TRANSKRIP “THE INDOPACIFIC AS A CONCEPT FOR REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE: WILL IT WORK, AND HOW DO WE GET THERE?”

Moderator

: Dr. Dino Patti Djalal (DPD)

Speakers

: Dr. Marty Natalegawa (MN)

MN: Well, thank you very much, Pak Dino Patti Djalal, thank you for the very kind and generous introduction and congratulations in the way you have created this whole forum. I really admire your achievements starting from basically scratch and seeing what we are seeing today, such an enthusiastic supporter and people with keen interest on matters that have to do with foreign policy and of course I’d liked to acknowledge the ambassadors who are before us. Thank you very much for being with us this afternoon. I’d like to try to be as a sink as possible on such an important subject matter which is actually very dear to me, and which I think ought to be discussed even more in the weeks and months to come. If I may I’d like to share some thoughts before, I guess you (Dr. Dino) will be moderating our forum. The first thought that I wanted to emphasize is to place incontext the notion of Indo-Pacific. Because as Pak Dino had said rightfully, the notion of Indo-Pacific has recently gain currency, has recently acquired attention, especially I think when following the visit by President Trump to our region. But the point that I wanted to emphasize this afternoon is that actually, as a matter of facts, not as a matter of conjectures, or as a matter of suggestions, actually the notion of the IndoPacific far far predates 2017. For those who had been following, and who have actually been executing foreign policies in the past, Indo-Pacific framework or Indo-Pacific mindset have always, at least in my recollection, informed and motivated Indonesian foreign policy. At the risk of caricature and the risk of oversimplification, I’d like to make references to a number of key junctions where the notion of Indo-Pacific has been mooted in the past. One of those was when the notion of the East Asia Summit was intensively discussed in our region. Back in 2002 when Indonesia was chairing ASEAN and then we have 2010 Malaysia to chair ASEAN, and to chair the first East Asia Summit. At that time, there was a very contested view within the region. Some in the countries in the region including within ASEAN, especially within ASEAN I believe, was off the view that East Asia community was to be achieved or driven or attained by ASEAN+3 process.

 

 

So when we speak of East Asia Summit, East Asia community, it must be only an ASEAN+3 process. But Indonesia was then the one that actually challenged this notion. We said that for ASEAN to be relevant, to be in the driving seat, to be relevant not only for now but for many decades to come, we must be even more transformative, we must have the courage to project ahead and think of what are the main dynamics for the future. Hence, at that time, eventually, we managed to get India in the East Asia Summit, Australia and New Zealand… East Asia Summit, and yet the constituent elements have been clearly Indo-Pacific right from the very beginning. I remember at that time, many of our friends in ASEAN was challenging Indonesia, why are you defining East Asia in such an expensive way? Surely, East Asia means, essentially, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, and yet we were insistence from the beginning to have India onboard. There were those who, at the time said that, India should come in as a guest of the East Asia Summit, as a plus one of the East Asia Summit, but we perceivered. Eventually, ASEAN reach the consensus and to their credit, China also consented to ASEAN’s preference. So from the very beginning, the East Asia Summit was always an Indo-Pacific in its outlook. and note least as well, we begun to develop the East Asia process. And Indonesia in 2015, I remember, at that time, Pak Dino was our Ambassador in Washington, at his invitation I spoke at a CSIS forum in Washington, where as Foreign Minister then, I expanded on the notion of Indo-Pacific for the future, especially the idea of having a TAC on the eve for the Indo-Pacific, which I will expand later on. In other words, the point I wanted to make is that, ASEAN’s perspective on the Indo-Pacific far predates the recent pre-occupation and even in 2013, following my remarks in Washington, ASEAN Summit in October 2013, and the first Summit of 2014 also made references to Indo-Pacific in the former outcomes. What comes next is best described as being‘it is what it is’. Because after 2014, Indo-Pacific as a notion, as a concept, dropped out of ASEAN’s lexicon. If you were to look at ASEAN’s Chairman statement, declarations, the initial promise shown between 2013 and early part of 2014 quickly evaporated. There was an interagnum; there was a silence from ASEAN on matters to do with Indo-Pacific. ASEAN begin to speak of the wider region and a bit shying away from defining an Indo-Pacific for what reason I will not speculate. But then of course President Trump happened, and he begun to use the term and now ASEAN is scrambling for Indo-Pacific position. So the point I wanted to make, the first point, is in terms of context and background that Indo-Pacific perspective is not a new phenomenon as far as Indonesia is concerned it was as early as 2002 that we seek, we deliberately and purposely pursued into its logical conclusion. The second point I wanted to make, before I end my remarks, so we can have even more discussion, is that the Indo-Pacific is nearly a geographic description. You simply describing a geography. What I’m missing today when I hear, of course, lately the Indonesian government and I am really pleased to know that the Indonesian government, especially when at the ASEAN-India Summit, has begun now to speak more eloquently and more forcefully  

 

