The Central African Republic Security Sector: Actors and structures
Niagale Bagayoko
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Contents Background, Methodology and structure of the report ............................................................................... 5 Political context............................................................................................................................................. 6 The ethnicisation of the State ................................................................................................................... 6 The MISAB and the MINURCA .................................................................................................................. 7 The coup attempt of May 2001 ................................................................................................................ 7 The seizure of power by Bozizé (May 2003) ............................................................................................. 8 Central African rebel groups ..................................................................................................................... 8 The influence of the regional actors ....................................................................................................... 10 Internal insecurity ................................................................................................................................... 10 The non-governmental armed groups / militias ................................................................................. 11 The "zaraguinas" ................................................................................................................................. 11 Present multilateral and bilateral forces in the Central African Republic .............................................. 11 The multinational force of the CEMAC: the FOMUC .......................................................................... 11 The representatives of the UN ............................................................................................................ 13 The CPI .................................................................................................................................................... 13 South Africa............................................................................................................................................. 14 The French cooperation in security ........................................................................................................ 14 The MINURCA and the EUFOR Chad / RCA ............................................................................................. 15 Inventory of the Central African security forces ......................................................................................... 16 The institutional frame ........................................................................................................................... 16 The Constitution.................................................................................................................................. 16 The administrative organization ......................................................................................................... 17
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The defence forces.................................................................................................................................. 19 The chain of decision .......................................................................................................................... 19 The FACA (Central African Armed forces) ........................................................................................... 21 The Gendarmerie ................................................................................................................................ 36 The forces of police ................................................................................................................................. 47 The national police force .................................................................................................................... 47 The problems ...................................................................................................................................... 50 Reform ................................................................................................................................................ 54 The municipal police ........................................................................................................................... 58 Intelligence services ................................................................................................................................ 60 Intelligence within the Ministry of Defence ....................................................................................... 60 Intelligence within the national police force ...................................................................................... 60 External Intelligence service ............................................................................................................... 62 Territorial organization of intelligence services.................................................................................. 62 The problems ...................................................................................................................................... 62 Envisaged reforms............................................................................................................................... 63 Customs and waterways and forests ...................................................................................................... 64 Customs............................................................................................................................................... 64 Waterways and forests sector ................................................................................................................ 66 Self-defence groups ................................................................................................................................ 67 The private security companies .............................................................................................................. 67 DDR, foreign fighters and SSR ................................................................................................................. 69 Light weapons and small arms (LWSA) ................................................................................................... 70 The presence of armed foreign fighters on national territory................................................................ 71 The democratic control of the security sector: the role of legislative power ........................................ 72
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The institutional powers of the National Assembly............................................................................ 72 The working conditions of the Central African members of parliament ............................................ 73 The reforms to strengthen the power of the Parliament ................................................................... 74 The role of the media.............................................................................................................................. 75 The governance of the security sector: transparency in budget management, and the fight against the corruption within the Forces .................................................................................................................. 76 Conclusion: the crucial challenge in the distribution of the competence between the forces of defence and the forces of security ........................................................................................................................... 79 Appendix: List of interviews ........................................................................................................................ 82 ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................................................. 83 Bibliography: ............................................................................................................................................... 87
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The Central African Republic Security Sector: Actors and structures
Background, Methodology and structure of the report The current report, realized within the framework of the study GO / 0717 financed by the DFID (International Department for Development, United Kingdom) and collectively piloted by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, presents the current state of the security sector in the Central African Republic (CAR). The methodology was qualitative in nature. The first phase of elaboration of this report consisted of a literature review, which mainly concentrated on the numerous reports that have been recently published by human rights organizations or independent research institutes. This first phase allowed for the identification of the main actors of the local security sector. The review of French military cooperation, Frères d’arme, was also particularly useful for this first inventory, as well as the report that the Preparatory Committee for the Inclusive Political Dialogue (CPDPI) was asked to prepare. The first part of the current study was inspired by these various sources and presents and analyzes the current political situation within CAR (notably the relationships of power between the main actors of the political game) and the way these influence the state of the security apparatus. The second research phase has consisted of leading field research in the country between April 12th and 30th, 2008. The first week was dedicated to following-up of a seminar dedicated to security sector reform in CAR. This seminar collected extremely precise data, and updated the functioning of, and the procedures of the Central African security sector. During the following two weeks, about thirty interviews with actors of the security sector were set up, using a semidirective technique (cf. list in appendix). The support of the French embassy was invaluable in getting in touch with many of them. The second part of this report successively considers: -
the institutional (constitutional and administrative) organization which supervises the action of the defence and security forces in the Central African Republic;
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the privileges of the executive authorities within defence;
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the organization and the functioning of the various security forces (FACA and the Gendarmerie; the police forces; the Intelligence services; the customs, waterways and forests services) as well as including the problems that they face, and the measures that are envisaged to reform them;
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the role of non-state security actors (groups of self-defence and private security companies);
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the problems created by the demobilization of ex-fighters, and the status of current foreign fighters in the CAR; 5
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the mechanisms of democratic control of the security forces (the role of the Parliament;, role of the media, and budget management).
Political context Since the proclamation of independence of the Oubangui Chari province of French Equatorial Africa (AEF) in 1960, and after the murder of the father of the nation, Barthélemy Boganda, five different presidents succeeded one another (one of them, David Dacko, having made two mandates in 14 years of interval). It is extremely important to mention the fact that the current political actors of the Central African political scene have, for decades, played a leading role: most of them occupied the highest functions (as shown in the table below) before joining the ranks of different rebellions. In the CAR, rebellions very often appear as the corridors of power.
President
Term
Ethnic group
David Dacko
1960-1965
Ngbaka
Jean-Bedel Bokassa David Dacko
1966-1979
Ngbaka
1979-1981
Ngbaka
Andre Kolingba Ange-Félix Patassé François Bozizé
1981-1993
Yakoma
1993-2003
Sara
2003-…
Gbaya
Post occupied before entering the function Secretary of Home Affairs, the economy and the finances Chief of Army Staff Advisor to Bokassa‟s staff Chief of Army Staff Former Prime Minister Former Chief of Army Staff
Reason connected to the loss of function Coup (on December 31st, 1965)
Dismissed in his absence by the French troops (in September 21st, 1979) Coup (on September 1st, 1981) Defeat at the elections (in September 19th, 1993) Coup (on March 15th, 2003)
Source: Berman Eric, The Central African Republic: a case study on the light weapons and the conflicts, the Special report of Small arms survey with the support of the PNUD, Institute of the high international studies, in June, 2006, p. 10.
The ethnicisation of the State The Central African State is characterized by the ethnicisation of its politics. General Kolingba particularly favoured for his family and his ethnic group, the Yakoma, which is a minority ethnic group that represents less than 5 % of the population. To punish Ange-Félix Patassé for having stirred up a coup attempt, General Kolingba ordered punitive expeditions in the ethnic fiefs of the putschist, particularly in the regions of Paoua (Patassé‟s home town) and Markounda. A lot of people were massacred which created a long-lived hatred of Kaba-Sara against Yakoma. 6
Kolingba inaugurated the instrumentalisation of the ethnic membership for political purposes. It is within the army and, in particular, within the presidential guard, that Kolingba‟s ethnic policy is the most obvious. In 1993, at the end of his mandate, 70 % of the FACA (Forces armées centrafricaines – the Central Africa armed forces) belonged to the minority ethnic group of the Yakoma. After three presidents who had their origins in the South (David Dacko and Jean Bedel Bokassa both Mbaka and André Kolingba, Yakoma), Patassé is the first president who comes from the North. The new Head of State widely aggravated the divisions between Northerners and Southerners, by opposing the "people of the savanna to people of the river». Patassé largely distrusted the army, particularly the presidential guard, who was seen as Kolingba‟s personal militia. First of all he tried to guarantee his own personal safety by putting the presidential guard, Yakoma, back into the ranks of the FACA. Having been privileged under the previous regime, the Yakoma then sunk into dissatisfaction. The new presidential guard also turned out to be a tribal militia, this time quasi-exclusively constituted by Sara-Kaba, Patassé‟s northern-ethnic group. The rivalries between this presidential guard and the FACA worsened; the FACA have been more and more neglected, and their dissatisfaction is largely seen to be the originators of the mutinies of 1996-1997. In 1996 and 1997, three mutinies burst onto the scene to protest against the non-payment of salaries, and against the deterioration of the living conditions of the FACA. Fifty people were reported dead. Following these mutinies, France decided to put an end to its permanent military presence in the country.
The MISAB and the MINURCA Six African countries, - Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Senegal, Chad and Togo, supported by France, agreed to send troops under an inter-African peacekeeping force, the MISAB. 750 African soldiers were deployed in Bangui. On April 15th, 1998, the MISAB handed over to the MINURCA, (Mission of United Nations for the Central African Republic) who were 1350 strong. On April 1st, 2000, the MINURCA ended, leaving their remit to the UN‟s Office of observation in the Central African Republic (BONUCA), which consisted of 70 civilians.
The coup attempt of May 2001 On May 28th, 2001, a commando equipped with heavy weapons attacked the residence of President Patassé. Although General Kolingba had - confusedly – already claimed the overthrow on national radio, President Patassé quickly suspected that it was the Minister of Defence, Jean-Jacques Demafouth, who had plotted the coup attempt. Demafouth was then dismissed and arrested. The case of Jean-Jacques Demafouth was finally settled by the Central African justice department, after Patassé identified a new actor (who had been previously hidden from the overthrow) in the person of General Bozizé, the chief of Staff, who was then dismissed. In violation of the agreement negotiated with General Lamine Cissé, head of the BONUCA, Ange-Félix Patassé tried again to seize François Bozizé, but Bozize succeeded in fleeing to Chad, and then went on to join France. After the coup attempt, Patassé launched a 7
hunt in Bangui for Yakoma, which ended with 300 deaths, and the flight of 50.000 inhabitants from the capital.
The seizure of power by Bozizé (May 2003) Supported by the Chadian armed forces, Bozizé‟s partisans launched a new raid on Bangui in October, 2002. The opposition in exile who had lined up behind General Bozizé, and who had joined Chad benefited from an alliance of the regional leaders against Patassé: -
President Deby, who had just launched a counter-offensive of the governmental forces in the North of the Central African Republic against the Chadian rebels, provided Bozizé with soldiers of his presidential guard;
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President Joseph Kabila of the DRC sent armaments that had been requested;
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President Denis Sassou-Nguesso of Congo Brazzaville financed the operation;
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President Bongo of Gabon gave his blessing.
On March 15th, 2003, General Bozizé arrived to Bangui with troops consisting of 80 % Chadians. The FACA did not react to the offensive (led whilst President Patassé was abroad) whereas the force of the CEMAC (cf. infra) received instructions not to oppose the arrival of the rebels. France sent 300 men to protect its nationals. But, as it transpired, in fact, Operation Boali, was then transformed into DIO (Detachment of Operational Instruction), which helped to stabilize the new regime. François Bozizé made an appeal to Idriss Deby who then sent 500 Chadian soldiers to restore order in the capital. The Chadian elements were guilty of numerous acts of plunder in Bangui. In May 2005, President Bozizé won the presidential elections, by a ballot judged as regular by the observers. At the same time, organized general elections offered him a relative majority to the Parliament. The FIDH accused Patassé and Colonel Miskine, who was in charge of the pacification of the North, of having been involved in numerous massacres of civilians. Bozizé‟s partisans were also accused of having committed a lot of abuses.
Central African rebel groups The Central African Republic‟s rebel movements only benefited from limited outside support, and their grievances are generally mostly internal. The Northwest rebellion - called APRD appeared as an attempt at revenge led by the previous holders of power. It had for core the members of the former presidential guard of Ange-Félix Patassé. The APRD has mainly been active in the provinces of Ouham, Ouham-Pende and Nana-Grebizi. It could only count on one thousand badly equipped fighters. These rebels asserted that their intention was not to knock down the power, but to open a dialogue that aimed to solve the problem of the political exclusion of Patassé1, as well as solving the security situation in the northwest, which had been 1
Ex-President Patassé was not authorized to run for the presidential elections of 2005.
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seriously disturbed by the "zaraguinas" (cf. infra). A report by Amnesty International denounced the fact that serious violence had been exercised by the armed forces in the northwest. The members of the presidential Guard, who come directly under the President‟s jurisdiction (cf. infra) were those who were primarily questioned. The signature on an agreement with the APRD is one of the major stakes in the current, inclusive, political dialogue. Other movements were also active in the North-West, especially the Patriotic Movement for the Restoration of the Central African Republic (MPRC)- which claimed the murder of the mayor of Bossangoa – and, above all, the democratic Front for the Central African People (FDPC), which was steered by the former leader of President Patassé, Abdoulaye Miskine‟s special unit. However, in January 2007, Abdoulaye Miskine joined President Bozizé and was finally appointed as a special councillor, in spite of his indictment by the International Penal Court for Justice for the abuses committed by his militia in 2002 and 2003 in the North of the country. This appointment followed the signature of the Syrte agreement which included the immediate cessation of hostilities, the stationing of the rebel forces prior to their integration into the national army, and the insurgents of the FDPC benefiting from a general amnesty. In the very little populated region of the Vakaga, in the extreme northeast part of the Central African Republic, elements of the Gula ethnic group - among which many received military training within poaching units - were at the heart of another rebellion. They undertook a grievance to the State for discriminating against their mainly Muslim community, and, more widely, for abandoning their province which has no roads, no schools nor sanitary infrastructures. Vakaga‟s inhabitants traditionally turned to Abéché, in Chad, and to Nyala, the capital of the Sudanese province of Darfur, to which the local leaders traditionally lent allegiance. The cohabitation between the Sudanese and the Central Africans turned out to be a difficulty. The tensions between the inhabitants (sedentary farmers) and the Sudanese nomads, who brought their people in the CAR in search of meadow water, reached their height in 2002, after the murder of an important spiritual leader, Yaya Ramadan, by the Sudanese. In Birao, the administrative centre of Vakaga, 63 Sudanese nomads were massacred in reprisals. The money paid by the Sudanese authorities to finance social programs to compensate for the murder of Ramadan were diverted and never reached the Gula, Ramadan‟s ethnic group. As the violence continued, an anti-Gula feeling developed within governmental circles, the armed forces, and the population in general. As a consequence, the local population fled from zones that were under governmental control for fear of reprisals. In this context, the arrival of Bozizé‟s former companions (the so-called “ex-liberators”), who felt excluded from the sharing of power, were able to contribute to the militarization of the prevailing dissatisfaction. These former partisans of General Bozizé gathered within the UFRD (Union for the democratic forces assembly) . The UFDR is a coalition of three armed groups (the Movement of Central African Liberators for Justice (MLJC) led by captain Abakar Sabone; the Group of Patriotic Action for Liberation of the Central African Republic (GAPLC) of Michel Djotodia, and the Central African Democratic Front (FDC) headed by Major Hasan Justin, who used to be a member of Patassé‟s presidential guard. This movement had a common cause with Gulas. In October 2006, the city of Birao was attacked by the UFDR rebels, who were made to go on the run by the FACA, and who seized an arsenal of armaments. In the same maneuver the movement also seized the cities of Ouanda Djalle, Sam Ouandja and Ndele. The FACA launched a counter-offensive at the end of November 2006, and reinstated Ndele and Birao, and then two other cities. France then settled in Birao a DAO (Detachment of Operational Assistance). In March 2007, the rebels of the UFDR attacked Birao again, but the city was conquered again thanks, in particular, to the support of the French forces, who had previously stationed 150 men there. In Vakaga, the Central African government led reprisals against the local population which were considered complicit. In comparison to the APDR, the UFDR were shown as being a better-equipped 9
movement, in addition to having a more centralized military structure. On April 13th, 2007, the operational command of the UFDR signed a peace agreement with General Bozizé, under the aegis of Omar Bongo, but without the agreement of Abakar Sabone. This text is similar to the Syrte agreements that had been concluded two months earlier with Abdoulaye Miskine, and invites the UFDR to participate in government.
The influence of the regional actors The CAR crisis is mainly rooted internally, and results from endogenous dynamics. However, a number of regional actors got involved to some extent in the CAR politics, which contributed to the worsening of the internal crisis: -
The Libyan forces and the Congolese Movement of Liberation (MLC) of Jean-Pierre Bemba lent assistance to Patassé in order to repel the assaults of Bozizé‟s rebellion. It is thanks to the intervention of hundreds of Libyan soldiers, sent by Colonel Kadhafi, that Ange-Félix Patassé managed to save his power after the coup attempt in May 2001. However, under the pressure of France and its regional allies (Chad, Gabon and both Congos), Colonel Kadhafi finally removed his troops in December 2002. President Patassé then appealed to Jean-Pierre Bemba‟s MLC. These Congolese forces were guilty of numerous abuses in the CAR;
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As previously mentioned, Chadian leader Idriss Deby supported General Bozizé‟s coup. Since Bozizé seized power, the military influence of Chad has been very tangible. The personal security of President Bozizé has been ensured by the presence of 80 Chadian servicemen, who stemmed from the same ethnic group as Idriss Deby - the Zaghawas. However, the Chadian influence in the Central African Republic tends to be widely reduced from now on;
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Contrary to the widely spread idea according to which the CAR crisis is closely linked to the Darfur crisis, asserting that Sudan is the main supporter of the Central African rebel movements, is widely erroneous. The incidence of the Darfur humanitarian crisis in the Central African Republic has, in fact, been very limited (in August 2007, only 4244 Sudanese refugees were registered in the CAR). There is no doubt that the Sudanese support Chadian rebels (established in Vakaga) who are fighting against Idriss Deby, and this has been extended to the UFDR rebels who have been provided with weapons, as well as with military training. However, this support was not conclusive. It is therefore probably a bit excessive to describe the rebels of the northeast as under the leadership of Khartoum.
Internal insecurity Apart from the rebellions, there are two phenomenoms that have contributed to the maintenance of insecurity in the CAR. Firstly, the proliferation of private militias, mostly set up by President Patassé and, secondly,the attacks by the so-called “zaraguinas”.
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The non-governmental armed groups / militias Under the presidency of Ange-Félix Patassé, militias and non-governmental armed groups have proliferated. President Patassé created a militia affiliated to his political party, the Movement of Liberation of the Central African people (MLPC). Moreover, he hired thirty or so private agents in the Central African Company of Protection And Surveillance (SCPS) and, not being able to increase the presidential guard‟s manpower any more, he also financed several personal militias, in the various districts of Bangui, known under the names of Karakos, Balawas and Sarawis. Finally, President Patassé established another militia known under the name of its leader, Abdulaye Miskine, which was meant to pacify the North. These non-state armed groups were generally better armed and better equipped than the governmental forces - with the exception of the presidential guard. All these groups seem to have now been disbanded.
The "zaraguinas" The zaraguinas consist of Central Africans and nationals of neighbouring countries, particularly the Chadians. The zaraguinas traditionally range in regions in the North of the country, but their action tends to be more widespread within the entire territory. Zaraguinas have been operating for a long time in the border zones of the CAR, Cameroon and Chad. They mainly attack the travellers on roads, and tend to widen their raids to incorporate villages, taking advantage of the quasi-absence of security authorities in the Northern regions. They particularly target the breeders, mainly the Peulh nomadic communities, whom they force to sell their cattle to pay as ransom in exchange for their children who they hold as hostages. Human rights organisations accuse the zaraguinas of proceeding to summary executions, while the local populations blame the FACA for not defending them. To flee from the zaraguinas, many communities have abandoned their villages and are forced to camp in the jungle. The attacks of the zaraguinas have forced some communities to set up self-defence units within their villages (cf. infra).
