RICARDO VICENTE https://sites.google.com/site/economicsricardovicente/ [email protected]

EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE – DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS Placement Officer: David Levine

[email protected]

Office Contact Information Department of Economics and Finance School of Business and Governance Tallinn University of Technology Akadeemia tee 3, Tallinn 12618, Estonia +372 620 4071

Employment: 2016 2012 Summer 2016 Spring 2014 2001 - 2005 Summer 2001

+39 0554685913

Home Contact Information Tammepõllu tee 9 – 5 74001 Viimsi, Estonia +372 535 62 654

CERGE-EI Foundation Teaching Fellow Tallinn Univ. of Technology Department of Economics and Finance, Lecturer Estonian Ministry of Econ. Affairs and Communications, External Researcher Estonian Ministry of Econ. Affairs and Communications, External Researcher Nova School of Business and Economics, Teaching Assistant Nova School of Business and Economics, Research Assistant

Graduate Studies: European University Institute PhD in Economics Thesis Title: Essays in Political Economy and Macroeconomics Completion Date: May 2016 References: Professor Árpád Ábrahám (Supervisor) EUI Department of Economics +39 055 4685 909, [email protected]

Professor Piero Gottardi EUI Department of Economics +39 055 4685 919, [email protected]

Professor Kadri Männasoo TTÜ Department of Economics and Finance +372 620 4051, [email protected]

Professor José Tavares Nova School of Business and Economics +351 21 380 1669, [email protected]

Pre-doctoral Studies: MSc., Economics, Nova School of Business and Economics, 2007 Licenciatura (4-year degree), Economics, Nova School of Business and Economics, 2001

Research and Teaching Fields: Research: Macroeconomics, Sovereign Debt and Default, Fiscal Policy, Political Economy Teaching: Macroeconomics, International Economics and Globalization, Econometrics

Ricardo Vicente

Curriculum Vitae, June 2017

Teaching Experience: At the Tallinn University of Technology Department of Economics and Finance: Spring 2017 Fall 2016 Spring 2016 Fall 2015 Spring 2015 Fall 2014 Spring 2014 Fall 2013 Spring 2013 Fall 2012

International Economics International Economics, Statistical Analysis, Mathematics International Economics Statistical Analysis, Mathematics International Economics, Time Series and Panel Data Econometrics, Global Economic Trends Introductory Macroeconomics, Time Series and Panel Data Econometrics, Global Economic Trends Introductory Macroeconomics Econometrics

At the Nova School of Business and Economics: Fall 2004 Spring 2004 Fall 2003 Spring 2003 Fall 2002 Spring 2002 Fall 2001

Introductory Microeconomics, teaching assistant for Prof. D. Lucena, Industrial Organization, teaching assistant for Prof. V. Santos Introductory Microeconomics, teaching assistant for Prof. V. Santos, Econ. Regulation and Competition Policy, teaching assistant for Prof. Mª Seabra Introductory Microeconomics, teaching assistant for Prof. D. Lucena, Industrial Organization, teaching assistant for Prof. V. Santos Intermediate Microeconomics, teaching assistant for Prof. Mª Seabra Introductory Microeconomics, teaching assistant for Prof. D. Lucena Introductory Microeconomics, teaching assistant for Prof. V. Santos Introductory Microeconomics, teaching assistant for Prof. D. Lucena

Professional Activities: Presentations: 21st Annual Conference of the Society for Institutional & Organizational Economics 2017 (New York City, USA); 12th Young Economists’ Seminar of the Croatian National Bank 2017 (Dubrovnik, Croatia); Annual Meeting of the Association of Southern European Economic Theorists 2016 (Thessaloniki, Greece); 3rd Conference of the World Interdisciplinary Network for Institutional Research 2016 (Boston, USA); 31st Annual Congress of the European Economic Association 2016 (Geneva, Switzerland); 6th Graduate Student Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research 2016 (Tartu, Estonia); 16th Doctoral Meetings of the Research in International Economics and Finance Network 2016 (Florence, Italy); 5th Graduate Student Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research 2014 (Innsbruck, Austria); Estonian Business School 2015, 2014; Tallinn University of Technology 2015, 2013 Discussant:

Estonian Economic Association Annual Conference 2017; 6th Graduate Student Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research 2016 (Tartu, Estonia)