on the Indo-Pacific treaty, the Indo-Pacific concept which is much welcome. And of course the Foreign Minister herself at her annual address in January also spoke very eloquently on the subject matters, this is a development to be much welcomed. But in relation to the second point that I wanted to make, that we have to go beyond describing geography. Indo-Pacific is nearly a geographic concept, you know, one can make references, some of us do in terms of modality, some speak of combination of ASEAN and the Indian Oceans Rim Association, and the other processes. But those are processes; those are means to an end. What I’m missing now… I’m missing… what is the geopolitical underpinning? What is the worldview that Indonesia trying to promote? You can’t simply speak of Indo-Pacific as a region, and then we began to speak of having a need for cooperation between this and that organization, synergizing ASEAN process with IORA, speaking of an open, transparent, free and inclusive Indo-Pacific. But what makes this region tick? Indonesia is called upon, called upon to really exercise intellectual leadership, provide the fuel, what is it… what makes this region… what drives the region? I am at the moment, I’m missing that, not withstanding the current emphasize on the Indo-Pacific, I’m missing the geopolitical argument. In the past, and for what’s it worth with all the shortcomings and falls, I’ve tried to inject the notion of a dynamic equilibrium for our region. That was my contribution at that time. It’s probably inherently fall pit and fundamentally unsound, but I tried. My suggestion at that time was for this Indo-Pacific to be 21st century in its outlook rather than 20th century, we must jettison set aside cold war mentality. Common security, common prosperity, common stability. ‘Cause at that time I was worried, when Australia, when United States and others was joining East Asia Summit, there was a thought that this was to contain the rise, for example, of China or some other rising countries. But at that time, we make the argument preponderant power or dominant power in the region can be addressed, not by collisions or by alliances in the 20th century foreign policy, but by injecting the notion of common security, common prosperity in the visibility of peace between the two sub-regions. And especially the idea that countries of the region can address the potential conflicts among them to peaceful means. So, with this kind of geopolitical perspective, we began to infuse what this meant by IndoPacific. The Bali principles of 2011 of the East Asia Summit speaks of countries of the region renouncing, I read it carefully again, the terms used was renunciation of the use of force. I mean to me that is a rather significant point in ASEAN and in Southeast Asia. ASEAN in 1976 we commit ourselves to the TAC, to the non-use of force, in our relations with one another. In 2011, through the Bali principles of the East Asia Summit, we have a commitment to renounce the use of force among the East Asia Summit countries, not only among ASEAN, but as I understand it this time, among Russia and US, US and China, China and India, Korea and Japan, Japan and China. That was the kind of positive infection we were trying to promote, to ASEAN-ize the region. I felt then I knew what I wanted to do, to be

 

 

honest, just to be frank and a little bit self-consumed, I felt we have a script, we know what we are going to do and we are going for it. Now I hope today as we begun to speak of Indo-Pacific notion once again, someone is putting their thinking cap on and not simply think of procedural matters. We need to organize Summits between the ASEAN and IORA, etc, but give it flesh. We need to win the geopolitical argument first. Then we find the means to that end. And this leads me to the point or final point I want to make on the future projection. I continue to believe that in this case, less can be more. I know that there is a temptation to want to bring everyone on board. You know, I mean you have your ASEAN and the IORA and all every possible permutations you bring everyone onboard and you hope that things will work out. In my view, it has to be, it has to be ASEAN-led. There is no two-way about it. ASEAN has the means; it has the comfort level enjoyed by the others, of the others, of it. And we must deliver. And the beauty of it is, thanks to the foresight of those who had decided then, my predecessor, because foreign policy is change of course but also continuity. My predecessor, Minister Hassan Wirajuda, he developed, to whom I contributed some of my thoughts, the idea of East Asia Summit. We already have the way we thought, the forum exists, it is an Indo-Pacific forum in the making and we even already have the substance, we have the Bali principles as the substance, but we need to deliver on it. If we simply wish to open up the process without a clear sense of what kind of perspective you are promoting, then we may find ourselves lost in terms of direction. So ASEAN, I believe, in particular East Asia Summit must be the primary vehicle, in terms of what’s next and this is the point that I see missing in the current discussion, we have to identify what are the nature of the challenges in our region, what are the nature of the opportunities in our region. People are talking about the Indo-Pacific, first of all missing the geopolitical argument as I was trying to suggest this now but also for going a common notion of what are the common problems we are facing. Otherwise, if we fail to grasp identify the problems, then it will be a mission looking for a mission, a solution looking for a problem. We have to identify the problem first, again, I know that no one has a monopoly of wisdom, but in the past I’ve spoken of at least three problems of challenges. Trust deficit, territorial disputes, and managing change. In my view, those are as good as starting point as any. Territorial disputes and trust deficit prevalent in our region. My recommendation Pak Dino, that I’ve spoken of in the past and now shall continue to make in the future. ASEAN… the East Asia Summit is in dire need of crisis management capacity. We have crisis all around our region and there is deafening silence. Crisis don’t await summits unfortunately. You have your summits twice year ASEAN leaders and East Asia Summit is once a year, a hello and goodbye moment, honestly, because leaders come in November or October, but things happened between January and November.

 

 

Actually a lot of things happened. But how can you make the ASEAN and the East Asia Summit a bit more time relevant, time sensitive, seen to be doing things. And that’s why in my view, the time has arrived to create a peace and security council of the East Asia Summit at the ambassadors’ level. Nothing fancy, nothing too difficult, no need for cultural performances before they meet. They should meet every week, with just two items, review of regional and global issues and other matters. So, there’s no a sense of putting on the dock that your problem as being discussed because it’s generic agenda items. The ambassadors meet every week, they are already there here in Jakarta, they meet every week, if they wish to escalate it to foreign ministry levels, to the head of state level, provided for the UN and in the ASEAN Charter; a crisis management capacity, to deal with the potential for so-called an unintended conflict. And the second point of my last point Pak Dino, is the idea of TAC for the Indo-Pacific. This is the one I was saying earlier, the need for us to externalize ASEAN’s experience, to externalize the TAC by having, this time, connecting the outer dots. We need to TAC relations, not only among ASEAN states, but also among the non-ASEAN states between, India and China, between China and US, China and Russia, Korea and Japan, Japan and China. These are dynamics in need of handholding, in need of bringing the pressure points lower. And I believe the TAC for the wider region is one instrument. I used to think in the past of having a one bigbang approach, an East Asia Summit process of negotiations and everyone collectively sign on to this. But I think seeing how regional dynamics is probably may not be a bad idea to take this one step at a time. ASEAN, everyone on board, and open for accession for others to exceed in their wish to align the TAC. I know that Russia has been working very closely with some of our friends within the East Asia Summit, if I’m not mistaken, it was with Brunei in 2013. China of course, with the proposal to have a China-ASEAN TAC-like instrument. So, the architecture is congested, but it’s very important to us to begin inclusive way rather than making it partial. So, my final point and my submission, Pak Dino, thankfully the Indo-Pacific concept is actually not new for ASEAN, for those who recall, for those who choose to recall, because it can be missed in amidst all the recent development, but we have had Indo-Pacific perspective ever since 2002, at the very least, we have been following it to the later until 2014. There is a bit of lacunae, but now thankfully it has been revisited and hopefully it can be taken up again. So context wise is very important to emphasize. The second point I wanted to make is that, we need to provide flesh; we need to provide substance to the notion, the geographic notion of Indo-Pacific. We need the geopolitical underpinnings. Someone has to be putting their thinking cap on and suggest something, and otherwise it will be a hollow debate procedural in nature, ceremonial probably in the outcome as well.

