have alrea$r stated, vre d.ifferenti.ated betrlreen iruportant and uitimportant theatres of war. trYe knew which vrere the more or less funportant systems (Verfahren) and. keys (Sch1tissel), and. m"ssages irr- these we passed to the front. ParticuJa"rly i.mportant messages were given the priority grad.e trKRtrr ard would, reach tle specialist concerned. v,iithjn an hour or an hour and. a half, Oenerally speaking, hov,revgp, this was impossible. The.rurnrber of Y,I/t messages was so great that they were sent out in series. The Tr& lines occasionally had. other oornm:i-tments, so that v're had. to allow for trryo or three hours in aI}.
SrLestion:
And so what happened rvhen you had. sigansl importanee?
Answer:
In that
of ryeciaI
case yre gave ord.ers for the remainder of the nessage to be sent too, vrhieh worrld take about an hour, 0n oceasions, wo also asked by telephone. When work oh a rnessage r€vealed. that we would be able to dec5pher the rest of lt as well as the first twenty or thirty
E.' .{urncnrv2;'J | ))
je(
NARA D^r,
v{
-t/
-a-r*:1F
-2-
I
t74
ic
c\l
f-tu
groups sentr'we d.id not delay aslring for the relnaincler we had deoSrylrered e1l fhe groups a1ready sen!.
until k
Ouestion:
You only decaphered
AnsgEs:
Yes.
into Eng:*str text?
A11 the textp were ln English. Directives were given to n:e every dqy on the reLative importance of the initividual subjects. If a decyplrered rnessage was cons{dered. i-r:rportant, it wou}d. be trnssed to n'c at onpei I would look through lt to qvaluate its i:uportance ftrcun a niI-itary aspect, and wouLd. then pass i'.' !o the.I-mno*iate
lnterpretation Party (sofortausvrertun3) (rfr fr), whence a Gerttan translation wouLd. be passed .rn ii\,itho{t delay. Other l'f/t messages, nvtrictr were less i:.,1-,ortant, were rrvritten out during the course of the cri"y onto sheets of paper, one after the other, and the pages lrare issued. as they were oorapleted" Carbon copies I'{\..re r&dc of these, and. they vrere handed. over to the sections concerned., to the convoy speciallst, for instance, or to the East Coast Specialist, accord.ing to the contents of the message. Quqqti.ol:
Stil1 in English?
Ansvrerl
There is something to be added. here. Ihe d.ecoder only had. in front of hirn the code as worked. on up to the previous day. With this he could submlt the message in English only, As an intermodiate stage the message then generally wlnt to the code specialist (coaelearbeiter). fhe latter tried. to fill in arqr textuaL blanks that migltt occur i:r the rjlessage.
O+estion:
Tfere there never arqp problems
Answer:
No, At the most, specialists
Question:
Dld you really see over;rthj-ng that was
Answer:
In gereral, I saw the most important decSrphering results at once. In ad.dition, I had the whole of the d.ecyphered. material subiilitted" to me each morning, so that I could.
Yes,
of translErtion? would. cor,re from the various
sections and. ask us hovr we would translate a particular text into Gern:an, TIe never d.id. any d.irect translations.
keep
in
rai-nd.
d.ec;rphered?
a general picture of the situation.
Qrestion:
Did. you work throq,rghout
Ansrrer:
The organisation worked. throughout the 2l+ hours froia begiruring of the war to the }ast months.
Qqe
sti-og:
Did. you have
a
the 2h }rorrrs? tkre
d.eputy?
ARsrrer:
The heads of the watshes were there in my abserrce. Each section had. its head (teiter) who dinected the work,
Qrieg!im:
Hotu
Ans^rer:
I[e generall;r worked.'8 horg ] everrirgs, j n:ights.
*Ouestionr
How maqg did.
were tire d:rty period.s allocated? According to the usual naval v,ratch systera?
shifts, in the 6v6!,t,,.r J daysr
a watch consist of?
\
f-t'tAnswer:
fpt depend.s on the eode, As thlngs rrere at the end., alout B0 raen per watch.and code, raiher less for the
Ansvrer:
for the Naval C;rpher. Iou r.rean the total figure for a watch? Yes, thc total ru::-rber per code.
