Draft of paper published in Philosophy East and West, Volume 61, Number 1, January 2011. Please cite published version.

The Possibility of Buddhist Ethical Agency Revisited: A Reply to Garfield and Hansen Bronwyn Finnigan Department of Philosophy University of Auckland

I begin by warmly thanking Professors Garfield and Hansen for participating in this dialogue. I greatly value the work of both and appreciate having the opportunity to engage in a dialogue with them. Aside from the many positive insights I gain from their replies, I believe that both Garfield and Hansen misrepresent my position. In response, I shall clarify the argument contained in my preceding comment, and will consider the objections as they bear on this clarified position. 1. Both Garfield and Hansen characterize the central argument of my comment as presupposing a relatively mainstream Western account of action. They suggest that, with a mainstream Western account in hand, I challenge Classical Chinese and Indo-Tibetan Buddhist thought for not having the resources to fit this account. In replying to my argument, they argue that the mainstream account of action is an inappropriate model of action in the context of the Asian traditions. They also maintain that the mainstream account is itself is a highly problematic model of action. Garfield and Hansen then proceed to offer highly insightful suggestions about the possibilities of action available in their respective traditions of Asian thought. The underlying thought of both replies, it would seem, is that the dilemma generated in my comment is the fruit of a mistaken presupposition about the nature of action rather than indicative of a genuine limitation in Classical Chinese and Indo-Tibetan Buddhist thought. If the underling argument of my paper did, indeed, fit the above characterization, then I would be extremely sympathetic to Garfield and Hansen’s line of reply. And to be fair, I can see how it may be read this way. However, this characterization misrepresents my argument. To see this, we need to clarify what is meant by the mainstream Western view of the nature of action and then identify the aspects of my argument that Garfield and Hansen believe commit me to this view. Arguably, the dominant contemporary Western account of action is the causal theory. Donald Davidson is widely recognized to champion this theory, characterized as the idea that intentional actions are both caused by mental states with propositional content (i.e. beliefs, desires, intentions) and ‘rationalized’ by reference to these mental states. What does Davidson mean by rationalization? This notion is often interpreted as the view that

the reasons an agent gives to explain their actions corresponds to the content of the propositional attitudes that caused the action (i.e. they are the reasons because of which the agent acted), and these propositional attitudes are related to one another due to some process of reasoning. This conception of action is what I understand Garfield and Hansen to mean by the ‘mainstream’ view. Significantly, both scholars additionally presuppose that, on the mainstream view, the propositional attitudes that cause action and are the referent for rationalization of action are necessarily consciously represented or entertained. Now, there are reasons to think that neither Davidson nor mainstream philosophers of action are explicitly committed to this additional presupposition.1 Nevertheless, Garfield and Hansen seem to think mainstream philosophers of action hold the view that an intentional action is one that is produced by propositional attitudes that are consciously represented and related to one another by means of a process of practical reasoning and subsequently explained (or rationalized) by reasons that refer to these very attitudes. According to Garfield and Hansen, the definition of action I present in my comment articulates this mainstream view. I define an action as intentional if it involves the capacity to both to ‘direct’ behavior and give explanations, using reasons, for the directedness of such behavior. There is reason to think that this definition of action is not necessarily committed to the mainstream view. Consider, first, what I call the ‘weak’ sense of intentionality; namely, that intentional actions are “directed or guided”. This condition may certainly be met by agents who consciously form intentions or actively engage in practical reasoning directly prior to action (i.e. the mainstream view).2 However, not only can this condition be met by dispositional accounts of action that satisfy certain conditional analyses. Dispositions 1