 

 

And third points, in terms of world map, at my view at least there's two possibilities, one is crisis management mechanism to a peace and security council of the East Asia Summit and the second is confidence building, trust building process to the TAC-like instrument for the Indo-Pacific. We need to emphasize the pacific of the Indo-Pacific, not that I have anything unfriendly towards countries of the Indian Ocean region, but the notion of pacific as a condition of peace. I think ASEAN must be striving to create a pacific Indo-Pacific a waging peace. I worry a little bit when we don't take corrective transformative outlook. Thank you very much Pak Dino.

Q & A DPD DPD Pak Marty you mentioned about building Indo-Pacific architecture by externalizing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) beyond ASEAN and throughout to IndoPacific, so 2 questions; first, what challenges that you have in try to achieve that? Was the comfort level low to some countries but what was the challenges you face and secondly is that game plan still in play now? MN

On the first point Pak Dino is often the most difficult of challenge is when you are trying to be proactive, trying to be projecting or anticipating certain development, there is whenever one is trying to anticipate certain future problems, and the challenges is, one of the basic doubt and question, why bother? Why are you being such a busy body? You know, why are you trying to create something when there is actually nothing that’s broken. It’s a solution to a non-problem. And I find that kind of challenge especially debilitating in terms of … cause I ravel if someone comes back with a strong counter argument, then we can, as we know in our trade, we can get back (at them), I mean (we can) have a counter-argument, but sometimes the responds is sort of like a blank stare… (like) what are you talking about? I mean, why are we… We don’t need this. But then I was thinking back in 1976 when our leaders then, came up with the TAC for South East Asia, remember South East Asia, at the time, was a region that was replete with conflict. But then our leaders had a foresight and then the forwardlooking and transformative outlook, they say, look this thing may not work immediately but we need to have an aspirational goal. And I have to say that one of the main challenges I faced within ASEAN has been a polite endorsement, because I should have mentioned in my contexting, ASEAN actually noted appreciation and East Asia Summit as well of the this notion of TAC, but I felt that there was still a sense of questioning why it is of relevance. I think we need to make an argument stronger and as well there was some question mark about what it is relationship with the TAC. There was always a Two schools of thoughts within ASEAN on the TAC. One school of thought has been (to) keep TAC to the ASEAN-10. When we were opening the TAC to accession by the non-ASEAN states and there was a lot of reservation and some actually wanted to have a moratorium and they think that we have become a victim of our own success, because now I’m not sure how many countries have

 

 

exceeded to the TAC, I think, over 25, and there was a fear that we’re just opening up our doors to “external intervention” in our region. But we felt then, externalizing our own TAC was a way of pacifying the region. That is why we made it as one of the requirement for EAS participation, the so called, Cebu Doctrine. You have to exceed to the TAC to become part of the East Asia Summit. And as a result, we saw India, we saw China, coming on board very early on 2013 and then the rest follow; Japan, Korea, Russia and the rest. So, I think it’s the matter of the challenges is one of, within ASEAN, of underscoring. How do we find or how we are trying to be transformative and, therefore, it is not of immediate need. And, of course, for our non-ASEAN colleagues, it is the question of the trust building. And to be honest, when we come up to the Bali principle in 2011, I look at all your documents, at the China-India agreements, Russia-China agreements, and we borrow languages, deliberately and purposely from those documents, so that you know that you’re not dealing with something that aliens, that we are not dealing with things that are foreign, so to speak. So I think this is some of the challenges, Pak Dino. But it is a challenge that is common to any future oriented undertaking. DPD You mentioned about trust building, and I think you would agree that by the time you ended your term as foreign minister, the relationship between the major powers had gone sour, it’s not your fault. What do you think happened, I mean we had it so good in the beginning, what do you think happened? MN

Well, I’m a great believer in dynamics. I believe in dynamics of power not balance of power, because we make references to intend to perception, not looking at indices of potentials. The economy, military, but what makes a country tick is what is their perspective and thoughts. And you’re quiet right Pak Dino, we had a window, I believe there was a window of strategic opportunity. When everything seems too align in a very positive way. But things happened. I know you have the developments elsewhere and then we are seeing the kind of dynamics that we are seeing now, but having said that, I think and there’s an action-reaction of was not quite right then, Korean Peninsula is the most evident example of such dynamics. But at the same time the Korean Peninsula issue, most recent development, for me, it confirms my believe that dynamics can be changed with the right kind of leadership, the right kind of ownership by the countries concerned. And this is where I think, where ASEAN countries can make a difference. Uncertainty it’s a given, change is a permanent. But a state of drifts is not inevitable. But what I’m seeing now is the state of drift, not just uncertainty, state of drift the result of policy in action, policy inconsistency, and policy contradictions. ASEAN must bring these countries together. Now in the Korean Peninsula, we are seeing the changing dynamics, thanks to leadership, thanks to ownership, taken up by the countries principally concerned with positive dynamics as we proposed the winter Olympics. Those are courageous decision by leaders who exercise leadership. I’m seeing not only trust deficit, Pak Dino, but potentially a leadership deficit. Because leaders must lead… must have the courage to take unpopular decision for the sake of the wider peace of our region. And I hope ASEAN can be part of that, positively changing dynamics efforts in our region

 

 

DPD I think you’re get it right on pointing out about the East Asia Summit could happen because Indonesia pushing it. What I mean by that, not self-congratulatory, but I’ve been saying that, if it was china who’s pushing it would not happened because Japan would shoot it down. If it was Japan who was pushing it, it wouldn’t happen because China will shoot it down. And the United States was not part of it back then and India wasn’t part of it, so it worked because none of the major power pushed it, right? But now the East Asia Summit is a different format, US is Inside, Russia is inside and so on. So my question is what must East Asia summit do, in order to promote a stronger architecture for Indo-Pacific? Must it expand or are you happy with this dynamics? But now all the major powers are in and supposedly that is a good thing, what is the next thing for the East Asia Summit to go to now? MN:

To refer to your first point, Pak Dino, about the ability to actually deliver a diplomatic results, it reminds of the needs for persistency, you know when we have an initiative, whatever is the initiative, we have to be persistent. We have to have that diplomatic heft. Persistent. Never tired. Diplomacy is not emotion, you cannot be exasperated. You cannot throw papers up in the air and said that’s it I’m done, I’m tired of this. You have to have sometimes infinite, never ending patience besides endurance of patience, arguments and always making sure that everyone is onboard. And especially within ASEAN, Pak Dino, Indonesia is objectively, factually speaking, is one of the larger country in ASEAN, but to be able to lead sometimes, in ASEAN, less is more. We cannot behave in ASEAN in the most predictable way for a large country. We have to earn the trust of our ASEAN friends. To be sure that our policies is good for everyone not just for the larger country, and sometimes it means we have to be a little bit more nuance, a bit more calibrated, the less demonstrative of our initiative always leaving room for imperfections for others to be able to feel that they are part of the process. I have to say intended now Pak Dino, now that I’m retired official as you are. Perfection can be the enemy of the good, in the past in many instances initiative are left deliberately having shortfalls, shortcomings, rooms for further improvements, so that others can contribute. But this is pre-twitter, pre-Facebook, pre-having to demonstrate everything that you are doing. Statesman like versus statesmanship. And sometimes, I believe diplomats or expiring diplomats in this room, there is a lot to be set still in traditional diplomacy in terms of delivering results. But you’re quite correct, Pak Dino, is a it is an effort to be made, but on the second point I remember many of questions when we began to speak of having India, having Australia, New Zealand on top of the plus three in ASEAN, many of my ASEAN foreign colleagues was saying “Can we control them?”, essentially to be candid and honest. You know you bring all these people in, what are you setting up yourself for, do you know what they are actually doing? But this is one of those half-empty or halffull glass notion. To me, at least we have a fighting chance, if they are under a common tent, a common home. If you are India, if you are Russia, US, Australia, New Zealand is out of the camp, out of the house, the tent, then it becomes like a loose cannon. So at least we are seated on the same home, but then as I said before, we must deliver, once we had

 

 

all this folks around the room, we have to deliver on our leadership, on our centrality with ideas, with initiatives. That's why if you remember, Pak Dino, when we all came out with the East Asia Summit Kuala Lumpur Declaration, we purposely made it ASEAN centric. Everything has to be ASEAN relevant. East Asia Summit cooperation must be have a prior ASEAN peace course on it. I remember being extremely discipline to the point of being seen to be saw problematic. Whenever an issue comes to the East Asia Summit, just out of the blue, I said: thank you very much, but we need to have an ASEAN peace course based on this issue, before we bring in to the East Asia Summit control of the agenda and the issues. And I think this is where, I hope, our current ASEAN leadership are not remised of what is now before then, I hate to see a situation where ASEAN simply has the convening power, we have a wonderful capacity to convene meetings, but then we have no capacity to actually influence the outcome and this is where I think the thinking cap on idea become extremely important, ASEAN must deliver on the potential it has created. DPD For students who are here, I hope you understand that you are really getting a lot of insights of how policies were made, right? I mean, knowing the policies is one thing you can learn from the media, but understanding the background issues and the different arguments that was priceless of the study of International Relations, right. I hope you took notes of what Pak Marty said. Remember, this event is not free, you got to pay by tweeting. Pak Marty, so the good news President Trump talked about Indo-Pacific and the National Security Strategy of United States issued by the White House, there’s one paragraph that I like: “We don't exclude Indonesia when we talked about IndoPacific.” But then, he talks about the quad; Australia, New Zealand, Japan, India. I’d like to hear your thoughts, this is about the quad, is it going to get us closer to this collective Indo-Pacific or is it going to create issues and different dynamics. How do you see the quad concept there? MN

Well, thank you Pak Dino, I think again distinguishing between the forum or the process and the ideas or the intent behind it. The quad, itself I mean, no one can stand against. I mean stand in the way country’s doing anything, you know, you can have all kind of permutations, possibilities of cooperation in this case of quad and the many other permutations but what interest me is, what is the dynamics, what is the intent, what is the leaving dynamics behind such a conjugation, such a constituency. And this is what worries me, because in terms of the, at least reported, the quad, to me, is a very 20th century in this outlook. The idea of containment, in this case of China, although furiously denied, on many instances, but one cannot help but get the impression and that is why, as I said before, when we have an Indo-Pacific perspective as a geographical scope, we must be very adapt and proactive in the ideas behind it. Otherwise, I know that some of it – I hate to see some, for example, for china to say they don’t like the Indo-Pacific notion, because they equate Indo-Pacific with the quad. When in fact we say there is an alternative view, an alternative more win-win type of mindset, the type of that, I have in the past try to suggest, the dynamic equilibrium of common security and common prosperity, etc.

 

 

But in the essence of such offering on the part of Indonesia, on the part of ASEAN and then the blanks will be filled by others. We have what we have in the quad, but I hope our ASEAN and Indonesia in particular will be very clear in offering the alternative vision. But as it sense now, the idea of four countries containing the rise of something, to me, especially, unappealing. It's a very 20th century notion when we are actually living the 21st century and dealing with the reality that security and stability is a common goal. How can India, how can Japan, how can United States, and China and Australia feels secure at the expense of another country, for example, in this case, China? You have to have a common security otherwise whatever security you feel will be very transient, very temporary, and in short, therefore, the quad knows, I think, unless in views with different kinds of perspective, I think is one that challenging ASEAN, very quickly with alternative vision. DPD How much do you think balance of power consideration should animate the process of the Indo-Pacific architecture? MN

