SHE WAS A GRIDLEY-BAGLEY-CLASS PREWAR DESTROYER. SHE WAS AS TOUGH AS THEY COME....HER AND HER CREW NEVER CONSIDERED THE CONSEQUENCES OF LEAVING BEHIND THEIR DAMAGED WHALEBOAT AND LIFE RAFTS. he Congress categorically denied the U.S. Navy any fund for new destroyers from 1916 until the early 1930s. The reason was obvious to anyone who appreciated the value of a modern Navy that was, at a minimum, equal to other Navies. Nearly 250 Wickes-class of four-piper, flush-deck destroyers were built to fight in WW I and, at war’s end, only a fraction of these ships served at sea against the enemy. May went from the guilder’s yard to the reserve fleet bastions at locales such as San Diego and Philadelphia. There they sat, and by their existence, prevented the expenditure of taxpayer dollars for modern warships. The response to the Navy’s request was always the same - “You already have a huge destroyer force, why do you need more?” Consequently, ignorant men prevented vital improvements in the nation’s destroyer force. Finally, as it became obvious that the U.S. Navy had fallen far behind the international Naval community, the Depression strapped Congress loosened its purse strings and allowed the construction of 72 destroyers classed generally as the “1500-tonners.” These ships were built beginning with the USS Farragut (DD-348, in service 18 June 1934) up through the USS Buck (DD-420, in service 15 May 1940). Within these 72 ships, there were variations such as the Farragut-, Mahan-, Dunlap-, Gridley-, Bagley-, Benham-, and Sims-class. The differences were in the number of stacks (one or two), number of 5-in/.38-cal guns (four or five), number to torpedo tubes (16 or 12), and other less-obvious variations. In essence, it was a time for experimentation and the limits were imposed by international treaties and money from the Congress. The USS Jarvis was a 1500-tonner and in the Bagley-Gridley sub class. This meant that the Jarvis, which was laid down on 21 August 1935 and commissioned on 27 October 1937, was characteristic of the Bagley-Gridley-type destroyers. The Jarvis was built at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and had a full load displacement of 1969-tons with a length of 341-ft and a beam of 35.5-ft. Its shaft horsepower as 47,191 from steam turbines that could generate up to 36.8-mph (trail speed) with two propellers. The Jarvis had a range of 6500-nm at 12 kts. The Jarvis was not armored except for thin-shell plating, and it main gun battery consisted of four of

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the new 5-in/.38-cal guns (A, B, X, and Y) controlled by a Mark 33 gunfire control system set on top of the pilot house. The forward barrels were shielded, and the aft two 5-in guns were open mounts. Weight considerations were paramount on these destroyers - especially above the main deck. The Jarvis also carried 16 21-in torpedo tubes in four mounts (two on each side amidships). It was thought that the torpedo would be the primary anti-ship weapon when the ship was designed. Consequently, attack from the air was all but ignored by ship designers. The Jarvis could fire a barrage with its fours 5-in guns, and for close-in defense, she had four water-cooled optically aimed .50-cal machine guns. In other words -very little! For ASW, the Jarvis was The USS Patterson & USS Jarvis leaving the building dock after armed with two depth charge christening May 6, 1937. racks aft with 14,300-lb charges on each rack, and depth charge projectors just aft of the torpedo mounts. Later, as the clouds of war gathered in the Pacific, the Jarvis was rearmed with six 20mm Oerlikon single-barrel machine guns that were far more effective than the .50-cal machine guns. The ship was commanded by a L/Cmdr. And had a peacetime complement of 158 which swelled to 254 during wartime. The Jarvis was certainly not in the same league as the future Fletcher-,Gearing- or Summer-class wartime destroyers, yet was a quantum leap forward from the WW I flush-deckers. The Navy had to rely upon the Jarvis and its 71 sisters during the crucial months in 1942 and early 1943 when the war at sea was seemingly its bloodiest in the South Pacific. These ships never cried, “Uncle!” Nineteen of the 72 destroyers were lost during the war.