Present multilateral and bilateral forces in the Central African Republic The national Central African forces of defence and security do not act alone in the preservation of the security of the country. The international community plays an important role in restoring and preserving peace of mind.
The multinational force of the CEMAC: the FOMUC At the conclusion of the summit of Libreville of October 2nd, 2002, the Member States of the CEMAC decided on the display of a force of 350 soldiers in the Central African Republic: the FOMUC. This force replaced the MINUCAR, the mandate of which came to an end in 2000. The FOMUC was displayed in November 2002. Its mandate was initially to ensure the security of 11
President Ange-Félix Patassé, and to contribute to the reorganization of the Central African armed forces, as well as to watch the work of the mixed patrols along the border with Chad. This mandate was extended and adapted after the eviction of the power of President Patassé by General Bozizé in March 2003. Since then, the FOMUC has been entrusted a mandate to accompany the process of stabilization by supporting the normalization of institutions. From July 12th, 2008, the FOMUC should pass under the command of the CEEAC to become FOMAC. Since 2002, three contributing states (Gabon, Chad, Congo) have supplied a staff consisting of three companies, totaling a contingent of 380 men (38 officers, 126 non-commissioned officers, 216 ranked men) to whom they have just added 119 men of a Cameroonian contingent. Since the arrival of the Cameroonian contingent, the staff now consists of four contingents. The socalled Boali French detachment supports the FOMUC, supplying an expertise in instruction as well as in logistic backup. The main part of the force is financed by France (12 million euros, mainly in materials) and by the European Union (10 million euros). The CEMAC contributes at the level of 250.000 euros. The main successes of the FOMUC‟s forces are concerned with the reassurance of the capital Bangui and its surroundings, their contribution to the fight against zaraguinas, their contribution to development by the construction of infrastructures, and with the implementation of civilianmilitary actions. The mandate of the FOMUC was initially foreseen to last between 2003 and 2006, but has been prolonged to allow them to work on the reorganization of the national army, and on the transfer of the responsibilities towards the FACA. Within the framework of the reassurances to the Northwest, the FOMUC have indeed collaborated with small units (sections of 30 men) of the FACA. There are three sites in the provinces (Kagabandoro, Bozoum, Paoua), on which the FOMUC has planned to systematically include a company of the FOMUC (90 men), with a section of the FACA. These units are called the «integrated FACA », they wear the same uniform, and hold the same materials as the FOMUC units. Thus, on the whole, there are 120 Central African servicemen in every detachment of the FOMUC. The integrated FACA receive training under the expertise of the FOMUC (e.g. patrols, shooting practice etc). The FOMUC‟s contingents also receive instruction on humanitarian rights, and how to fight against HIV/AIDS – and the integrated units of the FACA also benefit from it, as do other contingents. This is distributed by the NGO, the HCR, and the CICR. Besides this, when it has to manage zaraguinas, the FOMUC always integrates an element of the Central African gendarmerie: for instance when a road cutter is called out, he is immediately handed to the Gendarmerie for judicial instruction. In June 2007 the FOMUC ceded the camp of Bria to the FACA. The objective was to give to the FACA a garrison culture, by encouraging them to participate in local civil life, so that eventually, they do not take harass any more the population. However, numerous problems have arisen in the management of the camps today. The FACA is not ready to occupy a place in an appropriate way, and they notably show themselves as incapable of maintaining infrastructures, even if they are extremely well-equipped because they have been furnished in accordance with the current criteria for the forces of the European Union (e.g. deep freezes, air conditioning, televisions, generating sets). The maintenance of all of this equipment is extremely expensive (particularly with the running of them, and with electricity) and the FACA has no means to provide for them. The contrast between the decay of the FACA and the endowment and professionalism of the FOMUC - that could have been noticed during a visit to the Poko camp M', and during an interview with the assistant chief of Staff - is striking. The difference of means is a source of frustration for the FACA. According to some interviewed Central African military high officials, the integrated FACA section is only a folding screen to avoid the FOMUC to be seen as an occupying army.. These Central Africa officials do think that it would be necessary to give the 12
budget and the means of the FOMUC to the FACA, which are seen to be much more effective. It also seems that the EC (European Community), which co-finances the force with France, is dissatisfied with the balance of the FOMUC.
The representatives of the UN Two UN authorities are currently present in the CAR - the BONUCA, and the local Office of the UNDP. The BONUCA (Office of the United Nations for the Consolidation of Peace in the CAR) was established on February 10th, 2000, initially for a period of one year. Its mandate has been extended until then. For its mission, the BONUCA has to support the efforts of the government in strengthening peace and national reconciliation, strengthen democratic institutions, and facilitate the mobilization of the international plan for political support and resources for the national reconstruction, and economic recovery, of the country. The Office is also in charge of approving the diffusion of the principles of the human rights within the country. The Office includes military councillors and the civil police, it is asked to follow reforms in security, and to help operate training programmes. It is as such that the BONUCA contributes to the intensification of the capacities of the FACA and the forces of police, by organizing training both on human rights, and on technical subjects chosen by the Central Africans. The BONUCA has also helped the Central African police in drafting a definition of its particular status which is, at present, still on the desk of the National Assembly. As far as the Office of the UNDP it is concerned, it has been present in the Central African Republic since 1976. It intervenes beside the State through a frame of cooperation that binds it to the CAR in a periodic way. The current frame of cooperation has as its main objective the remit to facilitate a fast and durable return to constitutional order, security, peace and national reconciliation. The programme strengthens the national capacities in four domains: the promotion of good governance; the fight against poverty; the fight against HIV/AIDS; the prevention of crises and the post-conflict recovery. It is the UNDP which financed the seminar on sector reforms of security in the Central African Republic, which was held in Bangui between April 14th and April 17th, 2008.
The CPI In September 2007, the CPI opened a permanent office in Bangui. The CPI investigates the abuses committed between 2002 and 2003, but it is possible that it could extend its mandate to the period post-2003.
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South Africa In 2007, at President Bozizé‟s request, President Thabo Mbeki agreed to bring in support for the Central African capacities of defence. The cooperation joins only in a bilateral frame, and is limited to only offering training to the FACA - particularly in the fields of the engineering, of the military medicine, and of the command. It can also offer limited training to the presidential guard as well as participate in the rehabilitation of infrastructures. The South Africans also participate directly in security and have moved closer to President Bozizé. The concluding agreement of cooperation concerned is over a period of three years. The South Africans are not involved in SSR as such. The cooperation of the RCA-RSA does not meet a global approach. The South African volunteers admit that the language barrier constitutes a major obstacle. They also confess to having difficulty in understanding the functioning of the Central African system of security, particularly the role of the Gendarmerie. They also regret the lack of rigour, and of organization, of the FACA, complaining in particular about the absence of incentive to work, and about the discipline of the Central African soldiers. They also underline - as the military councillor of the BONUCA does - the secrecy that surrounds the activities of the FACA, and the difficulty that they have in obtaining certain information. Generally speaking, the cooperation with the FACA does not seem to arouse much enthusiasm or optimism, and it is possible that, at the end of Thabo Mbeki‟s term, the agreement of cooperation will not be seen out.
The French cooperation in security France has signed an official agreement of defence with the RCA which foresees more important military support in case of attack from outside forces, than the one foreseen in the agreement of military cooperation with Chad. France has maintained a contingent of 220 soldiers in the CAR, and has strengthened this contingent by sending supplementary soldiers after the seizure of Birao by the UFDR in October 2006. Besides direct military assistance, French servicemen have participated in the instruction of Central African servicemen. France is the main financier of the Central African Republic. French technical advisers work within the personal staffs of some of the ministers. A French general is permanently in post and assist the Head of State and the Deputy Minister of Defence in the reform of the FACA. Since 2003, the military cooperation of France with the Central African Republic has been characterized by the application of an emergency plan for the benefit of the Central African forces of defence, that aims to restore security in the capital, and in the provinces. The French military cooperation and defence division leads a programme of the reorganization of the armed forces, which is based on the reorganization of the Central African armed forces (FACA) and the institutional support (given to the Gendarmerie). The military cooperation and defence division in the CAR includes nine volunteers from the land forces and from the Gendarmerie, among which eight are directly embedeed within the armed forces as experts or as project managers. Supplementary to this permanent workforce, there are missions of short duration which can come to strengthen the mission according to identified needs. Under the aegis of the DCMD of the French Foreign Office, these actions of cooperation
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are led in close cooperation with the Ministry of Defence, and with particular thanks to the presence of the French detachment „Boali‟. Since 2003, the DIO have succeeded one another, with an objective of ensuring the training of three battalions. This DIO is concerned with the acquisition of individual and collective, tactical and technical know-how (from the fighters to the leader of section, then at the level of a major of a company). The instructions that are distributed by paratrooper commando groups address the staff of the republican guard. However, France has suspended its cooperation with the guard. Thanks to the application of important financial means within the framework of the Pellegrini Plan of 2003 which allowed a 6,5-million-euro grant over two years, a policy of equipment and reorganization could have been led in favour of the forces of the Gendarmerie. Introduced in 2004, this project contains three different and additional sections: the training of the organic structures of direction of the Gendarmerie; the improvement of the management of human resources; and the financing of new equipments and the rehabilitation of numerous infrastructures. In addition, the French cooperation of the Gendarmerie is very involved in giving training at the Gendarmerie school in Kolongo. A similar effort to the one granted to the Gendarmerie within the framework of the Pellegrini Plan was considered necessary for the Central African police by the French services of police cooperation. With this in this view, the project «Support for the rule of law in the CAR», which was signed in April 2007, aims at meeting the most urgent needs of the Central African police. However, this plan has not yet been operated since France is waiting for some wages from the Central African authorities. According to some, it is unfortunate that the organization of the French cooperation with the CAR duplicates the widely militarized frame which still prevails in the country. By giving powers to the attaché of defence, France contibutes to guarantee the global management of security by the forces of defence while it is exactly the major problem in the country. Some consider then, that it would be desirable to name a civil councilor – as a counterpart of the French General who serves as an adviser to the President - with the rank of prefect, to encourage the civilianisation of security.
The MINURCA and the EUFOR Chad / RCA On September 12th, 2007, the Council of the European Union approved the political and strategic objectives of a possible European mission in Chad, and in the Central African Republic. On September 25th, 2007, the Security Council voted for resolution 1778 to carry out the creation of a multidimensional presence «consisting of different elements amongst which the Chadian special elements of maintenance of law and order, elements of the UNO including policemen, staff of technical support and the force composed of troops of the European Union». The military operation was entrusted to the European Union, with France undertaking to supply half of the workforce. This operation was approved by the European Parliament on September 27th, 2007 and, on October 15th, 2007, the Council of the Union officially approved the display for one year of a "military operation of transition in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic, called EUFOR Chad / the CAR».
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Inventory of the Central African security forces The question of the distribution of competence between the internal security forces (the Gendarmerie and the police force), and the forces of defence (FACA and presidential guard) appears as the major challenge for the democratization of the Central African security devices. Indeed, the current situation is characterized by the constant interventions of the defence forces in the police missions which are institutionally in charge of the internal security forces. The defence forces thus invest in the field of internal security by using their own methods, and often by making themselves guilty of abuses, due to the disproportionate appeal to the force. The government deliberately gives priority to the defence forces and to militarily controlled security under all its auspices, mostly in defiance of the constitutional separation of the powers. The Gendarmerie, and the police even more so, are relegated to a second-class role.
The institutional frame The Constitution The new Constitution of the Central African Republic, adopted by referendum on December 5 th, 2004, was announced on December 28th, 2004 by President Bozizé. This was detailed on the basis of the previous Constitution of January 14th, 1995 which was put in brackets by President Patassé. This fundamental new law establishes a semi-presidential regime that is much inspired by the institutions of the French 5th Republic. With regards to the questions of defence and security, the Constitution stipulates that the President is the supreme Chief of the armed forces. He is responsible for national defence, and chairs the superior Council of Defence. Since 2003, General Bozizé has concurrently held both functions of the President of the Republic, and of Minister of Defence, in violation of the Constitution. Under international pressure, General Bozizé finally decided to create the post of Minister of State of Defence, which he conferred to his son. A certain number of reforms are imperative to guarantee respect for the Constitution,: 1. the scrupulous respect for the Constitution, notably article 23 stipulating that the function of President of the Republic is incompatible with the exercise of any other political function, at the risk of dismissal; 2. the implementation of binding mechanisms to impose the scrupulous respect for the Constitution of December 24th, 2004, and in particular the resumption of the activities of the Constitutional court, as well as the guarantee of its freedom of action; 3.
the respect for the separation of powers, and the intensification of legislative power.
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The administrative organization The territorial distribution of the defence forces is, as a rule, an exact copy of the administrative organization of the RCA. Besides this, the administrative organization determines the prerogatives of certain actors, notably mayors, and particularly in police terms. Finally, we will see that the groups of self-defence are organized within the framework of the municipalities, with a measure of autonomy that is institutionally recognized. It is thus important to focus on the administrative and territorial organizations that prevail in the CAR. The Central African Republic is divided into 16 prefectures, each placed under the responsibility of a prefect. These prefectures are divided into 66 sub-prefectures, then into 175 municipalities. Moreover we can also count into this equation 8800 villages or districts. The authority of the State exercises its power by means of the delegates of the Republic, as well as the prefects and the sub-prefects. In certain zones, posts of administrative control also exist. It is the decree N 88.005 and the decree 88.006 of February 5th and 12th, 1988 that determine the administrative organization of the CAR and cancel out laws 64/32 and 64/33 of November 20th, 1964 on regions with a measure of autonomy, and administrative districts. However, both these 1988 prescriptions have so far only been partially operated.
Municipalities and constituencies with autonomous status
The municipality is a territorial division, consisting of villages, districts, groupings, the territorial limits of which are determined by law. The municipality is headed by the Mayor, his assistants and the City Council. According to texts, the mayors are elected by the members of the city council, who are themselves elected for five years. It is foreseen that the members of the city council must be elected by direct universal suffrage, according to the law of 1987 of the electoral code. However, no municipal election has been ever organized in the Central African Republic and, at present, mayors are appointed by a central power via decrees, or orders taken by the authorities. That is why mayors are called “presidents of special delegation”. Mayors can be revoked for any faults by the President of the Republic, by a motivated decree of revocation. The mayor is only in charge of the administration. In security matters, the powers of the mayor are exercised through the municipal police (article 73 of the decree 88.006). Municipalities are legally responsible for the damages that result from crimes and offences committed on their territory by crowds or gatherings armed or not, against persons, public, or private properties. The payment of the compensations following these confusions are recovered from the budget of the municipalities. However, these capacities do not apply in wartime. In rural zones, villages are constituted of "groups of families having set a community of interest for ethnic, economic and religious reasons». The village is run by a village headman, elected for 10 years by the village voters. The village headman is placed under the authority of the mayor of the municipality that belongs the village. The village headman chairs the village council, composed of five to ten members, in accordance with their importance in the village. The council members of the village have to represent the various socio-economic groups present in the village (young people, women, farmers, breeders, fishermen, craftsmen, shopkeepers). Each group appoints their own representative. The village council is renewable every three 17
years. The discords between the leader of the village and the council are arbitrated by the mayor of the municipality under the control of the sub-prefect. The village council rules the activities of the community. The village headman is in charge of the execution of the decisions of the authority and the authorities of the municipality. His consultative title allows him to participate in the sessions of the City Council. He is also the one in charge of indicating to the competent administrative and judicial authorities all the malpractices, crimes and offences that have been noticed in his village. He possesses the right to call on all the people who live in the village, or to fight against a public disaster. Disobedience to the orders given in such circumstances are sanctioned by article 289 of the Penal Code. In civil and commercial justice matters, the village headman is invested with the power to reconcile parties. At the time that he takes up office, he takes an oath in front of the magistrate, in the presence of the village council. He can be liable to disciplinary measures (disapproval, suspension, deletion of reparations, revocation) imposed by the sub-prefect at the suggestion of the mayor, after hearing from the party involved. The Home Secretary then endorses the penalties. Built-up areas are established by districts. The district leaders have attributes that are identical to those of the village headmen of rural zones, and these are appointed with the same conditions as the latter. A set of districts constitutes a grouping at the head of which is placed a leader of the group. The leaders of these groups are chosen by the leaders of the district from among them. In important cities, groups can be created within districts. The leaders of these districts are appointed by the mayor from amongst the members of the city council, after agreement from the authority of the custodianship. However, areas, groups and districts do not form autonomous constituencies. The leaders of areas, groups and districts are in charge of the execution of the decisions of the governement, and of the authorities of the municipality. As village headmen, they are liable to penalty.
The administrative districts: prefectures and sub-prefectures
Constituencies with the autonomous measures described above also fit freely within the framework of prefectures and sub-prefectures, considered by the above-mentioned laws as constituencies with autonomy measure. As mentioned above, the CAR is divided into 16 prefectures and 66 sub-prefectures. In spite of the decree of 1988, there was no prefect until 2003: it was the military governors who managed the problems of administration and police. Henceforth, the decree of 1988 will be applied with regards to prefects and sub-prefects. In his district, the prefect is an agent of the State. He attends to law enforcement of regulations and governmental decisions. He is responsible for law and order, for the safety of persons, and of their possessions. He is given custody of the municipalities of his district. The decree clarifies that the prefect is responsible for the policing of immigration, for the traffic police, and has under his orders the detachment of the Republican guard and can, on demand, appeal to the forces of police forces stationed in the prefecture. The prefect has the power to exert judicial police power as per the provision made for by article 15 of the code of criminal procedure. The sub-prefect is placed under the direct authority of the prefect and can only communicate with Ministers through this route. He is responsible, under the authority of the prefect, for law and order, and for the security of persons and possessions in his district. He can commandeer 18
the majors of brigades of gendarmerie forces under his responsibility. The sub-prefect has access to the sessions of town councils. He organizes the elections of the village headmen.
The reinforcement of constituencies with an autonomous status and of decentralized services
The reinforcement of constituencies with an autonomous status, and of decentralized services appears as necessary to accompany security reforms. The adoption of the following measures is then highly recommended: -
to update the electoral code of 2004, to adapt it to the Constitution of December 27th, 2004;
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to apply the law on decentralization, especially the holding of the local elections (municipal elections) before 2010;
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to confer to the prefect power over the coordination of troops present in his prefecture;
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to increase the budget of the civil administration outside Bangui;
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to implement programmes of infrastructures for the most enclosed zones;
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to restore the authority of the customary leaders (according to the recommendations of the States General of Justice);
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to set up regional poles of decentralized development (a programme which should be financed by the EC);
The defence forces The Central African armed forces are the product of the transition between French colonial power and new national authorities. When they were created, they were governed by law n. 60.195, but it later underwent numerous modifications.