We’ve talked about this before, Pak Dino, in the past and just now as well, balance of power, in my view, is a very static, meaning very picture-framed notion as if you can take snapshot of a given period of time, you have abundant assertion classification, country A, Country B, Country C, and then you striving for some kind of a magical situation where there is a notion of balance. When in fact I think most countries are not striving for two balances, countries are thriving for preponderance, honestly speaking, I don't think countries are very finetuning their issues to strike the right balance. I think in the end, countries are going all out to have superiority, to have preponderancy, that's why I think the idea of dynamics of power rather than balance of power appeal to me, because then you are not looking in indices economic capacity nor looking in the military capacity, of course, you are looking at it, but you are not driven by it. But you are looking at the intent, what is the intent of say, India’s relation with China, China with Japan, and we address of conception or misperception. So to me, balance of power notion for the Indo-Pacific is one there is a recipe for action-reaction situation. We spoke earlier Pak Dino about find distinction of arms modernization, arms build-up, arms race. If we are not careful the balance power moral can quickly leave from what is a normal assessed need modernization of our country’s military to become an action-reaction arms race, arms build-up to which may lead to so called unintended conflicts in the region. So I think the balance of power idea is one of those 20th century (ideas) and by the way the nature of power has changed. Really, when you look at the world today when you define power as the capacity to affect change, capacity to influence events, the wilder of power those who are holding power are no longer governments, when you talk about cyber security, when you talk about trans-national threats. Power is being bewildered by non-state actors, by invisible forces even. So balance between what?, That's why I think dynamics is far more appeal to me because we addressed the core issue. Why there is a misperception and threat perception and lack of trust and all that.

 

 

DPD Two more questions from me. You mentioned one principle earlier, which is renunciation of force and this was used a lot in 20th century and none use of force. For those young diplomat across Indo-Pacific who probably want to draw the Indo-Pacific architecture. Can you think of any 21st century principles that should be incorporated in any Indo-Pacific architecture? MN

Well the easiest answer for me, in response to your question, Pak Dino, would have been to refer to the East Asia Summit, Bali principles of 2011. Two pages long, only 12-points and I remember when we were drafting it making sure that it doesn't extend beyond 2 pages. I was striving for 1 page, and some of my colleagues at the ministry start to changing the font to become smaller, and not quite the spirit of the enterprise, making the font to number 9 or number 7, to makes it into one page. But now in the end we ended up with the 12-points. But those are the known 12points and which I mentioned non-use of force, a peaceful settlement of disputes and renunciation of the use of forces in accordance with the UN Charter as well. Those are some of the dedounament of human force, territory integrity non-interference, etc. but those are the 12-points that we then as diplomats, with all our shortcomings, limitation, and limited wisdom that we have. Those are the best that we can come up with, but I'd believe when we speak of the Indo-Pacific, we must tolerate some degree of fluidity. You don't want to have… to try to freeze-frame certain principles either you are in and out based on these principles and those principles make you come obsolete the very day they're adopted. And this is a point I was trying to make, in this 21st century; change is permanent, values and principles are constantly changing, so we must have an automatic adaptive capacity for the Indo-Pacific. So there must always be room for adjustments, for automatic adapted capacity as I said before. So the main ones are already agreed to, back in 2011. A good start but certainly not exhaustive, they’re not, in totality, needed to be set, but I think it's a good starting point. Otherwise, everyone would bring forth of their own ideas. I mean democratic Indonesia of today, I would have thought we would want to have a human rights and democracy as key plan, I'm not sure whether that will fly but I know that there were references to it in their Bali principles, but we have to have beginning of flexibility, I think.

DPD Actually I have heard a lot, “Indonesia please lead ASEAN, Indonesia please lead ASEAN”, I hear this. If we want to be self-entertaining, we are leading ASEAN, we are the leader of ASEAN, right. But there's not the reality on the ground. I think Indonesia needs to do more, to punch above our weight. So what would your advice to your successor, Foreign Minister Retno on how Indonesia can lead ASEAN? MN

 

First of all, there's no one size fits all, right? I mean it is different dates, different situation, different circumstances, different type of challenges, different opportunities, so I think what may we had worked in the past may not be of relevance in the present. And likewise you know, different generation of stewards of Indonesia foreign policy must dealt with the situation as they face it, as they confront it and, therefore, it would be quite at the risk of misunderstanding the current problem if we tried to project experience of the past to the present.

 

But you’re quite correct in the sense, Pak Dino, in terms of the quality to lead ASEAN. The need, actually, this is rather good and great problem to have, it's not usual for a large country in a region, in a sub region, to be asked by the smaller countries, “Please lead us”, it's not usual. Normally, in a sub region the larger country is looking upon with some, there's a difference between big brother and elder brother, You know, I mean some countries can be throwing its weight around and yet in the case of ASEAN, in South East Asia, actually the ASEAN countries are actually imploring us, “Can you please exercise leadership”, and I think this is a quality, an asset, which is been developed by Indonesia over in many decades, the comfort level, that we had to manage secure within ASEAN. I think this is the currency that we neglect to our peril. With this kind of expectation, with this kind of hope comes certain responsibility. We have to behave in a manner that can generate comfort among all the ASEAN countries. We have to provide for all. There is the national head, the regional head and the global head. We can manage those points. How we can promote our national interest and, at the same time, ASEAN can continue to be developed. And I think in the past, we had managed to strike equilibrium, Pak Dino, on that issue. When I think about it to Pak Ali Alatas, Pak Mochtar before him, Pak Hasan Wirajuda, Pak Alwi Shihab, those are leaders, ministers, who had been able to strike an equilibrum. So it's not like an either/or. I'll give you one example, in 2002, no, 1998 onward, when Indonesia went through the reform process, democratization. Suddenly, Indonesia becoming... going through a transformational process, internally. Many of us, including many think tanks in Jakarta I remember, was saying, “Let's concentrate on internal issues, we have so many problems within, let's sort our self out within before we busy ourselves with ASEAN”, But at that time, as a Director General for ASEAN, talking with Pak Hasan Wirajuda and we consult, we discuss, and said, actually we need to be even more assertive. We began to bring the issue of good governance (and) human rights onto ASEAN in 2003, to make sure that the regional development and the national development in Indonesia goes hand in hand. There is no force choice between our own internal democratization process and our regional process. Likewise in the 2011, when some of us, again among think tanks and among those who are smart here in Jakarta say, “ASEAN has gone too small for Indonesia, we need to do the world. ASEAN is not the corner stone but a corner stone for Indonesia”. Then come up with ASEAN in a global community of notions. Bali concord III, we can do the world and we take ASEAN with us. ASEAN is also doing the world issues. In other words, leadership is about synergizing, apparently, conflicting demands. I hate to see a silo mentality where the notion suggested that we are focusing on internal issue, not external, and the like. I think the kind of leadership required we need to be a bit more recognizing the different linkage of issues. Not to give up. As if