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Ricardo Vicente

Curriculum Vitae, June 2017

Departmental Service: 2017Representative at the Department Council of TTÜ Dept. Economics and Finance

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships: 2017 TTÜ School of Business and Governance Student Council’s “Teacher of the Year” 2016CERGE-EI Career Integration Fellowship Mar. 2017 European Regional Development Fund’s Doctoral Studies and Internationalisation Programme DoRa Plus Jan. 2017 European Regional Development Fund’s Doctoral Studies and Internationalisation Programme DoRa Plus Nov. 2016 European Regional Development Fund’s Doctoral Studies and Internationalisation Programme DoRa Plus Sept. 2016 Royal Economic Society conference grant Sept. 2016 Archimedes Foundation Kristjan Jaak scholarship Aug. 2016 European Regional Development Fund’s Doctoral Studies and Internationalisation Programme DoRa Plus Jun. 2016 European Regional Development Fund’s Doctoral Studies and Internationalisation Programme DoRa Plus Mar. 2013 Euro. Social Fund’s Doctoral Studies and Internationalisation Programme DoRa 2010-2011 European University Institute 4th Year Grant (declined) 2008-2011 Portuguese Science and Technology Foundation PhD scholarship (2008-2011) 2007-2010 Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs scholarship for the realization of a PhD at the European University Institute (2007-2010)

Short Courses Taken: 2017 Monetary Policy: An Imperfect Knowledge Perspective (B. Preston), U Mannheim 2017 Introduction to R (F. Weiler), University of Bamberg 2016 Teaching Principles and Practices for Economics (R. Filer, D. Nováková, J. Hanousek, P. Whitaker, G. Krueger), CERGE-EI 2011 Liberty and Society (B. Caplan, A.I. Cohen, M. McNamara, J. Sorens), The Institute for Humane Studies 2008 Bayesian Econometrics (James Hamilton), Universidade do Minho 2005 Modeling the Evolution of the World Economy (Ronald Findlay), Nova SBE 2002 Regulation and Competition Policy, (M. Motta, and J.E. Harrington), Nova SBE

Skills: Software Languages

Matlab, Stata, EViews, Scientific Workplace, R English (fluent), Portuguese (native), Italian (advanced), German (intermediate), Estonian (beginner)

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Ricardo Vicente

Curriculum Vitae, June 2017

Research Papers: “Sovereign Default and Coalition Formation” (Job Market Paper) There is strong empirical evidence that the likelihood of sovereign debt default and rescheduling in democratic developing countries is reduced when the government is composed of more than one political party. A major tenet of coalition formation theory is the minimal-winning coalition; however, the relative frequency of surplus coalitions in both developing and developed countries seems to run counter to this theory. This paper links sovereign default empirical evidence with coalition formation theory. It provides a formal theoretical explanation for the coalition effect in the probability of default and for the formation of surplus coalitions. In a stochastic endowment economy, two parties rotate in power. They have the option to invite a third party, which represents that part of society which is more directly interested in retaining access to international borrowing markets, to form a coalition government. The presence of the smaller party in the coalition decreases the likelihood of default (coalition buys commitment), and hence, bond prices are higher. When the effect of higher bond prices dominates the redistributive effect of one more party in government, bigger political parties have an incentive to form a coalition, even when this is not necessary to guarantee majority support in the legislative body.

“On De Facto Political Power, Rent Extraction, and Tenure” A political leader redistributes income between herself and society in a deterministic endowment economy. Higher rent extraction leads to higher odds of deposition. To overcome the trade-off between rent extraction and survival in power, the leader diverts resources from her consumption into investment in de facto political power. Society can depose the leader if it is able to buy back the de facto power investments, and face other deposition costs. In equilibrium, the leader will be able to last longer in office than when investment in de facto power would not be possible. The model differences between democracy and non-democracy are kept to a minimum, and leaders are assumed to behave in the same way regardless of political regime. In democracy, leaders hold power much shorter periods, do not invest in de facto power, and generally appropriate fewer resources. The model thus accounts for important aspects of the data on duration in power and government effectiveness in both democracies and non-democratic regimes. It prescribes a high degree of independence of the economy from government for the purpose of achieving potential GDP; short-term limits and regular checks on the executive power; and careful scrutiny of public procurement and spending on security and defense.

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