For instance, Davidson explicitly claims that his view is not committed to the idea that the propositional attitudes that cause action are necessarily consciously represented directly prior to, or at the time of action. For example, he writes: “We cannot suppose that whenever an agent acts intentionally he goes through a process of deliberation or reasoning, marshals evidence and principles, and draws conclusions.” (“Intending”, in Davidson 2001, p.43) “It is clear that most of our actions are not preceded by any conscious reasoning or deliberation. We don’t usually “form” intentions, we come to them.” ("Problems in the Explanation of Action", in Davidson 2001, p.107) Moreover, a number of ‘mainstream’ philosophers of action have recently argued precisely that the causal process that generates intentional action need not be conscious. In these accounts, an action is intentional simply insofar as it is caused by the right kind of mental process, whether or not an agent is conscious of this mental process at the time of action. See, for instance Harman, “Practical Reasoning” in Harman 1999, p.56 and Mele 2004, p.200 (Harman, 1999a, 56;Mele, 2004, 200). If these arguments are plausible, one could argue that even a mainstream account of action would be able to accommodate behavior that does not involve a phenomenology of deliberation and consciously represented intentions to count as intentional action. 2 For elaboration on variants of this view see (Bishop, 1989; Buss, 1999; Harman, "Rationality" in 1999b; and Mele, 2000, and 2004)

need not be mental events or propositional attitudes, though they may counterfactually depend on the possession of certain states and attitudes.3 The weak sense of intentionality, thus, does not necessarily invoke conscious deliberative processes that culminate in consciously represented and formed intentions that subsequently cause action. In my comment I also discuss a ‘strong’ sense of intentionality; namely, that intentional actions are explained in terms of reasons, where these reasons “exhibit the directedness of the behaviour”. Is the strong sense of intentionality committed to the mainstream view? Again, I think not. Reasons offered to explain the directedness of actions may certainly refer to the propositional attitudes that cause action and thereby ‘rationalize’ the action (i.e. the mainstream view). However, this condition may also be satisfied by the idea that reasons are attributed to agents, or self-attributed by agents, in explanations offered for the purpose of interpreting or making the action intelligible as directed behavior.4 That is, reasons may ‘exhibit’ directedness by making intelligible the action as directed behavior. While the mainstream view of explanation by reasons arguably presupposes the agent has some kind of awareness of the propositional attitudes that cause their action in order to guarantee that the reasons offered to explain the action are ‘correct’, the ‘attributive’ account does not presuppose that the agent has any conscious awareness of the mental processes that actually generated their action. Now, I didn’t take a stand on which theory of action is more plausible. The mainstream theory faces epistemic problems about determining precisely which propositional attitudes functioned as efficient causes of a given action in order to provide corresponding reasons in explanation. The attributive approach faces problems concerning a gap between the mental elements counterfactually required for the possibility of action and the reasons attributed to make the action intelligible. Hence, significantly more argumentation would be required to establish the ‘correct’ theory of action. It was not my intention to establish the correct theory of action either for mainstream Western philosophy or for Indo-Tibetan Buddhism or Classical Chinese. The definition I adopted in my paper is purposefully broad so as to allow all of the above interpretations, if not a great deal more. In particular, it does not commit me to the view that an intentional action must be caused by an intention, understood as a discrete and causally efficacious mental state. Hence Garfield is wrong to suggest that my definition of action 3

It is worth noting that Davidson expresses his causal theory in terms of actions being caused by beliefs and “pro-attitudes” (Davidson, 2001a). At a certain point in his writings, Davidson defines pro-attitudes as dispositions to act in certain ways (Davidson, 2001c). Hence, Davidson’s claim that intentional actions are caused, in part, by propositional attitudes does not necessarily fit what Garfield takes as the mainstream conception of Davidson’s notion of ‘rationalization’ and, hence, problematises a straightforward attribution of the mainstream view of action to Davidson, as supposed by Garfield. 4 For a defence of the view that reasons given to explain intentional action are attributed to the agent, or self-attroibuted by the agent, rather than correspond to the content of the mental states that cause action, see Dennett 1999.

