Review: [untitled] Author(s): Eduardo J. Gomez Reviewed work(s): Markets and Democracy in Latin America: Conflict or Convergence? by Philip Oxhorn ; Pamela K. Starr Source: Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 1, (Spring, 2000), pp. 151-155 Published by: School of International Studies, University of Miami Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/166471 Accessed: 18/06/2008 22:38 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=miami. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

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improves on earlier research that compiled laundry lists of military prerogatives without distinguishing between those that dangerously encroached on civilian authority and those that did not. Comparing countries of the same type, Fitch extracts some key causes of militarypolicy outcomes, including the institutionaland political context and the design and implementation of policy. Considering the "missed opportunities"to move toward democratic civil-militaryrelations, Fitch then asks what policymakers should be doing. Acknowledging that there are no "simple recipes or proven strategies" for governments to follow, he offers proposals that correspond to the "system of civil-military relations they are designed to change" (p. 169). Tutelary regimes should forge pacts to extract pledges from a broad cross-section of groups not to play the military card, so as to increase the government's bargaining power. Countrieswith conditional militarysubordinationshould strengthen the constitutional mechanisms for crisis resolution. Systems closing in on democratic control, Fitch counsels, should learn to manage conflict that results from the military'sloss of prerogatives, find the militaryuseful roles to play, and tend to its professional needs. Fitch'sbook is an importantcontribution to our understanding of the armed forces and politics in democratic LatinAmerica. It gives a comprehensive view of the nature and range of militarybeliefs, policy, and civilmilitaryrelations in countries of the region. It also makes clear some of the challenges that lie ahead for governments wishing to make the military's stay in the barracks a long one. David Pion-Berlin of University California, Riverside

Oxhorn, Philip, and Pamela K. Starr,eds. Marketsand Democracy in Latin America: Conflict or Convergence?Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999. Tables, bibliography, index, 203 pp.; hardcover $55. For scholars concerned with the relationship between political liberalization and economic reform in Latin America, Philip Oxhorn and Pamela Starr'snew edited volume should be of prime interest and concern. Replete with empirical evidence and theory, this volume argues that there is no clear and necessary relationship between political liberalization and free market reforms in LatinAmerica. Instead, the contributorsassert that there are "autonomous" political and economic logics (mutually reinforcing, contradictory,and sometimes independent relationships between the state and society) that are found within any type of democratic system.

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These relationships are continuously in flux and are shaped by international and domestic circumstances, such as economic crisis, levels of inequality, and political representation. Therefore, to understand seemingly contradictory outcomes in new democracies (for example, delayed policy reform within large political party systems), the authors suggest looking beyond regime types to include changing state-society relations and institutionalcapacity. The volume concludes by arguing that a comparison of autonomous political logics instead of regime types provides a clearer, more persuasive analysis of the politics of reform in LatinAmerica. The autonomous logics take two forms: collective social movements and institutional (political and bureaucratic) capacity. The first three chapters look at the conditions that shape state-society relations and society's ability to influence public policy. In Chapter2, Oxhorn and Gracia Ducatenzeiler discuss how increased levels of socioeconomic inequality, triggered by countless economic reforms and the absence of effective social safety net policies, have hampered society's ability to collectivize for a more equitable distribution of income. In Chapter 3, Carlos Waisman extends the analysis to include how structural adjustment, political ideology, and institutional reforms combine to undermine sectoral mobilization, representation, and influence. As economic reforms advance, Waisman argues, sectoral linkages and support for previous regimes dissipate, while new governments limit their representation and hence their ability to influence public policy. While these authors submit a convincing argument, they overlook other institutional factors that contribute to declines in sectoral mobilization and political influence. When social safety nets have been implemented and local participation encouraged (for example, in Mexico and Chile), bureaucratic institutions and ingrained ideological interests have limited the central government's ability to reallocate income more efficiently (Graham 1994). Oxhorn, Ducatenzeiler, and Waisman's argument could have been strengthened if it had included cases illustratinghow the countervailing interests of institutions responsible for providing social services have brought about an inequitable distribution of income. Thus, even when the alternative to their argument is present-that is, the provision of a sound social safety net in periods of reform-entrenched institutional interests may also prevent civil society from effectively mobilizing and participating in the policymaking process. The next chapters discuss the economic and institutionalconstraints inhibit new democracies from reforming the state and economic that In Brazil, where the political party system is exceedingly fragpolicy. mented, polarized, and clientelistic, institutional reform has been very difficult to accomplish. In chapter 5, Philippe Faucher explains how high levels of political corruption and market inefficiencies under Fernando