 

 

we can only do one at the expense of the other. And again on ASEAN not to be exasperated, I mentioned before that... I shouldn't be but, for example on developments in Myanmar, nowadays with Rohingya issue, and I spoke before ASEAN colleagues in a few days ago, and I said Myanmar used to be a difficult issue for ASEAN but at the same time, an example ASEAN coming together. We manage the transition process in Myanmar, not in very rapid way but at least there was a soft landing. The changes in Myanmar took places not at the expense ASEAN unity, and actually ASEAN manage to handhold the process of change in Myanmar without geopolitical repercussions. But now, the issue of Rohingya, ASEAN is perfectly divided; you couldn't have a more perfect division than we have now. At the United Nations Third Committee, three countries of ASEAN supported the resolution, two country abstained and five country against. This cannot, to me, I'm sorry Pak Dino I'm being very frank, to me is a little bit unfortunate. So, to be able to have the ASEAN 10 together, it means we have to be persistent. Never giving up on ASEAN. Persistent with the diplomatic heft, with the diplomatic patience, until we achieve agreement. But if we wish to do other things then we have other things to deal with. But leadership, as I said, is a situation specific but as Indonesia has showed in recent years, Bu Menlu, Bu Retno has been very active and promoting many of solutions in our part of world, it is all I hope that our efforts bring concrete results, as it has. Q & A with audience 1. Maxim, foreign policy enthusiast, Airbus Employee How do we articulate the combination of foreign policy and the definition of our national interest. As we know, ASEAN is become priority among others not the priority of Indonesia. How do we convinced the President to push for the agenda of Indo-Pacific as priority of Indonesia and do we need articulate it with his priorities such as The Global Maritime Fulcure, or can we had the role of Parliament, as you know the Parliament is very active doing studies abroad. Maybe they can tend to help in this case, thank you. 2. Patrick, You've been describing the sort of two contradictory version of the IndoPacific. An exclusive one that would replace Asia in Asia Pacific by the Western way of excluding the largest country in Asia in terms of containment. And then, you also describe the inclusive version of Indo-Pacific which is more Indonesian fraction. It's an extend TAC well beyond its current web. And that would include of course, to IORA, parts of Africa and we have a complete, even though you're not talking about geography that you (want) to come with a completely new preposition of having a region that could extend from Juno to Maputo. How possible is that? In that sort of “over stretch”. That you would be creating, by one thing, something until Alaska. 3. Nikita, Russian Embassy. This new suggestion of Asia in the Indo-Pacific partnership, if it is institutionalized won’t it overlap with APEC activities. I know there are notion of critical security threats in the work of APEC. So there will be in an overlapping of interest.

 

 

MN

Thank you very much. Pak Dino, please remind me if I miss the questions, but do answers them, some of them are quite difficult as well. But on the third point, I’ll take the third questions first. I think some overlap in the region’s architecture building is inevitable, right? I mean, one must not be to need or insistent on having a very clear or neat delineation between one process over the other. And I think this has been the similar feature of our region. Even the definition of the region has been purposely less ambiguous, constructive ambiguity can often be quite instructive, and leaving the outer points deliberately not definitive. But actually the example we provided, in APEC, reminds me of the lacunae that we have. Unless, I am totally so not current, as I recall, India is not a member of participating economy in APEC. That has been one of APEC main shortcomings. Because an economy as large as India, not only large but also rising, to be excluded from this process was to APEC’s disadvantage. That was actually the argument that I made back in 2002, why India needed to be there from the beginning in the EAS, for ASEAN to be able to ride (and) to synergies its economies with India. I think your question is extremely pertinent in the sense of being alert to making sure we’re not reinventing the wheel, we’re not creating unnecessary burden on existing, well-created path. So we need to make a clear idea of who is doing what and where. And I remember actually, when we have an APEC meeting in Honolulu, Hawaii in 2011, with Mr. Lavrov. We discuss, actually, the need to have a meeting of all different processes, the APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEM, just basically (so) you would notice very quickly how one issue is being discussed all these forums. On issues like counter-terrorism, connectivity, so to be useful, one day we’d like to bring all of these difference processes for one forum to make sure we’re not being unnecessarily inefficient. But l think the question still remain extremely important. We must tolerate some overlap, in the end, as market forces, so to speak, will determine who will last, who will survive, which one is the most relevant. So some will come and go. I know there’s been accession about IORA recently. I know because we begun the process of Indonesia’s submission for chairmanship etc. back in 2013. But you want to take things to set one at a time. On the ambassador’s question as well, I’m totally in agreement. Fully understood and fully appreciate the nature of the challenge we face. I mean forget about Indo-Pacific, even South East Asia brings countries of such diversity, and East Asia, even more diverse. Talking about Indo Pacific is like talking about the dynamic of East Coast of the African continent, and the dynamics of the Gulf region as well I presume. Once we begin to dissect the possibilities, one become so consume by the recognition that this is such a diverse region hence Pak Dino’s question is a very telling one. What is actually bringing us together? What are the common principles? And I think there are a lot of things to be had by developing things on step at a time. That’s why rather than “bigbang” ASEAN + IORA, I would rather we begin with the East Asia summit, which we already have. We have the Bali principles, of course this is not the entire

 

 