is not compatible with Buddhism because ‘intention’, so characterized, translates into Sanskrit as cetanā and “no Buddhist philosopher has ever accepted the thesis that a buddha has cetanā”5 Not only does my account not necessarily presuppose cetanā, on the above characterization, it is arguable whether the best translation of cetanā should be tied to intentions, so conceived. While not aiming to settle the conditions for a sufficient theory of action, if such is even possible, it was important to my comment that some characterization of action be posited if we are to consider the conditions for its possibility, which is my real target. Hence, my comment takes as a working assumption the idea that an adequate account of action will fall within the wide-reaching framework offered by my definition; an action is intentional if it is in some sense directed and in some sense explicable by reasons, however these notions are interpreted. Having said this, Hansen rightly points out mistake in my characterization and employment of the stronger sense of intentionality. As a challenge against the deconstructive model, I charge that a buddha can't “explain his actions in terms of reasons...which exhibit the directness of the behaviour.” Here I seem to assume that satisfaction of the stronger condition necessarily involves an agent’s own “capacity ti explain” their action in terms of reason rather than the weaker and more agnostic claim that intentional actions are explicable by reasons. Hansen is right in objecting that such a necessarily condition would lead to several absurdities and I concede the mistake. Nevertheless, I do not believe it is fatal to my argument since, as I will go on to show, the crux of my argument lies elsewhere. It is crucial for my argument to note that behavior which is phenomenologically spontaneous, in the sense of not being preceded by consciously represented propositional attitudes, deliberation and the formation of intentions, can count as intentional action according to the above definition. That is, I took Garfield’s idea that the behavior of a buddha may be characterized as “action without thinking” (Garfield, 2006, 23) entirely at face value and as my working hypothesis. Indeed, my posited conception of intentional action was purposefully broad so as not to beg the question against the possibility of spontaneous action nor that of a certain prima facie interpretation of the anatta doctrine. That spontaneous action is a possibility is an idea that I defend (Finnigan forthcoming-b) (Finnigan, in progress, 200+-b) and that Garfield cites me as defending in (Finnigan and Tanaka, 2010). Moreover, my wider research project focuses precisely on developing and defending the view that some forms of spontaneous action can count as ethical action. I believe such a view may be compatible with some views advanced in the domain of IndoTibetan Buddhism and I present a limited defense of this claim in (Finnigan, 200+-a). Hence, I am entirely sympathetic with Garfield and Hansen’s arguments in their replies that an adequate account of action needs to accommodate spontaneity in action and that this possibility is sympathetically motivated within the context of Classical Chinese thought. They are mistaken, however, in reading my argument as opposing this possibility by presupposing a definition that rules it out. My comment assumed that 5

This claim is not entirely true. See, for instance, Keown 2001.

spontaneous action can, in principle, satisfy my definition of action. It assumed that spontaneous ethical action can, in principle, satisfy this definition. And it assumed that the spontaneous ethical action of an enlightened being and/or buddha can also, in principle, satisfy this definition. 2. If my argument does not fit the characterization that Garfield and Hansen presuppose in their replies, how should it be characterized? What is the underlying thought at the heart of the dilemma with which my argument culminates? Without rehearsing the entire argument, I shall limit myself to emphasising three core aspects. Conceptuality The context in which I investigate the question ‘How can a buddha come to act’ is not that of the entire Buddhist corpus. Buddhism is a heterogeneous tradition and it would be impossible to provide a definitive answer that satisfies all schools of thought. The context in which I investigate this question is that of the highly influential epistemological thought of Dharmakīrti. The guiding question is: if one adopts Dharmakīrti’s views on epistemology, how does this impact on the possibilities for action for a buddha (or enlightened beings, more generally)? In his original paper, Garfield compellingly demonstrates certain problems that arise for the possibility of action if one adopts a Dharmakīrtian epistemology. Garfield diagnoses the problem as concerning representations. His solution is to accept that representations are a problem but adopt a non-representational account of mind, which he identifies with Classical Chinese thought as characterised by Hansen. This model, I take Garfield to argue, allows for the possibility of action without thinking because it does not presuppose conscious representations directly prior to, or at the time of, action. While his initial concern may relate to a buddha’s capacity for thought, his solution concerns a buddha’s capacity for action and the role (or lack thereof) of conscious mental representation at the time of action. The problem for Dharmakīrti, as I understand it, concerns conceptuality (vikalpa) rather than mental representations. If mental representations are a problem, they are a problem only insofar as they involve concepts. There is some debate about how best to understand the notion of conceptuality in Dharmakīrti. For some, perception (pratyakṣa) delivers consciously represented mental objects and conceptuality their linguistic interpretations (call this the narrow view of conceptuality).6 According to this view, mental representations are not a problem for enlightened beings. The problem lies in our attaching linguistic labels or interpretations onto these representations. For others, however, the very possibility of having a consciously represented mental object already presupposes conceptuality (call this the broader view of conceptuality).7 According to this second view, mental representations are a problem for enlightened beings. 6 7

See, for instance, (Dunne, 2006). See, for instance, (Dreyfus, 1997;Katsura, 1984).