Question:
Perhaps we. could. note the
Naval Cod.e, rather rnore
Que
stion:
figure for
(Abteilung),
"Ansrriler:
each section?
I'RANKFURT (Naval Cypher No, 3). In Spring of there were a }lttIe more than JOO people. 80-90 to a'4J watch;. nur.'rber.reached,r-for a short perii:d, *u" j6O. ]F-^g:_"9e_st MIINCIEN (N1ry.l Code). At an estir.ate, 2bO nren, about bo to a rratch. rfith the Naval code we used. to d.ifferentiate 'between working on the Record_ing lables for
Auxiliary vessers ((sic angrice)) in trre British coastal area and NORTH on those of the reraaining -and Referent 0b1tn. ships in areas +rl+N'rrqr 1, 2 ard. j) KOLLIII?Z used. to d.eal vuith the coastal area, 'The j:ai:iediate evaluation of -this cypher system was done at the BRiTGES out-station, and-
Stre
%
stion:
Answer:
later at WILIELMSFIAVEN.
W?rat
about the training?
The personner r,'las trained. posted- to tirese stations.
at the }{igh cor,rnand., and flren
*O- tre stion: Answer:
s?
After
d.ecarphen:rent,
the material was sent to us complete
for f\rrtirer treatment;
itself
*Question:
Did the station
/i4s-vrer:
its research'stations for this Iiour mar4y people worked. in BRUGES?
Question:
BRUGES
have out-statio4s?
had.
sector.
.
Angr,rer:
0n d.ec;phering (Entuifferung), about
-0re stion:
Did. you have BRUGES?
Answer:
a
sharLow
!0
organisation here
The lrhole nrateriar yra.s gone over again
stations-were controrred. from
this
end.
people,
for
v,rcrk d.one
in
here, and. the outv,rithlut exception.
Questi-on:
lirltrat abou! raechan:ical research?
44s{9x:
i,ie startcd. ,,:echanical .lrork on this strff about May, ,L2. At that period. we still d-epend.e c1 on &n existing navar' HOLIaRrrH organisati-otr in mnutr, and we suppried. personnel to this organisation. Tichnicar opl-rations and. technical control y,rere d.j-rected. frcr.o this Lrganisatj-on, high-grade clerk at our ena,as uoor,-untr*rE[ea witrr 4infornratien on tlrese rnders, vrhich lvas neees*o"y fo" directing the 'work. Othermise, he recelved. prleisely formrlated tasks. \r/e have only rlpne thls pait of the work ourselves since EmRSwrr,rE. w" ttren ionirolled. these affairs directly, ancl fron thet point o" ii"rr SCHIWAIZ has been in this servicc.
%
*
ql
,auuonry
Ii'K* l--
L-J ARA IDate
Qreptl.gg:
:h
T,,
1ro)
Can you periraps e:qrlain ho,r yr:u d.ealt
with the SISNCIL
STIETRACTON SYSIEM?
4rflrer:
(Oipls. tng. SCiUaf,Z) In this conrection, I only received. set tasks fron the cryptogr.rrphio. section. I r,ras less oceupied. with the stencil itself than ruith figure data (Zahlenunterlagea) that I rec.eived. frora the cr;rptographia station, and on
which O.r*estj.on:
Angggr:
Oberreg. Rat TRAI{OTI
I
worked..
And how d.id you
get on vlith it, 0berreg. Rat
tRAN0'if?
i'ie vrould. take a partiorlar section out of thc *ateria1, giving us a rrJfifier of !-f/T nessages, l-lhich vucre sent to Herr SCHIvIALZ; he woul.d treat the cyplrer groups in the way thc ctX,ptograplelc rescarch section consid.ered nccessary. It vras up to SCtlrlU,Z to &iscover the best vlay to carry cut the allotted tade as quickly as posslble.