The chain of decision The first circle of decision
The chain of responsibility for defence is as follows: -
General Bozizé, Head of State, in his position as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces but also in his position - exaggerated regarding the Constitution - as Minister of Defence; 19
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the Minister of State of Defence (General Bozizé‟s son);
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General Ouende, Chief of Staff (CEMA) and the General Commandant of the national gendarmerie force;
In fact, there is strong opposition between the Minister of State and the Chief of Staff, who does not recognize the authority of the former. Along with the President who is generally the one who arbitrates between them both, they hold a very strong position,. Today, as the ICG report underlines it very well, the real power - in spite of the association in the management of the power of numerous personalities stemming from horizons others than his - is monopolized by the President of the republic, and his close relations who, for the greater part, belong to his family or to his ethnic group. However, in spite of the extreme subdivisions of power, and the ascendancy of the Gbaya ethnic group, it is very important to highlight that the strategy of power consists in not pushing opponents aside (including those who fight it militarily), or the persons who had a considerable influence under previous regimes.
The Superior Council of Defence
The Superior Council of Defence is a superstructure which was organized around ten years ago by the Committee of Defence of the National Assembly, after the States‟ General of Defence in 1996. The objective was to prevent the Head of State from being the only one who could make decisions. The Superior Council of Defence was set up under Ange-Félix Patassé but had never been activated. This was inaugurated under the leadership of President Bozizé. This structure is in charge of thinking about the strategic orientations of the policy of defence and security. The President of the Republic chairs the Superior Council of Defence. Ten Ministers are a part of it: the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence, the Home Secretary, the Foreign Secretary, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Waterways and Forests, the Minister of Mines, the Minister of the Agriculture, the Minister of the Communication, the Minister of Transport, the Minister of Tourism. The structure is managed on a daily basis by a Secretary General, who coordinates the action of the “defence representatives” (superior officers) which are posted to the 10 Ministries belonging to this Council. The role of these “defence representatives” is to notify the different ministries of the necessity of taking into account the questions of defence in strategic planning. In theory, the Superior Council of Defence has a particular role in strategic planning. In practice, it is on no account to be seen as a decision-making body and, in the end, its influence is actually very marginal.
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The FACA (Central African Armed forces) The FACA undertake the fundamental mission of ensuring the security and the integrity of the national territory, as well as the protection of the population against any form of aggression. The FACA have never had many members. It was under Jean-Bedel Bokassa that they reached their height, reaching a strength of 7500 men during Bokassa‟s eviction from power in 1979. Since then, the French troops have contributed widely to ensure the security of the country which, as a consequence, created a reduction in the numbers of the FACA, which were made up of no more than approximately 3750 soldiers in 1996. In 2000, 500 new recruits were added to this workforce, as well as several hundred members of the presidential guard, who brought the FACA workforce up to more than 4000. Generally speaking, the FACA were seriously affected by coups, mutinies and lack of interest in them from the governments from 1990s onwards. After the mutinies in 1996, they were no longer the object of attention. When the General Bozize came to power under international pressures, he gave up leading a witch-hunt against them, and kept the armed forces that were bequeathed to him by previous regimes. From then on, the FACA were 5300 strong (445 officers, 932 non-commissioned officers, 3700 men of rank), and now consists of a land force, an air force, a river patrols and a fire-fighters' body. In their current configuration, the FACA are organized in the following way: -
the general staff of the armed forces and the 4 offices that are connected to it. The first office is in charge of the human resources management; the second office, is in charge of the military intelligence; the third office, is in charge of education (national schools, plus training abroad); the fourth office is in charge of logistics. Besides them the BEC (Department of Studies and Coordination), is in charge of military protocol, and the office of garrison is theoretically in charge of defining the missions of every serviceman in every strategic point.
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the BSS (Battalion of Support and Service) in charge of the inter-armies support services (health, supply, fuel, social services and arms factories);
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schools and centres of instruction;
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the land forces and their various battalions, all based in Bangui;
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the Republican Guard, consisting of three battalions;
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the amphibian battalion;
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the Air Force;
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the fire brigades;
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6 military regions (Bossangoa, Birao, Bambari, Nola, Mongoumba and Bambari).
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The military division of the Central African Republic copies exactly the administrative regions. Armed forces are territorially organized in six military regions including, as the case may be, two or three prefectures. The instructions of the CEMA are directly sent to the commandant of a military region.
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The land forces
The land forces include: -
3 battalions of territorial infantry (BIT) of 450 men; these are the BIT who ensure the defence of the territory, fight against road cutters, and defend hunting zones.
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1 battalion of Engineers (for mine clearance);
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1 battalion of support and services.
The land forces lead operations of reassurance by means of mixed patrols in Bangui, and patrols that also extend across the country where detachments are stationed in Bouzoum, Bossangoa, Bossemptele, Bria, Kongbo, Bangassoou, Bema, Dimbi, Mobaye, Zemio, Avakaba, Bambari, Bouar, Nola, Mongoumba, Zingioo, Kaga-Bandoro and Sibut.
The Presidential Guard, known as the Republican Guard
Traditionally, this unit, the role of which is to ensure the security of the President, was - by comparison - much better staffed, better equipped, and better treated by those in power. 23
The Presidential ex-Guard (GP) was created in 1981. It is President Kolingba who inaugurated the ethnicisation of this force, almost exclusively consisting of Yakoma from his original ethnic group. When he took up office, Patassé placed the Yakoma workforce guard back in the FACA and appointed members of his ethnic group, Kaba-Sara. Ange-Félix Patassé leaned particularly on the Presidential Guard. The rivalry between the FACA, which were neglected, and this guard, highly privileged in terms of the workforce, equipment and treatment that it had, was greatly involved in the origins of the mutinies of 1996-1997. In 1997, France had decided to remove 24 technical advisers training the Guard, because of the President Patassé‟s refusal to conform to the Bangui Agreements, which had notably foreseen the trimming of the Presidential Guard‟s workforce, and the integration of this in the FACA. In 1998 President Patassé finally began to transform the GP into a special force of defence within republican institutions. But, in reality, this new force, called FORSDIR, kept the same organization, the same characteristics, and the same missions as the GP. At the end of 1999, the FORSDIR included approximately 1300 persons (the regime claimed that the FORSDIR officially counted 672 members), distributed between two battalions, one in Bangui, and the other in the provinces. In 2000, under the international pressure, President Patassé transformed the FORSDIR into the Unity of Presidential Security (USP) and integrated it into the FACA. The USP then received formal instructions not to get involved in police and internal security missions. Nevertheless, although supposed to act under the authority of the armed forces‟ Chief of Staff, and to answer in the final analysis of its acts in front of the Minister of Defence, this unit continued to depend directly on the President, from whom it continued to receive orders. The force consisted of 800 men, mainly coming from the North but also included foreign servicemen. This unit was particularly in charge of ensuring the protection of Ange-Félix Patassé. Sadly the USP was better known for its abuses and its summary executions, particularly after the failure of the coup of May 28th, 2001. President Bozizé dissolved the USP in 2003. Many former members of Patassé‟s Presidential Guard, which had been abolished by Bozizé, swelled the ranks of the rebellion in the northwest. President Bozizé renamed the Presidential Guard "Republican Guard" and created within it the Battalion of Protection, and Security of the Institutions (BPSI). The new guard is currently about 1000 strong. It consists of three battalions: -
the Battalion of Protection and Internal Security (BPSI) of 750 men;
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the provincial battalion, which consists of 300 men and ensures the protection of institutions in the provinces and in prisons;
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the battalion of honour, which ensures administrative support and other more formal services.
The BPSI is an active battalion. Inside the BPSI, there are four companies, one of which is known as «for administration» (the CPRA) but its purpose is to be entirely at the President‟s disposal and to ensure his personal safety. Until June 2007, the French military cooperation was in charge of the training of the BPSI. But the decision was taken to put an end to this cooperation, following the abuses perpetrated by the BPSI‟s members. General Bozizé then requested that the South Africans took over.
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The amphibian battalion
The amphibian battalion handles the safely of the waterways. It has however few materials: namely a barge, and some small reconditioned” boats, which do not allow its men to intercept or take control.
The Air Force
The Air Force is required to ensure emergency transport and the opening up of the difficult regions to access. The Air Force accounts for 300 men. It only has three reconnaissance planes (BM2), and a helicopter (MI8) (that is currently being reconditioned), as well as an old C130. However, these devices do not fly due to fuel being too expensive, plus also because there is no crew to fly the C130. The Air Force was equipped with ultra-lights in 2003 but these crashed and are therefore no longer operational.
The battalion of the fire-fighters
The fire brigade battalion is 214 strong. Its resources are very limited (two coaches, three ambulances, two trailer motor-pumps, one fire engine). The firemen are in fact unable to participate in any fighting missions. Moreover, they have no real military usefulness.
The permanent military tribunal
The permanent military tribunal is a very special court that sits only when summoned twice a year. The court is said to be permanent because the system receives constant complaints. There is an office that is specifically in charge of their treatment. When complaints are made investigations are led by the Gendarmerie. The magistrates of the court are not servicemen. Only the assessors are gendarmes and servicemen. As it is a special court, there is no possibility of appeal against any of the judgments. The permanent military tribunal is an organ of the Ministry of Defence. As such, the Minister of Defence decides when sessions should be held. Private parties have the ability to lodge complaints.. As a rule, as soon as the military hierarchy has knowledge of a malpractice, the CEMA can pronounce disciplinary measures (stopping, suspension, disbarment, expulsion) However, these disciplinary measures can be extended if the CEMA decide to ask for a procedure to continue after the complaint has been lodged: then the case is brought before the permanent military tribunal. Any defendant is judged by the military tribunal if the facts for which they are blamed occurred when they were carrying out their duties. The inquiry is led by the research and investigation section of the Gendarmerie. Today, some reforms seem desirable: 25
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the professionalization of the judges of the permanent military tribunal;
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more regular summons of the permanent military tribunal;
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the adoption of a new code of military justice.
The training
In terms of training, an important effort has already been made, through the reopening of the ESFOA (High School for active officers). Three schools now exist : Bouar school (that trains ranked servicemen), Kassai school (that trains officers, and non-commissioned officers) and Berengo school (that trains gendarmes). The opening of a school for non-commissioned officers is scheduled. Initially only of one year duration, training has now been brought up to two years since 2007. The training includes five elements, the first four being military, and the fifth academic: -
exercise of authority;
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operational missions;
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physical training;
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administrative and technical responsibilities;
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general knowledge.
A French superior officer is a technical adviser of the school.
The problems
Workforce
The first problem that affects the FACA is that of the weakness of the workforce compared to the size of the country. Out of approximately 5300 men, only 1200 to 1500 men are really operational. Half of the workforce - always the same - is so permanently deployed on the ground. The deployed workforce gets the PGA (global food prime) only in accordance with available logistical means, and they do not see the slightest commander. They are reduced to begging amongst villagers or extorting money from them and then they get „led astray‟. Furthermore, the Central African armed forces suffer from the heterogeneous character of its workforce, which results in an absence of unity. The armed forces are in fact a the protean aggregate, which can be categorised in the following way: -
loyal supporters of the regime;
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pro-Kolingba Yakomas;
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Patassé‟s former members of the presidential guard;
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former mutineers integrated into the army;
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ex-liberators, among whom there are many people who have received no training and are gang leaders.
Recruitment lacks order, and does not take into account physical or intellectual capabilities, military vocation, or even the morality of the recruits. Also, the official texts in matters of promotion and of appointment to superior ranks, and posts with responsibility, are widely ignored. This situation disrupts the pyramid of grades. The intervention of politicians and the importance of the criteria of ethnic belonging, as well as parental proximity, rule human resources policy. An important number of staff are assigned to high ranking officials, particularly as a chauffeur or as a bodyguard, which can mobilize staff who, as a consequence, can no longer be considered to be part of the armies operational capabilities. The situation is improving with regards to ethnic variety within the troupe, but is still far from being satisfactory. No observers would note any attempt on behalf of Bozizé to ethnicize recruitment within the army. At present, the results of competitive entry examinations (which are assessed by French military cooperants), do not show any ethnic imbalance. However, the legacy of the previous regimes still remains significant today. The Yakoma remain the most represented ethnic group in the army, and they can be found mainly among the officer class.
Lack of discipline, and violations of human rights
The absence of discipline is endemic within the armed forces. The disregard of the regulations by military leaders has consequently caused a lack of respect by the troops for their hierarchical superiors.Servicemen and gendarmes, do not take into account hierarchical criteria. Furthermore, for a great part of the CAR, and particularly in the North, the armed forces do not arrange for barracks to accommodate their troops since most of the barracks have been destroyed during rebellions and successive mutinies. As a result, many servicemen live out of barracks and at their own expense, while their salaries do not allow them to afford the costs, particularly when they have families to support. The Global Food Prime (PGA) is often suspended for months at a time, and the men are then reduced to taking subsistence from the populations of the zones where they are stationed. This situation encourages a lack of discipline, and abuses committed against the civilians because the soldiers who do not receive either food or goods are inclined to plunder and to extort money from the population. Such a context represents an obstacle for the high ranking officers, who then have difficulty in ensuring any actual control over their soldiers. In the fights that set the rebel forces and the FACA against each other, most of the summary executions and illegal deaths, as well as most of the fires in villages, were committed by the government armed forces. These forces also deliberately provoked the diaspora of civil populations. The FACA were able to commit atrocities by having a conviction that they had free license to commit their acts. Traditionally, the military leaders guaranteed, or at least closed their eyes to 27
the serious defects and the manslaughter committed by their subordinates. They had no deterrents since when penalties were envisaged, there was an absence of any disciplinary correction. For a long time, the government led no inquiry, nor did it punish a single officer . They did not publicly blame them either for their acts. Nevertheless, in a concerted way, foreign volunteers and observers today notice an improvement in the application of penalties against the authors of abuses among the FACA.
The behaviour of the BPSI
A large number of abuses reported by the NGOs can be attributed to the Presidential Guard, more precisely to the BPSI, which largely consisted of ex-liberators. In reality, the BPSI is still managed as the personal militia of the Head of State, particularly the CPRA. In theory, the GP depends directly on the CEMA. Yet it is directly operated from the Presidential office and takes advantage of total impunity. The BPSI recognizes police operations in an autonomous way in the districts of Bangui, or in the provinces. Its actions are rough and partisan. It is the BPSI‟s members who are the most involved in abuses against civilians. The fact that the GP acts only on the orders of the President is generally known and, as a consequence, General Bozizé is directly blamed for the acts of the GP. It seems that the President thus decided to incite the members of the Guard to adopt a more republican behavior.
The payment and the back pays
There is a consensus that servicemen are better paid than the other agents of the State and this should be recognised. A driver of the army (rank corporal leader) gets 80.000 FCFA in salary, and 50.000 FCFA as bonus. The irregularity of the payments of these salaries however reduces this. Besides, the measures taken by the World Bank at first limited the global payroll to 27 billion FCFA. A colonel explained that this measure had the effect of a 30% reduction on his salary and. So, for a theoretical monthly salary of 800.000 FCFA, he actually only gets 570.000 FCFA. The problem raised by back pays is still unsolved to this day. Back pays concern not only the FACA, but also other security forces and, more widely, the whole of the public services. For a colonel, for example, 33 months of back pay represents 25 million FCFA. Back pays accrued under the various regimes of Kolingba, Patassé and Bozizé. Under the latter regime, salaries were actually cut for six months. However, today salaries are regularly overturned. The dimensions of accumulated back pay affect the morale of the troops and causes the practices of racketeering and robbing the population at gunpoint. The most visible results of these practices, quoted in a recurring way, are called "illegal barriers", that are set up by servicemen along roads to wildly extort money from the population. To pay the back pay to the armed forces would require the release of 7 million euros. It would created officers who have reached the correct age, or who receive high salaries, to take the
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option of retirement, and would enable the recruitment of non-commissioned officers whose pays would be less high.
The ageing
The ageing of the FACA also constitutes a reason for concern. Indeed, an important number of Central African servicemen have already reached the age of retirement, but they do not leae the armed forces because the payment of pensions accuses 33 months in arrears. These excess staff is made up of men of the rank, non-commissioned officers, and officers (among whom 27 are colonels and seven are generals). At the end of 2007, 690 persons, of all ranks, had reached pensionable age but were still in post, thus blocking administrative procedures such as recruitment and promotions. If nothing happens by the end of 2008, 15% of the army workforce will be over the age limit. The refusal to go into retirement is widely connected to the nonpayment of back pay. The staffs know that if they leave, they will not benefit from their arrears. This phenomenon of ageing is partially to blame for the origins of the weak operational capacity of the FACA.
The size of the armed forces
The current size of the armed forces, organized around the concept of projection, is widely questioned. The workforce is concentrated in Bangui, which facilitates the activity of zaraguinas as well as trafficking in light weapons. Besides, the necessary logistics that are needed to plan the workforce are cruelly lacking. A certain number of sociological difficulties result from the current organization of the FACA. Servicemen have enormous difficulties in coping with those costs associated with their families. The current projection size raises the problem of the prolonged absences of the heads of families. Being sent most of the time to the provinces, the servicemen leave their families in Bangui, without financial support. Many families are reduced to being evicted from their homes, or resort to any means possible (prostitution in particular) to face their creditors.
The territorial organization
The territorial distribution of the workforce in military regions is really widely theoretical. In fact, the territorial device works badly. The role, the functions and the responsibilities of ground command is badly defined. It often displays contingency act under the responsibility of a section leader, and not under that of a commandant of a military region. The problem at stake here is the correspondence between the military regions and the administrative districts. Logically, the commanders of each military region (CRM) should coordinate the operations within his area of responsibility, but in fact, without associating with the CRM, the operations are directly 29
controlled by military authorities based in Bangui. In some other cases, prefects based at borders are servicemen, and they also act as (CRMs) Finally, defence zones should be created but are, for the moment, only theoretical. As a rule, the prefect should be responsible for the command of these defence zones, but the distribution of the competences between the military leader, and the civil leader, has not been defined yet.
The training
The deficiencies of the Central African educational system have cruel consequences in connection with the recruitment of armed forces. A large number of recruits are almost illiterate. The integration in the ENVR (National Schools with Regional Vocation) of the French-speaking world is made on competitive examinations or entrance exams. No Central African has passed the entry examinations for the schools of staff in Libreville or Koulikoro.
The equipment
During successive mutinies, the infrastructure of the army has been destroyed. The problem of the destruction of arms factories has been particularly raised. When they break rank, servicemen cannot lay down arms and then have to keep them with them, which is a factor for insecurity. The FACA do not arrange necessary logistic means to schedule the workforce. Besides, the equipment of the FACA only consists of gifts (donations) of materials. What is supplied comes from French equipment.
The parallel chains of command
The institutional organization, and the chain of command, of the FACA are also widely theoretical. There exists within the armed forces real parallel chains of command. The first phenomenon which underlies the existence of parallel chains of command is that of the uneven ethnic distribution. Even if we cannot really accuse General Bozizé of leading on an ethnic policy in the armed forces, some servicemen who were interviewed (as well as gendarmes, policemen, customs officers) admitted that only the Mbaya (of the President‟s ethnic group) have any authority. Another spring of the parallel chains of command is the result of the Bokassa era which had, for example, created by decree, in 1970, a particular presidential staff member, who directly came under his authority, and was asked to keep a watch on the armed forces chief of Staff (CEMA).
30
The practices of the former Minister of Defence Jean-Jacques Demafouth, who made a good impression amongst the armies personnel (because he recruited and reinstated elements that had previously been crossed off for serious fault), also contributed to feed this phenomenon. Thanks to this practice, Demafouth is suspected of having tried to build up a small personal army for himself. When Demafouth was Minister, the servicemen addressed only him, and bypassed the CEMA. The problem of the parallel chains of command is particularly striking with regards to the Presidential Guard. As we have seen it, the Presidential Guard reports only to the Head of State, and bypasses the CEMA.