Whichever approach one takes, the principal villain, for Dharmakīrti, is conceptuality. Cognitions that involve conceptuality are wholly erroneous and rooted in ignorance.8 Enlightened beings have overcome all ignorance and, hence, do not engage in cognitions that are erroneous; namely, those that involve conceptuality. In my comment, I assume that conceptuality, for Dharmakīrti, is subtler than that of the mere linguistic interpretation of mental objects or even the conscious entertainment of propositional attitudes in thinking. I assume that conceptuality is involved in the very shaping of an object of experience as an object of experience. For Dharmakīrti, in my interpretation, whatever exists is momentary (kṣaṇika) because only momentary existence can produce an effect (arthakriyā-samartha). Any object of experience that lasts for more than a moment is a conceptual construction formed out of the series of momentary sensations caused by momentary particulars (the only ultimately real things that exist).9 Even on an account of spontaneous action that does not involve thinking, agents are responding to objects of experience and not momentary particulars. And they respond in different ways depending on how they experience. Concepts, I assume, enable agents to discriminate systematically, repeatedly and reliably between soap and taps (when washing oneself); spice and detergent (when seasoning in cooking); a football and an opponent’s head (when playing football) etc. The agent need not consciously think the words ‘soap, ‘spice’, and ‘football’ in order to systematically discriminate and experience these objects and respond appropriately. Nonetheless, even without any thoughts entering one’s mind at the time of action, one typically washes oneself with soap and not taps; seasons food with spice and not detergent; kicks footballs and not opponents’ heads. I assume that, without concepts, such systematic discrimination as well as the possibility of the appropriate kinds of spontaneous response would be impossible. In my comment, I argued that Hansen’s interpretation of the Classical Chinese philosophy of mind does not allow any role for conceptuality. In my interpretation of conceptuality, this means that Hansen’s model of mind does not allow for the possibility of systematic discrimination and, hence, does not allow for the possibility of spontaneous response. In his reply to my argument, however, Hansen argues that his model of mind does allow for the possibility of discrimination (it even allows mental objects). It follows that his account allows for the possibility of conceptuality, in my interpretation of the term. If this is right, it undermines Garfield’s suggestion that adopting a Chinese model of mind will avoid the problems that arise from a Dharmakīrtian epistemology.

8

“Conceptual knowledge is not capable of apprehending (particulars) just as they are because conceptuality is controlled by ignorance” (Dharmakīrti, PVSV: 49); “(Sensory awareness is) not (erroneous) because ignorance is defined as conceptuality. That is, ignorance is conceptuality. Ignorance leads one astray by its very nature. Sensory awarenesses are not conceptual in this way.” (Dharmakīrti, PVSV: 49) 9 For additional arguments defending this interpretation of Dharmakīrti, see (Dreyfus, 1997;Katsura, 1984)