THE WAR BEGINS FOR THE JARVIS Like much of the Pacific Fleet, the war began for the Jarvis at Pearl Harbor at 0755 on 7 December 1941. She was moored next to the USS Mugford (DD-389) and just inside of 10 Dock opposite the battleship USS California (across the channel). Shortly after the first Japanese planes descended for their attack on Battleship Row, the Jarvis opened fire with its 5-in and 20mm weapons. At the same time, the ship lit off all boilers and prepared for sea on an immediate basis. By 0758, all of her weapons were trained skyward, and although the ship’s gunners claimed four enemy aircraft splashed, it was likely that at least one was brought down by the gung-ho destroyer. The Captain joined the ship at 0915, and at 1015, she pulled out and sped down the smoking channel to the open sea. This was an exceptional piece of seamanship as she had to get around the gunboat USS Sacramento (PG-19) and the USS Argonne (AG-31), and older troop transport. The destroyer Mugford joined the growing fleet of destroyers and cruisers

outside of Pearl Harbor at 1100 as she was delayed by refueling. It was a bitter exodus for the

Note: The Jarvis was docked at “10 dock” at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack....[green arrow]

in front of her were the Sacramento and Argonne...[if you enlarge this you can see what where these vessels were located]....so you can see how difficult it was to maneuver through this situation. all of the surviving ships as the crews had to witness the pride of the pre-war Navy smoking, sunk, capsized, or sinking. The Jarvis was slightly damaged during the attack, yet nothing serious enough to affect its fighting ability. There, they remained close to the Hawaiian Islands on ASW patrol, and defending against a possible invasion (which never happened). Nine days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Jarvis was assigned as an escort for the USS Saratoga (CV-3) which led Task Force 14 to relieve the Marines who were gallantly repelling the Japanese invasion forces at Wake Island. After coming almost within aircraft range of the American island, TF-14 was forced to retire on 23 December. The Navy’s decision to refuel had cost precious time and by the 23rd, the Japanese had taken Wake from the Marines despite their spirited defense of the atoll. Later, several Navy and Marine Corps pilots on the Saratoga angrily dubbed the incident as being overly cautious. The Jarvis then took up screening the USS Lexington (CV-2) in Hawaiian waters, and fortunately was able to rescue 182 survivors of the fleet oiler USS Neches (AO-5) which had been torpedoed by a Japanese submarine on 23 January 1942. It is not certain that the I-23, a Japanese Fleet submarine, sank the Neches, but it was certain that the Jarvis assisted by the USS Long (DMS-12) sank the intruder after two massive depth charge attacks in the later afternoon of 28 January. At 1839, the Long and Jarvis heard two distinct and delayed explosions and then saw large oil slicks. B1 Type (20 units) Main article: B1 type submarine I-25 B1 type submarine.B1 Type (I-15 Series) submarines (I-15, I-17, I-19, I-21, I-23, I-25, I-26, I-27, I-28, I-29, I-30, I-31, I-32, I-33, I-34, I-35, I-36, I-37, I-38, I-39) were the most numerous type of submarines of the Imperial Japanese Navy during World War II. In total 20 were made, starting with I-15, the class ship. These were fast, very long ranged, and carried a single Yokosuka E14Y seaplane, located in a hangar in front of the conning tower, launched by a catapult. The series was rather successful, especially at the beginning of the war. I-26, in 1942, crippled aircraft carrier USS Saratoga. I-19, on 15 September 1942, fired six torpedoes at aircraft carrier USS Wasp, two of which hit the carrier and sank her, the remainder damaging battleship USS North Carolina. I-25 conducted the only aerial bombings ever on the continental United States in September 1942. Several of these ships also undertook "Yanagi" missions to Europe (I-30, I-34, I-29).

The I-23 was quite modern as it entered Imperial Navy service just four-months before being destroyer. The boat was 367-ft in length; had a maximum diving depth of 330-ft, displaced 4172-tons surfaced, carried 18-21-in torpedoes serving six tubes, and had a float plane as well as

a 5.5-in deck gun. After the war, it was confirmed that two ships put an end to the I-23. Note: This particular type of Japanese submarine actually evolved into the I-400 series, which actually they called a “Submersible Aircraft Carrier.” Now if you are interested in reading about this design I have an article that will probably knock your socks off when you see what they designed and used....it is titled: Airfield Under the Sea.. If interested, just e-mail me and I’ll send it to you for further reading......

OPERATION WATCHTOWER Jarvis’s next stop after a short overhaul in San Francisco was to join Task Force 62 which had been assigned the first amphibious operation in the Pacific by the Allies. The target was the Solomon Islands, Tulagi and Guadalcanal, and ultimately up to Rabaul, the main Japanese base in the region. The operation was known as Watchtower, but to the troops and individual sailors, it was Operation Shoestring because there were only 84 ships, 20,000 Marines, and no capital warships (battleships) for bombardment. The USS Vincennes shown here one month prior to being sunk in the Battle of Savo Island.

