Online Appendices to “Multivariate Choices and Identi…cation of Social Interactions” by Ethan Cohen-Cole, Xiaodong Liu, and Yves Zenou

A

Model of Social Conformity

The usefulness of the proposed econometric model is not limited to the speci…c structural model considered in the main text. Here, we present another theoretical model to motivate the econometric model. Patacchini and Zenou (2012) consider a social conformity model where the social norm is given by the average behavior of peers in a certain activity. We generalize their model by de…ning the social norm based on the weighted average behavior of two activities. Suppose a set of n individuals interact in a social network. Given the adjacency matrix G = [gij ], individual i chooses e¤ort levels yi1 ; yi2 simultaneously to maximize her utility function

Ui (y1 ; y2 ) =

P2

1 2 (' y 2 + 2'12 yi1 yi2 + '22 yi2 ) 2 11 i1 P2 Pn 2 k (yik l=1 %lk j=1 gij yjl ) :

k=1 $ ik yik

1 P2 2 k=1

The …rst term of the utility captures the payo¤ from the e¤orts with the productivity of individual i in activity k given by $ik . The second term is the cost from the e¤orts with the substitution e¤ect between e¤orts in di¤erent activities captured by '12 . The last term re‡ects the in‡uence of an individual’s friends on her own behavior. It is such that each individual wants to minimize the social distance between her own behavior yik to the social norm of that activity. The social norm for activity k is given by the weighted average P P behavior of her friends in the two activities 2l=1 %lk nj=1 gij yjl with the weights %lk such

that %1k + %2k = 1. The coe¢ cient

k

captures the taste for conformity.

1

Maximizing the utility function yields the best response function

yik =

where ik

lk yik

+

=

lk

kk

Pn

j=1 gij yjk

'12 =('kk +

= $ik =('kk +

k ).

k ),

Let

ik

+

lk

kk

= x0i

Pn

j=1 gij yjl

+

ik ;

for k = 1; 2 and l = 3

= k

k %kk =('kk + k ), Pn + j=1 gij x0j k +

k

lk

=

+

ik

k %lk =('kk

+

k;

k ),

and

(the network subscript

r is suppressed for simplicity). Then, the best response function implies the econometric model considered in this paper.

B

Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1. The reduced form of the model is

y1 = S

1

+( y2 = S +(

[X( 21

1

+

[X( 12

+

21

2

+

21 )L 12

1

1) 2

+

12 )L

+ GX(

+ (1 2)

21

2

22

22 )L

1

+ (In

12

1

11

11 )L

2

+ (In

+ GX(

1

+ (1

(

11

1

+

21 2

22 G) 1 2

+

12 1

11 G) 2

+

1)

+( +

21 In 2)

+(

+ G2 X( +

21 G) 2 ]

+ G2 X(

12 In

+

22 1 )

21 2

11 2 )

12 1

12 G) 1 ];

(B.1)

2

(B.2)

where

S = (1

12 21 )In

+

22

+

21 12

+

12 21 )G

+(

11 22

12 21 )G

:

E(JZ1 jX) = [E(Jy2 jX); E(JGy1 jX); E(JGy2 jX); JX; JGX] has full column rank if and only if

E(Jy2 jX)d1 + E(JGy1 jX)d2 + E(JGy2 jX)d3 + JXd4 + JGXd5 = 0

2

(B.3)

implies that d1 = d2 = d3 = 0 and d4 = d5 = 0. As JGJ = JG, JSJ = JS and SG = GS, if we premultiply (B.3) by JS, then it follows from the reduced form equations (B.1) that

JX

1

+ JGX

2

+ JG2 X

+ JG3 X

3

4

=0

where

1

= (

12

1

2

= (

12

1

( 3

= (

= (

If d2 = (

+

+ (1

12 21 )d4

11

+

+

+

2 )d1 =( 12 21

2

+

12 1

12 21

11 2 )d1

11 22

21 2

12

2 )d1

22

12 1

+( 4

11

+

+ 21

12 21 )d4

(

+(

11

+

11 12 )d1 =( 12 21

1

+

22

1

21 2 12 21

11 2 )d3

1), d3 = ( 12 1

+

+(

12

1

+(

12

+

2 )d3

12 21 )d5

+

+

2 )d2

21

+ (1

22

2

12 1

1) and d5 = (

+(

21 12 )d4

+(

22 1 )d2

2 )d1

+(

22

+

+

+

1 )d2

2

+

12 1

+

21 12 )d5 12 21 )d5 :

11 22

21 12 )d1 =( 12 21

2 )d1 =( 12 21

11

1

1), d4 = (

12

1

+

1), then (B.3) holds. Therefore,

E(JZ1 jX) does not have full column rank. Similarly, E(JZ2 jX) does not have full column rank. The identi…cation of the structural parameters takes two

Proof of Proposition 2.