Whether or not conceptuality is required for the possibility of spontaneous response is a controversial issue in contemporary Western philosophy and cognitive science. Many debates of this issue focus on the possibility of animal cognition. Arguably, animals do not ‘think’ in the sense of consciously entertaining propositional attitudes in their minds. For instance, when a monkey peels the skin from a banana and eats the flesh, it does not first think to itself ‘the skin is inedible, the flesh is edible’ or anything of the kind. Nevertheless, it has a capacity to systematically discriminate between food and not-food, which enables the possibility of such behavior. If the capacity to systematically discriminate between kinds of ‘this’ and kinds of ‘that’ is conceptuality, then animals have conceptuality. For some, however, the basic ability for discrimination is too crude to count as conceptuality. Conceptuality, they argue, should be reserved either for linguistic representations (i.e. thoughts with words) or discriminatory abilities that are acquired through clearly linguistic forms of socialization. What one thinks about this issue will influence how compelling one finds my arguments concerning two models of spontaneous response. I call these models the ‘deconstructive’ and ‘constructive’ models. These labels refer to the deconstruction or construction of conceptuality with respect to spontaneous response (though, of course, there are different senses of deconstruction and construction at play in each model). These models are thematic explorations of the role of conceptuality in coming to acquire spontaneity in action (they are not intended as analyses of the Chinese thinkers that inspire these two approaches nor a complete account of what is mentally, emotionally, bodily or neurophysiologically involved in sentient action). One of the problems at the heart of my critique of the deconstructive account refers to the elimination of discriminatory ability that goes together with the elimination of conceptuality. If one denies that a basic capacity for discrimination presupposes conceptuality (as too crude an ability to warrant this label), one may not find this compelling. Moreover, if one grants a wide interpretative scope for my definition of intentional action, as I argue above, it may be possible to argue that some spontaneous actions generated at the culmination of the deconstructive process (once all conceptuality is eliminated) may be intentional. Before one passes judgment, however, it is important to emphasize that my argument does not simply concern the possibility of physical, bodily action for a buddha; it also concerns the possibility of (a) speech acts and (b) ethical action. Speech Acts I take speech acts (in teaching) to be an important type of action ordinarily attributed to the historical Buddha. This is not uncontroversial. The nature of the transmission of the dharma (whether by speech acts or some form of emanation) is a highly fraught issue in Buddhist scholarship. Nevertheless, I take it that speech acts are one important but frequently overlooked form of action that not only fit my definition of intentional action but, more significantly, are often spontaneous in the sense that we do not always deliberate or form an intention about what to say before we speak. Speech acts, as a form of spontaneous action, is a possibility that the deconstructive model cannot accommodate insofar as speech acts employ and, thereby, require the concepts that this model seeks to

eliminate. Admittedly, I haven’t argued that the constructive model of spontaneity provides anything close to an adequate model for the acquisition of spontaneity in speech acts. Nonetheless, there is nothing in the constructive model that, in principle, rules it out. Ethical Action The fact that I am concerned with ethical action plays two important roles for my argument. First, a concern with ethics implicitly motivates the argument. For many Buddhist scholars, whether or not a buddha can act is not a particularly compelling issue. Action, however, is the object of evaluation for ethicists and, hence, the possibility of action is a prerequisite for the possibility of ethics. Whether or not a buddha can act ethically, moreover, is a significant issue for contemporary debates in Buddhist ethicists. How one answers this question will have an impact on how one theorizes the role of ethical practice with respect to enlightenment (e.g. whether it be constitutive of enlightenment or merely instrumental towards enlightenment but abandoned at the point of liberation) and, indeed, how one theorizes Buddhist ethics (e.g. whether as a form of virtue ethics,10 or consequentialism,11 some combination of the two,12 or neither13). Second, and more importantly for the substance of my argument, ethical action requires a more demanding account of the kinds of discriminatory capacities required of an agent. This is because ethical action is appropriate relative to some evaluative norm. There are a variety of ways one can conceive of the role of evaluative norms in ethical behavior. For Buddhist ethicists with a consequentialist bent, whether an action is appropriate depends on considerations external to the action (i.e. the good consequences produced by the action) rather than anything internal to the agent of action. For Buddhist ethicists with a virtue ethical bent, however, whether an action is appropriate to an evaluative norm is intimately related to the agent of the action; the norm is instantiated in their behavior and this fact is in some way explicable in terms of the agent. Arguably, for both approaches to Buddhist ethics, it is possible for actions to satisfy constraints of normativity without presupposing conscious mentality. In my comment, I focused on the notion of spontaneous ethical response as an acquired capacity. That is, I was exploring the possibility of spontaneous responses that are appropriate relative to certain evaluative norms (i.e. they are ethical responses) but where the capacity for responding ethically has been acquired through some process of cultivation or training (e.g. the Eightfold Path). The emphasis on ‘agency’ in the subtitle 10