The opaqueness of the management of the budget
The budget of the army appears as theoretical. Nobody within the armed forces, not even the CEMA, has access to it. The budget is directly managed by the Presidency and the Minister of State. At the same time the question of the means of the armed forces has remained totally obscure, for the foreign volunteers (French, South African, BONUCA) and for Central African opposition parties. The question of their means is too sensitive an issue for the volunteers to dare to ask questions. The CEMA has to send monthly demands to the Minister of State to obtain allowances for running, as well as the PGA (Global Food Prime), spare parts and stationery. The CEMA does not manage ammunitions either, and has to ask for them from the Minister. This absence of control of the CEMA over the means of the armed forces explains the permanent fear of coups in which the President lives.
Beginning of improvement?
Most observers and volunteers recognize that General Bozizé now gives evidence of good will. The choice of General Ouende as CEMA is, according to them, the first sign of this encouraging change. As soon as the CEMA had knowledge of any serious facts, (abuses or diversions of money), he took penalties. In 2007, out of 250 members of the FACA who disappeared, there were 80 deaths. The rest underwent penalties and disbarment, whatever their ethnic group was. General Ouende also improved the variety in the way recruitment was managed, by launching a recruitment drive of 500 soldiers in the land forces. These were recruited from the whole of the country (except Vakaga and Obo, which are impossible to reach during the rainy season). For the first time in eight years, the CEMA managed to make a promotion table. Since then, there were only exceptional promotions. Even for the operations, with the little means he is given, the CEMA manages to obtain better efficiency from the forces deployed on the ground: the results obtained by the FACA against zaraguinas (hostages' liberation, and the effective fight against poachers) are encouraging. One remaining problem for the CEMA is that of its relations with the Minister of State. Indeed, the Minister of State is in charge of operational as well as organic questions, even though it is not in its mandate. In the facts, the CEMA is not empowered to take any decision of importance. 31
However, as he was promoted by Bozizé and as he is one of the most loyal persons to the President, he is often approved when the President has to arbitrate the disputes between him and the Minister of State.
Reforms
The first reorganization of the Central African army was decided during the states general of the national defence, which met after the mutinies of 1996. The very strong ethnicisation and the regional dominion of Yakoma was one of the main motives for concern. Jean-Jacques Demafouth, Minister of Defence under Ange-Félix Patassé had engaged with some success in a reorganization of the FACA: -
by reducing the presidential guard from 1200 to 800 men;
-
by decreasing the number of the FACA to about one quarter, bringing the armed forces workforce back up to 3000 soldiers;
-
by raising the imbalance between Nordists and Southerners within the armed forces. In May 2001, the percentage of Yakoma was not more than of 40% compared to the 70% at the end of Kolingba‟s regime.
Reforms were largely connected to the confidence placed by the President in the Minister of Defence, who not only tried to control the workforce of the presidential guard, but also to regularly pay salaries, even the arrears. In the opinion of all the observers the arrest of Demafouth, accused of plotting a coup, devaluated the FACA, who, nevertheless, remained loyal to President Patassé during the mutinies of 1996. During his coming to power, and to satisfy the requirements of the World Bank to see the CAR engaged in a reduction of the budgetary weight of its security sector, General Bozizé began an inventory of the FACA, the Gendarmerie, and the police, as well as all the different non-state armed groups. The evaluation of the workforce is generally considered credible. We can, however, note that Bozizé did not supply figures for his presidential guard (who does not seem to be a part of the total that were supplied to the FACA). The reflections led by French military cooperation, the operational conclusions stemming from the SSR seminar in April 2008, as well as the recommendation of the preparatory Committee of the inclusive political dialogue (CPDPI) bring about an important number of recommendations that had already been formulated at the conclusion of the States General of Defence emphasizing a certain number of points that are developed below. Many of these appear in the law project of military programming from 2009-2013, which proposes a frame of action for the next five years. This law will annually define objectives in order to reach the domains of human resources, materials and equipment, infrastructures, training, and the living conditions of the families of the servicemen. Finally, the reform of the FACA has to be the object of a White Paper that the staff of the French military cooperants would be entitled to draft. These efforts will have to come along with the updating of the legal and administrative texts by the creation of one appropriate Committee.
32
Management of the human resources
The envisaged reforms articulate around four major axes: -
the improvement of discipline. So that the officers as well as the rank soldiers respect for military regulations, the detailing of a code of conduct, the revision of general disciplinary regulations, the adoption of exemplary penalties, and the construction of a disciplinary premise all seem to be necessary;
-
the payment of back pay, and the retirement of staff who have reached the age limit. A form was sent to the European Commission in 2006 to obtain a grant for payment for these people. However, an agreement is still to be finalized. Besides, the implementation of programmes of accompaniment in the restructuring of the staff, by a training programme starting six months before retirement, also seems necessary;
-
an increase of the workforce, and the rationalization of their use. According to the bill of military programming, the workforce of the FACA should increase from 5300 to 7140 men (ideally 10,500 during the following five-year law). Qualitative measures would, at the same time, be taken to favour a more rational management of the workforce. First of all it would be advisable to develop a career plan (administrative and statutory texts) which would be objectively known by all, by establishing transparent procedures of recruitment, which would be based exclusively on capacity and merit. It will also be advisable to create a review of military aides-de-camp with the concerned authorities, to finalize a document that strictly limits the appeal to these aides-de-camp, as well as their numbers, with the objective of bringing back the discharged workforce to the operational elements of the FACA. It is the same for the functions of prison guards, for which it is advisable to demilitarize;
-
multi-ethnic recruitments. Recruitments will have to allow a fair representation of all the provinces. In every region of the country, mixed selection committees, operating recruitment in accordance to the criteria of merit and competence, must be organized.
Weight of the theoretical recruitment of 500 soldiers for every RM Region
Population
%
Recruitment
RM1
917 542
24
118
RM2
95 484
2
12
RM3
699 535
18
90
RM4
470 761
12
60
RM5
367 026
9
47
RM6
722 020
19
93
RM7
622 771
16
80
33
Revision of the size of the army: shift from an army of projections to a garrison army and territorial reorganization
The heart of the reforms lies in the passage of an army of projection to a garrison army, which implies a reorganization of the territorial distribution of the FACA. The objectives of this passage to a garrison army are: -
Improving the speed of reaction;
-
Favouring stabilization of staff and their families;
-
Decreasing the costs of the FACA‟s functioning;
-
Participating in the local development of the provinces.
At the same time, it is planned to remove the military workforce from Bangui, to build barracks at least in each of the six military regions, and to permanently install a battalion there made up of four companies, i.e. 500 to 600 men. Each of the barracks will be endowed with social flats which would welcome the servicemen's families. The purpose of this project is to reconvert the army to a territorial force, which it has stopped being for decades. Doing so, a fifth of the needs of the barracks should be satisfied. The FOMUC should play a major role in this restructuring: the force is at present deployed in provincial towns (soon to become garrisons) to secure the security environment and fit out the infrastructures of reception, before handing over and leaving the place to the FACA. In June 2007, the first barracks were ceded to the FACA in Bria in accordance with this plan. Other retrocessions are scheduled in Bozoum and Kaga Bandoro. This approach is to be implemented within the framework of the European strategy known as “poles of development“. The second axis of this revision of the size of the Central African army aims at setting up connections between the administrative regions and the military regions; it spreads out its workforce in order to create zones of defence. In this way, the law of military programming of 2009-2013 foresees the creation of zones of defence, which will include two to three military regions (cf. above, map of the military regions). -
The zone of defence one will include military regions one and two;
-
The zone of defence two will include military regions three and six;
-
The zone of defence three will include military regions four and five.
The objective of the creation of these zones of defence is to return to a regime of more fluid orders, and to develop a defence of proximity. It is foreseen that these zones of defence will be managed by the prefects of the zones. The zones of defence should coincide with the government of the administrative regions. Indeed, administrative regions were created on paper and should have governors placed at their head. Yet, for the moment, these zones of defence, as well as the regions, are merely empty shells. This revision of the size of the army will keep pace with the revision of its organization. So, the number of BIT should pass from three to six. The amphibian battalion, now considered as an autonomous body, would be integrated within the land forces. 34
Finally, this reform of the size of the army will eventually have to come up with new endowments of materials, particularly new mobility equipments.
Training
As previously underlined, a certain number of encouraging initiatives have recently been taken in training. With the support of French cooperation, the ESFOA has been reopened, the centre of instruction in Bouar has been refurbished and a school for non-commissioned officers is about to be opened. It is therefore especially important that the content of the training should be the subject of a greater attention. It would also be advisable to: -
develop more civil and moral instruction within the army;
-
train officers and non-commissioned officers in their roles, and in specific missions. 35
Restoring confidence with the population
The improvement of the relations of the FACA with the population is an absolutely crucial one. At first a certain number of measures must be urgently taken to put an end to the practices of the servicemen - for instance the harassment of the population. A particularly important measure consists of putting an end to the practice of illegal barriers that are organized by servicemen to extort money from road users. It would also be advisable to forbid the possession of firearms in bars, and in markets, and to build arms factories so that every serviceman can lay down his arms in safety. Secondly, it would be advisable that communication between the armies and the populations should be developed, to reduce the prevailing feeling of fear among the populations. The armed forces could be urged to: -
organize, on a monthly basis, a press review to present their current activities to the public and to update them on the progress of reforms;
-
organize open days;
-
sensitize the local population in the zones where the restoration, or the establishment, of garrisons is scheduled, in particular by leading CIMIC actions (sports and cultural meetings);
-
set up a possible Directorate in charge of public relations.
The Gendarmerie Like their colleagues of French-speaking Africa, the Central African Gendarmerie inherited the traditions, know-how and organization of the French Gendarmerie. It is dedicated to judicial, administrative and military police missions, as well as in administering law enforcement. Until 1995, the Gendarmerie was placed under the responsibility of the CEMA as an armed force. However, management problems quickly appeared because the Gendarmerie is a body with criminal investigation and judicial police competencies, whereas the CEMA does not have such competence. Besides, because of its privileges within military police, the Gendarmerie has been the object of reprisals on behalf of the servicemen. Since 1995, the Central African Gendarmerie is directly answerable to the Minister of Defence, in the same way, and with the same rank, as other armed forces are. It has been in complete reorganization since 2003. 1800 men strong, the Central African Gendarmerie is in much better shape than the national police. The Gendarmerie is the best preserved body of the State in terms of efficiency. Within the population the image of the Gendarmerie is better globally than that of the police, or of the FACA. Provided with six squads, 16 companies, 15 small squads of surveillance and intervention, one research section, four research brigades and 114 territorial brigades, the Gendarmerie spreads 36
its network throughout the whole of the territory. It plays a central role in internal security. For the past four years, it has benefited from important support from bilateral French cooperation (provision of equipment, support with training, rebuilding of infrastructures). It however suffers from a deficit of supervision staff : there are not enough gendarmerie officers. It suffers also from a lack of means of functioning and from armaments, particularly outside the capital. It also has to succeed in establishing itself in the provinces and face up to the FACA, who are the organization who – in practice - happen to be granted power in matters of internal security (especially the GP).
Organization The current structure of the Gendarmerie was fixed by the decree n.95.369 of January 1st, 1996, which separated it from the general staff of the armies. Since then, the Gendarmerie has been under the command of a Director-general of the national Gendarmerie (Directeur general de la Gendarmerie nationale - DGGN). The head office of the national Gendarmerie reports directly to the Ministry of Defence, and has a staff, with central services. There is also a post of assistant director-general. The central services who are dependent on the staff are: -
the office of study and documentation ;
-
the first office which is in charge of human resources;
-
the second office which is in charge of the intelligence service;
-
the third office which is in charge of the training;
-
the fourth office which is in charge of the logistics;
-
the direction of health services;
-
the direction of estate management;
-
the direction of social affairs.
The Head Office of the Gendarmerie is based in the camp of Izamot, at the heart of Bangui. It includes 240 persons. The current DGGN, Colonel Metinkoe, is recognized as a competent and non-corrupt person. On the other hand, his staff is more or less fictitious because of the absence of professional elements. Three large units constitute the bodies of the Gendarmerie: -
the legion of the territorial Gendarmerie consists of 1350 men and is divided into six squads, 16 companies, a section for research and investigation, and 116 brigades (among which 18 are specialized) in the whole of the national territory. This force of first category restarted on the whole territory and is competent in judicial, administrative and military police;
-
the legion of mobile gendarmerie, based in Bangui, is 180 strong. This second category force is specialized in the maintenance of law and order; 37
-
the school of Gendarmerie at Kolongo.
MINISTRE DEFENSE ESCADRON DES SERVICES
CABINET DU DIRECTEUR
DIRECTEUR GENERALE DE LA GENDARMERIE
ORGANISATION GENERALE DE LA GENDARMERIE NATIONALE EN 2006
NATIONALE
Directeur général adjoint SERVICE DU FICHIER
DIRECTION TRANSMISSIONS
BUREAU D’ETUDE PLANIFICATION DOCUMENTATION
DIRECTION DE L’INTENDANCE GENDARMERIE
SANTE SERVICE SOCIAL AUMONERIE
SERVICES FINANCIERS
B1 DIVISION .R.H
B2 RENSEIGNEMENT
LEGION DE GENDARMERIE MOBILE
SRI BANGUI
LEGION GENDARMERIE TERRITORIALE
COMPAGNIE MINIERE
COMPAGNIE SPECIALISEE
1er GROUPEMENT BANGUI
11 BRIGADES
Brigade Motorisé B.G.T.A BDE FLUVIALE
PIGN
PHR
1er EGM
BUREAU ORG EMPLOI OPS
BIMO
2éme GROUPEMENT BAMBARI
B.R.I
BIMO
3éme GROUPEMENT BOUAR
B.R.I
BIMO
4éme GROUPEMENT BANGASSOU
B.R.I
BIMO
5éme GROUPEMENT BOZOUM
B.R.I
BIMO
6
éme
GROUPEMENT NDELE
16 COMPAGNIES
B4 DIVISION LOGISTIQUE
E S O G N
DIRECTION DES ETUDES
DIRECTION DES STAGES
SERVICES Infirmerie – csernement intendance
B.R.I 15 P.S.I.G
114 Brigades territoriales
1
Since 2003, the Gendarmerie have benefited from the Pellegrini Plan, and from the action of cooperation led by the French mission for military cooperation and defence (DCMD), i.e. 1,7 million Euros over three years. In this context, the Gendarmerie has reorganized its units, has equipped the levels of command with means of mobility, and reconstituted up to 80% of its national transmission network.
38
Coverage of the territory by the Gendarmerie is considered satisfactory to Central African gendarmes, as well as to the French cooperants. This distribution corresponds to the pockets of populations who are concentrated more in the West. If the objective to recruit 400 gendarmes a year over four years is honored, the Gendarmerie will be able to keep its capability to lead its missions. The gendarmes hold weapons in the same way that servicemen do.
The legion of territorial Gendarmerie The legion of territorial Gendarmerie has national proficiency and has judicial, administrative and military police missions. The gendarmes are representatives of the law and, as such, can lead enquiries as officials who, at request of the prosecutor, have the power to make arrests. The territorial Gendarmerie works in accordance to a territorial brigade network. Its staff is versatile within the judicial, administrative and military domains. It covers all territories due to the following units: -
the squads which are placed in prefecture‟s administrative centers. There are six squads who share responsibilities for 16 prefectures, which correspond to the military regions. These squads are 300 to 400 strong; 39
-
the companies. There are 16 companies with a general aim. These 16 companies are placed directly under the authority of each of six squads. They play the role of controllers of the activities in all territorial brigades that are placed under their orders, they can exercise judicial, administrative and military police missions, and ensure the maintenance of law and order in the province. Every company has under its orders the brigades of the territorial police force, and can control their judicial, administrative and military police activities. There are also two specialized companies. Among these two companies, a mining company takes charge of policing the exploitation of the subsoil‟s resources and is directly placed under the authority of the Minister of Mines: this mining company has 14 brigades that are settled in the provincial mining zones. The second specialized company is the traffic police, which handles the police of the air, waterway and roadway transport: this company itself has three brigades: a waterway brigade, a brigade of air transport, and a roadway brigade;
-
the PIGN (Peloton d‟Intervention de la gendarmerie nationale - Small squad of intervention of Gendarmerie), which has for mission to pursue armed bandits. The PIGN has competence on the districts of the groupings. The PIGN acts only as additional help to pursue armed bandits and patrols in the hunting zones to pursue the poachers and the looters of mines. Consisting of a staff especially selected and trained for interventions of maintenance of law and order or for delicate police operations, the PIGN, recreated in 2004, is the heir of the GIGN created in Bangui in 1994. It is around 30 strong. The small squads are equipped with particular individual and collective armament, with material of clearing and with equipment of maintenance of law and order (devices of fight protection);
-
the section of research and investigation, that replaces the SERD (Section of Enquiry, Research and Documentation) – which was dissolved in 1996 because of its characteristics of police who were political and its arbitrary arrests. The research section has a mission to bring technical support to the other territorial units within the framework of big enquiries. This section also has an economic brigade which takes charge of the functioning of the services of trade, and a brigade that files reports on and identifies foreigners, of wanted notices, of desertions, etc... This service plays almost the same role as Interpol. Its competence is national. This service has 4 research brigades settled in the provinces with 4 squads (who play the same role as the research section itself with the squads).
Finally, it is advisable to underline that there is no hierarchy between the judicial police officers of the Gendarmerie. So, every officer empowered to make arrests that has knowledge of a criminal act in violation of the penal law has to at once open a preliminary inquiry of flagrante crime, or blatant crime, and has to inform the magistrate from whom he depends on (i.e. the public prosecutor or, in the jurisdictions where there is none, the President of the County Court). He has also got to report to the Major of the company.
40
41
The mobile Legion
The mobile Legion of the Gendarmerie is responsible for the maintenance of law and order and has no competencies in judicial police. This legion can, however, be requisitioned by a territorial unit for the protection of the investigators during any sensitive inquiries. The mobile gendarmerie has a unique base in Bangui, and it is from this team that elements are taken that can be sent to the provinces. The mobile Legion consists of: -
the head of body;
-
his assistant;
-
Majors of squadrons (three in all);
-
Majors of squads (six in all).
42
The school of Gendarmerie of Kolongo
Until independence, the gendarmes of the Oubangui-Chari were trained in Brazzaville. In 1960, the French Gendarmerie created a national school of Gendarmerie, to support the young independent nation. The Gendarmerie is the only body within the public services to recruit by only using competitive examinations, even if there are irregularities noticed in the progress of these exams. Unlike recruitment in the FACA, all recruited gendarmes know how to read and write. The School of Kolongo is in charge of the training of agents and officers. Recently, faced with the necessity of a massive recruitment drive, the initial training was reduced from nine to five months. Twenty-eight permanent officers and non-commissioned officers, to whom temporary replacement executives from legions and direction are added, give classes for the benefit of the gendarme cadets. There is also specialty training for active officers in the following fields: -
OPJ (judicial police officer) for 180 trainees (11 weeks);
-
Maintenance of law and order for 200 trainees (five weeks);
-
Commanding of brigade for 20 trainees (12 days);
-
Professional Intervention for 90 trainees of the PIGN and the PSIG;
-
Provost duties (military police) for 20 trainees (seven days).