steps. In the …rst step, we show that the pseudo reduced form parameters can be identi…ed under Assumption 1. In the second step, we show that the structural parameters can be identi…ed from the pseudo reduced form parameters under Assumption 2. Step 1. The proof follows a similar argument as in Bramoullé, Djebbari and Fortin (2009). We …rst show that, under Assumption 1 (ii),

0 In

identical rows implies

1G +

0

=

1

=

2

=

3

= 0. If 3

0 In

+

+

2

+

3

has identical

1G

+

2G

2

+

3G

2G

3G

3

has

2 )d3

rows, then +

0 n

for some constant c0 . As G

n

0G n

1G n

=

n,

+

1G

Subtracting (B.4) from (B.5) gives 3G

4

n

= 0, which implies

0

=

+

2G

2

n

+

3

n

= c0 n ;

(B.4)

multiplying both sides of (B.4) by G gives 2

n

+

2G

3

n

0 n +( 1 1

3G

=

2

=

+

3G

4

n

= c0 n :

0 )G n + ( 2 3

1 )G

(B.5)

2

n +( 3

2 )G

3

n

= 0 under Assumption 1 (ii).

The moment conditions E(J 1 jX) = E(J 2 jX) = 0 imply that

Let

=(

E(Jy1 jX) =

11 E(JGy1 jX)

+

21 E(JGy2 jX)

+ JX

1

+ JGX

1

E(Jy2 jX) =

22 E(JGy2 jX)

+

12 E(JGy1 jX)

+ JX

2

+ JGX

2:

0

1

;

0 0 )

2

with

k

=(

kk ;

lk ;

0 k;

0 0 k),

for k = 1; 2 and l = 3 k. If [E(JGy1 jX),

E(JGy2 jX); JX; JGX] has full column rank, then and E(Jy2 jX) implies has full column rank if

= e , i.e.

and e leading to the same E(Jy1 jX)

is identi…ed. [E(JGy1 jX); E(JGy2 jX); JX; JGX]

E(Jr Gr y1;r jXr )d1 + E(Jr Gr y2;r jXr )d2 + Jr Xr d3 + Jr Gr Xr d4 = 0

(B.6)

implies that d1 = d2 = 0 and d3 = d4 = 0, for some network r. The pseudo reduced form equations imply

E(Jr y1;r jXr ) = Jr Sr

1

[Xr

1

+ Gr X r (

21

2

22

1

+

1)

+ G2r Xr (

21 2

22 1 )]

E(Jr y2;r jXr ) = Jr Sr

1

[Xr

2

+ Gr X r (

12

1

11

2

+

2)

+ G2r Xr (

12 1

11 2 )]

4

where Sr = Inr

(

2 12 21 )Gr .

11 + 22 )Gr +( 11 22

As Jr Gr Jr = Jr Gr , Jr Sr Jr = Jr Sr

and Sr Gr = Gr Sr , premultiplying (B.6) by Jr Sr gives Pp

h=1 ( 0;h Inr

+

1;h Gr

2 2;h Gr

+

+

3 3;h Gr )xr;h

= c1

(B.7)

nr

where xr;h is the h-th column of Xr ,

0

= (

0;1 ;

;

0 0;p )

= d3

1

= (

1;1 ;

;

0 1;p )

=

2

= (

2;1 ;

;

0 2;p )

=(

+( = (

3

and c1 = nr 1

;

0 3;p )

0 (X r 0 nr

realizations of xr;h , 0

=

1

=

2

=

+

2 d2

21

2

22

1

+

22 )d4

12 21 )d3

11 22

3;1 ;

1 d1

=(

3

11

+

1

11

+

22 1 )d1

21 2

+ Gr X r

0;h Inr

(

(

+ G2r Xr

1;h Gr

+

2

+

22 )d3

1 )d1

+(

+(

+

12

1

11

11 2 )d2

12 1

+ G3r Xr

2 2;h Gr

+ d4

3 ).

3 3;h Gr

2

+

+(

2 )d2

11 22

12 21 )d4

As (B.7) holds for all possible has identical rows. Therefore,

= 0, which implies that d1 = d2 = 0 and d3 = d4 = 0 under

Assumption 1 (i). Hence, [E(JGy1 jX); E(JGy2 jX); JX; JGX] has full column rank and thus

is identi…ed.

Step 2. Under Assumption 2, the identi…cation of the structural parameters from the pseudo reduced form parameters follows the same argument as in a classical simultaneousequation model (see, e.g., Schmidt, 1976), and thus the proof is omitted here.

References Bramoullé, Y., Djebbari, H. and Fortin, B. (2009). Identi…cation of peer e¤ects through social networks, Journal of Econometrics 150: 41–55.

5

Patacchini, E. and Zenou, Y. (2012). Juvenile delinquency and conformism, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 28: 1–31. Schmidt, P. (1976). Econometrics, Marcel Dekker.

6

Online Appendices to aMultivariate Choices and ...

a set of 7 individuals interact in a social network. Given the ... individual 4 chooses effort levels 9i!,9i" simultaneously to maximize her utility function .i y!,y"! ' Σ.

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