For defences of Buddhist Ethics as a form of virtue ethics, see (Cooper and James, 2005;Keown, 2001) 11 For defences of Buddhist Ethics as a form of consequentialism, see (Goodman, 2008;Siderits, 2003) 12 For defences of Buddhist Ethics as a combination of virtue ethics and consequentialism, see (Cea, 2004;Clayton, 2006) 13 For defences of Buddhist Ethics as analogous to none of the aforementioned ethical theories, see (Hallisey, 1996;Harvey, 2000)

of my comment was intended to highlight a focus on the possibility of an agent intentionally acting ethically; where this is not merely the accidental satisfaction of ethical norms. Can a buddha’s spontaneous responses intentionally instantiate the evaluative norms relevant to Buddhism? In my comment, I argued that the deconstructive model cannot accommodate this possibility. While the elimination of conceptuality may retain the basic discriminatory capacities available to animals, it does not retain ethical categories of response insofar as they involve a socialized form of conceptuality (despite the fact that they may also involve more basic desiderative elements). When we act ethically, we do not merely discriminate objects of experience, we respond in ways that are appropriate relative to ethical norms for behavior. Even if a buddha’s behavior happens to accord with an ethical norm, in the deconstructive account it cannot do so intentionally. For the reasons I offer in my comment, there seems to be no sense in which behavior generated by the deconstructive model is directed and, arguable, it cannot be made intelligible by any available interpretation of explanation in terms of reasons.14 I take the constructive model to be more promising insofar as it focuses on revising an agent’s categorical matrix through which the agent discriminates objects of experience and spontaneously responds with certain associated types of behavior. Garfield’s moral phenomenological approach to Buddhist ethics, as I understand it, is a sophisticated version of this approach.15 Moreover, Hansen’s account of the dao agent, and his related idea of cultivating dispositions in the light of evaluative norms (the Confucian li), seems also to be a version of this approach. The problem I point out in my paper, however, is that accommodating these insights requires a more robust account of conceptuality than is permissible for one who accepts a Dharmakīrtian epistemology. I ended my comment with a dilemma to which, I claim, not all Indo-Tibetan Buddhist theories of ethics and epistemology need succumb. The dilemma concerns the status of conceptuality, not intentions, and is directed towards Buddhist philosophers who want to accommodate the possibility of ethical agency in buddhahood but who accept a Dharmakīrtian epistemology. There are various ways a Buddhist could respond to this dilemma. For instance, she could defend an interpretation of Dharmakīrti that employs a narrower conception of conceptuality than my argument allows and, thereby, argue that it 14

I take Dennett to defend the most liberal approach to explanation in terms of reasons, insofar as, for him, the attribution of reasons in no way depends on the internal mechanisms that generate behaviour. Even the behaviour of thermostats can be explained in terms of reasons. See (Dennett, 1990). Nonetheless, Dennett sets constraints on the warrantability of such explanations; e.g. they must be systematically predictive. Arguably, this constraint cannot be met by a Dharmakīrtian ontology, as I conceive it, insofar as what exists are momentary particulars with individual causal efficacy. Arguably, prediction requires a relatively stable and general ontology with repeatable and, hence, foreseeable objects. Of course, much more would need to be said to establish this claim, and I do not have the space to go into this here. This shows, however, that one need not interpret the strong condition in terms of a buddha’s own capacity to explain his behavior in terms of reasons for the deconstructive model to fail my definition. 15 See (Garfield, 200+)

is compatible with the constructive model.16 Alternatively, she may maintain that Dharmakīrti is, indeed, committed to the broader view of conceptuality, but argue that other Buddhist schools defend a much narrower view of conceptuality and, hence, can embrace the constructive model.17 As should be evident, the dilemma is not tragic nor does it fall outside the scope of theoretical possibilities for Buddhist thinkers. It is merely a dilemma that had yet to be posed and, hopefully, stimulates further dialogue.

16

For a defence of, what I call, the narrower view of conceptuality, see (Dunne, 2004, 2006). Arguably, Tsong Kha pa and other dGe lugs pa scholars held or hold a narrower view of conceptuality and, thereby, allow perception a much more active role in shaping experience than the broader view of conceptuality allows. For a detailed discussion of this point, see (Dreyfus, 1997) 17

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