(Entz:ffercr) knerv Iittle of the vrorking of the HOTTflRITH rnchines. Prcviously, thc H0LIERITH station would. just get a batch of material ancl had to
The crSrptographer
it. 'r'fe.s this gucccssful? Yes. fhe cryptographer is, generally speaJcing, bound. to discover the recarptrering system in the end. To start with, hc knows nottring; he is in possession of groups of figures, and. aLl litis r:rateriaL hc has tabulated accord.ing to groups. lTe trled. to collate the i:rrterial received. fror.i the d,ifferent .lreas accor&lng to recipients. The HOLIERITH.station then reccived. this r::a.teria11 arrl estabfi.shed" repeats of groups or ar\y other outstand.ing characteristics. Then the cryptographer takes this tabulated" data, and., e:can:ines it for vrhat can be got out of it. If nothing co:res outl he has'the uraterial treated. froni d.ifferant aspects, arrd e:raraines it afresh. The work continued. in this rin:nncr, until we arri.red at the conclusion tha.t this l,-ras npt the oLcl rec;rphering table but a system in ivhich the rec;pher only ren:ained in force for one day. ;vork on
"&,EEis!: Ansrarer:
Frorn that point on, the ::raterial -was collated. d.ai1y, orC.er to be examined. on rt daily basis. .Qge-q!ii-s:
Are any recortls of .bhi.s trork availai:le?
Inqlrpg:
No.
Nothlng
in
is availablc.
Diplo, Ing. qcr{\(4r3.
Fuq+iiq!:
Anything available r.rust be h:rnded ovcr.
Answer:
fhe II0LIEBITH installation in lOUldiNS$R i:arclly got to the point of starting v,rork ovrir.g to internrptions in the supply of electricit;r.
euestlon: ,*
r'ire argr kind.s
Ansrnrer:
I had. orders to d.estro;- record.s. fn so far as they nere_.avail_able in dup}icate, they were d.estroyed. in lBindiNSgEB and the rlr,rainder rrcre rles'uro;red hero at once,
of rcci:rd.s availablc at ell?
FqAuuontvz-vt
r2!s_
I
',jffixa@ a
_
5
Qrestiol: fuiswer: O-berreg. Rat
fiD
T-tv
l-,Ihat about Type )(?
Generally speaking, we intercepted. the naterial in ord.er to learn the extent of the trafflc, and the ainount to wnich figure c;rpher went over to T;ryex, but there vras no question
ryNs
;I""H"'Hlii ""lo*:lu:f'-",*ilr*1,:?:T:";1,il."Tffi' denrand"s
I
trfoulcl you have been
tues-lion: SIgggI:
men were very h:lgh. take on vtroroerxr In the
of the front for
'was ccmpellocl to JSo nen and, JS" wol:Ien.
orlr
Fbom 19&2 end" I had.
able to break Typex v,iith enough staff?
I e:azmined. the question at the tii:re ((or: once)) of vrhether to attack this probleir with a larger staff in view of the man power sltuation. Work on the machine vvould have necessitated. so large a staff that other riore essential rilitary ctrplrer.systens vrould have suffered. thereby. r,fe had. no captured. machine, so that l.re had. to refrain one could afford.
fro:: this
rvork.
.Question:
You expressly said.
,Lnswgf
No. Never.
:
Qqgsiion:
Did. you
that you never
achrally have your
working und.er you?
savr
a Typex nachine.
own captunecl
-:l
material d.epartment
i ;
Ilrere was no specia} section (AUteifurie); if anything was found.l it vras passed, if possible, to the naval sections Kapt.z.S.KUPtrER (Steften), A special collecting organisation for these find.s d":id. not exi.st.
AnEgtrI:
Qr:estj-on:
Areggr, Quqsli.og:
Ansyel: Obemeg. Rat rFANgr
_
Are no d.ocunents available
?
-
A11 d.ocrurents have been d.estroyed", not a single piece of paper was -Left. I clo not knorii rrhat was left in ffiRLIN.
in AP0LDA either? There tre no d.ocur:ents teft in /iPOIDA. lrt tire nost there night be sonethirg rer,raining at the I,IESSEDAI{, ffiRLIN. I had. a vrlrole lot of docr"Erents at the fuI0SSEDAili, even Wfi messagqs in tlm sane fornr in lvhr-ich they.were-d.ecyphered.. 'There r::ay be a few docunents in APOLDA or RUDOLST.TtrDT. Nothing
QuestiS:
Ylirere lroul-d thaL bc?