The largest ships were heavy cruisers from the United States and Australia. All of the heavy cruisers were treaty-type and restricted in size and armor. In the beginning, the primary heavy warships were the USS Chicago (CA-29). USS Vincennes (CA-44), USS Astoria (CA-34), USS Quincy (CA-39), the Australian County-class

cruisers HMAS Canberra and HMAS Australia; as well as two light cruisers - HMAS Hobart and the USS San Juan. The Canberra, Vincennes, Quincy, and Astoria were sunk during the Battle of Savo Island on August 8 - 9, 1942, and any narrative about the Jarvis must include this clash. These cruisers also helped to soften up the beaches before the Marines landed, yet all were surprised when the landing on Guadalcanal was virtually unopposed. Of course, the landing on Tulagi was far different. It had to be violently taken from the Japanese defenders. Fortuitously, the weather cooperated with the invasion force with clouds, intermittent rain storms and squalls that hampered the prying eyes of the Japanese Navy. It also produced a high level of heat and humidity that easily fatigued the men of the invasion force. On 7 August, the force arrived off the beaches of Guadalcanal where surprised Japanese engineers were feverishly attempting to build an airfield. Once a suitable airfield was built, the Japanese would control the sea lanes and supply routes from the USA to Australia and New Zealand. The Allies were not going to allow this. The advance of the victorious Japanese Imperial Navy and Army had already been stopped at Midway Island in June 1942, and now it would go no further in the Southwest Pacific. Guadalcanal was to be the end of Japanese aggression. As soon as the Japanese troops on Guadalcanal saw the invasion ships, the cruisers and destroyers began a bombardment, they left for the deeper jungle. But to the Allies, the airstrip was the primary goal and had to be taken before the Japanese were able to make it operational. Instead, the Allies were going to make use of the airstrip, and it was soon named Henderson Field.

THE EARLY DAYS OF WATCHTOWER AND THE SEA AND AIR BATTLES The initial landings by the Allies began at 0650 on 7 August 1942. The Jarvis provided gunfire support, ASW patrols and , later, anti-aircraft protection for the transports. No Japanese ships opposed the landing, and it was not until the early afternoon, that land-based Japanese

Three twin-engine land-based Bettys steak into the Guadalcanal Allied transport anchorage armed with torpedoes and bombs. The bombers had been sent from Rabaul and were bent on breaking up the landing by sinking of damaging as many ships as possible.

bombers and torpedo planes attacked the amphibious operation. Some minor damage was done to the destroyer Mugford (DD-389), yet by nightfall, the Allies had a firm hold on the beachheads on Tulagi and Guadalcanal. There was a claim of 14 Japanese aircraft being destroyed; however,

this appears to be over stated. The Marines even captured all of the Japanese equipment being used in the construction of the airfield, and food supplies due to air attacks and bombardments by Japanese warships intent on recovering the ground taken by the Marines. The 8th of August was to proven to be a A “Betty” that didn’t make it pivotal point in the campaign to hold on to the Solomon Islands and begin pushing the Japanese away from Australia. Besides, the transports were able to land 11,000 of the total troop strength on the first day.

As you can see by the map above showing the disposition of forces and approximate times. The Jarvis sailed right though the middle of the attack...[green arrows show track taken by Jarvis] Now that the Japanese knew essentially what the Allies were planning, they launched several air attacks from Rabaul to Disrupt the transport area and sink as many screening ships and transports as possible. They hit the USS George F. Elliott (AP-13) and set it on fire, and the

Jarvis took a torpedo forward that opened a 50-ft gash in its starboard side in the forward fire room. The twin-engine Betty that was carrying the torpedo exploded just as it was dropped, but the damage was done. The Jarvis was in no imminent danger of sinking and had to be temporarily towed to a shallow anchorage off Lunga Point by the USS Dewey (DD-349) Fourteen crewmen lost their lives and seven were seriously wounded. As darkness fell, the Jarvis was towed to Tulagi for emergency repair work and the wounded taken from the ship for medical care. The rest of the crew jettisoned everything on the port side, including torpedoes, to lighten the ship. This also included both whaleboats and all of the life rafts. The ship was soon considered to be seaworthy (perhaps a little wishful thinking) and could make 8-kts, so a decision was made to have the USS Hovey (DMS-11) escort the Jarvis to Efate, New Hebrides, for more permanent repairs. Apparently, the message to await the Hovey was not received and the destroyer’s commanding officer decided that his ship could make it to Sydney, Australia, for a complete overhaul. This would mean a long and dangerous voyage fraught with enemy submarines, aircraft and surface ships, but also a quick return to combat. The captain and his officers were anxious to get their ship back into action, so they weighted anchor shortly before midnight, and began their tortuous voyage to Australia. Unfortunately, the Jarvis picked the worse time to sail right through the first of a series of Naval engagements at night that were more like street fighting at sea [as you can see in the above map] At the time she was leaving Tulagi and began moving slowly through what would become known as Iron Bottom Sound, Mikawa’s force was within 10-mi of the Southern Group and HMAS Canberra. Actually, the Japanese swept right past the patrolling American destroyer USS Blue (DD387) at less than 1-mi range. The Blue simply turned back on her predetermined patrol route and did not notice the seven ships making high speed around Savo Island. There were a number of Allied cruisers and destroyers in the vicinity but also seven Japanese cruisers and one destroyer as well. The Japanese task force was on a collision course at 26-kts with the Allies who were generally unaware of their presence.