Continuous control was established throughout the period of schooling, Grading is supposed to be based on merit.
Other missions of the Gendarmerie
Besides its traditional mission described above, the Gendarmerie has a duty to inform all ministerial Departments on everything that concerns the security of their activities (examples: to inform the Ministry of the Transport about bridges collapsing and the state of the roads; to inform the Ministry of Agriculture about poaching of fauna and about illegal fishing; to inform the Ministry of Health about contagious diseases and epizooty). At border level, the Gendarmes are in charge of registering all the foreigners who enter the territory. The Gendarmerie can also be requisitioned by any third person who wish to ensure the security of their goods (for example, by the BEAC - Bank of the States of Central Africa – or by the primary banks who want their capital to be escorted). At the provinces level of, the local authorities, along with the prefect, are the majors of the companies. At every sub-prefecture level of, they are the majors of the brigades. However, these services work in collaboration - , without hierarchy - and are mutually anxious to have exchanges of information.
43
Problems
Composition of the workforce
The ethnic composition of the Gendarmerie is a reflection of the ethnic origins of the Chiefs of State who succeeded one another: Nbaka; Yakoma; Sara; Mbaya. However, this ethnic composition does not seem to disturb the functioning of the institution. As mentioned above, the Gendarmerie suffers cruelly from supervision staff. To cope with that, a suggestion has been made to overturn into the Gendarmerie police officers, in over abundance within the national police force (cf. infra). However, this solution is rejected by many with the reason that basic military training is essential to the exercise of gendarmes‟ functions. Difficulties were also noticed when some officers of the army integrated the Gendarmerie: it is the gaps in the competence in judicial police that were then noticed. In 2004, further to political agreements, 520 soldiers were then moved into the Gendarmerie. Most of these soldiers came from the Presidential Guard, from whom the trimming of the workforce was required by political agreements. When integrating the Gendarmerie, most of them kept the rank they had in their original body. Some of these new members of staff have proven themselves to be guilty of numerous abuses which have devalued the Gendarmerie. Furthermore, the very weak level of the officers of the Gendarmerie remains a major problem. This can largely be explained by the fact that many of them come from the FACA. Some factions are virtually illiterate, and have never even attended a training school. The only really valid components are those who have climbed up the various levels. The annual advancement plans are changed regularly by the human resources department (battle orders are modified up to three times a year), and appointments are made without taking into account the competence of the appointed personnel. In the body of non-commissioned officers, on the other hand, we can count many more competent personnel. The much more regular conditions of their recruitment widely explain this established fact. However, the body of non-commissioned officers is very reduced: we can only count 66 non-commissioned officers for every 1800 gendarmes. Besides, it would be necessary to wait at least about fifteen years before some of them could reach some important level of responsibility. Finally, it is interesting to stress that women can aspire to the same functions as men in the Gendarmerie (which is not the case in the police force). At present, there is a woman who commands a brigade, and six women who are superior non-commissioned officers.
Equipment
Thanks to the Pellegrini Plan, the Gendarmerie can requisition 70 four-wheel vehicles, and 80 motorcycles. However it frequently happens that materials get diverted for personal purposes, and that the high ranking officers actually appropriate them. The State puts no funding in the maintenance of materials given up by France.
44
The Gendarmerie is badly equipped in respect to armaments. There are, on average, only two AK47 per brigade. This lack of weapons largely explains the influence that the presidential guard – better armed – has on the ground, at the expense of the gendarmerie. The equipment – even though it is far more important to the Gendarmerie than it is in the police forces - is considered insufficient by the gendarmes we interviewed (particularly computer equipment).
Reforming the Gendarmerie
The increase to the Gendarmerie workforce appears as the major point of the reforms that are currently wished for. The Gendarmerie should be able to grow from 1800 to 3300 men. The main part of reforms concern the territorial Gendarmerie. In the law of programming from 20092013, it is therefore planned to set up three legions of the territorial Gendarmerie: respectively in Bangui, Kagabandoro and Bambari. To each of these legions, two squads of territorial Gendarmes will be connected. It is also planned to strengthen the PIGN to pass up to the strength of 600 men, which means that every brigade should then increase from five to seven/eight men. It is also planned to create two new PSIGs (squads of surveillance and intervention), one in Kagabandoro and one in Bangui. Finally, 23 territorial units should be equipped with funding for nautical means. The creation of four squadrons of the mobile gendarmerie legion, is foreseen as well: -
one which will be at the disposal of every legion of the territorial Gendarmerie;
-
two others created in Bangui (because the main part of the maintenance of law and order happens in the capital);
-
the creation of an anti-zaraguinas unit.
45
46
The forces of police The national police are the main police force operating in the Central African Republic. However, and although its mandate and its privileges are very limited, it is also advisable to mention the role of the municipal police.
The national police force The police of French Equatorial Africa (AEF) continued to work in the Oubangui territory which, until 1960, was part of the Central African Republic. Law n.60.105 of June 21st, 1960 created the Security Directorate. By decree n.69 / 09 of March 22nd, 1969, the Security Directorate became the National Police General Directorate. Then by decree n.74 / 196 of May 7th, 1974, it took on the naming of the Central African Police General Directorate (Direction generale de la police centrafricaine – DGPC).
47
Organization
In the organic sense of the term, the police are constituted by a set of services and of body placed under the authority of the Home Secretary. On the statutory plan, successive decrees conferred a special status to the police, such as decree n.65 / 256 of November 6th, 1965 which dealt with the specific status of the bodies of security services and was then replaced by decree n.81 / 020 on November 17th, 1981. This fixed the particular status of the executives of the police and defined their specific obligations. However, since July 16th, 1999, the police have lost their special status: they are have been governed by law n.99016, which fixes the general status of public services, and was created from a decree of application n.00.172 of July 10th, 2000.
General organization The organization of the police is defined by decree n.02.269 of November 25th, 2002, which settles the organization and functioning of the Home Office, and fixes the role of the Minister. The actions of the police both concern the administrative police (dealing with the prevention of crime and disorder) and the judicial police (dealing with the research and pursuit of malpractices). The Central African police thus have a mission to ensure the prevention and the repression of criminal acts, the application of laws and regulations, the public maintenance of law and order. The Central African police are placed under the responsibility of a General Director, though this depends hierarchically on the Home Secretary. At the end of decree n.02.269, twelve directions and several central services were placed under the responsibility of this General Director. These 12 services are as follows: -
The Directorate of the studies, the economic planning and the statistics;
-
The Directorate of the resources;
-
The Directorate of the central office for the suppression of crime;
-
The Directorate of the judicial police (Criminal Investigation Department);
-
The Directorate of the surveillance of the territory;
-
The Directorate of the services of administrative police (which correspond to the intelligence service);
-
The Directorate of the national school of police;
-
The Directorate of the external services for public security (which manages the public security police stations in the provinces);
-
The Directorate of the central services for public security;
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The Directorate of the central office of fight against drugs;
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The Directorate of the police of the Air, and of Borders and the Emigration / Immigration;
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The Directorate of the national companies of security.
The services of the Judicial police
As regards the judicial police, the Central African national police force have three directions: the Directorate of the Judicial Police itself, the Directorate of the Central Office for Suppression of Crime (OCRB) and the Directorate of the OCRAD (Central Office of the Fight Against Drugs). These three directions are organized as indicated below: The Directorate of judicial police arranges the following services: -
The service of criminal affairs and customs;
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The service of economic and financial affairs;
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The central service of judicial exploitation, control and the judicial identity (which is a branch of police dedicated to the scientific lead in investigations and on crime scenes);
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The service of coordination of international relations (INTERPOL).
The Directorate of the OCRB is in charge of organized crime. It benefits from three services: -
The service of inquiries and investigations;
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The company of intervention;
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Antennae in Bangui and in the provinces.
The OCRAD has four services: -
The services of research and investigation;
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The services of toxicology;
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The services of the coordination of foreign affairs;
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The services of archives and documentation.
The services of maintenance of law and order
In the maintenance of law and order, there are two units: -
The Directorate of the National Companies of Security (CNS), which is a separate Departement, and which, in theory, has a national competence. This is a central company (150 strong), and the creation of six regional companies is currently under 49
study. This company is the equivalent to the members of the French anti-riot police in France; -
The Force of intervention of the urban body (FICU) is connected to the Directorate of the central services for public security (i.e. the central police station):
Other services, which are not specialized in the maintenance of law and order, are connected to this directorate of the central services of the law and order: for instance the service of urban security, the urban body, the company of road traffic, the company of the standing still posts, and the district police stations.
The training The police academy (Ecole nationale de Police – ENP)partially reopened its doors in March 1994, to prepare, with instructors of the French SCTIP, the initial training of patrolmen. Closed in 1996-1997 because of the mutinies, the ENP was again operational in 1998. Between October 1999 and September 2000, a mission of long-term training, organized by the SCTIP, was allowed to operate a training programme for the benefit of various categories: patrolmen cadets; police investigators; police inspectors; chief constables; the preparation of the recruitment of 200 patrolmen; the reorganization of the teaching staff by the training of eight new trainers assigned to the ENP for the initial training; and the training of 12 trainers in the various services within the frame of long-term training. At the same time, from 1999 on, the MINURCA has been in charge of the initial training of 180 patrolmen. For four years, the training of policemen has been made in partnership with the civil police division of the BONUCA. In 2007 France financed a training session on the techniques of the maintenance of law and order with the aid of the FICU and of the CNS. This training was headed up by members of the French anti-riot police. At present, due to the lack of resources, the Police Academy indeed has to directly resort to members of the active services. To remedy this situation, France also finances (with the PSF - Priority Solidarity Fund) a training course which concerns the art of communication, and the ability to teach (according to the “train-the-trainer” concept) and is also intended for officers as well as for subordinates. The trained executives will come directly under the Police Academy, and will be directly allocated to it, to be made available on a permanent basis. Within the framework of the FSP, France also offers the opportunity to train a police superintendent and an officer. However this training is not specifically aimed at the RCA, but is only accessible by selection using tests that are common to all countries of the ZSP (Zone of Priority Solidarity).
The problems
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The police force is undoubtedly the one security service which is in such a state that it is currently the one that is declining the most.
Workforce The services of the police have never been the object of any increased attention by successive governments. In 1963 for example, Eric Berman relates that the police arranged only 61 firearms for 315 recruits. About 3500 strong in 1981, the Central African police underwent a constant erosion of its workforce. Only four years ago, there were still 1800 policemen. The strength of the Central African police forces is the weakest of all the sub-regions of the CEMAC today. The global strength is 1350 civil servants, e.g. today one policeman for 3111 inhabitants. If we add the gendarmes into the mix, this ratio is reduced to one policeman, or one gendarme, per 1333 inhabitants. The last recruitment drive for police inspectors and police officers dates back to 1974. The last time were promoted goes back to 2004. Since then, there have been no further recruitments. Retired men, whose posts have not been replaced, are what largely explain this decline. However, the large number of deaths amongst policemen, particularly because of the prevalence of AIDS, also explains this decline. At some point, Voluntary Assisted Departures (DVA) have been set up, and numerous people, tempted by money, quit the Police. The absence of a special status for the police turns out to be problematic: as mentioned above, policemen are being ruled by the status of the public services, and it has not been possible to make new recruitment drives because of the instructions of the World Bank, who have ordered a limit to the number of civil servants employed. The distribution of the workforce on the territory is also very problematic. For example, in Bamingui-Ndele, the police superintendent is, at present, the only policeman. In Boda, there is only a brigade of five policemen and one police superintendent and they do not even cooperate. The problem of the plethoric number of officers also comes up. A serious imbalance in the pyramid of grades prevails today, because the proportions between the various hierarchies are not respected: while the body of patrolmen is understaffed, the senior managers (officers and upper rank officers) are in excess. There are more general police controllers - ten - within the Central African police than there are in Paris, while there are very few basic men on the ground. The numerous exceptional promotions are made in accordance to subjective criteria, and these are mostly nepotistic. The lack of strength, and the disproportionate number of leaders, incited some personnel responsible for active services to resort to auxiliaries having no police training, and who then proved themselves not only to be guilty of constant harassment, or of regularly committing violations of human rights, but have also turning out to be incompetent. Most of these auxiliaries were finally dismissed. In spite of all these gaps, according to the opinion of a foreign volunteer, there are, however, members of staff within the ranks of the police who are worthy, and who are motivated. The police only survive thanks to the commitment and the competence of these personnel, in spite of the feelings of desolation that these people have.
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The absence of rationalization in the organization of the services
As previously indicated, there are 12 directions within the national police force, each of these is endowed with between 20 and 30 persons. Yet, some of these services are obviously redundant or useless. Two directorates handle law and order: one handles Bangui and its suburbs (the Directorate of the central services of law and order), the other handles all the police stations in the provinces (the Directorate of external services of law and order). These function, however, without a single vehicle. The Directorate of the national companies of security definitely is useless because it arranges only two vehicles, which are not used outside of Bangui. This department duplicates the Company of the Forces of Intervention of the Urban Body (FICU), which is connected to the Directorate of public security. The existence of the office for the fight against drugs has no real justification either, since, as far as we know, there is no trafficking of hard drugs in the CAR.
Infrastructures and materials
During successive mutinies and coup attempts, the premises of the police were systematically targeted, and were the object of plundering (in particular furniture, computers, but also ventilators, and electric cables) and destruction (possessions and infrastructures). In 2003, all the imprisoned gangsters managed to escape and, as they escaped, they targeted the police. The premises of the various police stations of Bangui are in a disastrous state. Even the premises of a unit that is known as crack corps, like the OCRB, are in a state of decay. The conditions in which people are kept in police custody are regularly denounced by human rights organizations. In certain provincial towns, the services of the police are accommodated in premises that are rented out to the police by the municipalities. The materials (computers, laboratory of technical and scientific police) at Head Office, as well as in the other services, or of certain police stations, were destroyed during successive crises. The police premises are only equipped with basic materials and equipment. The furniture is timeworn and consist of dissimilar or diverse constituents. It is often the plaintiffs who supply the paper. Complaints and hearings are recorded by hand and only typed up with 10 days‟ notice. This situation incites the OPJ to break the rules of the code of criminal procedure in relation to the period of police custody. Policemen these days no longer get equipment. Most police warehouses were plundered during the mutinies of 1996-1997 as well as during the coup attempts of 2001 and 2002. The only exception is the OCRB, which is authorized to appropriate weapons seized from criminals. The equipment for the maintenance of law and order are also inexistent. The CNS and the FICU, as well as the police stations of public security, cannot carry out their mission due to the lack of equipments (especially motorcars). Policemen do not have individual weapons as automatic handguns. They have neither means to control crowds (protective barriers, teargas, grenades, 52
water-throwing machines), nor do they have the means to transport the workforce. Only the aides-de-camp who protect personalities have the benefit of such materials. They lack whistles as well as handcuffs. The road company has no equipment for its night-interventions patrols. The absence of vehicles is particularly problematic. All in all, we listed seven vehicles of the pickup-truck-type, one of which was out of order. Only specialized units are provided with these. All the motorcars are concentrated in Bangui. In most of the handled cases, it is the plaintiffs who have to give the policemen the vehicles for the interventions that they ask for. The police stations for public security have no means of transport of their own and thus cannot carry out community policing. The French cooperation supplied the police forces with motorcycles; however, these were not used for lack of fuel and, sometimes, they were seized by police superintendents for their own private purposes. The Police‟s radio equipment is ill-equipped to ensure the coverage of the whole territory since they had been plundered in 2003. Most of the staff have been reduced to using their own cellular phones. Only a few services have access to the Internet and only the DGPN has a fax. With regards to uniforms, every policeman dresses in accordance to his means, which creates a total lack of uniformity. Many policemen wear combat uniforms. Only some specialized units were able to be equipped by the French Police cooperation services. Naturally such impoverishment is harmful to the Police, who do not so present an image of uniformity and cohesion. In an even more worrisome way, the population has difficulty in telling the difference between policemen, gendarmes and servicemen. They also have difficulty in distinguishing dishonest individuals, who illegally dress in military uniforms to deceive their victims.
The behavior and the working conditions of policemen
The current situation echoes the morale and the behavior of policemen and is translated by: -
The relegation of high rank officers to subordinate tasks, because of the inversion of the pyramid of grades previously described;
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Ethics and deontology are regularly infringed. Policemen proceed to unauthorized police checks, and deprive citizens of their money and possessions, with no legal mandate;
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Certain bodies, notably the OCRB are sadly known for the abuses they commit. This unit has very explicitly been accused by a recent HRW report of carrying on the summary executions of "rebels" or "bandits"- often publicly. These charges are reported by numerous Central Africans (including the policemen of the other services) who, however, consider that the situation is evolving, thanks to the impact that this report has had in the CAR, and which subjected the police officials and the OCRB to strong pressure. France has stopped its cooperation with the OCRB.
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Disciplinary rules, such as those expressed in article 4 of decree n.65 / 020 of February 15th, 1965, are no longer respected. Subordinates frequently refuse to obey the orders of their hierarchical superiors, and are not afraid disciplinary procedures against them, knowing that these would not succeed thanks to the support of relatives connected to highest officials ; 53
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The non-observance of the reserve obligation. The police fight more and more often for a political parties cause;
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A certain number of foreign volunteers explain that policemen no longer have selfrespect. Many frequently beg for money in order, for instance, to look after their sick relatives.
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The population has an extremely negative image of the police force which they identify with corruption practices, with the unpunished violations of human rights, with the abuse of authority, and with racketeering. It is important to underline the fact that to the population, gendarmes have a better image than policemen do. The difference of means which both forces have does not contribute to the credibility of the police. Police superintendents mostly proceed on foot, whilst gendarmes have the luxury of vehicles. The Gendarmerie are very recognizable because they are correctly dressed;
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At present, we can consider that the ENP is lying almost dormant. The executives of the local police are no longer trained at the Police Academy of Yaounde because the CAR have not paid for the school fees of its trainees.
Reform All the projects of reform envisaged laud the quantitative and qualitative improvement of the workforce, and the means of the police actions, as well as the rationalization of organizational structures.
The adoption of a special status for the police
As previously mentioned, the Central African Police are an integral part of public services. We have seen that this status prevents the recruitment of new police officers. Given the obvious lack of a workforce, it seems necessary to confer special status to the police, following the example which would benefit servicemen and magistrates. In this respect, the adoption of a law that places the police out of the general status of public services recorded in prescription n.93 / 008 of June 14th, 1993, is necessary. This adoption is, at present, in progress, and a bill on the special status of the police has been sent to the National Assembly whilst the project of decree of application is being prepared.
The recruitment and the appointment of staff
To reach the ratio of one policeman for every 250 inhabitants, it would ideally be necessary for the Central African Police to account for 12.000 agents. For the moment it is, however, unrealistic to aim for such an objective. The objective has to be to maintain the equal or superior strength of 2000 agents. The current priority concerns the recruitment of executive staff. The specialists recommend the recruitment of 200 patrolmen every year over four years. The body 54
of inspectors also requires to be intensified: 80 new elements members (i.e. twenty inspectors every year over four years) should be recruited. This would allow the restoration of a pyramid of grades within the institution, and would make the appeal to known-as "auxiliaries” useless whilst still allowing the fight against ageism. To avoid patronage, the institution of recruitment by the taking of competitive examinations should be privileged, and this special status should give the police its own recruitment responsibility of. The intensification of the police workforce in the provinces of the North seems to be a priority. In this respect, the project of «poles of development», advanced by the EC, which aims at sending back in province civil servants and representatives of the State , looks like the most relevant solution. Finally, the deliberate use of computer tools for staff management, with which the French cooperation endowed the human resources department, should allow the police to be able to access information on the time, the place, and service of appointment, of every agent.