Ansrrer: K]MMR
In RUD0LSTIIDT, r,uybe in :\IWEI,ST.AIDT. I r.icnti-oned. this morning that I vranted. to carry out a group of historical tasks iJr APOLDA. These lyere never startecl. ffe never iaoved into HEIDECI(SBLBG.. The people used to coue to the clothlng-office in APOIDA and. .rvere then posterl -bo AURICH. The transfer of the r.rachirery was read"e by the secti-on interested" in the i:rachines, vrithout our particil:ation.
Quesj9iogr
Are th6re.by any chance d.ocur.rents
Anmlerl
All d.ocurents were brought to AIJRICH. There nray be work regulations in.the clothing office in APOLDA.
Kapt. z. See
Diplo, Ing. SOHI(AI,Z
in the ISIDECIGBUBG? sor:e
i
i I
i
i
, raurnonwa._r
l J) lyl
j,KNA@
I
ir*
I-w
-6 alrq,gliqs:
'lile d"o
It
A$ggert
not know who brought the nackines to
was an
officer
on
EUD0LSTAIT.
the reserve - Oberltn,
MICHAELSEN
-
who was transferrcd tlrere. , He laay be there stiL1, as tlurt was his home. At the end. of lfrarch' :,'re lost contact
with the station (Stette),
}eft
in
iusE!&!:
l{'as noth:ing
Ansv"ler:
No, Nothing r,vas left in RUDOISTi'JIT; irl AURICH everything ltas either burn'i; or brouglrt elong he re. The only place trhere there i.iiglrt stiIl be clocunents is in the MESffiDl,.M, BnRI,lN. We h"ad large zr.rchives therc - about 200 cubis i'"etres in tire ]-orrler cel"lar - in tho BIfiTHSCHIffiIDERSISIA$SI (at the K,fSEnnr/ile{ undergrounrL station oppositc ths Li'alr buii-d"ing;s).
0berreg, Rat rRAI\Iolif
Que
stion
:
l&gssr: Kapt, z.$ccr
trl-as
betuinil.
arry order issued
R[[)0LST*iOT?
for the tb.ings to be destroyed.?
f
gave orclers to 0b1t" JOS'I either to d.estroy ttre naterial on receiving, rry ord.er or, in tl:e case of d.anger, tr: d.estroy it on his ovyn initiative anrl responsibiJ.ity.
KiiPTER
9ilselisg, Ansi'rer:
Di<1
I
you give
viras
that
order?
unable to give the order for the r.nterial to be
d.estroyed..
QsgEIies: {U}SwEg!
0b.. Reg Rat fzu,mi{
Nolv
for traj-ning.
At first, HR JJr, tii0ir/iA dlrected" the training, for about p r:ontht, starting er.t tire enrl of 1942" Previous to that, we ci:iriccl out tl^re tralning 'i,vitiri-n the d.epartnrent. .J[lren fernle staff cane into the office, thp s"baff r,ras syste::"atically instr.r:..:tccl in a J v,reeksr cor-trsc on .such pcrints as:ri:r'l:at qloe s a "i{/T n}essage look like, what Croes thc cS4pher k:olc lihe, liovu are the lrrrliviclual categories to be registered.. It vras only relatively ci,.sual instruction. At thc beglr:ning of, r&J, .oning to the riifficultles of the syste:n ancL thc conseguent large increase of i:rcrsonnel, the trainin;; of i;he nen becaue nore systet:atic, and- bore r:ore particularly on the systcms the iirCividu,r] ,ren had to uork on. Copics cf, o1d. 'it/T n*teriaL vrcrs given to the school, anCL later, ;.ortcrjal we hacl prepared ourselves; they were given the coiLe, ancl hacL ti: .rvork on tlre relevant c;ptrers (Schluessel),
training last?
