Curriculum Vitae

Chu WANG Department of Economics Texas A&M University College Station, TX 77843-4228

Phone:1-(979)422-6919 Email: [email protected] https://sites.google.com/site/cwangecon/

EDUCATION Ph.D., Economics, Texas A&M University, Aug 2009 ~ expected May 2016 Dissertation: Essays on Patent Policies Committee members: Guoqiang Tian (chair), Silvana Krasteva, Ximing Wu, Yuzhe Zhang B.Sc., Economics, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Sep 2005~ June 2009 RESEARCH INTERESTS / EXPERTISE Applied Microeconomic Theory, Mechanism Design, Dynamic Programming WORKING PAPER “Entry, Settlement and Litigation under Sequential Innovation” (Job Market Paper), with Silvana Krasteva and Priyanka Sharma “Optimal Patent Design”, with Guoqiang Tian and Yuzhe Zhang WORK IN PROGRESS Rewarding Single Innovator in a Market with Technology Flow-in The Competitors' Pressure in the Asymmetric Contest with Conditional Investments PRESENTATIONS Texas Economic Theory Camp 2015, University of Texas at Austin, November 2015 Fourth Year PH.D. Student Presentation, Department of Economics, TAMU, May 2013 Third Year PH.D. Student Presentation, Department of Economics, TAMU, May 2012 HONORS Dennis W. Jansen Scholarship, Department of Economics, TAMU, 2013 Graduate Enhancement Scholarship, TAMU, 2010~ 2012 People’s Scholarship, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, 2006~ 2007

Chu Wang, TAMU

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Curriculum Vitae

OTHERS Language: Chinese (native), English (professionally fluent) Computer Skills: LaTex, Microsoft Office, SAS, Fortran Personal Life: Married to Dr. Yue Liu with two children REFERENCES Dr. Guoqiang Tian(Committee Chair) Alfred F. Chalk Professor Department of Economics TAMU 4228 College Station, TX 77843 Telephone: (+1)979-845-7393 Email: [email protected]

Dr. Silvana Krasteva Assistant Professor Department of Economics TAMU 4228 College Station, TX 77843 Telephone: (+1)979-845-7347 Email: [email protected]

Dr. Yuzhe Zhang Associate Professor Department of Economics TAMU 4228 College Station, TX 77843 Telephone: (+1)319-321-1897 Email: zhangeager@ tamu.edu

CONTACTS Placement Directors: Dr. Jason M. Lindo Email: [email protected] Phone: +1(979)845-7380 Dr. Andrew Barr Email: [email protected] Phone: +1(979)845-1363 Placement Assistant: Mary Owens Email: [email protected] Phone: +1(979)845-7354 ABSTRACTS OF SELECTED PAPER “Entry, Settlement and Litigation under Sequential Innovation” (Job Market Paper), with Silvana Krasteva and Priyanka Sharma Abstract: We study a patent holder’s incentives to litigate, settle, or accommodate a new market entrant with a quality improving product. Patent protection is uncertain and is characterized by a patentability standard and patent breadth determined during litigation.

Chu Wang, TAMU

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Curriculum Vitae

Thus, patent litigation carries a potential benefit of preventing new entry if the entrant’s technology is found infringing on the incumbent’s patent, but also a potential risk of invalidating the incumbent’s patent. In equilibrium, the incumbent possesses a credible threat to litigate only improvements that are sufficiently small, with large improvements being accommodated due to the risk of invalidating the incumbent’s patent. Litigation occurs for incremental improvements that are likely to be found infringing by the court, while settlement takes place for moderate improvements, whose litigation is still preferred to accommodation, but have lower likelihood of being found infringing by the court. We find that improving the patent holder’s position, via a more lax patentability standard or a wider patent breadth, encourages litigation for a wider set of quality improving innovations, while the settlement incentives may respond non-monotonically to such policy. “Optimal Patent Design”, with Guoqiang Tian and Yuzhe Zhang Abstract: In this paper, we study a dynamic environment where the identical innovators can choose to engage in research that produces technological improvements. Each invention represents a new type of intermediate input, so called specialization. We focus on finding an optimal patent policy, in which the mechanism designer controls the optimal length of patent protection. To induce innovation effort, the social planner employs a mechanism that grants stochastic monopoly power to ensure certain amount of expected profits to the innovators by conducting a lottery among all existing firms. However, monopolistic power is associated with a loss in consumer surplus. Therefore, in choosing the optimal mechanism, the social planner balances the need to incentivize innovation effort with the loss of consumer surplus due to the monopolistic power. We find that the probability to win the patent in every lottery keeps increasing until a certain level is reached, and from then on, the probability will keep at that level. Specifically, in a continuous time horizon, the optimal policy is the combination of two stages of stationary policies: At first, the social planner grants no monopolistic power to the innovators. From a certain time point on, the social planner will be granting infinite full monopolistic power to the innovators.

Chu Wang, TAMU

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