The training
A decree should be announced concerning the conditions of access to the ENP. Besides this, the initial training should be strengthened to mould the new recruits as well as improving the training to augment the professionalism of the agents who are already on duty. In each case, a respect for human rights should be stressed particularly, with special concern to the training of officials who are empowered to make arrests. The policemen from the hinterlands feel that they are untidy and that they have been abandoned because the available training courses only benefit the policemen of Bangui. A project that aims at training within the inside of the country is currently under consideration, and this would be accessible to policemen who have no ways of getting to the capital. Finally, it is urgent that the premises of the National School of Police (ENP) be reconstructed (building up of dormitories, outer walls, installation of an information centre, and classrooms).
The reorganization of the central services
It is advisable to mitigate the current dispersal of the police services. The number of directorates should be brought down from 12 to six. The main obstacle to such rationalization is due to the fact that the heads of services do not want to lose their positions and their bonus. The drawn-up propositions are as follows: -
The OCRB, created in 1987 within the Judicial Police Directorate (DSPJ) but removed from this one in 2003, to be set up as an independent department, should join again the DSPJ. Given the outbreak of crime in provincial towns (Bouar, Bambari, Bossangoa, Berberati, Bambari and Bria), such a reinstatement would allow the fight against crime to 55
be led by a staff strengthened depending on police stations of public security, which would guarantee the single command devolved to the police superintendent in charge of the district, and would thus avoid multiplying local structures; -
The OCLAD (Central Office of the Fight Against Drugs), created on the recommendation of the United Nations programme for the fight against drugs (PNUCID) but which no longer benefits from its support, should also reinstate the Directorate of the services of the DSPJ;
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The Directorate of studies, economic planning and statistics should be integrated within the Directorate of resources;
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Police stations placed at the borders (Bocaranga in Ouham-Pende, Kouango in Ouaka, Mobaye in Basse-Kotto, Obo at the top of Mbomou), and who at present come under the Directorate of public security should integrate with the DPAFEI.
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The wo current public security directorates (the external Direction of the central services of public security, and the direction of the central services for public security) should be fused together;
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It would also be necessary to strengthen the operational capacities, and to decentralize the units of maintenance of law and order;
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Finally, the Directorate of the surveillance of the territory should reinstate the Directorate of the service of the administrative police (DSPA) (cf. infra, paragraph on intelligence services).
The enactment of a code of conduct
Within the context of the project of reorganization, it is recommended to fuse both the plainclothes and uniformed police bodies, which will imply the obligation of all civil servants to wear uniform, allowing for exceptions permitted by the proper authorities. In this respect, the adoption of a code of conduct strengthening the special status on the questions of discipline and good practices is foreseen. This code, as well as the special status, should be an educational objective for the young recruits.
The clarification of the zones of police / Gendarmerie competence
A thorough analysis of the setting-up of police stations with regards to the brigades of the Gendarmerie within the entire territory seems necessary in order to avoid redundancy. Such an evaluation has to be made by asserting the role of the civil authority in law and order and in civil defence, i.e. in this particular case, the prefect.
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The re-energization of the central inspection and the creation of a disciplinary office connected to the office of the General Director
The central Inspection handles discipline, audits, and studies and is connected to the cabinet of the Home Secretary. However, this central inspection lacks means and, due to the lack of vehicles and fuel, cannot lead public and judicial inquiries within the whole of the territory. It does not participate in the preservation of discipline within institutions. It is recommended then to create, within the DGPC, a disciplinary office that would be immediately capable of handling all the cases that have turned out to be neglect of discipline. This disciplinary office would deal with the cases of agents that belong to executive and managerial bodies, whereas the central Inspection would focus on cases that involve senior managers.
The re-energization of the service of public relations
Although it appears in the organization of the current chart and is connected with the DGPC, this service is but an empty shell. All the criticisms and charges to which the police are the object of in the media, or in international reports, remain without answers. The re-publishing of a police magazine is recommended, as well as the creation of weekly radio broadcasts available to a large audience which would explain the nature of what normalized relations should be between the police and the population.
The supply of materials, and improvement to the conditions of employment
Given the current destitution of police forces, it is absolutely necessary to endow them with a minimum of material means. The supply of such, which obviously exceeds the means the Central African State may be able to mobilize would, however, be brought to the attention of the partners when the authorities of the country will very clearly have demonstrated their will to rebuild the police to the detriment of the FACA, in particular by the adoption of the statutory and regulating measures necessary for the reform. The most urgent measures would consist of: -
Endowing the workforce with uniforms for the population to be able to identify them, and a strengthening of the sense of discipline;
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Allotting staff with individual weapons;
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Build new police stations (two in Bangui, 12 in the provinces);
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Look for donating partners for help with running costs;
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Acquire means of communication.
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The creation of a social medical service The agents who had been wounded during operations do not immediately find medical services. Besides and as previously mentioned, the rate of HIV/AIDS is extremely high within the police force, and has caused numerous deaths. It is thus essential to develop the presence of doctors and medical ancillary services within the police force by the creation of a social medical service.
The municipal police Decreen.88.006 dated February 12th, 1988, studied earlier, fixed the attributes of the municipal police. In the CAR, the mayor is a holder of the powers of the police in his municipality. He can exercise these powers in accordance to article 112 of law 64/33 dated November 20th, 1964 that states the organization of regions with autonomous measures, and administrative districts, modified and completed by decree n.88.05 and 88.06 in 1988. The decree n.71/289 dated July 28th, 1971 created the municipal police and clearly defined its attributes. It is important to underline the fact that the mayor‟s powers in municipal policing do not obstruct the Home Office‟s right to take any measures that would be relative to the preservation of health, security and public safety, in any case these measures would not have been provided by the municipal authority. Even more important, it is necessary to underline the fact that the power of the municipal police is not at all equal to that of the national police force, nor that of the Gendarmerie. Their power is limited to the exercising of the mayor‟s administrative police powers .
Organization and attributions
Coming under the jurisdiction of the Home Office, and ruled directly by the authority of the mayor, municipal policemen are on judicial and administrative duty. The municipal police have as their mission the ensuring of safety, security and public health. The municipal police is a police of propinquity. The attributes of the municipal police are as follows: -
Ensuring the safety and the ease of the traffic on streets, places and public highways, notably the cleaning, the lighting, the removal of congestion, the demolition or the repair of insanitary buildings;
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Repressing breaches of the public tranquility (fights, crowds, noise and night-gatherings)
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Maintaining order during large gatherings;
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Inspecting the foodstuffs sold by weight, or by measure, and the healthiness of the edible food on sale; 58
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Ensuring the protection of the persons and of public and private goods;
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Guaranteeing the preservation of public places in association with waterways, forests, hunting and fishing services.
The municipal police have an obligation to report all malpractices that come under the jurisdiction of the Central African Police, and which they would have missed. Also to give assistance in any places that inhibits breaches of the peace, morality and neatness of the city. They write reports in the following domains: hunting and fishing, trafficking of drinks and drugs, tobacco and games of chance, smuggling, food hygiene, public drunkenness, the coordination of local public transport, telecommunications and the supply of electricity. They can be also requisitioned by the public prosecutor via the chief constable, the police officer or – if the former are missing – via a the commandant of a Gendarmerie‟s company. Finally, prescription 88.006 mentions the possibility for the municipalities to use the services of “municipal guards” who exercise activities that are allied to the rural police. These municipal guards may have the responsibility of looking for, in the area they are assigned to, infringements of regulations and the orders of the municipal police. They draw up reports to make note of these infringements. These municipal guards are appointed - or dismissed - by the supervising authority.
The problems
The body of the municipal police has to face the following difficulties: -
- First of all, the municipal police suffer from an absence of recognition. There is no document that guarantees the career of any of the agents. Besides, the texts that define the facets and the functioning of the municipal police are not respected, particularly by other security forces;
- The staff is under qualified and ageing; -
- The municipal police are extremely poorly equipped, and lack means of communication, computer and office automation equipment, and they have no vehicles;
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- Finally, the municipal police cover a very small part of the territory: we can list less than one municipal policeman per 1000 inhabitants.
Reforms
If the body of the municipal police must be maintained, the intensification of the synergies between the municipal police and the other bodies of security appears as a first measure to be taken. In the second place, the adoption of a status that guarantees the career of its agents, in accordance to the recommendations of the States General of 1996, also represents a priority. It would also be advisable to give the municipal police identity cards.
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The implementation of a training and managerial programme for agents and executives would also be welcome. Finally, to allow the populations better identification of the municipal police, it would be important to extend a programme of mobilization and sensitization to the different municipal texts that are available.
Intelligence services Several services handle the collecting of intelligence and come under various ministries.
Intelligence within the Ministry of Defence Within the Ministry of Defence, two services handle the collection of intelligence: -
The 2nd Office (B2) of the Gendarmerie who, on the one hand, supply to the Home Office reporting bulletins which contain information about events relating to law and order and, on the other hand, provide operational information to the gendarmerie specialized units;
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The 2nd Office of the FACA is responsible for military security, which means that it sees to the protection of material, staff and National Defence installations, against any hostile action or outside intervention. This Office also collects military information that it delivers to its units deployed on the ground.
Intelligence within the national police force Until 2002, the Direction of the Services of Administrative Police (DSPA) coordinated the socalled “renseignements generaux” services and the surveillance of territory services. Since the adoption of article 30 of the decree n.002.269 dated November 25th, 2002, only ”renseignements generaux” are named „Administrative Police‟ while the service of the surveillance of the territory have been set up as an autonomous directorate. There are, at present, therefore two services that are in charge of the collection of intelligence within the national police: -
the renseignement generaux integrated in the DSPA;
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The Directorate for the Surveillance of the Territory (DST).
The search for information by the renseignements generaux services, is different from the type of information looked for by the DST. The renseignements generaux services are in charge of the search for and centralization of political, economic and social information. On the other hand, the DST polices intelligence by supplying information on defence, and is intended to be
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able to discover activities that are inspired, set up or supported by foreign states that intend to harm the country.
The renseignements generaux (Directorate of the services of the administrative police)
The renseignements generaux are belonging to the Directorate of the Services of the Administrative Police (DSPA) which is placed under the direct authority of the General Director of the Central African Police (DGPC). The DSPA consists of four services: -
The renseignements generaux service, which collects information from the eight districts of Bangui and Bimbo, follows social movements and strikes, as well as following economic and financial activities, and informing authorities about groups that are considered subversive. It is important to note that it is forbidden for the members of the renseignements generaux to take the lead in any repression measure. The prefect is in charge of making referrals – if necessary – to the relevant service;
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The service of public inquiries, which, at the request of the political and administrative authorities, executes enquiries into the opening of bars, the demands of carrying firearms, the demands of associations and the creation of companies. Most of the files are passed on to it by the Cabinet of the Home Secretary via the Direction of the Political and Administrative Affairs (DAPA);
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The service of gaming and spectacles, which controls the activities of casinos, gaming houses, cinemas and other spectacles;
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The archives and documentation service, which archives the information notes and the files of enquiry.
The Direction of the Surveillance of the Territory (DST) The Surveillance of the Territory, according to the decree n.02.269 of November 25th, 2002, is the body in charge of watching the secret activities of foreigners during their stay on Central African territory, as well as watching any harmful activities supported by foreign states. The DST also executes deportation orders taken out by the Home Office. The Direction of the Surveillance of the Territory (DST) consists of three services: -
The Service of Enquiries and Investigations, is in charge of antinational activities, which investigates the secret activities of foreign bodies, or the nationals operating in the national territory. It supplyes information about the civil and military installations that come under of defence secrecy. This service is authorized to take repression measures;
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The Service of Official Journeys, which works in direct contact with the presidential security forces, and with the services of the Protocol;
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The Service of Archives and Documentation which is required to elaborate on files from collected information about foreign bodies and secret organizations (agents, members, structures);
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Finally, the DST has officers, or agents, within the judicial police who work in accordance with the code of criminal procedure for malpractices that relate to treason, espionage, or infringements to the security of the state.
The DST executes the orders of expulsion from the territory taken by the Home Secretary.
External Intelligence service The Central African State has been trying hard, for several years, to set up a service of external intelligence. The so-called DGDE (Direction generale de la documentation d‟Etat) is supervised by a Councillor and answerable directly to the presidency of the Republic. This service was created in 2000. This direction succeeded the National Research and Investigation Centre (CNRI), which was created in 1993, after the dissolution of the CRND (National Centre of Research and Documentation). The DGDE has now been dissolved in its turn and has been replaced by the National Office of Documentation (BND).
Territorial organization of intelligence services At present, the renseignements generaux services are leading their investigations within the framework of the administrative districts of the prefectures. On the other hand, the DST exercises its mandate in the administrative frame of the military regions. So, on the local plan, the renseignements generaux services depend on the authority of the prefect. The prefect must be informed about the reactions of the population prior to decisions taken by the government, or the administration. Nevertheless, with the exception of the city of Bangui, there is in practice no local information post, which deprives the prefects, as well as the police headquarters, of information about political and socioeconomic activities (for example, the reactions of the rural populations face to the decisions taken by the government or the administration).
The problems The financial difficulties of the intelligence sector are as striking to the FACA as to the police. Intelligence services are understaffed and vital materials and equipment are missing. The lack of IT is striking, particularly at the local level. The avenue of action is extremely limited. Intelligence services do not arrange motorized means of transport, nor modern means of communication. The search for information is essentially made using manpower, and mainly on foot. The use of files remains manual. Technical equipment (cameras for example) are nonexistent.
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Moreover, there is really no coordination organ between the various intelligence services. The Direction of the Coordination of Information (DCR) is a body which centralizes the information and this has a military character. In practice, it is supposed to collect all the reports of military intelligence, and those of the police, and to establish a synthesis for the Minister of Defence. The various agents have no specialization. After their initial training, the agents do not benefit from training courses. The agents are mostly recruited from amongst political party activists. Due to a lack of training, the agents of the various services have great difficulty in obtaining information from cross-examination.. Finally, unlike the other states of the sub-region, the CAR has no effective external intelligence. As is the case in numerous other countries, the competition between the intelligence services are often criticized. The information collected becomes more of a means for the settling of old scores (personal and organizational) than as an instrument of public utility.
Envisaged reforms Four reforms to be given priority were suggested during the SSR seminar in April 2008: -
The setting-up of the services within the entire territory, by harmonizing the districts of the renseignements generaux services and the DST;
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Three levels of the creation of a coordination of intelligence structure: at the political level, with the creation of a National Council of Information; at the level of the police headquarters, with the direction of the coordination of the information; and at the local level, by coordinating the represented services. It is thus recommended that the Direction of the Coordination of Information (DCR) should redefine its attributes and widen them out to the other services that are not yet represented;
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The professionalization of the agents, by the training of specialists in various information fields, within specialized schools;
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The improvement of the operational capacities of intelligence with regards to human, financial, material and technical resources.
The transnational dimension of the activities of the poachers and the road-cutters should also be the object of greater investment of intelligence services: it is, in this respect, necessary to better coordinate the activities of the internal and outside intelligence services, and to develop the cooperation with the foreign intelligence services . Finally, while in 2002 the renseignements generaux services and those of the surveillance of the territory were organically separated, the tendency in the other countries has been rather in the grouping of both these branches in a unique direction.
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Customs and waterways and forests Customs The administration of Central African customs was recently the object of a reform, thanks to the adoption of the decree n.06.289 dated September 2nd, 2006, after establishing the dissolution and revision of the aforementioned administration. However, it seems that all the previously denounced problems persist since the reform.
Problems
Before its dissolution, these customs counted among them 480 agents, amongst whom 300 were trained in a school of customs, and 210 were militarily trained in an army training centre. At present, the operational capacity of the customs are as follows: 396 agents, among whom 17 are main inspectors, 81 are inspectors, 41 assistant inspectors, 17 are main controllers, 67 are controllers, 24 are observation agents and 149 are civil servants. The services of customs come under the auspices of the Exchequer. The status of the customs officers was blended into the general status of public services. The porosity of borders (and, in certain places, the difficulty of precisely localizing them ), the absence of detection materials and the lack of professionalism of the agents have exposed Central African customs to the illicit traffic of weapons (APLC and war weapons), to money laundering and to contraband . The malpractices against the customs procedures tend to become the rule in the CAR. The customs officers are very often in collusion with these malpractices. There results from it a nonapplication of the code of customs, the collection of payments without receipts or with falsified receipts, the proliferation of false collectors or accommodating exemptions, the pre-liquidation at the counter level without physical checks of the goods, which creates false statements. The customs department also suffers numerous internal dysfunctions, notably the absence of hierarchical control over the execution of the services, the bad use of human resources (notably because of accommodating recruitments carried out under political pressure), the absence of control of the customs rules and procedures. Besides, the customs officers are not equipped with arms, which prevents them from ensuring the safety of receipts as well as their own protection. Other security services tend to substitute themselves for the customs officers: the permanent implication of the servicemen in the procedures of customs clearance is a major problem. The strength of the agents, which at the level of the borders varies from six to 12, does not allow the agents to work effectively. Since the adoption of the organic law that stated the general status of public services, the particular status of customs is melted, what hinders the functioning of this organ, considering that the recruitment is based only on the criterion of the university degree and not the diploma of customs specialization.
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Finally, the customs‟ infrastructures are in a state of collapse. Three-quarters of customs offices are broken down; the agents cannot arrange any working equipment (scanners, working clothes, ..) and are deficient in computer tools. The customs service only arranges six vehicles and six motorcycles as well as 10 broadcasting radio stations to cover the entire territory. Apart from the Customs Code of the CEMAC, at present there is no legal frame in existence to implement a transregional customs policy . There is also no legal frame that puts in place the principles of the cooperation between the various services that are allocated to the security of the borders (police force, presidential security, police of the borders and customs).
The reforms
A certain number of measures were proposed during the SSR seminar in April 2008. These measures are made up of three kind of recommandations:
Reform the organization -
Make an adaptation of statutes that are specific to the customs services;
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Apply the new organization chart that was adopted in 2007;
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Proceed to the appointment of executives in accordance with their competence, and in accordance to the results of enquiries made on their morality.
Strengthen the capacities of the Customs -
Develop the initial training of agents;
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Give compulsory military training;
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Train staff in specific domains (gold, wood, diamonds, hydrocarbons);
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Organize a seminar on ethics and deontology;
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Increase the workforce;
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Computerize the services;
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Equip the custom services with equipment and materials (radio communications, vehicles, computer material, scanner, uniforms);
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Equip the staff with armaments;
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Finalize the building of an arms factory.
Improve receipts -
Elaborate on the codes of procedure;
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Dismantle the unique counter (guichet unique);
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Make the committee on granting exemptions operational;
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Establish an index card of posts specific to the actions of this service for the executives of the inspection of the customs services;
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Re-evaluate salaries.