Queqteqn:
Hov long clid
Anwuer:
:ibout six v'leeks, anr,i "i;1mn they joinec. the vratch antl" r^ient through.all the sta.g,les of Ll.ri: vi:rk ancl reilained ,rt one stage or c;ther a.cc*rctlng to qualifications ancl *ptitude.
Qq.qqli-qp:
:lrc
,\qqge{r
Ies, a fevr are stiLl av:lilable"
!ssElls.:
llc would. like to talk to the peoplc
sono people sti11 avai}ible who proved. sui'ted, to cr;rptography?
ivh.o
particularly
d.id
that
rvork,
7
a \)
t,q.
t
Ans'lver:
Question:
have hard.ly }ny neople here any longer who r,,rorkec} on {e FR NI{3URT and I{uNCmN, because on}y L{0RSrGS and" the ninor systens rvere to be worked on in lmmvii-fl\srER. Dr, THOl\t\ nas left behind., Aiirtsrat sclnrAm rrvas takenalong for MERSTGS" c9u1d- you perhaps *or.F soi.ie people trEANi(FilRT ancl I',iUNCIfrN?
with
particularly
concernecl
Answer:
The cryp'bographer:s thei:rselves?
-
Questien:
qho particularly ri.istinguishecl thei.iselves, even f?oplu if they are no longer l':ere, ancl give appropriate- cor.ments.
"ilnswer:
The people were i,rostly eo:iplIec1.
specialists.
The
list is
being
(Inooi-prehensible questiori o::itted.). .\rlqrirer:
Aratsrat scilul,m 'is-
here, Kapt. IIERMu\I\N had no c1e-5xrty.
After his d-lsririssal, rtatsrat scu'r'lim took his place for a fer,;
c1ays.
Ouestion:
rs there anyone here who coulc. give us a picture of the Ry""1"1, situetion? Can you te11 us briefly soi.:etkring aDout 1t'/
Answer:
on R:-ssian c;rphers in the year ,33, Up till had. been no cryptographic u.r""*"", Tiren I vvent to sv'IrNEivi{l\TDE wit}: the task- of }earning Russian and Polish, breal
k
I started
then th.:re
''r:t/T rrcssages connected.
v'rith ti:is netv,rork coul-d. also be traced. in the seeond L-figure c;4pher, This r"ras a recyphering systeci, fhe sjrsteia itseff vras not entirely decypherable, as tlre inateriil v,ras insufficient; we only received. a littre of it r+rith heavy'ff/r interference; ii'Ie arso received. i;raterial fronr tha BIricK sA1 lvhich presented the sar:e picture although the keys (schluessel) wer* sor?ewhat d.ifferent. s By coreparing both iots of material, after n:y return to-ffinf,iN, if was possible to decypher it. eoruple,{:e1y. Then, in lmRf,fN, *i.*, vrere precipitated., r worked. for sone tir:re j on rtalian """"t"cJ4phcrs, and occasi-onalIy on French and. Spnish ones. Sonetiiaes a whole countryrs naterial was ieft untou"h"a. Then,I resrured wgrk on nUSStA, rvh:ich was sti1l using a l-figure key, which llras not a subtractor, however, but an add.er. The break $ras suceessful. ihere ,v""o d.ifficulties, owing to the size of the basic look, whlch contained 50r0OO groups; 1t vras hatted,"oae and changed. after soue tii-ie. vfe aiscovered. a form'r1a accorCing to vrtrich the code groups $rere built up, arrd" id'entified. thereby.na.ries or sntp-s, eErivaLents 'ol rirxrbers and punch:ation rnrks. Thc key (s"n-rrr=su1) changea aaiiy,
lct,urnorrB/
z.\)
ffi r-, tst ribKNARA
I Date
B
- i ru) \.
I
f.0-
I
I
I
{
'rlie eould. only work op^ the system wkren go to. 100 nessages carire in. per c1ay. The basit book changed. .,ie
tut it again, although not-neu."iy as,far as wllh the English one, ilttite ure were reading the ivuice,
always got into-
lp-figure systen the 5-figure gave us very good. ivellr during the RUSS0-r'n{rsI{ r,varl although-vrork vras suspend.ed for a. short tine by order. Duriig ;hi; ;;; the Russians introduced a aoirtle recyphertng system.