Indo-Pacific, but we can have, whatever we agree, an accession by countries in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Rim countries. So there is a step-by-step process. So we develop the habit of consultation and having a common process. Otherwise, we would like to begin with perfect delineation, As soon as you agree, the first debate would be, can we have more members. In the 21st century, the form of regional and international organizations should be a bit more flexible. It is not a permanent member because it’s pretty much an issue dependent. When you talk about certain issue we decide, who are the main interlocutors, who are the main people that have to seat around the table. But sometimes, in the 21st century we have a permanent membership and you assume that we will know everything there is to know on every topic in the world. We want to adopt a more flexible type of working procedure. And we have doing it. We have invited the UN’s Secretary General, Asia Development Bank Chiefs, and I believe the European Union also wanted to be invited and wanted to join us as an entity as well. The first issue, the question is similar to what Pak Dino had raised. I think any summation in a one minute foreign policy of any country is bound to be replete with oversimplification and misunderstanding. So I think, the time Government has continue the tradition of active foreign policy engagement at the multilateral level, at the UN, I believe, running for security council membership and then at the ASEAN as well. But at the same time, whilst being active, as a matter of fact, there’s constant suggestion as if some of foreign policy objectives and domestic policy priorities are either-or. As if we have prioritize one over the other. Economic Diplomacy, by the way, is not a new term either. Pak Dino, we were ambassadors once, and many of my colleagues who were ambassadors before, economic diplomacy was always been partial parts of our efforts. So, my point is maybe we (ASEAN) as a pillar or the pillar should moving away from the semantics but simply get on business of conducting foreign policy. You’re quite right, we have a certain timeline ahead of us, and at the same time Indonesia would become member of the Security Council, hopefully. I have served twice in the security council as Indonesia’s representative and it’s a tremendously rare opportunity for Indonesia to showcase its capacity to make a difference. It will a really unfortunate situation if we do not make full use of this opportunity. DPD We gotta do the twitter question. (We have 3 questions). 1. One question about culture diplomacy. 2. Where should Indonesia start in order to develop geopolitical argument about Indo-Pacific? 3. How Indonesia manage a region that has many territorial disputes and managing change? MN

 

Well culture diplomacy is always been an inherent part of Indonesian foreign policy. Pak Dino, to recall flash back, we have Pak Mochtar’s Culture Diplomacy (Diplomasi Kebudayaan) and he had a program in the United States. So culture diplomacy has always been parts of Indonesia’s diplomatic instrument, so called, soft power. What’s unique of the present time, I think, is that we are beginning to define culture in a more

 

inclusive way. In a sense of that it is not only about culture in distinctive sense but also in the economic impact, on the technology, and the like. So we are, in public diplomacy of course, Pak Hassan Wirajuda, my immediate predecessor, was very instrumental in creating the public diplomacy directorate general within the Foreign Ministry, in recognition of how public diplomacy is critical in our efforts. And, of course, our culture in a sense of widely defined, using our capacity to have technical cooperation as well. So, in other words, it’s not culture in a sense of traditional culture but also in terms of soft power, very much of it. And I think the current government has been, especially, effective as well in developing that notion. On the second one, I think first and foremost there has to be a very thorough discussion among ASEAN members states themselves. ASEAN can only be effective agent for transformation, for change in our region, if we speak with one voice. So I think first and foremost, ASEAN foreign ministers, I gather they just had meeting recently couple days ago in Singapore, must have a truly qualitative, meaningful exchanges among themselves in a very honest and frank way. How do they define the nature of the problem? Because the one that we have been promoting in the past, in which ASEAN have politely and kindly welcomed, was Indonesia’s notion. Indonesia’s initiatives. But we need to hear back from ASEAN, either they are in agreement or do they have some problems. So that we can have a good (and) sound debate and discussion, the way that we have in the East Asia Summit. I hope ASEAN can have that discourse. Nowadays, retreat can be very official. I mean we need to really disarm yourselves from all the documents and just have a good old-fashioned debate and discussion. Frank and candid. We can take it. Then once we have a common view, we take it to our East Asia summit. I know, there has been a number of workshops, I think we had one in 2013, Indonesia and Russia with Brunei, with China as well, but it’s not an insufficient effort. What is missing I think is beyond workshops and identifying the actual recommendations. (Third question) Well, first is recognizing the nature of the problem. Let me just give 2 examples instead, because I have an immediate and direct examples. One is on Thailand – Cambodia, when Thailand – Cambodia happened in 2011, the conflict in the border region, it was actually uncommon until then, for ASEAN to actually deal with conflict situation among ASEAN member states. We tend to shy away from disputes amongst ASEAN family. The term used was to sweep the issue under the carpet and just pretend things are jolly and we move on. But in 2011, when Thailand and Cambodia reoccurred, because it has already occurred in 2008, at that time, Indonesia was in the Security Council together with Vietnam, Pak Dino, two ASEAN member states in the UNSC, but again at that time, there was no ASEAN position on Thailand – Cambodia conflict. And I remember how foolish the two countries felt in the Security Council not being able to refer to an ASEAN position.

 

 

Hence, when it happened again in 2011, we chose a different script and we immediately tackled the issue and we addressed the problem. But, for that to occurred is a second challenge, the issue of trust. You have to earn the trust of your interlocutor, your partner, in this case, Thailand and Cambodia, that you are actually an honest and reliable facilitator. And this is often requires, the point that I have said before, that less is more, we try not to pontificate, we try to keep things in a very quiet way, quiet diplomacy, and of course the rest followed. On the South China Sea as well, when ASEAN was divided in 2011, we failed to generate a chair statement. Indonesia confronted the issue and we quickly try to fix the problem by doing the shuttle diplomacy and not to allow the division of ASEAN to fester. In other words, we were afraid of policy failure. I was afraid of policy inaction, I was afraid of a lacunae of action that we let things be and that’s why I am so agitated now, as a personal level when I see certain division in ASEAN, not provoking a sense of outrage. The division cannot be made like a normal stage of affairs. Someone must get upset over this. Someone must felt compelled that we must not allow this to continue even for one day longer. But I fear there is a sense of pembiaran, so that we continue on as if this is… (sighs). You know we must be firm and yet flexible. DPD We are running out of time. But you know, to have Pak Marty here is a luxury to us. So I will allow two more, short and direct questions before we close. I know Ambassador of Jordan wants to ask questions and we’ll take one from the students. Thank you. Q

(Ambassador Walid of Jordan) Thank you very much this excellent discussion, as always conducted by FPCI. Two things, I noticed from the meeting of Bu Retno with the United States’ Secretary of Defence, she made it clear that this cursive must be more elaborated. The same statement made by the President, H.E. Joko Widodo in India. It all must be based on trust (of) cooperation for the all regions. Is it clear in the minds of the leaders in Indonesia the concept per se? The second one is, the China factor. I believe we will be touched by this two important factors, firstly because of the United States (policy) no longer pivoting towards Asia plus the assertiveness of China, the Dynamic Equilibrium will not be there. But also India might counter balance, in a way. Is it kind of an American containment with China? Not as the same as the quad, but might be also the same in a way to contain China, instead of TPP economically. Please enlighten me of President Trump’s thinking, thank you.