Waterways and forests sector On alimentary, economic and social plans, the waterways and forests sector (including hunting and fishing) is crucial for the CAR. In theory, the forest agents are paramilitary agents, called upon to lead, besides their traditional missions of conservation of natural resources, security missions along with the forces of defence and security. The forest agents, called "forest wardens" before the announcement of the law that assented to the new status of the public service, do not have more than about 50 members. Every agent handles a watch of more than 1000 km2. The training, particularly the military training, of their executives is non-existent, and their surveillance techniques are lamentable. The main problem is the absence of any qualification of the agents, and this needs to be remedied. The national legislations are not implemented, because of corruption and ignorance of the law texts, as well as the intervention of the political authorities in decisions that should come under technical services. of the licenses are not attributed in transparent conditions. The projects of the new forested codes, the code of protection of the fauna, and the code of the fish farming have waited more than five years to be adopted and advertised. The number of seasonal movement corridors for cattle is often a channel for the transmission of security threats. Their reorganization, as well as the stimulation of economic activities in the various zones, would favour a return to safety. The identification and the effective control of these transhumance corridors in the northwest and northeast parts of the country are also priority grievances, in order to prevent the infiltration of poachers, sometimes heavily armed, who are not only committed to the plunder of fauna, but also attack the populations of the implicated zones. The disarmament of the transhumance corridors, and the deletion of some of them, are essential here.
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Self-defence groups Faced with the institutional incapacity of the Central African State to ensure its authority in the entire territory, particularly at borders, local self-defence groups were formed. These groups were often provided with traditional weapons. In 1984, Yaya Ramadan, leader of the village of Tiroungoulou and former mayor of the city of Birao, set up a self-defence unit in the prefecture of Vakaga, which received the approval of the government. This militia had the fight against poaching as its initial objective. Since this date, other surveillance organizations of the district, as well as groups of vigilante, have appeared throughout the country. These self-defence groups are called "local forces". They are followed by the prefect to avoid any straying. These local forces use weapons made by regional craft manufacturers, and they collaborate with the servicemen. Peulhs, known as the “archers” use poisoned arrows (and “mystic forces”). These local self-defence groups got themselves organized to fight the road cutters. They are considered very brave by the population and, sometimes, manage to release people who have been taken as hostage. The role of the local forces is often perceived as very positive by the populations because it supplies servicemen and policemen who are not on the spot. The intervention of the FACA, and the police, is subject to the licensing systems of the central authorities (CEMA, Minister), which delays interventions. In every village, or every district, it is the local authorities who identify the brave young people able to defend their community. Every village then has its own self-defence group . The mayor also keeps an eye on the self-defence groups of every village. These groups thus report to the mayor, and to the detachment of the local police force. The ethnic criteria – which is taken into account for the appointment of village district leaders - does not play a part in the choice of the members of the self-defence groups. The bravest young people are chosen from among all the ethnic groups who are mobilized. The members of the self-defence groups are usually between 20 and 45 years old. Several MP‟s (Members of the Parliament) we interviewed explained that they often have to supply ammunitions to the automobile-defense groups because the mayor has no money to do so. For these MPs, it is thanks to these self-defence committees that a modicum of security can be maintained. The FOMUC would also have supplied ammunitions to these local forces and would have been involved with controlling how they were used. It seems necessary to define a text for the use of these self-defence groups and the archers today, as well as to define the attributes of their cooperation with the FACA, gendarmerie and police forces, and the chain of command, that apply in this case.
The private security companies The wave of internal conflicts, and the accompanying endemic insecurity, is at the origin of the privatization of the functions of security. In the CAR, private security companies have as a main mission, the protection of companies and possessions (guarding furnitures and buildings, as well as the protection of the people who are directly, or indirectly, bound to those companies). Companies and private individuals employ more and more of their services.
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Several security companies were created over the past five years in Bangui but none, with the exception of SCPS (a private company of security created by Patassé, but, as previously indicated, dissolved from now on), seemed able to hold any weapons. Agents are recruited on the spot, without any specific training. They only have the surrounding walls where they stand guard as a radius from which they can act. The suspects, or the arrested individuals, must be handed over to the police who then ensure that they have judicial procedures levied against them. There are no legal texts that rule out or regulate the activities of the private security services. Generally the various companies have status, and a legal base of internal regulations that assist in the settling of the functioning of the company. However, the Home Office and the Ministry of Trade have adopted recently some legal measures: -
by applying the decree n.02.269 of 2002, the Home Office has granted documents of recognition and operating approval to a dozen of private security companies ;
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by applying the decree n.83.033 of December 31st, 1983, the Ministry of Trade assimilates the private security companies into the private companies of services. It recognizes only three of them.
These legislations are not sufficient however. Faced with the development of this private sector, the creation of a department that is directly in charge of it, as well as that of a clearly defined legal framework, seems highly desirable. The Parliament has to introduce a law that regulated this sector. Recently, a bill was detailed by the Minister of the administration of the territory, following the work done by an inter-ministerial committee. This bill contains five titles and 19 articles: -
Heading I (article one to five): deals with the license to operate. Article two places the private security companies under the exclusive leadership of the Home Office which is in charge of the law and order.
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Heading II deals with the staff and the equipment. Article six clarifies the profile of the employees of a guarding company , Article eight puts the principles of the recruitement and of preliminary training, and Article nine clarifies the kind of equipments useful to these companies, as well as their work uniforms (the use of weapons of war is strictly forbidden).
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Heading III deals with control. Articles 11 and 12 arrange controls over the technical services of the Home Office, namely the Direction of the Services of Administrative Police (DSPA), and the Direction of the Political and Administrative Affairs (DAPA), or those that the central inspection can organize.
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Heading IV deals with penalties. Articles 13 arrange that there are two orders of penalty: temporary; or definitive closure and cancellation of approval, followed by detention from 15 days to one month, matched by a fine of 50.000 FCFA.
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Heading V arranges that the already existing companies have to send their statutes and internal regulations as well as the curriculum vitae of their staff to the Ministry within one month, at the risk of being fined 50.000 FCFA.
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DDR, foreign fighters and SSR The security situation in the CAR, notably the presence of rebels and foreign fighters, requires – in any global approach of reforming the security sector – the integration of the issue of DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration). In spite of the DDR‟s experience in the CAR through the PNRD (National Program of Disarmament and Reintegration), and the PRAC (Project of reintegration of former-combatants and support to communities), there remains a lot to be done to cover the light weapons and small arms (LWSA) and ex-fighters challenge. Indeed, in general, the PRAC is unanimously recognized as a failure. The Syrte agreement signed between the Government and FPDC, as well as the Birao agreement, signed between the Government and the UFDR, have not led to the application of any realistic DDR programmes. These agreements have allowed a fragile pacifying of the northeast though in reality they only experienced partial application. Faced with this situation, the SSR seminar of April 2008 suggested the following measures: -
Lead a campaign of pleading at both international and national level for technical support to set-up the programme;
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Lead a sensitization and information campaign in the local communities;
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Define the criteria of eligibility of the demobilization that must be accepted by all the different parties;
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Identify eligible ex-fighters;
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Lead a study on socioeconomic opportunities for reintegration project;
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Detail appropriate activities for foreign fighters;
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Set up an action of accompaniment and assessment of the programmes set up.
in the zones of the
Besides this, within the CAR there is already a promising programme which, as the report of the Preparatory Committee for National Inclusive Dialogue (CPDPI) underlines, could serve as a platform of social and professional reintegration for the younger fighters . This programme, called the National Pioneer Youth (Jeunesse Pionniere Nationale), was created in 1964. It favours the professional and social inclusion of young Central Africans. This programme was, however, left more or less dormant before it was reactivated by the decree n. 06.147 of April 28th, 2006 which restored the High Commission in charge of the Pioneer Youth. This High Commission is institutionally connected with the Presidency of the Republic. Its objectives are as follows: -
Ensuring civil and moral training. This first phase of training lasts three months, and comes under a military framework;
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Offering, in the second term, technical training (hairstyling, secretarial work, sewing, masonry, carpentry, mechanics, tanning, electricity, cooking, soldering and sheet metal work, agriculture, fishing) to young people who are no longer in school in order to favour their social integration.
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This programme is also accessible to girls as well as to young men, between the ages of 17 to 25 years old. A quota is fixed for every village. Once the training has ended, these young people are encouraged to return to their villages of origin to develop within cooperatives (and not in a isolated way) the activities learned in their area of training and so establish pools of development –. In 2007, the High commission opened up 15 hectares of subsistence crops to Bossembele, within the framework of agricultural training, and trained a dozen pioneers in the skills of driving agricultural machines, and of fishing. Such a programme could constitute an interesting framework for the implementation of a DDR programme, especially since the High Commission collaborates at the national level with all ministerial departments.
Light weapons and small arms (LWSA) Until 1982, light weapons did not represent a major problem in the CAR. However, following a failed coup against Bokassa, the Central African actors began to receive weapons from abroad. The change of government in Chad also had serious implications for the country, since the borders were crossed by foreign armed forces. The situation in the DRC also influenced the traffic of weapons in the CAR, particularly following the overthrow of Mobutu in 1997, and two years later when Jean-Pierre Bemba's MLC (Movement for the Liberation of Congo) overcame Congolese Forces. Besides, the disregard of the legal frame for the holding and detention of weapons could also explain their proliferation. To fight against the proliferation of light weapons in the CAR, the following actions should be started: -
To forbid the manufacture of homemade light weapons;
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To mobilize capital and to begin a national programme of control and reduction of the LWSA;
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To set up training for the gendarmes, policemen, and the FACA in control of the LWSA;
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To support the composition of a registry of military and civil weapons to ensure a reliable inventory to control weapons and ammunition;
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To lead a study on the dynamics of the LWSA up to the national level by taking into account regional dimensions;
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To collect weapons by setting up an incentive system (for example in exchange for recommissioned weapons, the local community would obtain a bus, as well as toilets);
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To revise the ratio one man/one weapon for the DDR programmes with, in particular, a ratio that would be negotiated by a weapon for ex-fighters associated with the test to dismantle and reassemble weapons;
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To train gendarmes and policemen to specialize in collection operations, as well as local specialists in disarmament which include data management, inventory control and the destruction of weapons;
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To create a programme of the management of legal weapons within barracks.
The presence of armed foreign fighters on national territory During the SSR seminar, it was considered necessary to set up an operation of identification that would enable to cope with the difficulties in controlling streams of people. These objectives were declined as follows and some of the measures that appear below were also formulated by the CPDPI.
The ensurance of an effective control of foreign fighters -
The distribution of ID cards;
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The setting up of services of prefectural information;
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The sensitization of mayors and district leaders;
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The implementation of the decree n.88 of February 6th, 1988 relating to the attributions of local authorities.
The reduction of internal and outside threats -
To revise the corridors of transhumance in authorized zones, with a formal ban to be circulated in hunting zones;
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To update the bilateral agreements with bordering countries;
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To define a framework that is harmonized for the distribution of goods and people;
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To set up a coherent law on immigration;
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To revise the agreements of regional cooperation with Chad, Sudan and the DCR in order to ensure border security, strengthen motorized patrols together with the Chad, Sudan and Cameroon and to systematize the exchange of information;
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To operate and respect the Stability Pact for the Great Lakes region ;
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To operate joint patrols between nearby states to watch over (or protect?) the borders;
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To set up facilities for the reintegration of foreign elements back into their country of origin. 71
Register the action in a sub-regional frame -
To apply the Pact of non-aggression, solidarity, mutual assistance and security of January 28th, 2006;
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To operate the Mechanism for Early Warning of Central Africa (MARAC);
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To apply the Agreement of security cooperation of May 15th, 2004;
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To apply the tripartite Agreement between Sudan, RCA and Chad of 2004;
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To apply the resolutions of the UN Stanging Committee on the questions of security in Central Africa;
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To exchange military intelligence between states;
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To apply the coercive phase of the fight against the APLC.
The democratic control of the security sector: the role of legislative power In the CAR, the Parliament is unicameral: the National Assembly consists of 105 representatives. At present, the Central African National Assembly is dominated by the group of the representatives of the presidential majority which includes: the independent group KNK (a political association created by General Bozizé and not yet constituted as a political party), the PDCA, the PNCN, the MDI, the PLD, the MDD, the PLD, the MUD, the FODEM and the PUN. The KNK adds 38 seats, and the whole majority 77 seats. The parties of the opposition are the MLPC (Patassé‟s party, taken over by Jean-Jacques Demafouth), the RDC (Kolingba‟s party), the APD (Koyambo‟s party), the FPP (the party of the historical opponent Abel Goumba, companion of the CAR‟s founder Barthélemy Boganda) and some other small associations of lesser importance on the political scene.
The institutional powers of the National Assembly Article 61 of the Central African Constitution foresees a whole series of areas covered by the law: security is explicitly a part of it. Within the framework of the legislative work, by which the Parliament puts the legal frame supervising the missions of the forces of security, the first responsibility of the Parliament has to be to fix the distribution of the competence between the civil forces and the armed forces. The National Assembly exercises parliamentary control over the forces of defence and security. This parliamentary control widely passes by the work made in committees. Certain Committees of the Central African Parliament have powers of inquiry others, on the other hand, are content with examining the work of rapporteurs, and have no initiative capabilities. There are two 72
Parliamentary committees in charge of security questions: the Committee “Defence”, is in charge of questions that are relative to the FACA, and to the Gendarmerie; the Committee “Home/Law”, is in charge of the questions that are relative to the internal forces of security. These Committees are endowed with power of inquiry. The National Assembly has “parliamentary actions” funds, which are supposed to allow the financing of inquiries led by MPs. The work in the Committees enables the MPs to exercise control at three levels: -
The parliamentary control of the budget, which consists of giving approval to the budget which is presented by a Minister and of controlling expenses further down;
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The control of public administration, which consists of a regular evaluation of the actions of a Ministry within a frame that has been set beforehand;
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The control of ministerial responsibility.
The MPs can resort to written and oral questions, call Ministers, and even vote for a vote of censure. The National Assembly only has the power to audition Ministers, and not the President, because only the government is responsible in front of the Parliament. That is why, faced with the impossibility of appealing to the President/the Minister of Defence, it has been traditionally the Home Secretary who has answered questions from the representatives. Since 2007, the Minister of State for Defence has been in charge of appearing in front of the Parliament. So far, he has been required to appear twice in front of the representatives : the first time about the matter of illegal barriers ; and, for a second time, about the absence of communication on disciplinary measures that had been taken against servicemen who were guilty of abuses. These hearings were led in front of the Committee “Defence”.
The working conditions of the Central African members of parliament The institutional capacities described above suffer from the practice of numerous infringements, largely attributable to the difficult conditions in which the members of parliament exercise their functions. It is important to underline that wherever their district is, the representatives mainly live in Bangui: they receive reports that describe the situation on the ground, and only move to their own constituencies on occasions. Certain representatives have never even been to visit their districts since 2005. It is foreseen that the “Defence” Committee is to lead three parliamentary evaluation missions in the provinces to review the military barracks, the police forces and the police stations, in accordance with the “Home/Law” Committee. Three missions each comprise of five representatives who were already sent to the provinces at President Bozizé‟s request. Besides this, the “Defence” Committee has already visited the Kassai camp within the framework of its inquiry on the living conditions of servicemen. However, the means are missing to enable the MPs to carry out the missions. The following are cruelly lacking: -
Logistic means: every mission on average requires six vehicles to transport three teams. The missions in the hinterland were made up from private vehicles; 73
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The fuel: On average representatives have to wait one year before obtaining the necessary fuel for them to move around;
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A parliamentary assistant to gather information;
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The absence of training of the representatives on questions of security.
Representatives seem also to have absolutely no control over the defence budget. Officially, this budget was voted by the Parliament to include amounts of up to 12 to 13% of the national budget. But in fact, it is extremely difficult for the representatives (as for the other actors) to obtain information about the reality of the defence budget. Only the president and the Minister of State (not even the Treasury Department) know the reality of the available amounts and, apparently, they are the only ones who can decide on the way there are used. The representatives demand the right to be entitled to having access to the management and control of the budget, and dispute the secrecy of the defence, but this is systematically turned down. They assert that the defence secrecy costs are only for the operations that are led on land.
The reforms to strengthen the power of the Parliament Improvement of the general functioning of the Parliament in its role of control of the security sector It is desirable that the Parliament broadens the competence of its Committee “Defence” in all questions regarding security and, to this effect, is equipped with strengthened means to do this. The reformulation of the Committee “Defence” into Committee “Defence and Security” would also be welcome. The Committee “Defence and Security” should also be entrusted with the mission to create a structure in charge of intelligence. The intensification of the capacities of this new Committee - “Defence and Security” - by the assignment of a parliamentary assistant expert on the questions of security, is also desirable as well as the organization of a training seminar for all the members of parliament on the question of security.
Update of the legislative frame in domains concerning the SSR
In terms of legal instruments, the update and the vote of different laws by the Parliament were recommended at the end of the SSR seminar, among which are: -
The law of military programming;
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The legislative framework for the intelligence services and the Defence secrecy;
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A law establishing the particular status of the police;
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The legislative framework for the municipal police;
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The law of regulation for the closure of the budgetary year; 74
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The adoption of a bill for the new forest code, the code of fauna and the code of fish farming;
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The revision and the elaboration of texts that are relative to the participation of women in the security sector ;
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The adoption of a consistent law on arms trafficking.
The role of the media The media situation is one of many contrasts in the Central African Republic. The media benefit from a certain amount of freedom. With concern to the public media, broadcasted information is often only partially relayed, and only resumes with the versions that the governement wish to spread. The views of their opponents, of syndicates, or of the man in the street, are mostly ignored by these public media. It is particularly the private media which gives evidence of a certain amount of courage in data processing. In the CAR, there are a dozen private, generally religious, radio stations. There is a Muslim radio station, but most of the radio stations are Christian. Indeed, every diocese possesses its own radio. Besides, the most serious, and most professional, radio – and also the most listened to – is NDEKE LUKA (“Bird of Luck”), which is non-religious and is financed by the United Nations via the PNUD. With regards to the press, the main newspapers are: «Le Confident» (“The Confidant”),« Le Citoyen »(“The Citizen”),« Le Démocrate »(“the Democrat”), and « L‟Hirondelle » (“The Swallow”). Most of these newspapers represent the opinions of the opposition. However, the quality of the content and the data processing are generally rather bad. In the CAR, the training of journalists indeed represents a large problem. Having no training, the journalists often combine their ideas, and do not cross-reference their information. As a consequence, we are regularly beset with defamations and the ignorance of any of the deontologies, which creates frequent legal procedures for the journalists. The treatment of the security questions does not make exception. The forces of defence and security are often criticized, even frequently diabolized but the facts for which they are blamed are not often backed up. Three years ago, a project supported by the UNESCO planned to open a department of journalism and sciences of information at the University of Bangui. In February 2008 the Minister of Education adopted an order to create this department, but, so far, nothing has been set up. The second major problem that characterizes the media sector is its small-scale broadcasting across the country. Yet, the national broadcasting is supposed to cover the whole territory. But most of the broadcasting stations, established at the time of Bokassa, are now obsolete. As for television, although it can cover only the city of Bangui, it does not go beyond around 100 km. Most of the newspapers are dispersed in Bangui, though these are essentially only in the town centre. Nine km from Bangui, no newspapers can be found. In a city like Obo, which is 1200 Km east of Bangui, there is no radio or Central African television reception. Broadcasts received by the inhabitants have been broadcast from the RDC, Sudan or Uganda. It is the same for Birao, where the inhabitants generally receive broadcasts that are mainly transmitted from Sudan. The improvement in media coverage on questions of security is an extremely important venture. The following measures could take part in this improvement: 75
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Communicate widely with the actors of the media, law practitioners and legislative authorities on the freedoms of the media in favour of its application;
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Rehabilitate, modernize and spread out the whole of the territories radio and television channels;
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Reactivate the order that entitles political parties access to the media ;
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Assign a focal point that would be in charge of press relations in the army, the gendarmerie and the police;
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Organize periodic meetings between the press and the FDS;
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Offer journalists training in the various security sectors and training on the law;
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Incite the press not to diabolize the FDS.