' results rater,
vre worked. together ruith FrNr,AND. trl-e had. one break into the,clouble rec,ri;lhering add.er lut-:_t I_ed" to no practicar resurii. "y*i"ir,our itre then liraitecl attention to the 4-figure syste:1, which went vr,elL unti] '19, f nyself was head. of-the Rr-rssian section, but af:aost all r+y personnel vras taken auray f;;;;t1 ;;iy few remained and._c-oping v,rith the tasks involvea arricurties " of personnel, ana betrveen 'j9 and. r40 t Ua-t" t:elp with cari:hers of other countries. Owing to lack of staff r only renrajried. in touch with difficitty.
Autu'an 194'0: 'ufhat cloes-tiie c;4pher
break
like, and can it at all, using large ni*r"r"look ;i ffi;nnel? -but
-we
At all events r,re kept our head.s above ,r.i"", with some the begiruiing of the war the que stion .d:if.ficu1ty.. +! vras whether we shourd. nans.rje-to brJak it or u=i*;;;"" of staff vuas suppligd", ai zl/+ _ r teiie,r*--"ot.-'" *t th; tii.," of the attack on JrIGosr,AVrA, the syste* changed previousl;r l a substitution systera; it becarae an ad"d.er, trfhen
the
'r'',rar
wi-th
started., we could read. a trigr: ?he constnrction of the aaaenyaEpeculiar, and. consi.sterl of repetitions. ffr"-".r"pi_cion arose that the ad-d-er mrst, be basecl 0n a clear ,ro"i-tu*i'. 1,Ile received. confimr,ation froa Frlru\lD that it lvas a book, obtainable cormercially, in lvhich each letter was replaced. by a figure and these rors of rigures aa;;;-;"";t"";I#:"groups' The indicators only ga.ve the p?ge ana-iinJ-Jr il* book. The indicator itself-rvas a"ri"a-(iJro:""*;;l i"'fir-* recJ4:herecl by the ac.dition mothe r-nuriber, ],-fe IuTt.:ld had this bool< in our dranver. One ofor" *,rpiolrees, U.ving 9fin the sarae house as the miritary attache, .urto-r*.r to leave sud'clen1y ancl reft a ntuaber of books behin&, *"i"-;;';* o".?.1 book-salvage, rrelpecl hj-raseli "oi.:""r, io-tr,* Russie,:r 3i3:u !o DooKs. \/e learned !h" title of thc book, anc1 se:Lrched. percentage
of it.
RUSSTA
unti-f 11" ((our er.ploy"e)) r"*"i.lu""a trrrt tr* "Itistory of the'ior.r.runi-st po"ty" *uu *or; ;i;;. 1Ie should have nranaged any case, but the loof. fu"ifitotea" }n the work. ite vrgSe in a position to read- about fia/, ot the material, The d.ifficulty vras the ;;" but it -only had' been broken so far ihot ,v" courd. read. it and. forlow exactly the novenents and. ialnefierd.s of the Russians 1n the BAr'Trc. Trds was rmtil the Ihrssian$ vtrere locked. in around IENINGRAD. After this the w/i--;;"fiiJ a"opp"a . off. Later on there were only lesser vessels, 'mhich were hand.ec. ovei to the riins "yph;;;inr"",5ii"rr the ,iutlu-,',, because I'INUrllD had. better reception. the f,inns currently i-nforn:ed. and. vue turne-c. our attenti.ons toke1:t us the BLACK ffiA and. had. ,rery great success. A r.rort""istic feature was *re bre;rt ,*rr.rU"" of syster.rs, vuhich "t frequently changed., Then there r,/ere cy1:hers froi:r the i{IIfTE everyvuhere
b.ook-
Sii, whlch at first were workeo. oir- in-r,nrr"irr,u;'* ffi;" on r,re ourselves broke fgv; ",,,,trc cp:hero" 1ater had 1 I1j-nor a siaall group workingln KTR]GNES:-- l',Ic rvorkecl on probreras connected- with nrra.jor syste:as and hacl o ,u"ro""L'-station