Q

(Aji, Indonesia Defense University) Well I’m quite interested about the balance power you mentioned before. You said that the nature of power is changing towards the non-state actors. How Indonesia or other countries see the rising power of the non-state actors? Is Indonesia strong enough compare to non-state actors, which is now in the rise? Thank you very much.

MN

Thank you very much, Ambassador. It’s always good to see you in whatever setting. And thank you for your very important question. On the second question, on China, I feel that in any of our forum, regarding the Asia - Pacific, inevitably, the focus always

 

 

turn on China or issues that associated with US – China relations and how it will impact on the region. And when I talked with my China colleagues, I always emphasize the reality, I believe in my experience, of how actually ASEAN and China, if we get our relationship right, it can have a tremendous impact on the wider region. Vice versa, if we troubled in our bilateral relationship, so to speak, then the wider region is also impacted. In other words, ASEAN and China has a beyond bilateral impact. I’ll give you recent example, on the South China Sea for example, whenever there was an interregnum, a slowing down of the diplomatic path on the South China Sea in the DoC, CoC, the issue become like a loose cannon. Discussion many of forum and becomes a problem issues but in contrast, by contrast I mean whenever ASEAN and China make a joint efforts, promoted diplomatic pathway then things becomes a little bit more benign, peaceful and less controversial. So, in other words, it is for China basically, and to ASEAN to some extent, to decide which script it wants to follow. Is it gonna be a big country throwing their weight around or it is going to be a more constructive power in the region. This is where I think policy makers in our region have a capacity to influence the debate in China. Because sometimes you want to behave according to, like a self-fulfilling momentum, in certain ways, in certain forms, then it becomes certainly in that way. So that is why with China I think the challenge is how to ensure that it is a positive influence and factor in the region. RCEP, I mean, of course, there was TPP (Trans Pacific Partnership) and there was ASEAN’s Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership one. It was an ASEAN’s effort and with China supported, TAC which also China supported, there is one issue that I think subject to further thinking through, it’s the One Belt One Road (BRI). I hope China in pushing BRI is not remised of the fact that they have an ASEAN connectivity program as well. And make sure that the BRI is not seen as a unilateral, national centric efforts, but it’s a win-win connectivity effort with the rest of the region. But I worry a little bit by some outlook beyond the region that looking at China as a rival or even Russian Federation as a rival. Enough. Enough already with this kind of language. I mean, what is there to be… I don’t understand. This is why countries of the region must be forthright and must be preemptive in putting an end to this kind of suggestion. But China, the proof will be in its own actual conduct, in reality in the South China Sea and the like. For your first question, it just came to my mind, if you watch a movie there is saying, “coming soon”. We are going to hear, no doubt. What will be the flesh, the substance? But I think we are beginning to see the outer elements. Some of the elements, the notion of ASEAN Centrality, the notion of the IORA, which is very interesting how the ASEAN and IORA synergize. But that’s just procedural issue. More than that, I think the philosophy behind it is where I will be keen to be on the lookout… is where I would be keen on the lookout for and to be following. The Foreign Ministry has the people with brilliant ideas and initiatives. I am sure President Jokowi will be well served by the Foreign Minister and by the team that coming up

 

 

with concrete details. Now that the genie is out of the bottle, it has been out of the bottle for some time actually, but now it is even more out of the bottle, it has to be directed, where is it going to go. Otherwise, there will be lost momentum. But I am sure it will be forthcoming in the future. For the next question, I’m sorry if I miscommunicate. But I was not suggesting as if non-state actors are replacing or becoming as important as state. I truly believe that today we are returning to the age of power politics, the great geo-politics. But amidst all this, we have a processes, I don’t even want to use the term “actors” because when you say non-state actors, even that notion suggest as if there is an entity. Whether it is businesses, NGO’s, but actually, I’m talking about processes. I mean, who controls technologies; the reality of information technology, artificial intelligence, and all the disruptive that is now out there which gives actors, entities, or processes, other than state capacity to change, to make a difference, to make an impact and this is where your next question, about how do we deal with it, well I think we have to recognize it at first. We have to recognize that the constellation out there is diffuse and complex. What government said no longer automatically followed. It does not necessarily you adopt a declaration, you adopt a treaty, and suddenly everything will be fine. But you have to identify what are the processes, recognize the constellation, and deal with a reality that in 21st century the national and international is all intertwined. I think this is one of the key challenges in the future for diplomats. Diplomats usually have a working assumption that there is an internal issue and there is an external issue. Neatly delineated, sovereignty, non-interference, and the like are extremely important. But the reality of our world, it is a messy world out there. It is a work where there are problems that divine national solutions. There are problems that are trans-boundary such as environment, trans-national crimes, technology that are no longer contain within a state. And yet the way we work is national, at most international between states and there is a lacunae that must be addressed. And hence, I think, it is important to have process like Pak Dino introducing the idea of having a foreign policy community, constituency, that goes beyond states, beyond traditional actors, so to speak. But recognizing the challenge is a good start. We have to a little bit more humble in recognizing that we cannot fix everything. We have limitations of power. Power used to be defined as your economy, your GDP, your military prowess, but what does your military prowess do in terms of influencing matters to do with technology, for example, to do with trans-national crimes and the like. I think we are reminded that we have problems that becoming more complex, but the solutions are not necessarily with us. So we have to be smarter in finding new ways of dealing with that. Pak Dino, I have taken up too much of your time, I don’t normally speaking in many forums, as you know, here in Jakarta because I am happily in retirement. And I am sorry that if I have, I hope not to pontificate, but I have not been too rambling in my thoughts expressed just now, but I want to express my admiration for all your important work here within the FPCI. Thank you very much.