The governance of the security sector: transparency in budget management, and the fight against the corruption within the Forces During the SSR seminar held in Bangui in April 2008, the debates of a subcommittee were specifically focused on the non-application of texts governing economy, on the favour granted in the execution of the army‟s budget in comparison to other sectors, on corruption within the FDS who are better paid than other civil servants, on the absence of penalties towards corrupters that has nevertheless been foreseen by the Penal Code, and on the inability of the controlling structures within the Department of Finance. According to the established diagnosis, the troubles that are gangrening the economy are due to the lack of rigour, and to the nonapplication of the texts that govern them. To compensate for these defaults, the sub-committee looked into the continuation of the reform which was begun in 2005 and was further to the various reports of the international partners (the IMF and the World Bank). Nevertheless, although this view was briefly evoked, the dimensions of the informal sector, and its role at the same time in human, budgetary and material management of the forces of Defence and security, was not measured enough. As a consequence, all the recommended measures, which we reproduce below as information, seem to us to be far too much of a purely accountants approach. It seems very clear now that the understanding of the phenomena of corruption and absence of transparency in the security forces management also has, and maybe above all, to meet a sociological approach, stressing the weight and the specificity of social relations, but also the domestic solidarities, which can explain some of the deviant or deceitful behaviour. Following the example of the highest leader, every civil servant at the head of an administration or a service uses its resources both to build up for himself a devoted clientele, and to make its duty toward his own (widened) family. The individual connections interfere in the political and social life, forcing most of the civil servant, who want to immortalize his power but also to preserve social recognition, to be generous and to be able to meet the needs of his protégés. So the intensity of interpersonal relations (families, clans, customers) forces down on the exercise of power of certain functions, to begin with the hierarchical power, particularly in the security sector. Patronage creates informal networks, which constitutes the real supporting points of the 76
regime, but also guarantees a certain social balance, the civil servant being socially obliged to his „parentage‟ and thus forced to carry out his solidarity duties towards them. Consequently, these phenomena are amplified in the security sector as far as the detention of a function within the army, within the police and within the other security services is, closely or by far, a means of access to coercive and physical means of checking the populations and thus inspires fear, which is a supplementary guarantee against any pursuit. During our field research, servicemen and policemen (whatever their ranks) have agreed to speak about practices of corruption : they systematically emphasize the weight that constitutes their social duty to meet the needs of a widened network. Any analysis of the phenomena of corruption within the army has to take more into account the reality of such social practices. As indicated before, the operational conclusions drawn out at the end of the SSR seminar mainly come within an accountant‟s approach which, besides, does not consider the specificities of the security sector enough. If a certain number of these propositions are completely relevant, they should focus more on the sociological context of the traditional systems of solidarities that prevail in the Central African Republic, and are connected to the specificities of the security sector. It is therefore necessary to improve knowledge in a more rigorous mastery of the informal sector. The recommendations of the seminar are as follows:
Improvement of budget estimation -
Expenses: O Elaborate a chart-type for each Ministry; O Make reliable the file of payments (operate a new chain of payments); O Improve the knowledge of human and material resources that currently exist in ministries, and present estimations of the necessary needs of functioning for the purposes of an eligible budget proposition to put to the Parliament; O Present the credits of the year within the framework of expenses at the middle term (CDMT) in accordance with the DRSP (Strategic Document of Reduction of Poverty).
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Receipts: O
Launch a detailed inventory of economic units, implementation of chartered centres of accountant management and intensification of customs controls at the borders.
Respect for the budgetary procedure -
Apply the text relating to the circuits of expenses;
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Establish a naming of the details of expenses; 77
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Establish a mercurial of the prices;
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Legally supervise exceptional procedures of the expenses to translate them in terms of budget;
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Apply the new code of procurement contracts;
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Operate a computer system that is integrated for the follow-up of the budgetary execution;
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Set up a structure of budgetary regulations that would be intended to manage budget allocation in accordance with the cash flow statement.
Improve receipts -
Cross-examine taxes/customs files.
Improve the accountant follow-up and the cash management in the Treasury -
Set up an accountant naming resulting in the presentation of an account of management.
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Establish a finance unit that owes its thanks to the deletion of current accounts in the primary Banks, and transfer receipts to the Treasury.
Strengthen the bodies of operational and autonomous control -
Put the national audit office into a situation where it can judge the management accounts of the Ministries of security.
Promote the fight against corruption -
Negotiate a durable solution for the payment of back pay;
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Free salaries;
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Elaborate a body of ethics for each state body ;
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Set up a structure that is independent in its search for corruption;;
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Apply the penal code against corrupters and the corrupt;
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Take disciplinary measures for the diversion of public monies (expulsion from public services and publication of penalties);
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Communicate the results of the customs and fiscal controls and bring them back to the highest level;
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Implement an incentive system of payment within the framework of the fight against fraud;
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Effectively operate the power of investigation by the general inspection of the taxes and the national audit office;
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Massively inform the population about the rights and duties of each one of them.
Conclusion: the crucial challenge in the distribution of the competence between the forces of defence and the forces of security
The major problems of the Central African security sector really lies in the disproportionate role played by the FACA in the management of internal security. It is very clear that the CAR have not yet returned to a state of civil and democratic rule of law: although widely deprived from means and capacities, the FACA is omnipresent in the management of security, particularly in its internal dimensions. The state continues to work as if it was still at war. The question of the distribution of the competence between the internal forces of security and the forces of defence is crucial for the civilianisation of the maintenance of law and order in the CAR, as well as for the launch of judicial procedures corresponding to the law, that are indispensable to a real democratization of security management. The major objective of any SSR process is to contribute to the scrupulous recognition of the missions of each of the forces of defence and security, over internal security. The key issue for the CAR in reforming security consists of handing back the forces of defence to their barracks. Indeed, in the CAR, any SSR process obviously has, at first and above all, to go through intensification reinforcement of the forces of police. As first resort forces, the national police force is competent in the maintenance of law and order, and it is authorized to require support from the Gendarmerie -although the opposite is not possible. The Gendarmerie (judicial police force with a military status) is the second resort force. The prefect can appeal to the army as a third resort in accordance with the gravity of the events. However, appeals to the army re subject to the declaration of a state of emergency, declared by the Head of State. According to the law, the authorities (prefects, sub-prefects) can mobilize the security forces on demand. The demands can be of three sorts: a particular requisition (requisition particuliere), in case of light demonstrations; a main requisition (requisition principale), in cases of more important demonstrations; a general requisition (requisition generale), in cases of serious events, the management of which requires the use of firearms. At present, such a plan is not enforced in the CAR: it is often the FACA, and particularly among them the workforce of the BPSI of the presidential guard, that are mobilized as a first resort, in cases of infringements of law and order. 79
The support provided by international donors to internal security forces (police and gendarmeries) must be perceived as the first instrument in strengthening the rule of law. For better territorial coverage such an objective has to go through revisions to the deployment of the forces of defence and security in all territories, particularly by the devolution of the forces based in Bangui. The major objective of a reform should be to strengthen security in Bangui, by removing the servicemen from the capital, and by strengthening the workforce of the police there. At the same time, it would be advisable to strengthen the security in the provinces by endowing the forces of the Gendarmerie in the countryside, and the forces of police in cities, means with which to carry out their missions. Only policemen or gendarmes should be deployed on the legal barriers. Finally, it would be advisable to strengthen security at the borders, by redeploying the workforce of the FACA, so that they can ensure, in a preventive way, their first mission of defence of the territory, and by decreasing the importance of the presidential guard. It will be necessary to train servicemen to reiterate their missions to them by particularly asserting the fact that servicemen do not have to intervene in the maintenance of law and order, apart from cases demanded by the prefect. The case of the fight against zaranguinas, which is what represents the main security issue today, is extremely problematic. Within the framework of the fight against zaraguinas, there is today no judicial follow-up: servicemen just purely and simply eliminate the road cutters that they arrest. The police forces and Gendarmerie claim to be involved, at different degrees, in the fight against zaraguinas. Some of the road cutters‟ financiers operate from Bangui and send order to them via radio: according to numerous policemen, such an operating mode justifies the involvement of the police forces. Gendarmes consider themselves as having to be called to manage the attacks of zaraguinas in the provinces, because they are authorized to requisition all the present forces in their jurisdiction, i.e. the army, customs officers and agents of waterways and forests. In the CAR, it is the army who is involved in the fight against zaraguinas because it is the only outfit to be awarded by the authorities the necessary means (especially fireguns). The Gendarmerie have no means of their own, and limit themselves to the supply of information to the FACA. The problem is that zaraguinas use very heavy war equipments, which can justify the commitment of the army. However, the FACA systematically execute zaraguinas, which does not allow the police or the gendarmerie to lead an inquiry, then carry out legal proceedings for the dismantling and the arrest of road cutters and their financiers. Yet, it is always necessary to open a judicial procedure, and to prosecute the road cutters because their actions are a criminal matter, and not, as such, one of aggression against the security of the State. Apart from this question, it today seems essential to restore the image, and especially the confidence of the police forces, amongst the population. There is real confusion today in the minds of the population, who have difficulty in distinguishing between the various defence and security forces of. The problem of the nature of every force‟s equipment comes up. The Kalashnikov does not have to be the weapon of the gendarme, nor of the police (who, as we have already underlined, often only have the weapons taken from people they have arrested). The distinction between the uniforms and weapons that are possessed by the various categories of defence and security forces are essential. However, the distribution of competence between the various police forces remains problematic within the CAR. The distribution of ability between the police and the Gendarmerie is, in theory, the following: -
In urban areas, the police is competent, in all domains as a first resort force, apart from the events of an administrative or military character; 80
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In rural spaces (5 km from urban areas), it is the Gendarmerie who are competent.
Yet, it turns out that this distribution of responsibilities is not always abide with, particularly in the provinces. Furthermore, we can notice that the municipal police often performs the function of a national police force, while its prerogatives should be limited to the exercise of the mayor‟s administrative police‟s powers . A clarification of the roles of the various police forces constitutes one of prerequisites for any of the SSR processes. Besides, a question that has scarcely been approached in the current projects of reform is to know if a country such as the CAR can allow the maintenance of two internal security services that have competence in the maintenance of law and order in the judicial and administrative police (without taking into account the supplementary role of the municipal police). To conclude, this crucial problem of the distribution of competence between the forces of defence and the forces of internal security have to particularly prompt the adoption of a global approach of SSR in CAR. Such a global approach should become synonymous with the following points (amongst which are some that were formulated during the SSR seminar held in Bamgui in April 2008): -
Make a vote for a law organizing the links of defence with the other security sectors, which would be more general than the law of military programming, ;
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Define the mechanisms of a dialogue between the various forces (FACA, Gendarmerie, Police, Customs) to clear up their missions and the ways that they collaborate;
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Detail a decree that defines the roles of the military leader (commandant of military region), and of the civil leader (prefect) in the defence zones ;
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Make a study of the question of the territorial competences between the FACA and the Gendarmerie, as well as a study of the distribution of the responsibilities between the police forces and those of the Gendarmerie;
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Set up a legal framework to favour the dialogue, and the coordination, between the various security services that are in charge of border management, in particular, the Gendarmerie, the FACA (especially the presidential guard), the border police and customs services.
In the end, it is obvious that the achievements of SSR in CAR are very strongly linked to that of the sector of justice. The object of this study was to give a detailed account of the Central African security sector but obviously this one does work - or should work - in close collaboration with judicial devices. The reinforcement of the internal security forces can prove all its efficiency only if the judicial authority exercises its prerogatives.
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Appendix: List of interviews -
Two members of the CPDPI; Former Chief of Staff, at the time of the field research in charge of heading of the Preparatory Committee of the SSR seminar held in Bangui in April 2008; First Counselor at the French Embassy; French Defence Attaché ; French Deputy Internal Security Attaché; French officer, special adviser of the Central African Chief of Staff; French gendarmerie officer, special adviser of the General Director of the Central Africa Gendarmerie; French officer (general), special advisor of President Bozizé; Two South African military advisors in charge of training the FACA; Head of the governance team at the UNDP office in CAR and two of its collaborators; Expert one expert working at the European Union Delegation in Bangui; Head of the BONUCA; Military counselor of the BONUCA; Deputy Chief of staff of the FOMUC; Central African officer in charge of logistics within the FACA; Central African officer in charge of human resources within the FACA; Three non-commissioned officers from the FACA; High Commissioner for the Pioneer Youth; Police officer, Head of the OCRB; Head of the Police Academy; Three policemen (inspectors) Head of the 3rd office of the Central African Gendarmerie; Two journalists; President of the Central African private sector association; Three parliamentarians from the majority (groupe KNK);
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ACRONYMS AEF
French Equatorial Africa
ANR
in THE DCR
APD
Koyambo‟s party
APRD
Armée populaire pour la restauration de la République – Rebel mouvement
BEAC
Bank of the States of central Africa
BIT
Battalions of territorial infantry
BND
Bureau National de la Documentation - National Office of Documentation
BONUCA
Office of the United Nations in CAR
BPSI Bataillon de protection et de securite des institutions - Battalion of protection and security of the institutions CAR
Central African Republic
CEMA
Chief of Army Staff
CEMAC Communaute economique et monetaire d‟Afrique centrale – Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa CID
Criminal Investigation Department
CIMIC
Civil-military actions
CNRI Centre
Centre National de Recherche et d‟Investigations - National Research and Investigation
CNS
Compagnies nationals de securite - National Company of security
CPDPI Comite Preparatoire du Dialogue Politique Inclusif – Preparatory Committee of the Political Inclusive Dialogue CPI
Coour penale internationale – International Penal Court
CRND Centre National de Recherche et de Documentation - National Centre of Research and Documentation DAPA Direction des affaires politiques et administrative - Directorate of the political and administrative affairs
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DCMD
French mission for military cooperation and defence
DDR
Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinstatement
DFID
International Department for development
DGDE
Direction generale de la Documentation d‟EtatHead office of the documentation of State
DGGN Direction generale/Directeur General de la gendarmerie nationale – General Directorate/Director of the National Gendarmerie DGPC Direction generale/Directeur general de la police centrafricaine – General Directorate/General Director of the Central African Police DGPN
Direction Generale de la Police Nationale – General Directorate of National Police
DIO
Detachement d‟Instruction operationnelle - Detachment of Operational Instruction
DPAFEI Direction de la police de l‟Air et des Frontieres et de l’Émigration/Immigration – Air and Borders Directorate DRC
Democratic Republic of Congo
DRSP the poverty
Document strategique de reduction de la pauvrete - Strategic document of reduction of
DSPA Direction des services de la police administrative - Directorate of the services of the administrative police DSPJ
Direction de la police judiciaire – Judicial Police Directorate
DST
Direction de la surveillance du territoire - Services of the surveillance of the territory
EC
European Commission
ENP
Ecole Nationale de Police – National Police Academy
ENVR
National Schools With Regional Vocation
ESFOA
Ecole supérieure de formation des officiers d‟active – High School for active officers
EUFOR
Military Operation led under the aegis of the European Union
FACA
Forces Armees Centrafricaines / Central African Armed Forces
FCFA
African francophone currency
FDC
Front démocratique centrafricain - Central African democratic Front (rebel movement)
FDPC Front démocratique pour le Peuple Centrafricain - Front for the Central African People (rebel movement) FDS
Forces de Defense et de securite – Defence and Security Forces
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FICU
Force d‟intervention du Corps Urbain – Intervention Force Of The Urban Body
FIDH Federation
Federation internationale des Droits de l‟Homme – Human Rights International
FOMUC
Force multinationale en Centrafrique – Multinational Force in CAR
FORSDIR Force spéciale de défense des institutions républicaines - Special Force of Defence Of The Republican Institutions FPDC
Popular Front of the Central African Republic
FSP
Fonds de solidarite prioritaire – Priority Solidarity Funds
GAPLC Groupe d’action patriotique de libération de la Centrafrique - Group of Patriotic Action for Liberation of the Central African Republic GIGN – Groupement d‟Intervention de la gendarmerie nationale– Intervention group of the national gendarmerie GP
Garde Presidentielle - Presidential Guard
ICG
International crisis Group
IMF
International Monetary Fund
INTERPOL
International Criminal Police Organization
MARAC
Mechanism for Early Warning of Central Africa
MINURCA
Mission of United Nations for the Central African Republic
MISAB
Inter African Peacekeeping force
MLC
Congolese Movement of Liberation
MLJC Mouvement des libérateurs centrafricains pour la justice - Movement of Central African Liberators for Justice MLPC Mouvement de Liberation du people centrafricain - Movement of liberation of the Central African people MPRC Mouvement Patriotique pour la Restauration de la République centrafricaine - Patriotic Movement for the Restoration of the Central African Republic NDEKE LUKA Independent Radio NSP
National School of Police (ENP)
OCLAD
Central Office of Fight against Drugs
OCRAD
Office central de lutte contre la drogue - Central Office Of Fight Against Drugs
OCRB
Office central de repression du banditisme - Central Office Of Suppression Of Crime
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OPJ
Officier de police judiciaire – Judiciary Police Officer
PGA
Global Food Prime
PIGN Gendarmerie
Peloton d‟intervention de la gendarmerie nationale - Small squads of intervention of
PNUD/UNDP Programme des Nationa Unies pour le Developpement –United Nations Development Programme PRAC projet de réinsertion des anciens combattants et d’appui aux communautés - Project of reintegration of war veterans and support to the communities PSF
Prior Solidarity Fund
PSIG Pelotons de surveillance et d‟intervention de la gendarmerie - Squads Of Surveillance And Intervention of the Gendarmerie SCPS Société centrafricaine de protection et de surveillance - Central African Company of protection and surveillance SCTIP Service de cooperation technique internationale de police – International Technical Police Cooperation Service SERD Section d‟enquete de recherché et de documentation - Section of inquiry, research and documentation SSR
Security Sector Reform
Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement – Union of Democratic forces Assembly (Rebel movement) UFRD
UN
United Nations
USP
Unity of Presidential Security
ZSP
Zone de solidarite prioritaire - Zone of Priority Solidarity
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Bibliography: -
Freres d‟arme Magazine (2006) Special Issue: Central African Republic, file number 251, 3rd trimester
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Berman Eric G., (2006) The Central African Republic: a case study on the light weapons and the conflicts, the Special report of the small arms survey with the support of the PNUD, Institute of the high international studies, June, , p10
-
International Crisis Group (2007) Central African Republic: anatomy of a ghost State, a report Africa number 136, in December 13th
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Human Rights Watch (2007) Central African Republic: state of anarchy. Rebels and exactions against the civil population, volume 19, number 14, September
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Refugees International (2006), Central Africa Republic An Unknown Emergency in a Dangerous Region
-
Didier Bigo, (1988) Power and obedience in the Central African Republic, Khartala, Paris, , pp. 114-143
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http://www.cf.undp.org / SSR.htm - Rates in the SSR seminar of Bangui (in April 1417th, 2008), available for consultation on the site of the PNUD: www.cf.undp.org/SSR.htm,
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