ANOTHER SURPRISE ATTACK AND ALLIED DEFEAT Shortly after discovering that the Allies had landed on Guadalcanal and Tulagi, the Japanese Navy responded with a hurried plan to make a night surface attack on the transports and screening ships near Savo Island. Rear Admiral Mikawa in his flagship, the heavy cruiser Chokai, was able to pick up four additional heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and a single destroyer. The plan of attack was based on a high-speed run from Rabaul to the landing area; attack whatever shipping was present and then retire at high-speed to be out of Allied air cover by daybreak on 9 August. Everything was done to avoid being discovered and although his force was sighted by an American submarine and two patrolling Hudson medium bombers, the warnings were either not heeded or received. Mikawa’s force was tasked to come in South of Savo Island and with gunfire and torpedoes sink or destroy everything in the Guadalcanal anchorage. The force would then retire around Savo Island and head back to Rabaul. The Allies had dispersed their cruisers and destroyers in three distinct groups around savo Island - Southern, Northern and Eastern. Right through the Southern Group, the damaged Jarvis was making her way toward Australia at about 0150. At this time, Mikawa’s force swept into the area and begin

firing/launching torpedoes at HMAS Canberra (the cruiser sank the following day), and seeing the Jarvis, began firing upon the limping destroyer. She was within 3,000-yds of the Japanese column, and the destroyer Yunagi was detailed to engage the Jarvis. The destroyer was down by the head, most of its weapons were inoperable, and the Japanese though she was an Achilles-class light cruiser due to the trunked single stack. To sink a cruiser would be quite an accomplishment for the Yunagi. The destroyer was one of the older models (1924) with four 5.5-in guns and four 21-in torpedo tubes were liberally used on the Jarvis, but with no results. The Yunagi continued on to bigger game. The Jarvis also limped onward at maximum speed to get out of the melee that was beginning north of her position. With no communications and few weapons, there was little the destroyer could do. At 0200, the Yunagi opened fire on the Jarvis, with its 5.5-in guns, yet thee was no real damage done. By this time, the Japanese heavy cruisers had gotten amongst he American heavy cruisers in the Northern Group, and the surprise was complete. The Japanese Navy was expert at night fighting and its optics were superior to the U.S. Navy’s unreliable radar. The Japanese column remained intact and began a rapid fire of 8-in shells plus launching torpedoes at the blind

and confused Allies. The Japanese even illuminated the Americans with powerful searchlights to help define their targets. At 1215, the USS Astoria had been hit several times, and quickly sank; the heavy cruiser USS Quincy was next and she went down bow first at 0236 quickly followed by the USS Vincennes which sank at 0250. The USS Chicago was also hit by a torpedo on her port side forward, but was too far away for any further damage. The destroyer USS Ralph

The USS Chicago shoring up its torpedo damage after the Savo Island battle

The USS Blue rescuing crewmen from the HMAS Canberra.

T albot (DD-390) was at the far end of the Allied patrol zone in the northern quadrant, and the retiring Japanese force used the destroyer as their parting shot - in other words, she was hit innumerable times. She did not founder but she was severely mauled. The only real response to he Japanese was a few secondary battery hits on the Japanese cruiser Chokai; however, this did not impede its escape with the rest of its task force. The Jarvis was at least 12-mi from Savo Island at the same time (0250) that the Japanese force was making its way back to Rabaul. However, the problems facing the damaged destroyer were just beginning.

THE END OF A GALLANT SHIP AND A BRAVE CREW Shortly after dawn, a patrolling American aircraft from the USS Saratoga spotted the Jarvis badly down by the head and trailing an oil slick that was visible for miles. That was the last time the ship or its crew were ever seen by the Allies. The Japanese were convinced that a light cruiser was escaping to Australia and threw 31 land-based Betty twin-engin torpedo bombers at the ship. At about noon, the aircraft sighted the Jarvis, and went to work despite the 20-mm anti-aircraft fire. Jarvis was hit by a number of torpedoes and at 1200, she literally split and went down. None of her crew was saved. Perhaps the reason was that they jettisoned any and all flotation devices (rafts and boats). All of her remaining 233 crewmen perished. However no one can ever say they were not courageous and devoted to getting back into the fight. Of course, this is a core characteristic of a destroyerman.

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