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Collor de Mello (1990-92) delayed efforts to reform the state. By 1992, rising public sector deficits and the reemergence of hyperinflation kindled new interest in constitutional reform and economic stabilization. Following Collor'simpeachment in 1992, Ferando Henrique Cardoso emerged as a victorious finance minister implementing an effective inflation stabilization program, the Real Plan. With the support of society and several political parties, Cardoso assumed the presidency in 1994. Faucher concludes nevertheless that the emergence of a new consensus was not the result of an electoral strategy but evidence of a new political will and commitment finally to reformthe state and stabilize the economy. In chapter 6, Peter R. Kingstone questions this thesis by arguing that although the Cardoso administration successfully rejuvenated interest in reform, Brazil's fragmented and polarized party system will gradually obstruct further efforts to reform the constitution and thereby stabilize the economy. Kingstone notes how the recent emergence of party coalitions that resist constitutional reforms has delayed the government's ability to curtail expenditures at the state level. Since 1995, the simultaneous effort to reform the pension system and social security while pressuring state governors to repay their debts to the federal government has forced loyal congressmen to uphold the latter'sinterest in delayed reforms. Kingstone argues that the increased representation of subnational interests, coupled with the fragmentationof the political party system, will continue to create institutionalobstacles to timely constitutional and economic reform, in turn complicating Brazil's ongoing integration into the global economy. The Brazilian example certainly bolsters the contributors' position that political liberalizationdoes not equate with expeditious policy reform. Nevertheless, high levels of party fragmentation and polarization sometimes facilitate the reform process. In India, for example, differences between the Hindu BJPandJanata Dal Partiesover key policy issues, such as financial liberalization and affirmativeaction, precluded the formation of a coalition opposing reforms (Echeverri-Gent 1998). Because opposition never emerged, new economic measures were successfully implemented in 1993. Thus, not all fragmented and polarized political party systems obstruct the reform process, as Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman are quick to contend (1995). While this in no way refutes Kingstone's thesis, Echeverri-Gent'sanalysis certainly reaffirmsthe significance of examining the autonomous political logics (for example, political parties) that prevail in new democracies; they may provide more persuasive generalizations of the politics of economic reform when compared to similar political systems. In the last two chapters, Leslie Elliot Armijo and Pamela K. Starr illustrate the similar political logics found in different political regimes reforming similar economic policies. In chapter 7, Armijo compares

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Argentina, Mexico, Chile, and Brazil to demonstrate that despite acutely different regime types, the underlying economic objectives for structural adjustment are insufficient to explain why politicians pursue austere privatization measures. Instead, Armijo argues, the political rationale for privatizingstate-owned enterprises is just as important,if not more so, than conventional economic wisdom. The political will to reformis found in the first three cases, bolstering Armijo'sargument that the executive's interest in appeasing domestic actors, such as business, is more important when deciding to privatize industry. In Chapter 8, Starr compares the politics of economic reform in Mexico and Argentina to reaffirmthe often neglected wisdom that regime types in LatinAmerica sometimes fail to generate results to coincide with their political structure. Starr explains how Mexico's authoritarian-style democratic structure was constrained in reforming monetary policy in 1994, and conversely, how Argentina'sfragmented party system ushered in the fiscal and structuraladjustment measures needed to safeguard its fixed exchange rate and thereby avoid future macroeconomic imbalances. The critical underlying differences in both cases are attributed not to international pressures or political ideology but to the nature of each government's electoral regime and its ability to influence the strength and endurance of the president's political party. In Mexico, Starr argues, the PRI, fearing that it would lose its popularity and political influence, neglected to introduce austere fiscal policy measures or to reform monetary policy. Starrdocuments that no change in economic policy occurred after the 1994 elections; what was at stake was not the PRI'selectoral strengthbut its long-term dominance amid new levels of interpartycontestation and reform.In Argentina,by contrast, CarlosMenem's ability to rely on the support of a strong electoral coalition eased the implementation of the economic measures needed to sustain a viable exchange rate system. With the aid of an economic team enlightening society about the long-term benefits, Menem ultimately managed to reform economic policy within his precarious political party system. By comparing Mexico'sauthoritariandemocraticsystem to Argentina's full-fledged democracy, Starrreaffirmsand strengthens a general theme of this study: that scholars should not just analyze regime characteristicsand expect certain outcomes, but instead should look at the underlying political dynamics that structureincentives and motivations for economic reform. These logics are indeed autonomous and, when compared, provide ample opportunity not only for theoretical criticism but, more important, for cross-national comparisons and perhaps more persuasive theoretical explanations for the actual relationships between political liberalization and free market reforms. The contributors to this volume submit convincing arguments that there is no clear and necessary relationship between those two phenom-

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ena. Researchers should expand on the internationaland domestic factors that shape the autonomous logics and strive to explain what relationship does exist. Focusing on the logics that prevail within the state and society should also encourage cross-national comparisons of similar reform processes. Such comparisons may yield a more intuitive grasp of the political economy of reform in developing nations. This volume provides an excellent point of departure. EduardoJ. Gomez University of Chicago REFERENCES Echeverri-Gent, John. 1998. Politicians' Incentives to Reform: Globalization, Partisan Competition, and the Paradox of India's Economic Reform. Paper presented at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston.

Graham,Carol.1994. SafetyNets,Politics,and the Poor: Transitionsto Market Economies. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Haggard, Stephen, and Robert R. Kaufman, 1995. The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Tuman,John P., andJohn T. Morris,eds. Transformingthe LatinAmerican AutomobileIndustry: Unions, Workers,and thePolitics ofRestructuring. Armonk:M. E. Sharpe, 1998. Tables, figure, notes, bibliography, index, 240 pp.; hardcover $68.95, paperback $27.95. During the final years of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the majorityof the LatinAmericancountries buried the politics of development based on the old model of import substitution industrialization.In its place emerged a mixture of liberal economic policies governing monetary stabilization and preferentialtrade agreements (PTAs) among some of the countries in the region. Paradoxically, the neoliberal context did not eliminate the need for policies designed to promote some industrial sectors, principally those requiring new productive investments, skilled labor, and export support. This has been the case for the region's automobile industry over the last eight years. Through special government programs (some calling for incentives, others for industrial policies), the majorityof the LatinAmerican countries have executed public policies to modernize the automotive sector and help it adapt to the "new order"of globalization. Globalization in this context means several things: greater freedom to import vehicles and components; a new relationship between assem-